SKANDERBEG
SKANDERBEG
SKANDERBEG
Oliver Jens Schmitt SKANDERBEG The new Alexander on the Balkan Verlag Friedrich Pustet
Regensburg Published ...
Author: Oliver Jens Schmitt
SKANDERBEG
Published with the support of the Fund for funding. scientific research
Bibliographic information of the German National Library The German National Library lists this
publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; Detailed bibliographic information is available on the
Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.
ISBN 978-3-7917 -2229-0 © 2009 by Verlag Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg Set: Vollnhals photo set,
Neustadt ad Donau Printing and binding: Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg Printed in Germany 2009
ANATOMY OF A CRASH
Charisma
Missed opportunities
Hungary's crusade and the uprising of the peoples. Expensive fame bought
Two sultans
Border Foremen, Renegades, Orthodox Auxiliaries: Skanderbeg's Ottoman opponents in the Balkan
Warfare III
A HERO OF RENAISSANCE
vassal of Naples
The Albanian fateful year The abominations of desolation In the hands of the powers
FAMA PERENNIS
Comments on the terminology of language groups and rooms as well as names of places and persons
Conceptuality of
Notes
410
List of used literature Abbreviations Sources
Picture credits
Literature
Register
FOR INTRODUCTION
Structural analyzes and cultural-historical studies on nationalism, individual ethnic and religious groups
and modernization processes predominate in the specialist discussion, which also focuses heavily on the
19th and 20th centuries. Although recent history has seen a return to narrative, and also to the genre of
biography, some explanatory words are still appropriate at the beginning of a book which, in its outward
appearance, has the form of a biography. The subject of the present account is the life of a man who was
perceived by his contemporaries, but also by many generations to come, as a "hero", a concept that may
seem foreign today.
The figure of Georg Kastriota, whose nickname was Skanderbeg (Herr Alexander), employed statesmen,
humanists and historians of the fifteenth century, but then biographers, literary figures, librettists and
political publicists to this day. From the Piccolomini pope Pius 11 through Vivaldi to Benjamin Disrae1i,
the arc of those well-known Europeans who have explored Skanderbeg is tense. Most of them chose the
biography as a form of rapprochement. No other figure in the history of Southeastern Europe has
received as much attention as an individual over centuries, as did this Middle Albanian nobleman. His life
between Orthodox Christianity, Islam and the Catholic faith, and its twenty-five-year uprising against the
Ottoman sultans, had captivated the European public in an age when the Ottomans and their Islamic reli-
gion. In the face of numerous military setbacks, Gion felt that the example of an accomplished Christian
army commander was encouragement and consolation. Many authors were attracted not only by the
contrast between Christian and Muslim world,
which seemed to embody itself in Skanderbeg, also its adventurous curriculum vitae, the exoticism of wild
battles in the unkempt mountains and forest canyons of the Balkans exerted a strong fascination. So the
biographical occupation with Skanderbeg is old. And so over the centuries, a narrative tradition has
emerged, which can be traced back to the first biographer, the humanist and Catholic priest Marinus
Barletius, who published in 150811510 in Rome a work that was to become one of the greatest book
achievements of the Renaissance. The narrative structures of the Skanderbeg biographies in many
languages have become so obsolete that even today hardly any historian could break it out. Only in the
form of a biography did it seem possible the story of the great uprising against the Ottoman conquest of
the Balkans. Why a new book about Skanderbeg, why another biography? On the one hand, this can be
justified in a classic manner with new insights. Extensive sources of new sources have been discovered
in numerous European archives, transforming the classic image - beginning with the ever-puzzling
question of why Skanderbeg has returned to Christianity as the only Balkan adversary converted to Islam
- and requiring a new interpretation. In addition to the development of new written documents, a second
methodological approach was chosen: the systematic tour of the area in which Skanderbeg's life took
place. Text and terrain were previously separated in the representations - experts wrote mostly, without
having visited the mountains of Mati and Dibra; Field experts, such as a British intelligence officer of the
Second World War (H. Hodgkinson), in turn, had operated no archival work. In addition, most historians
approached Skanderbeg either from the west - due to Occidental sources - or from the East, based on
Ottoman material. But both fall short for a life that began in the mountains of the Balkans, led to the
Sultanshof, to the Bulgarian Danube and Transylvania, and found its ceremonial culmination in a solemn
entry into Rome. But only in recent decades, not only in the archives of Italy, Croatia, France and Spain,
new sources were found, but the so important Ottoman material was from Macedonian, Turkish and
Albanian historians only really opened and evaluated. A monograph on the subject is therefore on a very
different material basis than twenty or thirty years ago. New material alone, however, only partially
justifies a comprehensive presentation. This book also seeks to break through, at least in part, the
mentioned narrative tradition. It uses the model of a work that is a structurally related society at the other
end of Europe 8
describes: RR Davies presented in 1995 a story of the Welsh national hero Owain Glyn Dwr, who had
fought against the English crown around 1400, and told a life that resembled that of Skanderbeg in many
ways: a rebellion against a nightmare neighboring with centralized administration and strong army
apparatus; a society divided into many settlements and politically fragmented into pebbles; the meaning
of bards and heroic songs; the support of a militant church; an ideological transformation of the uprising; a
guerrilla war exploiting climate and nature, a woody, mountainous world; a strong numerical and military
inferiority of the rebels; Disagreement and discontinuity of the carrier groups of the uprising; an early
internationalization by appeals for help to neighbors and distant powers; the failure in the face of the
superiority of the enemy empire; the leadership of charismatic nobles, who assumed legendary traits
during their lifetime; finally, a centuries-old culture of remembrance in the two regions. Comparable is also
the source situation - although it is clearly better in terms of Wales than in the Balkans. From within the
insurgent societies, little has been preserved. In a first step, the historian must take in the perspective of
his sources, which have arisen in the environment of the rebels' opponents and allies. In a second step,
however, he has to read the material "against the grain" to gain a more accurate picture of the inner view
of a society in turmoil. He has to perform the "anatomy of an insurrection" (Davies) with the dissecting
knife, and this is only possible if he leaves the framework of a purely chronological progression
narrative. Davies, who was able to foresee his readers' familiarity with the most important events in Glyn
Dwr's life, limited the narrative of the fights and contracts to a few pages. In the case of Skanderbeg and
the history of the Balkans in the late Middle Ages, this is not a viable option. In the following is therefore
quite well told, in two large blocks, which include the two halves of life Skanderbegs: the man from the
Balkans (1405-1450) and the heroes of the Renaissance (14501468). A true understanding of
Skanderbeg's elevation, which is two and a half times longer than that of the Welsh nobleman, But it can
only be understood through a study of structural traits: followers and a charismatic leader, fidelity and the
heroic ideal of a mountain society, nature and climate, alpine farming and coastal trade, the value of
money and the procurement of weapons, the struggle in the mountains , the connections with the
neighbors, the importance of conservative mentality structures and the dimension of the religious. The
text invites the reader into the world of the late medieval Balkans, far from the big 9 the connections with
the neighbors, the importance of conservative mentality structures and the dimension of the religious. The
text invites the reader into the world of the late medieval Balkans, far from the big 9 the connections with
the neighbors, the importance of conservative mentality structures and the dimension of the religious. The
text invites the reader into the world of the late medieval Balkans, far from the big 9
Byzantine and Adriatic cities, sea routes and military roads. He wants to show the differences between
the Ottoman society, the Balkan highlands and the courts of Renaissance Italy, between which
Skanderbeg's life took place - and the fate of Southeastern Europe for many centuries. It remains an
approximation, because many answers prevent the silence of the sources, a silence that is all the more
depressing, considering how abundant the tradition flows to the important figures of the age in Italy:
exaggerated can be said that the lap-shroud Pius 'II. More is known than about some important military
leaders on the other side of the Adriatic. Anyone who describes the life of a Southeast European
nobleman - and he is as famous as Skanderbeg - faces in many ways the methodological problems of
historians who deal with the High Middle Ages. The personality of Skanderbeg escapes the
questions. Descriptions of his person, his character written by contemporaries are extremely rare. For the
Italians, the most informative reporters, he remained a figure in a strange, weird country. The legend
seems stronger and takes possession of the hero - similar to the case Glyn Dwrs. Thus, a biography is
less the description of a life, but expands, following the example of many methodically similar examples,
to a representation of a society in the age of an outstanding figure. The "anatomical" Access also helps
here, not only to better classify a figure, but above all not to make them a superman, as the Skanderbeg
is worshiped in parts of Southeastern Europe. Skanderbeg is neither a superman nor a fictional character
(Franz Babinger). Even when attempting a sober examination, however, the special mood of that age is
palpable, when a lord of the mountains stood against a new world empire. In order to do justice to
Skanderbeg, the heavy layers of interpretation that weigh on him (and discussed in the last chapter) must
be cleared away. He should not be understood right from the start as a hero of a national, social or
religious uprising, his epoch should not serve as a projection screen of modern ideological
convictions. This can only happen by resorting directly to the sources. Katenen-like many substantive
false statements have consolidated over centuries so that parts of the state Skanderbegkults in the
Balkans based on later inventions and ideas. It should not be construed as a contempt for its
predecessors, if prior to this Hinterglund the sources enjoy priority; where possible, an attempt was made
to view the originals of edited sources as well, according to which 10 if the sources take precedence over
this Hinterglund; where possible, an attempt was made to view the originals of edited sources as well,
according to which 10 if the sources take precedence over this Hinterglund; where possible, an attempt
was made to view the originals of edited sources as well, according to which 10
becomes. A detailed scientific apparatus should make it comprehensible how the results, which often
deviate from common opinions, have been worked out. In addition, the secondary literature is used, which
offers actual scientific knowledge. The enormous flood of Skanderbegpublizistik could not be considered
here. For most of what is written and printed on Skanderbeg comes from the same sources: the
biographer Barletius and so-called standard stories, as they have developed academies in the time of
communism (and also afterwards) as an expression of valid historical "truth". To scholars, whose works
this book owes a lot, are called - in chronological order of their action: the classics of the Austro-
Hungarian Albanian Medieval Studies Konstantin Jirecek, Ludwig von Thall6czy and above all Milan of
Sufflay; Franz Babinger, the histist Mehmeds II and connoisseur of the Balkan history; the Romanians
Constantin Marinescu and Francisc Pall, whom communism in its homeland prevented from writing a
monograph on Skanderbeg; Giuseppe Valentini, the great publisher of Venetian sources; the important
Turkish Ottoman Halil Inalclk; the Macedonian Ottomans Aleksandar Matkovski, Metodi Sokoloski,
Aleksandar Stojanovski and Dragi Gorgiev; the Albanian Ottomans Selami Pulaha and Hasan
Kaleshi; Skanderbeg researcher Kasem Bic;: oku; the mediavist Luan Malltezi; the 15th century Serbian
explorers Ivan Bozi6 and MomCilo Spremi6; the connoisseurs of trade history Alain Ducellier and Bogumil
Hrabak; and most recently, the Albanian Ottomans Ferid Duka and Dritan Egro, the latter also the first
Albanian historian to study historiography critically. In fact, a subject of his own - not yet written -
investigation is the afterlife of Skanderbeg in the Balkans and other parts of Europe. Although there is a
barely complete wealth of individual studies, a reception history is a desideratum. The present book was
not concerned with giving a second volume to the portrayal of the circumstances in the 15th
century. Rather, the last chapter tries to draw the reader's attention to the manifold interpretations and
instrumentalizations of the figure of Skanderbeg, in which not unimportant parts of the modern
development of Europe and the western part of southeastern Europe are reflected. This chapter is
methodically linked to the annex, a workshop report that provides an overview of the sources and an
assessment of the essential secondary literature. This appendix is intended to relieve the main text and to
inform the scientifically interested reader about the fundamentals of research history. 11 This appendix is
intended to relieve the main text and to inform the scientifically interested reader about the fundamentals
of research history. 11 This appendix is intended to relieve the main text and to inform the scientifically
interested reader about the fundamentals of research history. 11
The list of those persons and colleagues who supported the author during the more than ten years of
preparation of this book is long: he was always well received in the archives of Venice, Milan, Mantua,
Dubrovnik and Zadar; In particular, the Director of the Dubrovnik Archives, Ivo Oreskovic, for his excellent
work opportunities. In Dubrovnik he was allowed to enjoy the hospitality of D. Bemardo Plese and in
Zadar and Split that of his friend Prof. Marko Trogrlic. Significant parts of the book WlITden are written
under the impression of trips made by the author in the summer of 2006 and 2007 at the invitation of his
Albanian colleagues Kasem Bi <; olcu and Dritan Egro in those areas which formed the natural framework
of Skanderbeg's uprising. For this great hospitality and the many stimulating discussions, he would like to
pay his special thanks to the two traveling companions. These trips were greatly supported by Neritan
Ceka, Beqir Meta (both Tirana) and the Macedonian Ministry of Education. Muharrem Dezhgiu and Valter
Shtylla (both Tirana) helped on the ground. Archival work on a European figure like Skanderbeg is difficult
for an individual to master. All the more the author Claudia Märtl (Munich), Daniel Duran i Duelt
(Barcelona) and Jacques Paviot (Paris) is obliged to Danle, who have ilun in rare generosity for years
copies of relevant sources sent. Important information he owes to the correspondence with Irene
BeldiceanuSteinherr (Paris), Momcilo Spremic (Belgrade) and Sergei Rusev (Sofia) and talks with
Macedonian colleagues Dragi Gorgiev and Toni Filiposki (Skopje). Dr. habil. Georg Kastner (Vienna) he
danlet for the significant support in the creation of the sentence. Those who took a critical look at the
various versions of the manuscript and made sure that the author corrected many opinions, tried to see
and present many things more clearly, took the greatest trouble. Claudia Märtl, Eva Frantz, Annina
Galijas (both Vienna), Markus Koller (casting) and with a particularly attentive eye Konrad Clewing
(Regensburg) have shown the author such great friendships. As always, all mistakes and weaknesses of
the book are the responsibility of the author. When a book becomes a figure, whose evaluation is still not
without emotion, is placed in the hand of the reader, the author can only hope that ilun the intent to prove
all explanations and make comprehensible, has succeeded and clear that according to the old principle of
sine ira et studio procedure, and that if sympathy, then only for Klio has influenced the
presentation. Vienna, in the spring of 2009 12
THE NEW ALEXANDER On the eve of her confinement, the young woman had a vision of her dream:
she would give birth to a serpent of immense size, whose bodies would cover the landscape of Epirus,
wind itself to the borders of the Turks, and devour them in their mighty jaws; her tail bathed the serpent in
the sea, near the climes of Christians and the Venetian Empire 1. With this vision, one of the most famous
books of early modern Europe, "Life and deeds of Skanderbeg, the Prince of Epirus", written by the
Catholic priest Marinus Barletius from the northern Albanian city Skutari2. The work was probably printed
in Rome in 1508. Every humanist educated reader understood what Barletius wanted to express. For the
dream of Skanderbeg's mother is entirely inspired by the life of Alexander the Great from the pen of
Plutarch: Olympias, the mother of the ancient hero, had also dreamed of a worm that embraced Europe
and Asia, promise of a conqueror's life in the fight against the Persians. More than 14 centuries later, the
situation changed in Epirus, home of Alexander and Skanderbeg; no more attack, but defense against the
new "Persians" was the order. "Persians" called learned Byzantine enemies from the east, and in the late
Middle Ages these were the Muslim Ottomans, whose beating collapsed the orthodox empires of the
Balkans. It took a new Alexander at that time to avert this danger. And this new Alexander could only in
Epirus, born in the country of origin of the ancient hero. This landscape, also called "Albania" in the late
Middle Ages, was considered the "bearer of princes" 3, it had produced Alexander the Great and King
Pyrrhus, nobility and freedom, it was said, had their home there. The new Alexander would, with the help
of Christendom, especially Venice, annihilate the enemies of the faith, throw Islam back to Asia, an idea
that inspired early modern Europe: for the reality was different. As Barletius' book on the printing press
ge. Venice had the worst defeat at sea. she had brought forth Alexander the Great and King Pyrrhus,
nobility and freedom, it was said, had their home there. The new Alexander would, with the help of
Christendom, especially Venice, annihilate the enemies of the faith, throw Islam back to Asia, an idea that
inspired early modern Europe: for the reality was different. As Barletius' book on the printing press
ge. Venice had the worst defeat at sea. she had brought forth Alexander the Great and King Pyrrhus,
nobility and freedom, it was said, had their home there. The new Alexander would, with the help of
Christendom, especially Venice, annihilate the enemies of the faith, throw Islam back to Asia, an idea that
inspired early modern Europe: for the reality was different. As Barletius' book on the printing press
ge. Venice had the worst defeat at sea. Book on the printing press ge. Venice had the worst defeat at
sea. Book on the printing press ge. Venice had the worst defeat at sea.
13
Ottomans suffered (1499-1503); When one of the most important reprints appeared in Strasbourg in
1537, the Kingdom of Hungary had perished (1526), the Ottomans had hammered at the gates of Vienna
(1529), nothing and nobody seemed to be able to stop the fury of the enemy in the East. Therefore, in the
Occident they eagerly sought a work promising hope, a story told by an Adliban in the Balkan Balkans, in
a small spirit inspired by the idea of the Christian faith and a hot love for freedom The Ottomans,
especially the dreaded conqueror-sultan Mehmed II. Barletius' work was quickly translated into many
languages or adopted by other writers with minor changes4. In the German Reich published in the year
1533 the Augsburger printer Heinrich Steiner "of all the deadstesten and most dear prince and Mr.
George Castrioten called Scanderbeg Herzogen to Epiro and Albania etc. knightly deeds so he happily
committed in his life to receive his inheritance with the Turckian Kaysern" 5th In all European countries
attacked by the Ottomans, translations came into circulation: two decades after the German version,
readers in Venice kept a vernacular translation in their hands; an additional delay followed after just five
years (1560) 6. In 1569, the theologian Cyprian Sieradz published another version in the Punic Brest7. •
The biography of the hero continued its triumphant advance into the west and north of Europe 8. She was
joined by the Italian volume "Report of the Affairs of the Turks and of Mr. Georg Skanderbeg, Prince of
Epirus, published in Venice in 1539, with his life and that of him, God's Almighty Aid and his own
invaluable power Virtue achieved memorable victories "9. Both biographies carried Skanderbeg's name to
the remotest corners of Europe. Skanderbeg became the best-known south-east European for many
centuries in the West. In the eighteenth century Antonio Vivaldi was inspired by this fame to an opera. 10.
A full-size statue of Skanderbeg, "according to the proportions of the man and splendidly gilded ce,
adorned at a central point the Venetian state ship, the Bucintoro, symbol of ceremonial Venetian
SelbstdarstellunglI. In the seventeenth century, the author of a description of famous portraits celebrated
the hero, before whom the barbarians would have trembled before he even drew the sword. Portraits
Skanderbegs hung in the Uffizi and the collections of the Habsburgs at Castle Ambras, who acquired at
the end of the 16th century also sword and helmet, which had allegedly belonged to the hero 13. 14
Everywhere the nobleman of the 15th century was revered as the new Alexander. Barletius made a
decisive contribution, because his work could be read as a new Plutarch, ancient and modern hero
merged into a heroic figure. But behind the idea of a new Alexander was more than the thought of highly
educated Catholic clergy. Because Skanderbeg means nothing else than "HeIT Alexander". The new
Alexander was baptized in the name of Georg Kastriota. His father had to deliver him hostage to the
sultan. Georg converted to Islam. and received as an honor for his weapon acts the nickname Iskender
beg. The admiration of Alexander the Great had a long tradition on the soil of the ancient Byzantine
Empire, the West and the Islamic world. The written and the written knew him as a symbol of heroic
virtues. Such a nickname therefore meant the highest praise and recognition. Georg Kastriota kept this
nom de guerre when he fell off the Sultan in 1443 and fought for 25 years against the Ottomans. In the
cities of Dalmatia, at the courts of Italy and Burgundy, he achieved under this name already in his lifetime
highest fame. In the West, people knew the meaning of the name. And one of the most educated
humanists of the time, Pope Pius H., forged a grandiose political program out of it. 15 Like many of his
predecessors, Pius H. did everything in his power to expel the Ottomans from Europe with a crusade. The
head of the army was to be joined by that warlike and victorious army commander, who bore the name of
Alexander. An attack on the sultan was a formidable venture, and the pope thought of rewarding his field
captain. He designed together with the Archbishop of Durazzo, the most important port of Albania, the
plan of a Christian kingdom of the new Epirotes. Italian Renaissance princes used ancient history to
present themselves to the political public. The same should now happen with the planned Crusader
kingdom. History and the present spoke for the idea of a new Alexander: did not Olympia, mother of the
great king, come from Epirus, that is Albania? Was in the vague geographic terminology of the
15. Century Albania not also referred to as Macedonia? Was there a more promising name, a name that
is more in the East and West to fight against the "Persians" would shake up as Alexander? But in order to
undermine the new program, a symbol was needed in a largely coreless society such as late medieval
Albania. Therefore, the Archbishop of Durazzo traveled to Milan in June 1464, where he received at the
court Francesco Sforza's expensive armor parts, including probably the so-called helmet Skanderbegs,
an unusual piece originating from Lombardy workshop, because ornate 15
it was from two long horns. Only recently was the deciphering of the symbolism possible: the helmet is a
true replica of the ancient Macedonian royal crown, the symbol of those rulers whose ancient capital was
Aigai ("goats"). The captain of the crusade, Pius 11, was to be crowned king of the Epirotes, in the
ancient tradition of the Macedonian rulers, as the true new Alexander, by name, rank, and history. It was
to become a Christian, a Catholic kingdom, illustrated by the Archbishop's planned elevation to the
cardinal. Alone, the flight of thoughts was followed by a tragic peripeteia: in August 1464, Pius 11 died in
anticipation of the fleet that should have taken him to Albania; Skanderbeg fought a largely lonely fight
against the busy Sultan, a war that ended in the utter devastation of his country. In reality, the story of the
new Alexander took a bleak turn, but not in the memory of the West, when the figure of the Tui-fighter in
the Albanian mountains of Uluso shone brighter, the darker his own present, the more menacing the
Ottoman attacks.
16
TIME TURN the 14th century was an age of crisis and transition for the whole of Europe, but especially
for the Orthodox Balkan world. Old orders and certainties broke. The Fourth Crusade in 1204 had dealt a
heavy blow to the Byzantine imperial and cultural idea. By 1300 it became clear that the attempts of the
Byzantine emperors to renew the empire would not succeed. On the ruins of the old world, Bulgarian,
Greek and Serbian princes were fighting for the succession of Byzantium. The Serbian dynasty of the
Nemanjids wins the victory, an easy victory in the face of weak opponents. Byzantium, paralyzed by the
turmoil of the throne, Bulgaria, splintered and declining, Greece, administered by weak little prince, the
Albanian region, bowed to fermentation. When the Serb king, Stefan Dusan, put the crown on the head in
Skopje in 1346, it remained a stalwart triumph on the ruins of a ravaged world. The Orthodox elite of the
Balkans was shaken by the showers of mysticism, the doctrine of Hesychasm drew the gaze of the clergy
and laity into the otherworld, they wanted to see the Tabor light, not the abominations of the earthly world,
and refused the intellectual theology of Western scholasticism. accompanied not the abominations of the
earthly world and denied the intellectual theology of Western scholasticism. accompanied not the
abominations of the earthly world and denied the intellectual theology of Western
scholasticism. accompanied
was this triumphal procession of mysticism of violent conflicts, ecclesiastical violence, popular riots and
hate speech against the enemies of
the new doctrine of salvation. Exclusion of believers, but the criticism of the Hesychastenkult critical,
religious fanaticism - the Orthodox world had lost the secure certainty of ancient Byzantium. 1 The events
in the earthly world seemed to confirm this form of turning to the hereafter: The Black Plague hit, from the
ports of the 17th
Black Sea Coast, the Byzantine cities. From Constantinople, the plague made its way west, devastating
the shores of the Balkans. Where sources are available in sufficient numbers, the decline in population is
evident. But climate change, the creeping slowdown, the transition to a small ice age also hit people,
reduced harvests, led to hunger, weakening human resistance. As if the misery had not been enough,
Asian conquerors came on the scene, who translated from Anatolia to Europe and there eliminated in a
few decades, the wavering remnants of the ancient Byzantine world: The Ottomans. From a small Gazi
(religious warrior) emirate in Bithynia, in the hinterland of Constantinople, The legacies of the warrior
leaders Ertogrul and Osman around 1300 quickly became the rulers of a powerful regional empire2. The
success of the raids on Byzantine territory attracted afflicted Turkic Muslims from inside Anatolia, as well
as Christians. First they devastated the landscapes, then the Ottomans and their followers began to
encircle and starve the larger cities. In 1326 the old Prussa fell into their hands, which, called Bursa in
Turkish, became their capital from then on. Eleven years later, the Byzantines largely cleared Asia
Minor. The Ottomans quickly went through the transition from powerful looting gangs to an orderly state
system. Osman's son Orhan established the Ottoman rule in the cities, which were converted into centers
of the new rule: mosques, Medresen (religious schools), soup kitchens for the poor (Imarete) were built
and also changed the face of once Christian cities. Byzantium found no means to oppose, as it were from
nothing rising opponent. On the contrary, when the Ottomans were involved as allies in a dispute over the
throne, Byzantium created rather a precedent, which many Balkan Christian princes should imitate. The
Ottomans came by themselves, but often they were taken as reinforcements in internal-Christian
struggles. "The Turks always love the Christians dispute," complained in the 15th century a chronicler of
Epirus 3. Finally, in 1354, the Ottomans set foot in Europe, never to retreat. An earthquake had brought
down the fortresses on the Dardanelles, including the barrier fortress Gallipoli. It was easy to set about
the Engnis and to settle in the rubble of the castle. There followed an unprecedented victory run: in 1362
fell Adrianople, the Byzantine metropolis of Thrace; In 1371, the army of the Serbian princes of the
Macedonian region on the Marica was defeated: thus the entire southern Balkans was open. From 1372,
the Byzantine paid 18
Emperor tribute, the old Eastern Roman Empire was just a vassal of the conquerors. In 1385, the
Ottomans reached the Albanian Adriatic coast. In 1387 Thessaloniki fell, the most important city in the
Balkans. With it the Ottomans had brought the Via Egnatia under their rule, the ancient military road that
connected Durazzo with Constantinople, that traffic axis of the Balkans, on which Roman armies had
already marched. Then they turned north along the second main axis, following the Vardar and Morava
rivers connecting Thessaloniki with Belgrade. Durazzo, Thessaloniki, Belgrade and Constantinople are
the cornerstones of the Southeastern European road network. Within thirty years, the Ottomans had
subdued the river valleys along which the streets ran. In 1388 they attacked, Incidentally, at the invitation
of a native Christian prince - Georg II Stracimirovic Balsa, his family will still meet many times - the
Bosnian kingdom, but successfully defended itself. The revenge train led Sultan Murad 1. Through the
Vardartal he marched north. The Serbian gentlemen whose lands lay on the road joined forces with the
Bosnian king for defense; an Albanian nobleman of the Muzaki family also came to their aid. On June 28,
1389, the battle was fought on Amselfeld, which keeps the minds alive until today. The sultan and his
opponent, the Serbian prince Lazar, fell. Both sides suffered high losses4. But while the Ottomans soon
recovered, the Serbian nobility did not dodge the blow. Between 1371 and 1389, the Serbian system of
power that Tsar Stefan Dusan had built collapsed. But the Ottomans were still content with indirect rule:
the Albanian and Serbian lords were left as vassals in their principalities. The Sultan was not yet allowed
to think of an immediate integration into the Reich. Too strong would have been extended his so quickly
gained empire. The relieved Orthodox gentlemen complied. The Ottomans then turned to regions closer
to their power base in Asia Minor: in 1393 Tarnovo, the old Bulgarian tsarist city, soon after fell to the
Black Sea of the Dobrotica descendants (the Dobrudja), the first blows also began on the other side of the
Danube young Romanian principality of Wallachia, led (1395). In the south, the conquerors abolished the
Greco-Serbian principality of Thessaly in 1393 and also made Epirus dependent. Even more important
was the storming of Skopje (1391), which was rapidly expanded into the center, army camp and
administrative capital of the Ottomans in the heartland of the Balkans. 5. From Skopje the Ottoman
armies rushed through the Balkans, 19
along the Vardar to the north against the Serbian principality and towards Hungary, and to the east
through the valley of Polog towards Ocluid and the Albanian area. In only four decades, between 1354
and 1396, the Ottomans had subjugated almost the entire Orthodox Balkan. Help for the beleaguered
Balkan crisis could only be corrected from the West. The papacy in particular, however, combined the
promise of a crusade with the demand for the unification of the two Christian churches, that is, the
subjugation of the Patriarch of Constantinople to the first Rome. "16 But the Occident was only awakened
when the Ottoman attacks on Catholic territory struck. The Kingdom of Hungary, which in the 14th century
ascended to northern supremacy in the Balkans and Bosnia, northern Serbia, western Bulgaria, Wallachia
and the Vltava considered as an inflow zone, called for help, appeared in 1396 in the form of a majority
French Crusader army on the Danube, but suffered a complete defeat at the Bulgarian Nicopolis against
the Ottomans. Thereafter, the Ottomans continued their triumphal procession unhindered. However, they
found their master - albeit only temporarily - in the Mongol ruler Timurlenk, who defeated the Ottoman
sultan Bayezid I at Ankara in 1402 7; His Albanian and Serbian vassals, who had obediently followed the
command of their lord, were also beaten. For almost two decades, the young Ottoman Empire plunged
into a serious crisis. The disunity of the Christian princes of the Balkans and Christian powers such as the
maritime republics of Genoa and Venice as well as the Hospitallers of Rhodes saved the Ottomans from
destruction. In the reign of Sultan Murad 11th in 1421, the Ottoman Empire had recovered and set out to
new conquests. The resounding success of the Ottomans can be explained by the weakness of the
opponents as well as the Ottoman strength in the army and administration. Internal turmoil, plague,
climate change, natural disasters and mental crisis had decisively weakened the Orthodox Balkan
Christians. But they were facing an opponent, which would have been defeated even more stable
societies. The Ottomans developed a political dynamic that, following the pendulum stroke of Balkan
history, to bring the space of utter fragmentation back into an imperial whole. They started the legacy of
Rome and Byzantium. They possessed an enthusiastic following of the idea of the Islamic war of faith and
prey-hungry followers, who grew steadily by moving from Asia Minor. Recently, a historian compared the
early Ottoman Empire to a loot jumbo that expanded like a giant amoeba, taking everything JJ
20
that they become humble and obedient; Under this yoke, they live six years. "9 The system of boy reading
(dev ~ irme) thus secured the empire the flower of the Christian youth in the Balkans 10. The hard-
working janissaries were characterized by fighting power and loyalty to the Sultan The Lehensreiterei, the
Sipahi, who were assigned to non-royal loans (Timar), were also called timariotes 11 • In the 15th
century, the sultans were able to muster 64,000 of these knights.122 In addition to these core troops, the
Heerbann was followed by numerous skirmishers and raiders. the lightly armed AlanClS: Around 1475
8000 Alancl were always ready in the European part of the empire, "Corsairs on the mainland ... brave
men, tried in evil deeds, experienced riders armed with arrow, bow, shield, sword, could do nothing
against this war machine. The early introduction of modern siege technique, especially the art of gunning,
increased the Ottoman fighting power. The Ottomans did not come only as conquerors; The warriors were
followed by Turkic immigrants, sedentary and nomadic people (Yürüks), who brought their language, way
of life and above all their religion to the Balkans. Especially flirty and 21
The Eastern Balkans, Thrace, the Bulgarian region, the areas along the Via Egnatia, the axis of Ottoman
conquests, were permanently recorded by this immigration. Nevertheless, in the Ottomans no purely
Turkish phenomenon can be seen, but their victorious conquests were joined by numerous inhabitants of
the Balkans, Slavs, Greeks, Jews and Albanians, who converted to Islam, but at times Christians
remained. Yes, it is even said that the Ottomans actually came from the society of the Orthodox Balkans,
and not from Anatolia. The Ottoman armies were also accompanied by dervish monks, who represented
a less strict Islam than the Sunni theologians at Sultanshof, showed themselves more open to the
Christian population and many people won their faith19. In their early conquest areas, the Islamization
also progressed because the conquerors converted churches into mosques and severely beat the church
hierarchy. The prospect of rising into the new Henenschicht drew many people to Islam. The Ottomans,
however, did not make the transition to their religion a condition. Christian feudal riders were tolerated in
the early Ottoman period, as in the second third of the 15th century, especially in the Albanian
area20. The Ottomans had little choice, as they simply lacked men to manage the rapidly conquered
territories. Therefore, they had to make a virtue out of necessity and integrate those parts of the Balkan
upper class into their system of humankind, which were ready for it21. The subjugated population was
treated according to Islamic law: those who surrendered were allowed to negotiate the conditions of the
new Henschaft; who was defeated in the fight, was at the mercy of the conqueror. In order to actually
dominate their spatially so extensive areas, the Ottomans had to grow the native population. They
therefore created a sophisticated system of privileges. Not only as timariotes, but also as pass (derbenci)
and fortress guards, as auxiliary soldiers (voynuk) Christians were integrated into the Ottoman
system22. With tax privileges were also important craft and agricultural branches, from miners to rice
farmers, equipped23. At the end of the 15th century, about four million Christians lived in the Ottoman
Balkans24. It was not the sultans alone, but great families of warriors who had advanced the subjugation
of the Balkans; appropriate fame and wealth enjoyed genders like the Turahanoglu and the
Evrenosoglu. The former hid in the grain-rich Thessaly like in a family estate, promoted and built cities,
directed like Henscher frOlmne foundations (valaf)
22
donated mosques, caravanserails, food kitchens and schools25. The sultans over the conquests
stretched an increasingly dense network of administrative facilities, all of which served the army. These
families were "margraves" or, better, frontier patrons (Ottoman us, bey), who acted quite independently,
especially in the late 14th century. In addition to Turkish families, more and more Islam-looted princes
from the Balkan aristocracy appeared at the head of the Ottoman Empire; Greeks, even from the imperial
dynasty, Albanians, Serbs, Herzegovins, clothed the Älter of the Grand Vizier or the Kadi-askers 26. With
Mara Brankovi6 resided in Edirne a wife of the Sultan, Murads H., which had maintained its orthodox faith
and the interests of Orthodoxy promoted to 27. The two imperial parts, Asia Minor (Anatolia, Turkish
Anado lu), and Rumelia ("Roman Country", by the Byzantine self-title "Romaios") were each subordinated
to a Beylerbey (governor), who maintained his own court on the model of the Sultan28. These general
governors were subordinate to the Sancakbeys, governors of a province (sancak) 29. The most
significant of these was the Paçasancak, which encompassed much of today's European Turkey, present-
day southern Bulgaria, northern Greece, Macedonia, and Albania, and its capital first in Edirne, then
(about 1443) in Philippopel (Plovdiv), and finally towards the end of the 15th Century in Sofia lag3o. In the
90s of the 14th The Sancak Nigbolu (Nicopolis) was built on the lower Danube in the 19th century and the
Sancak coastal dynasty in today's Bulgarian-Macedonian border area. to the west joined the
simultaneously established Sancak Ochrid; south of it was in the 15th century probably a sancak in
Monastir (Bitöla), in southern and central Albania after 1417 the great Sancak Arvanid. The Albanian
space, which is the focus of this presentation, was one of the earliest subjugated areas of the
Balkans. The great frontier patrons in Thessaly and the Vardar basin had attacked him repeatedly and
had scourged the small orthodox noble families. As early as 1400, most nobles of the middle and north
had sworn vassal envy to the sultan. In the southeast, about Kors; a and Permeti, At the same time,
Ottoman subordinates (officers), KadIS (judges) and Timur lords had already been included 32. Only near
the coast were still native tribes (the Zenebish, Muzaki and Araniti). In 1417, the frontier lords inflicted the
decisive blow on them. The great Byzantine strongholds of the south fell almost without a sword: the port
of Valona with the nearby fortress Kanina, the mighty Berat, the steeply situated Gjirokastra. This time the
Ottomans were not content 23 The port of Valona with the nearby fortress Kanina, the mighty Berat, the
steep Gjirokastra. This time the Ottomans were not content 23 The port of Valona with the nearby fortress
Kanina, the mighty Berat, the steep Gjirokastra. This time the Ottomans were not content 23
more with sheer vassalage. Rather, they set up their own Greater Province of Albania, the Sancak
Arvanid-ili (or Arnavud-ili, "Albanian Country"), whose main town Gjirokastra or Greek: Argyrokastron
("Silver Castle") was determined. Almost all agricultural land was confiscated and redistributed by the
Ottoman state. The old sexes were not completely ousted; those who added to the new circumstances
were allowed to remain in his possession for the time being as a servant of the sultan. In any case, the
Ottomans did not express reservations about the pre-Ottoman states; they named most of the landscapes
according to their earlier names, the BalSaland (Bal ~ a-ili) between the later place Kavaja and the
Shkumbinmündung, Jonima country (north of the today's Peqin), the country of the Pavlo-Kurtik, Kondo-
Miho and Bogdan Ripe (otherwise unknown Kleinhenen with typical orthodox names) around the river
Shkumbin, Ashtin-ili around Permeti, Zenebish-ili around Gjirokastra, in the north, finally, also Jovans land
(Yuvan-ili, the Skanderbegs area Father Ivan or Jovan Kastriota). Individual gentlemen in the transitional
area to the Venetian-influenced Skadarin basin maintained a certain freedom of movement. In much of
the South, however, attempts were made to create a new Ottoman-faithful layer. The land was velieilt as
a timely loan to about 300 beneficiaries; Muslim Turks entered the country, but their numbers were
limited; with their relatives, they will hardly have counted more than 800 people33. The fiefs were mainly
used by Albanians who converted to Islam, both men and women. Of course, the apostasy from the old
faith was not a requirement for a timely loan. About a sixth of the beneficiaries remained loyal to
Christianity; Certainly Christian ministries did not receive the largest and best possible loans, but their
example shows the adaptability of the village and rural upper classes in the orthodox South and Central
Albanian area34. The big families often split into a Christian and an Islamized branch; The latter rose
rapidly to the highest dignity in the Ottoman Empire, and were soon to fight against their own Christian
compatriots and estates as they rose against the sultan's power. Of the gentlemen who remained
Christian, the renegades were often shamelessly concealed, as the family chronicle of the Muzaki
shows. The Muzaki, in particular, had given the Ottoman Empire strong ties with Jakub bey and
KasnTi; Jakub's son Jusuf Gelebi was rewarded with a fief in Tetovo, the Ottoman limestone trade35. The
same happened to Thopia, Araniti, Skura and Zenebish: their Islamized descendants - such as Ali
(Thopia), Hasan at Zenebish and Murat at Skura - still had around 1500 rich lands in their ancestral areas
around Berat, Gjirokastra and Delvina36. 24
The nobles, who wanted to remain Christian, threw themselves on the night of the Adriatic, the Republic
of Venice, in the Allne. To protect the sea route on which all Venetian merchant ships frequented, the St.
Mark's republic took possession of the port of Durazzo in 1392; In 1393, their governors moved into the
river port of Alessio am Drin, three years later in the mighty castle of Skutari. Thus, the southeastern
coast of the Adriatic Sea seemed divided between the mainland Ottoman power and the naval state of
Venice. At first glance, the Ottoman conquest of Albania seemed to have been swift and smooth: a single
early battle (1385), no long sieges, little bloodshed, rather rapid subjugation and acceptance of the new
system of possessions and, in part, of faith. It seemed, as if the old families had willingly entered the new
empire, following the example of many Christians who had defected to the Ottomans. But the Ottomans
had to learn in the following decades that the Albanian levels in a rapid attack easily overrun, but the
surrounding hills and mountains were difficult to control in the long run.
LOB OF COMING The landscape, which is called Debar by South Slav, but Dibra by Albanians, is
situated in the interior of the Balkans37. Traversed by the black Drin, which feeds from underground
source in the Ochridsee, it was divided from time immemorial into upper and lower land. It was a village-
like world, but there were no actual cities38. The nature Init steep mountains and deep valleys, so a
contemporary meant, was sufficient as protection from 39. In Upper Dibra was famous the castle, which
the Slavs Svetigrad ("Holy City") natmten, next to the town Rahovnik (today: Debar) and the Adlelllest
KodZadZik4o. In sub-Dibra Piskupija (Albanian Peshkopia, "bishop's seat") formed the center of the
valley, a small market town, around the middle of the 15th century, after the Ottoman conquest, scarcely
more than 120 to 150 inhabitants counted41. Nearby lay an old monastery whose monks proudly
proclaimed a Byzantine imperial certificate confirming their ancient prerogatives. In the usage of
Byzantines as well as Slavic and Albanian Balkan Christians the borders of Dibras were quite uneldar, at
least wider than in the understanding of space of the Ottomans, who used the terms upper and lower
Dibra only for a small district in the west of the old Balkan 43. Dibra or Debar became of Slavs, Albanians
and VIaehen but in any case wider than in the understanding of space of the Ottomans, who used the
terms upper and lower Dibra only for a small district in the west of the old Balkan Dibra43. Dibra or Debar
became of Slavs, Albanians and VIaehen but in any case wider than in the understanding of space of the
Ottomans, who used the terms upper and lower Dibra only for a small district in the west of the old Balkan
Dibra43. Dibra or Debar became of Slavs, Albanians and VIaehen
25
inhabited44, together maybe 40000 people45. In the Middle Ages, this meant no national groups in the
modern sense; Rather, these terms were used primarily to identify speakers of different languages, and
sometimes different ways of life and economy were distinguished. Thus, the Vlachen, who used a
language of the Balaam language, practiced a seminomadic livestock farming, "in a constant change
between the winter pastures in the valleys and the pastures on the alpine pastures.44 Clear boundary
lines in space did not exist among the language groups in the Middle Ages In many villages, people with
Slavic and Albanian names lived together. From a name alone but can not conclude with certainty on the
linguistic affiliation of a person. Although the mountainous Oberland was in the schematic classification of
Skanderbegbiografen Barletius as Slavic, the lowlands as Albanian, but lists of names from Ottoman tax
registers point to a komplizielie linguistic stratification. In Lower Dibra, in the valley, in the main town of
Piskupij alPeshkopia, people of Slavic origin predominated, while in villages in the surrounding hills and
mountains, Albanian names prevailed47. The altitude of a settlement, the difference between the valley
floor and the mountains, was the decisive factor. In Upper Dibra, on the other hand, the Slavic population
was proportionately stronger than the Albanian-speaking majority in the lowlands; but Albanians lived
between the Slavs. The Slavs in turn divided into two groups; in Pislcupija the Serbian influence prevailed
in the personal name, supported by the tradition of Serbian statehood, which had penetrated from the
Blackbird field into the valley of the Black Drin; but the further one went from Piskupija to the south, the
stronger became the Bulgarian influence radiating from the old ecclesiastical center Ohrid. Skanderbeg's
biographer Barletius emphasizes this, especially when he speaks of the broad valley of Polog in the east
of Dibra, "which obeys the barbarians of Bulgaria" and no longer belonged to the room that the
Skutarinian priest called "Epirus" (meaning in antiquing Form Albania meant) bezeiclmete 48. The
linguistic as well as the mentality differences were perceived in the Middle Ages49, but the different
people's names indicate, there were also individual Vormieile - the Albanians considered the Slavs
superstitious - but all Dibrans belonged to the orthodox faith of Christianity50. At the same time, Barletius
counsels the Bulgarians: "Bulgarians or tribal dwellers there (in Upper Dibra, p. S), a people wild in battle
and Skanderbeg, not merited by their many merits in glorious valor and fidelity. 26
For the people of the Balkan Middle Ages, the common orthodox faith formed the core of identity. There
was thus no tension between the language groups who experienced the orthodox liturgy in the world of
the village and who hardly differed in the structure of society. Common to the Dibraneans was also the
way of farming: growing cereals, growing fruit and beekeeping in the valley, livestock farming on the
higher elevations. "The lowlands are flat and fertile - surrounded by rich fields round the river" 52. The
Dibrans looked east to Ochrid, the seat of an archbishopric famous throughout the Balkans. Ochrid
radiated as the ecclesiastical capital of the Orthodox Central Balkans deep into the surrounding
landscapes. Its churches and palaces were already visible to the Dibranians from afar, when they
descended from their mountains into the fertile plain, the Ohrid surrounds. Those who lived in Dibra,
deeply rooted in the Orthodox faith, were a person of the inner Balkans, shaped by its Slavic-Byzantine
civilization. Albanian noblemen admired the wealth of Ochrid, whose surrounding lands have lost 12,000
gold ducats a year, according to accounts from the fifteenth century. Under Serbian rule, Albanian
noblemen had settled on the shores of the Macedonian lakes in the late 14th century, the Gropa around
Ochrid, Comnino Prespa around Prespa, where at the turn of the millennium Tsar Samuil of Thessaly had
left the bones of St. Achilles; in Albania you knew the wonderful basilica, which was built in honor of the
saint on an island in the small Prespasee54 and their ruins are still visible against the backdrop of the
reed-lined bank and the surrounding mountains 55. This world came from the Kastriota family, whose
modest origins are lost in the shadow of a region that was as unknown to outsiders in the 14th century as
it was in the 21st century. The name of the family has a Greek form in language; it is probably derived
from the Greek "Kastron" (which in turn is taken from the Latin "castrum"), which means "castle"; a
"Kastriotes" is therefore a resident, perhaps also a commander of a castle. Since no contemporary source
commented on the origin of the name, It should not be difficult to put down this hypothesis. The only
certainty is that the name of the Byzantine cultural world is assigned. A "castriot" is attested around the
middle of the 14th year}: "kefalija" (captain) of the castle Kanina near Valona56. Whether this is an
ancestor of the Castriota of Dibra and how the family could have come from the south to the east of the
Albanian region can at best be speculation. There is a double silence about the origins of the Kastriota.
Once, a family of little village rulers was barely perceived, but then, when it suddenly became
27 (Captain) of the castle Kanina at Valona testifies56. Whether this is an ancestor of the Castriota of
Dibra and how the family could have come from the south to the east of the Albanian region can at best
be speculation. There is a double silence about the origins of the Kastriota. Once, a family of little village
rulers was barely perceived, but then, when it suddenly became 27 (Captain) of the castle Kanina at
Valona testifies56. Whether this is an ancestor of the Castriota of Dibra and how the family could have
come from the south to the east of the Albanian region can at best be speculation. There is a double
silence about the origins of the Kastriota. Once, a family of little village rulers was barely perceived, but
then, when it suddenly became 27
Having achieved fame, the biographers of the family's most famous scion spread the cloak of oblivion
over the modest beginnings. It was a member of the Albanian Uradels, Giovanni Musachi 57, who in
contrast to the eulogies of Skanderbeg described in detail, which origin of the Kastriota were. It may have
brought him a late satisfaction in describing the simple origin of that family which had disempowered its
own, far older and more respected. "Mr. Skanderbeg's grandfather was called Mr. Paul Kastriota and had
no more than two Döljer nam.ens Signa and Gardi-ipostesi; to this Mr. Paul was born Mr. Johann
Kastrioto, who made himself master of Mati, and dies was born Mr. Skanderbeg, · And the mother of the
said Mr. Skan derb eg, the wife of the said Mr. Johann, Here and there were scattered numerous little
chickens, witnesses to a lively Christian life 61. The Kastriota were thus Bergler, who had set themselves
at the top of two small villages. Their ethnic origin is as controversial as their place of origin: modern
Albanian communities compete for this fame as once Greek cities had claimed Homer for
themselves. While this quarrel is solved thanks to Musachi, there remains the thorny question about the
eternal affiliation of the Kastriota, which in our day is affecting the national sentiments of the Balkan
peoples62. It is a question that was of little interest in the late Middle Ages, and which, apart from a
scholarly dispute in the 17th century, was actually made only in the 19th century, as the propagandists of
the modern and Serbian, the Albanian and the 20th century. Century of the Macedonian national thought
wanted to put important figures of antiquity in their national pantheon63. But it is not only anachronistic,
but also goes past the mixed ethnic character of the European nobility, who, as soon as he leaves a
small-scale insignificance, marries without regard to national boundaries. This also applies to the inner
Balkans in the late Middle Ages. In addition, that This also applies to the inner Balkans in the late Middle
Ages. In addition, that This also applies to the inner Balkans in the late Middle Ages. In addition, that
28
However, ethnic origin alone hardly says anything about a person's self-image: Johann Hunyadi, the
great Turkish fighter of the 15th century, came from a family of Romanian descent, but as a Hungarian
administrator he acted within the framework of the empire of St. Stephen's crown, and not just one non-
existent Romanian state and nation feeling. The same applies to the Kastriota. Her most famous scion,
Skanderbeg, rose to the rank of Lord Albania; which ethnic blood flowed in his veins did not bother his
followers. Had she worried about it, Skanderbeg would hardly have risen to such fame in an ethnically
mixed region. What is now known about the ethnic origin of Kastriota relies on few sources. Skanderbeg's
mother Voisava was probably a South Slav, Daughter of the Helm of the Rich Plain of Polog64. At the
end of the 14th century, it was located on the sidelines of the great Serbian noble family Brankovici. It can
be assumed that Grgur Brankovic has to be considered Voisava's father. Thus Voisavas sons would be
related to the family, which in 1427 ascended the Serbian despot (princely) throne. The already
mentioned Giovanni Musachi described Skanderbeg, the most famous Kastriota, as a man who was
"Serbian by nature" 65. Musachi wrote this from the perspective of a Middle Albanian nobleman whose
family maintained close ties to southern Italy. For him, the Kastriota lived on the extreme eastern edge of
the Albanian language area. What he meant by a "Serbian nature" - the origin or perhaps rather the
habitus, Skanderbeg's mentality - must remain open for lack of other sources. It should be noted in any
case that Musachi felt a mixture of admiration and rejection towards the great Kastriota; after all, this had
hurt the Muzaki politically severely. How difficult the ethnic assignment of the Kastriota already appeared
to the contemporaries, proves another element: The Albanian nobleman Musachi saw in Georg Kastriota
a Serb, the Serbian monks at the Athos Monastery Chilandar but called that tower, which Skanderbeg's
father Ivan donated, the "Albanian tower" 66th The Kastriota were Serbs for an Albanian nobleman and
Albanians for Serbian monks. Nothing shows better their position in a transitional space between the two
language areas. That's for sure, that the ethnic origin was not decisive in the rise of the Kastriota
family. The Kastriota were upstarts. Skanderbeg's grandfather had owned two hamlets in a remote
mountainous area, but his father Ivan had, albeit for a short while, taken the important caravan route from
the Adriatic to the Amselfeld under his control and was able to protect Dubrovnik merchants from shore to
29
to assure the city of Prizren67. Ivan Kastriota would never have achieved this position if an old world had
not broken down around him. He was also aware of this when, in retrospect, he said that his career had
begun when the emperors killed Bayezit and Ti'tur Lenk. "68 He meant the battle of Ankara in 1402, in
which the Ottoman Sultan was inferior to the Mongol ruler Serbian and Albanian vassals were also among
the defeated Ottoman troops, and the news of the overthrow of the Ottoman power had reached remote
valleys in the Balkans.While the captive Sultan was towed by the victor through Asia, turmoil broke out in
the Ottoman Empire Decade (until 1413), giving daring men the opportunity to to build their own power
structures in rapid access to the ruins of the Ottoman state and its Christian vassal dominions. Ivan
Kastriota grabbed the opportunity. He pushed westward. In the east of his narrower home on the Black
Drin were small Serbian principalities, but above all Ivan expected that an advance to the Vardar basin
would be less promising; for in Skopje stood still an Ottoman margrave with strong troops. In the west,
however, in Mati and the Adriatic coastal plain, Ottoman power had largely disappeared, and there lived
also weak noble families, the Jonima and Zaharia, who, however, called their grain and willow rich lands
their own. And Kom for the entourage, salt and grass for the cattle needed Ivan. He also wanted to come
into direct contact with foreign merchants, especially Ragusanern, and he had to open a gate to the
Adriatic. Since Venice had taken possession of the port of Durazzo since 1392, since 1396 Skutari and its
surrounding area, remained as the exit to the sea only a narrow strip at the mouths of Ishmi and Mati. The
mountainous area of Mati, he seems to have gained in agreement with the powerful Catholic clergy there,
the Highland Bishopric of Albanum, whose interests he successfully enforced against the supported by
Venice Bishop of the Plain, based in Alessio (1405). Thus the orthodox gentleman from Dibra had
overcome the confession difference without effort and secured its mountain rule also church-wise. The
success gave him prestige among the regional nobility, as its spokesman against Venice he already
appeared in 1406. Once Ivan had settled on the coast, he fell into the power game of the great powers,
Venice, the Ottoman Empire and also after the Battle of Ankara resurgent Ottoman vendetta pottery
(Principality) in Serbia. Ivan dominated the caravan route from the coast through the highlands to the
Amselfeld, he was able not only the trade, but also Ottoman hosts on1J
30
keeping to the Adriatic Sea. He took advantage of this against Venice: He presented himself as the patron
of the passports to obtain help from the St. Mark republic. He also offered himself as a mediator in the
bloody petty war, the Signoria with the most powerful helmet in the Albanian north, Balsa IH. BalSi6
delivered (1408). The extremely unstable situation forced him to compromise a lot. When the Ottomans
temporarily gained strength in 1410, Ivan had to submit to the sultan. He took advantage of it, however,
by recruiting 300 men Ottoman auxiliary troops, which he along with 2000 own warriors in 1411 the
Republic of Venice in the war against Balsa IH. as a mercenary. At the same time he prevented the
passage of larger Ottoman formations through the mountains, and, as he said, "by divine
inspiration ... but to hand over important storehouse Medua on the Adriatic as well as the rich village
Barballushi at Drin. He had the trade as well as the supply of the highlands with grain in view. His
relationship with Venice was put to the test in the autumn of 1422, when the Serbian despot Stefan
Lazarevi6 wanted to take over the coastal legacy of BalSi6i around Skutari, which had taken over the
Republic of St. Mark. The Despot offered Ivan to succeed against the Venetians. Ivan also came, but
negotiated behind the back of the Serb with the Republic of St. Mark, from which he demanded
territories; it was mainly about the legacy of his southern neighbor, Niketas Thopia, once Lord of the Kruja
Castle 71 • He paid dearly for his neutrality from the Venetians - he regarded civil rights as reinsurance in
dire straits, not as a bond of loyalty to the Signoria. • The regional lord had a strikingly close relationship
with the Serbian despotate, the Sultan and the Venetian Republic. His political scope, however, became
increasingly smaller. Since 1415, an Ottoman captain sat on Kruja as the southern neighbor of Ivan,
keeping an eye on the highlands73. In the north, the Venetians of Italian mercenaries and northern
Albanian minor nobles had created a powerful force to defend their areas around Scutari. 31 In the north,
the Venetians of Italian mercenaries and northern Albanian minor nobles had created a powerful force to
defend their areas around Scutari. 31 In the north, the Venetians of Italian mercenaries and northern
Albanian minor nobles had created a powerful force to defend their areas around Scutari. 31
Family Tree of the Kastriota Family in the 15th Century Grgur Brankovi6 by Polog
Paul Kastriota
~ (?) Ivan - - - -
(Q)
---- Voisava
(Hamza)
Mamica
Jela
Angelina
Stefan Cmojevi6
Vladin Golem
Grjin Muzaki
Muzaki Thopia
(Q)
I Andronika
Vlaica
Maria
Georg
Hamza
Repos
Irene Irene
Rallaina
Brankovic
But not only against the great powers Ivan secured himself. His fast-knit rule he fortified by numerous
marriage alliances. He benefited from the fact that his marriage to Voisava was blessed with children's
wealth; She had given him four sons and five daughters: Repos, Stanisa, Konstantin and Georg74, as
well as Maria, Jela, Angelina, Vlaica and Mamica. The daughter-men sought out Ivan with
circumspection: he gave Maria to Stefan Crnojevic, the Lord of the Black Mountains, Angelina to Vladino
Araniti Komino, the brother of the mighty Araniti Komino, of the most important family of Central Albania,
Elela to Paul Strez BalSic, Vlaica to Gjin Muzaki 75. Ivan thus protected his access to the coast to the
north and south. Not included in this system were its immediate neighbors to the north of Mati, the
Dukagjin, perhaps an indication of an antagonism that should last throughout the 15th century. Internally,
he based his rule on a loyal following of some 2,000 warriors76. His court, if you want to use this term at
all, was confined to a few men, mostly from the Orthodox Balkans, the presbyter Dimitri, the abbot Peter,
the community teamman (or shepherd celnik) Peter77. The followers were rewarded partly with plunder,
but above all with income from the adriatic trade with Ragusa and Venice, 32 mostly from the Orthodox
Balkans, the presbyter Dimitri, the abbot Peter, the community leader (or shepherd leader; celnik)
Peter77. The followers were rewarded partly with plunder, but above all with income from the adriatic
trade with Ragusa and Venice, 32 mostly from the Orthodox Balkans, the presbyter Dimitri, the abbot
Peter, the community leader (or shepherd leader; celnik) Peter77. The followers were rewarded partly
with plunder, but above all with income from the adriatic trade with Ragusa and Venice, 32
but also regional merchants such as Alessio and Cattaro 78. lvan called salt pans his own, he sold grain,
and he received money from the customs of the near Alessio located stacking place Shufada on the
Adriatic. He had only four castles, most of them in Mati; Cities did not belong to him. In general, his rule
was based less on fixed places, but on people. As long as his warriors, most of them shepherds, followed
him, Ivan was able to hold on, even when the Ottomans conquered his castles. The cultural diversity of
his reign is reflected in the languages of the chancery: with Chilandar and Dubrovnik he communicated in
the Byzerbian Greek language, in Venice, in Byzantine Greek, which the Albanian lords of the Adriatic
used to cherish from time immemorial80. Linguistically, his rule was mixed, in the west, on the coast and
in Mati was spoken predominantly Albanian, from the Black Drin towards the east, the number of Slavic
speakers will increase steadily. Ivan moved without difficulty in this multilingualism, the juxtaposition of
Byzantine, Slavic and Adriatic influences. But he sought clerical support above all in the church of his
fathers, Orthodoxy. Following the example of the Balkan nobility, he gave Mount Athos a foundation; He
selected the Serbian monastery Chilandar. This rule the juxtaposition of Byzantine, Slavic and Adriatic
influences. But he sought clerical support above all in the church of his fathers, Orthodoxy. Following the
example of the Balkan nobility, he gave Mount Athos a foundation; He selected the Serbian monastery
Chilandar. This rule the juxtaposition of Byzantine, Slavic and Adriatic influences. But he sought clerical
support above all in the church of his fathers, Orthodoxy. Following the example of the Balkan nobility, he
gave Mount Athos a foundation; He selected the Serbian monastery Chilandar. This rule
George 85. Ivan himself told the Venetians that his affliction had begun with the establishment of
Venetian rule in Salonika (1423) 86. He was so in the hands of the sultans; and yet he tried to manage
some rest of his freedom of movement. His political thinking is best understood in an embassy he sent to
Venice in August 1428. He warned against the arrival of a large Ottoman army against Venetian Albania,
an army about which he was well informed, for none other than his own son rode with him at the top, the
son, who, according to Ivan, "Turk and Muselmann ( Mulsuman) and was received by his (his) Lord's
command "87. Sultan Murad 11. exerted strong pressure on Ivan to open the passes to the Adriatic
Sea. Ivan, on the other hand, begged the Signoria to take him under her protection, "so that I can save
my head, my sons, my country, my nobles, and my belongings in your house." this should become visible
by receiving a banner bearing the image of the evangelist Mark, the patron saint of the lagoon
city. Moreover, Ivan did everything to turn his northern neighbors, especially the mighty BuraseviCi - or
CrnojeviCi, as they were called, gentlemen of the Black Mountains (Crna gora, Montenegro), on the side
of Venice: he had their messengers as sultan just intercepted. Venice urgently needed an ally in Albania,
but did not want to be involved in a war in the highlands. It promised asylum in an emergency, met I van
in customs questions and summoned him, to remind his son of the due obedience to his father90. On
both sides, typical decades-old strategies emerge here: the Balkan nobility desired a protectorate and
good trade relations with the Adriatic; He also tried to win over other noblemen to a system of power
whose de facto lord in the mountains, into which - he knew - the Venetians would never advance, he
would be alone. The Signoria, on the other hand, was only interested in creating a protective belt of allies
around its Albanian ports, and in no way wanted to be involved in the intra-Balkan feuds. So Ivan stood
alone when the Ottomans attacked his rule. He survived the year 1429, but in 1430 he was defeated by
the army of the Ottoman frontier field Ishak bey. He had two castles of Kastriota dragged, in two more
Ottoman crews were placed91. Ivan's defeat fell into a year in which the Ottomans made important
conquests elsewhere as well: the Venetian Salonika came under their rule as well as the most important
city in Epirus, Joannina - both were not to change hands until 1912. The Ottomans no longer showed
consideration to Ivan; he had only a small 34 left The Ottomans no longer showed consideration to
Ivan; he had only a small 34 left The Ottomans no longer showed consideration to Ivan; he had only a
small 34 left
unbroken strip of land between Alessio and Durazzo. The Timar system was introduced, and like two of
his sons, Ivan had to convert to Islam under the name Hamza92. The victorious Ottomans then sent out
chancellors who were to register the taxable subjects throughout the Albanian Sancak. But this proved to
be a crucial mistake. Nothing displaced the inhabitants of the Albanian region more bitterly over the
centuries, right up to the twentieth century, than when they demanded taxes and the recognition of a state
monopoly on power, in other words, when a great empire was transferred to their inner state , intervened
in small-scale affairs. Ottoman rule in the Albanian area began in the early 15th century with riots and five
centuries later it also ended with anti-modernist rebellions directed against the Reichszentrale. In Albania,
the nobles first took up arms in the rugged, mountainous country of the south. They drove away the tax
collectors and locked the passports. Outstanding was Araniti Komino, who came from an ancient
Byzantine noble family; He was joined by Depe Zenebish (or Zenevesi), who crossed the narrow sea
under his exile on Corfu and besieged the ancestral seat of his family, the Gjirokastra high above the
Dropulltal valley, with followers (Winter 1432/33) 93. The responsible Ottoman border warlord Turahan
bey marched in the middle of the dead of winter from Thessaly and defeated Zenebish in January /
February 1433. But the rebellion was not downed, rather, gentlemen in the middle and north of Albania
followed the example of their southern counterparts: Ivan Kastriota shook off the Ottoman suzerainty as
did his northern neighbor Nikola Dukagjin. For fear of Ottoman vengeance, the peasants partly fled into
the mountains, partly their columns with humans and cattle flooded the Venetian harbor of Durazzo,
where tugs required huge sums of money for the passage to Apulia. In the summer of 1433, three
Ottoman frontier patrons from the Macedonian and Thessalian states appeared. Ivan's lands were heavily
deserted, many of his followers were taken to slavery. Although Venice took on refugees, but remained
neutral - because it did not want to put the peace just concluded with the Sultan at stake. This
constellation: Ottoman attacks on Christian noble families and Venetian non-interference in the interests
of commercial interests will be more frequent. It was not until 1436 that the resistance in the Albanian
South was finally stifled; but the Ottomans had tried everything and fondly on high Christian holidays
(December 26, 1434, Easter 1435) attacked to surprise their Orthodox opponents. 35
The Ottoman defeats also caused a stir outside Albania, not least because the Albanian nobility turned to
Pope Eugene IV, but also to the Roman Emperor and Hungarian King Sigismund of Luxembourg. This
brought the Bulgarian Zarensolu1 Fruiin into play; even an Ottoman pretender to the throne was
temporarily present in Ragusa. Help from the outside did not come. But it had been proven that the
Albanian Orthodox noblemen were able to extend their rebellion into a question of the great European
policy, an element that would shape the coming decades. The uprising collapsed as the Ottomans
attacked, plundered and deported many people year after year with large armies; the Ottoman chronicles
rejoiced, With all the beautiful captive boys and girls, the army camp has become a paradise. The skulls
of the slain were piled up in the middle of Central Asia - here the origin of the house Osman - to deterring
hills. Finally, Araniti gave up Komino, descended from his mountains, and made an oath to the
Sultan. Apparently peace was rife across Albania, not least because one of the most restless nobles had
died. Ivan Kastriota had the time blessed on May 2, 143796. Apparently peace was rife across Albania,
not least because one of the most restless nobles had died. Ivan Kastriota had the time blessed on May
2, 143796. Apparently peace was rife across Albania, not least because one of the most restless nobles
had died. Ivan Kastriota had the time blessed on May 2, 143796.
EARLY YEARS
Little is known about the personal destinies of many leading Balkan nobles and Ottoman grandees from
the 15th century. As shadowy figures, they glide past the posthumous observer, who, although able to
follow the most important stages of their career, hardly ever learns anything about the character and life-
world of the individuals from the sources. The further inland the lives of these men were, the less they
came into contact with Venetians and Ragusans, most of whom report political leaders. Ottoman
chronicles and administrative records reveal little about the personality of the men who served under the
sultan. To these counted those Georg Kastriota, which, under its nom de guerre Skanderbeg, was to
become the most famous Southeast European for centuries. If one surveys the numerous contemporary
narratives and documents about his life, their unequal distribution becomes clear: a thin trickle in the first
four decades of his life becomes a broad stream of news, which for Skanderbeg 's last years has at times
become 36
even allow him to follow him day in day out. He meets the historian as a figure of profound fog, but
approaches more and more, and finally one hears, in a conversation protocol of an Italian diplomat, even
his voice, one has the impression of listening to the thought of this Balkan nobleman. The historian finds
himself here in the position of a cameraman, who brings his object from the wide-angle perspective. The
beginnings are thus arranged in a broad framework, but are in detail unclear. The end, on the other hand,
takes place in the glaring light of world history. So indistinct are origin and youth that not even the birth
year can be determined with certainty. It can be deduced from statements made by various narrators and
observers at the end of their lives. Skanderbeg died in January 1468 at the age of 63, which allowed him
to be born in the year 140597. Georg Kastriota was born the youngest of four sons. His parents gave him
a name popular in the Orthodox world. Two of his older brothers wore Slavic (Repos and Stanisa), the
third, like Georg, a Christian given name. Thus, Ivan and Voisava Kastriota had followed the two
predominant traditions in the Slavic-Byzantine Balkan culture: while Serbs preferred "national" first
names, in the Byzantine-Greek region a Christian influence prevailed. Where George spent his first years,
whether on one of the castles of the father or with this through the highlands, is not known. Due to the
description, however, its cultural characteristics may be outlined: He grew up in the society of the
Byzantine-Serbian tradition influenced small nobility in the Albanian region; through the marriages of his
siblings he was in family relation to the most important noble families of the country. Monks from Mount
Athos were around his father. At the request of two of these prophets, Simeon and Sava, Ivan donated
KastriotajenenAlbanerturm to Chilandar, which bore the name of St. George. Was this because of his
son, whom he had to deliver to the Sultan? That his brother Repos chose the monk's shabit was no
coincidence, but a venerable custom in Byzantine aristocratic families, whose model was also imitated in
the outskirts of the old empire. George's life took a decisive turn when his father, together with his
brothers Repos and Constantine, had to deliver him as hostage to Sultan Murad H. (after 1423). The
three young Kastriota, all around the age of 20, were transferred to the Ottoman capital Edirne, the
ancient Byzantine Adrianople. The hostage-taking of young Balkan nobles served the Ottomans to secure
their power in the outskirts of their young empire. Georg Kastriota's fate was all 37
other than extraordinary; it has been preserved in an outstanding position in the memory of posterity only
because of its later fame. For if he had not deviated from the path set out in the Ottoman state for him, he
would, like many of his ottomanized estates, have fallen for oblivion after a fulfilled football in the Sultan's
service. About Georg Kastriotas years at the court of Murad tell in detail and legendary his Albanian -born
biographers Barletius and Franeo, following which most Western historians; in short, the Ottoman
chronicles, occasionally the Byzantines. What happened to George in Edime corresponded to Ottoman
custom. He was integrated into the corps of the court pages, the 19-oglane. There he will be meeting
several Balkan Orthodox fates. At an unknown timing but before 1428 101 - he is then, like so many other
hostages converted to Islam. This solitary moment was described by his biographer Marinus Barletius
more than 80 years later; In doing so, he will have reproduced stories that related to this memorable
event in the vicinity of the later Skanderbeg. A dervish is said to have won the young Kastriota for
Islam. The change of faith was easy; it sufficed to recite the Islamic Faith: "There is only one God, and
Muhammad is his prophet" - Barletius verballhornt with "La, lla, La" (for "La ilaha illa Allah Mohammed
rezul Allah") reproduces - and already the conversion was completed. The new Muslim was then
besclmitten and, according to the custom, celebrated by his fellow believers 102. Remarkable in the story
of Barletius are less faith formula, circumcision and celebration, but rather his remarks on the dervishes in
the Ottoman Empire. They were to be compared with Christian monks, had traveled through the country
as beggars, thereby also committed many robbery and were eventually persecuted by the sultans Bajezit
1st (1389-1402) and Mehmed 1st (1413-1421) and severely punished. They divided into several classes,
including the Hoca and the "Talasmani", the latter being the Dani§mend, graduates of a madrasa
(school), who could pursue the career of a KadIS 103. Barletius, a Skutari priest writing in Venice, knew
something about the early history of the Dervishes in the Balkans. And for nothing he will not have
included his treatise on their order in the description of Georg Kastriota's change of faith. Rather, it can be
assumed that the young hostage had accepted Islam not in the context of Sunni court theologians, but in
the because of his beliefs often persecuted and ostracized dervish milieu. The dervishes, who had
originally come from central Anatolia, had numerous customs of the popular 38 L
Adopted in their practice of faith closer to many simple Christians than Sunni preachers. It has already
been pointed out its importance for the Islamization of the Balkans. 104 Later on, the Dervishes were to
advance to Albania, and in the course of time the legend arose that the surviving Skanderbeg had been
one of their own, which, given Barletius' report, perhaps less fabulous than has long been thought. It was
not for nothing that the castle, which was always mentioned in the same breath as Skanderbeg, became
the Central Albanian Kru, yes, the center of the dervishes in Albania 106. In its new milieu, the renegade
went through a swift career. But he owed this less to his change of faith than to his physical advantages,
his spiritual gifts and his courage. Over the years at the Ottoman court, legendary stories were told as
early as 1500. The young Kastriota had distinguished himself in tournament-like duels, which he had
victoriously won in the presence of the applauding Grand Lord. He is said to have taken down a bearded
Tartar, two brothers, Jahja and Hamza, in the old Ottoman capital Bursa; All these opponents, in the
presence of the sultan, had called upon the lords of the court to fight, and every time Skanderbeg had
slain his opponents without being wounded himself. From the later life of Kastriota can probably only
conclude that he has learned the warcraft with the Ottomans thoroughly or that has already perfected in
Dibra and Mati practiced. The statement of Barletius seems credible, too. Skanderbeg learned many
languages, including Turkish, Arabic, Greek, Italian, and Slavic ("Illyrian," as he puts it). In addition to
Albanian, he will have spoken Slavic (probably a West Bulgarian dialect, but perhaps also Serbian 110)
already in his homeland; Greek served his father in addition to the Slavic as a law firm language. At the
Ottoman court, Arabic was cultivated alongside Ottoman Turkish as the language of the faith (Barlas does
not mention Persian as an important literary language); that the Kastriota eventually spoke Italian, to
perfection, is confirmed by a Milanese diplomat who met him in person. Legend has it that Sultan Murad
H. is deeply moved by his retainer. have been impressed. His deeds gave the young Kastriota an
honorable nickname, which he should maintain throughout his life, even when he turned his back on
Islam: Skanderbeg, "Herr Alexander" l12. Thus, his Ottoman arms blunders put him on a par with
Alexander the Great, the hero par excellence, whose memory in the Middle Ages from the Levant to the
West through songs, 39
Epics and novels most people were familiar with. The Ottomans knew him by the name Iskender, from
which the Skander form derives. Whether the praise should also refer to Skanderbeg's origin from the
Albanian region - Alexander's mother Olympia came from the epirotic royal family - is not to be proven. It
was not until four decades later that this link was to achieve political significance. More importantly, the
legendary tales produced a special personal relationship between the Sultan and Iskender; He was not
just any officer or courtier, but a favorite of the grand-dorm. For the Sultan Iskender also fought in Asia
Minor, as against the "King of Cilicia," as the historian Paolo Giovio wrote in the 16th century. will have
been the opponent Ibrahim of Karaman, the rival of the Ottomans, who decades later described to the
Pope Skanderbeg's war tactics in every detail. In all his years in the sultan's service, Skanderbeg had not
broken off his relationship with his father. He was also concerned to mention his Muslim son in
documents - under his Christian name George - and to protect him from Venice. 115 The Sultan did not
seem to care if he knew it. Rather, he instructed his faithful retainer on a timeline in the family of Jonima,
close to his father's possessions; soon afterwards (1432) he appointed Skanderbeg captain (suba) of
Kruja Castle, the key of Ottoman rule in central Albania 16. This happened, shortly after the rebellion of
his father had been crushed. Murad 11 showed so full confidence in Iskender, otherwise he would
scarcely have sent him to Albania to keep rebel forces, including his own father, in check. In Kruja,
another Islamized Albanian had to leave the post, Hlzlr beyll? The deposed governor should not forget
this. There was an enmity between the two men that would last for almost four decades and at the end of
which HlZlr would take terrible revenge. Nothing has been learned about Skanderbeg's behavior during
the rebellion of his father and the Christian nobility (1433-1436). He does not seem to have been openly
involved. But he did have a close relationship with the local nobility, such as Vrana Conte, the Ottoman
feudal lord of the village Mamurras 1l8 - like HlZlr he should also play a significant role in the further life of
the Kastriota. Skanderbeg must have enjoyed a high reputation in the society of Christian minor nobles,
not only because of his well-known father, but above all because of his relations with the Sultan and his
acts of arms. When his father died, Skanderbeg desired to inherit the legacy, especially the rule of 40
the land of Misia, which lay between Alessio and Durazzo on the Adriatic coast, thus opening a gate to
Italy. But this was flatly rejected: A high Ottoman dignitary in Albania with Mustafa had written a warning
to the Sultan (spring 1438). Murad H. acted as well; Not only was Ivan's inheritance withheld from his son,
who had to surrender nine of his fiefdoms to the Christian nobleman Andrea Karlo and left Albania shortly
afterwards19. Hart had to tell him who had been appointed as his successor on Kruja: HlZlr bey. This was
the first deep rupture in the renegade's life-picture so immaculate. For some years Skanderbeg
disappears from the sources. When he reappears, he is found far away from his old home, on the
Danube. Mentioned is an Iskender as a bailiff in the important Bulgarian Danube port of Nikopolis - where
half a century earlier a crusader army had been defeated. As an officer in this frontier Iskender
participated in fateful undertakings of the Ottoman armies: in 1439 he marched north and participated in
the conquest of the Serbian despotate; the Serb prince Georg Brankovic, probably a relative of
Skanderbeg, fioh l21. If one believes Marinus Barletius, then it was Skanderbeg, who was instrumental in
the Ottoman conquest of Serbia; the biographer tells us that the Sultan, in subjugating the despot, made
particular use of the country's knowledge of the Kastriota. Since a brother Skanderbegs had lived at the
Despot Court, this seems not unlikely. 122 Soon after, Iskender will have met a man which would become
fateful for him: Johann Hunyadi, the leader of the Hungarian resistance against the Ottomans. With him
he should attempt to overthrow the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The loss of the Balkan archives wraps
the beginnings of the relationship of both men in a deep darkness. Only two texts shed some light: one
offers a fairytale-looking narrative; the other, however, comes from a knowledgeable source. "There were
seven brothers from the land of Albania," says a Venetian chronicle, "Renegades and subjects of the
Turks, who served the Turks well and were valued by him as valiant men." When the Turks fled with
barques across the Danube, so did Skanderbeg flee with a bark, the door. But those who wanted to flee
earlier refused to allow him entry.
born Martinus Segonus. He describes how Skanderbeg, under the command of the governor (beylerbey)
of Rumelia, Mesid bey, had participated in an invasion of Transylvania. The Ottomans had reached
before Sibiu, but were defeated by Johann Hunyadi (March 22, 1442) 125th Mesid's severed head sent
the victors to the Serbian despot Georg Brankovi6. For Skanderbeg, the failed march across the
Carpathians will have been a dramatic experience. Not only did he feel betrayed by his comrades in
flight; much more important was that he first came into contact with J ohann Hunyadi. Whether the two
men talked at the time must remain uncertain. A few months later, however, they brought the Ottoman
Empire to the brink of destruction in the Balkans. While in this way Skanderbeg's life gets its first outline
after his deposition in Kruja, the background of the Sultan's decision to send the faithful renegade from
Albania to the Danube, and thus the motive for Skanderbeg's elevation in the fall of 1443, has remained
unclear for five and a half centuries , At the beginning of the 16th century, in the vicinity of the Kastriota,
the Sultan had poisoned Skanderbeg's brothers, but this is demonstrably false, for Repos died, as already
told, in 1431; Stanisa was still alive in 1445, and only Konstantin's traces were lost himself127. The
account of the treachery on the Danube should also explain the resentment of the sultan's followers. Both
narratives are far from the real cause. Because the dark story that underpinned everything, was recently
found in an envoys report by the Roman Curia. He reveals why Skanderbeg, the only noble renegade,
has dropped out of the sultan. On January 10, 1454, the two Milanese diplomats Sceva de Curte and
Jacobo Trivulzio wrote to their lord, the Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan, of the reception granted by Pope
Nicholas V to a messenger from Skanderbeg. This happened just over half a year after the fall of
Constantinople, when all of Italy was in a state of excitement when the otherwise disputed powers were
working on an "Italian league", which also came about in Lodi's land peace in the same year. Under these
circumstances, the envoy stepped in front of the Pope and reported that "because of the personal hatred
he (Skanderbeg, p.
been brought. The reason may be that the old troublemaker had prepared another rebellion - in fact he
continued to maintain close ties to Venice and applied for Venetian civil rights for his sons Stanisa and
George; he had also wished for citizenship in Ragusa! 29. With the Venetian governor of Alessio,
Pasquale Gradenigo, he had an extremely cordial relationship shortly before his death; the Venetians
called him an excellent friend. "130 From an Ottoman point of view, this was reason enough to eliminate
this dangerous man once and for all, and his son Iskender, who in the eyes of the Ottomans was not
immediately implicated in a conspiracy, immediately disappeared old home, it remains unclear whether
Skanderbeg learned of the murder at once, or whether this happened later. In any case, he soon thought
of revenge. Assuming that the oral custom of the Albanians was already in the Middle Ages, he had little
else left to preserve his honor. Only he had to take blood from the family who shed blood: And this was
the house Osman. Instead of letting himself be carried away to a thoughtless act, Skanderbeg practiced
the art of dissimulation, which was probably widespread at the Ottoman court with its many Christians
forced to change their faith. Later biographers agree that he knew how to masterfully hide his true
thoughts. So he went to the Danube as a loyal Iskender and waited patiently for a favorable moment. In
Nicopolis a new world opened up for him; On the other side of the Danube lay the Orthodox principality of
Wallachia, which paid tribute to the sultan, whose prince Vlad Dracul made time-consuming resistance
and was repeatedly attacked by Ottoman troops. West of the Carpathians, in the Kingdom of Hungary, J
ohann Hunyadi led the defense! Hidden threads will soon run from Skanderbeg to the north, to the
Transylvanian Turk, but also to the west, to his old homeland, where the orthodox nobility rejected the
Ottoman rule, and to southern Italy, where in 1442 Alfonso V, King of Aragon who had come to power, a
monarch who ruled much of the western Mediterranean and dreamed of the crown of Byzantium! No
spontaneous act of violence, but a long-planned deadly prank should atone for the sultan's blood-
guilt. The opportunity for revenge came in a year of dramatic events: in 1443, thunderclouds gathered in
the west and east over the Ottoman Empire. Johann Hunyadi and the Hungarian-Polish King Ladislaus
equipped for the crusade; the agriculturist Georg Brankovic hoped to return to his despotate. The course
of events suggests that Skanderbeg was privy to their plans and his contribution to the fall 1J the
agriculturist Georg Brankovic hoped to return to his despotate. The course of events suggests that
Skanderbeg was privy to their plans and his contribution to the fall 1J the agriculturist Georg Brankovic
hoped to return to his despotate. The course of events suggests that Skanderbeg was privy to their plans
and his contribution to the fall 1J
43
quietly prepared the Ottoman rule. In Anatolia, Ibrahim of Karaman, against whom Skanderbeg had been
in the field in earlier years, was in league with the Hungarians. Iskender had already come into contact
with all the important figures of the year 1443, Hunyadi, Brankovic, Ibrahim of Karaman. Against
Karaman, Murad 11 took off at full speed, marching with him his favorite son Alaeddin Ali <; elebi. Already
in the spring of 1443, before the Hungarians had moved, Ibrahim was defeated. The Sultan was
devastated: his crown prince had been killed, strangled by a court official, Kara Hidr Pasha. 135 The
Sultan was severely disturbed by the Nazis, and his paralysis in the face of the Christian advance in the
fall of 1443 became disastrous explained. The only thing that remained unknown to this day was why
Murad's beloved son - together with his own children - had been brutally murdered. Skanderbeg's
ambassador to Rome was the only man who ever spoke of it: Alaeddin Ali <; elebi had fallen victim to a
conspiracy in which Skanderbeg was a driving force. But could the governor in Nicopolis initiate the
murder of a crony, which was also in Anatolia, on his own, as Kara Hidr Pasha had acted on the orders of
the court? This is unlikely, and Skanderbeg's ambassador also said that his master had killed the brother
of the Grand Master (meant in 1454 ruling Mehmed 11), so he himself had not led the trick. But whoever
had the power and good reasons To support Skanderbeg? There are far too few messages about
Murad's 11th court for this question to be answered with source testimonies. More than one hypothesis
can not be ventured; after all, siGh supports them with circumstantial evidence. In Murad's environment,
two people had a strong motive: firstly, his wife Mara Brankovic, for in 1441 Murad had had their two
brothers cruelly blinded; on the other Alaeddin Ali <elebis younger brother Mehmed, who was only eleven
years old at that time, but old enough to impress his teachers by his strong character 136. Skanderbeg
probably also related to Mara; for Skanderbeg's mother Voisava was probably a Brankovic. But even if
this is not the case, There is certain evidence of Skanderbeg's long close relationship with the Brankovic
family: as early as 1423, one of his brothers had stayed at the Serbian court 137; Skanderbeg had
participated in Ottoman campaigns against Serbia. Mara's father Georg promoted Skanderbeg's struggle
with cash payments from his Ragusan silver deposit (1453); one of the two dazzled brothers Maras,
Stefan Brankovic, found refuge with Skanderbeg in 1459 and became of this 44
married to an Albanian princess from the house of Araniti; Skanderbeg's son Ivan finally married the
daughter of the second blinded Brankovic, Lazar in l38. Looking now at Mara's relationship to her stepson
Mehmed, it is striking that both enjoyed great respect for each other after Meluned's accession to the
throne, and that for decades Mara was negotiating with Western powers as Meluned's secret
diplomat. Genealogical connections between the Brankovic and Kastriota families 140 Grgur Brankovic I
Vuk Brankovic
Voisava I
(] I)
(] I)
I Theodora
Voisava
(I)
I Ivan Kastriota
Lazar I
Georg (Skanderbeg) I
Ivan
Mara I
(] I)
(] I)
(] I)
(] I)
I Andronica Araniti
Stefan I
, J,
Irene
Milica I (] I)
These are certainly no evidence, only hints. But Mara and Mehmed had a motive, and both benefited from
the murder. In the context of Skanderbeg, Mehmed was explicitly described as a fratricide murderer: "This
is that flour1'zed who strangled his brother out of greed," according to Barletius Skanderbeg's most
important adviser, Archbishop Paul Angelus of Durazzo, (probably 1463) - he did not mention the guilt of
his master in any way. The murder of the crown prince occupied even after decades the
minds. Skanderbeg's involvement 45
Indeed, Mehmed's is very likely indeed. This created - despite all later enmity - a bond of special
complicity between these two power-conscious men. All this Skanderbeg's envoy told the Pope was
Murad Ir. remained hidden. He grieved for his son without knowing the perpetrators, who were obviously
all close to him. Mehmed H. made sure that the memory of his murdered brother disappeared from the
Ottoman chronicles, not a damnatio memoriae, but rather a quiet forgetting. If Skanderbeg's diplomat had
not spoken, you would not know anything about the details of this tragedy in the house of
Osman. Skanderbeg never mentioned his revenge again: he received no help from the pope in a vendetta
against the Sultan, but when he led the fight of the cross against the crescent. And this company, the
consistent continuation of his revenge, he should only a few months after the order of the prince begin.
HUNGARY'S CRUSADE AND THE UPRISING OF THE PEOPLE The years around 1440 saw a dramatic
escalation of events in the Balkans. The Serbian principality of the despot Georg Brankovic, this henn
over the richest silver mines of the Balkans, owners of large castles on the Danube, was conquered by
Sultan Murad H. and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. The despot fled to his possessions on the
Adriatic, to Antivari, traveled from there further north and finally arrived in Hungary. In the same year
(1439), after more than two years of negotiations in Florence, the union between the Catholic and the
Orthodox Church was proclaimed, which was to put an end to the nearly four-hundred-year schism. In
return for the subjugation of the Byzantine church under the first Rome, Pope Eugene IV promised the
deployment of a crusade, which should free Constantinople from the Ottoman danger. However, the
Union encountered strong reservations among Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. Only on the rocky
western shore of Skadar Lake, in the Krajina countryside, was a unified archdiocese established. • The
success of the crusade alone would determine the fate of the unification. The collapse of Serbia had
plunged the Adriatic coast of Zeta into confusion. In the power vacuum left by the Serbian despotate
came several powers: from the north Stefan VukCic, Lord of Hum, a country a unified archbishopric was
set up 142 • The success of the crusade alone would decide the fate of the church union. The collapse of
Serbia had plunged the Adriatic coast of Zeta into confusion. In the power vacuum left by the Serbian
despotate came several powers: from the north Stefan VukCic, Lord of Hum, a country a unified
archbishopric was set up 142 • The success of the crusade alone would decide the fate of the church
union. The collapse of Serbia had plunged the Adriatic coast of Zeta into confusion. In the power vacuum
left by the Serbian despotate came several powers: from the north Stefan VukCic, Lord of Hum, a country
46
which at that time began to take the name of Herzegovina; from the east the Lord of the Black Mountains,
Stefan Crnojevi6; from the sea and from the Skutari area finally the Republic of Venice, which wanted to
secure the coastal cities of Antivari and Budua. Until 1443, a ferocious guerrilla warfare took place around
these harbors, from which Venice emerged victorious: its galleys and bombers had made the
difference.143. On the opposite Adriatic coast, in southern Italy, profound shifts had taken place. After a
ten-year battle against the house of Anjou, King Alfonso V of Aragna, the most powerful prince of the
western Mediterranean, entered Naples on 2 July 1442 in triumph. Immediately he took up the old Balkan
policy of the sub-Italian kings. His Catalan sailors fought hard for Venetian merchants in the Levant. Their
king wanted to dominate both sides of the Adriatic and bring the Strait of Otranto, the lifeline of the
Signoria, in his power, finally Durazzo, the starting point of the Via Egnatia, win to march to
Constantinople and put on the imperial crown. Alfons thus entered a new stage in the struggle for
supremacy on the Adriatic: the Aragonese - Venetian opposition should weigh on the Western Balkans for
the next decades. But also in the north of the Balkans, new forces were stirring: The aforementioned
Johann Hunyadi and the young Hungarian-Polish King Ladislaus prepared a campaign against the
Ottomans. This was to liberate the Hungarian borders from Ottoman attacks, but above all, as a crusade,
grant the Balkan Christians the help promised by the pope. On New Year's Day 1443, Eugene IV
proclaimed the Crusader bull. The driving force was Cardinal Cesarini. The plan was based on the model
of similar considerations of 1437 deceased German Emperor Sigismund of Luxembourg, a huge pincer
attack in Europe and Asia Minor, there supported by Ibrahim of Karaman. A double attack was planned in
the west: a land army was to cross the Danube and attack the Balkan provinces of the Ottomans; The
destination was the Ottoman capital Edirne. At the same time, a fleet was to attack from the sea; To put
ships had the Republic of Venice and Burgundy. Hunyadi also prepared a survey of the Balkan
Christians, which should take place at the same time as the entry of the crusader army ~: George
Brankovi6, hoping for the recovery of his despotate, certainly lent him a helping hand; and Balkan
Christians who had converted to Islam were ready to strike at the sultan. In a letter to Pope Eugene IV,
the Hungarian army commander enumerated the Balkan areas that had promised on their arrival:
Byzantium, Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria and Albania 145. From the east Karaman formed the 47th
The driving force: "You march from the west, I from the east, Rumelia will be yours, Anatolia mine. We
shall win back Vzlkoglus (the son of Vuk, according to George Brankovic, p. , Ibrahim is said to have
proclaimed his ally Hunyadi 146. But the artful schedule failed, not least because of the long lines of
communication that had overwhelmed all those involved. But the land army in southeastern Europe
actually entered the war. The strength of the army consisted in artillery-reinforced wagon castles, as they
had successfully used the Czech Hussites for decades against knights armies. Numerous soldiers also
wore heavy cuirass, which could hardly be penetrated by the bullets of the Ottomans. The Ottoman forces
did not withstand this army. At the beginning of November 1443, the governor of Rumelia, KaSllTi Pasha,
had to flee from Nis; over Pirot and the Dragomanpass he rescued himself to Sofia. Before the imposing
Christians, the Ottomans set fire to Nis like Sofia. Only the scorched earth tactics seemed to be able to
save the ill-tempered Ottoman Empire. The more the crusaders approached the imperial capital Edirne,
the stronger became the Ottoman resistance. Added to this was the onset of winter. Shortly before
Christmas, the Crusaders suffered a defeat at the Zlaticapass, but were able to entrench themselves in
their Wagenburg. On the retreat of the Christian army, the brother of the sultan was captured in
Dragomanpass l47. Thus the campaign for the year 1443 was over. Under terrible hardships the
Crusaders made their way through snow-covered Serbia; a contemporary thought they were more like
ghosts than humans. Even though the crusader had not finally brought the Ottomans to their knees, the
structure of the empire was shaken to its foundations. For at the news of the approach of the Christian
army, rebellions against the Sultan had broken out in many parts of the Balkans, when the framework of
Timar lords and Christian auxiliary troops that had been erected so quickly collapsed. This had happened
in Serbia, where Georg Brankovic had been welcomed by his old subjects, but this had also happened in
the very south of the Balkan Peninsula, where the Byzantine despot of the Morea (Peloponnese),
Constantine Palaiologos, later the last emperor of Byzantium, across the Isthmos from Corinth to Central
Greece, where the Vlachian shepherds in the Pindos Mountains had risen. All these uprisings were
probably planned for a long time 149. But the first thing that had ignited was a conflagration in the
Albanian space, which had just been pacified by the Ottomans. Already in the midsummer of 1443, before
the actual attack of Hunyadi, but shortly after the murder of Alaeddin Ali <elebi (June f
48
1443) it had come to unrest 15o. In the autumn of 1443, the Albanian South stood in a state of turmoil: the
Ottoman garrisons in Valona, Kanina and Gjirokastra strengthened the fortifications; within weeks they
had been cut off from all external relations and so desperate that the Venetian Senate considered the
possibility of an amicable takeover of the castles, "Cun bona voluntate" of the Ottomans. The defining
figure was first Araniti Komino, whose reputation among the Tosks, the inhabitants of the Albanian south,
was unbroken; an echo of his fame is found in Barletius: "Arianites Thopia Golen'lUs, or with a word in
better Latin: Commatus, a man with a great name and great esteem, because of the age of his noble sex,
his extensive experience in the war, The excellent dignity of his speech and figure - which is of great
importance to the ordinary people - hastened ahead of all others with a handsome band of riders and
infantry. He had once been taught by Murad and had not refused the required tribute; but now he rose in
the face of the favorable opportunity, the old hatred in his heart flared up again, and his nobly preserved
meaning revived. "152 This was followed by Andreas Thopia, whose family had once ruled Durazzo Sons
Komino and Muzaki and his nephew Tanush, who wanted to reclaim their ancient lands in southern
central Albania, so in the Albanian area the uprising started in the heart of the Ottoman Empire, where all
the Muslim and Christian Timariotes sat, where the Ottoman rule seemed to be established. This was
also facilitated by the fact that important pillars of the Ottoman rule, such as Jakub bey from the Muzaki
family, fought far from home in the Ottoman army 153. Probably in November 1443, a man appeared in
Albania, who should take over the leadership of the survey : Skanderbeg 154. With Hunyadi's attack the
decisive hour of revenge had come. By the murder of Alaeddin Ali <; elebi he had already hit Murad II
deeply - but this was a blow whose originator the Sultan did not know. But now the opportunity for open
waste opened up. The speed of his trade can not have been spontaneous. Rather, it can be assumed that
Skanderbeg knew about the attack plans Huny ~ dis and Brankovic, yes, that he had made arrangements
with the two gentlemen. In any case, several informants had reported to the biographer Barletius about
secret messages by Skanderbeg to the Hungarians. 155 As an Ottoman dignitary in Nicopolis, this would
not have been difficult for him. Easily secret couriers could be sent across the Danube and the
Carpathians. One may also assume that he is king
49
Alfons V. had touched 156. In any case, the Kastriota was ready when the crusaders crossed the
Danube. In the Battle of Nis, where the Ottomans opposed the invaders, Skanderbeg took revenge. With
that Kaslm Pasha, an Islamized Muzaki, so an Albanian compatriot, he had marched up the Morava, he
had joined in the order of battle. At the decisive moment, however, Skanderbeg and his co-conspirators
left the Ottoman ranks. The Ottomans were badly beaten. The interaction of Hunyadi with traitors in the
Ottoman army had had an excellent effect. Giovanni Musachi, who reflects the tradition of the Albanian
nobility, says: "... after the death of his father, he fled the Turks, that is, the Turk sent Rumeli's Pasha
against the Hungarians, with him he also sent Skanderbeg, · when the said Pasha was defeated, the
Turks fled; Skanderbeg with allegedly 300 men - a symbolic figure popular in the Albanian folk song -
Skanderbeg, accompanied by Reposs's son Hamza, hunted westwards, exploiting the confusion of the
Ottomans and leading the Chancellor of the Ottoman army, the At first he turned to his native region of
Dibra and, to keep his arrival secret, arrived in the dead of night and immediately summoned the leading
men who greeted him enthusiastically as the son of Ivan Kastriotas, and Barletius said they had him tears
of joy, the face, the hands, the feet kissed and welcomed him under long hugs 158. The first to join was
the Dibran Skanderbeg movement; This proved to be important, because over Dibra, the Ottoman
message routes to central Albania, which were now interrupted. Skanderbeg pursued a clear plan: He
wanted to bring into the possession of a strong castle. Since the Albanian north was dominated by Venice
and in the south, the Araniti had hardly accepted an intrusion, only Central Albania, the ancient Kastriota
inflow area, and there alone offered Kruja, which was contrary to all other fortresses considered
impregnable and also rapid connections to the coast, to Durazzo, and the Albanian north, as assured
south. There, however, sat a strong Ottoman crew, which certainly would not give way without a sword
stroke. She was also commanded by a man of ancient Albanian nobility, Hasan bey, the son of Helena
Muzaki 159. Skanderbeg therefore forced the Chancellor to issue a document to the Ottoman governor of
Kruja, in which he was appointed new commander of the castle and the garrison was called to clear the
castle. The chancellor initially refused, but avoided violence; As soon as the document was issued,
Skanderbeg had the man killed. With his 50th Skanderbeg had the man killed. With his 50th Skanderbeg
had the man killed. With his 50th
He then approached henchmen in the dense forests of the castle. The long autumn nights helped the
company to 1.60. He sent his nephew Hamza ahead to report his arrival; At the same time the warriors
lay in ambush in the forest thicket. Shortly after Skanderbeg rode in Kruja 161. The Ottomans in the
castle had no suspicions of evil; after all, Skanderbeg was considered to be a loyal follower of the sultan,
and the Ottomans would not yet have experienced the defeat of Nis; Upon presentation of the document
they opened the gates of the castle. The inhabitants of Krujas rejoiced over the new commander from a
well-known family. The following night, however, the men of Skanderbeg, hiding in the forest, entered the
castle and took the crew by surprise. a part was still slain on the sleeping places, others defended
themselves with great violence; since they had been deprived of any possibility of escape, they were soon
pushed back and mostly cut down. Only those who converted to Christianity were spared. The chronicler
Musachi relates that Skanderbeg himself publicly returned to Christianity on this occasion: "Immediately
he became a Christian again." 164 The rebellion began with a bloodbath, and that same night
Skanderbeg sent messengers to the whole country for general uprising and surprise In quick succession,
the small castles of the surrounding area fell from Kruja, Preza and Petrela to Bila Kamin and Stellush in
the Matital, and everywhere men converted to Islam returned to Christianity. This general reconversion
also clarified the character of the survey: Religion marked the followers of the sultan. These should now
be driven out of the Albanian lands. The success was resounding. "The Turks are in great anxiety about
the victory and the successful advance of the Christian army against the Turks," reported the Venetian
governor of Corfu on 23 December 1443 166. The decisive factor was that the Ottomans were unable to
relieve their cut-off fortresses. Murad H. found himself threatened in Anatolia as in the Balkans and
decided to gain time. A special role was played by the Serbian Sultana, Mara Brankovic, who in the late
winter of 1444 sent an orthodox monk on a secret mission to the west; He traveled to Split via Ofen. The
Sultan particularly courted Georg Brankovic, whom he promised to return the despotate. Brankovic did
not reject this, and as early as April 1444 he pleaded with the Hungarians for peace with the
Ottomans. As the orthodox prince of a principality situated between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, he
had no interest in the superiority of one of his neighbors: the Hungarians had broken Ottoman
arrogance; he, 11 The Hungarians had broken the Ottoman arrogance; he, 11 The Hungarians had
broken the Ottoman arrogance; he, 11
51
but did not want to trade the Ottoman rule with the hegemony of a Catholic state. Brankovic was hostile to
the church union; he felt himself to be the guardian of the Olihodox tradition in Serbia. Ultimately, he
acted like the majority of the Balkan orthodox elite, who prefer to state the downfall of statehood rather
than the subordination to a Catholic neighbor. Murad's 11th sudden generosity also benefited Wallachia
voivode, Vlad Dracul. Thus, Murad had driven a wedge into the Christian front and blown up the short-
term agreement of Catholics and Orthodox along the confessional border; Cleverly he will also have
exploited the fear of a Hungarian hegemony, which existed in Serbia as well as in Wallachia, which only a
century earlier had won state education in hard fights against the Hungarian crown. When the Hungarians
began to negotiate with the Ottomans in the spring of 1444, the situation in the Balkans became
ambiguous; Peace-loving, as well as satisfied Serbs and Wallachians, stood the skilful followers and allies
of Skanderbeg, the Pindosvlachen and Byzantines (in Morea). If Hungary was weakened by the departure
of its allies, then King Ladislaus also had a growing nobility opposition in his native Poland and the not
exactly friendly attitude of the German Emperor Frederick IH. to ward off 168. In the Hungarian Reichstag,
the mood was focused on war, and on April 15 Ladislaus had also praised the continuation of the
struggle; but he nevertheless continued the negotiations and sent four diplomats with a stately following of
60 horsemen in the Ottoman capital Edirne, where they were received on June 12, 1444. Clearly, the
attitude of the king can hardly be called. Murad 11, on the other hand, repeated the pledges to Brankovic
and Vlad Dracul and offered the Hungarians a ten-year truce. The sultan was under enormous pressure:
his surroundings had given up hope of salvation; Although Murad H. prepared for the war, many noble
and rich had fled to the safe Asia Minor Bursa, the former residence of the Ottomans. After the departure
of the ambassadors, the sultan from Adrianople (July 12, 1444) set out for Bursa; He left his son Mehmed
and Halil Pasha behind. In the same month, another Ottoman legation appeared in Ofen, which Brankovic
reinstated in his reign; the important Danube forts Smederevo and Golubac were handed over to the
Serbs, and on 15 August a formal peace of the Serbs was concluded with the Sultan.19 The Despotate
and Wallachia remained Ottoman vassals, but left the war. 52
With Hungary, things were far more difficult. On 25 and 26 July, the Ottoman diplomats met in Szeged on
King Ladislaus. Whether it came to a formal peace agreement between Unganl and the sultan, is - in the
context of further development - between the scholars violently controversial. In any case, the Ottomans
took advantage of it and pulled Ladislaus in the aftermath of the word break. Regardless of whether the
king made a peace or not, on August 4, 1444, he vowed to cross the Danube near Orsova until
September 1, and drive the Ottomans out of Europe that same year. The now successful Christian
uprisings in the Morea and Albania, but above all a larger alliance of Christian states called Ladislaus to
strike. While fighting was going on inside the Balkans, Pope Eugene IV had not idleness to support the
seemingly obvious success against the Ottomans and thus the realization of the summoned church
union. Venice, Burgundy and the small, strategically important Ragusa promised help. Of course, Duke
Philip the Good of Burgundy did not personally go into the field, but he sent a naval organization from
Flanders to the east. Venice had been attentive to the situation, but cautiously restrained: the prospect of
the conquest of the ports of Salonika and Gallipoli, which Cardinal Cesarini promised to the Republic, as
well as other ports in the south of Albania and Thrace, had a convincing argument. So ran on 22 June
1444 a reinforced with Venetian ships papal fleet against the Dardanelles. This news was instrumental in
getting Hungary back to arms72. In the autumn of 1444, the situation came to a head: in Edirne there was
a serious riot of the Janissaries at the end of September, with a big fire also breaking out. Sultan Murad II
had meanwhile beaten his opponent in the east, Ibrahim of Karaman, again and hurried to the west on the
news of the Crusader attack. The decisive factor was that the Christian fleet could not prevent the
Ottoman army, with predominantly Genoese assistance, crossing the straits and rushing towards the
Christian land army. The two armies met in the Bulgarian city of Varna on the Black Sea on 10
November. After extraordinarily violent struggles, the happiness of the slaughter already tended toward
the Christians, when King Ladislaus felt careless; The attack was slain. The Christian army disbanded
and its warriors were killed in flight or captured in the following days. Cardinal Cesarini remained missing,
Johann Hunyadi, however, was arrested by the Wallachian voivode on the run l73. The defeat caused
short-term devastating effect, it broke the Hungarian attack spirit and the Wider53
but the will of the rebellious Balkan Christians is not. But it would be twenty years before a pope could
send a crusade of greater magnitude eastward again. The Ottoman Empire had asserted itself, but at the
price of severe shock. His losses were high; the riots in Edime had been a warning sign to the sultan. He
then took an extraordinary step: while Ladislaus' head was sent through the Ottoman Empire in a jar filled
with honey, Murad II handed over his young son Mehmed Ir. the rule and retired to the idyllic located
small Asian Manisa (Magnesia) at the foot of the Sipylosgebirge. Mehmed did not rule alone, but the
experienced Grand Vizier Halil Pasha led the scepter. This unrest at the Ottoman state peak gave the
rebellious Balkan rebels an important respite after the horror of defeat; This was extended by the inability
of the young Mehmed to control the state ship. He came into conflict with his Grand Vizier, who recalled
Murad from his retirement in the spring of 1446. In midsummer 1446 Mehmed was deposed by his father
and now had his turn to go to Asia Minor. He was not out of favor. On the Christian side, no one was able
to exploit the difficult situation of the Ottomans. Rather, each went his own way, especially the Venetians,
who defended themselves against allegations of lack of military aid, but at the same time negotiated with
the Ottomans and on February 23, 1446, came to the conclusion of a peace 174. As a result, they no
longer wanted to risk this prematurely. Pope Eugene IV soon blessed the temporal, and his successor,
Nicholas V, for the time being refrained from further plans of attack. The Hungarians had to recover from
their defeat. The Serbian despotate had tied his fate to the Ottoman Empire. And so in the Balkans, only
the Peloponnesian despot Konstantin Palaiologos and Skanderbeg remained with his followers, who
continued the fight begun in the autumn of 1443. You must now turn to the presentation again. The
events of the first four years of Skanderbeg's uprising are only vaguely outlined and strongly surrounded
by legends woven as early as the sixteenth century by the historians of the Albanian national movement
after 1900 as a colored tapestry. whose blaze of color blends, but rather the wishful thinking of the 20th
Century as the reality of the 15th Century expresses. Skanderbeg's first concern was to secure the rapid
successes of the November 1443 coup d'état. The Ottoman garrisons of Petrela, Stellush and Bila Kamin,
who had escaped the insurgents, 54
retreated to Ochrid, past the "sultans servants" slain by wolves and dogs; Among them must have been
men like HlZlr bey. They immediately attempted a counter-attack, which was prevented by a quick attack
by Skanderbeg. In the east of the rebellion, the inhabitants of the ethnically mixed landscape Dibra
Skanderbeg had joined, Albanians, Slavs Bulgarian and Serbian tongue and Vlachen; Skanderbeg's ride
westward was followed by the rugged mountainous regions of Mati and Kruja, populated heavily or almost
exclusively by Albanians. Skanderbeg went after the attack on Kruja immediately back to the east, where
he locked the passes on Mount Mokra and Svetigrad. Ice and snow, however, prevented the storming of
all Ottoman castles. Then he went to sub-Dibra to Moses Golem, the local helmet. Together with him he
returned to Kruja, where he welcomed the nobles of Albania, including his nephews Muzaki d'Angelina
and the sons Jellas, Gojko and Georg Balsie, as well as his brother Gjin Muzaki, husband of Vlaica
Kastriota; Troops and money arrived from another brother-in-law, Stefan Cmojevic, from the Black
Mountains. 177 In other words, Skanderbeg was welcomed by his other relatives. The Kastriota had now
to face the world of the ancient Albanian nobility; in the south Komino Araniti and his noble friends who
had already started the uprising; and in the north a large number of lords over small mountain rulers,
power-conscious, warlike, jealous of their independence. They paid close attention to their rank and
claim. Thus Giovanni Musachi notes: "He (Skanderbeg) regained Mati, the reign of his father, then he
took possession of the city of Kruja, which his father had not possessed" 178. Kruj a had heard Thopia
before the Ottoman conquest, and all the world knew that. And the gentlemen distinguished exactly
between legitimate inheritance and doubtful conquest. Tradition and tradition dominated her thinking. In
the autumn of 1443, Ottoman castles were broken in central Albania, but not in the south; The Crusade
fictional artist passed by on the Albanian coast in the summer of 1444, and reports of events in the inner
Balkans will not have been lacking. All this, above all, the further development in the Albanian region itself
required an in-depth consultation, a meeting of the various gentlemen, what was called in the Albanian
tradition Kuvend (from Latin conventus). And in the spring of 1444, such a nobility meeting was also
invited to the Venetian Alessio. The place had the advantage of being easily accessible to most
gentlemen, but above all it was on neutral - Venetian - floor l79. 55 but most of all he was lying on neutral
- Venetian - soil l79. 55 but most of all he was lying on neutral - Venetian - soil l79. 55
On the day trip from Alessio the Albanian nobles of the southeastern Adriatic coast took part 180: The
biographers mention Komino Araniti and Andreas Thopia with his sons Komino and Muzaki and his
nephew Tanush, former owners K.rujas, now lords on Petrela, who after their famous ancestor Karl
Thopia, once Duke of Durazzo, called KarloviCi; they controlled a part of the lower ~ Albanian plain and
the cliffs of Himara; Central Albania was represented by several gentlemen of the Muzaki family, as well
as Georg Strez BalSic, whose brothers Ivan and Gojim had stayed at home; from the north came Paul
and Nikola Dukagjin, lords of the highlands east of Alessio; Peter Span with his sons Les, Bozidar, Uros
and Mirko 181, gentlemen in Kirital near Drivasto, maintained close relations with Amselfeld, where they
served the Serb despots and one of them temporarily managed the mining town of Novo Brdo; Leka and
Peter Dusman, lords of a lordship north of the middle reaches of the Black Drin; Leka Zaharia, the lord of
the castle of Dagno, whose power included the surrounding villages 182; Stefan Cmojevic, sovereign of
Montenegro, descended from the mountains north of Lake Scutari with his sons GojCin and Ivan. The
meeting was not purely Albanian; Many of the gentlemen also had ethnically mixed areas, especially
around the Skadar Lake, on the Black Drin, but also in the Albanian-Greek-Vlachian region in the
south. Barletius also emphasizes this aspect when he speaks of "the neighboring princes and petty kings
(reguli), both epirotic (d. H. Albanian7 ~ 0. S) as Illyrian (ie Slavic 7 ~ 0. S) origin "speaks 183. Visible
were three extremely loose power blocks in the Kuvend: The gentlemen in the south who had to tame the
Ottoman garrisons of Valona and Gjirokastra, but long term because of its proximity to the main gateway
to Albania, the Via Egnatia, and particularly endangered to the rich Ottoman province of Thessaly, the
gentlemen in the north, who had little connection with each other and who themselves fell into the power
districts of the Dukagjin in the south and the CmojeviCi in the north, the latter had to take account of a
large number of pastoral warriors' associations, including a group of old but weakened families in the
broader Kruja area, especially BalSiCi and Zahm-ia. Alessio's administrators, the Venetians, appear
marginal in the reports. In contrast to the venice-friendly portrayals of Barletius, however, it can be
assumed that the republic viewed the aristocratic alliance with a disdainful eye. She did not want to have
anything to do with the arrests, and therefore forbade her subjects to lease the tolls of the masters; in fact,
this was a blocked capital, because funds were procured by the noblemen of the Verpach56.
of charges 184. Incidents did not wait; Skanderbeg offered Venetian enemies protection and AsyP85. In
the summer of 1444 Skanderbeg's men were already driving away the cattle of the inhabitants of Alessio
and abducted many people. The neighborhood with the Adriatic naval power had begun under
unfavorable circumstances. About this noble meeting are no contemporary reports VOl · 187. It was not
until about seventy years later, at the beginning of the 16th century, that the Skanderbegbiographers
Barletius and Demetrio Franco and the Middle Albanian nobleman Giovanni Musachi described the
Kuvend. While there is no reason to doubt that the meeting actually took place, caution should be
exercised when examining their political content. Because it can be assumed that the three writers
described less the actual events, but the memory of the heroic past. Her writings are also documents of a
culture of remembrance, which originated in 1500 in Italian exile, a culture of remembrance that was
decidedly Venice-friendly and in retrospect reluctantly emphasized discrepancies between the
participating noble houses. The content of the negotiations is best described by the nobleman Giovanni
Musachi, because he reflects the memory of the Albanian nobility and does not follow the somewhat
euphemistic, since Skanderbeg glorifying narrative of Barclays. He reports: "Then the gentlemen of
Albania took counsel in Alessio, one went himself, the other sent representatives, so that said
Skanderbeg became the captain in Albania, each contributing each team and money to his fortune; Some
of the sons of these gentlemen also fought under him to learn warcraft and to defend W11's reign as
well; as said Lord was warlike and brave, he was made a captain, and each one obeyed him. "188 The
nobles therefore chose one of their own, whom they paid particular attention to because of his military
experience and character, as leader of their followers in particular, when he says that the gentlemen
referred to Skanderbeg as "our good son and brother, as far as age is concerned, but our venerated
father, in virtue and bravery," 189. An actual program for a political reorganization was not
formulated. Skanderbeg, however, announce that he sees himself as the "heir of the balsa" 190. With this
he expressed several things: he used a conservative political language, he used traditional prisoners of
political negotiation, and at the beginning of his uprising he also represented ideas that were entirely
based on the Byzantine-influenced, self-reliant orthodox nobility of the southeastern Adria were
aligned. 57 which were aligned with the tradition of the Byzantine-influenced, self-reliant Orthodox nobility
on the southeastern Adriatic. 57 which were aligned with the tradition of the Byzantine-influenced, self-
reliant Orthodox nobility on the southeastern Adriatic. 57
He claimed the fame and prestige of the once mightiest North Albanian gender - so he refused to
emphasize the name of his own, young and in the circle of the traditional nobility far less respected
family. At the same time, however, he supplanted the descendants of the warrior brute BalSa IU with this
claim. (t. 1421), who participated in the Kuvend. His country and the whole Principality of BalSiCi, which
the Venetians had taken possession of, he demanded: this was an open declaration of war against
Venice and a veiled enjoyed to its state, as far as they, like the Zaharia and the BalSi6i, ruled in areas,
about the once BalSa IU. his sword had swung. But most families did not feel threatened. You will have
rather noted that Skanderbeg was integrated into their world and supported their essential goal - the
reestablishment of conditions prior to the Ottoman conquest. In the spring of 1444, the desire for
"freedom" was a key driving force: "We make you our captain-general, defending our dear freedom, and
we hope for the Supreme God that there should be no power to ours, The words that Franco puts into the
mouth of noblemen 191 • But the rebellion did not want any innovations, but a return to the tried and
true. Byzantine contemporaries such as Chalcocondyles and Kritobulos agree that the strong desire for
freedom of mountain dwellers was the trigger of the uprising, their unwillingness, To pay taxes and obey
strangers: "They did not want to pay tribute to the sultan, nor obey or obey the gate himself" 192. The
rebellious areas, on the edge of the Ottoman Empire, often also mountain areas, refused to integrate into
a new empire, refusing to abandon the local and regional self-rule cherished in the centuries of Byzantine
weakness. The rejection of perceived as unfair innovations such as the Timar system or the loss of the
own country was the focus of the nobility meeting. Everything should be as it once was: a multitude of
lesser gentlemen in narrow-minded dominions, the resurgence of innumerable tangled feuds, the
uninhibitedness of the unifying, lawful power of a great empire. It was a profoundly conservative
movement that opposed a new era: after Rome and Byzantium, the Ottomans, as the third great empire,
set the whole Balkan region under another capital, Constantinople on the Bosporus. Not the entire
population of the rebellion resisted the centralization of the rule, against tax and monopoly power of the
empire. In the following decades it should prove to be a deeper one Not the entire population of the
rebellion resisted the centralization of the rule, against tax and monopoly power of the empire. In the
following decades it should prove to be a deeper one Not the entire population of the rebellion resisted
the centralization of the rule, against tax and monopoly power of the empire. In the following decades it
should prove to be a deeper one
58
Crack by the inhabitants Dibras, Matis and the plains on the Adriatic went. What distinguished the
insurgents from the Ottomans, what made them outwardly recognizable, was their faith. Christianity
served as a unifying band of rebels against the Muslim Ottomans, the carrier of the new empire. The
rebellion had broken out when a general mood of rebellion against the Ottomans had seized the
Balkans; not along linguistic or ethnic boundaries were the fronts. They were Albanians, South Slavs, and
Vlachs, who had risen; and it was Christian lords, Albanians, and South Slavs who adhered to the
orthodoxy that gathered in Alessio. In their confession to Christianity, they saw an essential separation
from the Ottomans: Skanderbeg's public confession of the faith of his fathers, the mass return of the
renegades to Christianity revealed after the fall of Krujas an important feature of the uprising. Already at
the capture of Stellush, those Ottoman defenders who feared the wrath of the sultan had been
baptized. At Christmas 1443, Barletius said, the baptism of Hamza Kastriota and his followers was
celebrated. 193 Christian nobles and their followers had risen up against the Sultan, against an empire
that linked them to another religion, Islam. The renewed acceptance of the Christian faith by the leaders
of the uprising sent the strongest possible signal of demarcation and resistance. This did not mean,
however, that they were followed by all the clu-s subjects of the sultan.
PASSED OPPORTUNITIES Alessio's aristocratic alliance had to find its place in a political world that was
not just Balkan but European. In the East, the Ottoman Empire recovered from its deep crisis. In 1446,
Murad Ir returned. Manisa retired from his old age, put his son Mehmed back in the second rank, and
again took over all his power, and with a hard hand he threw down the uprising in the Peloponnese (1446)
.1447 he gave his army rest, but in the following year In the meantime, the insurgent nobles had to take
Italy's political power into consideration, and the opposition between Alfonso V in Naples and the
Venetian Republic quickly gained in severity, and both moved on the east bank of the Adriatic Ally Alfons
V.
59
vassals who threatened the Venetian maritime trade. In February 1444, Stefan VukCi6, Prince of
Herzegovina and rival of Venice in the Zeta, joined the king at 194. Shortly thereafter, that is, just a few
weeks after the Kuvend in Alessio, Stefan and GojCin Crnojevi6, two of the most powerful lords of the
Alliance, negotiated with Venice and made far-reaching demands, especially wishing them villages and
farmland on the Adriatic and the skyline ; again the rule was that pastoral leaders had to feed their
followers. In July 1444, the two CrnojeviCi received the Venetian civil rights in l95. Venice had
compensated Alfons' V. Zug with it. The Kastriota family also tried to get back to Venice to reassure
themselves: in the interest of the family, and not in the name of Kuvend, Skanderbeg and his brother
Stanisa turned to the Republic; they were granted citizenship, the Senate promised them and ten
followers asylum, but wanted to know of a lease of Kastriotazöllen to Venetians (20.2.1445)
196. Citizenship in the eyes of the Balkan nobles meant no loyalty, but an insurance for emergencies. For
the Venetians, in turn, the neutralization of the Aragonese influence was in the foreground. This was
noticeable a few weeks later: In March 1445 Stefan VukCi6 and the Serbian despot Georg Brankovi6 had
concluded an alliance that was clearly directed against the Venetian possessions on the Adriatic. Both
princes wanted to wrest the Signoria from the ports between Cattaro and Dulcigno. As a counterbalance
to this power block, the republic won the Bosnian king, and in August 1445 she succeeded in removing
VukCi6 from the Serbian alliance. He received for it houses in Cattaro, Zara and Venice 198. Farther
south, Komino Araniti looked to Naples. His situation was not easy. Although he had started the uprising
in late summer 1443, but the nobles had transferred the leadership of the fight Skanderbeg. The
renunciation will not have fallen as easy Araniti, as Barletius describes this, because in 1444 he had
finally contacted Pope Eugene IV, had solved the pontiff of his allegiance to the Sultan, he was promised
indulgence and handed over a papal crusade flag and, finally, Johann Hunyadi had also considered him
his peer l99. It is therefore not surprising that Araniti did not give up his external relations. In July 1446 he
sent Abbot Lazar to the Curia; The abbot returned to Albania with presents, including a horse and a gold-
knitted silk scarf. Shortly thereafter, another envoy called Theodoro Albanes crossed the Adriatic and
handed in King Alfonso in Naples precious hunting birds, a popular gift of the Balkan lords. All these were
visible symbols of the foreign policy autonomy of the Aranite20o • a popular gift from the Balkans. All
these were visible symbols of the foreign policy autonomy of the Aranite20o • a popular gift from the
Balkans. All these were visible symbols of the foreign policy autonomy of the Aranite20o •
60
Schopf: In October 1447, his ambassador Bernardo Lopez toured Albania, Herzegovina and Hungary with
the mission to forge an alliance against Venice and to carry the Italian fight against the Signoria to the
Balkans201. Alfons aggravated the warlike turmoil that had seized the Balkans after 1444. For already in
the winter of 1444/45 the Ottoman vassal Georg Brankovi6 had begun the fight against Venice202. The
Aragonese alliance system, which now also included Skanderbeg and Araniti, gave him the prospect of a
military victory; this also attracted the CrnojeviCi. The lords of the Kuvend became the instrument of
Italian power politics. A two-front war threatened, in the east against the Ottomans, on the Adriatic against
Venice. After the quick success of the survey Skanderbeg first had to secure his eastern flank. Between
1444 and 1447 there were repeated skirmishes in present-day western Macedonia, especially in the
mountainous, densely forested Mokra, of which, however, only the biographers tell. Skanderbeg mainly
defended the passes there; Thus, in 1445 in a narrow forest valley in the Mokra, he probably surprised an
Ottoman army under Feriz bey, voivode of Sitnica in Kosovo and former dignitary in Nicopolis - an
acquaintance of Kastriota203 - but then managed an Ottoman raid led by a Mustafa was not to
prevent; Also in 1447 Ottoman riders in the Skanderbeg area ravaged: "The beautiful land was plundered
and under the sword of the barbarians the trees fell ... Between the house of Osman and Skanderbeg the
relationships never broke even in later decades. Such a feeling is therefore conceivable. Skanderbeg,
however, did not abandon his attitude. He had already gone too far, and most of all, he had something
completely different in mind. He planned another large-scale pincer attack on the osmani61
German Empire, along with its most important ally, the great Turk fighter of the north, Johann Hunyadi, or
Janko, as it was called in the Balkans. Because he knew that only by offensive, only by the destruction of
the Ottoman state in Europe, his rebellion would be successful and, above all, permanent. The example
of Aranitis warned him: The hero of the Albanian South had remained stuck in his mountain fortress in the
1930s, had to fend off attacks year after year and was ultimately forced to his knees. The connection with
Hunyadi also fit into the great politics, because the Hungarian imperial administrator merged with Alfons
V; Skanderbeg was in contact with both gentlemen, as he had already done in 1443-44, thus leaving
Venice at the same time. The "Sandorbegus", how Skanderbeg was called in Hungarian206 was in
constant communication with Janko. For on April 16, 1446, the Council of Ragusa, which was nominally
under Hungarian supremacy, at the request of Skanderbeg had let write a letter to Hunyadi. This was
followed by negotiations: Hunyadi in turn sent ambassadors to Skanderbeg and Araniti Komino - thereby
recognizing the political dual leadership of the Albanian masters. Shortly before the campaign that
Hunyadi began in the late summer of 1448, it had come to an actual alliance. It was decided at Kuvend's
second quasi-summit meeting, "said lords of Albania have taken counsel among themselves," as it was
called207. After that Hunyadi should advance along the Morava and Skanderbeg attack the Ottomans
from the western flank208. In order to ensure the success of the company, but two other powers had to
be won, the Serbia Georg Brankovics and Venice. Both refused. The Serbian despot had obtained from
the Sultan what he wished, and now he was afraid of a Hungarian preponderance. The Signoria, in turn,
was concerned for her peace with Murad H. and saw no reason to support partisans of Naples. Between
Hunyadi and Brankovic, the tone was sharpened so much that the regent threatened to depose the
despot 209. However, Hunyadi believed himself sufficiently secured by his alliance with Albanian Kuvend
and Wallachia. He had not taken into account the shortsightedness of the Albanian nobles. For what
happened in Albania in 1447 and 1448, Against the background of the global political constellation -
Hunyadi was concerned about the expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe - hardly believable. But it
shows that most nobles thought only from day to day and were well informed about developments in the
big politics. Finally 62
Most gentlemen over small plains and valleys were unable to think long term. The success of the
moment, a modest but tangible goal, was enough for them. Only then is it understandable why
"Skanderbeg involved in a petty war for some alpine pastures and a customs station on a caravan route,
instead of preparing for the attack against Murad H. Not big world politics, but the fierce dispute over a
small town pushed into The castle town of Dagno was of great value: once royal royal palace, it lay on a
bell-shaped mountain, which dominated the caravan route to Prizren, behind the customs station and the
nearby little church of St. Mary steeply -in the barren mountains beyond Castle Hill, one overlooks the
plain of Skutari, the far meandering Drin, which came out of the mountains at Dagno, but also the road to
Alessio, lined with high hills and mountains: the whole of Venetian Albania lay at the feet of the Lord of
Dagno, he commanded the weal and woe of the trade in the highlands and the field of Blackbirds; under
his eyes, the animals laden with salt, whose merchandise depended on livestock farming in the
mountains, the salt supply of Kosovo, raised tariffs from the caravans loaded with silver, from the
hinterland to the ports of Alessio or St. Sergius The village of Dagno was small, but it included the rich
plain with famous hunting grounds, beekeeping and orchards.210 • Dagno belonged to the Zaharia
family, whose chief Leka had enjoyed Venetian citizenship since 1442, thus showing the Signoria, how
important the place appeared to her. Leka Zaharia was killed in a feud by his vassal Nikola Dukagjin. The
Dukagjin were the most powerful race in the mountains behind Dagno; they were divided into two hostile
branches. Zaharias widow handed over the castle to the Venetian governor of Skutari in September
1443. Zahm "ias vassals Paul and Leka Dukagjin, enemies of Nikolas, acknowledged this, but Venice
also took over an old feud between the inhabitants of Dagno and the citizens of the neighboring Venetian
town of Drivasto, the subject of the dispute was willows Drivasto, about 10 km to the east It is one of the
most splendid ruined cities in Albania, and in the Middle Ages it was the mistress of the northern
mountainous country, two miles long, its mighty ramparts; a well-paved road led to the high plateau town
divided into a lower town and a heavily fortified acropolis. The city was surrounded by the stream
Kiri. From the castle you could enjoy a wide view, in the southwest to the castle hill of Alessio, in the west
almost to the Adriatic, Skutaris fortress mountain Rosafa was well recognizable, the eye wandered over
large parts 63
the Skutarisee, in the north and east rose the majestic mountain country with its forests and
meadows. Drivasto was scarcely lesser than Skutari; It was dominated by a proud patriciate, who traced
his origins back to the late Roman provincial Roman population and had a distinctly Catholic identity on
the border with the Orthodox world. The city boasted its Latin school, from which numerous priests
emerged, who not only had the say in Kiri, but gained important offices in the cities of
Dalmatia212. Drivasto was in feud with the sex of Span, who ruled in the upper valley of the Kirir
River; here too it was about pastures; it would be to Raufhändeln in the meadows, while pasture keepers
were injured from Drivasto. At the same time Nikola Dukagjin led a small feud with Dagno, Apparently
settled in 1445 by the cession of some mats and villages on the part of Venice213. But Nikola Dukagjin
had evidently managed to win over Skanderbeg, who himself fought a few small frontier deals with Venice
and was probably disappointed with the cool attitude of the Republic at his legation in 1445. Alfonso V
also intervened and drove Skanderbeg in December 1447 to the war against Venetian Albania214. Thus,
the captain of the Kuvend entered a feud of the Dukagjin, but this was only part of the proxy war of the
Italian powers in the Balkans. As an excuse Skanderbeg took an alleged promise of the last Zaharia, the
castle should be handed over to his death the Kastriota215. Skanderbeg probably started the war
hoping the agricultural wealth of the Skutariner plain - grain, salt and winter pastures - as well as with
Dagno to gain control of the caravan route that had once belonged to his father. But at the same time he
was involved in the war of Georg Brankovi in Zeta. Alfonso V. gave good words to Skanderbeg, promised
asylum, but otherwise limited himself to watching his Balkan vassals fight. In the winter of 1447/48 Venice
tried to save the peace. It offered the lords of the Kuvend 1000 gold ducats, but in return demanded the
release of the caravan route and protection for the Venetian possessions meant: Against Serbian attacks
216. Skanderbeg beat this. For this he took together with Georg Brankovi6 and Stefanica (Stefanlein)
Crnojevi6, the Lord of the Black Mountains, in the spring of 1448 Venetian-Albania. There he found, with
the exception of a village (Balldreni) no support. The inhabitants of the important village followed
Skanderbeg, however, only because their village captain appointed by Venice had incessantly plagued
them.217. The Albanian and Slavic subjects of St. Mark's republic did not associate with the noble lords
of the hinterland. The Venetian 64
Rather, cities defended their economic interests against the highlands; again level was against
mountains. The Venetian Landstunn was called up, a Venetian subject, "a clever and crafty person", even
served to name Skanderbeg for 100 ducats2. The captain of the Kuvend first attacked the isolated
Durazzo, whose frightened citizens asked Venice for a separate peace; a guerrilla war broke out in the
plain and the hill country on the eastern shore of the Skutarisee, where the Drivastiner fought off the
nobility; In the wide alluvial land of the Drin between Skutari and Dagno, there was a major battle in June
1448. The Skutarin city squad, led by powerful pro-Venetian patricians of the city, and Venetian
mercenaries under Daniel Juri6, a captain from Sibenik (in Dalmatia) 219, fought against warriors of the
aristocracy; Skanderbeg won. After a laborious siege he also won Dagno - to the delight of the Dukagjin,
whose interests the Kastriota had enforced here. The guerrilla warfare then shifted to the rugged, densely
wooded hill country on the eastern shore of Skadar Lake, where the Spaniards were in feud with the town
of Drivasto. The battle was fought over the ruined city of Balezo, once a bishopric at the foot of Mount
Maranaj; Skanderbeg set up a ski jumping hill there, his nephew Hamza fühD: e skirmish against the
Drivastiner and suffered a severe slap against the citizens of this big city. Worse still, when Skanderbeg
attempted an attack on the Venetian antivari, a city about five kilometers off the coast, on its heavily
fortified, slightly rising plateau was hardly ingestible. It was planned that the Kastriota with George
Brankovi6s and Stefanica Crnojevi6s followers should unite to a raid. But the Venetians in Antivari had
not been inactive: they had tried to buy the Dukagjin, they had won the shepherds' warriors between the
western banks of the Skadar Lake and the Adriatic Sea and split them with a List Crnojevi6 and
Brankovi's general Altoman. With the help of the neighboring shepherds, the Venetians added a
devastating defeat to Skanderbeg; far from his power in Mati, the Kastriota of his 7,000 men allegedly left
1600 on the Walstatt - a massive bloodletting; the Serbs were also beaten, their leaders deported to a
village near Padua22. These battles had led the nobles of Kuvend less against the Venetian Republic, but
against the Venetian rule of the northern Albanian cities, whose patricians and citizens met Skanderbeg
with great hostility222. The warriors from the highlands had been beaten back by the
townspeople. Venetian Albania was too difficult for the nobility. 65
However, Venice's great diplomacy proved to be even more dangerous for Skanderbeg: at the end of
June 1448, the Venetian Senate commissioned Special Envoy Andrea Venier to move Murad H. to an
attack on the Kuvendruhrer. Venier was to make every effort to destroy this treacherous Skanderbeg,
"this Turk" so that he would be eliminated. "223 At the same time, he was to negotiate with Skanderbeg
himself, the Republic's good relationship with his father Ivan and his Brothers to remember, but above all
to cool his little one "(animum jrigescere); he must not forget the future, for things are not always in the
same state. "Venice did not commit itself in the instruction of Venus: Should Skanderbeg consent to a
peace, he should leave Venice alone, when Dagnos was ready to pay, he was to be paid; but otherwise
Venier should court the Dukagjin and not save with money and expensive robes. Venice's efforts proved
unnecessary, for Sultan Murad H., along with his son Mehmed, was already on the march when advice
was still being given at the lagoon. The goal of the spa was Skanderbegs most important barrier fortress
in the east: Svetigrad, the "holy city". Around this castle, better: its exact location, some legends of recent
science entwine. Johann Georg von Hahn, Austrian consul in the Albanian region around 1850 and
founder of modern Albania studies, one of the first Western travelers to explore the inner Balkans in
modern times, moved Svetigrad to the town of KodZadzik. This is still a veritable eagle's nest today. high
in the mountains near Dibra on a small plain, surmounted by a shapeless rock, whose peaks and rock
formations look like fortifications from afar. Hahn did not climb the mountain; however, Kodzadzik's
identification with Svetigrad followed generations of explorers, partly because early modern Ottoman
chroniclers praised Murad H. for his capture of the KodzadZik castle. In the more timely sources but does
not speak of this village. Later scholars have questioned the identification of Svetigrad with
Kodzadzik. They proposed the "Holy Mountain" (Mali i shejnt) in eastern central Albania, then a ruin near
the village of Kerk, which was popularly known as the "Skanderbeg Castle". at present also a ruin on a
maple wooded ridge near the village Dervenik, east of the medieval village Sopotnica in southwestern
Macedonia, which was later called by the Ottomans Demir hisar, "Eisenburg". From this castle the
Vardarebene could be overlooked, but also the important roads to the Ochridsee and into the interior of
Albania, thus the Via Egnatia, the old Roman-Byzantine connection from the Adriatic to Constantinople
226. But if she was actually the old Svetigrad, there is one final proof still JJ
YY
YY
JY
YY
66
out. As much scholarly diligence as has been used for the localization of the castle, it still proves to be a
difficult assignment. Svetigrad must remain for the time being the most enigmatic castle of the hemus
peninsula. Their importance for Skanderbeg is beyond doubt. It was commanded by Peter Perlat, an
Orthodox clergyman (Protosynkellos) from the Matigebiet in Inneralbanien; The team consisted mainly of
South Slav Christians from Dibra, supplemented by Orthodox Albanians. The well-fortified castle was
accessible only on one side, but otherwise they protected steeply sloping rocks. Murad II had chosen his
goal well: If he could break the castle, then the way to the interior of the rebellion area was open to him. In
a defeat every Ottoman thrust west had to fear for the safety of the supply. On the news of the Ottoman
attack Skanderbeg hurried east; He had to vacate all the seats won in the West227. He had misjudged
the situation and had to save what could be saved. He did not venture an open battle against the sultan,
but hid with his warriors in the woods. Murad II summoned the city to surrender according to the rules of
Islamic martial law. When this was cut off, an extraordinarily violent siege began, to which Marinus
Barletius devotes a whole book of his historical work, clearly revealing the importance of the fighting. The
Ottomans attacked the Mauem with their cannons: siege artillery, which also ruined Constantinople in
1453, was available to the Ottomans to an impressive extent. Soon there was a breach, however, the
Azab and Janissary storms were warded off by rifle fire, the use of pitch and hot oil. Skanderbeg was
barely able to distract the besiegers with his needlepoint attacks. As so often in the medieval fortress war,
however, it was not an assault but treason that precipitated. In the main fountain of the castle a dog
carcass was thrown. According to Barletius, the superstitious Slavic Dibrans would then have lost their
courage. Peter Perlat emptied in vain before the assembled crew a cup of well water. Svetigrad opened
the sultan's gates. According to the Byzantine historian Chalkokondyles, however, the Janissaries had
taken the fortress by storm229. The message ran through the Albanian mountains: On the 4th. In August
1448, correspondence with the client left the Venetian port of Alessio, and shortly thereafter, on August
12, it was known in Skutari that Murad had captured the neighboring castle Belca (perhaps: Belce, or
Bllaca in the Drintal?). The Byzantine historian Chalkokondyles also reports the fall of a fortress called
"Getie" 231. 67
Svetigrad was built by the Ottomans to an important base, the South Slavic population from now on
faithful to the Sultan232. Skanderbeg was fortunate that the Ottomans after a long siege could not feed
themselves in the barren mountains, but above all had heard of Hunyadi's armor on the Danube and
therefore withdrew to the east233, not without crews in the conquered places and not without Thoroughly
devastating Skanderbeg's borderland and, as Ottoman chroniclers point out, destroying the
churches234. The echo of Svetigrad's downfall in the Balkans was great. In Serbia, where monks wrote
notes on political events at the edges of their ecclesiastical manuscripts, a clergyman wrote: " In the year
1448 the emperor (as lan called the Sultan, OS) came against Skenderbeg and took. Svetigrad "235.
Svetigrad's case opened the roads to the interior of Albania for the Ottomans, who were defeated by
Skanderbeg and his allies, for they had lost time and crew in the shots on the coast, but even after this
heavy setback, Skanderbeg hoped Beat Venice in Albania before marching on Amselfeld, attacking
Durazzo at the beginning of September 1448, as before unsuccessful.236 The Venetians had sent fleet
reinforcements from Crete and Dalmatia to the waters off this important port.237 Valuable weeks had
passed. Hunyadi meanwhile set off, probably without knowledge of the events in the deep
Balkans. Skanderbeg now urgently needed to make peace with Venice. The republic would certainly have
demanded a high price, unless on 19 September 1448 a conflagration had devastated its main fortress
Slcutari; several hundred people, including the last Zaharia, had died in the flames. Catholic clergymen
reached an agreement that was concluded on 4 October 1448 in Alessio. Skanderbeg and Nikola
Dukagjin performed for Kuvend. Dagno and the villages west of the Drin fell to Venice; Each year,
Skanderbeg had to send four hunting birds to Scutari as a symbolic recognition of Venetian sovereignty
(similar to the gift of Aranitis to Alfonso V). The Albanian gentlemen pledged to persuade Paul Dukagjin to
surrender villages occupied by him. Venice, for its part, promised the payment of a year's allowance, the
repayment of pensions, the admission of Venetians to the Customs Custody, amnesty for defectors,
asylum for Skanderbeg, free toweling from Durazzo for their own use, Araniti Kominos. Essentially, the
condition was restored before the gun, this also a sign of Skanderbeg's failure.
68
There was barely time for the Albanian to make up for his serious mistakes. He sent envoys to Rome,
where he had two hawks worshiped by the Cardinal of S. Maria Nova; also in Ragusa appeared a
Velireter Skanderbegs and asked for a loan. The councilors gave him 200 ducats, nothing more; They
feared Murad too much (October 20, 1948-39), and any help would have come too late, Skanderbeg
marched eastward through the autumnal mountains, through a rugged landscape where even small
groups of lightly armed warriors would take several days to reach the Blackbird Field It was a tragic race
against time Hunyadi pushed for rapid immigration, but too late! Hunyadis Heerbann, Hungary, Bohemia,
Germans, Wallachians, when Crown Prince Mehmed intervened with reserves hidden behind a bump in
battle243. The Christians were defeated as in 1389. But this time the defeat was final. For four and a half
centuries, the battle decided the fate of the hemus peninsula. Skanderbeg had come up to 30 km to the
place of slaughter, fleeing Christians came to meet him. He returned 244. Skanderbeg's biographers later
spread the news that Georg Brankovi6 had obstructed the march of the Kuvendheeres through the
mountains. Certainly the despot had added to the Hungarian army, and it was not in his interest for
Skanderbeg to arrive in time on the Amselfeld. And Georg Brankovi6 also took the opportunity to capture
his Hungarian rival on the run. But even without Serbian ambushes Skanderbeg would not have been
able to keep his part of the campaign plan. The war against Venice had caused the loss of Svetigrad and
the catastrophe on the Blackbird field. For this the gentlemen of Kuvend, above all Skanderbeg, bore the
responsibility. Actually, his fate was sealed with it. For from now on he was completely in the defense,
and no Hungarian army should come to his aid so soon any more. JJ and no Hungarian army should
come to his aid so soon any more. JJ and no Hungarian army should come to his aid so soon any
more. JJ
YY
69
EXPENSIVE RUHM bought Christian Albania experienced a gloomy winter (1448/49). In the north, Georg
Brankovi6, one of the winners of the fateful year of 1448, prepared for a new attack on Venetian
Albania; For this he also wooed Skanderbeg246. The Neapolitan-Venetian proxy war continued. Only the
gentlemen of the Kuvend took a different attitude. After three heavy defeats they had little choice. The
reference to Naples and the Serbian despotate had brought no fruit. And so Araniti Komino and
Skanderbeg addressed the St. Mark's Republic in separate embassies. This alone indicates that the
Kuvend gradually lost cohesion. Aranite's envoy joined the Senate in April 1449. He did a proper
kneecap asked forgiveness for his lord's transgressions and his connections to enemies of Venice, such
as Alfons V and Pope Nicholas V; he offered Aranitis lands and requested Venetian patronage. Araniti
hoped to become a Venetian voivode (captain) on the outskirts of Durazzo. He was prepared to renounce
his political independence and to run from the camp of Naples to Venice. In return, he wanted better
export conditions for his crops and cattle herds247. The old hero of the Albanian South seemed to depart
from Skanderbeg and only think of his survival. Skanderbeg, on the other hand, was less humble. Yes, he
also wanted to approach Venice, he also wanted a protection under international law (protectionem sui
status), but above all he was concerned with the continuation of the fight against the sultan. He urged the
Signoria to quickly rebuild Skutari fortress, asking for permission to recruit crossbowmen in Venetian
territory248. After the loss of Svetigrad Skutari had gained in importance as a backup of its northern
flank. Because the Ottomans would now march against Skanderbeg's main castle Kruja, unhindered by
the now lost feasts in western Macedonia. Venice, however, did not intend to jeopardize its peace with
Murad 11th by a protective rule over those gentlemen who had invaded last year on Venetian
Albania. Rather, the Republic kept watch over the war against Alfons V; Stefan VukCi6 also moved in
Herzegovina. On the other hand, the Albanian nobles should not be offended, as they provided a useful
shield against Skutari and Durazzo. Skanderbeg was thanked for the offer of troop assistance "to protect
and safeguard
70
that the actual impact would be against them, because in Durazzo, which had attacked Skanderbeg only
a few months earlier, there was a shortage of crew and supplies. But nothing came of the plan. But he
initiated that lasting rapprochement of the insurgents to the Neapolitan crown, which two years later led to
a formal vassalage, and thus also to the final dependence of the rebellious nobles of the great Italian
policy. In the Balkans, too, Skanderbeg tried to make up for the setbacks of the previous year. Probably
also in the year 1449 is his attempt to retake Svetigrad together with Moses of Dibra and Zacharias
Gropa, a wealthy on Ochridsee orthodox nobles. Barletius tells that the gentlemen had also taken
German and Italian mercenaries into service. The attack ended in a debacle, about which even Barletius
only sneers: in pouring rain and thunderstorms, the men of the aristocratic alliance vainly invaded the
walls of the castle; completely drenched they had to retire in the misty mountains251. This was a big
setback. Dressed in a shepherd's coat, Skanderbeg led his warriors westward. Most of Kuvend's allies
had not participated in the attack. Svetigrad, the key to Albanian space, remained in Ottoman
hands. Once again an offensive was clever. Skanderbeg had no other choice than to seek help again
from afar while making preparations for the Ottoman counterattack. Kruja was given to the command of
Vrana Conte, the nobleman, knew the Skanderbeg from his time as an Ottoman dignitary; also the small
castles in the Matigebiet, Bila kamin and Stellush, were provided with crew and mouth reserve252. In the
autumn of 1449 a second legation set out for Venice, in February 1450 a representative of Skanderbeg
appeared before the Council in Dubrovnik; both times tangible results remained. 71
The cohesion of Kuvend had already eased, and external aid was not in sight, as it became clear in the
spring of 1450 that the insurgents would be put to the biggest test so far. Sultan Murad H. was
determined to besiege the rebels in his own castle Kruja in person and finally put down the rebellion. The
driving force was the industrious Crown Prince Mehnied; The complaints of Ottoman subjects about the
raids of Skanderbeg and the incitement of a renegade nephew would hardly have been necessary. For
the first time Mehmed and Skanderbeg measured themselves. The situation developed extremely
favorably for the Ottomans. When her mighty army rolled west in June and reached Albania in July, The
rebellious nobles ran in droves to the sultan and even made an alliance with him. Nikola and Paul
Dukagjin are known by name. Under sultan's protection, they resumed their feud with Dagno and
plundered it in Venetian territory256. The defeats of Skanderbeg and the fear of the superiority of the
Sultan's army were the decisive factors. The Kuvend of 1444 broke during the march of the
Ottomans. Resistance was provided only to those gentlemen who were the most compromised,
Skanderbeg and Araniti Komino. The other nobles went to the Sultan, who "best kept them company," as
the Venetian governor of the Dalmatian island of Korcula (Curzola) learned from Durazzo257. The non-
weaponable population was brought to safety in neighboring Venetian fortresses258. Even Skanderbeg
and Araniti retreated to the highlands with several thousand warriors. Kruja, the goal of the Ottomans,
was defended by a crew of around 1,500 men, including around 400 Italians259. Skanderbeg's cries for
help had finally been heard by the pope. Nicholas V pledged all plenary voters to Kruja's voluntary
defenders, and indeed smaller groups, especially French crusaders, crossed the Adriatic in 260. Not the
Kuvend, but an ethnically very mixed army of Orthodox and Catholics prepared for defense. Initially, these
fighters did not seem to be able to do much: The Ottoman racers and burners (AkmcI) straightened out
the parts of Albania that remained faithful to Skanderbeg; the main barrow, heavily loaded with supplies
and metal for the guns, probably moved west along the Via Egnatia, then turned north and entered a
camp in the plain before Kruja, then called Little Tirana. Skanderbeg himself wrote greatly exaggerating -
in the summer of 1451 to Siena, the army had counted 400,000 men262; a tenth or less will come closer
to the truth. In front of the ramparts, as before Svetigrad, two guns were fired, firing 400-pound bullets at
the castle. Although a part of the 72nd Skanderbeg himself wrote greatly exaggerating - in the summer of
1451 to Siena, the army had counted 400,000 men262; a tenth or less will come closer to the truth. In
front of the ramparts, as before Svetigrad, two guns were fired, firing 400-pound bullets at the
castle. Although a part of the 72nd Skanderbeg himself wrote greatly exaggerating - in the summer of
1451 to Siena, the army had counted 400,000 men262; a tenth or less will come closer to the truth. In
front of the ramparts, as before Svetigrad, two guns were fired, firing 400-pound bullets at the
castle. Although a part of the 72nd
Mauem soon laid down, although earthworkers dug corridors under the ramparts, but the Ottomans had
to find that Kruja was not a second Svetigrad263. On the one hand, the crew proved to be tight-lipped and
steadfastly loyal; There was no betrayal, because Kruja was held by numerous Christian faith fighters, not
by a scared by the sight of the sultan Upper Dibran Landstunn. Then the Ottomans soon found it difficult
to supply their large army from the stockpile in the Macedonian plain; and Skanderbeg greatly contributed
to these difficulties. Because now he found the way to fight, with which he could give the Ottomans heavy
blows. In contrast to the battles for Dagno, Durazzo or Svetigrad, he had given up all attachment to the
fortress war; rather, he burst out of the mountains he knew in rapid attacks; he thereby stopped the
Ottoman supplies, broke up the caravans and worried the Ottoman camp at every opportunity. In a bold
attack on the Ottoman camp, the Kastriota would have been almost captured; He returned to the
mountains with a completely disfigured shield264. At night, his report fire blazed on the steep cliffs above
Krujas, encouraging the defenders, but terrifying the Ottomans. All attempts of the Ottomans to penetrate
into the mountains, he struck back. When the guns failed, the Ottomans shelled the ramparts with stones,
then threw animal carcasses into the castle, but the defenders threw them out again. There was a
sweltering summer heat, and the stench of the dead flesh lay in the air; Epidemics began to spread in the
Ottoman camp265. Under the scorching sun, the Ottomans finally opened the Generalsturm; first
Christian auxiliary troops were sent into the fire to spare the Muslim elite units; Barletius reports that these
planners had asked the defenders in tears for protection; but under the defenders' attack they had fallen
in rows, and their bodies had served as a bridge to the storming Muslim warriors2. Again and again
Crown Prince Mehmed drove the troops forward. The crew stopped. German riflemen had inflicted heavy
casualties on the Ottomans267. The Ottomans then increased the pressure on Skanderbeg, who together
with Araniti at times al: had withdrawn from Lefvenezian territory, which caused embarrassment for the
republic. Venice's attitude was exceedingly ambiguous: Officially, it was at peace with the sultan, but
feared the danger that threatened Durazzo and Skutari in a case of Krujas. Three galleys therefore
crossed before Durazz0 268. Both warring parties, Skanderbeg and the sultan, oppressed the Venetian
73
Governor on site for help; and both sent plunderers on Venetian territory, the Ottomans with reference to
Skanderbeg escape to Venetian territory - so bombarded archers Durazzo allegedly "per jesta" 269_, the
insurgents in turn as an act of revenge for Venetian grain deliveries to the Sultan. Because the Venetian
grain traders pulled from the supply shortage of the Ottomans large profit and supplied eagerly
supplies. When Skanderbeg pillaged Skutari, the Venetians also secured his mouth. Thus, the Republic
of St. Mark provided for both parties, a company that should neither vote for the young Mehmed nor
Skanderbeg27o. Meanwhile, Albania was so devastated by the Ottomans that even the most loyal allies
began to despair: In September 1450, Araniti Komino, whose lands had been completely overrun by the
Ottomans, asked Venice for the settlement of a peace in which Kruja remained in Skanderbeg's
hands; The Venetian Senate said that it was sending a suitably appointed governor ZU271. But it took no
Venetian intervention more to move the Ottomans to the trigger. For the political situation had changed:
Venice and Naples had made peace on July 2, 1450272. Even more important, however, was that
Johann Hunyadi was stirring again in the north: in the spring of 1450 he had been dissolved by the pope
from his oath, which he had rendered to Georg Brankovic. The relations between the Hungarian imperial
administrator and the Serbian despot worsened during the summer; finally Hunyadi moved with an
army, in which numerous Bohemia and Poland served, again over the Danube. After 1448 Georg
Brankovic had made every effort to expand his rule under Ottoman protection: he fought small-scale wars
with Bosnia, deployed soldiers along the border with Venetian Albania, and even sent ambassadors in
Murad's camp off Kruja for help To request Venice 273. He had already demanded from Venice, in April
1450, the publication of the coastal land around Scutari at the news of the Ottoman invasion. Although
Murad respected peace with the republic, his army's cereal red was too large; but he worried about his
northern border. From Edirne was reported probably at the end of August 1450, the arrival of
Hunyadis. Skanderbeg had the messenger intercepted and attached the warning letter to his
ear. Murad, already scorched by the unsuccessful siege, ordered the retreat in the face of approaching
winter and dwindling supplies. He is said to have previously tried to bribe Vrana Conte, then offer
Skanderbeg a peace in recognition of Ottoman suzerainty276 - in vain. 74
I~
The Ottomans were inferior to the world. Crown Prince Mehmed should never forget this shame; the fight
against Skanderbeg became for him a very personal revenge for an unprecedented humiliation. For
Skanderbeg was the first Balkan nobleman who had successfully resisted an attack by the sultan; Only
the emperors of Byzantium behind the famous ramparts of Constantinople had succeeded in doing
so. The news of Krujas's resistance in the West was therefore unheard of. For the first time since the
catastrophe of Varna, fighters of the cross had again won a victory. There are many peculiar stories about
the Ottoman retreat; for example, according to which the sultan died of grief in Albania278; even more
amazing is the legend that Murad 11. shortly before his death married a daughter of Skanderbeg (the
Kastriota was still childless back then) 279. In fact, the march to the east went very hard; Warriors
Skanderbegs repeatedly attacked the Ottomans in ravines and forest valleys, inflicting harsh losses on
them. Murad retreated over the winter to Bursa, Asia Minor, where he succumbed to a stroke on February
3, 1451, during a binge drinking281. Although the Ottomans could not take Kruj a, Skanderbeg had won
at most one Pyrrhic victory. His land was devastated, and he had to admit that he alone would not be able
to hold the blown-up Kruja against another Ottoman attack that inevitably took place. He was not allowed
to count on his noble peers in the fall of 1450. Rather, an open rebellion threatened his
followers. Because the inhabitants of the devastated landscapes no longer trusted Skanderbeg to offer
them effective protection; the noblemen wanted to preserve their possessions above all else. He did not
even have enough money left to start the occupation of Kruj a. With the exception of Krujas, he had lost
almost his entire rule. So Skanderbeg remained only to submit to a third power. He developed a hectic
diplomatic activity in autumn and winter 1450/51. Just a few days after the withdrawal of the Ottomans, he
sent an abbot to Agustino de Renier, the Venetian administrator of Dagno, and offered him the transfer of
Krujas (mid-October 1450). So desperate was he that he threatened in a Venetian refusal to hand over
the castle to the Ottomans. Veneqig declined, true to his cautious attitude, but wished Skanderbeg
success in reconquering the lost and offered mediation to the Sultan, which was what the Republic had
already granted to Araniti. But the signoria did not go further. Skanderbeg then turned to another Adriatic
power. Nothing shows his uncertain position more clearly than that he himself goes to Ragusa 75
He hoped that Dali hoped for help, but there he also wanted to receive papal crusading money, which he
urgently needed for the execution of followers. From the 10th to the 14th of December, 1450, the Rector
and the Small Council of the Blasius Republic negotiated Skanderbeg's requests; but also weighed
here. Caution; even a cash gift of 500 ducats was heavily controversial and was decided only init a
narrow majority of votes286. Skanderbeg could not have expected much more from the small republic
with its trading rulers in the Balkans. The pope's calls to Ragusa did not bear much fruit287. But he
seems to have used the 500 ducats after returning to Albania. Perhaps 200 Neapolitan mercenaries, the
Alfons V. somehow, helped before March. In 1451 he had sent across the Adriatic288. Other embassies
went to Siena, Burgundy (autumn 1451) and to the court Charles VIII of France (January 1452) 289. All of
Europe learned about the battle for Kruja, but also about the distress of Skanderbeg. In the winter of
1450-51 it was to prove how unstable the political situation in Albania was, how unsettled the behavior of
the gentlemen there was. De1l1l the Sultan's army was hardly withdrawn, covered. many a nobleman his
attitude. The Ottoman Albdruck had disappeared, above all, the Ottomans had no important castles break
kohl1len29o. Now, suddenly, Skanderbeg again proved to be a stronger force - probably through the
distribution of funds he filled the power vacuum and pulled back some gentlemen; in February 1451 it was
said in Ragusa that he had " a good part of his reign (signoria) regained 291 • Of course, this only applied
until the next Ottoman attack. Skanderbeg knew this and turned to the third Adriatic power for protection:
Alfonso v., King of Naples. Even after the peace with Venice, he had not given up his sweeping Balkan
policy; the infirmity of the Byzantine Empire nurtured his dreams of imperial rule on the Bosporus. It
seemed as if the young Sultan Mehmed 11th and the most powerful Christian master in the eastern
Mediterranean provided a race for the city on the Bosphorus. Great was therefore still Alfons' interest in
Balkan allies. This is the only way to understand why the Skanderbeg seeking protection and the power-
conscious monarch came so quickly to an agreement. In March 1451 Bishop Stephen of Kruja and the
Dominican monk Nicholas Berguzzi came before the king and asked urgently for help: In Albania one
knew nothing of Murad's 11th death and feared for April another Ottoman attack. On March 26, 1451, a
contract was signed that would determine the fate of Skanderbeg's reign for the next seven years. The
bishop and the monk Berguzzi signed, the first in Greek 11th
76
Letters, a deal that ilu · em pressed gentleman brought the hoped-for relief. They represented "the
prestigious and magnificent Mr. Georg Kastriota, Lord of the ... City Kruja, and his relatives, barons in
Albania". Alfonso V promised to send an army corps to Kruja, upon his arrival Skanderbeg had to hand
over the castle. Skanderbeg and his noble followers assured that they would subordinate all conquests to
the Neapolitan crown; Skanderbeg vowed, after the expulsion of the Ottomans, personally to take the fief
of the king ("juramento et homagio de fidelita et de vasallagio"); Skanderbeg and the nobles had to pay
the king also the Turkish tribute and salt only from Neapolitan stocks to buy. In return Alfons confirmed
the gentlemen all their old privileges292. Skanderbeg became the vassal of the Neapolitan crown 293. He
followed the time-honored tradition of the Albanian nobility to align themselves with the Kingdom of
Naples. Skanderbeg was deeply grateful to Alfonso V, whom he regarded as his personal benefactor. In
fact, without Neapolitan help Skanderbeg would hardly have survived the conflicts with the other nobles
and the Ottomans. In May 1451, he urged the king, through one of his blood relatives, to send the
promised aid across the sea. On May 23, Alfonso "George Kastriota, the Lord of Kruja, our beloved
follower," promised to send Mr. Bernardo Vaquer with two captains, a hundred foot-slaves, and plenty of
mouth-stock; and six days later he informed Johann Hunyadi of this measure, who tirelessly fought
against the Ottomans on the Danube. The Catalan instruction to Vaquer gives an insight into the ruler's
plans for Albania: with the help of the harbor master of Puglia, the soldiers were to be embarked in Trani
or Barletta. Having landed in Albania, Vaquer was to go straight to Kruja, there to greet the gentleman
"Jordi" (George) and hand over the credentials, inform him that the king had sent the men for the Turkish
fight, and also given grain; Vaquer may explain that the king apologizes for not having provided
assistance earlier because of other tasks. With reference to the Treaty of Gaieta Vaquer should then
demand the surrender of the castle and other fixed places and then to receive the fief of the
inhabitants. After that, the Neapolitan Solates would have to take over the watch. But Alfons also added a
clause in case Skanderbeg had a different mind: then Vaquer would have to obtain the transfer in any
way. Vaquer also had to collect news about the castle and the country, possibly also to report in coded
correspondence. Finally, he had to hand over to Skanderbeg a precious gift from the king, saltpeter
and Then Vaquer would have to obtain the transfer in every way. Vaquer also had to collect news about
the castle and the country, possibly also to report in coded correspondence. Finally, he had to hand over
to Skanderbeg a precious gift from the king, saltpeter and Then Vaquer would have to obtain the transfer
in every way. Vaquer also had to collect news about the castle and the country, possibly also to report in
coded correspondence. Finally, he had to hand over to Skanderbeg a precious gift from the king, saltpeter
and
77
Sulfur for the production of gunpowder297. In fact, Skanderbeg had to evict Kruja. King Alfons
distinguishes between "the castles and cities he owns in Albania" and the "land and castles of the most
distinguished Georg Kastriota called Skanderbeg" - Kruja and its surroundings were thus separated from
Skanderbeg's dominion, while Königsland stood beside the land of the vassal 298 , What was of
paramount importance to Skanderbeg was merely a link in a broad Balkan vassalage system in the
political minds of the Neapolitan king.299. For Alfonso V had bound the Byzantine despot of the Morea
(Peloponnese) Demetrios Palaiologos in late winter and spring of 1451 and incorporated into June 7,
1451 the rejected from Venice Araniti Komino in his power structure. Represented by the nobleman
Filippo Pantella from Piacenza, the most important nobles of the Albanian South had negotiated a plan for
joint campaigns: The destinations were the cities of Belgrade (Berat) and the port of Valona. The spoils
were already divided confidently: the Muzakiland north of the river Devol would fall together with the
fortress Berat to Alfons, Araniti would receive its old areas south of it and would also deliver taxes to the
Neapolitan governor of Berat. Valona and the nearby feasts of Kanina would belong to Araniti, who would
not hand them over to any other; Naples would lay hands on the Turks tax and salt production in the
area. In general, Araniti had to leave the important salt trade Neapolitan custody. Negotiator Pantella
would receive the littoral Vagenitia in the highlands behind Corfu as a reward. Only the clause, Araniti
may close a standstill in the absence of rapid assistance from Naples with the Ottomans, reminded that
the document were lofty plans, which opposed the tight Ottoman rule in the Albanian South30o. The two
agreements show several things: Skanderbeg and Araniti acted separately, here the Kastriota with his
"relatives and barons", since the older one, in prestige long superior "Earl in Albania" 301. In early
summer 1451, Alessio's aristocratic alliance ceased to exist as an independent power. Then the strategy
of Naples becomes clear: taking possession of the large castles inland, Kruja - indeed - and Berat as the
target of an attack; Vassalage of Skanderbeg and his followers; Control over the most important produce
of the country, salt, and thus repression of the Venetian and Ottoman competition; indirect dominion over
the Albanian south, where the king would have the donations by Araniti recruited. 78
Sun stood at the end of the first phase of great Ottoman attacks the integration of Christian men of
Albania in the Neapolitan sphere of influence. This had to disturb the Venetians even more than the
Ottomans, as it came so the country behind Durazzo and - at least potentially - the entire coast down to
the Venetian port fortress Corfu under Neapolitan influence. It should not be long, and the tensions
between the two Italian Adriatic powers would revive. Skanderbeg, however, had acquired a respite,
albeit always endangered. After the collapse of the aristocratic alliance, the descent of many lords and the
desolation of the country, he now had to reorganize his rule.
79
11 ANATOMY OF A RISE
CHARISMA During his lifetime Skanderbeg achieved great fame in the Balkans and the West. As the only
orthodox nobleman of the Haemus Peninsula, he had successfully defied the Sultan. His envoys had
carried the news of this success to the courts of Europe. The tremendous reputation, the legends that
soon arose, but hide the actual structural causes of Skanderbeg's political survival. For his fight against
the Sultan, which lasted a full quarter of a century, was not a triumphal procession, but year after year, an
attempt to face a far superior enemy and experience the next winter, which offered protection against
Ottoman attacks with its snow masses. The imbalance of forces could hardly have been greater: The
most excellent army of his time against a small band of peasant and shepherd warriors. A simple account
of engagements, sieges and embassies with Western rulers is hardly able to explain why in the Albanian
region - in contrast to the well-organized states of Serbs, Bulgarians and Byzantines - the Ottomans made
an incomparably greater effort to bring the conquest to a speedy conclusion , Therefore, in the following
chapters will be presented, which special features Skanderbeg and his followers distinguished. Foremost
is Skanderbeg himself. Without him, the war would never have granted those long 25 years. The uprising
was his personal fight against the Sultan, which he fought to the end. He had neither a regulated
administration nor a fixed territory. Rather, he was constantly on the move, in the summer in the
mountains, in the winter, when the Ottomans had left, in the plains. Held in later years
80
he also often gets up on the coast during the hot season. Skanderbeg's rule was not static, it was subject
to constant expansion and contraction. Heavy defeats and successful battles and raids changed in quick
succession. Security never prevailed. Those who followed Skanderbeg had to live a hard life in the
mountains. That many men joined Skanderbeg in spite of Ottoman superiority is essentially explained by
his personality. Skanderbeg embodied the ideals of martial heroism in the eyes of the Albanian, South
Slavic and Balkan peoples of the Balkans. He represents the type of charismatic leader described by Max
Weber: " The bearer of the charisma takes the appropriate task and demands obedience and following by
virtue of his mission. Whether he finds it, the success decides. If those to whom he feels sent do not
acknowledge his mission, his claim breaks down. If they recognize him, then he is their master, as long as
he knows how to obtain recognition through 'probation'. "1. The veneration that the Orthodox population
of the Western Balkans held for such leaders was reflected in the Balkan heroic song.2 In one society in
which only very few people were able to read and write, historical events, the memory of great men and
their deeds were processed in the song - partly into our day. but the Albanian highlands are one of the
core areas of this oral culture of remembrance. "The famous deeds of strong men," says the bishop of the
coastal town of Dulcigno Martino Segono, from Kosovo, were sung in the mountains; praised were the
guys who were ready to "endure any effort" 3. When men gathered, songs were sung to the glories of
their ancestors. Joy and sadness were expressed in such a way. External observers, Greeks and Italians,
witnessed these song traditions. These heroic songs were also found in the biographies of Skanderbeg,
which were recorded by Northern Albanian priests after 1500 in Italian exile. Only covers the shape, the
humanist Latin and the borrowings of ancient classics, this typical Balkan memory of a great man6. The
songs in which Albanian and Slavic contemporaries glorified Skenderder's fame have died away. But this
oral world is not completely lost. Because in the landscape that borders on the Albanian area in the south,
in Epirus, a heroic epic poem was written in the early 15th century that sings the deeds of Carlo Tocco,
despot of Joannina. In Epirus at that time lived Greeks, Albanians, Vlachen, Slavs and Italians side by
side. Carlo Tocco's main opponent 81 which is adjacent to the Albanian area in the south, in Epirus, a
heroic epic poem was written in the early 15th century that sings the deeds of Carlo Tocco, Despot of
Joannina. In Epirus at that time lived Greeks, Albanians, Vlachen, Slavs and Italians side by side. Carlo
Tocco's main opponent 81 which is adjacent to the Albanian area in the south, in Epirus, a heroic epic
poem was written in the early 15th century that sings the deeds of Carlo Tocco, Despot of Joannina. In
Epirus at that time lived Greeks, Albanians, Vlachen, Slavs and Italians side by side. Carlo Tocco's main
opponent 81
were Albanians. The poet, who wrote his verses in the Greek vernacular, did not express scholarly
Byzantine ideas. His work was written on the edge of the ancient world of Byzantium, which at that time
had withdrawn from Epirus; not the old imperial law, but an imperial order, but the right of the stronger,
the charismatic leader, who promised his men fame and, above all, loot. From the so-called "Chronicle of
the Tocco" can be read out the prevailing ideals of the Balkan warriors in the 15th century7. The hero
alone stands out by his appearance: "A handsome youth, tapel ~ a beautiful young hero (Greek
Pallekari)" 8. Personal courage, cunning towards the enemy, generosity and affability against the
followers, Eloquence and wit characterize the leader. If the opponent, according to the Ottomans, is too
strong, he waits, seems to make peace, but he is like a serpent who suddenly "bites and kills their
enemies" 9. In combat, he is always the first: "Like a bolt from the clouds" he bumps down on his
enemies. He stands in the middle of the fray, swings his lance and shoots "like an arrow" into the midst of
the flock of enemies, whose spears of battle he breaks through; nine lances are in his armor, but he
keeps fighting. Alone, he fights in the midst of the adversaries, who press his horse, but he strikes a clear
path with his sword free 10. His slaughter horse and his weapons are the subject of admiration: his
cuirass "shines like the star of the East"; he is" like a radiant sun in the saddle. "He rides a dark horse,"
black as an olive "," a horse from Calabria, beautiful, well-built, pitch-black. "On this horse, the leader
resembles a" tunn "11. The customer of one Such heroes, the prospect of prey and rich gifts are attracted
by the young warriors from the villages and shepherd catteries. "His castles, his lands have all become
richer ... they have great liberties, they enjoy great advantages" 13. Defining the warriors about their
allegiance to such a gentleman: "I was given the opportunity to join the Duke's house. He honored 711, I
miss ~ and much I owe to his friendship. Nienwnd may I say this out of friendship. Go through the world,
east and west, The honor of the shepherd warrior is determined not only by defending his own property,
but by successful combat, but especially by raids on which the cattle of the opponent is expelled. The
ideal of war is the successful raid, in which humans and animals are captured; Ransom is demanded, the
own herd increased. "For many days, the troops ravaged the land for all their strength, plundering,
pillaging, and 82 The honor of the shepherd warrior is determined not only by defending his own property,
but by successful combat, but especially by raids on which the cattle of the opponent is expelled. The
ideal of war is the successful raid, in which humans and animals are captured; Ransom is demanded, the
own herd increased. "For many days, the troops ravaged the land for all their strength, plundering,
pillaging, and 82
Highlights in this life are the celebrations after successful fighting. The people of the castle-towns receive
the victorious warriors: "Men, women, children, and young children, all cry out the name of the Duke
(Cario Tocco, p. Respectfully the locals collect trumpets, flutes and other instruments, "the mountains
rejoice", one sings the old Byzantine blessing "many years" and solemnly hands over the keys of the
place. Then the HeIT walks to the church, where the clerics are waiting in the festival, burning lamps and
candles; in return, the gentleman shows himself affable, distributes gifts to the people and invites to a
banquet; Meanwhile, his men hoist his banner and keep watch. After the feast, the Lord goes on foot
through the streets, speaks to the men, learns their desires, once again distributes clothes and money,
the ruling office and title 19. In addition to the division into leaders and followers, the poet also uses
religious and ethnic categories to describe the epirotic society. Strong and clear is the difference between
(Orthodox) Christians and Muslims; This antagonism is certainly due to the fear of the superior Ottomans:
"The Turks, devious and very vicious, naturally and, as they say, by their right to fight the Christians and
to defeat them completely" 20. Among the Muslims are also Albanians who have converted to Islam,
relatives of Orthodox Albanian nobles in Epirus 2 !: "He is Turkish, The latter pokes fun at the poet and
insults her as a "swineherd" 22; but he respects them again as "brave, admirable" opponents in the
fight3. A fundamental feature of the Albanians is above all their inner dissension, they plunder each other
villages and pastoral Katune24. 83 The latter pokes fun at the poet and insults her as a "swineherd"
22; but he respects them again as "brave, admirable" opponents in the fight3. A fundamental feature of
the Albanians is above all their inner dissension, they plunder each other villages and pastoral
Katune24. 83
This world hardly differed from the conditions in the area of the lords of Kuvend. The
Skanderbegbiografen Barletius and Franco followed in their descriptions several strands of traditional
hero worship: ancient models of Plutarch and Livius, traditional prince mirror, but especially Balkan songs
merged in their presentation. Her skanderbeg image fits in perfectly with those categories in which the
poet of tocchochronic thought, praising her hero's physical appearance: he was a tall man, poorer and
more muscular than any other man, with a broad chest, his eyes bright His eyes were open.25
Courageous, strong, personally unassuming, insensitive to cold and heat, averse to vice, physically
enduring is the hero - he sleeps only five hours, and always in arms, lying on a rug26. He detests
inactivity. Skanderbeg is an excellent orator, he is "smart, alert, lively, generous, polite, just, generous
and merciful", he spares children and women and prevents any desecration, his peers confess to him
"virtue, dignity and wisdom". He loves fighting and is always the first in combat. The hero is
invincible; when the horse is killed under him and he crashes injured, he first kills himself; When the
Ottomans want to cut off their heads, he jumps up, knocks them down with his sword and swings himself
on a fast horse that his hurried henchmen bring to him. In combat, a sword blow is sufficient to kill an
opponent. He is "agile and fast". In the pursuit, he challenges sprung Ann to better meet the
enemy. "Otherwise Skanderbeg was probably armored, armed and equipped, when (danger) was to be
feared, he threatened, if necessary, it showed itself cautious and wise, with all strength he would never try
the highest". He chases after every adversary, sets him, cuts him in half. After Skanderbeg's death,
veterans said he alone killed 3,000 Ottomans in combat. As a special feature they mentioned that
Skanderbeg sometimes bit his lips until they started to bleed. Barletius, the priest, goes so far as to praise
him as "an almost divine man" 29. The recognition which Skanderbeg found in those aristocratic circles
that were politically suspicious of him is shown by the remarks of Giovanni Musachi, who speaks of the
"virtit evalore" Skanderbegs, of which List tells of Kruj as being surprised, calls him a major captain. For
Musachi, a gentleman is characterized by being a "huomo de core e che valeva". He praises that
Skanderbeg was "wise and able and well-disposed"; but above all: "He was a greater Lord than all his
predecessors" 30. The hero is not only a great fighter, but also an excellent hunter: He rides through the
vast Albanian coastal plains and shoots 84
with a shot of bears, deers, wolves. As a famous hunting anecdote Franeo tells of an incident during
Skanderbeg's campaign in Puglia (1461); in the presence of King Ferrante and his courtiers he conquers
a boar armed only with his sword. In Albania, people marveled at another hunting experience: in the
forest of his sister Mamica, a wild bull had caused many people serious damage, so that even the nobles
before him took off; the extraordinarily clever hero cut off the monster's head with "a nice punch"
3! , Admiration is also true horse and weapons of the hero: The Ottomans are said to have brought a
pious awe to Skanderbeg's sword; this sword is said to have penetrated tanks, helmets, armor of any
kind. Three of these swords possessed the hero, and generously he sent one to his adversary, the
Sultan, when he wanted it - but neither he nor the Ottomans were able to lead the sword properly
32. Skanderbeg's warhorse was in battle fume 1, but tame in his master's hand. After Skanderbeg's
death, it was said, the horse had shed great tears and stamped and knocked out day and night, until it fell
to the ground and died 33. Skanderbeg's biographer Demetrio Franco draws the contrast between the
simple-minded hero and his warriors walking in gold and silk34. The hero shares with his men the
deprivations of the small war in the mountains, even in the cold season. He often wears a waistcoat, a
robe of coarse cloth35, So it does not differ from many of its followers - Albanian, Slavic and Vlachian
Shepherd warriors from the highlands. He is said to have put on magnificent robes only on feast days. His
personal modesty he does not force his followers, but presents them with beautiful clothes. The followers
are faithful to their leader: he entertains them generously at his table, where 3500 guests are served. His
big ones bring venison and fish; Guests are highly honored according to the country's custom:
"Sometimes he gave one of his own to drink from his own cup, which is regarded as highly important in
this country". Depending on rank, he presents his men with money and horses, clothes and expensive
fabrics37. The leader also takes care of the fallen; no corpse remains delivered to the wild animals
without being buried. The ideal form of the war is the successful raid, which brings ransom and
livestock39. Franco raves about 800,000 sheep, 60,000 cattle, 3,000 horses from the sultans' stud
farms40. Unlike Toccochronik, however, Skanderbeg is a Christian hero: he beats the cross before he
rides into battle, gives mercy to Christian opponents, takes fleeting ones
85
Christian noblemen with them, frees Clnists from the hands of Muslims 41 • The spiritual biographers
repeatedly emphasize the Christian character of Skanderbeg's struggle. God occupies a different position
than in the worldview of tocchochologist: For Skanderbeg fulfills a mission in his fight against the Sultan,
while Carlo Tocco ultimately remains a temporarily successful robber baron, who is hailed by his
cronies. In contrast to the Tocco, Skanderbeg also went down in legend: the folk songs of the Albanians
recorded in the twentieth century - which in part may have been influenced by the sixteenth-century
biographies rediscovered by Albanian intellectuals in the late nineteenth century - show an archaic,
mythical one Presentation of the hero to whom superhuman powers are attributed42: Skanderbeg had
been invulnerable, he had thrown huge rocks into the air with his bare hand, splitting huge stones; he had
rushed through the land like a thunderbolt, flying with his horse through the air; the Ore, the fairies of the
Albanian legends, had given him special protection and anointed him with the broth of meadow-herbs,
which had made him invulnerable, with the exception of the armpits. A terrible snake is said to have
guarded his treasure. It was believed that Skanderbeg had been born as a "drangue," a mythical being
who had the power to defeat evil. Priests, nobles, and the common people saw in Skanderbeg the
charismatic leader who was legendarily exalted, in folk-thinking even a supernatural being to whom ideas
were attached, which can also be found in other European saga groups. In the case of Skanderbeg, it is
particularly appealing to put the legend's hero next to the historical figure. Because contemporary sources
allow to compare myth and reality. Skanderbeg was a stately figure, tall, a warrior figure. Striking was his
aquiline nose, which was in Italy as a hallmark of the Kastriota family44 • According to Albanian custom
Skanderbeg had shaved his hair almost completely. For this he wore a beret in the style of Carmagnola,
that 1432 executed in Venice Condottiere named Francesco Bussone 45. From Venice he received
precious fabrics for his clothes. In fact, he is always the first in combat. This is most impressively
portrayed by the Venetian governor of Durazzo,
He was surrounded on all sides by Turks, and he forced himself to retire to the mountain, Ul11. to escape
from the Turks, to him. wanted to cut the way. After the report of the Catalans ~ (Alfons' V. Soldiers, 0. s.)
Skanderbeg plunged like a lion among the Turks and killed with the help of their own hand in the bravest
way many of them, so they had to release the way to Skanderbeg and his men 47. The historian Sabellico
had heard from his father's mouth, a participant in the Neapolitan War (1461), how Skanderbeg, a second
Pyrrhus, had ridden through the plains of Apulia at the head of his fast horseman, with his face bare.48
Milanese diplomats in Puglia, Queen Isabella of Naples, Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan, but especially
Pope Pius II lay further testimonies 49. It was this personal bravery and dedication, even in the defeat that
made Skanderbeg a leader in the eyes of his followers. He did not seem to blame his warriors until the
very end, which he did not even take on himself. To free his men from the encirclement, he plunged into
the wildest fray. He fought and killed with his own hand. This must have made a deep impression on the
HÜIE warriors who went out with him. They therefore accorded to Skanderbeg all those heroic virtues that
were sung in song and that formed the nature of heroic behavior. Especially the shepherd warriors
Skanderbeg gladly followed successful raids. The contemporaries, most probably the Venetian general
Gabriele Trevisan, also tell of these who in the summer of 1464 accompanied the Kastriota as far as the
gates of Ochrid: "With the light horses of his land and those of your rule (Venice, pp. 1), he robbed many
villages of the area, burned them down, and robbed them of wholesale and Small cattle and other
belongings in large quantities ". As the Ottoman cavalry approached, the raiders retreated
rapidly. Trevisan added, "All the spoils and prisoners ... have given this gentleman great glory and have
terrified his enemies and neighbors" 50. There are hardly any differences between Trevisan's words and
Franco's report. Skanderbeg's love for hunting is also guaranteed, especially his pleasure in picking
birds. The lords of the Balkans · gave away magnificent hunting birds. In May 1455, Skanderbeg's envoy,
an abbot, appeared in Venice with such a precious present and talked with the Milanese ambassador in
the lagoon city; both were enthusiastic about the nobility of these animals, the wild geese, ducks and
even small goats beat51. The hunting passion had also affected the Albanian clergy. Skanderbeg's fame
as a just judge is also provable: Given the choice, decide his case in Dubrovnik or Skanderbeg to 87
In 1465 an Italian merchant gave preference to the court of the Albanian lord. In Skanderbeg's territory of
Dibra, Mati and the mountains behind Kruj a, the inhabitants followed until very recently into the so-called
Kanun Skanderbegs, an oral custom, which was recorded in writing only in the 20th century and the folk
tradition with the name of the great Kastriota connects53. Which parts of this right of the highlands
actually go back to Skanderbeg can not be determined. It governs human marriage life in a space lacking
written rights, the rights of the great empires, where there are few or no judges in which disputes are
conducted according to strict rules, by the so-called "taking blood" (vendetta). Compared to the competing
common law, which is associated with the name of Skanderbeg's rival LeIm Dukagjin, the number of
people threatened in the blood trap is severely limited in the Kanun Skanderbegs. However, since there
are no sources of jurisprudence in the mountains during the lifetime of the Kastriota, conjectures about its
legislative activity are forbidden. It may be assumed, however, that in the highlands customary law
applied, while one knows with certainty that in the coastal cities the - partly preserved - city statutes and
Byzantine and Venetian law were applied54. Skanderbeg's legendary weapons, on the other hand, have
a peculiar history: the Hofjagd- and Rüstkammer of the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna contains a
number of items of armor attributed to the Kastriota: An almost 90 cm long sword and a 31 cm longer
curved sword as well as the already mentioned helmet with the two goat horns. An art historical
investigation reveals, of course, that the longer sword is a typical Bohemian fencing sword that could
hardly have been in the possession of the Kastriota. The shorter straight-bladed weapon, on the other
hand, could have been made in the Balkans: the Arabic inscription is flawed, and it is unlikely that the
Skanderbeg, who knew the language, would have tolerated such a fake. The sword is a very elegant and
high-quality work, as it is usually found only in the collection of sultans in Topkapl Saray. After all, the
helmet is probably only in Venice at the beginning of the 16th It was then made into the art collection of
the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand 11 at Ambras Castle in Tyrol. While the Hehmeif can hardly date from
the 15th century because of the font of the letters on the helm script, one may surmise that the goat
horns, the central symbolic element, which points to Skanderbeg's fame as the new Alexander, probably
really 88
are55. In contrast to these pieces, that splendid sword has not survived, the Skanderbeg in December of
1466 as a gift from the hand of Pope Paul II. 56 • Ideal hero and historical figure coincide with
Skanderbeg. His charisma repeatedly drew followers, his deeds were glorified in the song. Although there
are hardly any descriptions of the mentality of his followers in the highlands from the Middle Ages,
observers of the 17th century agree that the people from the mountains are proud and wild ... and that
they are more devoted to armscraft than frolics ] seldom] and visiting the churches only on feast days] but
wishing the priests respect and respect; great fighters and leaders were worshiped. For centuries,
Skanderbeg was the epitome of the heroic ideal of the Balkan mountains. Neither the Serbian despot
Georg Brankovic, the rich prince, who commanded a sumptuous court, nor the fickle, personally but
certainly not cowardly Stefan VukCic of Herzegovina, nor the last emperor of Byzantium, Constantine,
who fell on the ramparts of Constantinople XI. Palaiologos seems to have impressed the people of the
Inner Balkans as much as the hero of the Albanian highlands, who was indeed Kastriota and
legend. J1 great fighters and leaders were worshiped. For centuries, Skanderbeg was the epitome of the
heroic ideal of the Balkan mountains. Neither the Serbian despot Georg Brankovic, the rich prince, who
commanded a sumptuous court, nor the fickle, personally but certainly not cowardly Stefan VukCic of
Herzegovina, nor the last emperor of Byzantium, Constantine, who fell on the ramparts of Constantinople
XI. Palaiologos seems to have impressed the people of the Inner Balkans as much as the hero of the
Albanian highlands, who was indeed Kastriota and legend. J1 who commanded a sumptuous court, nor
the fickle, but certainly not cowardly, Stefan VukCic of Herzegovina, nor of the last emperor of Byzantium,
Constantine XI, who fell on the ramparts of Constantinople. Palaiologos seems to have impressed the
people of the Inner Balkans as much as the hero of the Albanian highlands, who was indeed Kastriota
and legend. J1 who commanded a sumptuous court, nor the fickle, but certainly not cowardly, Stefan
VukCic of Herzegovina, nor of the last emperor of Byzantium, Constantine XI, who fell on the ramparts of
Constantinople. Palaiologos seems to have impressed the people of the Inner Balkans as much as the
hero of the Albanian highlands, who was indeed Kastriota and legend. J1
The character of Skanderbeg's rule is anything but unanimous in historiography. Often, one speaks of a
state and thus arouses the idea of a centralized system of power with a clearly demarcated area, a
permanent population and a stable administration building58. But this is hardly a way of understanding
Skanderbeg's work. He has never controlled a permanent territory for a long time. His rule is not primarily
about the space - which will be reported later - on capturing people. The association of persons, the
following, carried Skanderbeg's power, his ability to fight and to survive. The search for state-like
symbols, for the expression of state sovereignty, has masked the conservative nature of Skanderbeg's
self-image. Because as already told, he was not started to create something new, but to restore the
old. Deliberately
89
He joined in existing traditions. The nobility and rural population of the insurgency were marked by a
nearly thousand-year tradition of Orthodox Balkan culture, and so was Skanderbeg. Therefore, he relied
on the BalSiCi, and therefore he never ventured to settle for himself another rule title than the humble of a
"Lord of Albania". The right to give titles came to Emperors and the Pope alone, in the Orthodox world
exclusively to the Byzantine Basileus - only the Herzegovina looked in the 15th century to the west, the
German Emperor Frederick III. The kings of the Balkans, Bulgarians and Serbs, had received their
crowns from these rulers. However weak the dying Byzantium really was, the prestige of the Roman
tradition nevertheless persisted; no nobleman of the Balkans had ever illegally worn a Byzantine court
title. With the fall of Constantinople, this source of legitimacy dried up. Skanderbeg had not aroused the
attention of the Emperor in the dull recent years of Byzantium, nor did he make any effort, for he did not
hope for empty titles, but energetic help. He searched for these in the west, not on the Bosporus. Above
all, Skanderbeg's power was not derived from the age of his family and sounding titles, but from his
charisma as a warrior leader. Even when dealing with Western rulers, he contented himself with a simple
"master" (Slavic: "gospodin", Latin "dominus") and imitated the custom of his father. His records he soon
drew only with his name ("Wi1 ~ Mr. Gjurg Kastriot, The double-headed eagle was the symbol of the
Byzantine Empire and the Orthodox Church, a sign that every Orthodox in the Balkans could read and
understand. Those who followed the double eagle chose the orthodox tradition against the Islamic beliefs
of the invaders, chose the memory of Christian rule against the sultan61. As in the title, Skanderbeg
showed a traditional and traditional connection. 90
Skanderbeg's outstanding position was symbolically expressed by the costly garments and precious
Prussian weapons donated by Venice, the Pope and Milan. It was not until the end of his career, when
the influence of humanistically educated Catholic clergymen increased, that Skanderbeg's self-image
changed. He wore a signet ring showing Leda and the swan: Was this an allusion to Castor, the son of
Zeus and Leda? (semi) divine origin 63 The spiritual world of a nobleman from Dibra had little in common
with such humanistic games. Most of his life Skanderbeg used the habit of a Balkan Orthodox regional
gentlemen, with whom he had been familiarized in his father's environment. He was also contrary to the
expectations and expectations of men, which he had to win as a follower. It was this group of people the
Kastriota was actually based on. The gentlemen of Kuvend did not belong to this crowd of loyalists, for
they were the heads of their own followers, who were not loyal to Skanderbeg. Skanderbeg's followers
consisted rather of Albanian, South Slavic (Makedo-Bulgarian and Serbian) and Vlachian shepherds and
peasants, young nobility, Catholic clergy and a small group of often South Slavic laymen. Mostly they
belonged to the Orthodox faith; only in the extreme west, in Mati and on the Adriatic, will the warriors have
been mostly of Catholic faith. The loss of the Albanian archives makes it extremely difficult, especially the
Nichtadligen to grasp more accurately. The others entered the field of vision of the Italians and the
Dalmatians through weapons exploitation, but above all through embassies, and are therefore more
accessible in the sources. This following was bound by loyalty to Skanderbeg; the castriota forgave
neither title nor office, he created no administrative structures. Here, too, he adhered to tradition: Old
Byzantine dignities still existed, as though they were a slowly dying memory of the orthodox world empire
on the Bosphorus 64. The Albanian Lord did not touch it; and, as he did not presume himself a rank, he
did not dare disobey the tradition. It was precisely this informality, the strong personal, non-
institutionalized attachment to the leader that helped follow the agility that secured their survival for a
quarter of a century. Skanderbeg ruled over a small area, which stretched mainly from the Adriatic Sea to
the Black Drin and consisted mainly of hills and mountains. Seventy years after the subjugation of Dibras,
the Ottoman authorities counted around 44,000 inhabitants (1536/39) 65. Based on the hypothesis that by
1540 the population level before the osma91
In the western part of Skanderbeg's territory (Mati and the land between the Adriatic Sea and Kruja), at
least as many people as in Dibra were lived, and a cautious estimate was made of 11,100,000 subjects of
the Albanian democrats. • Recruit the core of the retinue Skanderbeg in the hill and mountain areas of
Dibra and Mati. The squad of young warriors was often spontaneous. Barletius tells how the young
fellows from Bagasseust poured into arms and formed a fighting harp without any great preparation.67
Since no documents have survived from the Bergland before the Ottoman conquest, those peasants and
shepherds remain largely in the dark, essentially had formed the following of the great Kastriota. After all,
there are information on the number of warriors. Skanderbeg's usual crew was between 2,000 and 3,000
men68, with tension of all powers 10,000 K.rieger69. More fighters than his father Georg Kastriota
therefore could not set up. Great lords in the plains possessed allegiances of 5,000 to 6,000 men. 70
Ottoman tax registers provide information on the economic mode of the followers: the peasants cultivated
millet, barley, lentils, wheat, and oats, and also made cider. Occasionally there was beekeeping72. In
some villages stood watermills73. The shepherds mainly had herds of sheep74. In this small village
world, popes and wealthy peasants formed the village upper class75. As in the Skutarin basin, village
chiefs, called "prim.ikur" (by primikerios) in the Byzantine tradition, were at the head of peasant
communities, but also of Vlachian shepherd catteries76. In other villages remnants of Byzantine official
traditions had been preserved, but titles that were not awarded by Skanderbeg, as in the village Majtare a
"lagator" (Byzantine: alagator) called Progon, or the name "protuger" for a village chief77. This was the
typical peasant society of the Central Balkans: field crops and orchards, livestock farming at higher
altitudes. Few of these local leaders were mentioned by contemporary biographers; Among them are the
Kulca, the Berisha, and the Perlat. 8. Demetrio Franco counts on faithful Skanderbeg subordinates: Moise
Gjurica, Musald D 'Angelina, Gjin Muzaki, Johann Perlat, Nikola Berisha, Georg Kuka, and Gjin Manesi,
"anyone capable, to command a large number of warriors 79. Some of these men survived the years of
fighting and reported to the biographer Franco on their deeds: these veterans included Peich Emanueli,
Zacharia Gropa, Lek Kulca and Paul Manesi, who "with other faithful and brave men almost every time in
his life Followers were "80. The defender of Kruja in 1450, 92
Vrana Conte also deposed the Albanian nobility; Barletius tells us that Skanderbeg has named him "Duke
of Mati." These monks belonged to the group of young noblemen whom Giovanni Musachi described:
"Some of the sons of the gentlemen fought among them to learn warcraft" 82. By name, they were
spokesmen for the Albanian. These sub-leaders had to pay a high blood toll. In exile Giovanni Musachi
especially recalled: "Not without the death of many of our lords and knights" would Skanderbeg's
followers have fought83. Sultan Mehmed II saw in these gentlemen dangerous opponents and let some of
them, who had fallen into his hands, to death martyr 84. Only a representative of an old noble family
served permanently in Skanderbegs envoys: The Knight Martin Muzaki visited on behalf of his master
twice (1460 and 1463) Pope Pius 11 and appeared in 1468 even at the court of Duke Charles the Bold of
Burgundy85. , In contrast to these warriors in the highlands, the clergy of both denominations are more
accessible in the sources; because they issued certificates, and they led Skanderbeg's relations with
Western countries for many years. The orthodox clergy did not have the meaning that one could have
expected. There were several reasons for this: Numerous Orthodox dioceses were already firmly
integrated into the Ottoman power system before the uprising, as in Korc; a, Berat, Kanina, Artalloz and
Kruja86. The higher clergy did not participate in the survey in these areas. In the area of the uprising, the
orthodox center was only the diocese of Kruja, traditionally the northernmost point of orthodoxy in the
Albanian area at the transition to the Catholic world; Near the highest point of the castle was a fresco-
decorated Orthodox Church of St. George 87. The bishops did not follow a consistent line: Bishop Stefan
led the negotiations with King Alfonso V in the spring of 1451. The Aragonese occupation in Kruja,
however, evidently put pressure on the Olihodox: Alfonso V represented the interests of the Catholic
Church. When Skanderbeg and the troops of the King of Naples were defeated in the summer of 1455 at
Berat, the Bishop of Kruja was involved in a plot with which he wanted to pass on Kruja to the Ottomans
88. Eleven years later, The orthodox bishops of Kruja thus did not support Skanderbeg's struggle. Even
the Archbishop of Ochrid, in whose residence a strong Ottoman garrison lay, did not offer the Orthodox
insurgents any help. In the summer of 1466 Mehmed II left the 93rd The orthodox bishops of Kruja thus
did not support Skanderbeg's struggle. Even the Archbishop of Ochrid, in whose residence a strong
Ottoman garrison lay, did not offer the Orthodox insurgents any help. In the summer of 1466 Mehmed II
left the 93rd
Deport Archbishop Dorotheos; perhaps this is an indication of hidden contacts between the prince of the
church and the Lord of Albania. However, Skanderbeg's most well-known aide belonged to the lower
clergy: the protosynkellos Peter Perlat from Mati defended, as already mentioned, the castle Svetigrad in
the summer of 1448. It is also reported that in the year of the war, 1466, a monk from Mount Athos in the
vicinity of Skanderbeg worked 91 • Overall, however, the higher ranks of the Orthodox Church held
back; This is also explained by the complete change in the external conditions. On May 29, 1453
Constantinople had fallen, and the Patriarchate of the Imperial City had subordinated to the Sultan. Two
years earlier, Skanderbeg had become a vassal of a Catholic king and had thus begun a slow - even
ecclesiastical - approach to the Catholic West. The hostility between the Eastern and Western Churches
meant that there was considerable restraint on the part of the higher Orthodox clergy in the face of a
nobleman making a turn to the west. In addition, the church princes did not want to compromise their
agreement with the sultan. The Orthodox Church had so few reasons to support the deep incision of 1453
Skanderbeg. The lower clergy, the village pups and men like Perlat, might have it different. But they stood
for regional and local interests, not for the Orthodox Church as a whole. The attitude of the Catholic
Church and its representatives was fundamentally different. The more the fighting areas moved to the
Adriatic - the case of Svetigrad in 1448 had caused this spatial shift -, the stronger the insurgents came
into the cultural sphere of influence of the Catholic Adriatic. After the collapse of the Balkan coalition with
Johannes Hunyadi (also 1448) Skanderbeg sought help in Italy and Dalmatia. These foreign relations
vetoed less Olihodox clerics - if the Albanian Lord requested support from the Pope - but Skanderbeg had
to resort to the help of Catholic clergymen. First he turned to those church leaders with whom his father
had already plowed Ivan's hand, the bishop of the mountain diocese of Albanum and the powerful abbots
of the monasteries in the highlands. Until the 20th In the 19th century, these abbots enjoyed the highest
esteem among the inhabitants of the mountains; they were far more than just clergymen, they also acted
as political leaders of their faithful. Bishop Andreas traveled twice (1448 and 1452) to Ragusa; he also
mediated the peace between Venice and Skanderbeg in the autumn of 144892. Peter Duka, abbot of the
monastery S1. Alexander in Molendino, served as apostolic nuncio in Albania in 1463 and prepared the
Crusade Skanderbegs93. Even simple religious clerics stood up for the Turkish fight: the Franciscan
Eugenius "from Albania" and his he also mediated the peace between Venice and Skanderbeg in the
autumn of 144892. Peter Duka, abbot of the monastery S1. Alexander in Molendino, served as apostolic
nuncio in Albania in 1463 and prepared the Crusade Skanderbegs93. Even simple religious clerics stood
up for the Turkish fight: the Franciscan Eugenius "from Albania" and his he also mediated the peace
between Venice and Skanderbeg in the autumn of 144892. Peter Duka, abbot of the monastery
S1. Alexander in Molendino, served as apostolic nuncio in Albania in 1463 and prepared the Crusade
Skanderbegs93. Even simple religious clerics stood up for the Turkish fight: the Franciscan Eugenius
"from Albania" and his
94
Brothers of the Order, as for many years, also in the spring of 1457 commissioned the Pope to ward off
the frightened Christians in the highlands94. In the autumn of 1459, the Dominican monk Blasius de Lino
acted as Skanderbeg's comrade-in-arms to help the Ottoman-ravaged mountainous country to strengthen
the Christian faith in the Black Drin, to preach the crusade, but also the Dominican convent of Durazzo
with the help of the Archbishop and canon John Mangiacavalli95. A Frater Alexander made in 1465 the
connection between the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus and Skanderbeg96; and in the horror of the
war year 1466 a Franciscan hurried to the papal court, to ask for help97 • In 1463 Skanderbeg's prior
council also included the prior of the Dominican convent of the Venetian fortress city Skutari, Brother
Blasius 98. The really important missions, however, were undertaken by clerics from the coastal area,
who had better knowledge of the Italian and Dalmatian conditions than the monks of the highlands. Two
men determined Skanderbeg's foreign policy for decades - on the one hand Georg Pelinus, abbot of the
Adriatic monastery Rotezo at Antivari (until 1463), and then Paul Angelus, archbishop of the port city of
Durazzo (between 1463 and 1469). Pelinus' Abbey, high on a cliff north of Antivari, was one of the most
beautiful buildings on the eastern Adriatic ever, with a church of elegant brickwork, set up in alternating
layers of ornate red and gray stone99. From his cape, the abbot looked across the Adriatic, but also to the
south, to the Venetian ports Antivari, Dulcigno, Skutari, to the north towards Budua and Cattaro. The
monastery was conveniently located on the main route of the Adriatic Shifffalui, near the Black Mountains,
not too far from Skanderbeg's power south of Skutari. Rotezo had always attracted pilgrims from the
southern Adriatic, who wandered to the monastery, "rich in movable and immovable possessions, in
villages and cattle," with their miraculous image of Mary. Even the Serbian kings, including Tsar Dusan,
had generously gifted the monks; their records were carefully kept by the abbots 10 1. In the sprawling
convent, a leprosy hospital was maintained, in which several monks (who, although Catholic, were called
"calogeri" by the inhabitants according to orthodox custom) 102. Since 1444, the abbot was one of the
most important partisans of Venice; he had opposed the Serbian influence on the coast as well as Stefan
VukCi6 of Herzegovina l03. As a reward, he received from the Signoria a year's allowance; his career
was also facilitated by Venice: in 1446 the Senate proclaimed Pelinus' appointment as Coadjutor of the
95th he had opposed the Serbian influence on the coast as well as Stefan VukCi6 of Herzegovina l03. As
a reward, he received from the Signoria a year's allowance; his career was also facilitated by Venice: in
1446 the Senate proclaimed Pelinus' appointment as Coadjutor of the 95th he had opposed the Serbian
influence on the coast as well as Stefan VukCi6 of Herzegovina l03. As a reward, he received from the
Signoria a year's allowance; his career was also facilitated by Venice: in 1446 the Senate proclaimed
Pelinus' appointment as Coadjutor of the 95th
97-year-old archbishop. The abbot soon became completely undecayed. With Abbot Andreas he worked
in September 1448 on the peace between Skanderbeg and Venice. The improvement of relations
between these two powers then became his life's work. The republic of St. Mark blew its loyal followers
with posts for its Albanian-Slavic kinship. But it was not the signoria that paid the abbot, but rather it
offered the Venetians considerable sums of money; In other words, the monastery of Rotezo became one
of the main donors of the Turkish war and diplomacy between Venice and Skanderbeg 105. The abbot
procured money through Ragusa 106, among other things through grain trade. Since the Signoria and the
Albanian Lord lived in a constant tension, the abbot soon came between two millstones; The Venetians
repeatedly distrusted him, and the insurgents saw him as a Serenissima man. The incessant feuds wore
pelinus. On his own behalf, he told the senators of the lagoon republic, "I have neither spared my fortune
nor my life in dangers, but always had the honor and benefit of your state in the 'eye', but now he had"
reached a frail age "and could" The hardships in that land of Albania "can no longer endure:" For the land
of Albania is no longer for me "(El paexe de Albania non e piit per mi) 108. Nowhere else does a follower
of Skanderbeg express what all the effort that mean tension of continuous struggle, nowhere does the
conditio humana of late medieval Albania come to light as in this confession of extreme exhaustion and
fatigue. Despite all setbacks, the abbot worked for the cause of the Turkish fight: in 1451 he represented
Skanderbeg in Venice; In 1456 he made an alliance with the Signoria; In 1457 he traveled to the lagoon
and to Rome for the Kastriota; In 1458 he reached another alliance of the two powers, this time directed
against Leim Dukagjin; soon afterwards he was back in Venice; In 1462 the Republic called him again as
Vennittler; the experienced conciliator also went straight to Venice; the culmination of his career was the
contract, in the Skanderbeg and Venice, in August 1463, they decided on a joint campaign against the
Ottomans. 9 As compensation for all the trouble and dangers, the Senate provided the Abbot with a
residence in Venice. Pelinus campaigned for the Christian cause until his death. For two decades
Skanderbeg's most important external connections were in his hands. He failed to reconcile the two
powers permanently. But without Pelinus' intervention, the antagonisms between the Republic and the
Kastriota would probably have turned into an open war. The policy of the abbot confirms the importance
of the regional Catholic clergy He failed to reconcile the two powers permanently. But without Pelinus'
intervention, the antagonisms between the Republic and the Kastriota would probably have turned into an
open war. The policy of the abbot confirms the importance of the regional Catholic clergy He failed to
reconcile the two powers permanently. But without Pelinus' intervention, the antagonisms between the
Republic and the Kastriota would probably have turned into an open war. The policy of the abbot confirms
the importance of the regional Catholic clergy
96
War against the Ottomans. In contrast to orthodoxy, he saw no room for compromise and subordination to
Islam. Pelinus passed the staff on to a man who decisively shaped Skanderbeg's political thinking. 110:
Paul Angelus was a son of Drivasto, the town situated at the entrance to the Albanian mountains. which
was dominated by Catholic patricians and clergy. Angelus was one of them. First, he served the uniate
archbishop of Krajina, the landscape on the steep west coast of Skadar Lake; Paul Angelus accompanied
him in April 1456 on an embassy to Rome !!!. Then he turned to Durazzo, the seat of the archbishop; He
ascended to the archdeacon, but dreamed of something higher. He was not averse to funds, and he
urged ecclesiastical opponents ruthlessly aside, which did not cause a little sensation. But in 1460 he was
at his destination: As archbishop of Durazzo, the man from the mountains was the head of the Albanian
Catholics. Not for a moment hesitated to seize the notebook of the Ottoman war. Like Pelinus he hurried
from court to court in Italy, to Naples, Milan and Venice; like the abbot he settled between Venice and
Skanderbeg; Unlike his predecessor, however, Angelus envisioned a clear conception of the struggle. He
was influenced by the ancient past of Durazzo, legends of his family, which linked the Angeli of Drivasto
with the Byzantine imperial and epirotic dynasty of the same name; he had studied Latin as well as
Greek, and read the ancient classics Come in contact with the humanism of the Italian Renaissance
courtyards; at the curia he was a respected figure; he brought Skanderbeg close to the ancient writers,
told him about the heroic deeds of the Epirotes and about the king Pyrrhus, about Alexander the Great,
son of Epirotin Olympias - he opened up a completely new world to the Kastriota. And it was he who
created the Renaissance hero, the new Alexander from the faith fighter, the Crusader Skanderbeg, who
was to realize the dream of a Catholic kingdom of the Epiroths and his own elevation to
cardinal. Recommended by Skanderbeg to the Italian princes, l13, Angelus forged the crusade plan with
Pope Pius H., he built on an Albanian crusader kingdom. Among his compatriots he enjoyed the highest
reputation, he was considered the real oracle. The Venetians trusted him fully, saw in him the man of
compensation with Skanderbeg. Angelus became a tragic figure when Pius H. died before the onset of
the Crusade, and all the plans of kingship and cardinalate dissolved into nothing. He followed his master
Skanderbeg to the grave a few months after his death (1469). In addition to the figures of these church
princes, who were already noticed during Skanderbeg's lifetime, those men seeming to fade,
97
Skanderbegs issued certificates, its financial affairs worried and acquired arms and war technology in the
Adriatic. Skanderbeg's system of rule knew hardly any offices, and if official titles appear, they were in
Byzantine-Serbian tradition. This shows that the Kastliota did not build a state with fixed administrative
structures, but rather a flexible and smooth system of power that adapted to the needs of a rapidly
changing military situation. A cumbersome apparatus would have meant only one load. Like his father,
Skanderbeg moved in the tradition of the great chancery languages, Slavic, Greek and Latin. 114 His own
office was small; she was led by the Protonotar (a Byzantine title) Peter Smachi, The family of
Skanderbeg had several supporters 115. The Slavic documents for correspondence with Dubrovnik were
issued by one of the most loyal long-term followers, "our scribe (djak) Ninac Vukosalic" 116. Elsewhere,
his office is described by the term "kan 'filer" (by cancellarius, chancellor) 117. This detail shows how
Slavic and Latin merged in Skanderbeg's reign. In 1459, Ninac took over the processing of delicate
money in Dubrovnik. Skanderbeg ennächtigte him, "he dÜlje from my side to your rule speak"
118. Together with Ninac, a writer named Radic produced a document which Skanderbeg provided with
his seal. I 19. Also, a celik Rajan wore a Slavic name, Skanderbeg liked to hand over the exhibition of
Latin documents to the Venetian notaries in the coastal towns, above all Alessio, but also Durazzo, such
as the Venetian Chancellor of Alessio, J ohmmes de Parenzo (Istlien), or the Durazzin Presbyter and
Notary Borius de Grillis 121 • However, there are too few original documents of the Albanian gentleman
for a more detailed description of his office to be possible. Much better is it for the group of businessmen
who quietly supported Skanderbeg's combat logistic in Dubrovnik. A key position came to the Gelbrten-
and diplomat family Gasulus. Johannes Gasulus (c. 1400-1465), who received his doctorate from the
University of Padua in 1430, was considered an important scholar. Travelled a lot, he was known in Italy
and at the Hungarian court of the King (and German Emperor) Sigismund. As an astronomer, he enjoyed
high reputation among the clergy Ragusas 122, where he was rector of the church of S. Pietro maggiore
in 1443 and reigned as rector of the church of S. Maria Maggiore in 1451 l23. This Catholic cleric was
already charged with conducting difficult secret negotiations at this early stage of Skanderbeg's
struggle. In Ragusa there were spies, informers of all the neighboring gentlemen, money and
weapons This Catholic cleric was already charged with conducting difficult secret negotiations at this early
stage of Skanderbeg's struggle. In Ragusa there were spies, informers of all the neighboring gentlemen,
money and weapons This Catholic cleric was already charged with conducting difficult secret negotiations
at this early stage of Skanderbeg's struggle. In Ragusa there were spies, informers of all the neighboring
gentlemen, money and weapons
98
procure here and quietly lead to the battlegrounds. It required a wise, discreet man of unbreakable loyalty,
but at the same time less conspicuous than the abbot of Rotezo, or an archbishop of Durazzo, a man well
integrated into the society of Ragusa; all of this applied to Johannes Gasulus. In April 1451, Pope
Nicholas V instructed him, together with the Bishop of Cattaro and the Vicar General of Ragusa Gelder
from the Jubilee, which had been celebrated in 1450, to hand over to Skanderbeg l24. This mission was
taken over by Johannes Gasulus. because even in the summer of 1451 125. Finally, in March 1452, in
Ragusa, in the presence of numerous witnesses, the surrender of 4893 Hyperpern to Bishop Andreas
Summa as plenipotentiary of Skanderbeg took place26. Nowhere is it becoming clearer how the Catholic
Church supervised the financial transactions of Skanderbeg. In the following years Johannes Gasulus led
the negotiations between Skanderbeg and the Blasius Republic. So he obtained on September 24, 1454,
the export of one thousand Annbrustbolzen l27. In February 1455 he tried in vain to wrest the councilors
consent to the construction of a castle on Cape Rodoni, where Ragusan merchants had already traded in
Ivan Kastriota's time l28; but a few months later he reached the fact that his master was allowed to hire a
Ragusan limpet called Blasius Ostoji6 for shipbuilding. He took over his most important task in February,
when he, equipped by Ragusa with ample travel money, went to Hungary to step before King Matthias
Corvinus. The knight Paul Gasulus, no less active, turned out to be no less active. he, too, distinguished
himself by the prudent handling of money transactions and the execution of military embassies; Thus in
September 1453 he fixed a large sum of the Ragusan bank balance of the Serbian despot Georg
Brankovi6; in the following year he received from the hand of Pope Nicholas' v. auxiliary payments; In
1456 it is found in the courts of Burgundy and Milan, in 1458 again in Rome - together with the abbot of
the highland monastery of St. Maria de Trafendana in the fan area - and held in Ragusa 133, in spring
1459 in Ragusa, in June 134 in 134 in Rome he is in Skanderbeg near in the stack Shufada on; in March
1461 he again negotiated with the Ragusan councilmen, in June again in Rome 135, in December 1463
he resigned to the Venetian Senate and in April 1465 to Pope Paul H. 136 The Gasulus can be regarded
as a ballistic diplomatic family; Andreas Gasulus worked in 1457 as ambassador of the moreotic despot in
Ragusa, a few years later (1462) he is found in the service of Skanderbeg 137. As in the clergy, many
men served in the worldly following, whose work is only vaguely known; such as Aesop Sguros,
ambassador in Naples and Rome in 1453: The Milanese whose work is only vaguely known; such as
Aesop Sguros, ambassador in Naples and Rome in 1453: The Milanese whose work is only vaguely
known; such as Aesop Sguros, ambassador in Naples and Rome in 1453: The Milanese
99
Envoy at the Curia described him as a Greek, "a worthy Rittel ~ who speaks exquisitely Italian"
138. Francesco Maramonte, from an Italian family that had already gained fame in Albania at the
beginning of the fifteenth century, traveled to Milan as ambassador of Skanderbeg in 1456 and ten years
later to the curia of l39. Antonius Vasiligievich (Vasilijevi6) served as ambassador to Ragusa in 1457 and
also as a timber merchant between Blasiusstadt and Albania l4o. In 1458 the English knight John
Newport represented the Albanian lord in Rome and Naples; he had previously purchased war gear in
Milan. He does not seem to have much esteem for him at the Curia. Other retainers known only by name
were the Inisser Piero, "Ambassador to the Lord of Albania" (December 1460) 142, the goldsmith master
Georg from Ragusa (1460) 143 and a Stjepan Radojevi6, ambassador (orator) of Skanderbegs, who
arranged ships for the journey to Sibenik or Split in Budua (September 1466) 144. Finally, a "Ruscus
Theodori de Cattaro" claimed at the court of Francesco Sforza to have administered Skanderbeg's funds
(1466) 145. Not directly belonging to the followers, but as middlemen Skanderbegs some Ragusan
patrician families appeared. Members of the GondolaiGunduli family6, especially Paul, Michael and
Paladino de Gondola, took over ambassadors for Skanderbeg, hired specialists in shipbuilding and
fortress construction in Rodoni and acted as agents of Skanderbegs in Dubrovnik. The gondola did its bit
when Skanderbeg visited Dubrovnik in l47; and it will hardly be surprising that they had intensive trade
contacts with Albania: In 1464, Junius, Paladino and Paul de Gondola bought grain in Skanderbeg's
territory 148 for the sum of 1450 ducats. Close ties to Skanderbeg were also maintained by the families
BonaiBuni6 and Pozza / PuCi6 149. These families soon acted in their own economic interest, soon in the
sense of their city republic, which had to balance their military weakness with a policy of good
neighborliness between the Balkan powers. A special group of followers formed those voluntary
Crusaders from the Occident who moved to Albania to fight Skanderbeg against Islam. In addition to the
mentioned John N ewport known from the Skanderbegbiografien German and French, who fought at
Svetigrad and Kruja 150th In 1456 followed Skanderbeg a French nobleman with cross attached and 50
other crusaders l51. Skanderbeg's allegiance presents itself as a multi-layered, hard-to-limit structure:
betrayal (discussed in a separate chapter) runs through Skanderbeg's life. Neither blood ties nor
belonging to the group of noble grandes characterizes the followers. The 100th
sometimes multiple changes from the insurgents to the Ottomans and back, a considerable instability of
loyalty determines the behavior of many men. It should not be astonishing that in the rapidly changing
vicissitudes of the war, most inhabitants of the insurgency tried to survive. Victory and defeat thus
determined the size and cohesion of the followers. The number of men Skanderbeg could rely on will not
have been very great in the twenty-five years of the uprising. What bound these men to the Kastriota was
neither kinship, nor a common language, nor even a national identity. Albanians, southern Slavs and
Vlachen followed him and repeatedly turned away from him. Who fought with Skanderbeg, belonged to
the Christian faith (what this meant is discussed in the chapter "Faith"), but often enough fought against
Christians in Ottoman ministries; those who fought with him rejected the Ottoman rule and trusted in the
victorious charisma of the leader. The war led farmers and shepherds from Dibra and Mati. They were
commanded by a young generation of noblemen, whose hard core was composed of representatives of
small and little-known families. These warriors were reinforced by crusaders from the Occident, but never
gained any special importance. All of these groups were subject to constant change, through death,
imprisonment, overflowing to the Ottomans. But the uprising would never have taken a quarter of a
century, if he had not been supported by money and weapons from outside - this is also the crucial
difference to the Araniti Kominos collection in the 1430s. This help was not organized by warriors but by
diplomats. Two or three chancelleries, the Gasulus family in Dubrovnik and a small group of mostly South
Slavic ambassadors took over secret businesses in the Adriatic. But great diplomacy was in the hands of
the powerful Catholic princes of the church. The Catholic Church was the only institution in Albania that
Skanderbeg unreservedly supported; not a single traitor came from their ranks, while the nobility,
orthodox clerics, peasants, and shepherds kept falling away from Georg Kastriota. That Skanderbeg
always turned 'more to the Catholic faith, lay to the one in that the battlefields gradually moved to Catholic
zones of the Albanian West, but above all, the Albanian Lord paid tribute to the performance of the
Catholic clergy. Unlike the Orthodox Church, she refused to submit to Islam. It formed a unit of interest
with Skanderbeg: both were ready to lead the war to the end. Catholic priests in Italy, therefore, tirelessly
sought help in Italy, and just as relentlessly they endeavored to destroy them Both were ready to lead the
war to the end. Catholic priests in Italy, therefore, tirelessly sought help in Italy, and just as relentlessly
they endeavored to destroy them Both were ready to lead the war to the end. Catholic priests in Italy,
therefore, tirelessly sought help in Italy, and just as relentlessly they endeavored to destroy them
to reconcile Christian nobles and settle between Skanderbeg and Venice. Politically, but also culturally,
the Catholic clerics took over the design of Skanderbeg's Turkish War. The burden of the war, however,
carried the people between the Adriatic coast and Dibra. The Ottoman warfare, deportation and, finally,
systematic deportation and murder were directed against them. Skanderbeg wrote in June of the disaster
year 1466 to Pope Paul II, the Ottomans had abducted 30,000 people from Albania; the well-informed
King Ferrante of Naples, Skanderbeg's feudal lord, counted on 20,000 deportees - a figure confirmed on
the side of the Sultan of Kritobulos 152; Ottoman sources speak of 7,000 to 7,500 Albanians killed in the
same year in the same year. After the Ottoman conquest, ie After these serious losses due to war and
enslavement, Ottoman tax officials in the eastern part of Skanderbeg's former rule, the Dibra countryside,
still had some 11,000 people (1466/67). Assuming that the population has recovered in the seventy years
to the creation of the next tax register, for the Dibra region before the Ottoman conquest about 44,000
inhabitants, then, with an estimated 30,000 victims, there is a population loss of almost 75 %, with about
20,000 displaced persons and 7,000 dead, a similar percentage is achieved. Mehmed's biographer
Kritobulos also reports that many of Skanderbeg's followers would rather commit suicide. nothing more
dramatic than the determination of the insurgents 154. The Sultan had, Old, Including women and
children, kill or deport nearly three quarters of the population in the eastern part of the insurgency. In the
west, to Kruja, he had destroyed 75% of the villages l55. No region in the Balkans had experienced such
a demographic catastrophe during the Ottoman conquest. Skanderbeg's following was largely wiped out
in 1467. Only a few of them survived the Ottoman conquest. Those who followed Skanderbeg into the
fight eventually lost their homes and lives. Skanderbeg's following was largely wiped out in 1467. Only a
few of them survived the Ottoman conquest. Those who followed Skanderbeg into the fight eventually lost
their homes and lives. Skanderbeg's following was largely wiped out in 1467. Only a few of them survived
the Ottoman conquest. Those who followed Skanderbeg into the fight eventually lost their homes and
lives.
BLOOD TIES
r had had with alljenen, the principalities and power, Related "economy closed and was made by the
Lords of Albania Generalhauptl1wnn" 156th Thus, the noble chronicler Giovanni o
Musachi describes the beginning of the uprising in the Albanian region. Power and kinship were very
close in the noble world, not only of the Balkans
linked together. In the Albanian tradition, however, blood ties are of additional importance; the gender
associations, often called "stalkers". draws (alb fis), which were formed after Skanderbeg's death, are
based on mythical ancestors, kinship is understood as a common "blood", blood (alb gjak) is also
regarded as a basic concept in the settlement of disputes: In the judicable highlands the injured person
"takes" blood. The blood relationship therefore surrounded an almost sacral aura 157. Skanderbeg had
his fight as a blood revenge for the murder of his father by Murad.II. started, a course of action which was
expected of him and which put him into the tradition of habitual thinking. The fact that part of the oral law
is linked to his name shows that how strong in the imagination of the Highlanders Skanderbeg was an
embodiment of this thinking. Thus it would have been known that family and relatives had represented the
true backbone of Skanderbeg. The marriage policy of his father had tied numerous blood ties with
important sexes. Through reciprocal marriages, most families were often close
relationships. , Skanderbeg also relied on them at the beginning of his uprising. Of his brothers Repos
had already died in 1431; nothing is known of Constantine, and Stanisa is no longer mentioned after
1445. His sisters were married to gentlemen of the Crnojevic, Araniti, BalSic and Thopia families. All
these families were also represented on the day trip by Alessio. The Crnojevici but had to ward off in the
following years of the Serbs and Ottomans and could hardly afford larger troop assistance. The situation
with the Araniti family was complex: Vladin Golem, son of the leader of the insurrection Komino, had
married Skanderbeg's sister Angelina; from this marriage came one of the best kastriota subordinates,
Muzaki d 'Angelina (the "Angelina son," as he was named after his mother's line, a peculiarity in a
patriarchal society) 158. After the first siege of Krujas, which brought Araniti Komino and Skanderbeg
back together, the bond between the two sexes was fortified by the marriage of Kastriota with Aranit's
daughter Andronika. The relations with BalSiCi were tense. Finally, Muzaki Thopia, Head of this ancient
Middle Albanian aristocratic family, until his death on the slaughter (1455), insisted on independence and
distance from his overpowering brother-in-law. Of his brother-in-law, especially Muzaki Thopia,
Skanderbeg received repeated help, but did not recognize him as a senior. The sons of his siblings
formed a separate group in which loyalty and betrayal balanced each other. Hamza Kastriota, son of the
Repos, had 103
he raised the banner of the insurrection with his oil - but he also became the prototype of the traitor (see
chapter "Betrayal"). MuzakiD'Angelina, on the other hand, was tortured to death by Mehmed H. in 1464:
Harnza and Muzaki thus form the two extremes between which the behavior of the other nephews
moved. Ivan Balsi6, probably a son of Stefan Balsi6 and Vlaica Kastriotas, drove grain trade with the
Ragusan family Pozza! Puci6 (1461) 159. Gojko Strez BalSi6 served his uncle as sub-generals in the
Apulian campaign (1461/62) 160; This example was also followed by Constantine 161 and an otherwise
unknown nephew, Andretto, who was imprisoned at short notice. On the opposite side was another
nephew, perhaps Repos Thopia, who is said to have married his daughter to Skanderbeg's archenemy
Balaban (1466) 163; another nephew converted to the Ottomans in 1466 and showed them the way into
the country; after the failure of the attack he was at the behest of Mehmed Ir. impaled l64. Skanderbeg
pursued his own marriage policy in order to meet this family conflict. Only one son was born of his own
marriage, whom he baptized according to the orthodox tradition in the name of his father, Ivan (1455). In
1464 he began marriage negotiations with the richest and most sincere oi-thodox family of the Balkans,
the BrankoviCi; Although these had lost their principality in 1459, stories about their silver treasure
circulated, which in Italy also heated the idea of princes such as the Sforza of Milan. Irina, daughter of
Lazar Brankovi6, who died in 1458, was chosen as the bride. Unlike many of his relatives, Irina against
the Ottomans - and the Helene Palaiologina. Skanderbeg joined forces with opponents of the Sultan, but
above all, he sought after his son in the last Byzantine imperial dynasty - the Palaiologists - married. What
a rise from the little Qidhna to the connection with imperial blood! After tough dowry negotiations, which
had meanwhile smashed, the marriage covenant came about. The correspondence had passed through
the hands of the Ragusan chancellor Bartolomeo de Sfondratis, who in December 1464 put the amount of
the dowry at 6,000 ducats. This blood ties to the BrankoviCi and the Palaiologists were created and
secured a not insignificant dowry. A rich bridal gift was also involved in the marriage of Skanderbeg's
nephew Repos, the son of his sister Mamica and the 1455 fallen Muzaki Thopia. As a bride, Rene
Rallaina was from the well-known Byzantine race of the Raises. Her father John, Lord in the
Peloponnesian landscape Arcadia and 1459/60 ambassador of despot Thomas Palaiologos in Milan in
1667, gave her a rich dowry of precious stones
stones and money estimated at 1200 ducats in Durazzo by two Venetian patricians called as experts
(1464) 168. This marriage of a younger member of the Kastriotageschlechts shows several things: The
close connection to the Byzantine - Orthodox world, especially to the environment of the Palaiologen, the
alliance with rich, but politically weak Byzantine aristocrats, the incentive of a large dowry, finally, that in
such shops Venetian Patricians were involved. But it was this nephew, Repos Thopia, whom Skanderbeg
betrayed at the end of his life. The family did not make the mainstay of Skanderbeg's fight. In particular,
some of his nephews were his most dangerous opponents. It therefore does not surprise
MONEY he Battleland has made Skanderbeg's contemporaries, as well as posthumous historians, forget
that warfare is based primarily on money, money to pay followers, craftsmen to build castles and ships, to
recruit mercenaries, to buy weapons, and after Custom of customary law to always offer a hospitable
table. Skanderbeg's struggle was a tremendous effort for himself, his followers, and his domain, and only
by mobilizing all forces could a small mountainous area withstand the Ottoman Empire. From the
beginning, Skanderbeg had to divest everything to ensure the supply of his men and their families, as
these together with the Waffenrumn formed the basis of his power. Money had a special value in the
mountains. For in contrast to the coastal cities, it was rare until recently in the highlands, natural economy
prevailed. "There were no coins there," writes the Ottoman court historian Kritobulos, continuing: "The
Albanians paid tribute to young men and herds of cattle." When coins were in circulation, they were
considered more than in the plane. This difference in the value of money between mountain and plains is
usually overlooked, for example, when talking about the importance of aid money. Although there are no
sources from the Albanian mountains to calculate wages and prices, the notary books of Dalmatian cities
offer a substitute: there, too, shepherd cats went down to the coast to sell their produce. in the Natural
economy prevailed. "There were no coins there," writes the Ottoman court historian Kritobulos,
continuing: "The Albanians paid tribute to young men and herds of cattle." When coins were in circulation,
they were considered more than in the plane. This difference in the value of money between mountain
and plains is usually overlooked, for example, when talking about the importance of aid money. Although
there are no sources from the Albanian mountains to calculate wages and prices, the notary books of
Dalmatian cities offer a substitute: there, too, shepherd cats went down to the coast to sell their
produce. in the Natural economy prevailed. "There were no coins there," writes the Ottoman court
historian Kritobulos, continuing: "The Albanians paid tribute to young men and herds of cattle." When
coins were in circulation, they were considered more than in the plane. This difference in the value of
money between mountain and plains is usually overlooked, for example, when talking about the
importance of aid money. Although there are no sources from the Albanian mountains to calculate wages
and prices, the notary books of Dalmatian cities offer a substitute: there, too, shepherd cats went down to
the coast to sell their produce. in the Although there are no sources from the Albanian mountains to
calculate wages and prices, the notary books of Dalmatian cities offer a substitute: there, too, shepherd
cats went down to the coast to sell their produce. in the Although there are no sources from the Albanian
mountains to calculate wages and prices, the notary books of Dalmatian cities offer a substitute: there,
too, shepherd cats went down to the coast to sell their produce. in the
105
In 1442, for example, a shepherd in Sibenik received a ducat 171 for his annual cheese production. The
difference between the Münzannen highlands and the Adriatic basin with its old money economy only
becomes clear when one looks at the price level in the ports The Abbot Pelinus of Venice paid a 120-year
annual allowance - that is, one hundred and twenty times the annual salary of a shepherd. The same
Pelinus rented a house in Venice for an annual rent of 25 to 30 ducats 172. He gave Venice a loan of
1200 ducats 173. At the same time, the Venetian governor of Antivari received an annual salary of 400
ducats, with which he also had to pay his servants 174. Quite different sums were involved in leasing
profitable industries: Two thousand ducats were used to lend Skutari fish farms money to the casket of
the Venetian treasurer of Skutari (1466) 175. There was thus a huge gap between the monetarised
economy on the Adriatic and the largely moneyless highlands. Skanderbeg belonged to both worlds and
took advantage of it: For trade he drove with the Adriatic, money he received from Italy; but he had to pay
the inhabitants of the highlands. On the way from the harbors into the mountains, the money gained in
value with every elevation gain. Skanderbeg earned money on the model of his father from the natural
wealth of his rule, wood and grain 176. Like his father, he drew money from the caravans that traveled
through his mountains. Right at the beginning of the uprising, he directed Alessio, near the river
port, where the mule-drivers were unloading their goods for the highlands, they imposed new tariffs,
which the native merchants bitterly lamented. According to ancient custom, he leased his duties to the
highest bidder. He had every interest in keeping the number of possible tenants large. Hence his urge to
allow Venice to allow his subjects to bid on the lease (1445) 178. Merchants from Florence and Milan,
competitors of the Venetians, were also among the customs tenants 179. Traditionally, Dubrovnik and
Venetian merchants fought over the Albanian markets. Ivan Kastriota had business deals with both
commercial republics. Skanderbeg tried to continue this policy. But he preferred the politically weak
Dubrovnik. When Ragusans leased their tolls, In his interest, Skanderbeg kept the Venetian competition
away: "We have learned that it has recently been forbidden for our people to export grain from the lands
and squares of Skanderbeg ... and this innovation has come as some of your citizens have taken over
their tariffs. en "wrote the Venetian Senate in September 1462 complaining to the regiment of
Ragusa. This quarrel broke even in the episode a Kaper106
war of Venetian galleys against Ragusan cereal drivers from l80. Although the Kastriota was not afraid to
treat the Ragusans hard if they did not comply with his will, in general there was good agreement. Only in
the last months of the then already weakened Kastriota did the merchants seem to have become
somewhat brazen. Wood and grain went to Dubrovnik, in return Skanderbeg took cloth from the
Dalmatian merchants on a large scale. The shepherds in the mountains liked to dress in the products of
Italian textile workshops, and Balkan princes liked expensive Italian fabrics. However, economic
cooperation also touched on areas that had a significant strategic importance for the Albanian heri. His
rule was not just about money but also any form of banking. However, he had to work with considerable
sums of money for his armaments, and for this he needed the services of knowledgeable bankers. The
branches of the large Florentine banks in Dubrovnik handled such money transactions with the necessary
discretion - it was about arms trade in an officially neutral, the Sultan tribute city. Skanderbeg maintained
business relations with the banking houses Pazzi, Strozzi and Albizzi. The latter were interested in
Albanian wood. In silence, the celnik Rajan Gelder of the Pazzi corrected 85. The Kastriota also availed
himself of the services of the Ragusan Bank, in which he had a deposit of at times 2400 ducats and about
which the Serbian despot Georg Brankovic had him instructed silver186. Skanderbeg's deposits came
from trading businesses, about which only fragmentary news is available: in 1463, for example, his
representative Thodor took on board a sailing ship with six sailors in Ragusa to transport a load of grain
from Shufada to the Apulian ports of Trani and Barletta I 87. As in Ivan Kastriota's time At the mouth of
the Ishmi wood sold to Dalmatians, as to the merchants Radoje Milosevic and Antun Radeljic from the
Venetian-administered Korcula / Curzola 188. The large sums involved in the game shows a grain
purchase, the three members of the Dubrovnik family GondolaiGundulic in 1464 by two The Sunune of
1450 ducats flowed into Skanderbeg's pocket l89. In addition to Ragusans, northern Italian merchants
also ran into the storehouses of Skanderbeg, such as a Baldesar de Rexina from Milan, the wheat, Barley
and millet acquired I 90. Skanderbeg also supplied grain to his allies in barren mountains, such as Prince
Vladislav of Herzegovina or his brother-in-law Stefan Crnojevic, whom he had sent 140 tonnes over the
Venetian port of Cattaro91. Skanderbeg lost a number of shiploads during the war with Venice; such a
shipment of 26 tons of grain, 260 kg of beans and 17 pigs; other
107
Buy a further 26 tons of grain and a salt transport and grain shipment of 3.2 tons purchased from a
Florentine merchant's mill in Ragusa1992. Skanderbeg not only waited for the Adriatic merchants, he
proved himself able to carry out an active export trade on rented ships 193. The riot leader was also a
prudent merchant. The same applies to his relatives: his nephew Ivan Balsie was a partner in a ship that
the Albanian merchants Nicholas Laleme and Michael Ingieti from Durazzo used for the export of
grain; against Venetian customs regulations, they wanted to bring the cargo to Dubrovnik, but were
brought before Korcula by a Venetian police vessel and put on trial l94. What was smuggling for
Venice, meant a profitable investment for Skanderbeg's nephews. Thus, the Kastriota not only had
military talent, but apparently also a well-developed business sense. Grain was the wealth of
Albania. Skanderbeg did not dominate the plains permanently. Time and again, the Ottomans broke deep
into his territory and destroyed the crop or consumed the grain itself. Already in the 1440s, Barletius
reported that during the war years there was a large grain shortage that could only be compensated by
smuggling from Venetian areas 195 , Good years alternated with times of need, in which Skanderbeg had
to buy grain from the Venetian districts, which was sometimes approved by the Venetian authorities
l96. However, Venetian governors sometimes stopped legal deliveries if they considered the supply of
their own cities to be in jeopardy. The Ottomans also tried to dissuade the Venetians from delivering grain
to Skanderbeg.198 So his grain exports proved as erratic as his entire system of power. An orderly
economy did not emerge under the constant Ottoman threat. Skanderbeg's followers often used force to
get what they could not do in commerce. Many of them were highland farmers and shepherds who were
used to lack, but who, according to ancient custom, descended to the plains to rape their families. This
custom lasted until the beginning of the 20th century. 199 The swift riders from the mountains loved raids
on which they could expel livestock. The raids were directed mainly against Ottoman territory, but also the
Venetian towns were not spared. A few weeks after the insurrection began, the inhabitants of Alessio
reported that a certain Jezerius Castrioti ... had committed several attacks and continued on a daily basis,
robbing their cattle and captivating them and their wives and children.A raid Fill also Skanderbeg against
the stacking place J1
108
Pirgo on the Adriatic, where Venetian and Ottoman merchants traded; Only the Venetian patrician
Geronimo Foscolo lost cloth worth more than 200 ducats201. In the East, the rich Ochrid, with its fish
farms and large herds, attracted the ramblers; but also the Solner pastures of the Sargebirge 202
lured. The Ragusan State Chancellor Bartolomeo de Sfondratis reported that Skanderbeg had captured
on two raids in western Macedonia in 2000 draft animals (probably the customary buffalo) and allegedly
400 000 head and small cattle 203. Serbian land was once robbed, Demetrio Franco believes. In later
years, Skanderbeg's men, probably under his nephew Ivan BalSi6, also piracy on the Adriatic: For
example, a ship loaded with grain and salt meat was robbed by the Ragusan Chancellor de Sfondratis of
Milan, who appealed to his sovereign Francesco Sforza; this in turn demanded from Skanderbeg the
publication of the spoils205. Above all, however, the Albanian subjects of St. Mark's Republic
suffered. Skanderbeg could not or did not want to restrain his followers when attacking the plains at
Durazzo, Alessio and Skutari206. The war over Dagno was only the culmination of this conflict between
the inhabitants of the plain and the mountains around scarce arable land and pastures on the coast. As a
result, lasting tensions between Venice and Skanderbeg 207 emerged. The Albanian Lord accepted
this; because his followers saw no crime in the raids, rather, these were part of their way of life and their
ideal of warriorism and heroism. The prey on animals also compensated for the losses incurred during
Ottoman attacks on Albanian herds. The export of sheep, in particular, was of considerable importance in
a largely animal-breeding business. Livestock sold the Albanian nobility Dalmatian and Italian merchants
at the small stacking places of the Adriatic coast. Araniti Komino wanted in 1449 the export license for
1000 sheep and 100 head horn cattle, which were to be shipped in the Venetian Durazzo208. In order to
get an idea of the value of these animals, it is necessary to take a look at Corfu and Dalmatia - for lack of
information from the Albanian region, through whose harbors the shepherds in Epirus or sold their
products in the Dinaric mountains. In 1442 7, 9 ducats were paid in Corfu for 100
sheepskins. Skanderbeg's annual allowance of Venice, which amounted to 1400 ducats, corresponded to
the value of about 17,700 sheep skins209. Such quantities were barely loaded. In Sibenik, the most
important export port of Dalmatia for livestock products, the Venetian Customs Office recorded the export
of around 13,000 lamb skins, 7100 sheep skins and 4,500,109 for the years 1441-43
Ziegenhäuten210. These numerical examples show how difficult it was to acquire large amounts of capital
with livestock farming. Much more profitable was the business with prisoners; especially in the first 15 or
so years of the uprising, the insurgents made considerable sums with ransom211; In one fell swoop,
Sununs fell into the hands of the warriors they would have had to work as shepherds for years. For
example, officer Hamza bey (probably 1451/52) allegedly paid 12,000 gold pieces, and in 1464 an
Ottoman tax collector at Ochrid was forced to buy gold for 11,000. Grain, livestock and timber trade,
customs leases and raids alone did not bring in enough money. Skanderbeg was therefore early on rely
on outside help. For this he turned to the States of Italy and Dubrovnik. The richest city in Dalmatia was
not allowed to openly support the Albanian lord. Dubrovnik belonged to the Hungarian crown and paid
since 1458 the Sultan Tribute213. His caravans moved through much of the Ottoman Empire; Securing
the costly war merchandise was the supreme aim of Ragusan statesmanship. Although more and more
massive ramparts protected the city, in which several Balkan princes had deposited their treasures, but
the councilors wanted to avoid that the strength of the fortifications ever put to the test. Dubrovnik stood
between the Occident and the Ottoman Empire, it also had to satisfy the troubled noble lords of the
neighborhood, in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Albania, and finally to fend off the Venetian competition to the
sea. Skanderbeg's demands for money and weapons aid did not embarrass the small republic214. One
did not want to endanger the lucrative business in Albania, was also happy about a gentleman who fought
the Ottomans, but one feared the Ottoman spies in the city and the danger to life and limb of their own
compatriots in the Ottoman Empire. The attitude of Dubrovnik was subject to constant fluctuations, which
followed the great political developments in the Balkans. In 1446 and 1447, the Republic supported
Skanderbeg with diplomatic mediation and arms215. When Skanderbeg in 1448 a loan for the attack on
the Blackbird field requested, the councilmen shied back from such a challenge of the Sultan, but gave, in
order not to bounce off the Albanian master, 200 ducats216. Two years later, When the Ottomans
threatened Kruja - and thus Ragusan commercial interests on the Adriatic - it seemed advisable to the
councils to help Skanderbeg with a counterattack of 500 ducats217. But then caution prevailed again, so
1452218. Ragusa never wanted to get a year's allowance and other fixed financial obligations. About
Dubrovnik but ran the negotiations between Skanderbeg and Johann Hunyadi 110
and later with the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus; Ragusa also promoted Skanderbeg's intervention in
the Neapolitan throne dispute (1461), as King Ferrante favored Ragusan merchants219. Finally the
patricians hoped for Skanderbeg's intercession with the king. Particularly embarrassing, the enterprising
Ragusan brought the popes' repeated request that the city should become a hub for the distribution of
Crusader monies in the Balkans, making it a focus for attacks on the Sultan. Ragusa escaped with a lithe
diplomacy, which soon agreed, soon refused; but the rich but rich republic permitted diplomacy, arms-
trading, and money-making within its walls, all under the careful supervision of the authorities. The
Ragusan state used Skanderbeg for its purposes in the Christian fabric of the Adriatic, but avoided an
open financing of the Ottoman War. The night of the Adriatic, the Republic of Venice, was in a difficult
relationship with Skanderbeg221. The border incidents have already been discussed, as well as the
economic contrast between Venice's subjects and Skanderbeg's followers. The patricians of the Albanian
coastal towns were usually supported by their Venetian peers who wanted to exploit the wealth of the
plains themselves. Venetian governors and merchants in Albania, therefore, took the Albanian elite
mistrustful of Skanderbeg and were more hostile than the senate in distant Venice. Central and local
authorities of the Signoria often act differently, and so it is wrong to speak of a uniform Venetian
politics. Rather, capital and provincial authorities pursued different strategies in relation to the Albanian
lord. At the beginning of the uprising, Skanderbeg of Venice had demanded above all investments in his
tax leasing and asylum in case of emergency. When it came to war in 1447, he had received protection
money from Durazzo222. Money then came into play with the agreement of October 1448. 1400 ducats
annual allowance was worth the peace to the Venetians with Skanderbeg223. If one estimates the annual
salary of a shepherd, as reported, with a ducat a year, could the Kastriota with this sum of his usual
following of about 1500 warriors for a year long. Entsprec; he insisted, therefore, on the actual payment of
this aid. But this was subject to the ups and downs of relations with the republic of St. Mark. On the
Venetian side, there was also a structural problem: at the direction of the Senate, the Alessio district had
to hand over the year's allowance; the capital itself did not want to pay anything. Alessio - and Durazzo,
who was to help him - soon showed 111
unwilling, soon unable to raise the sum; Raids and wars hit the salt trade hard from whose profits the
funds would have to be reimbursed. Some times, the Venetian governors even had to pay Skanderbeg's
pension out of their private funds224. In addition there were jurisdictional disputes between the Venetian
districts. Finally, some of the Venetian officials enriched themselves with the annual allowance: Durazzo's
chamberlain tried to deceive Skanderbeg, and it was difficult to prevent him from attacking the city225. It
was not always evil will Skanderbeg opposite, if the payments were omitted 226. Repeatedly, however,
Venice used the year allowance to force Skanderbeg to political good behavior. Since the siege of Krujas
in 1450 - when Venetian merchants had supplied the Ottoman besiegers with food - but especially since
1451, when Skanderbeg had become vassal of Venice's opponent Alfonso V, the two neighbors were
repeatedly on the verge of an open war 227. But the Albanian master needed the money so urgently that
he asked his Neapolitan liege lord to use him for him in Venice228. However, Venice kept up the pressure
and temporarily forced Skanderbeg to give in a few months after the fall of Constantinople (September
1453) 229. For his part, the Albanian lord did not hesitate to oppress the Venetians; he once occupied a
Venetian place, probably near Dagno, and another time he barred the caravans to Alessio (1456f30). but
also the Venetian customs policy formed a constant source of the quarrel 231. A change in the amicable
relationship occurred only after Skanderbeg's patron Alfonso died in 1458 and when it became apparent
that Venice could no longer evade the war with the Sultan (1463). In 1460, for example, the republic paid
for Skanderbeg after a long push; the financial administration released 50 ducats which were available to
the Kastriota on a monthly basis and handed over the money to an ambassador from Albania on 12
September 1460232. Three years later she urged him then aid money against the Ottomans aufuf33. In
the war itself, the Venetian Senate decided several times to provide Hilfsgeldenl, once 4000 ducats, then
300.3000 and another 2000 ducats, in addition to the pension. For Venice, which itself spent 60000
ducats a month for the Turkish war, these were modest sums. But it is unclear whether all these funds
have really reached Albania; It is certain that they were by no means sufficient, for Skanderbeg had in
1467 had to advance the Venetian officers in Albania £ 5,000, through a bill of exchange, which the
Ragusan Paladino Gundulic had brought about; Skanderbeg received just 140 ducats from this loan a few
weeks before his death236. The he112 which the Ragusan Paladino Gundulic had brought
about; Skanderbeg received just 140 ducats from this loan a few weeks before his death236. The
he112 which the Ragusan Paladino Gundulic had brought about; Skanderbeg received just 140 ducats
from this loan a few weeks before his death236. The he112
Keeping sources does not allow to calculate the exact sum that was transferred to the kastriota of the
republic of republic in total. The political. The opposition of the neighbors, which was only temporarily
replaced by political interest groups against the Dukagjin and the Ottomans, was reflected in the financial
behavior of the Signoria. She did not like to provide funds to the vassals of Naples; The Venetians and
their Albanian subjects will not forget or forgive Skanderbeg's attacks. Basically, Venice wanted a
Christian Albania under its own tutelage, without Skanderbeg, and ultimately it achieved that goal. If
Venice decides to be a reliable donor, the Kastriota had to seek other subsidies. His feudal lord Alfons V.
let repeatedly Nachschubsendungen, Send troops and supplies from Apulia across the Adriatic; He was
not prepared to make large payments to his vassal. Skanderbeg does not seem to have expected that; he
probably valued the solid support of the king more than mere cash payments. Alfonso son Ferrante but
had to stop because of the throne after 1458 any help, but Skanderbeg had in person to assist the king
against its adversary (1461). When his position had been strengthened, the monarch Skanderbeg, who
had just renewed his vassal envy, admitted a 1200-year mark-up (1464) - but it can not be determined
how much of it was actually sent to Albania. Only one payment from Ferrante is certainly attested, those
1000 ducats, which he handed over to his vassal in the fall of 1467. Of the other states that visited
Albanian ambassadors - Milan, Siena, and Burgundy - there were encouraging words at best, but neither
money nor troops that really appeared on the Albanian coast. So there was only one power that financed
the Christian rebellion on a permanent and large scale: the Catholic Church, both the papacy and the high
Catholic clergy in Albania itself. Dignitaries such as Abbot Pelinus or Archbishop PaulAngelus were the
driving force behind the resistance against the Ottomans all their funds; The Ottomans destroyed the
possessions of the archbishop in central Albania in 1466 with good reason. Again, the archive loss makes
it impossible to specify exact numbers. Somewhat better ordered is the overview of the sums that flowed
from Rome to Albania, even if an overall view can not be made. Nicholas V. (1447-1454), Kalixt
IU. (14551458), Pius 11 (1458-1464) and Paul H. (1464-1471) turned their attention, albeit to different
degrees, to the rebellion of the helmet of Albania. Following the example of Araniti Komino, Skan113 tried
These were relations with the Curia, which gained in importance after the fall of Constantinople. The end
of Byzantium forced the Orthodox riot leader to look west. The siege of Krujas in 1450 influenced the
papacy as a fan. In March 1452 in Dubrovnik about 4,900 hyperpersions from the proceeds of the jubilee
year were handed over to the commissioner Skanderbegs242. The Dalmatian cities, however, were not
exactly happy about this: The citizens of Cattaro, who could almost hear the warlords almost outside their
walls, pressed their protective power Venice, this should engage the Pope, so that part of the funds
earmarked for Skanderbeg to build the new cathedral could be used 243. The achiatic solidarity was far
from sufficient. To take Pope Nicholas V for his cause, The Castriota even planned a trip to Rome in
December 1453, but handed the matter over to the ambassador who revealed to the Pope the story of the
vendetta between his master and the sultan. Pope Nicholas V was inclined to help despite this clumsy
argument and gave the diplomat 3000 ducats in gold and gifts worth a further 1000 ducats245 - a
considerable success for the insurgents, as could be supplied to about 4000 warriors. The Pope may
have particularly touched on part of Skanderbeg's message; for he declared that he would only use the
papal funds if the Ottomans actually attacked, and he suggested that the pontiff pay the subsidies only on
a monthly basis; in the absence of the enemy, the sum would be refunded246. Pope Kalixt IH., Nicholas
V soon succeeded, his pontificate dedicated entirely to the fight against the Ottomans. His estate found a
vow to use all his resources to recover Constantinople and defeat Islam. Italian wars, however, prevented
him from equipping the Albanian insurgents with money as he wished; Kalixts Ur. Writing bears witness to
the Pope's impatience to be unable to help sufficiently. He was particularly outraged that the Ragusans
had withheld money for the crusade and had to be threatened with excommunication247. In February
1458 at least 5,000 guilders were sent to Albania248. Pius H. was one of the most important supporters
of Skanderbeg in general, albeit predominantly in the field of diplomacy; and Paul H., albeit less eager to
defend the Ottomans than its predecessors, the Kastriota surrendered a total of 5,000 ducats and 7,750
gulden between April 1466 and September 1467249. Papal help was not exhausted in money mail, Kalixt
IH. had a fleet extended into the Adriatic, and Pius U. drove to a crusade, whose command in the
Albanian area Skanderbeg 114
should have taken over. In a mixed calculation of actual payments and expenses for fleet and troops, one
scholar estimated papal support at 56,000 ducats2 5o. But even here you can exercise caution in
absolute numbers. Rather, the reason given is that Skanderbeg received the most military aid from
Naples between 1451 and 1458 and the largest sums of money between 1452 and 1467 from Rome. The
papal funds were probably distributed in the mountains, where they will have a certain effect. By Italian
standards, these were modest sums, which ultimately also reflected Skanderbeg's low political
importance for Italian statesmen. The Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus, As the ruler of an old and
powerful state, he had a much larger army, and in August 1464 alone the Curia sent 40,000
ducats251. Ultimately, given the fragmented numbers, the question must remain open whether
Skanderbeg has borne its uprising from its own resources or has paid mainly out of aid; here, too, it is
more cautious to assume that he would not have survived without outside help.
ROOM kanderbeg ruled over people, but less over a fixed area. The almost uninterrupted Ottoman
attacks prevented the formation of a permanent rule in the room. Rather, Skanderbeg was in constant
motion. It is therefore appropriate to speak of an area of action rather than a sphere of control. In this
space of action are zones of concentrated exercise of power from around the areas where Skanderbeg
warfare but could not exercise a firm control. Giovanni Musachi, who was well acquainted with the
Albanian countryside, described in detail the core area: According to him, the kastriota possessed "Dibra,
Mati and Kruja all the way to the sea, Deberina, that is the Randesia and the land of Guonimi" 252; in a
second place he states: He was not only Lord of Mati, but also made himself master of Knlja, Dibra,
Birina, that is the Randisia, of Tomorista, of Misia and the land of Guonimi to the coast '253. It was not for
nothing that he first counted the mountain lands of Mati and Dibra; Skanderbeg's father had ruled here,
but above all the mountains offered better protection than the open coastal plains between Kruja and the
Adriatic. The other regions, however, were much smaller; you Above all, however, the mountains here
offered better protection than the open coastal plains between Kruja and the Adriatic. The other regions,
however, were much smaller; you Above all, however, the mountains here offered better protection than
the open coastal plains between Kruja and the Adriatic. The other regions, however, were much
smaller; you
115
stretched between the mountainside of Kluja in the east and the Adriatic coast near Durazzo and Alessio
in the west. Scenically, this nucleus of Skanderbeg's action space showed considerable contrasts: the flat
to hilly coastal land, partly wooded, partly used as pasture, where in the summer oppressive, humid heat
prevailed; then the eastern adjoining hilly area, with better air; here there were fields, but also groves,
here lay several small castles protecting the main fortress, the strong Kruja. To the east of Kruja rose
steep mountains over which small mule tracks led into the broad valley of Mati. This basin landscape is
divided in the middle by a ridge of hills and bounded on the east by humpbacked mountains. From the
southeast of the Matitales a narrowing valley led to the pass road, over which one arrived to Dibra. This
road ran east of the pass through a wide, high mountain-lined, water- and grazing valley called
Valikardhe. Dibra finally, in addition to Mati, the second chamber of the heart of Skanderbeg's power, was
flowed through by the Black Drin, which comes from Ohrid ago squeezed through a narrow forest valley
and breaks into the broad sub-Dibra with its fields and orchards. The mountains that terminate Lower
Dibra to the east against the Upper Dibra are higher and rugged than the mountains between Mati and
Lower Dibra. But here, too, footpaths stretch over alpine pastures and crevices, which wind down in the
east into the densely forested valley, where the old monastery Sveti Jovan Bigorski rises. From west to
east, flats and mountains, coastal fichia, Alpine areas and inner Balkan settlements. The mountains
sweep from north-west to south-east, forming a considerable obstacle to traffic, but not an insurmountable
obstacle, especially for perennial shepherds who know the ways. In the west and in the east, nature
created the borders: the Adriatic Sea on one side, the mountainous country of Mokra on the other
side. These "wet" mountains separated Skanderbeg's home in Dibra from the broad plain of the Polog
and in the late Middle Ages also formed the linguistic boundary between the Barologian "Bulgarian" Polog
and the predominantly Albanian but interspersed by Serbian linguistic islands. Polog is one of the large
settlement crests surrounded by mountains in the inland Balkan. In the north it is completed by the
massive massif of Sar, in the south of a highland, which offers room for the pass road to Ochrid; to the
east lies the "dry mountains" (Suva gora), which separates Polog from the vast Vardarebene. About the
main town of the Polog, at the foot of Sar cowering Tetovo, which the Ottomans called Kalkandelen, ran
the army road from Skopje to Ochrid, one of the main deployment routes 116
of the Balkans towards the Adriatic Sea. This road passed between Skopje and Tetovo a hermitage, the
Engpa.ss of Derven, which was guarded by the high castle Sobri255. From Derven to the Polog, the
sultans had set up one timothy after another: the lowland was a bulwark and a deployment zone for the
Ottomans against the rebels of Skanderbeg 256. Skanderbeg's northern and southern borders in the
coastal country are also known in detail thanks to a Venetian file. Towards the north, the coastal plain
narrows at Alessio, whose cone-shaped castle hill can be seen from afar. Here was also the permanent
district of Skanderbeg's state in the plane. This is no coincidence, because the alluvial south of Alessio
has been controversial since ancient times: the mountains were near, and many gentlemen wanted to
drive their animals to the winter pastures, whereas the farmers of the plain had to protect their winter
sowing. The border was drawn along the Matiflusses, from the coast over the ford of Milot to the river
Fani, which came down from the high mountains. In the south another river system, that of Ishmi,
Skanderbeg's state, was decided; again the line ran along the watercourse into the hill country, the small
hamlet of St. Maria in Berar, about 14 km southeast of Kruja257. However, Skanderbeg did not dominate
this core area permanently, but as a rule only outside the campaign season. When Ottoman armies
marched in spring and early summer, the insurgents cleared the plains and retreated to the
mountains258. The massif of Tumenisht (now Mali i Skenderbeut) behind Kruja259 and the Molcra, " If
traitors did not show them the way - as was often the case - the Ottoman units had to be content with
plundering and devastating the plains and retreating from lack of food during midsummer. Then the
insurgent shepherd warriors began to descend from the high mountains into the hills and the plains, to
pursue the Ottomans and Ottoman-dominated villages in the Polog, the Ottoman capital 117 there
To attack Tetovo as well as to the south also Ochrid, sometimes plundered them to the gates Skopj it
264. The summer contraction phase of the action space was followed by a strong expansion in
autumn. Martinus Segonus of Novo Brdo claimed, a few years after Skanderbeg's death, that the
Albanian had been "to Stratford, to the frontiers of the Macedonians and Thracians" 265. He refers to the
river Struma in present-day western Bulgaria, no other source mentions However, it can not be ruled out
that the knowledgeable Segonus heard of a unique raid that extended beyond the
Vardarebene.Unfortunately, the overfill of the insurgents occurred but on the eastern slope of the Mokra
and on the heights of the Sargis Mountains, where Ottoman hens grazed their herds in summer266. On
the other hand, Skanderbeg has hardly reached the northeast.267. In November 1448, although he had
moved into the vicinity of the Amselfeld, but was forced to reverse before he had the level
enceicht. Sixteen years later he planned a foray into northern Kosovo, but had to refrain from it when he
learned that Sultan Mehmed H. stood with a strong army on the river Sitnica268. The southeastern
boundary of the military action space lay before Ochrid. This large and rich city was protected by a strong
Ottoman occupation. The plain on the northern shore of Lake Ochrid (between the towns of Struga and
Dibra) was open to attacks by the insurgents, who were also favored by the fact that that a range of hills
obscured the guards of Ochrid over the entire plain. The vast plains of Oronik, where the airport of Ochrid
now lies, were the scene of skirmishes269. This is clear from a story by Barletius (probably to the year
1462): The Ottoman Karaden bey layed near the village Livada, northeast of Struga, while Skanderbeg
lurked in the hill country27o. Skanderbeg failed to permanently subjugate the lake shore or the plain of
Polog; but he made the Ottoman border officers life difficult and harmed the inhabitants by constant raids
against the large cattle herds. The Ottomans, embittered by these constant forays, year after year,
invaded Skanderbeg's forest fortress in the Mokra. In addition to Ochrid they held since 1448, the
important Svetigrad in the hand; at an unknown time, they also stormed the Eagle's Nest of
KodZadZik271. Until Mehmed's 11th Grand Offensives (1466/67), however, they failed at the natural
fortress of the insurgents in the mountains. If the two highlanders were the actual refuge of Skanderbeg,
where the followers and herds of cattle found refuge in the summer, the coast plain fulfilled another task:
they supplied grain for the supply 118
the followers, but also for the export to Dalmatia and Italy. She was such a significant source of
income. But then the great flocks of Skanderbeg and his followers wintered there. On the warm plain,
Skanderbeg's men also recovered from the deprivations of the summer war season. The rivers afforded
protection in these plains: Even today, Ishmi, Mati and ores are moving out of the Central Albanian
mountains in wide meanders towards the Adriatic Sea. In the spring they swamped, swollen by the
snowmelt, large areas and turned them into impassable marshes. In 1466 a large Ottoman rider army got
stuck in this morass literally. Protection promised but also the vast coastal forests, trackless damp-hot
thicket in the meditelTanen Albanian summers, an obstacle for heavily armed Ottoman feud riders to pass
only for easily-armed local natives. The plain was more open to the south than to the north: it was
intersected by the Via Egnatia, which entered the plain from the Shkumbintal. The Ottoman armies from
the inner Balkans also marched there almost every year. Until 1466, however, the Ottomans had to leave
the road to the insurgents in autumn and winter, who were entrenched in the mountains of <ennenika, the
center of the Vlachen in the Albanian region. The constant Ottoman attacks exhausted the old noble
families in the broad valley, especially the Araniti. These were also under pressure from the north,
because Skanderbeg, who had no prospect of permanent terrain gain in the east, had to consolidate its
power on the Adriatic and expand to the south as to the north. The Albanian mountains encircle the
coastline in a generous arc that creates a broad plain whose vertices form Valona and Alessio. The
southern part of this plain was essentially occupied by the Ottomans, who conquered the main fortresses
of Berat, Valona and Kanina in 1417. There was an unclear transition zone against the families of families
like the Araniti and Thopia. The possession of castles ultimately decided on the balance of power. On the
northern edge of the plain, in Alessio, the Venetian zone of influence began, the center of which was in
Skutari, the strongest stronghold of the Albanian north. The so narrowed Skanderbeg tried several times
to gain air and to enlarge its rule along the north-south axis. He fought in league with his southern Slav
neighbors against Venetian Albania (1447/48) and defeated. He made a second attempt as a vassal of
Naples (1453 and 1456), again in vain 273. Since he was thus barred to the Skutari plains, he began to
expand his power in the eastern highlands, but collided with the Dukagjin, who repulsed all attacks
that the insurgents' offensives were directed against Valona after the cataclysm of 1448 in 1449 and
against the mighty Burg Berat six years later. Even a devastating defeat in July 1455 276 did not prevent
Alfons V. and Skanderbeg from planning a second campaign south only a few months later; This time
again Valona was the ZieF77. Alfonso V even considered the deployment of one of the most famous
Condottieri of the time, CountJacomo Piccinino. The Milanese ambassador in Naples described the
strategic considerations of the king: if he had him (Piccinino, p. S) translated into Albania soon and his
majesty the king would soon send 16 or 20 galleys to Valona to the borders of his empire, Count Jacomo
m with the help of Mr. Skan derb eg, who would hurry up to many thousands of men Besieging Valona on
land and sea, and this year would be fruitful, especially as his majesty the king has news that the Grand
Turk has decided to soon Albania against Skanderbeg to assault, and käm, e el ~ as l1wn believes, he
would make even better preparations, as he would approach Italy's borders. Skanderbeg was fully
involved in the monarch's space strategy, which targeted both the Ottomans and Venice. In the shadow of
Naples, the Kastriota succeeded in capturing the heritage of Thopia, especially the castle of Petrela
(autumn 1455) 278. Indeed, he was even instructed to intervene in the extreme south of the Albanian
region, in the lordly reign of the Zenebish family on the cliffs of Himara. Himara was opposite the
important Venetian harbor of Corfu, the Zenebish were also Neapolitan vassals. So it was not about
Skanderbeg's interests, rather. this was only a tool of Neapolitan politics (1456) 279. After Alfons' death,
those Aragonese mercenaries were left without whom the Kastriota could not venture a siege of the
Ottoman fortresses. This does not mean that the Ottomans have now brought the flat land under their
control
H.
120
II
l~
have. As late as 1464, Valona formed a cornerstone in Skanderbeg's Raumdenken 280. As in the north,
however, the Albanian lord in the south had not been able to increase his power in the long term. The
only successes; In the middle of Albania he gradually supplanted the BalsiCi, Thopia, and finally the
Araniti, and thus he firmly established his power behind Durazzo, at least in the coastal country - but at a
high price (of which in the Chapter "rivals" tells). Space control required solid permanent support, and
these offered non-agile warrior associations in the highlands, but castles. Skanderbeg's weakness to the
east was due to Svetigrad's early loss. East of the Black Drins almost all castles were in Ottoman
hands. Probably in 1451 the Albanian hurried to build a small castle in a hurry: Modric (or Modrista)
281. This lay in a "cut-off forest canyon" between Dibra and Struga in the gorge of the Black Drin. While in
Dibra he had no castles other than KodZadzik, in Mati and on the coast he had several smaller festivals
from his father's time, such as Olrunen, such as Bila kamin (Petralba), the eagle's nest Skanderbeg's wife
also served as a safe summer retreat, and Stellush, which, according to Barletius, could hardly be praised
for its size, but because of its beautiful and safe location and fresh mountain air. Both castles are so steep
on towering rocks that they can only be climbed with great effort283. No longer existing wooden galleries
or ladders must have facilitated the entrance to the castles. From both, large parts of Matis could be
seen. The "white stone" also dominated the pass road, which connected the Adriatic coastal plain with the
vast Matital. Stellush was built in an even more daring situation, on a shapeless rock in the highlands,
which today is not to climb without good mountain equipment. Forests and mountain mats surrounded the
two castles. Although Bila Kamin and Stellush were hard to get hold of, they did not provide room for
larger units; they represented bases, arms and stockpiles, but not more. A similar task was fulfilled by
Preza, on a hill southwest of Kruja; Petrela, on the other hand, surveying the valley of the ore at a dizzy
height on a narrow rock plateau 30 meters high, measuring 50 meters was not Skanderbeg until 1455, but
its neighbor Muzaki Thopia285. Together was Bila Kamin, Stellush, and Petrela their location on narrow,
steep rock spurs. Modric in the far east, in the end, served more as a "shield against raids and protection
against raids of the neighbors" 286 and as a starting point for raids, because as a safe retreat
SOli; Barletius tells that the castle was evacuated by the Amnar of stronger Ottoman units and that the
occupation in the mountains or 121 because as a safe retreat SOli; Barletius tells that the castle was
evacuated by the Amnar of stronger Ottoman units and that the occupation in the mountains or
121 because as a safe retreat SOli; Barletius tells that the castle was evacuated by the Amnar of stronger
Ottoman units and that the occupation in the mountains or 121
westward into Skanderbeg's core area287. After all, Kruja, with an area of 150 to 270 meters, was by far
the largest castle; On a rocky spur that rises above the plain in front of the steep cliff of Tumenisht, it was
protected in the Middle Ages by dense forests, which evidently also rose up the mountainside. From Kruja
you can see all of Albania, from Tomor mountain near Berat in the south to the peaks of the Montenegrin
mountains; every ship sailing on the Adriatic was recognizable289. There was no better location on the
southeastern Adriatic for a castle. But the central position of the castle had lured the Ottomans early. The
siege of 1450 had taught Skanderbeg to avoid the fortress war. The surrender of K1uja to the crown of
Aragón and Naples in 1451 signified a substantial strategic relief. Skanderbeg visited the castle
frequently, exhibiting there also certificates, considered them until the end as his possession; However, it
was guarded and defended by Aragonesian, later also Venetian mercenaries, reinforced by Albanian
warriors. It became more and more the bone of contention between the two Adriatic nights Naples and
Venice and can not be regarded as the capital of Skanderbeg. The inhabitants of the hills and mountains
around Kruja, on the other hand, belonged to the core group of the insurgents; few of them survived the
Ottoman conquest291. Like the Serbian rulers of the 13th and 14th centuries, Skanderbeg had no
permanent residence; rather, he moved between the mentioned castles and, especially in heavy Ottoman
attacks, protected mountain areas. If one can speak of a permanent center of Kastriota rule, then this was
not at the foot of the highlands, sondel11 by the sea. This corresponded to the strategic thinking of
Skanderbeg, who at the beginning of the uprising expected to flee abroad 292; but above all, only castles
on the coast preferred to provide the insurgents with weapons and money from the Adriatic. North and
south of Durazzo there were no major fortresses up to Alessio or Valona, which Skanderbeg could have
taken over. While leaning on ancient castles in the hills, he had to build new ones on the coast. The
promontories of La <i, Pali and Rodoni, which jut out into the Adriatic, offered themselves as natural
positions. their access was easy to defend and the ships offered anchorages293. Since his rule lacked
funds and, above all, craftsmen, the Kastriota relied on the help of his feudal lord and the Ragusans to
carry out a construction program. Immediately after the acceptance of the vassalage, Skanderbeg urged
the king to lash out existing castles and to have a strong position extended to Cape La, "if the Grand Turk
were to kill him
which finally narrows down to a few meters. The castle was behind this bottleneck, which was also
protected on the sides of steeply eroding cliffs. From Rodoni the whole Achia was surveyed between the
area of Durazzo and the wide gulf of Alessio and Dulcigno; Venetian Albania lay open and in the east
there was visual contact with the well-recognizable Kruja Castle. By land, Rodoni seemed
impregnable. But the whole instability of Skanderbeg's reign came to light when in the years 1456 and
1457 the Ottoman general Ali from the family of Evrenosoglu Lac: i as Rodoni stormed and
destroyed. The Ottoman prided himself on this in front of the Venetian senate, who saw in the castles
above all Naples' support on the eastern Adriatic: "He believed he had rendered a service to the
Signoria, by destroying places which Skanderbeg had built and given to castle chiefs, one last year and
one in this year, these castles had turned against his master and against the Signoria, and one lay "on
this side of Durazzo, the other beyond, and one was called Cape Ragona "296. But the Kastriota, if he did
not want to lose his external relations, had no choice but to rebuild at least the more protected fortress,
that of Cape Rodoni. New was his plan to settle on the promontory many of his followers, 297 a clear sign
of the shift of his power from the highlands to the sea, but also a result of numerous Ottoman victories in
the mountains. The construction work was Skanderbeg on the eve of the great offensive of 1463
perform. His Ragusan confidant, Paulus Marini de Gondolai Gundulic, commissioned architects in
December of that year to work with some bricklayers for two months "in the village of Redoni in Albania":
Slavic-Dalmatian craftsmen from Ragusa built Skanderbeg's last castle. The work continued for years,
deli still in February 1465 Ragusan craftsmen began the journey south 298. Rodoni became the most
important port of Skanderbeg's reign and for Still in February 1465, Ragusan craftsmen started the
journey south 298. Rodoni became the most important port of Skanderbeg's reign and for Still in February
1465, Ragusan craftsmen started the journey south 298. Rodoni became the most important port of
Skanderbeg's reign and for
123
probably a few months to his residence 299. The fortress, from which parts of the port facilities have been
preserved, resembled the ramparts and towers of Dubrovnik. In the church of St. Maria of Rodoni,
Skanderbeg gathered the leaders of the Catholic Church of Albania to discuss the crusade and send the
knight Martin Muzaki to Rome (1463) 300. When three years later Mehmed 11 invaded Albania,
Skanderbeg entrenched himself in Rodoni, ready to flee to Apulia if necessary. The sultan immediately
attacked and conquered the castle in the Stunn; it was one of the worst defeats of the Kastriota302. On
the cape, a nephew of Skanderbeg, who had defected to the Ottomans, was captured by 1300 Ottoman
soldiers. In July 1467, half a year before his death, the Kastriota overpowered him and struck his own
head off his head. He immediately asked Venice to help rebuild the castle, and at the same time tried to
recruit Maurine masters in Ragusa (October 1467) 303. Both republics did not respond to the request of
the lonely and beaten gentleman - with 30 against only 5 tricks the Dubrovnik senate made a polite
apology304. Rodoni was thus the scene of Skanderbeg's last win. In the historical memory, Rodoni lies
wrongly in the shadow of Jujas. Because the coastal fortress served as a short-term residence, it was
defended by local warriors, while Kruja had long been the object of Italian power politics and the basis of
Italian Sö1dnertruppen had become. Skanderbeg's building program was not limited to castles in his own
domain. Despite the tense relations with the Signoria he saw in the Venetian fortified towns Skutari,
Alessio and Durazzo essential pillars of his strategic space concept. Alessio served for many years as a
meeting place between the Venetians and the lords of the neighborhood; His governors had the task of
monitoring the mountains and keeping quiet. In 1440, devastated by a conflagration and decaying
ramparts, the city was unable to withstand a serious attack. It was different with Durazzo and
Slcutari. Together with his neighbors Araniti Komino and Muzaki Thopia, Skanderbeg agreed that the port
of Durazzo would have to be converted into a strong fortress. This meant, however, that the old sewer
system had to be rebuilt first, so that the malaria that had spread around the city to fight307. The three
lords, all vassals of the Neapolitan crown, expressed their willingness to employ up to 8,000 workers
(1454) to build a Venetian fortress, which would also serve as a haven for the regional nobility. Venice
expressed interest and sent its own engineers to Albania, who requested 80,000 bricks and construction
equipment in the lagoon city and also drafted a plan according to which the Venetian
districts on a bi-weekly cycle should be required to provide 400 to 500 workers each. It was a great idea:
Durazzo was to be transformed into an unreachable island fortress, "a haven for all Albania" (refugium
totius Albanie) 308, easily supplied with galleys - psychologically crucial to the Venetians - but hardly
accessible to Ottoman equestrians. Alone, the matter dragged on. Venice dispatched a capable patrician
with Giovanni Bollani in March 1455, and the Albanian masters urged the work to begin soon: "The
recovery of the air and the fortification of Durazzo will bring many benefits and security to all masters and
inhabitants of those lands." , But Bollani died shortly thereafter and the three men suffered in the summer
of 1455 at Berat a defeat at the Muzaki Thopia fell. Although the Republic of St. Mark alone tried to
implement the project, only their own subjects refused in Albania, as they shied away from the costs. The
plan was taken in 1461 by Archbishop Paul Angelus, who allegedly brought in 8,000 workers and had
them fortified to the delight of the Venetian Senate. But the Albanian nobility had no visible part in that. In
Durazzo the archbishop held the war council with the Venetians and Skanderbeg. When Memned
attacked H. Albania in 1466 and 1467, Durazzo was seriously threatened, but for Skanderbeg, who fought
farther north, it retired. This was also due to the distrust of the Venetians, who, probably not entirely
wrongly, assumed that Skanderbeg had never really given up on the plan to overrun all cities. In April
1458, such speculations had been seriously discussed by King Alfons and the Signoria diplomat, Nicholas
Sagundino. Indeed, after warnings from Naples and Cattaro, a conspiracy in favor of Skanderbeg was
discovered in Durazzo, raids on Drivasto and Antivari, and then on Skutari were apparently imminent. The
Venetians maintained their districts in the north, especially Skutari, with a similar grip. The Skutarins were
barely friendly to Skanderbeg, the war of 1447-48, Skanderbeg's raids of 1450 had left their
mark; besides, the Skutarins moaned under the yule money, that they had to pay to their warlike
neighbors312. But as in the case of Durazzo, the krapiota had much of a good condition for the
fortress; Therefore, after the devastating city fire, he urged a reconstruction. The tensions remained,
however, and when Skanderbeg had returned from southern Italy in the spring of 1462 after successful
battles, he repeatedly attacked the Venetian main fortress. It is not surprising that Skanderbeg barely
visited this city. Only in general collapse 125 that Skanderbeg barely visited this city. Only in general
collapse 125 that Skanderbeg barely visited this city. Only in general collapse 125
In the spring of 1466 Georg Kastriota, who had come rushing over Rodoni and Dulcigno, opened the
gates; Skanderbeg did not stay long, he rode on to the highlands. Since the Venetian commander-in-chief
maintained his staff in the Ottoman war in Skutari, the city became for some months the link with the
Henschaft Georg Kastriotas. In the spring of 1467 Skanderbeg gathered in Skutari the followers, with
whom he wanted to shock the castle Kruja315. But overall, Skutari, as elsewhere in his long history, kept
aloofness from strangers - and in the view of the patrician, Georg Kastriota was one of them. Beyond the
Bojana, Skanderbeg's influence waned anyway. Stefan Crnojevic, with whom the Kastriota was in good
spirits, was hailing in the mountains. Only twice did Skanderbeg fight north of the Bojana, once in the
campaign of 1447/48, then on the flight from the spring of 1466 just mentioned; the terrified citizens of
Dulcigno - Mehmed 11. threatened with an attack - but urged him to a long-distance journey 316. In
Dulcigno, probably in 1467, also Scanderbeg's wife and his court temporarily found refuge317; Barletius
reports that in times of danger the city granted Andronika Kastriota protection318. It was no coincidence
that Skanderbeg died near Alessio. In January 1468 Rodoni lay in ruins, on Krja blew the St. Mark's
banner; the castles in Mati had been taken by the Ottomans. The Kastriota no longer had a fixed position,
but preferred to keep only in a small zone along the Venetian borders. Ultimately, this final outcome of the
uprising reflects its crucial weakness: it failed to bring lasting control over a larger area; There were only a
few tracts of land in which the Ottomans had not penetrated even before the catastrophe of 1466. The
insurgents had not been able to protect even their core areas: In the 1950s alone, the Ottomans moved
several times (1455, 1456 and 1457) deep into Albania. "The Turks staged a massive attack on Albania
and conquered many areas up to eight miles from Kruja, a city of the king (Alfons V, O. S)," wrote a Milan
diplomat in the autumn of 1459 19. Skanderbeg's north and south conquest plans had all failed, to the
east he was only able to carry out raids. He had rarely taken Ottoman castles, but the Ottomans had
immediately destroyed his fortresses in rows. The very fact that these losses did little harm to the
insurgents for a long time proves the low significance of castles and conventional warfare in the 25-year
struggle. The insurgents held until 1466 in the highlands 126
a few seconds safely; in the plains they did not resist the heavy Ottoman riders in open battle. The law of
the mountain and the plain determines the way of fighting and the success. Not in square kilometers, but
by height meters measured power and rule: In the summer Ottoman armies washed around the mountain
massifs of Tumenisht and Mokra. In autumn and winter, the rebels descended from their mountain hiding
places to the plains vacated by the Ottomans for lack of supplies. Terrain and seasons had such a
decisive influence on the political balance of power 320. Not on a fixed, geographically well-defined rule in
the lowlands or on permanent castles, but on people who moved in the urban highlands, Skanderbeg's
power was based on an area extending or contracting, depending on the season, and adapted to the
shepherds of the highlands, who were driven by the rhythm of the Alpine economy. Only when the
Ottomans realized this, stayed in the winter, stormed the mountains and extinguished their followers did
the uprising collapse.
RIVALEN ls 1500 the survivors of Skanderbeg's uprising in Italian exile recorded the history of the fighting
in written form, two different cultures of remembrance emerged. The two ministers working in and near
Venice, Marinus Barletius and Demetrio Franco wrote descriptions of life of an ideal hero who fought with
brave fellow campaigners for Christianity against Islam. Disagreement and inner tensions had no place in
this narrative, the Albanian society appears as closed and steadfast in the defense of Ottoman
attacks. The view of the person living in the Kingdom of Naples is quite different. Nobles Giovanni
Musachi. He respects Skanderbeg as a valiant commander and as an ideal of warriorism; he also
portrays him as more courageous and capable than other nobles. yet he does not ignore the serious
quarrels that tore the Albanian nobility, and he is not afraid to call Skanderbeg the author of these
conflicts. For the castriota had humbled his peers by taking their wife away from them, putting them back
in rank or, in the case of rebellion, even throwing them in the dungeon. The Turkish hero, the vassal of
Naples, for many years had his noble peers who did not want to submit to him. These feuds, compared
with the struggle against the Ottomans, seemed petty and confused put them back in rank or even let
them fall into the dungeon in the case of rebellion321. The Turkish hero, the vassal of Naples, for many
years had his noble peers who did not want to submit to him. These feuds, compared with the struggle
against the Ottomans, seemed petty and confused put them back in rank or even let them fall into the
dungeon in the case of rebellion321. The Turkish hero, the vassal of Naples, for many years had his
noble peers who did not want to submit to him. These feuds, compared with the struggle against the
Ottomans, seemed petty and confused
127
but they shape the life of the Kastriota as well as the weapons exploits more honorable in the West. They
also explain why he ultimately failed to finish a larger stable Henschaft. The narrative must therefore lead
deep into the world of the Albanian mountains, into a rugged landscape with small villages where every
piece of land, every village was fiercely fought. The pride and thirst for power of regional leaders collided
with each other, who had a loyal following. To nourish and equip them was the most important goal of the
nobles. Neither she nor her warriors were willing to submit to another: Henn. Rank fights by charismatic
leaders are a characteristic of Albanian society. Skanderbeg was aware of this. That's why, in the spring
of 1444, he also tried the hens in the traditional style of a Kuvend to rally. This had been successful, and
his election as captain-in-chief meant a first step toward the pooling of followers. However, it soon
became apparent that many nobles were not prepared to accept Skanderbeg's claim to leadership and
that they saw Kuvend as a means of enforcing their territorial claims. Venetians and Ottomans had
supplanted the noble families from the cities of Skutari, Durazzo, Berat and Gjirokastra. The families
wanted to reclaim these lucrative possessions. The southern Albanian families Zenebish and Araniti
dreamed of Gjirokastra, Valona and Berat - he (the Sultan, 0. S) had taken away from us Musachia and
Belgrade (Berat, p. S), the capital of Musachia, "it said the family tradition of Muzaki322; the Middle
Albanian Thopia coveted Durazzo 323; in the north, Balsici and Kastriota fought over the coastal plain
behind Durazzo, the Dukagj in and the Kastriota around the most famous Zankapfel Albania, the customs
castle Dagno. Cities provided protection and revenue, for they were on important caravan routes, had
harbors and, like Durazzo, salt marshes. Not in vain did the nobles fight in the first years of the uprising
(1444-1447) towards the east only with restraint; It was much preferable for Dukagjin and Span, with the
help of Skanderbeg and Southern Slavic princes, to cover the Venetian possessions with war: cities,
cornfields, winter pastures, and salt-works attracted them. Heavy defeats against Venice and the
Ottomans led to disillusionment by 1450. The Araniti, Thopia and Skanderbeg submitted to Naples in
1451, They were soon followed by (before 1454) Gjin Muzaki, Georg Strez and Ivan Strez BalSic, and
finally also Pal Dukagjin (October 1454) 324. One by one, that means everyone, Alfonso vowed his
fate. What had formed as Adelskuvend in 1444 had, ten years later, been transformed into a Balkan
vassal network of the King of Naples in a considerably reduced form. Beside Skanderbeg were only the
Thopia, JJ
128
Muzaki, BalsiCi and Araniti remained. The families of the North were missing: the Crnojevici were
separated from the other nations by Venetian territory, and alternated between the Signoria, the Serbian
despotate, and the Ottomans; the little families of Span and Dusman remained in their mountains; the
Dukagjin went their own way (see the following chapter). From the Kuvend had survived so only a
fuselage in a small space. And this lack of space also explains the feuds that soon broke out openly or
covertly. Between the rivers Mati and Shkumbin crowded to many families. Skanderbeg needed land for
his followers; he could only take this away from his peers. "He strove to make himself Lord over the whole
country," complained Giovanni Musachi 325. Most important was the landscape Misia with Cape Rodoni,
where the BalsiCi sat. Only a tiny little country had remained of the ancient fame of their generation,
which had been hiding from the Adriatic to the Amselfeld at the end of the fourteenth century. The BalsiCi
tried to pull their noses out of the noose by submitting to the crown of Naples326, so Georg Strez and
Ivan Strez BalSic appeared alongside Skanderbeg, Muzaki Thopia, Araniti Komino and Gjin Muzaki as
"councilors" Alfonso V. 327. Part of the BalsiCi, especially Ivan's brother Gojko, in turn sought closest
connection to Skanderbeg328; the others, however, were so beset by him that they approached the
Ottomans; then the Kastriota took her prisoner and deposed her to southern Italy (after 1458) 329. The
Misia with Rodoni finally came into the hands of Skanderbeg. This coup was not forgotten even after
decades in Albanian aristocratic circles. Giovanni Musachi wrote: "He had the brothers captured Mr.
Giovanni and Mr. Coica Balsa, and sent them to King Ferrante in Naples for the sake of his captivity, and
he took their dominion between Kruja and Alessio, I mean the land of Misia "330. No other old-noble
family was treated as hard by Skanderbeg as the BalSiCi. But they proved to be tough. As soon as the
great Kastriota had died, they went before the Venetian Senate and demanded the inheritance of the man
who had claimed the name and fame of their generation a century before! , The captain of Kuvend the
Bergl9-nd Tumenisht wrested from the family of the aristocrat, the Muzaki, around Kruja; this too was not
forgotten332. The Muzaki and the Thopia also offended Skanderbeg for forcing the head of the Thopia,
Muzaki Thopia, to break his first wife, a muzaki, and instead marry Mamica Kastriota333. For a family of
whom Demetrio Franco reports that they called themselves Karlovi6i, "which means in Slavic terms, or
sons of Charles, because they are 129
Since the Signoria in Albania was not active against the Ottomans, he joined the attack of Naples and the
Central Albanian nobility on the Ottoman fortress Berat, where he lost his life together with the majority of
his followers in the summer of 1455. Muzaki had been smashed between the Adriatic powers and his
neighbor Skanderbeg. His country was partly conquered by the Ottomans, partly occupied by Alfonso V,
who handed over Petrela, the ancestral castle of Thopia, Skanderbeg. His widow Mamica fled with her
son Repos in the Venetian Durazzo: This sister of Skanderbeg kept thus distance to her brother and tried
to preserve their son the inheritance377. The Milanese envoy in Naples in November 1455 reported to his
master, Duke Francesco Sforza, at length on the fates of the family: The Turks also conquered the reign
of the sons of Mr. Musach, who had been killed in the defeat of his relative Skanderbeg; these areas are
about a mile from Durazzo. The Signoria (Venice, p. S) has received the sons of the said Musach, who
was her great friend and guardian; although Skanderbeg was an enemy of the Signoria Wal ':
Skanderbeg's agent told us these things "338. Six years later, Repos appeared before the Venetian
Senate," the son of the late Mr. Muzaki Thopia of Albania, whose ancestors had surrendered our city to
the city of Durazzo while he himself always devoted himself to us and an excellent friend of our state
Wa7; also ours said a good neighbor,
I! i
rich Greek. Repos should not forget that his uncle Skanderbeg had insulted his father and seized his own
inheritance. He waited for the moment of revenge and in 1467 became a traitor to the cause of the
insurgents. After all, the Aranites also suffered under Skanderbeg's will to govern340. Golemi Arenit
Comninovich, as addressed by Araniti Komino in 1452 - the Slavized form of a Byzantine emperor name
(Komninovi6) once again proves the intersecting cultural influences in the world of the Albanian nobility -
was the hero of great uprisings against the sultan, respected by the nobility and its 6,000 Man strong
following, also known in Italy 341. He gave his children a high education at his court, which was probably
followed by Byzantine models; as his son in 1469 before Pope Paul Ir. he spoke there, to the
astonishment of the Cardinals Albanian, Slavic (probably a West Bulgarian dialect), Italian and Latin. This
man had been a leading figure on the Adelskuvend of Alessio, but then had an ever heavier sword
against Skanderbeg. The kinship of the golem Araniti Komninovic 1. male progeny: (2)
OD
Konstantin
I Araniti
(1)
OD
Maria Muzaki
I Andronika
Gojsava
Chiranna
Helena
despina
OD
Georg Kastriota
OD
OD
OD
Angelina
Comita
OD
OD
Gojko Balšić
Skanrbeg ~ I
Ivan Georg Skender renegade sons, all three children renegades (renegade)
131
Caterina
Stand: His old fame faded, and he had to give way to the aspirations of the younger man step by step. All
the same, in February 1451, the humanist Francesco Filelfo praised him in a letter to King Charles VII of
France as "an extraordinarily fit man, hostile to the Turks" 343. Like his peers, he held after the defeats of
1448 distance to Kastriota. He, too, sought salvation in Italian patronage. Rejected by Venice (1449); he
swore allegiance to King Alfons V in 1451. With Neapolitan help he hoped to recapture his lands in the
Albanian south. Skanderbeg bound the old Kämpen by a marriage bond: Andronika Araniti became the
Signora Scanderbecha. Araniti was then pulled into the whirlwind of 1455 defeat with Muzaki
Thopia. After this failure of the Neapolitan orientation - which was also the policy of Skanderbeg - Araniti
made a break with his feudal lord and his son-in-law. In May 1456 he went to the camp of Venice. The
Doge Francesco Foscari appointed him the "chief 11th in the Albanian lands" and took his rule under
Venetian protection. He was given a gold-plated St. Mark's banner, which he was only allowed to develop
when Venice was at war with the sultan. His authority ranged from Durazzo to Skutari: in other words,
Araniti, as a representative of Venetian interests in the area, had to oppose the Neapolitan Captain
Skanderbeg. He was subordinate to the Venetian governors. Like the Dukagjin, he valued to be
commanded by no other Albanian nobleman. As a Protector, he handed over control of his trade to the
Venetians, so he had to redirect all caravans to Durazzo, his followers were allowed to acquire salt only in
Venetian districts. The Signoria offered protection, subject to the peace treaty with the Ottomans; as well
as refuge for the family Araniti. How weak the Lord was, the provision shows that all his conquests would
fall to the Republic344. Of course, Araniti had no choice: his southern neighbor Muzaki Thopia had fallen
last year; Skanderbeg in Handel soon with Venice, soon entangled with the Dukagjin. Araniti did not want
to fight against them. Surely his age was also noticeable, he wished to order his inheritance, to hand over
his rule neither to the OSlnanen nor to Skanderbeg. The status of a Venetian captain was well respected
in Albania: in the north in 1455 Stefanica Crnojevi6 received the same dignity. However, Araniti remained
personally associated with Southern Italy: in his second marriage, he had the daughter of a nobleman
known as buccaneer and adventurer 132
Married to Oliviero Francone: Pierina or Petrinella Francone must have been an energetic, power-
conscious woman. In Albania she was given the honorable surname Despina, Greek for Mistress; Here
the old Byzantine influence made itself felt. Greek was also part of Arani's allegiance, such as that of
Johannes Grammatikos, "mi / it albanensis," who represented ilm at the Curia in April 1458. His
reputation in the Balkan world also remained unbroken: When the Serbian despotate of Meluned 11th
was conquered in 1459, the son of Georg Brankovic, the blind Stefan, fled to Albania and married there
Aranitis daughter Angelina. Serbian chronicles are proud to note that Stefan Brankovic married into a
family of imperial blood, the sex of a man in high spirits. Angelina, according to the same Serbian
sources, was a highly educated and intelligent lady346 (and thus apparently similar to her sister, Signora
Scanderbega). Araniti died before June 1461 - not even the exact year of the old hero's death is
known347. His widow took over the business and tried to save what could be saved. Her son-in-law
Skanderbeg paid little heed to the Araniti; in his truce with Mehmed H. it seems to have been determined
that the sons of the family had to serve the Sultan. On the other hand, Skanderbeg helped Despinas
travel to Venice. The Signoria sympathetically accepted the widow and her three sons, and put Thomas
(Comino) Araniti as the most capable in the inheritance of the father, by the way, on Skanderbeg's
intercession. The Aranites were holding, in the forest landscape C. ermenika and around Librazhd349 as
long as Skanderbeg lived in peace with the Ottomans (l461-autumn 1463). But when gloomy war clouds
opened, it turned out that the men of the family were weak: Despina hurried to Venice in September
1463. The Republic looked entirely at Skanderbeg and Leka Dukagjin. Thomas Araniti came as an ally
initially hardly considered: The mother joined him, obtained the additional payment of the annual
allowance, asked for inclusion of the family in any contract of Venice with Meluned H.350 In the wake of
the Venetian offensive of 1464 then the three Sons of Despinas, Thomas, Constantine and Araniti,
admitted to the Venetian patriciate351. Despina also maintained close relations with Signoria in the
following year through her son Thomas, also known as Comino. But then came the catastrophe: Mehmed
11 fell in the spring of 1466 in the area of Araniti, where he broke the resistance of Skanderbeg and the
family. Despina fled to the north, first to Skutari, then, probably in August 1466, to Venice. In the middle of
the old core area of the Araniti, Mehmed 11 builds its most important fortress in Albania: Elbasan. Like
133
The Muzaki or Zenebish split under the impression of Ottoman power unfolding the family Araniti: Thomas
/ Comino ran over to the Ottomans and roamed with Ottoman riders in the autumn of 1466 before
Durazzo 354. His mother, meanwhile, was received in Venice with all honors and hosted in the palace of
Giovanni Tiepolo in the city center of Castello355. The Senate had every interest in quickly sending the
sons of Despinas back to Albania to fight against their brother Thomas, so he promised the family a
house in Skutari, plus 1000 ducats for armor356. But homecoming was out of the question. Despina now
took an important step: she asserted her influence in the highlands and drew a large number of warriors
and shepherds, the Berisha, on the side of Venice (winter 1466/67) 357. This gave the Araniti the right of
residence in Venice and enabled them to be incorporated into the Italian aristocracy: Despina established
relations with the Sforza of Milan, the Gonzaga of Mantua, the Estonian of Ferrara, she came before the
Emperor Friedlich IH. and in front of the Curia. Thus, she enabled her sons steep careers in Renaissance
Italy - one commanded under Pope Julius H. the Swiss Guard in Rome358. The remaining in Albania
Araniti, however, went completely to the Ottomans, fell to Islam and also rose to high dignity. The
renegade Komino, however, was slain by rebellious Christian South Albanians in the rocky coastal land of
Himara in 1485359. The old world of the Central Albanian nobility was shattered under the pressure of
Skanderbeg and the Ottomans. The gentlemen, deeply influenced by Byzantine imperial and cultural
heritage, had tried by their rebellion in the autumn of 1443 to restore their small principalities and shake
off the access of the new empire. But they were unwilling to pay the political price that would have existed
in the recognition of a new leader whom they did not consider to be of equal rank. The castriota was an
upstart in her eyes. When he did more than his duty - the expulsion of the Ottomans - he became
uncomfortable. But the war had already developed its own dynamics, which made it impossible for the
nobles to put Skanderbeg in their place. On the contrary, in order to maintain the struggle, the Kuvend
captain took away their lands and forced them into an alliance with a hard hand. They followed him into
the Neapolitan vassalage, because it ensured a certain independence: they swore an oath to Alfonso V,
but not to Kashiota. All the vassals were equal before the king; Skanderbeg had no primacy. The rebellion
suppressed most families for several years. But ultimately he drove her into the arms of his opponents,
Venice or the Ottomans. 134
ENEMIES IN HIGHLANDS
It is clear from the biographers Barletius and Franeo in Giovanni Musachi's memoirs that, at the same
time as the war against the Sultan in the Central Albanian highlands, a feud between Skanderbeg and the
great Dukagjin family was waged. For a long time it remained unclear what deep hatred Skanderbeg and
this largest family of the North separated360. Only Venetian and Neapolitan documents and files give an
insight into that inner Albanian war, which has caused the insurgents the most serious damage. He is
typical for thinking and acting of the Albanian nobility. Especially the confusing skirmishes, the constant
change of covenants and fronts, the bitter family feuds, the course of which is hard to
comprehend, demonstrate in an exemplary way the behavior of Balkan regional rulers in mountainous
retreat areas. To give an insight into action and thinking of this mighty highland dynasty, the dukagjin
battles should be told in more detail. The Dukagjin were a widely ramified family: In the 1440s, two main
directions appeared, on the one hand the brothers Pal (t 1458) and LeIm (t after 1451), on the other hand
Nikola Dukagjin (t before 1454). The younger generation consisted mainly of Pals sons Leka, one of the
most powerful personalities of Albania (t after 1481), Nikola (t after 1481) and Pro gon (t before 1471) and
Nikolas son Draga (t before 1462). These gentlemen, according to the report of the chronicler Musachi,
had a proud family memory. They derived themselves from the Trojans, an ancestor had accompanied
the French king on a crusade to Jerusalem, when he had arrived in Italy and there ascended to the lord of
Este and later of Ferrara; a second representative of the family had gone to Albania and took possession
of several lands there, namely the Zadrima - the area east of the Drinunterlaufs - the Black Mountains
near Dagno, the mountains around the Fani River and the landscape Pulti (or Polatum or Pilot) along the
Drinschlucht east of Dagno, where he also built the castle Satti. This progenitor, with all but one of his
relatives - with the exception of one son - was killed by his followers in the elephant landscape (on the
Fani River) after beating the local bishop, who had lasciviously approached his wife. The surviving son
had been secretly brought up by Stefan Progon in the village of "Calameri", then took his daughter to wife
and sired numerous offspring. According to tradition, the family split into different branches, the Lords of
Zadrima, the Lords of Fani, and finally the Dukagjin, who settled as patricians in Skutari362. After
Musachi, the main branch was the 135th
Dukagjin, the "casa delli veri Ducagini", extinct in the 15th century: He probably meant the line of Nikola
and Draga. This branch was affluent on the Dibri (not to be confused with DibraJDebar) and the Big Fani
363, a small landscape around the 700 m high ~ Kalor Mountain, connected to the plane through the
breakthrough of Mati, where Skanderbegs borders at the places Shullaz and Milot were lying. The
prevailing branch was considered less distinguished at the booth: "The other Dukagjin are not from the
right house in direct descendance, but have been raised by fate lately, that is, by Pal Dukagjin" 364. This
distinction, to which the Albanian noblemen of the time attached the greatest importance, this separation
into the genuine, older and a younger, less prestigious line explains the bitter quarrel in this gender. The
Dukagjin were widely related to the most important families of Albania: Pal Dukagjin from the older
lineage was linked to the Aranites by his marriage to a sister of Signora Scanderbega; Pal from the
younger line is said to have grown up together with Skanderbeg's father Ivan365. The younger Pal
enjoyed high esteem: Barletius praises him, but veils the fact that he came from the younger line when he
said he was "born in that illustrious family, from which so many extraordinarily belligerent military leaders
had emerged, especially. Paul's son, who far surpassed the honor of his father and grandfather in his war
glory. "366 A sign was said to have been exhibited in Prizren, that the Dukagjin crashed in one fell swoop
S011367. Such gentlemen did not subordinate themselves to a Kastriota, whose family had no old
nobility. They combined the prestige enjoyed by the brave warrior leader with their followers in the
mountains, with a family history that linked them to the European aristocracy and the Crusader idea:
Prizren and Jerusalem were the cornerstones of this world of imagination. This powerful race went its own
way, which may appear intricate from the outside, but always followed a goal: to preserve the autonomy
in the highlands, against the Ottomans, against Venice and especially against the hated rival
Skanderbeg. Both the Sultan and the Republic of St. Mark, but also Alfonso V took the Dukagjin very
seriously and did everything to pull her to her side. In 1459, a Dukagjin served the Sultan as Timar Lord in
Polog368, but it was still a while before the Dukagjin-zade became one of the famous Ottoman
families. During Skanderbeg's lifetime, the contrast between the two branches of the family reached its
peak. The fronts might change, the goal was always the same: Dagno. At first, Pal fought out of the
younger and 136
Pal Ct 1458)
II Draga
Nikola Ct before 1454)
Ct
Ct before 1462)
Nikola from the older line with Skanderbeg against Venice and his Albanian subjects (1447/48). At that
time, in the Doge's Palace, stunts were voiced that the Dukagjin must be destroyed; but soon the
senators realized that it was easier to play the Dukagjin and Skanderbeg against each other and to
deepen the differences within the sex. In the peace of Alessio of October 4, 1448 only Nikola Dukagjin
made the oath and told himself at the same time of Pallos; The republic of St. Mark was allowed to fight
Pal, which occupied Venetian villages, without the older line intervening in the war. The younger line
never forgot this. The gauntlet was thrown, Pal and his sons attacked him. The older line then followed
close to Venice, but was unable to to protect his allies in the highlands. Pals line broke in the following
years, a series of bloody raids on the fence. Both branches took no account of the interests of Kuvend. In
the spring of 1450, when Murad II raided Kruja, Nikola Dukagjin rode through the villages of Merishti and
Pistulli and also ripped off half of the Shkjezi at a ford of the Fani - two and a half villages as winnings,
while a few miles further south one of the great battles of the Late Middle Ages raged370. The threat to
her neighbor Skanderbeg did not change her mind; on the contrary. The violent young Leka from the
younger line attacked with his neighbor Bozidar Dusman the Venetian Drivasto background probably
were again quarrels about the scarce pastures (March 1451); his father sent to Venice, but that rather
bought peace than to compete with these gentlemen: From February 1452, the governor of Alessio Pal
Dukagj had to pay in salary371. The republic of St. Mark did this too, so as not to lose the Dukagjin to the
camp of Naples. Pal and Nikola soon afterwards found an opportunity, in an unfortunate coincidence, to
bring war on Skanderbeg (1452) 372. The battles gained so much focus that the Dukagjin joined the
Ottomans, so rather brought the Sultan into the country, as to submit to Skanderbeg. This news even
reached the Curia, where Pope Nicholas V was appalled by this inner-Christian dispute, this "heavy
hatred"; as an apostolic nuncio he sent to the 137 The republic of St. Mark did this too, so as not to lose
the Dukagjin to the camp of Naples. Pal and Nikola soon afterwards found an opportunity, in an
unfortunate coincidence, to bring war on Skanderbeg (1452) 372. The battles gained so much focus that
the Dukagjin joined the Ottomans, so rather brought the Sultan into the country, as to submit to
Skanderbeg. This news even reached the Curia, where Pope Nicholas V was appalled by this inner-
Christian dispute, this "heavy hatred"; as an apostolic nuncio he sent to the 137 The republic of St. Mark
did this too, so as not to lose the Dukagjin to the camp of Naples. Pal and Nikola soon afterwards found
an opportunity, in an unfortunate coincidence, to bring war on Skanderbeg (1452) 372. The battles gained
so much focus that the Dukagjin joined the Ottomans, so rather brought the Sultan into the country, as to
submit to Skanderbeg. This news even reached the Curia, where Pope Nicholas V was appalled by this
inner-Christian dispute, this "heavy hatred"; as an apostolic nuncio he sent to the 137 that the Dukagjin
joined the Ottomans, so they preferred to bring the Sultan into the country rather than submit to
Skanderbeg. This news even reached the Curia, where Pope Nicholas V was appalled by this inner-
Christian dispute, this "heavy hatred"; as an apostolic nuncio he sent to the 137 that the Dukagjin joined
the Ottomans, so they preferred to bring the Sultan into the country rather than submit to
Skanderbeg. This news even reached the Curia, where Pope Nicholas V was appalled by this inner-
Christian dispute, this "heavy hatred"; as an apostolic nuncio he sent to the 137
Dukagjin a mountain man, the bishop Paul Dusman of Drivasto, a man who was familiar with the
mentality of the highlands373. The hatred, however, was greater than the influence of the Church, and it
seems that the Catholic clergy in the land of the Dukagjin followed the interests of secular masters more
than the pontiff in the late Rome. Nicholas V had to threaten so the Dukagjin and the clergy in the
highlands with the Barin curse; the Dukagjin, according to the papal letter to the two bishops entrusted
with carrying out this mission, Andrew of Lis in Mati and Nicholas of Polatum, also of the sons of the
highlands, "would have been reported to have suffered serious divisions and quarrels between him
(meaning Nikola, O. S) and our beloved son, the noble Mr. Georg Castrioth Skanderbeg, to rule for a long
time ... support for themselves, their followers, countries and places the disgusting prince of the
unbelieving Turks, had entered into an alliance with him and had him in many things. helped, but
seriously harmed Christian faith. "374 (August 1454) The conciliation met with some success, but only
since Nikola had fallen in battle, in service of Venice, as his son Draga should tell eight years later Whom
Nikola had fought remains unclear, but as a wage earner of Venice and partisan of the Ottomans, he had
stood in contrast to Skanderbeg and Naples.Internal rivalries and the Turkish struggle were superimposed
in the Central Albanian mountains.In the summer of 1454, the Kastriota and Pal Dukagjin, now stronger
Man of his sex, peace, At the last moment apparently, because an Ottoman army was just about to
invade the mountains, but had to withdraw on the news of the inner-Albanian agreement three days
marches376. Skanderbeg soon afterwards drew Pal the Neapolitan camp; In October 1454 the Dukagjin
laid the vassal envy by a representative in Naples; he paid for it with 300 ducats annual fee377. In other
words, Pal had been bought by Naples; he did so because his plans against Dagno could not be enforced
against his previous employer Venice. His son Leka took the conquest of the castle immediately in the
hand. Outwardly, Lei came to the Signoria as a friend; he received Venetian pay, and as late as March
1456, the Senate met its wishes 378. Secretly, Leka made connections with men in the castle; he
succeeded in bribing a Venetian officer. The suspicious Venetians provided the crew with military
equipment, and when it was rumored that conspirators were in the town, governor Antonio Dolfin had
eight suspects tied up. All caution was in vain. On a dark autumn night, Leim's men approached with
carefully measured assault ladders, damaging the Mauem 138
and entered the governor's office, who was surprised in bed; Leka had his head cut off, raped the
patrician's beautiful young daughter, and then drove Dolfin's wife and other children half-naked across the
Drin to Skutari (October 29, 1456). Leka Dukagjin took advantage of the success. Although Skanderbeg
refused him any help, he crossed the Drin and drew against Drivasto, whose battle-hardened citizens
beat him back; the Skutarins appeared on the battlefield, pushed Leka back to the drin and inflicted a
devastating defeat on him; 1200 men were killed or drowned in the floods. Leka escaped into the
mountains with 60 followers382. When the news of the raid on Dagno arrived on November 20, 1456, in
Venice, she was shocked, which was soon replaced by the greatest indignation383, but there was also
anger on Dolfin, to which one was to blame. Behind the attack one suspected the hand Alfons Y .; This
opinion prevailed in Albania385. Again, Italian politics played into Albanian feuds. This time, the republic
of St. Mark did not avoid a war. She had been hurt in her honor and had to restore her reputation. The
Venetians knew how to fight an opponent like Leka Dukagjin. Already around 1420, the inhabitants of the
coastal town of Cattaro had advised that in the mountains one thousand more ducats than more than
8000 warriors "386. Venice wrote a bounty on Leka, 1000 ducats dead, 1500 alive he was worth the
republic; a ten-year tax exemption 387. The Senators also remembered Skanderbeg's enmity with the
Dukagjin; the faithful abbot Pelinus won the castriota in November 1456 for an alliance 388. The onset of
winter gave Leim a breathing space. In the spring of 1457, however, 200 horsemen and 300 foot-soldiers,
50 of them riflemen on three ships at sea, struck the lagoon city, accompanied by two galleys. soon
afterwards Venice sent three guns to Albania; there the Landstunn was summoned; grace was promised
to even fleeing murderers when they joined the Venetian weapons389. The threatened LeIm threw
himself into the hands of the Ottomans and released their passports. He was therefore responsible for a
strong Ottoman army invading Skanderbeg's heartland Mati and inflicting a heavy defeat on the
Kastriota. For the second time, the Dukagjin had helped the Ottomans decisively. While Mati went up in
flames, Venetian mercenaries and northern Albanian patricians advanced against Dagno. The fight was
conducted with the utmost brutality; a patrician from Drivasto had Leka's own hand cut off; an Italian
condottiere fell; after numerous Schannützeln on pastures and in front of the castle itself JJ
139
Dagno was finally thunderstruck (summer 1457). With 16 men, Leka escaped to the mountains391. The
feud was also a brother fight, because Draga, head of the older line, had also stood against Leka and his
father Pal in the field. He had hoped to conquer, with the help of Venice, thirty-two villages in which the
two branches were fighting; He had expected in secret that he would win the coveted Dagno. The
Signoria, however, only surrendered to him the only Satti, farther east in the mountains on the Drin. Since
Italian mercenaries refused to serve in Dagno - the casualties in combat had had an effect - but the
Venetians did not trust Albanian warriors, a power vacuum threatened. The quarrelsome allies were taken
away from this concern: In August 1457, Ottoman riders broke into the landscape around Skutari, where
Draga Dukagjin was hit hard by Satti393. If Skanderbeg had not achieved one of his greatest victories
shortly thereafter, the petty war for Dagno would have caused the Christian uprising the most severe,
perhaps irreparable damage. Leka and Pal Dukagjin were initially startled by their own defeat and
Skanderbeg's victory and had asked for peace in Venice in the fall of 1457, but their "ambiguities and
lists," as the senators put it, met with considerable mistrust; rightly so, because in the winter of 1457/58
the younger line of the Dukagjin made the decisive strike against the older branch around Draga: With
Ottoman help, they raided Satti and lived so close to their relative's country that his desperate subjects
fled across the Adriatic to Apulia and the Marche. Draga remained behind with few nobles; his land was
"empty and abandoned," he sued the Venetians in September 1458 394. With that, Venice's Glacis had
collapsed around Dagno, and it had to fear an attack by the younger line of the Dukagjin and the
Ottomans. Under these circumstances, the republic was only a way out; she had to win Skanderbeg. He
had just lost his feudal lord; Alfonso V died when the Signoria turned to the Kastriota. In view of the
erupting thrones of throne in Naples, it seemed imperative for the Albanian race to let go of its hostility to
Venice. He saw the possibility to approach the lagoon city and at the same time to tie the
Dukagjin. Because he realized that he had grown up in Leka Dukagjin an equal rival. The mediation
between Skanderbeg and Venice took over the proven Pelinus. While the senators wanted the "complete
annihilation" of the Dukagjin, the castriota skilfully staged. The old Pal he wanted to spare, only in Leka
he saw an opponent. For once needed Venice Skanderbeg more urgent than this the Republic. The
castriota, however, did not wish for another nobility feud. And he kept the upper hand. 140 the dukagjin
wished, the kastriota tactfully staged. The old Pal he wanted to spare, only in Leka he saw an
opponent. For once needed Venice Skanderbeg more urgent than this the Republic. The castriota,
however, did not wish for another nobility feud. And he kept the upper hand. 140 the dukagjin wished, the
kastriota tactfully staged. The old Pal he wanted to spare, only in Leka he saw an opponent. For once
needed Venice Skanderbeg more urgent than this the Republic. The castriota, however, did not wish for
another nobility feud. And he kept the upper hand. 140
~. I
After an Italian Condottiere captured by the Dukagjin was also used as an intermediary, Pal, Leka and his
brothers sent the Franciscan Eugen to Venice. Again, the Catholic Church had settled in the
mountains395. The Dukagjin released all prisoners and asked the Senate for forgiveness for what had
happened. They listened to open ears: "In a sincere spirit, we accept and welcome them and treat them
as sons and dearest friends," the Senators ordered to the Franciscan monk, who was relieved to hear
about the end of battles that were very lossy and not complete No side was victorious: Venice retained
Dagno and its old district with the countryside Rogamenia (a small plain around the village of Rrogam, 47
m above sea level), it pushed its territory up the Drin to the much-contested Satti Castle, which was now
to be sanded. Masonry and timber had to be removed from the place. This would demilitarize the
border. The Dukagjin, on the other hand, kept all land beyond Satti as their own possession, as a
Venetian fief, however, several villages in the eastern hills of the Zadrima396 and three villages on the
river Gjadrj397. However, the Venetians held their hand to the large village of Troshani, which protected
the way to Alessio along the Drin. Both sides were content: Venice kept control of the most important
castle (Dagno) and the traffic routes in the plain, the Dukagjin in turn secured the fields and pastures from
the Drin at Dagno down to the lower reaches of Fani, where the Kastriotaland began. Venice won the
desired frontier guard to the east and the salt monopoly in the mountains: For the Dukagjin recognized
the Venetian suzerainty by handing the governor of Skutari a ten-pound wax candle on Mark Day, but
especially by salt only from the Venetian districts Albania related398. The Senate agreed with these
provisions, advised on the necessary fortification Dagnos, rewarded the Franciscans with 25 ducats and
gave instructions to complete the peace on the ground (January 1459) 399. In Albania, the threat of
renewed excommunication proclaimed by Pope Pius H. by the archbishops of Antivari and Durazzo
weighed on the Dukagjin. Pressed by the church, Skanderbeg and Venice, rode to Dukagjin and his
BJ1ider Skutari and there concluded with the governors Benedetto Soranzo of Skutari, Luca Contarini of
Alessio and Cresio de Molin of Drivasto a formal peace treaty (February 19, 1459) 401. In these expressly
Venetigs trailer Draga Dukagjin was included. But as soon as Leka Dukagjin calmed down, it became
apparent that Skanderbeg, who was not involved in the negotiations, did not see the result
hinnahm. As part of the Dukagjin defeat, he took the Satti Castle in a coup d'état and briefly extended his
rule to the Drin in a wedge-like manner; Now he was in turn on the Venetian Dagno neck (probably March
/ April 1459) 402. The Venetian Senate sent his Admiral Admiral Lorenzo Moro and the Condottiere de
Imola to move Skanderbeg to the exit; The argument that Satti was really unimportant, of course, had to
sound strange after all the battles. But the Venetians prevailed: in the treaty signed in Alessio on June 4,
1459, Skanderbeg clearly expressed his indignation, but at the same time his attitude towards Leka
Dukagjin: that he was "the enemy of Christ and of me" 403 , The hostility remained, although both
gentlemen turned to other things: Skanderbeg fought in southern Italy in 1461/62, but Leka Dukagjin
continued his feud against the older branch of his race. Sometime before June 1462 Draga Dukagjin fell
victim to this family quarrel. From his branch survived only his nephew Nikola, who was taken with his
following on 11 June 1462 in Venetian military service and received some villages in the
Zadrima404. Thus, the younger branch of the Dukagjin had prevailed. Leka had become the undisputed
master of the highlands of Drin and Fani, and on the hill country of Gjadri; he controlled the caravan road
that ran over the ridge of Puka; and he kept Skanderbeg in control of this important part of Albania. Leka
will have followed with discomfort, how Skanderbeg gradually supplanted the other old-noble
families. Both men continued to separate an abyss of mistrust. This was best expressed by Leka when
Venice wanted to win him over to the great Turkish war in the fall of 1463: "I do not want to be under
Skanderbeg, but I am content to serve and obey every signatory or representative of your Signoria I
demand that if Skanderbeg engrossed me in war, the most sublime Signoria will help me ... "It was not
the unconditional fight against the Sultan, but the concern for his own sex and his own dominion, that
Leka outweighed that Francis Eugene said: "If the Turks drive me out of my land, may the Signoria give
me a place where I can stay with my sons, The fighting against Leka Dukagjin had tied important forces of
the insurgents. Neither Venice nor Skanderbeg had the brutal master The fighting against Leka Dukagjin
had tied important forces of the insurgents. Neither Venice nor Skanderbeg had the brutal master
of the highlands forced to their knees. Leka enjoyed fame and prestige among his followers. The most
important collection of oral habitual right, the "Kanun of Leka Dukagjin," is associated with its name in
popular tradition406. His warriors and their lords fought against their enemies, whether Venetians,
Albanians or later the Ottomans. Skanderbeg was in their eyes the head of a hostile rule. Leka and his
men survived among the millstones of power politics. As he lavjelie between the sultan and the Italian
states, Leka possessed more diplomatic maneuvering space than Skanderbeg, which stood in sharp
contrast to the Ottomans. Not for nothing did the name and power of the Dukagjin persist for centuries,
VERRAT kanderbeg's life can also be read as a tale of betrayal. Already the contemporaries occupied
that relatives and closest confidants relapsed of the Kastriota and overflowed into the camp of the
Sultan. They linked this renunciation of the cause of the insurgents with the names of three men: Hamza
Kastriota, Moses of Dibra, and Balaban Pasha. These men embodied typical destinies in the age of
Ottoman conquest, and each one entered the realm of legend in his own way. In a form of rule in which
neither offices nor other solid structures existed, power and survival were based on trust and
loyalty. There is nothing known about the fiefs of the followers at Skanderbeg; Feudalism of Occidental
Tradition had never invaded the Inner Balkans, but had reached in foothills only the coastal land. The
relationship between leader and henchman was based on the exchange of protection and reward for
obedience and military service. Personal dealings, a lasting close relationship between warrior and Lord
maintained this bond. Prey in the war, care for the families formed a strong putty. If someone broke this
bond, he violated the principles of human coexistence in the highlands. It is not for nothing that the
Scandinavian biographers tell so much about the three basic types of traitors. Hamza Kastriotas weighed
the heaviest. As a nephew, he was a blood relative to Skanderbeg; he had the autumn of 1443 with his
uncle the The relationship between leader and henchman was based on the exchange of protection and
reward for obedience and military service. Personal dealings, a lasting close relationship between warrior
and Lord maintained this bond. Prey in the war, care for the families formed a strong putty. If someone
broke this bond, he violated the principles of human coexistence in the highlands. It is not for nothing that
the Scandinavian biographers tell so much about the three basic types of traitors. Hamza Kastriotas
weighed the heaviest. As a nephew, he was a blood relative to Skanderbeg; he had the autumn of 1443
with his uncle the The relationship between leader and henchman was based on the exchange of
protection and reward for obedience and military service. Personal dealings, a lasting close relationship
between warrior and Lord maintained this bond. Prey in the war, care for the families formed a strong
putty. If someone broke this bond, he violated the principles of human coexistence in the highlands. It is
not for nothing that the Scandinavian biographers tell so much about the three basic types of
traitors. Hamza Kastriotas weighed the heaviest. As a nephew, he was a blood relative to Skanderbeg; he
had the autumn of 1443 with his uncle the If someone broke this bond, he violated the principles of
human coexistence in the highlands. It is not for nothing that the Scandinavian biographers tell so much
about the three basic types of traitors. Hamza Kastriotas weighed the heaviest. As a nephew, he was a
blood relative to Skanderbeg; he had the autumn of 1443 with his uncle the If someone broke this bond,
he violated the principles of human coexistence in the highlands. It is not for nothing that the
Scandinavian biographers tell so much about the three basic types of traitors. Hamza Kastriotas weighed
the heaviest. As a nephew, he was a blood relative to Skanderbeg; he had the autumn of 1443 with his
uncle the
143
Insurrection started, along with this Kruja surprised. What moved him remains unclear; perhaps he had
hoped to inherit the long, childless Skanderbeg. The birth of Skanderbeg's son, Ivan, in the year C! J1455
was a shame. Hamza then went to the sultan and had him set up as a counter-ruler. With this he was the
only Albanian nobleman to challenge the great castriota with a clear political counter model: as vassal
prince of Sultan Grace. Hamza enjoyed the protection and help of the mighty Ishak Pasha. In the spring
of 1457 he marched into Mati and Dibra, the excellent connoisseur of the country. Only barely escaped
Skanderbeg after heavy losses his rule. Barletius created from this story a parable of good and evil: The
light-form Skanderbeg, the soul-size, God trust, the aura of the faith fighter assigned, he faces the
physically and mentally crippled traitor, the small-minded, intelligent, but devious
Hamza407. Skanderbeg's victory is a triumph of the right cause: The traitor and his Ottoman assistant are
led in triumph to Kruja, Hamza then sent to Naples. In Italy, this attracted appropriate attention. None
other than Pope Pius H. took up the story in his work De Europa: "A nephew of Skanderbeg, son of a
brother, inclined towards the Turks, ambushed the uncle, but was caught by this, sent to Alfonso and into
the dungeon "408. Like Barletius, the Piccolomini pope also uses the report to highlight Skanderbeg's
moral superiority. After the death of Alfons V. Hamza is said to have been given Albanian honors and to
have had a different meaning; He was allegedly poisoned by his attempt to release his family, who were
held hostage by the Sultan. Barletius makes the traitor feel so late remorse and make atonement. Even
more varied are the stories of the second great Venat: Moses of Dibra, whose full name is Moses Golem
Araniti, came from Valmi (now Elbasan) in Shkumbin Valley. He was the nephew of the famous Araniti
Komino and the Vladen Golem Araniti, ie the father-in-law and the brother-in-law Skanderbegs409. His
rule was in Lower Dibra. Outraged by the suppression of his influence by the Kastriota and probably
sobered by the devastating defeat at Berat (summer 1455), he sat down in the Ottoman camp. Like
Hamza, he led the Ottomans into the country, but was also defeated. He then returned to Skanderbeg,
from whom he was received by grace. Barletius tells the story with artful drama. The betrayal was
triggered by doubts about the leader, not through thirst for power and inner-family rivalry. For Barletius
Moses is the original type of the traitor, his story is also in the 144th
narrative structure designed as a doctrine for doubters. The moral evaluation of the waste is
clear; Skanderbeg considers betrayal worse than a defeat in the field411. The traitor is, as it were, the
bearer of evil: "If with Moses all perfidy and every misfortune leave Epirus!", Skanderbeg is said to have
proclaimed Barletius. Dibra, the traitor's homeland, was symbolically - and also through harsh measures -
cleansed of the traces of the garbage: The elders gathered and examined the men, by crier was invited to
display apostates. But nobody became. reported. The confiscation of Moses' estates closed the wound
the traitor had torn. This left no trace of Moses and his act. In contrast to Hamza's fate, history takes its
own course: Moses challenges Skanderbeg to a duel, but avoids fear at the last moment. Even before the
gun, the traitor is broken inside. He does not stand up to the charisma of Skanderbeg. The traitor fails like
a naughty son before his father - so Barletius 413. The Ottomans, brought into the country by Moses, are
subject. Moses does not dare to face the Sultan. He wanders around and finally returns to the father
figure Skanderbeg: The closing scene sees the picture of the humble kneeling, begging for mercy lost
son. For Barletius, the second story of betrayal ends with a military and moral triumph of Skanderbeg,
reinforced in the case of Moses by the renewed confession of the apostate to the Ottoman
struggle. Moses makes active repentance in battle and in his death; captured by the Ottomans, Moses,
the two-time traitor, is skinned alive at the behest of the Sultan. 415. While Barletius uses the betrayal of
Moses to glorify Skanderbeg, Giovanni Musachi gives a very different and much more sober view of
things: "He (Skan derb eg, 0 On the other hand, Moses Comnino took his reign, which was in Dibra,
Moses was a generous and efficient man, and since he could not endure such an act of violence, he went
to Turks, and this Turk allowed him to be the chief nanny one of his armies and sent him against Skan
derb eg "416. Musachi shows understanding for his Skanderbeg offended peers. After all, the castriota
had not treated the Muzaki differently. The blame lies not with the traitor, but with Skanderbeg, who had
seriously offended a nobleman and, as it were, forced revenge. Moses had no choice, he did not want to
lose his honor. Mehmed II should do this. Exploiting grudge and ordering Moses to kill Skanderbeg417 •
He would have defeated the insurgents, using their own code of honor, but above all their inner
zeal. When this failed, it was not Moses who returned pleadingly to Skanderbeg; viel145 who pleadingly
returned to Skanderbeg; viel145 who pleadingly returned to Skanderbeg; viel145
According to Musachi it was almost the other way around: "he (Skan, eg, O. S) had him ordered, he
returned Inöge, he would treat him like a brother, Moses, who knew that he was not safe in the Turks, but
also, in order not to magnify its (Skanderbeg, p. S) power with the blood of Christians, then returned
"418. Skanderbeg had recognized his mistake, and even Moses was overcome with remorse; at the same
time the apostate feared for his personal safety after the failure. Thus the interests of both gentlemen
coincided again; the insult was forgotten, the brotherhood of arms restored to the death - which Moses
suffered horribly. In order to overcome the treachery, however, two narrative traditions emerged, those of
Skanderbeg as victims and those who sees him as guilty of garbage. One comes from the milieu of the
Catholic clergy of northern Albania - Skanderbeg's most important supporter - and the other one was
supplanted by the orthodox nobility of central Albania, who was allied with the Kastriota. Finally, the third
traitor differs from Hamza and Moses in several respects: Balaban Pasha was not descended from any
noble family, but was a son of a son from the village of Martanesh in Mati and thus a subject of
Skanderbeg's father Ivan. Like his master and son, he changed his faith and became Muslim. In 1423 he
served together with Pir Ömer bey at the castle Kruja and built before the Venetian Durazzo its own
Zollamf 19. Thus, like Skanderbeg, he held an important office in the Ottoman administration of the
Albanian Sancak. The Kastriota and his former subject were on the same level in the new
system. Balaban had no interest in restoring the former state, and remained loyal to the sultan in the fall
of 1443. According to contemporary reports, he is said to have passed through a dazzling career in the
Ottoman army and, among other things, stormed the walls of Constantinople in 1453 as one of the first
421. Balaban created his own sultan's faithful dynasty. His son Ilyas Mehmed H. was the captain of the
strategically important castle Sobri at Derven, at the passage from Skopje to Tetovo. Ilyas died there,
probably in fighting. What importance the sultan attached to this Islamized Albanian family that in Ilyas'
place he made his son Hamza commander of Sobri. Thus, the third generation of the Balaban sex
entered the war against Skanderbeg. Balaban's nephew Ali also took part in this struggle424. In the final
battle with the Kastriota the old farmer led the decisive field.,. the doggedness of which can also be
explained by the social opposition, the hatred between the newly Christianized Lord and the Muslim social
climber. In the summer of 1466 transferred 146 whose doggedness can also be explained by the social
opposition, the hatred between the newly Christianized Lord and the Muslim upwardly mobile social
climber. In the summer of 1466 transferred 146 whose doggedness can also be explained by the social
opposition, the hatred between the newly Christianized Lord and the Muslim upwardly mobile social
climber. In the summer of 1466 transferred 146
Mehmed 11. the siege Krujas the Balaban Pasha. This became a figure also noticed in Italy; In the first
months of 1467, King Franrante even received an embassy of the renegade, effectively recognizing him
as the new ruler of Central Albania, 42 while Skanderbeg was still a Neapolitan vassal. The Venetian
governor of Alessio hastened to send gifts to Pascha and to seek good trade links between his city or
Durazzo and Valmi (the new Ottoman city of Elbasan on the Via Egnatia) 426. In Albania itself, a nephew
of Skanderbeg went over to Balaban and gave this - peak of disgrace for Skanderbeg - his daughter to
the wife427. Only in the spring of 1467 did Skanderbeg, under pressure of all his might, defeat this
dangerous enemy; Balaban fell in battle. No other man from the Balkans, neither the Ottoman frontier
patrons nor the Albanian defectors, had threatened Skanderbeg as existentially as Balaban. The horror
which he inspired the insurgents finds in the stories of Barletius, Franeos, and Musachis a strong
contradiction. hall; Skanderbeg tried to humiliate him by sending him a hoe, a plow, and a sickle, which
were to remind him of his origins, 440. For Balaban was against the social as well as the fierce he was
not excused, as he was for a Hamza or a Moses whose noble honors had been violated by
Skanderbeg. Balaban was simply a treacherous farmer for nobles and clergy whose great gifts disturbed
her deeply. Even if the biographers deride the modest origin of the Pasha, they do not want to conceal his
deeds. Musachi expresses his disgust at the breaking of all rules of combat when he tells of an episode
that hit the nobility. In the fall of 1464 Moses of Dibra, Muzaki d 'Angelina, Gjin Muzaki, Johann Perlat,
Nikola Berisha, Georg Kuka and Johann Manesi, all important underlings of Skanderbeg, had recklessly
fallen into an Ottoman trap. Usually she would have been able to trigger Skanderbeg, but this Balaban
refused. The nobles were skinned in Constantinople for two weeks.431 This terrible end contradicted the
traditional way of thinking, but served the Ottomans to spread fear and terror, so it was out of
nationalism. The noble ideals - Musachi speaks of bravery "and manliness" 432 - were no longer
valid. The Balkan chivalry was subject to a new era in which talent and not origin counted and in which
old rules were eliminated, in the interest of a new world empire. Balaban's achievements brought him
great fame. Kritobulos, who tells from the perspective of Sultanshofes, calls him Na11 Balaban's
achievements brought him great fame. Kritobulos, who tells from the perspective of Sultanshofes, calls
him Na11 Balaban's achievements brought him great fame. Kritobulos, who tells from the perspective of
Sultanshofes, calls him Na11
11
11
147
men, a rarity in a work entirely dedicated to the praise of the ruler. Balaban had been "one of the best
men" of Mehmed, "a very gifted general" 433. The legend soon took possession of this impressive figure:
even in the 20th century it was reported that Balaban had carried his severed head to the castle of
Petrela, where until 1967 - when atheism and the "cultural revolution" brought in from China began to
grow - his tomb, a Türbe, was visible434. What bound contemporaries and later generations to the names
of these three men was not limited to a small group of people as a social phenomenon. Treachery
repeated itself rather in the 25 years of the uprising. No population layer, neither the nobility nor the
peasants nor the orthodox clergy, remained unaffected. Only from the ranks of the Catholic clergy is no
case of betrayal known. The first large-scale movement of rubbish had occurred during the invasion of
Murad H. in 1450. After Skanderbeg had become a Neapolitan vassal, the situation stabilized. The defeat
at Berat, however, triggered a second major shock. Not only Moses of Dibra went over to the Sultan; on
the contrary, many followers had lost confidence in Skanderbeg, which could no longer guarantee their
security against the Ottomans. The castriota feared "that the whole country would be lost because ... the
men of this land are very attached to the Turk, who offers them a good and mild rule, and since they have
no sure hope, they would be the burden of war and such cruelty, Many people were simply tired of the
country's annual rhythm of flight, destruction, struggle and reconstruction in the autumn. The more violent
the Ottoman attacks became, the greater the extent of the betrayal. In 1457, the Venetian Bailo of
Durazzo reported: "He has been abandoned by all his captains, who have passed over Turks" 437. Nine
years later, "Skanderbeg doubted at the news of the An148
march of the enemies to the loyalty of his captains, whom he knew were devoted to his nephews; he had
her relieved and replaced by others whose wives and sons he sent to Calabria with their property as
hostages. But the captains of the castle, who had been taken away from their castles and allegedly fled
out of fear to the Turks who had already come into the country, had the Turk executed when he realized
his failure. To those nephews of Skanderbeg, who had led the way and advised him, he had spitted on a
stake ... "438 This letter of Agostino Patrizi Piccolomini of 1466 reveals how weak the loyalty of the
nobility to Skanderbeg in particular two decades war was. Kastriota's loyalty was secured only by hostage
taking and blackmail, and he wanted to be a deterrent to the expropriation of rebel property. In his own
family, however, he was unable to maintain this pressure. Again he had suffered a treachery from a man
from the innermost circle. Traitors were in the immediate vicinity of Skanderbeg, with typical Albanian
social structures playing a significant role. Balaban had blood relatives in his opponent's camp. The
castriota knew nothing of these kinship relationships and gave his trust to this man. Not even Skanderbeg
was able to cope with the ramifications of large familial kinship networks, which still today characterize
significant parts of Albanian society. He also failed because of specific Albanian conditions: With many
followers, blood ties to relatives in the Ottoman camp proved to be stronger than the loyalty to a standing
outside of their own extended family leader. Only the Catholic clergy did not know this family, loyalty band
and therefore remained spared treason. Mehmed H. rewarded traitors only in case of victory; not only
Skanderbeg's nephew was punished for his failure; the following year, 1467, the sultan had 3,000
mountain dwellers deported, who had released his passports but had not helped him, a decisive
victory. In the years 1466 and 1467 the garbage movement finally reached a comprehensive character:
those who resisted were killed or abducted by the Ottomans; many people fled north or to Italy; but some
stayed and submitted. It was those men who were registered in the tax registers in 1467 a, as members
of a new Ottoman administrative layer. That's how their names are known. In Skanderbeg's former Kem
area around Kruja were employed as servants: A priest named Peter - he proves the betrayal in the (well
Orthodox) clergy; then Vlk, brother of Urana, finally Christian timothy named Dragoslav, Lumash, Peter,
Mavro, Aleks Ripes, Kalo149 A priest named Peter - he proves the betrayal also in the (probably
orthodox) clergy; then Vlk, brother of Urana, finally Christian timothy named Dragoslav, Lumash, Peter,
Mavro, Aleks Ripes, Kalo149 A priest named Peter - he proves the betrayal also in the (probably
orthodox) clergy; then Vlk, brother of Urana, finally Christian timothy named Dragoslav, Lumash, Peter,
Mavro, Aleks Ripes, Kalo149
Gjergj, Jonima, Gjergj, Theodore, Kolo Sirodi, Tanush and Izvoniko Perlati well from the family of the
defender of Svetigrad stalmnend442. Skanderbeg's fortress Bila kamin and the important town of Klos
were elevated to Ottoman military villages, so they were given a privileged position443; in the villages of
Klos, Lis - a Catholic bishopric -, Dirjan and Bejni Christians were used as voynuk, as Ottoman
soldiers; Among them is a Mark Kastrioti, one of the many renegade family members of Skanderbeg
444. A serious blow must have been the descent of the Vrana family: Vrana Conte had served the
Ottomans like Skanderbeg in the thirties. In 1450 he had married Kruja; a Vranes - probably that Vlk
(Wolf, a Slavic name) - commanded seventeen J later deposed an army of 7,000 to 8,000 Ottomans, who
plundered before Skutari446. Structures of exodus of former followers can also be found in Dibra by tax
registers: a number of Christians were taken as Timur lords and voynuks in Ottoman services in
1467447. In Upper Dibra the renegade Jalcub received a fief of 1619 Ak <; e (Silberlinge) 448; modest
loans were given to Christians: Stanisa Srnrce 1150 Akye 449, Gjergj 338 Ak <; e45o, Jonko Smile and
Nikola Arbanasi together 108 Akye45 1; the voynuk were recruited from the linguistically mixed population
(Pro gon Lagator, Lazar, son of Rumen, Gorgi, son of Jani, Stanisa Popovic, Zotko Evgeni, Dimitri, son of
Bogdan, Progon, son of Gorgo, Nikola Kosarin; Jani Popovic) 452. In Lower Dibra, on the other hand, the
number of Christian Timur lords is much lower; massively Muslim Ottomans were used here4 53. This
means that in this heartland Skanderbeg no traitors were to win, so Ottoman dignitaries had to be brought
from outside. The same applies to the area of Dolgo brd0 454. Only the voynuks still worship Christianity
there; they bore Albanian and Serbian names (Gjin Lukash with his brother Gjon and his son Gjon, Leo
with Duro, the son of Gjergj, Nenko Pendavic, Gorge, Solm of Papa Radovic, then Albanian - Slavic
hybrids like Kole Pribic with his brothers Gorgo and Bogoslav) 455. In Lower Dibra, Skanderbeg's old
core area, the design of the new Reichsgewalt can be followed in detail: Ottoman was now the old border
castle Modric, in the west of which up to 2084 m ho her ridge served as a natural boundary. West of this
mountain range were over 1000 m the villages Borove and Stebleve 456, fief of Ali ÜZgÜI. Two villages
were uninhabited there, probably as a result of the fighting. In the north, the fief of the Sejdi Hoca joined,
Gjinovec, which was reached on a mule track from Borove, and beyond the ridge in the east, already in
the Drintal the village Drenok457. The 150th which was reached on a mule track from Borove, as well as
on the other side of the ridge in the east, already in the Drintal the village Drenok457. The 150th which
was reached on a mule track from Borove, as well as on the other side of the ridge in the east, already in
the Drintal the village Drenok457. The 150th
The next village, Trebishte, was added to the fief of Aluned bey, the most important Timarioten in Lower
Dibra: He drew the levies from the. Main village Piskupija / Peshkopia, the nearby Orthodox monastery,
from the alpine villages on the slope of the up to almost 2400 m uplifting mountains (<::: erjan, Belove,
Shimsan), and the village Tren in the south, at the foot of 800 m high Mali i Trenit458. North of Trebishte,
the Drin widens to a small plains: several Timur lords were used here: in Topoj an and Kovayice the Turk
Ahmed 459; in Okshatin a Hamza460; in the east of the Drin, opposite Okshatin Bliaten the Janissary
Ali461. The northeast adjoining mountain range and the villages and pastures fell to the Sancakbey
(Maqellare, Keryishte, Poyeshte) 462. Northern neighbors were in Hobok, Under Keryishte and Kovayice
of KadI Mevlana463, in Herbei and Erebare HaCI Germiyan (an Anatolian from Germiyan) 464. The
mountain slope west of the Drin, from which the Kastriota had once descended, Sine and Gur, received a
former slave of an Albanian field maid named Hizir (to him below) 465. The bitter mountainous area of
Lura, Skanderbeg's mountain refuge at almost 2000 m, was taken over by an Ali from Vardartal466. In
the valley below, at the same height, the yeriba ~ l Ali arrived in the villages of Belica and · Suhodol; he
also got the Alm Zagrad high above Piskupija467. This walk through the valley of the Black Drin, which
does not even enumerate all the forgiven Timarlehen, makes it clear that the Ottomans had entered the
last hamlet, the last Alpine pasture and taxed. Skanderbeg's followers had been ousted here. But just the
act. The fact that in the Drintal between Modric and Piskupija a considerable number of Timur lords had to
be stationed, which were for the most part Asians from Anatolia, makes it possible to refer to this region
as Ober-Dibra or Mati as Herzland Skanderbegs468. Defectors and traitors, like the followers, can not be
understood in ethnic categories, but rather the nature of the country, the remoteness of a valley or a
mountainous area was the decisive factor. Upper Dibra with Svetigrad had already been subjugated by
the Ottomans in 1448, at least in the valleys, ie here the new HeiTen had the say in winter as well. The
valley bottom of Sub-Dibra, on the other hand, was under Skanderbeg's rule until 1466/67, at least
outside the war period. The population of Piskupijas, which bore Serbian names, and the Albanian-
speaking inhabitants of the surrounding mountains remained faithful to Skanderbeg, while in Dolgo brdo
men with Albanian names served the Ottomans as voynuk, took over Timarlehen in Mati and Kruja-
Albanian, and received numerous offices in Upper Dibra. 151
The most dangerous defectors, however, were all Albanian'ry language: Hamza Kastriota, Moses of Dibra
and Balaban, the Islamized Muzaki and Zenebish, to those simple warriors who led Skanderbeg's
underlings to the scaffold in 1464 469. The Ottoman conquest had split the population of the Albanian and
Macedonian areas into two camps; the fault lines did not run according to ethnic criteria. On the one side
were the Muslim Ottomans and Orthodox Christians, serving in lower ranks and offices of the new
empire. The insurgents, however, counted only Christians in their ranks, behind them stood especially the
Catholic Church. Their collection in the sign of the Byzantine imperial eagle and later of a papal crusade
had a clear religious dimension, which was strongly emphasized by the spiritual leaders. In this view, the
apostasy to the Sultan was a betrayal of the Christian faith. The Scanderbegbiografen condemned this
behavior on the example of a few outstanding figures, but they dared not to report what is evident from
documentary sources so clearly that Skanderbeg's life of betrayal in large Style was shaped. The
charismatic leader then lost his power when he suffered defeat when the promise of protection and victory
was not kept. And this only happened often enough. but they did not dare to report what is clear from
documentary sources: That Skanderbeg's life was characterized by betrayal on a large scale. The
charismatic leader then lost his power when he suffered defeat when the promise of protection and victory
was not kept. And this only happened often enough. but they did not dare to report what is clear from
documentary sources: That Skanderbeg's life was characterized by betrayal on a large scale. The
charismatic leader then lost his power when he suffered defeat when the promise of protection and victory
was not kept. And this only happened often enough.
TWO SULTANE kanderbeg's insurrection had arisen from a blood feud with the house of Osman and had
spread to a Balkan conflagration. It can only be understood if the Ottoman perspective is contrasted with
that of the Christian rebels. The elevation under the banner of the Byzantine imperial eagle challenged
the sultans in several respects: Skanderbeg had grown up in the Ottoman system of power and Islam: his
public commitment to the faith of his fathers was seen by the Ottomans as a double apostasy, once by
the sultan, then, and so on weighed heavier, from Islam. No other Christian nobleman who had converted
to Islam had previously dared to do so. If Skanderbeg succeeds, this would invite others to
imitate. Skanderbeg had also violated a fundamental rule of Islam, who severely punishes the conversion
to another faith. And above all lay the mysterious history of the vendetta, in which only a few persons
were privy, perhaps also Mehmed II.
152
! j 'I
,I
II
II
III
II
For this reason, Georg Kastriota was a special opponent for the Ottomans, not comparable to all the
Christian princes who were brought to their knees one by one. Skanderbeg also had to be recaptured or
eliminated for ideological reasons, as a double traitor, either for its own ranks, in order not to tempt the
numerous other renegades in Ottoman service. Recognizing this danger, Murad was prepared to
negotiate with Skanderbeg in a moment of political weakness. At the same time, a personal moment
came into play, for Skanderbeg had enjoyed a high reputation at the Ottoman court, perhaps even the
sultan's confidence. This made it difficult for the Ottomans to coolly deal with Georg Kastriota. Always the
idea of a betrayal of the father, then the idea of an almost brotherly struggle against Mehmed 11. Murad's
courtship for Skanderbeg failed; even more devastating, however, was that the Sultan's military
punishment for the apostate failed. The withdrawal of Kruja and the soon following death of Murad II. form
a unity. Mehmed 11 had felt the setback as a personal scoundrel: The traitor to his father had asserted
himself against the concentrated power of the Ottoman Empire. Skanderbeg himself spoke of a "personal
hatred" (odio privato) between him and Mehmed II. Two strong rulers measured themselves, and many of
them could not have been: the castriota always stood in the field himself, led all the warfare himself, even
traveled Dalmatia and Italy, he was for most of his life less hunter than hunted, a lord of the
mountains, who was always in motion, disappeared from his allegiance and legend in his
lifetime; Mehmed II, on the other hand, commanded a vast army and administrative apparatus over wide
provinces; the plains of the Balkans obeyed him, and only the mountainous country in the extreme west of
the peninsula escaped the grip of the Ottoman armies. Mehmed II raised the Ottoman Empire to a world
power, he subjugated the Balkans and the whole of Asia Minor, and he is one of the most important
figures in world history. Although he moved out with his armies, but never saw him as Skanderbeg at the
head of an attacking cavalry troop, he never had to make the experience of flight and bittreisen
abroad. Mehmed II regarded his fighting troops from protected sources. The conqueror Consinoples had
for many years pursued more important goals than the suppression of an insurrection which, although
troublesome to the Ottomans after Hunyadi's defeat on the Amselfeld (1448), did not seriously threaten
them. His conquests in southeastern Europe slowly tightened the noose around the rebel territory. When
the sultan finally attacked Skanderbeg in 1466, the whole of the old orthodox world of states was
Georg Kastriota was still growing up and had broken up: from the Morea (1458-1460), Serbia (1455-
1459), the eastern part of the Black Mountains (1460) to Bosnia (1463), the Ottoman land encircled the
rule of the Kastriota. This did not mean that, in the meantime, there had been peace on the Albanian
border. On the contrary, only the Ottoman grandees of the Balkans led the fight against the Christian
insurgents under Skanderbeg. They did so with strong forces, the recruits from many Ottoman provinces,
but not using the entire Sultan's military apparatus. The economic situation of Sultan's campaigns reflects
the dangerousness of Skanderbeg. Once he almost threatened the existence of the empire (1444), twice
he seriously challenged it (1448, 1464). Between 1444 and 1448, the Balkans were in turmoil: Johann
Hunyadi was demonstrating his most powerful offensives, and Skandbeg was also involved in his
strikes. Murad 11th wanted to counter the assault only by tension of all forces: The attacks on Svetigrad
(1448) and Kruj a (1450) are to be understood in this context. But Skanderbeg would never have
presented such a danger; Only in association with Christian lords of the Balkans did he seriously concede
to the Ottomans. Although the sultan Kiujas had to give up conquest, but he had so weakened
Skanderbeg that this - largely without strong allies in Southeastern Europe - had to leave any thoughts of
larger offensive plans. The attack on Berat (1455), a major campaign for Skanderbeg, was hardly
perceived by Mehmed as a pinprick, which was repelled by its governor in Skopje and other
governors. The situation was different in the years after 1463: There Skanderbeg was again in league
with several foreign powers: He served a papal crusade as a field captain, received help from Venice and
Hungary; Christian gentlemen advanced in many parts of the Balkans, Venetian galleys
appeared. Skanderbeg and Venetian mercenaries broke into the Polog, coming dangerously close to the
Ottoman centers of power at Vardar (1464). Mehmed II decided to eliminate these weaknesses of the
Ottoman warfare (see chapter "Warfare"). But the relationship of the Sultans to Skanderbeg was not just
marked by open warfare. A special closeness of adversaries based on reciprocal intimate knowledge runs
through the quarter century of Skanderbeg's work. There is no doubt about the Kastriota's will to survive,
the Ottomans' urge to win. Only the relationship was more subtle than a scheme of rigid enmity would
have you believe. This is shown, on the one hand, by that strange Harar; (Tribute to the Sultan) 154
of 6000 ducats offered by Skanderbeg and Araniti Komino Venice470. Several sources indicate that the
kastriota had paid tribute to the sultans at least for a time. Thus, according to the report of Bar- lettius
Murad H. in 1450, in view of his failure before Kruja, von Skanderbeg demanded the payment of the Hara
<; 471. It was an attempt by the militarily humbled sultan to save face. Skanderbeg, in a desperate
situation, actually paid. On the other hand, he had preserved his independence, and on the other hand
the Grand Duke maintained his claim to supremacy over the world. But scarcely had Skanderbeg Alfons
V vowed the fief, he set the payments immediately 473. Also the young Mehmed Ir. should, following the
example of his father, probably 1452, Forced by threatening news from Asia Minor, which obstructed an
Ottoman attack, tribute demanded474. Reports on tax payments are also from Italian diplomats, such as
the well-informed Milan Velireter in Venice, Gherardo de Collis, and, dependent on this, the Mantuan
ambassador at the Milan court (July 30, 1464): Then Skanderbeg in the summer of 1464 tribute to the
Sultan have paid. If this is true, it may be presumed a precautionary measure of the Albanian race, who
wanted to spare his forces before the expected crusade of Pope Pius H. 475. But de Collis himself
doubted the truth of the customer. Mehmed's biographer Kilobos tells us that insurgent Albanians "wanted
a bargain out of fear and need, a messenger to the Emperor (Sultan, 0. S) and sent. an agreement was
made, offering hostages and pledges, or even an annual tribute, in the form of young men and of cattle.
"477 The background of this peculiar position of Skanderbeg towards the Sultan is in military stalemate
and other interests, especially the Sultan's: Mehmed's H. Balkan commanders were unable to defeat
Skanderbeg, while Skanderbeg needed a respite after years of constant attack, and in 1459 Pope Pius H.
feared that Skanderbeg would be forced into a truce.474 In 1460, Mehmed II was temporarily reconciled.
and Skanderbegs: Towards a Ceasefire - for Islamic law did not allow the conclusion of a lasting, genuine
peace with non-Muslims. completed for a period of six months, 479 allowed Mehmed H. to advance the
conquest of Asia Minor, while Skanderbeg consolidated his rule in Albania and made an expedition to
southern Italy, where he led Alfons'V. Son Ferrante hurried to the rescue. Demetrio Franeo says that
Mehmed never believed that the Kastriota would actually move to Italy. Only Barletius tells 155
the content of the previous negotiations; he gives a (fictional) letter to Mehmed 11, which, however, aptly
characterizes the relationship of the two princes in psychology and political content: Meruned 11.
reminded the Kastriota of the common youth at Sultanshof; "we have lived together for a long
time"; Skanderbeg had contributed so much to the greatness of the Ottoman Empire; and nothing would
be better for the sultan than to meet him face to face. The last Ottoman raids on the territory of the
castrati were done without his knowledge (an excuse that Mehmed also used against Venice 482). Then
the Sultan set his conditions: first, free passage for Ottoman troops pulling against Venetian
Albania; second: Skanderbegs Solm Ivan should go as hostage to the Sultanshof; third, free passage and
trade: for Ottoman merchants; and fourth: Skanderbeg was to appear in person at the Sultanshof, for
which he was promised safe conduct 483. Although the letter itself is fake, this is less true of its content:
Mehmed II knew about Skanderbeg's tensions with Venice, and the Ottoman trade, which was lively in
southern Albania, was also interested in the northern areas. And like his father Murad H., he wanted to
bring the rebels at least into symbolic dependency. According to Barletius, Skanderbeg is said to have
convened a council meeting which agreed only with the freedom of Ottoman merchants, the only proposal
which did not affect either the honor of the Albanian lord or his safety. If one believes at least the content
tendency of Barletius, Mehmed 11 and Skanderbeg met with mutual respect. The sultan was again, after
Barletius, ready to acknowledge the Kastriota as an independent master. "Three jabre later, in Flühjabr in
1463, Skanderbeg and Meruned H. then concluded a longer-term - but not permanent - peace. Mehmed
H. needed a free hand in his attack on Bosnia, even in the slowly surging crisis with the Pope and
Venice488. Skanderbeg, on the other hand, after his return from Puglia to Venice, was in a tense
relationship; self-confident on the Italian victories, he had reached the pinnacle of power and prestige; but
as no new help from the Occident seemed to stand by, he preferred to spare his strength for now. Again
Barletius gives a - again in the form fictitious, In correspondence but not inaccurate - correspondence of
both princes again: In May 1463, the sultan again recalled the time together in Adrianople, but then
warned that Skanderbeg should remember the fate of the Byzantines, the Emperor of Trebizond and the
Serbs Pages were not minded to find a long-term livelihood with each other. 156
to break the alliance of his Christian opponents through special negotiations, such as Milan and
Naples. Through a "SUba $ l" (bailiff) he also approached Skanderbeg and let him know that he would
incite Milan against Venice, thus creating a second front in northern Italy. Skanderbeg was unimpressed
and replied that he would do nothing because the sultan was against all Christian powers. The
suballocated to Constantinople, and returned with the commission of concluding a separate peace with
Venice with the help of Skanderbeg; in return he would "recognize" Skanderbeg 490. The Venetian
chronicler Malipiero described Skanderbeg's reaction: "Skanderbeg replied that all Christian princes had
agreed together Skanderbeg informed Venice of a peace offer and warned against trusting in this
request. We are grateful for your advice and your opinion, which we duly appreciate because it comes
from a very clever gentleman, our dearest son, "they replied Senators of the Markus Republic493. From
all these details, a picture emerges that is actually little surprising: the Ottomans had repeatedly offered
Skanderbeg him as 157
Recognize the head of a vassal principality, a model they had also applied when a quick and total
conquest did not seem possible. But while about Skanderbegs neighbor Georg Brankovic received this
proposal, denied the Kastriota, even if he temporarily paid Haray. For the Serbian example, but also the
fate of many other Balkan princes, had made him believe that he did not trust the Ottomans. It is
astonishing that the sultans had not taken better account of Skanderbeg's intimate knowledge of Ottoman
power mechanisms. Ultimately, they were probably convinced of their final victory. Skanderbeg, on the
other hand, was celebrated for "contemptuously rejecting all the powerful gifts and promises of the Turk"
494. At the height of his power - around 1460 - Skanderbeg was treated with respect by Mehmed H. The
conqueror had to regard him as the only counterpart in the Balkans, at least as a general and prince-
figure - Vlad Dracul, the lord of Wallachia, lacked the nobleness, awarded to contemporaries
Skanderbeg495; all the other princes, the last Bosnian king Stefan Thomas, the last Serbian despot
Georg Brankovic, not to mention the desperate despots of the Peloponnese, Demetrius and Thomas
Palaiologos, or the no-fly Tocco in Epirus, were not enough to fight as warriors in the field to the Kastriota
approach. Unlike his father, however, Meluned was willing to do the wrestling by any means and
determined to emerge victorious in the showdown. Mehmed shied, According to reports by Skanderbeg's
biographers, no means to clear his opponent; so he is said to have hired Albanian assassins, exposed a
huge bounty on Skanderbeg and the Archbishop Paul Angelus of Durazzo496. In the imbalance of forces,
the outcome was fixed from the outset. The Sultan started his war machine, while Skanderbeg with a
small following fought backfights, but the downfall of his rule could not prevent. The special relationship
between the sultans and their Albanian opponent is also reflected in Ottoman court historiography, which
followed Oriental and Byzantine traditions and above all served to glorify the monarchs, thus concealing
or weakening failures and defeats. The chroniclers therefore gladly report on victorious campaigns of the
Sultan, on fleeing opponents who were "as low as dust," 497 and on great prey to men and movable
goods. The stubborn resistance in the Albanian area was a great embarrassment to the lieutenants of the
Grand Dukes; For at least three times the sultans had to fight against a comparatively annes and
insignificant soul
!I
I1
undressing, which promised less glamor and glory for the conqueror than Constantinople or the Serbian
silver towns in the Blackbird field. Thus Ottoman historical works not only represented the enemy fighters,
but above all nature as an obstacle to the rapid success of the Sultans. A trackless, mountainous, forest-
covered mountainous country with deep gorges and unclimifiable mountains had opposed the armies of
the Grand Duke. The discomfort of the Ottoman elite is palpable, an elite who was used to war in the
plains, war in battle order or in fortresses, facing for the first time an enemy escaping this form of struggle,
not castles, but the forest Had retention. Exaggerated accounts Dibras and Matis as a rugged forest
thicket but also increased the glory of the ultimately victorious Grand Masters. In addition to nature, the
chroniclers brought the figure of the rebel leader into the foreground. The timely historian A ~ lkpa ~
azade portrays him as a former court clerk, to whom the sultan had loaned a timeline, but which then fell
away500. The historian Tursun bey felt this further: Skanderbeg had been educated from his earliest
childhood at Sultanshof. He regards his apostasy from the Sultan and Islam as a serious betrayal for
which Skanderbeg receives the deserved punishment501. Not everyone tells the story in the same way:
sometimes his name is avoided - the memory of the garbage and the heavy fighting certainly did not
weigh on contemporary historians - but later chroniclers find the quasi-official version of the Ottoman
court, the story of the stately young man, similar to Alexander the Great, who would be included in the
Court Pagenkorps, to whom the Sultan handed over the paternal inheritance, but who thanklessly forgot
the benefits of Murad H. For the Ottoman historians, as well as important Turkish historians of the modern
age, 502 Skanderbeg is a traitor on the edge of the empire, a rebel, the sultans managed after completing
more important plans of conquest without further effort from the neck. The allegiance of Skanderbeg is
described as stubborn and unreasonable. Sultan Murad H. described the Albanians in a letter of victory,
which he sent after the Battle of Vatna to the Sultan of the Black Sheep in Tabriz, as "schweineköpjig"
503, which was a special treatment in two respects: on the one hand because of the contempt of the pig
in Islam, and on the other, because in the same letter other opponents are not so contemptuously treated:
The Vlachen were considered to be a deceitful one, the Byzantines as "contemptible infidels "the
Hungarians as" idol worshipers, deniers of the holy scriptures, enemies of the religion of the Prophet and
deniers of Moham711, eds message "504. Here comes the 159th
The sultan's request was brought to light against the very adversary who in 1444 could not be
subjected. Of the actual events of the war, A ~ lkpa ~ azade briefly describes the conquest of Svetigrad
and the campaign of Murad 11 against Kruja, ignoring the Ottoman defeat and emphasizing the
conquered land and prey. Not Skanderbeg caused the retreat of the sultan, but the news of an attack by
Johann Hunyadis on the Danube505. While Ak§parazazade in a nutshell emphasizes the crucial
campaigns of Mehmed, Tursun bey presents a true historical painting: he reflects on Mehmed H.'s
reflections in the year of crisis in 1463, when a crusade loomed on the Balkans. Mehmed H., according to
Tursun, considered the Albanians the weakest link in the chain of opponents; the slightest blow would
shake them. In the spring of 1466, the year of the decisive campaign, there was an expectant mood in the
Ottoman army, which moved from Edirne to the plain of Bitola and thence against the "infidels" in the
Albanian countryside. Tursun revels in pictures1 of slain adversaries, whose corpses fill the valleys, are
piled up into whole hills; Ottoman forces invade the last corners of the valleys and mountains and erase
the resistance of the "infidels". The Albanians appear as stubborn traitors brought to justice by the
"orthodox" Sultan508. Mehmed 11 builds the huge fortress Elbasan, from which the second, even more
devastating campaign against Skanderbeg is led in the following year 1467. Tursun tells how the Sultan
set his opponent "checkmate", conquered and completely subjugated his whole country 509. Skanderbeg
flees fearfully to the sea. Tursun had a good knowledge of the Albanian landscape, he calls the
Buzurshekgebirge at Elbasan, the Matital, the city Skutari as targets of Mehmed H. He conceals the two-
time failure of the Sultan before Kruja. Other Ottoman historians complement this picture only
insignificantly. In contrast to these Ottoman-writing scholars, the historian Kritobulos from Imbros records
a lot. finer, more literarily elegant picture: The whole art of a millenary Byzantine history show unfolds for
the last time in his work, whose hero is no longer the emperor of Byzantium, but the new Muslim ruler of
Constantinople Opel. Kritobulos also dealt with the causes of the repeated uprisings, beyond the plain
picture of apostasy and betrayal. He came very close to the structural causes of surveys in mountainous
areas, structures that lasted until recently: "The Illyrians (Albanians, 0. S) ... live on the Ionian Sea and
have long lived on large, mighty mountains · They have strong and kawn invisible castles, 160
They finally succeeded in doing so by a terrible bloodbath among the people in the highlands
(1466/67). In the long run, however, the Ottomans had to retreat back to the plains. And when in 1912 the
Ottoman rule collapsed in the Balkans, the administration of the Sultan in the highlands had little more
power than during Skanderbeg's lifetime.
T • For many years Skanderbeg did not object to the Sultan himself,
U but to fight against the Ottoman greats in the Balkans. These were not just any subordinates, but
powerful personalities, often of the old genders, who had a decisive share in the conquest of the
Balkans. They were equal in every respect to Skanderbeg, and often they had more possessions and
allegiance than Georg Kastriota, and many knew the Albanian opponent from common duty in the
Sultan's army. The center of Ottoman power in the Balkans lay in the basin landscapes of Thessaly and
Macedonia. From Thessaly Epirus and southern Albania were subjected and kept in check. With the
conquest of Valona, Berat and Gjirokastras (between 1417 and 1419), the Ottomans had gained a
foothold in this area. Gjirokastra became the capital of the Albanian Sancak, where Islamized Albanian
nobles of the Muzaki and Zenebish clan made calves. Even more important, however, were the Ottomans
for Skanderbeg
see big ones in the Vardar basin. Skopje and Monastir served the regional Ottoman forces, but also the
sultan's army as a deployment area512. The local frontier patrons not only made the conquest of the
Balcan, but also created a new, Ottoman city type: Caubey in Monastir, for example, who had moved to
Skanderbeg in the army cad Murads H. had erected foundations with his pilotage frolmne, a mosque in
Monastir, but also facilities in distant centers of the empire, in the capital Edirne and in Vidin on the
Danube 513. The real center of power of the Ottomans in the Balkans was Skopje, where a few decades
earlier, in 1346, the Serbian King Stefan Dusan had been crowned Tsar - Skopje was a real key position
on the military road from Thessaloniki to Belgrade and from the Vardar basin to llmeralbania. Martinus
Segonus from Novo Brdo knew these basin landscapes from his own view: "This city," he wrote to
Skopje, "is fertile and abundant in all the precious fruits of the earth, full of riches7 ~ a very special
princely seat, lapped by the clean Vardar, of the The towering peaks of the Orbellus mountain gush down
and reach into Macedonia, to the tribal people of Mysia, to Epirus and Dalmatia, and are therefore ideally
suited to take up an army. "514. Skopje was received in 1392 by Pa ~ a Y19lt, also known later in
Albania, whose son Ishak bey, sancakbey of Skopje (1413-1443), the regional power of his sex
continued. This family left its mark on the city of Skopje: In 1438/39, Ishak bey had the magnificent
Colorful Mosque built. It followed a veritable building program, with which he transformed Skopje into a
real Ottoman city: 1438/9 was a poor food house (Imaret). Two baths (Hamam), two caravanserails, a
bazaar with 102 shops were handed over to a religious foundation (vakIf) 515. This gave Ishak bey also
three villages, two mills on Vardar and three other mills and a vineyard. Ishak handed the staff over to his
son Isa bey, who continued his father's endowment policy: he built a belief school (madrasah) and a
imaret; he named a mixed hammam and 68 shops, including a market selling meat from cattle and
sheep. He promoted the cultivation of rice, which is so important in the Vardar basin, by creating water
channels. Like the Turahanoglu in Thessaly, the Nachkormnen Pa ~ a YlgltS in Macedonia had
established its own sphere of power of Sultan's grace. The lords showed their loyal servants
recognizable: Isa bey received 150 villages as fiefs, which earned him 800,000 akge (silverlings) (for
comparison: The total income of the sultan from the poll tax (cizye) for non-Muslims amounted in 1489
32.4 million akge516 ). The sphere of influence of the 162nd Isa bey received 150 villages as fiefs, which
earned him 800,000 akge (silverlings) (for comparison: The total income of the sultan from the head tax
(cizye) for non-Muslims in 1489 was 32.4 million akge516). The sphere of influence of the 162nd Isa bey
received 150 villages as fiefs, which earned him 800,000 akge (silverlings) (for comparison: The total
income of the sultan from the head tax (cizye) for non-Muslims in 1489 was 32.4 million akge516). The
sphere of influence of the 162nd
The family reached Kosovo, the Black Mountains and up to the area of Sarajevo. Skanderbeg, the
CrnojeviCi and the Ragusans. they fear as opponents 517. The family was also wealthy in the Polog,
which was organized by the Ottomans as vilayet (district) Kalkandelen, as the old Tetovo was
called518. There, on the border to Skanderbegs area, a number of Timur lords were used in large
villages: 106 households were in Miladin, 117 in Ponoriste, 100 in Celopek, 80 in Egypt, 129 in Dibriste
519. Several Timariotes belonged to the entourage of Isa bey, including some who bore Christian names
(Pavel, Miladin), but most of them were Muslim (Ibrahim, Huseyin, HaCl Yusuf, Muhamed, Köpek, Ilyas,
Rüstern, etc.). Christians sat in small or remote fiefs such as the mountain village of Mavrovo on the lake
of the same name, where Dimitri and Oliver lived as serviceable warriors who had to go out every year at
the behest of the sultan; Oliver then converted to Islam and adopted the name Suleiman, a typical
process in the milieu of the Orthodox followers of the Sultan. In Tetovo, the sultan had used as
administrator (suba ~ l) an Albanian known family, Hasan at Zenebish 521; He received income from the
taxes of the capital Tetovo, which in 1455 counted 146 Christian and 60 Muslim houses and paid 30,624
Akye (silverlings) in taxes; the stately village of Gostivar further south was also assigned to him. Also a
Dukagjin became in 1459 with income from seven villages, a total of 6609 Akye, thoughtfully - of course
the fief was temporarily taken from him because he had not appeared for military
service522. Skanderbeg's other opponents had loaned the Sultan along the borders, as told, the son of
the famous Balaban, Ilyas, "Sprout Balabans the Little One", as the Ottomans called their faithful follower
523. Above all, the Timor lords in the plains acquired great wealth, for example, "okadar Ali bey, the
suballo of Skopje, who took Akye alone from the city with its 925 households in 174982". Jakub bey
(50000 Akye) 525 and Murad bey Köpülu526 belonged to the group of these wealthy feudal knights. The
Timor lords of the Polog had to bear the brunt of the fighting against Skanderbeg, which took place in
their unimportant neighborhood: In the hills and mountains around Tetovo, the Mokra, On the passports to
Upper Dibra and in the plains around Ochrid, they paid a high blood-price for the Sultan, as can be seen
from the constant redistribution of the loans, whose owners had fallen. In the Vilayet Kalkandelen, one
third of the Ottoman Timariotes died in this way from the mid-fifties to the end of the sixties of the fifteenth
century. The Ottomans had a 163 in the main battlefield in the valleys and river canyons of the Mokra
Passwatcher (bawling) village erected next to the other: The privileged, often Christian villagers were to
block the rebels' path to Ochrid and Polog. So guarded were the road from Gostivar at the southern end
of Polo Gege to Dibra (namely in the villages Cerovo, KiCinca, Volkovija, Galicnik and Dolno Kosovrasti),
the road from Gostivar to Kicevo (Lokavica, Sretkovo), then the routes in the strong wooded mountain
area along the mountain pass from Kicevo to Ochrid (Strata Pass) and in particular density between
Struga on Ocmidsee and Dibra, the region from which Skanderbeg's warriors burst out of the mountains
to attack Ochrid528. Special importance had there weir villages in the steep hills west of the Drinschlucht,
such as Jablanica. These villages were inhabited by only a few families at the end of Skanderbeg's
uprising. Again, the followers of the Ottomans had suffered heavy losses529. Isa bey of Skopje was the
most dangerous adversary of Skanderbeg, a rich lord, representative of Islam, promoter of urban
planning, but also lord of a stately army of Lehensrittem, a gentleman whose family knew the Kastriota
well: For Isa's father Ishak once had Skanderbegs Father Ivan forced to his knees530. The bitter feud of
the fathers continued the sons. Economically, military-technically and in team strength Isa was superior to
Skanderbeg. From Ottoman point of view, he played a key role in the fighting: in 1448 Murad ordered him
to collect the Renner and Brenner (akmcl) and attack Svetigrad. he got rid of this task with great success
532. His most important hour, however, was experienced by Isa bey in the summer of 1455: he
succeeded in not only repelling the attack of Scanderbeg, Araniti Kominos, Muzaki Thopias, and the
Neapolitans against Berat, but succeeded in destroying Skanderbeg, a victory in Italy and in the
Byzantine world A stir caused 533. In both campaigns Isa bey not only commanded his own troops from
the Vardar basin; rather, in 1448 he was also in command of Ottoman commandos from Thessaly, and in
1455 also from "Serbia," that is, the room in which he had numerous loans. At times, Isa served as
Mehmed's 11th main field commander in the Balkans. His successes confirmed the correctness of this
election. At the same time Ali, from the family of Evrenossöhne534, as a capable Ottoman army leader
important successes. He took part in the siege of Krujas (1450) 535 and fought five years later before
Berat, where he celebrated the night after the victory together with the crew 536. After that he secured
Svetigrad against Albanian attacks 537. He was given the task of accompanying the imprisoned
Christians to Constantinople, where they were led in triumph through the new Ottoman
capital538. Evrenosoglu Ali's power base was in the Albanian south. There had been a fine until 1466 to
accompany the imprisoned Christians to Constantinople, where they were led in triumph through the new
Ottoman capital538. Evrenosoglu Ali's power base was in the Albanian south. There had been a fine until
1466 to accompany the imprisoned Christians to Constantinople, where they were led in triumph through
the new Ottoman capital538. Evrenosoglu Ali's power base was in the Albanian south. There had been a
fine until 1466
Outlined Ottoman administration: Within the province of Albania (sancak Arvanid or Arnavud - ili) were
districts (vilayet) in Gjirokastra (Greek Argyrokastron), Kel <;: yra (Greek Kleisura, ie bottleneck), Kanina,
Berat, Skrapar , Pavlo-Kurtik and <; artalloz have been set up 539. Evrenosoglu Ali also represented the
Sultan's interests in Venice, as a diplomat who knew the Venetian-Neapolitan antagonism in the Adriatic,
and his own successes against Alfonso's. Allies skillfully portrayed as Ottoman benefactor at Venice; yes,
for the destruction of Rodoni he even demanded a reward from the Signoria (1457) 540. He also had the
task of subduing the Zenebish541. Before the Venetian Senate, he boasted that he had in the country
"that against his master, the emperor, To conquer Mati. In Albulena, he was captured in the fall of 1457
and had to be released by the sultan 546. On the other hand, the Grand Vizier, who decisively influenced
the fate of the Reich from 1456 to 1468, was as powerful as Isa bey of Skopje: Mahmud Pasha of the
Angelovici family. This dynasty, Serbized Byzantines, held high offices at the Serbian despot
court. Mahmud, through his Christian relatives, had excellent relations with the Olihodox nobility of the
Balkans; He also had the best knowledge of the way of thinking and living of people, the shape of the
landscape. It will come as no surprise, then, that Mahmud made a decisive contribution to the Ottoman
conquest of the Haemus Peninsula. Serbia (1459), Bosnia (1463), the Venetian Morea (1463) are
victorious pillars on its way. Auc): In Albania, he played a fateful role: the Grand Vizier was operating -
with the knowledge of the Sultan, never quite clear his own foreign policy, secret negotiations with which
he was supposed to overthrow Mehmed H. temporarily48. He also served the Grand Duke as Vennittler
to the Ball (Venice and Venice.) In the fall of 1464 Mahmud planned to win the Republic of Ragusa, a
peace with the St. Mark's
to negotiate republic when the Ragusans gave him only words and words, he began to try this thing
through Skanderbeg. The castriota did not respond, and Mahmud changed his attitude. From the noble
Vennittler he became the destroyer of Albania: In June 1467 he led a large army detachment from
besieged Kruja to the north, appeared before Skutari, reduced the landscape to rubble, crossed the Drin
south on June 17 and harassed Dagno, from whence he enters the highlands of the
DukagjinP50. Mahmud Pasha was closely related to his Serbian kinship with the Spaniards of the
northern Albanian family, who had themselves been important Serbian officials on the Amselfeld. In the
years 1466 and 1467 F eriz bey (in Ragusa called Ferizbegovic), Woiwode in Sitnica in Serbia and former
comrade Skanderbegs in the Bulgarian Nikopolis 552, the Voivode of Serbia called Ömer bey and the
voivode of Dibra participated in the final destruction of Christian Albania , Sinan bey headed Ottoman
soldiers in the Mokra (probably 1462) 554. From Asia stalacti of the Karaca mentioned by Barletius, "an
old man famous by many campaigns, enjoyed the highest regard in Mehmed as his father Murad" 555.
The great generals of the stroke of Isa bey and Mahmud Pasha led the decisive attacks. However, they
never managed to turn Skanderbeg on their own and eliminate them.The ongoing guerilla warfare led to
Islamized Albanians, ie Skanderbeg's own compatriots: The mentioned Hasan at Zenebish of Tetovo is
the "Assambegus" of which Barletius relates that he delivered hard fights to Skanderbeg at Ochrid
(probably 1462) 556. The final battle against Skanderbeg then took over two Albanian families who were
associated with the Kastriota in years of hatred: Balaban and HlZlr bey. Here comes a hitherto neglected
moment: personal rivalries in the group of Albanian renegades at the beginning of the thirties of the
fifteenth century. HlZlr bey has already met once as commander of Kruja. He was replaced in this office
by Skanderbeg and replaced this in turn; In 1443 he fled from the rebels to the east. Hlzlr and Balaban
were among those Islamized Albanians who did not follow Skanderbeg and did not return to
Christianity. They led a decades-long feud against their compatriot, which opens only in the dry notes of
Ottoman tax registers. Balaban's family fought over three generations against Skanderbeg; old Balaban
was as much in the process as his son, who had commanded Sobri, before him; Balaban's grandson also
moved against Skanderbeg. The case was no different for Hlzrr bey and his family. Joining with Balaban,
he is responsible for the devastation of central Albania, for murder and arson The case was no different
for Hlzrr bey and his family. Joining with Balaban, he is responsible for the devastation of central Albania,
for murder and arson The case was no different for Hlzrr bey and his family. Joining with Balaban, he is
responsible for the devastation of central Albania, for murder and arson
JJ
166
Lich. Muslim Albanians thus devastated their old homeland and stifled the rebellion of their Christian
compatriots in the blood. The individual steps of these dogged skirmishes can be well understood: These
officers pushed Skanderbeg ever further north: Probably in 1465 already Jakub Arnaut (probably a
Muzaki), also an Albanian, fought at Kashar, in the hills northwest of Tirana, but was on October 28, 1465
severely beaten by Skanderbeg; Jakub fell, his soldiers were killed by the inhabitants in the fields and in
the forests557. The decisive attacks then led Balaban and HlZlr in the following year. The former casked
from 1466 Kruja, while Hlzlr rolled up the villages Skanderbeg, which were behind the steep mountain
wall of the Tumenisht (today: Mali i Skenderbeut). In the heartland of Skanderbeg, the tried and tested
administrative system was introduced in southern Albania. The erobelie country was subdivided into
several districts (vilayet), namely Akyehisar (Weissenburg, di Kruja); Uraka named after a brook flowing
into the Mati, a small landscape at the foot of the 2246m high Mali i Dejes; continue Dhimiter Jonima,
Benda, Kurbin and Mati. The village of Martanesh - Balaban from this area - was exempted from taxes,
probably a reward for going to the sultan. Villages with total taxes of 46,567 pieces of silver were
assigned to the Sultansgut. This affected the more important places - such as Bila Kamin, Klos and Lis in
Mati. The lion's share, usually strategically important areas, received Balaban and HlZlr bey and their
relatives. So Hlzlr moved into Skanderbeg's old castle Stellush558. Abdullah, his son took over the Mati
riverbank area, which bordered on the immediate vicinity of Rodrigo and Alessio, the villages of Shullaz,
Pedhane and Zojmen559. Behaderi, Hlzlr's second son, gained power in the villages east of
Skanderbeg's former fortress Petrela, on the upper reaches of the ore, in Shen Gjin, Fravesh and
Selita560. His brother Mustafa finally provided the pacification of the hamlets north of Bashtari561. Also
clients of Hlzlrs were considered; Especially humiliating for the Kastriota had to work, that a former slave
of an Albanian Reiiegaten managed her hometown Sine562. Hlzlr and his three sons had been
commissioned to control an area that extended themselves around Kruja for the sultan; the focal point
was the Bur-Stellush, where the father sat, while two sons guarded the hills behind the Tumenisht
mountain range, which once formed the backbone of Skanderbeg's reign. Even otherwise, the often
burned villages and hamlets of Kastriota were awarded to defectors: In Uraka to two Perlat and a Vrana
(Uraniti) 563. In the Vilayet Akyehisar to the brothers Gjergj and Nikola, to Peter Suma, Andreas and
Dhimitri Kimiza, 167
the renegade Ilyas, Ugurlu and Mahmud564. Three generational feuds arose: Ivan Kastriota and his son
George fought against the race of the frontier commander Ishak of Skopje, against their old peasants,
Balaban's race, and against Skanderbeg's conspirators against Kruja, Hlzlr, and their relatives. Muslim
Turks, Balkan. Renegades and Orthodox Christians completed the subjection of Mati and Dibra. For the
Ottoman armies that fought against Skanderbeg existed, especially when it came to the commandments
from Sancak Albania, Macedonia and Thessaly, from Islamized Albanians, Slavs, Greeks, and Byes, and
from Christian members of these groups; Islamized Albanians, males, Skanderbeg accompanied for
decades as an opponent. It may sound strange, but at the beginning and end of Skanderbeg's struggle
Balaban meets bey and Hizlr bey. They fought the man who had left their ranks, the Ottoman
administrative elite. In the end, they had struck him down with the ancient power of the Ottoman
Empire. Apparently, these Muslim Albanians were indifferent to the fact that they completely destroyed
their homeland. The two renegades, Hasan Zenebish, J alrub Amaut (Muzaki) and numerous other ethnic
Albanians were the real enemies of Skanderbeg. Nothing shows this better than a small episode of the
fighting: Probably in the fall of 1464 Skanderbeg's best subfields got ambushed; they were captured and
dragged to Constantinople to be sent to Him. The famous Moses of Dibra was overpowered by a soldier
named Jakub, Muzaki d 'Angelina, but by an Albanian named Gjon, who had done this with Jusuf, a
Muslim; the Sultan rewarded the two, the Ottoman Christians and Muslims, who embody the new order, in
abundance, granting them a fief in Moses' old race565. The front lines in Skanderbeg's revolt ran
between Christians on the one hand, Muslims and Christian assistants on the other. Language and
ethnicity did not matter. he was granted a fief in the name of Moses' youth by the Jusuf. The front lines in
Skanderbeg's revolt ran between Christians on the one hand, Muslims and Christian assistants on the
other. Language and ethnicity did not matter. he was granted a fief in the name of Moses' youth by the
Jusuf. The front lines in Skanderbeg's revolt ran between Christians on the one hand, Muslims and
Christian assistants on the other. Language and ethnicity did not matter.
WARRIOR kanderbeg spent his whole life in the war. But while he was in a large army belied an officer
post until 1443, since the beginning of the uprising the burden of command burdened for a quarter of a
century on his shoulders. It took an amazing physique, before
168
all but extraordinary spiritual Spamua juice to withstand this pressure. Skanderbeg waged war on various
fronts, against various enemies: against Albanian nobles such as the Dukagjin, against Venice, but above
all against the Ottomans. If the skewers proved to be about the same length as the two first opponents,
then the war against the Sultan was marked by a complete asymmetry of power. The gap between
Skanderbeg's resources and that of his Ottoman adversary was so vast that even contemporaries found
the insurgents' survival almost miraculous. The Ottomans did not even need to muster their entire army to
gain numerical superiority. The units from the Balkan provinces alone were enough, to outnumber
Skanderbeg's entourage numerically. For the year 1475, a list lists the following numbers of troops that
the individual governors had to collect at the borders of Albania: The former Serbia: 1900 riders; southern
Macedonia, territory of the Evrenosoglu family: 1500 horsemen; Skopje: 1600 riders; Southern Albania:
1000 riders; Epirus and Middle Greece between Arta and Athens: 1200 horsemen; Monastir with the two
Suba'l of Prilep and Ohrid: 1000 horsemen; of the latter, one-third had to compete with heavy
tanks566. Not at all included were the infantry and in particular the auxiliary peoples of the Ottomans
567. These auxiliary troops consisted of Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians and Christians, some Christians,
some renegades; in the village of Brvenica near Tetovo, for example, two brothers served in
1467 Mustafa, who had become Muslim, and his brother Rale568, who remained a Christian. In the
Sancak coastal dynasty alone (ie the present-day East Macedonia and western Bulgaria), 14872237 men
(voynuk and yamak) had to do auxiliary service in 1469. These very Christian units made a deep
impression on the insurgents. Barletius tells how the Stunn attacks on Kruja (1450) were carried out by
these same soldiers. "These were for the most part Christians, subjects of the Sultan, who carry the
barbarians in all their campaigns in immense numbers, and are scarcely armed because they are not truly
married." They take upon themselves all the hardships of warfare; strike wood, build jumps, earthworks
and other fortifications, but in open battle they are sent to the enemy as cannon fodder, To divert Uln's
attention and exhaust his energies. In sieges, however, they drag the war machines, they are chosen to
fill the moats with their bodies. "570. Some of these men must certainly be forced to fight against fellow-
believers and compatriots, but many will enjoy their benefices and with the Muslim soldiers the prospect
have shared on victory and above all loot. The enthusiasm over the gefan169 but many will enjoy their
benefice and share the prospect of victory and, above all, loot with the Muslim soldiers. The enthusiasm
over the gefan169 but many will enjoy their benefice and share the prospect of victory and, above all, loot
with the Muslim soldiers. The enthusiasm over the gefan169
The girls and boys, the captured cattle, and the spirited mood before the campaign, are all narrated by the
already mentioned Ottoman chronicles. With the Janissaries, the Sultan had a disciplined infantry, with
the Timariots a predominantly armored cavalry; Light-armed men followed this core army, accompanied
by numerous entrances. Guns were cast from entrained metal in place. Even the Balkan provinces were
heavy opponents, but an army led by the Sultan did not resist a prince in the Balkans. Although medieval
sources tend to exaggerate numbers; but Venetian accounts give a rough idea of the proportions: In
November 1466, 6,000 Ottoman riders invaded northern Albania; the following summer 12-15,000
cavalrymen appeared before Durazzo, and allegedly 60,000 mounted before Scutari; Mehmed's army in
1467 was estimated at 200,000 people and 60,000 chariots, even if only one-fifth of this number
corresponds to reality, it was disproportionate to the possibilities of the insurgents571. Skanderbeg's
followers on the other side could not have been more different. This began once with the team numbers:
With 7000 men Skanderbeg 1447 was drawn against Antivari; In 1455 Muzaki Thopia 5000, Araniti
Komino 6000 and Skanderbeg had sent 1000 men against Berat; Skanderbeg will rarely have mustered
more than 10,000 warriors from his own followers572. His sister Mamica was in Naples in June 1466,
Skanderbeg commanded 15,000 men, "
unsuccessful ... The troop was well suited for robbery and overwork, but incapable of war in the Italian
manner, defenseless against our swords and bullets. "575. Another Italian reports that Skanderbeg's men
had a lance, an arrow, a bow, and so forth nothing further "fought576. Irritated spoke a third observer of
Albanian "Janissary" 577th An Occident could hardly distinguish Skanderbeg's men from Ottomans. The
insurgents lacked modern weapons such as nappies, rifles, and guns; these were not produced in
Albania, contrary to the folk legend578, had to be laboriously procured in the Adriatic. Although there
were some supplies at the Adelsburgen, for Dagno, for example, an inventory of the weapons and
storage chamber from the time of the Zaharia family was preserved: 640 staria grain (1 Venetian star
weighed about 65 kg, there were 41.6 tons of grain in Dagno), 660 quarts of wine, seven bombards, six
small bombards, twelve crossbows, 20 rifles, nine boxes with crossbow bolts, 3000 arrows eight barrels of
gun powder were stored there579. But these weapons crests were not enough. The castriota had to buy
in the arms market, and this was in Ragusa, which delivered 1447 valuable powder to
Albania580. Skanderbeg's liaison people in the trading city spent decades trying to buy war
technology. However, arms trading was a political business, and as with money-making, the Ragusans
were careful not to challenge the sultan. 1466 - Skanderbeg threatened to succumb the Ottomans
approached dangerously close to the city - the council admitted buying powder 582. Only late
ZU581. Gunpowder also sent King Alfonso to the Adriatic Sea for arms shipments. In March 1466, the
archbishop of Durazzo returned to Albania with four small guns, ten rifles and twenty barrels of powder
destined for Rodoni Castle. The Kastriota attached great importance to breastbones or the recruitment of
crossbowmen from Italy who were in great demand throughout the Balkans. The Annbrust still proved to
be the most reliable and effective firearm and also inspired armored Ottoman warriors. Every year in
Venice, the Balkan princes requested permission to use so-called balestrieri (Annbrust contactors); from
the middle of the century onwards, the demand for rifle shooters rose. Crossbow bolts were on. precious
commodity: An emissary of Skanderbeg received 1454 in Ragusa permission to acquire 1000 of these
projectiles585. But it was not enough to deliver the weapons, and there was a lack of trained
soldiers. Barletius reports that Italian, German, French and Dalmatian mercenaries had served the war
machines586. British will also have fought with Skanderbeg587. Mercenaries often become JJ French
and Dalmatian mercenaries had served the war machines586. British will also have fought with
Skanderbeg587. Mercenaries often become JJ French and Dalmatian mercenaries had served the war
machines586. British will also have fought with Skanderbeg587. Mercenaries often become JJ
JJ
171
also more reliable than native followers, who repeatedly routed to the Ottomans. The pay - the French
gunners are said to have received five ducats a month - but meant a significant Belashmg588. In 1466
Skanderbeg in Ragusa urgently requested permission, a gun master. to be allowed to recruit what he was
beaten off589. Only in late years does the Kastriota seem to have dealt with the occidental art of war. It is
said that he was in possession of a manuscript of the war scientific treatise "Bellifortis" of Conrad Kyeser
from Eichstätt, a 1405 completed work590. To be sure, Skanderbeg hardly had any of the military
equipment described in the manuscript; Fortress war was not his thing, and therefore it is hardly to be
assumed that he made significant use of Kyese's beautiful drawings. Many of the desired weapon
broadcasts probably did not come about because the Adriaanrainer saw the upgrade of Skanderbegs with
discomfort. This becomes clear in the Kastriota's attempts to build up his own small fleet. For troop
affairs, for foreign affairs, for diplomacy and trade, and ultimately for the survival of the insurgents, the sea
was of paramount importance. But neither Naples nor Venice or Ragusa wanted ships under the flag with
the double-headed eagle on a red background. All the insistence on Skanderbeg was given evasive or
negative answers: by King Alfonso V several times, in December 1447 and March 1452 591. Substantial
transport problems also arose during Skanderbeg's largest naval operation, The transfer of more than
2,000 men of his allegiance to Puglia: Here was all about Ragusa, where Skanderbeg on July 21, 1461 at
Plocetor in the presence of the Chancellor Xenophon Filelfo, son of the famous humanist Francesco
Filelf0 592, for 40 ducats a Fusta (a type of ship ) with 18 rowing benches acquired 593. This probably
served his personal purposes; the crossing had to be done with the escort of three Neapolitan galleys,
which took a long time to come594. Therefore, Skanderbeg rented another ship in Ragusa595. Finally,
the crossing was troublesome for lack of transport ships596. Hardly landed in Apulia, Skanderbeg asked
King Ferrante for his own galley, with which he wanted to move his men quickly along the Apulian
coast597.
The Venetians tried to win him in 1463 as an ally, he insisted on receiving galleys in sufficient
numbers. Venice promised, between In April and June 1464 several warships were sent to
Albania599. For personal purposes, he also wanted another galley and a sailing ship6 ° o. Since Venice
in the winter of 1463/64 this request because of the season could not yet meet, Skanderbeg, who wanted
to take in 1464 in Naples vassal envy in late winter, back in Ragusa to seek a galley601. Even in 1465 -
relations with Venice had darkened again: - Skanderbeg received the Ragusan state ship602. As late as
1466, Skanderbeg's envoy, lmez Stjepan Radojevic, hired two boats from Budua in Ragusa for a trip to
Sibenik and Split. In addition, the Kastriota operated the construction of their own small flotilla: 1455 a
Slavic Kalfalterer was recruited604; Chancellor Ninac requested permission in Ragusa in October 1463 to
acquire two "barques" and bring four shipbuilders to Albania - the Ragusan council, frightened by
Mehmed's conquest of Bosnia and full of hope for the Crusade, agreed in 605. On 15 October,
Skanderbeg's agent, the patrician Paladino de Gondolai Gundulic, commissioned the Zimmenan Andreas
Thomasii de Zuppana. The construction of a separate fleet did not succeed. As a fortified port could have
served only Rodoni, which, as told, repeatedly the target of Ottoman attacks formed. Skanderbeg himself
did not love the sea and the ships at all. "This gentleman fears the sea very much," knew the Venetian
senators, who felt uncomfortable in the face of Skanderbeg's mountains. Precisely because of this
aversion of the mountain to the sea, the number of Skanderbeg's voyages, especially in his final years, is
striking: 1450 to Ragusa, 1461 and 1464 to Puglia, 1466 to Italy again. These organizational difficulties
also affected the procurement of news. Communication in the mountains was erratic and often
inaccurate. The great distances and the uncertain message flow contributed significantly to the failure of
important companies such as the unification of the armies Hunyadis and Skanderbegs. Even in the good
season news needed weeks to get to Albania from Venice or Hungary. In order to find out the plans of the
Ottomans, Skanderbeg maintained a wide network of scouts608. Crucial, however, was his own
familiarity with the enemy. This is a key to insurgents' survival. How good the Kastriota is about the
events throughout the Balkans and in the heart of the Ottoman Empire 173
An Italian ambassador to the Curia (1454) demonstrated to the astonishment of Italian diplomats: He says
quite wonderful things about the power of the Turks and about the armor that he manages for the good
season. Among other things, El says that the Turk was not accustomed to making large galleys because
he lacked wood, but he says that he felled many trees in Constantinople and brought them to Adrianople
and brought them there every day and that he has many master craftsmen, many of whom are Christians,
and that he has made a huge number of galleys, 'he also says that so many have been completed and
brought to Constantinople that they are like a second Constantinople Lake appeared. He told a thousand
other wondrous and frightening things. Skanderbeg was well acquainted with Ottoman naval armaments
in the late Stambul, and even the technical obstacles that stood in the way of the sultan were known to
him. Even in later years he passed on reports on Ottoman campaigns in Asia Minor to Italy: His strategic
view spanned - though not continuously - much of the Ottoman Empire 610. He also received news from
his Christian neighbors on the eastern Adriatic, for example from the Republic of Ragusa61 and probably
also from the always well-covered titular character of Arta, Leonardo IH, who resides on St. Maura
(Leukas) in front of the epirotic mainland. Tocco 612. There were also contacts with Ottoman
subordinates613. But the scout system repeatedly proved too slow and inaccurate; it failed
catastrophically in the summer of 1455, when Skanderbeg's spies escaped the Ottoman march against
Berat - with some passport guards bribed614 - and the rebellious nobles were completely overcome by
the attack. Low team strength, insufficient armament and poor communication links were the structural
weaknesses of the insurgents. In the open field their chances of success were low against attacks of
heavy Ottoman cavalry. The lack of military equipment made every siege seem less
promising. Skanderbeg had to make a virtue out of necessity. In addition, as a former Ottoman officer, he
had observed not only the strengths of the Ottomans, but also the mistakes of their Christian
opponents. Bulgarians, Byzantines and Serbs had faced the Ottomans either in field battles or behind
fortress walls. They had each pulled together their entire force in one place, although they had few
reserves that would have allowed for the continuation of the war after a defeat. The Balkan Christians had
therefore always chosen a decisive battle, and they were always inferior. Similarly it was the Crusade of
Varna and then also Johann Hunyadi in 1448 ergan1J The Balkan Christians had therefore always
chosen a decisive battle, and they were always inferior. Similarly it was the Crusade of Varna and then
also Johann Hunyadi in 1448 ergan1J The Balkan Christians had therefore always chosen a decisive
battle, and they were always inferior. Similarly it was the Crusade of Varna and then also Johann Hunyadi
in 1448 ergan1J
H.
174
As the first Balkan leader, Skanderbeg had survived a siege war at the siege of Krujas in 1450, albeit only
with the utmost difficulty. The teachings he drew from these impressions essentially explain his survival:
he used the seasons and the terrain, avoiding major battles and sieges, and led a constant
movement. Both Ottoman and Byzantine historians report in unison that the sultan's army had made the
trackless forest desert and rugged mountains difficult to deal with; a rough mountainous country is
Albania, with many castles and small towns, dark forests and inaccessible areas, wrote Kritobulos
615. The Molaa, the mountains of Dibra and Mati, the mountains around Kruja offer excellent
opportunities for small, lightly armed units to to attack better equipped formations in a flash. The forest
was Skanderbeg's best ally. Skanderbeg also adapted to his opponent skillfully. His followers were able
to assert themselves against regionlile associations of the Ottomans. The mostly from the Polog
originating Ottoman warriors made repeated attacks on the Mokra and Dibra, where they plundered and
burned. The Ottomans deliberately destroyed the crops and killed fruit trees. The war fed the Ottomans,
but also Skanderbeg's followers. At the regional level, both sides essentially carried out a robbery war
616. The defense against major attacks led by the Sultan was different. The Ottoman warfare followed a
solid seasonal rhythm for logistical reasons. In March, the troops were hauled together on the large
grassy and wet plains of Edime, Bitola or Skopje. Most of the time, the march to a destination that the
sultan kept secret for a long time kept the enemy in the dark. The troop armies allowed campaigns to the
south, west and north; every year, therefore, the whole Balkan and the Adriatic riparian states trembled
617. The deployment of a sultan's army at the destination extended for up to three weeks from the arrival
of the Vanguard until the appearance of the Grand Master himself. The casting of the guns took another
two weeks619. Kritobulos relates that Mehmed's H. march against Albania in 1466 lasted 33 days. The
actual fighting took place in a very short time, in May and June, partly in July. Then, forced by supply
shortages, began the return march. The numerical strength proved to be a disadvantage in longer combat
operations. The stocks of the attacked countries were quickly exhausted by the Ottoman soldiers,
especially when it came to barren mountain areas. Finally, the grand master also had to note that 175
wanted to return his Timur lords to their homes at the time of the Enlete. The war season was limited to a
few weeks a year. Rarely did the Ottomans attack in the fall; and then it was provincial orders, not the
sultan's army. Thus, Ottoman forces attacked Skanderbeg, already weakened by the defeat at Berat, in
October 1455, forcing him to flee to the mountains.621 For Skanderbeg it was about surviving the crucial
months between May and June. He had to survive in particular the first Anstunn a well-fed and prey-
hungry opponent, which took place mostly in May. As strenuous as the battles during this period were, the
months in which the rebels could recover stretched. From late summer to spring, there was usually peace
at the heart of the insurgency. Skanderbeg himself described this rule to the Milan ambassador to Rome
(December 1466): "He did not want to stay longer than mid-February (in Rome), because, as he says, the
Turk retires in the Kalender of March." 622nd In winter, the damage to the castles was repaired,
inventories increased, patrol rides in the borderlands were carried out 623. When threatening major
attacks began in the spring, a movement in the highlands. During the short fighting season, Skanderbeg
cleared the plains and winter borders624 and retreated to the mountains with his warriors; he soon
brought the families of his men to the Venetian harbor fortresses, later but especially in mountain hiding
places in safety. Kritobulos relates: "Some were in strongholds, the others had taken refuge with their
leader Alexander in the mountains" 625; elsewhere he writes: "He fled again into the solid and rugged
mountains, into his usual haunts and abodes in the highlands" 626. Barletius adds: "There are some
mountains in Epirus that cover so 111.it forest and are so inaccessible that 1nan enjoys there greater
protection than in the strongest castles" 627. Such hiding places were in the safest part of Skanderbeg's
reign, in Lower Dibra; there was the valley of Valikardha, not far west of Rahovnik (Debar), protected in
the north and south by mountains up to 2000 m high; eastward the valley descended to the Black
Drin, from where attacks against Ochrid were carried out; to the west there was a possibility to escape to
Mati and on to the Adriatic Sea. Water and pastures were abundantly available here; In addition, the
broad valley connected the two core areas of Skanderbeg's rule, Mati and Dibra. In the summer of 1464 it
also served Venetian troops as a corridor to the east628. On the other hand, the Kastriota brought his
followers to safety in Qidhna, the place of origin of his family, only a few kilometers in a straight line north
of 176 In the summer of 1464 it also served Venetian troops as a corridor to the east628. On the other
hand, the Kastriota brought his followers to safety in Qidhna, the place of origin of his family, only a few
kilometers in a straight line north of 176 In the summer of 1464 it also served Venetian troops as a
corridor to the east628. On the other hand, the Kastriota brought his followers to safety in Qidhna, the
place of origin of his family, only a few kilometers in a straight line north of 176
from Valikardha. The village Sine was situated at 1529 m altitude on a wide plateau, about 1000 m above
the nearby valley of the Black Drin and from there only accessible via steep paths. The seven mountain
lakes of Lura provided water, the surrounding pastures also enough food for the animals 629. In these
densely wooded valleys and mountains the insurgents disappeared when the Ottomans marched
on. These seemed to flood the plains in the summer, especially the plain off Kruja; in smaller campaigns
they had the Polog and the plain around Ochrid firmly under control. They rarely met resistance in the
lowlands. They also repeatedly managed to storm the passes the insurgents were trying to block. They
used archers and light-armed men, who scattered Skanderbeg's followers. So it was not like that that the
Ottomans had failed in the highlands, on the contrary, in summertime, they are always spectacular
successes; but with just such regularity they lost this terrain again. Critobulos tells about Murad 1I .:
"Emperor Murad, the father of the Emperor (Mehmed 11), attacked and defeated them, he stormed the
passes, destroyed a good part of their land, plundered there and conquered some castles but he was
unable to finally subdue it "631. Often the inhabitants of the rebellious areas paid tribute at the height of
the Ottoman attacks - and forgot all promises as soon as the last Ottoman soldier had left the country; the
same Critobulus reports in detail about the experience so frustrating for the Ottomans: " At the same time,
the autumnal raids on the Ottoman borderlands began333. This campaign rhythm was essentially
conditioned by climatic conditions. The mountains of Dibra and Mati sink into the snow in winter, and even
for locals the trails become impassable. As early as mid-September, Skanderbeg had to expect winter in
the mountains, reported his Venetian associate, a Valikardha officer. Snow and rain 177
were important allies of the insurgents, "the winter, the enemy of the wars", as Barletius wrote in 635: The
Karaca bey died after heavy autumn precipitation, the pack animals in a camp, which he pitched at
Livada, in the plain of Struga, northwest of Ochrid would have; had he not moved the tents quickly into the
hills, the losses would have been even greater. Cold and wet, the Ottomans from the country stayed in
their winter quarters, which lay far away from Albania in the Vardar basin. The winter also increased the
insurgents and paralyzed larger attacking enterprises: "Rain, ice and snow help the glorious, thirsty
warriors"; Vrana Conte warned his captain Skanderbeg 637. But even in the summer, the climate was
particularly troublesome for the powerful Ottomans, who were marching in heavy armor; Heat and lack of
water plagued them in the mountains638; here were the lightly armed warriors Skanderbegs, who were
accustomed as Bergler deprivation, in their cloth clothes at an advantage. If possible, the Ottomans had
to set their march times early in the morning, at least before the midday heat639. But also Skanderbeg's
warfare was dictated by the climate. Main concern in the summer was the care of his followers: Water and
shortage of supplies harassed him approximately in the camp in the mountains at Valikardha640. Even
though the Kastriota sold his crops to Ragusa in good years, Kom was repeatedly missing. Barletius says
that devastation, but the military service of the farmers had at times led to the fact that Skanderbeg's
followers could reap grain for only three months 641. As told, grain smuggling from Venetian areas had to
make up for it; "Peasants and Venetian merchants brought it secretly" 642. In fact, until the 1460s, the
Ottoman invasions mainly hit the plains, where the Ottomans deliberately destroyed the
fields643. Meanwhile, the inhabitants who fled to the mountains were starving. This became most evident
in the year of need, 1466, when Skanderbeg's ambassador to the Curia urged that no Italian mercenaries
be sent to the devastated land that could feed no one else; In November of the same year, Ragusa
delivered a large shipment of hard-baked bread to the Kastriota645. Again and again Skanderbeg had to
buy grain in Apulia or to ask for help646. Occasionally Venice provided him with legal channels, as in
April 1460 600 Staria were released from the state granary. An ambassador of Skanderbeg had bought
Lombard grain from the Mantuan trader Giovanni-Battista da Guazzi647. In the decisive phase of the war
(1466/67) Skanderbeg finally relied entirely on grain imports from Puglia648. In addition to grain, livestock
farming formed the food base of the insurgents. The herds were vulnerable, exposed to enemy
attacks. 178 An ambassador of Skanderbeg had bought Lombard grain from the Mantuan trader
Giovanni-Battista da Guazzi647. In the decisive phase of the war (1466/67) Skanderbeg finally relied
entirely on grain imports from Puglia648. In addition to grain, livestock farming formed the food base of
the insurgents. The herds were vulnerable, exposed to enemy attacks. 178 An ambassador of
Skanderbeg had bought Lombard grain from the Mantuan trader Giovanni-Battista da Guazzi647. In the
decisive phase of the war (1466/67) Skanderbeg finally relied entirely on grain imports from Puglia648. In
addition to grain, livestock farming formed the food base of the insurgents. The herds were vulnerable,
exposed to enemy attacks. 178
It was no easy task to secure the seasonal change of animals between winter and summer pastures. The
Albanian coastal plain did not offer enough space, as the livestock owners in the plain, usually Venetian
subjects, claimed the grasslands. In this context belongs the attempt of the Kastriota to win the Venetian
winter pastures of Velipoja and Medua on the Adriatic for his herds 649. These areas were shielded by
high hills and protected against Ottoman raids. From there, in the spring, the cattle could also be driven
through safe Venetian territory on the summer pastures. The herds, the wealth of the highlands, were
increased by continuous raids in the neighboring areas. Damage to the enemy, Providing followers and
the traditional increase in prestige through successful robbery went hand in hand. Outsider observers,
Byzantines, Ottomans and Italians, have consistently pointed out that Skanderbeg's cavalry was
characterized by being quick to attack and then retreat. Mehmed's 11th adversary in Anatolia, Ibrahim of
Karaman, wrote to the Italian courts in 1455 that the Albanian lord would, in case of danger, go into safe
positions with his army, dodge a battle, and strike only on a favorable occasion. In Italy, the celebrated
humanist Francesco Filelfo, whose son as Ragusan Chancellor had connections to Skanderbeg, in March
1464 in a letter to the Venetian doge Cristoforo Moro from: " This Skander will do little to benefit the
common cause of the Christians, but rather by distraction than by the destruction of the Turkish
armies. For he does not have a large heel that will fight the Turks in battle order with erected
battlefields; rather, he will inflict considerable damage and loss through ambushes, lightning attacks, and
attacks. "651. While these two observers lived hundreds of miles from Albania, the Venetian patrician
Gabriele Trevisan, general of the Signoria troops in Albania, was on a campaign in the His report to the
Doge was written in Valikardha, the aforementioned valley west of Dibra, on September 16, 1464: "The
Lord Scandarbei has decided To make another bold ride into the land of the Turk, and on the 6th of this
month he has gone out with men of Laand and your Excellency's soldiers, Italians as well as Albanians, to
march to Serbia, where he may have done a great deed would have; he had reached the border when he
learned from the scouts sent in advance that the Turkish emperor had arrived in Serbia; therefore, he
decided to turn back immediately, and in order not to leave in vain, he turned against Alcria (Ochrid, p. S),
179 that the Turkish emperor arrived in Serbia; therefore, he decided to turn back immediately, and in
order not to leave in vain, he turned against Alcria (Ochrid, p. S), 179 that the Turkish emperor arrived in
Serbia; therefore, he decided to turn back immediately, and in order not to leave in vain, he turned against
Alcria (Ochrid, p. S), 179
an important place of the Turks, well-populated and located on the shores of the lake from which flows the
Drinfluss: When he arrived at the plain, he left the Italian crew in battle order at one. and then attacked
with light horsemen of his country and your excellency many villages of the said area; he burned them
and robbed large and small cattle as well as other good in large numbers; When almost all the land had
heard the noise and seen the flames all the way to the city, numerous well-equipped Turks waved with
great force toward ours; but the said gentleman, who knows fully the mode of action of the said Turks,
retired, constantly giving them skirmishes, turning against them again and again, leaving the Italians in
reserve; then he had the Albanians attack the Turks and finally they were defeated, many killed and about
40 caught; but as Turks kept on advancing, and their large numbers were constantly burning, and ours
were exhausted from the long ride, he did not want to persecute them, but returned with all the booty and
prisoners without loss of ours and arrived in this place (Valikardha, 0 652. Trevisan's story is
supplemented by a report by the Condottiere Antonio da Cosenza, called Cimarosta, written on 17
September 1464, which gives more precise information on places and travel times.Three days
Skanderbeg marched to the Serbian border - that is to say was probably the passage into the landscape
around Prizren The sultan was on the way back from the Bosnian castle Jajce, where he had fought
against the Hungarians, and camped on the Sitnica, 20 miles from the target of Skanderbeg's planned
loot. The improvised procession to Ochrid proved to be one-day and one-night encroachment, and by the
third hour of the morning the Christian army had appeared in the plain in front of the rich city. The
Trevisan report illustrates the interplay between heavily-armed Italians and the light Albanian cavalry, in
which Skanderbeg's men and Venetian subjects from northern Albania were involved. While Trevisan was
deeply impressed by the raid, an equally Italian Balkan connoisseur judged much more soberly about the
same raid: Ragusa Chancellor Bartolomeo de Sfondratis, from Lombardy, noted in a report to the Duke of
Milan:
180
ij
le
Skanderbeg's ability to inflict lasting damage on enemies through attacks proved limited even under
favorable circumstances. Skanderbeg's type of warfare is clear from the report. Before: looting, pillage,
quick retreat on securing the loot make a successful attack. The open battle in battle formation is avoided,
rather, the opponent is lured by a rapid withdrawal from his order, involved again and again in small
battles and then struck with an instantaneous transition from flight to attack, a tactic 'also popular with the
Asian equestrian peoples and perhaps he had learned from the Ottomans. It also reveals that the light
riders at once sought the protection of the hills, and also that they relied on the armored Italians. Heavy-
armed riders had repeated access to Skanderbeg: Aragonesi mercenaries of King Alfonso V. appeared in
stately numbers: 1,200 footmen and 500 horsemen in 1455 655, even 1,000 mounted and additional
infantry in the following spring656; In 1457, 1,000 cavalrymen and 1,000 men were preparing to walk in
Albania657. A symbolic value, but not to be discounted, came to those 50 French crusaders who left with
Skanderbeg in 1456658. In May 1456, Rome even hoped for "a merger of crusaders". Decisive
importance they do not seem to have achieved because of their small number; for Skanderbeg the
symbolic value will have outweighed: The presence of the French knights proved the echoes of his fame
in France and Burgundy, for whose interest Skanderbeg, too, very much endeavored. Trevisan's report
must not obscure the fact that Skanderbeg's interaction with Italian mercenaries failed in fundamental
differences in warfare and mentality: the artillery tactics of the lightly armed insurgents were in diametrical
opposition to the artistic warfare of the Italians. Although Skanderbeg had specifically requested troop
assistance from Venice in 1463, and not merely pay for his own allegiance - perhaps the fear of betrayal
in his own ranks played here - the Venetian senate complained in 1466 that the mercenaries of the
Signoria were of Skanderbeg's men been treated badly, which is why Italians refused to serve in
Albania. Skanderpeg, to whom Venice had given command of the mercenaries, proved, as early as 1455
before Berat, incapable of uniting his own warriors and Italian mercenaries into a powerful army. Most
battles thus denied the riders from Dibra and Mati. This core team was highly motivated, their warfare
simple and tough. 181
To a visibly shocking Italian diplomat, Skanderbeg described his idea of war: "He wants to wage war in
his own way, that is, kill anyone who gets his hands on him, and make no prisoners" 661. Prisoners could
not feed the poor mountain areas; not for every Ottoman ransom was to be achieved; Above all, the
insurgents fought for their existence. The uprising against the sultan was also a state of extermination,
which led both sides to increasing bitterness. In December 1455, the diplomats learned to a Neapolitan
royal court that the Ottomans, after their victory at Berat in the newly conquered territories, killed all men,
but deported women and children. The peculiarities of the insurgents' warfare is summarized in a Military
Manual, The Albanians little prisoners. The victory is celebrated by burning and plundering. But if they get
used to, Deroute will easily step in. "663 Skanderbeg's warfare hardly differed from that: the strengths and
weaknesses of the mountain warriors had changed dramatically over the centuries.The rebellion against
the Sultan was Skanderbeg's own personal calf He rode tirelessly against the Sultan from 1443 to 1468.
But he was a realist enough to include the case of defeat in his plans, and Skanderbeg knew he was a
"renegade" in the struggle for survival with the Ottomans. In defiance of all the locomotion of the sultan,
there was no chance of a pardon, and he had to make provisions for his family, his followers, himself. A
little over a year after the beginning of the war, Stanisa and Georg Kastriota asked for asylum in Venice
for emergency purposes and they were also assured of this, in their capacity as Venetian citizens
(February 1445) 664. When Skanderbeg Alfons V. approached (December 1447), he brought this
immediately
Question on; the king replied: "The refuge which you desire in our lands in Puglia especially for you, your
children, and your allegiance in the event that God forbid you to be defeated by the enemies, we also
gladly confess to 665 , Over the years, Skanderbeg developed a two-fold withdrawal strategy, which
essentially followed the example of other gentlemen, such as Stefan VukCi6s or Araniti KOlninos 666; He
tried to buy houses in neighboring fortified towns, but also to acquire property outside Albania in the event
of complete defeat. In 1449 he wished, in the sense of the first strategy, of Venice a house in Skutari
667. At the Italian courts, the asylum question is taken seriously; Pope Pius H. In 1460 a request was
made to King Franrante of Naples668. The pope says that the Kastriota, the "fighter for the faith," also
asked for refuge in the Papal States669. Skanderbeg, after 1460, was particularly concerned with houses
in southern Dalmatia, both in the Ragusan and Venetian areas, a strategy aimed at reducing the risk of
losing refuge in conflict with one of the Adriatic republics. On April 4, 1461, he made an official request to
the Council of Ragusa; he asked for "admittance for his followers in our islands, if he were tormented by
the Turks, what God forbid" 670. Three weeks later, the island of Mrkan-Merchana was already under
negotiation, but the Ragusan senate refused to do so671. The asylum question became urgent in the
preparations for the great attack on Mehmed II in the fall of 1463; Venice explicitly granted asylum to
Skanderbeg, including on the islands of Hvar / Lesina and Korculal Curzola, north of Ragusa, and at the
same time easily accessible from Albanian ports672. Skanderbeg secured himself several times; In 1465
he obtained another sanctuary, on the island of Mljet / Melita, on Ragusan territory. As long as it seemed
possible, Skanderbeg stayed in Albania. In the attack of Mehmed H. Skanderbeg and his entourage had
retreated behind the Mauem Rodonis, in anticipation of help, but also ready to escape across the sea
(1466) 674. In Albania itself, his family found refuge in dire need in the Venetian cities of Skutari and
Dulcigno 675. But when the hour had vanished, Skanderbeg's widow and her young son crossed over to
Puglia, where, in a straight line opposite Dulcigno, King Ferrante had given the Kastriota a fief, the slopes
of the Gargano, the plateau of S. Giovamli Rotondo 676. They preferred to live according to rank among
the southern Italian nobility than in houses under the supervision of distrustful city republics.
Skanderbeg had skilfully averted the risk: in the Ragusan, Neapolitan, and Venetian regions, there were
houses ready to escape. The fact that Skanderbeg's triumph and skill finally won the Ottomans is due to
the strategic genius of Mehmed H. He recognized that three things had a success: the seasonal limitation
of the fighting; the exploitation of the forests by the enemy; and the retreats of the insurgents in the
highlands. Mehined, Skanderbeg in two campaigns (1466/67) knocked out all these pillars from the
hand. He broke through the seasonal cycle when, in 1466, he decided to extend the fighting to the whole
year. For this he needed a permanent base in Albania and above all large storage warehouses to provide
for the troops. In the HochsOlnlner in 1466, for example, he had the mighty Elbasan fortress built in a few
weeks' time in 1866. And from then on, Skanderbeg's men found no peace; after one and a half years, at
the end of 1467, the Ottomans had reached their destination; the game was rushed to exhaustion, the
resistance collapsed. Mehmed, however, had not only done this radical step contrary to the old Slavonic
tradition. He had also taken up the fight against Skanderbeg's second strategic advantage: against the
mountains and nature. Not Kruja or Rodoni, but the forest was Skanderbeg's real fortress. In the forest
lost the numerical and technical superiority of the Ottomans, Skanderbeg pursued a tactic as after ilun -
until recently - Balkan guerillas 679. He was only allowed to dare to attack the heavily-fortified Ochrid
when he advanced through the woods and almost trackless mountains. His peasants and hikers knew
every way and footbridge; they displayed an unusual stamina, similar to those Albanian St Mnmes
warriors, who for days around 1900, almost without supplies, marched through the highlands for
days. From these forests Scanderbeg's warriors quickly made plunder into the plains681. There they
surprised the Os- nian marching columns. As long as the forests were still in existence, the Indian armies,
and especially the convertible caravans, could never be sure. As soon as the Ottoman units pushed from
the lowlands into the hills and mountains, they encountered bitter resistance. Few Bauemund shepherd
warriors were enough to prevent even superior Ottoman formations from penetrating the mountain
valleys. Mehmed Ir. ordered in 1466 that along the Haupunarschweges, the Via Egnatia, at strong points
strong guards were erected, but above all he left the corps of lumberjacks and part of the
Swarm fulminating people, Uln the pines along the way to cut down; Now, the Ottomans had a clear view
and the insurgents were robbed of their hiding places. Then the Sultan broadened the ways. For the first
time, the convoys and the pack animals moved unopposed11 towards central Albania 684. The sultan
had taken up the fight against nature, Skanderbeg's allies, and won. There was still the war against the
mountains. In 1466 and 1467 Mehmed II sent. RollkOlmnandos in the valley and up on every mountain,
and let either man or beast either Ulnbringen "or deport." Critobulos describes how first the skirmishers
rejoiced, then bowmen and gunners, and slingers. "Peacefully and step by step ((followed the infantry and
pushed back the rebels until they were annihilated. Mountaintop for mountaintop was so tuned in and the
last hiding places were exhausted. The Ottomans had never previously used a defensive
warfare. Nielnals again the Ottomans should set the Bergbewohnenl so the foot on the neck. With a total
war Mehmed 11 had won the victory. The oSlnan tax registers prove the success of this tactic, which led
to an actual dinographic catastrophe in Mati and Dibra. Skanderbeg was not the only Balkan prince who
had resisted the Ottomans for many years: in Wallachia, but especially in Moldavia, lightly armed
peasants competed against the Sultan's army in the deep forests ilu " he lands back. Like Skanderbeg
they gave up part of their territory to Jews, like Skanderbeg they had learned from the mistakes of the
Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb princes, the defeats of the Crusaders at Nicopolis, Varna, and Anselsel. In
order to defeat the Ottomans, they were not allowed to embark on their way of warfare: they had to be
lured into rough terrain where the Timalts had to tackle mountains and trees before they hit the opponent,
where the Janissary's squad was spinning The bushes broke, where the locals used their strength, agility
and knowledge of the terrain, and the Moldavians burned down their fields and drove their animals into
forest corners. unoccupied areas - the inhabitants lurking in the woods, meanwhile, 686. Like the
orthodox peasants of Wallachia and Moldavia, Skanderbeg's fast peasant and shepherd warriors also
achieved their great victories under these fury. Not mercenary armies - apart from the Crusaders of the
Occident and individual mercenaries - but pawns687, the strong one
their own interest in defending their faith, their personal freedom, their own possessions, and the
command of charisinan leaders, who respected and revered them, at least temporarily halted Ottoman
rule. These commonalities of the Wallachian, Moldovan and Albanian resistance must always be kept in
mind; then it will come as no surprise that the great princely figures, Stefan de Grosse of Moldavia and
Skanderbeg, received a tremendous folk worship. The ongoing guerilla warfare, taking advantage of the
country's nature, led by a small band of convinced warriors, this was Skanderbeg's Kalnpffonn, and this
explains his survival.
VASALL NAPLES
We believe that it is not hidden from Your Highness that we are vassals around the most illustrious King
of Aragon in those areas, "wrote Skanderbeg to the Duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, on July 18,
1456. He thus expressed his position to the monarch who, in contrast to Venice and Ragusa, had helped
him at the moment of greatest distress and had taken him under his protection in the form of a feudal
relationship. Until his death, Skanderbeg remained faithful to the crown of Naples; and after his death the
Kastriota migrated to Puglia. The Albanian lord was from 1451 to 1468 the most reliable vassal of the
kings Alfons V Ct 1458) and Ferrante I in the Balkans. He followed them in the war against the Ottomans
as well as in the conflict in Venice. The fact that Skanderbeg involved himself in this struggle between
Italian states, which was carried on the Haemus peninsula and permanently weakened the region's
defensive power against the Ottomans, shows his dependence on the Arag6n family. The vassalage
relationship was not uniform. Alfonso V planned until 1453 the conquest of Constantinople and then a
crusade in Albania. He was prepared to send larger groups of troops across the Adriatic Sea and to
attack the OSlnans together with ln Skanderbeg. His son Ferrante, on the other hand, had to contend with
a dangerous aristocratic fringe until the mid-sixties of the fifteenth century. Afterwards his mistrust of
Venice made him enter into close relations with the Sultan; he had neither the means nor the will to
continue his father's policy of conquest. Skanderbeg was not only vassal in rank; he felt a deep sense of
loyalty and gratitude to Alfonso V, a feeling he felt
on FelTante nauseating 2. His policy remains incomprehensible, if Inan does not consider this permanent
connection to Naples. He was, however, also a prisoner of the Venetian - Neapolitan struggle to dominate
southern Adia, all the more so as his attempts to obtain tangible help in Ragusa, Milan or distant
Burgundy (1451) 3. The castriota therefore tried to preserve a certain amount of leeway; but he did not
succeed. The death of Murad II had given the insurgents the urgent need for a break. The new Sultan
Mehmed 11 paid close attention to the preparations for the siege of Constantinople. The riots on its
western frontier marks appeared only incidentally. Skanderbeg was, of course, unable to benefit from the
distraction of the Ottomans. Too weakened, he had emerged from the fighting of 1450. The only tangible
success that Skanderbeg recorded was the speedy construction of a new border castle in the hill country
of the western Polog, even in the Slavic language area, where people bore Serbian names. Modric was
made ready in the few months of the waning season and immediately availed as a starting point for a
raid; there, as Barletius relates, that the Olanders of Venice were not inland, the attack succeeded without
difficulty. The newly arrived on the throne Mehmed II had been at war in Asia Minor. hn camp
Skanderbegs itself was aware of the missed opportunity? In a speech that Barletius puts into the mouth of
his hero, he complains about the empty chatter "of his followers, while the dishonor of Svetigrad's loss
was not atoned for. 8 Because of the early season, there was no attack on this key position. Even the
contemporaries had recognized failure and failure; in retrospect, they knew what a high price the
insurgents had to pay for their feuds. 11th Constantinople entangled, Skanderbeg and the Dukagjin
engaged in a fruitless petty war in the mountains 10. In the north, Stefan Crnojevi, unlike An Inland
Albanian nobility, had not gone over to Naples, but had received a St. Mark's banner from the Venetian
governor of Cattaro in February 1452; He promised his hilarious warriors that he would defend the
passports against Serbs and Ottomans for the Lagoon Republic 11. What had become apparent in 1444,
now solidified: The CrnojeviCi went their own way. The agreement of Alessio had no validity. Stefan
Crnojevi6 was grateful to the Venetians for having raised his son from the hostage of the Herzegovinian
Stefan VukCi6. When he finally defeated the Serbs in 1452, he became well respected as the Most
Infernal HelT between Cattaro and Skutari 12th JJ
Skanderbeg could only observe this with a certain amount of envy. In September 1452, one and a half
years after the beginning of the Neapolitan vassalage, he sent to Venice and volunteered for our services,
in person and in his own men, without pay "against the enemies of Venice.13 The Venetians thanked him;
they had no opponents in Albania, the Serbs were beaten, and with the Sultan there was a treaty that
secured the Venetian trade, and the Senators did not want to be involved in a war against the OSlnans of
Skanderbeg the Signoria apparently supported the Dukagjin against the Kastriota, Venice closed the
year-money in l4lInlnerhin succeeded the Albanian lord in the late summer of 1452 a success, wrote by
the viceroy Ortafa to Naples l5. In fact, it was on Mount Mokra, those wooded heights west of the plain of
Polog, that a battle took place in which the Ohlan commander Hamza bey was captured. Skanderbeg
generously entertained him and eventually obtained a handsome ransom. Soon after another battle broke
out in the same region with an Ottoman officer, whom Barclus "Debereas" (probably from Dibra) calls
l7. The year 1453, which saw the fall of Byzantium, was marked by a confused petty war in the western
Balkans. Since the OSlnans had increased all the essential forces in the Bosphorus, it was easy for
Skanderbeg to advance. In Ragusa it was said that he had conquered an oli called "Casii", meaning
perhaps the landscape Has at Prizren 18. Alfons V. was unable to to send more help; Venice was
hostile. Skanderbeg was so attached to his Balkan neighbors. The Serbian despot Georg Brankovi6 sent
a handsome sum from Ragusa to the man who, like him, regarded Venice as an opponent (Septeinber
1453) 2 °. In Ragusa, envoys of the Kastriota spoke in March, in June, and in September. Through
Ragusa he made contacts with Vladislav, son of Stefan Vukci622. All this diplomatic activity took place in
the interests of Naples, Init, and cities that distrusted the Republic of St. Mark. In the HochsOlniner of
1453 Skanderbeg indeed warned the Venetians against an Indian attack, but at the same time he had Init
Mämiern Alfons' V throws on the border with Venetian Albania. Under Neapolitan flag, he then marched
in. North, where the Venetian provincial squad went into defensive position23. But this was apparently
just a threatening gesture, perhaps to blackmail the Jahrgeld; for soon afterwards began negotiations in
which Skanderbeg affirmed his loyalty to the treaty and offered to establish his good relations with George
Brankovic6 for the purpose of vindication between Venice and Despot (August 1453) 24. An agreement
became JJ
The Kastriota wished to conclude that he was planning a trip to Naples and Rome, to which the governor
of Alessio, Venice's contact to the highlands, was to accompany 25. The project was smashed. For
Skanderbeg fought against Ottoman associations, so that King Alfonso V in October 1453 could report to
the Pope, "that lead in the Albanian lands Georg Castrioti or Skanderbeg and Araniti, his companion,
against the Turks K.rieg ... they, who are supported by us and who have recovered in ours and with our
field-signs a large part of the territories occupied by the Turks and daily make their way with their sword
and also do not exclude to subjugate the rest of the country "26. However, more than the conquest of an
unnamed castle seems to have been unsuccessful until December.27 Thus, a year that would have
offered a good opportunity for a major offensive passed without any noteworthy result. How uncertain the
terrain profits were, proved already in the following spring. In January 1454 the Venetian governors and
Skanderbeg wrote to the Senate that the Sultan would approach with a mighty army ... the destruction of
Skanderbeg and the conquest of our (Venetian, O.) territories and places. "28 At the same time the
ambassador went away Rome, which explained to Pope Nicholas V. the true reasons for the uprising, but
the Venetian fear of the Turks soon dissolved: On April 18, 1454, eleven months after the fall of
Constantinople, the Signoria concluded a treaty with the Conqueror's Sultan in which she promised tribute
for her Albanian places29. Venice was at best still interested in recruiting workers of the Albanian nobility
for the fortification of Durazzo30. Otherwise, it kept a cautious distance to the insurgents. In the
mountains the feud of Skanderbeg with the Dukagjin continued; In central Albania, however, King Alfonso
V took the initiative again. Alarmed by the Ottoman successes, he wanted to push his vassals into the
Albanian south in order to avert any danger to his Apulian coast (June 1454) 31. He won the dukagjin as
a vassal and now knew the felines BalSic, Kastriota, Muzaki, Thopia and Araniti as followers behind
him. For the first time in a long while, the Henen found a new campaign, united under Banner
Neapel. They were very serious about the attack plan. In Italy, however, a land peace had been
concluded in Lodi, which, in view of the Ottoman threat, was to end domestic conflicts. Venice watched
the preparations with unrest. Although it reinforced the plans in Durazzo, also Dagno was secured33. But
it was glad that Muzaki Thopia broke from her Neapolitan influence in February 1455 34. JJ
Thus, the neighboring Venetian Durazzo was protected from OSITIANS as before Naples. Alfonso V,
meanwhile, mobilized an expeditionary force. In May 1945, 1,200 Aragonese footmen and 500 horsemen
embarked in Puglia and, under the command of Santo Garillo and Teseo, translated Savello into
Albania35. There they awaited Skanderbeg, Araniti Komino and Muzaki Thopia with their followers. The
great attack of the King of Naples and his Albanian vassals on the Ottoman part of Albania had
begun. The king wanted to conquer the most important Ottoman fortress in central Albania, Berat - at that
time still called "Belgrade in the Romania (in the Byzantine country, OS)", a real castle town on a steep
mountain, protected by still strong in Byzantine times strong Walls36. Berats Burgberg rose almost 200 m
above the level; it was located in a wide depression, which was bounded to the west by up to 900 m high
mountain ranges, to the east by, the almost 2500 m high TomolTica, to the south by a river gorge and
widened only to the north to the coastal plain. In the city at the foot of the castle probably lived around 800
people37. Only one access led to this fortress, which was additionally secured by IT gates. Berat could
not be stormed, only by ITIassive shelling or simply starving the castle would fall. What plan the
Aragonese and the rebellious nobles pursued, is unclear. In any case, they were unable to bring the city's
predominantly Albanian-speaking population to their side; Skanderbeg did not want to tolerate them in
their walls, sondenl rather praised the Ottomans loyalty38. While the mainstay of the Christian army
marches southward, it seems as if the report of the Chalcocondylus, which is not always reliable in its
chronology, is believed to have undertaken a second advance to the east; The goal was Svetigrad39. The
offensive was ventured as Mehmed's H. Hauptheer fought far to the north, where it besieged the silver
city of Novo Brdo on deItI Amselfeld and on 1 June einTTI. Martinus Segonus from Novo Brdo described
the city as follows: "The city of Neuenberg, a settlement of the Germans, because from the beginning
they inhabited Saxons who were searching for ores and silver in the landscapes of Mysia (Serbia, O. S).
The city Wa7 ~ should not be continued here "40. Three weeks later, the Ottomans arrived in Prizren, a
city that had once been temporarily custodated by Ivan Kastriota and that lends ITIit to the Dukagjin
connections41. On the battlefield of 1389, Mehmed H. sacrificed a dead man for his ancestor, Murad 1,
and then moved south towards Salonika42. The Ottomans had settled in the
Ownership of the richest mining town in the Balkans. The border field Isa of Skopje vennehrte by his new
loan his already huge possessions. With the final subjugation of Kosovo, the uprising of the insurgents in
Dibra and Mati had become even stronger; their connections to the Serbian despotate, which was to last
four years on the central Danube, were largely suppressed. In the Venetian town of Slcutari, the news of
the fall of Novo Brdo was filled with excitement; the Signoria ordered a strong fleet into the southern
Adriatic Sea, which was to cross between Cattaro and Durazzo (July 1455) 43. But these galleys also had
the assignment not to let Alfonso's troops get too strong. Under the cover of smuggling contraband, they
supplied supplies to the expeditionary force. On the 21st to make even greater preparations against the
Turk 44. Alfonso V for his part did nothing to provoke the Venetians. On June 16, he sent John John
Claver to the southern Albanian minor nobleman Sünon Zenebish, 45 who swore his vassalage to the
king. Zenebish's involvement in the band of Albanian vassals was not just Init's view of the Turkish
War; On August 20, 1455, Alfonso entrusted the Thai ambassador with much credit: "His (Zenebish, O. S)
areas are 12 miles off Corfu 46, the main port of Venice's Ionian Sea." The Christian campaign in Albania
was under a bad star Naples and Venice were on the brink of an open dispute. And the Ottomans had a
decisive victory and were already marching south again - and this at a time when the Christian siege force
against Berat was only gradually dismantling. This time shift between the two campaign calendars was to
have a devastating effect. By July 1455, the allies finally had counsel. What happened next is reported by
eyewitnesses such as the Albanian Nicolo Lalimi, then Teilneh11
11
men in battle, and Albanian mercenaries in Venetian service, whose experiences were recorded by the
governor and also by the calumniate of Durazzo. "47 According to them, the besiegers were 26th." In July
they took up their positions around the castle hill. Muzaki Thopia and his entourage, totaling 5,000 men,
reinforced by 500 Catalans, lay down in front of the main gate, while Skanderbeg and Araniti Komino sent
their men out to procure Uln siege equipment such as Sturmleitenl and lumber for war
machines48. Araniti's 6,000 men were thus withdrawn from the city, while Skanderbeg was on the other
side of Mount Init Reitenl and 1,000 warriors on foot. Viewed from the castle, the field camp had spread
far apart, The besiegers probably stood in a semicircle north of the city, where the valley of the river
Osmn widens. No one had thought to save the areas south, where the Osmn erupted from the
mountains. Apparently, the nobles relied entirely on their spies; and these failed. The OSlnanen had not
escaped the gentry march of the Aragonese and the Christian nobility. Mehmed H., already on the
backslide along the Vardar, ordered his frontier lords to settle the matter. Isa bey of Skopje, the
Evrenosabkinling Ali (referred to in the western sources as Sebalia or Sabalia), and Hamza bey, manned
the regiments from Serbia and Vardartal, totaling about 30,000 men. While Skanderbeg's scouts were
looking to the east, These generals infiltrated in a wide arc around the area of resistance in the region of
the Ottoman fortress Valona. From there they did not choose the coastal plain, but rather difficult
mountain paths, which were pointed out to them by well-informed monks. In three days, according to the
Venetian governor of Durazzo, these units are said to have covered 200 miles. Although this is evil, the
Ottomans had made a tremendous marching effort. On July 25, they arrived in the south of Berat without
a hitch and stopped there for a day. It does not seem plausible that the besiegers have not noticed
anything. On the morning of the 26th of July, both the relief army and the garrison of Berat could clearly
see the opportunity. Muzaki Thopia lnit s " a 5500 man stood alone against a sixfold superior power. Then
the besieged Tatbians and other instruments of war were sounded, thus giving the signal to attack: The
relief army fell from the east across the Thopia in a great cavalcade attack, and at the same time the
besieged made a defeat, causing a terrible battle on the mountain saddle in front of the castle, Muzaki
and his whole unit were cut down, and Araniti and Skanderbeg saw the powder pot in the air and hurried
through the plain to Burgberg. It's a terrible battle on the mountain saddle in front of the castle; Muzaki
and his whole unit were cut down. Araniti and Skanderbeg saw the gunpowder in the air and hurried
through the plain to Burgberg. It's a terrible battle on the mountain saddle in front of the castle; Muzaki
and his whole unit were cut down. Araniti and Skanderbeg saw the gunpowder in the air and hurried
through the plain to Burgberg.
but they came too late. Besides, the Christians had already lost almost half of their army. So Skanderbeg
and Araniti were lost; The Kastriota proved in the defeat an outrageous personal bravery and killed many
OSlnanen with his own hand to enable his men to retreat. This withdrawal movement became a
disaster; the heavy armed men fled, probably to the northeast into the hills about 700 m high, throwing
away their weapons and crossbows. Skanderbeg and Araniti escaped the init of many of their
warriors; However, the Catalans, who were less familiar with the terrain, survived only 200 to 300 years.
The losses of the Christians amounted to 5,000 to 6,000. Many survivors, often badly wounded, rescued
themselves in the Venetian Durazzo, where inhabitants and administration feared the worst. This was the
biggest defeat the insurgents had had to take. The power of Thopia, whose allegiance had been almost
completely destroyed, was not Inehr. At least as bad proved the loss of prestige: The two Charis
Inatischen Aufstandsfuehrer Skanderbeg and Araniti had to answer for a disaster beyond
compare. Terrified by the number of dead, outraged by Skanderbeg's failure, many insurgents began to
overflow to the OSlnans. Umnut prevailed especially in Dibra; Moses, Lord of the Dibran Lowlands, fled to
Svetigrad at Mehlned H.52 The victorious Ottomans soon led their captive captives in triumph through
Constantinople 53. It had turned out that the southern part of the landscape Albania did not follow the
insurgents; rather, the Ottomans in the plains like Uun Bergland had enjoyed the support of the
unicorns. In Naples, the news hit a 54 on 7 August; The defeat attributed Inan to the supremacy and the
force of the Olandan cavalry. The news that the Ottomans had reached the sea disturbed the court at
least as much as the news of defeat; "From there, Inan can penetrate into the harbor of Brindisi one
night ... All these days these Turks are shouting, they want to translate to Brindisi, and if the fleet of Turks
who are going against Rhodes, swiftly to this passage Brindisi, and there, united in this army, then woe all
over Italy, "wrote Alberico Maletta his Duke 55. The diplomat's assessment agreed with that of the
king. The monarch was so preoccupied by the unexpected defeat that, on August 22, he told his
confidante Maletta two miracles to have happened after the battle: "Although many Christians had died,
Inan claims that many more Turks have been killed, and in one place The battle, where the corpses of
Christians and Turks lay side by side, was at night in all
Clearly seen a shine and shine, which came down from the stars to the bodies of Christians, but not the
Turks. The second miracle: When the Turks wanted to bury these bodies, they found most of their bodies
rotting and eaten and torn to pieces by wolves and other wild beasts, but the bodies of the Christians
were intact and odorless when the Turks saw this this, the Christians would have done this through
magic. The King confirms that this is true and that he has reliable information from trustworthy persons.
"56 In Naples, the martyrs were given the aura of martyrs.1 But in the end, Alfonso V was not deterred by
the defeat, but felt only Inelu - encouraged to fight the Ottomans on the eastern Adriatic, Uln his own king:
rich to protect. Only a month after the battle, Maletta reports another interview with the king, in which he
set out his strategy; the attack on Berat should have opened the way to Valona, bringing the Neapolitan
zone of influence up to 50 miles to Corfu57. In other words, Alfons V. saw himself at war with both the
Ottomans and the Venetians. It is not surprising that they seriously mistreated an envoy of the king, who
wanted to hoist the Aragonese banner in the Zenebish area. Alfons, for his part, suspected the Signoria
that if he did anything in Albania, the greatest quarrel and quarrel would arise between the King and the
Venetians, because they did not want the king to do anything in Albania, but rather in the hands of the
Turks wanted to see "59. The planned Aragonese offensive in the autumn of 1455 took place against the
background of the intra-Italian antagonism, which gained in sharpness on an inonational basis. On August
26, 1455, in a splendid Zereinonie, Alfonso V, in the presence of his court and a crowd of many thousand,
expressed his firm will to take the cross for the defense and reestablishment of the holy faith, "his thought
has always solidified and expanded," says Maletta because he recognized that great and hard oppression
by the perfidious Turk, and that in this unfortunate time we lost to our great misfortune and misery, the
Eastern Church. "60 Realpolitik, however, shaped itself less pompously: Venice secured the Support of
Stefan Crnojevic, whose Slavic and Albanian shepherd warriors are working on 6. On 14th September
1455 they gathered in Vranjina on Skadar Lake and swore allegiance to the Republic61. Equally
impressed by the battle of Berat, Stefan VukCic hastened to leave Naples and form an alliance with Init
Venice 62. In the north, the Zeta and Herzegovina were firmly in Venetian hands, while the weakened
central Albania and the Zenebish in the south continued on with Naples JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
held. The whole south-eastern Adriatic region was thus under the immediate influence of Italian politics,
vassals had sworn allegiance to all essential nobles. Alfonso V, meanwhile, was considering a trip to the
Iberian Peninsula in order to offer further aid there. On October 10, 1455, in the instructions for his envoy
to the King of Portugal, he laid out his plans. His crusade project was particularly secured by his bases,
"some castles and lands he owns in Albania." He had these lands expanded in the fall of 1455, by attacks
of his vassal Skanderbeg on Venetian territory; The Kastriota took over a castle of an - unnamed -
Venetian vassals 64. Venice responded by commissioning the archbishop of Durazzo in the fall of
1455, to incite the Ottoman frontier rulers against Skanderbeg 65. At the same time the Signoria closed
the gates of the port city before Albanian refugees: "Many Christians who fled to Durazzo, the Venetians
did not want to get involved, and the Turks caught them at the gates". For all the plans of the king had no
influence on the advance of the OSlnans, who overran the defenseless country of Thopia and, except for
a few miles, approached the Neapolitan Kruja. Skanderbeg had to banish many inhabitants of the castle,
as he feared treachery; At the same time he urgently asked the king for 500 mercenaries. Probably in the
second half of October the Ottomans attacked once more against Skanderbeg, "who fled the country in
great exhaustion" 67. But the Kastriota once again proved its tenacity: On New Year's Day 1456, the
Pope received a letter reporting heavy losses of the OSlnans in the fight against Skanderbeg68. In the
face of the widespread collapse of his Albanian viceroyalty, Alfonso V had to fear that his vassal's camp
would disintegrate, by descent into the Ottomans and Venice. In fact, the disappointed Araniti KOlnino
joined Venice in the spring of 1456, the Thopia fled to Durazzo. At the turn of the year 1455/56, the last
remnants of Kuvend had fallen apart. The noble families were defeated and weakened, seeking salvation
from Skanderbeg's adversaries. The Kastriota was thrown back to the level of 1450: he was alone, only
Naples was able to save him. His gratitude to Alfons V grew again, as he again received help from Upper
Italy in dire need.
dangerous Albanian theater of war would be lost 69. Piccinino was too clever to let Uin get out of Italy. In
the winter of 1455-56, the King also assisted Skanderbeg in submitting his requests for help to European
courts north of the Alps; Presented as a present to Duke Philip the Good, whose readiness for a crusade
was known but inhibited by fear of his French neighbor, Skanderbeg gave his ambassador, Paul Gasulus,
six O-Lnan prisoners, who received the legation in Lille on May 15, 1456 did not miss her impression. The
representative of the Kastriota - and the Serbian despot, "dispot de Roussie, duc d'Albanie", was received
with honor; Jean, the "bardard de Roisin" led him through the country; Gasulus returned via Milan, where
he made representations to Duke Francesco Sforza, returned to Albania70. Actual help could not afford
the Duke, but had the news of Skanderbegs Türkenlaieg to the most magnificent courtyard of late
medieval Europe. The Kastriota also moved under Alfons V's diplomatic support when, in June 1456, he
sent Francesco Maramonte to the court of Milanese Duke Francesco Sforza as ambassador of "the
sleazy situation in his (Skanderbegs, O. S) areas and his distress in the face of the Turks
"reported7. Although this famous general paid tribute to Skanderbeg, he referred the "Count of Kruja,
Lord Albania, and Captain-General" of the King of Naples, to Neapolitan and papal funds. Like Burgundy,
rich Milan did not intervene in Balkan barter. Skanderbeg was not annoyed, but took the opportunity of the
wedding covenant between the houses Aragon and Sforza to a letter of congratulation, which was issued
on July 18, 1456 in Kruja. As a gift he sent the Duke a noble horse, which had just been captured from
Ottoman territory. Certainly, the Albanian lord hoped that after the alliance with the dynasties, more aid
would be sent across the Adriatic. By the appointment of the King of Naples, the Kastriota had received
such personal relations, embassies, and correspondence with important princes of the West, a
considerable achievement in the field of diplomacy, when one considers the severe setbacks in the
struggle. Without the intercession of the monarch, this would hardly have been possible. These diplomatic
courtesies took place in a year that once again marked a decisive landmark on the ostensible
unstoppable path of the Omani sultan. Having brought the entire valley of Vardar and Morava under his
control, Mehmed H. lacked only the possession of Belgrade, in order to completely strengthen the old
military road from the Danube to Thessaloniki, the backbone of any rule over the Balkans
rule. In the spring of 1456 he marched northwards with great army. The protection of Belgrade was well
prepared for Johann Hunyadi, whose far-flung troops were reinforced by numerous volunteers and
crusaders, especially from the German Reich. The monk Giovanni di Capistrano cheered on the
defenders, Cardinal Juan Carvajal, legate of the pope in the Balkans, supported him as much as
possible. On July 14, 1456, there was a decisive battle, which was conducted with extraordinary violence
and ended with a heavy defeat of the sultan. But the Christians also suffered many deaths, which were
perpetrated in battle, but above all by a plague which soon broke out, which also succumbed to Johann
Hunyadi on the 11th of August and the Monk of Capistrano on 23rd October. Although Pope Kalixt III. in
Rome all the bells ringing and inviting the cluistic princes to seize the opportunity and definitively expel
the Sultan from Europe, but the West contented himself with making it easier to celebrate and celebrate
the victory on the distant Danube. Hunyadi's death robbed Skanderbeg of his best ally in the Balkans, the
man with whom he had forged great offensive alliances against the Sultan in 1443 and 1448. When in the
same year 1456 Georg Brankovi6, that silly, but also hard-tested despot of Serbia, sank into the grave,
Mehmed 11 was allowed to rejoice: the most influential figures of Southeastern Europe besides
Skanderbeg were not many. But before the death of the Balkan princes Once again, the concentration of
Ottoman troops far from the Western Balkan uprising area would have given the Kastriota an excellent
opportunity to advance into the Vardartal or the Albanian south and to oppose the Ottomans in the
back. But what did Skanderbeg do that year? 14567 It was between his fingers, he lost himself in small-
scale feuds, caught in the play of the Italian powers. A look at the well-crafted details clearly shows the
limits of Skanderbeg's possibilities for action and his dependency on Naples. In the month of May he had
received 1,000 Neapolitan riders and 50 French Crusaders who had passed over the Adlia; on 8th May
further reinforcements from Naples arrived in Kruj a75. But a rumor had already circulated in April which
had shattered all plans of aggression Inachen had to: Stefan Vukci of Herzegovina had been put under
pressure by Mehmed H. and allegedly brought 200,000 men to Init, among them all Indian soldiers,
against Skanderbeg76. Far to the north, in Ofen, Cardinal Carvajal still hoped in May that Skanderbeg
would carry out a relief attack, with Crusaders, who allegedly crowded into Albania77. But instead of
rushing against the OSInans, the company
nelunen Skanderbegs into the pitfalls of the Neapolitan - Venetian intrigues. The opposition of the two
Italian powers was - more sharply than ever - also carried out in the Balkans. If Venice had Araniti and the
Thopia pulled on its side, then Alfons V won in May Peter Span, whose small rule in the mountains east of
Drivasto lay. He also continued his small-scale feud against Venetian subjects under the umbrella of
Naples. At the far south the king strengthened the vassal band Init the Zenebish, whom he especially
recommended to Skanderbeg (August 1456) 19. On June 19, 1456, the King encouraged his "dear
captain-in-chief and councilman" Skanderbeg, that he inquires with the well-informed troops "in the
service of our Lord, to do some things against the enemies" 80. Achievements come true, such a victory
over the renegade Moses of Dibra, who soon afterwards returned to the camp of the insurgents (April
1456) 81. On the other hand, the ospanian general Evrenosoglu Ali destroyed one of the two new coastal
castles of Kastriota. Thus King Alfonso V was soon forced to redesign the command structures of his
administration in Albania; In addition to the viceroy d'Oliafa, the monk Juan Claver (born June 19, 1456),
who died just a few months later, died as a special guest. So the army stepped on the spot. Responsible
for this seems to have been Stefan Vukcic, who, on behalf of the Sultan, "undertakes great machinations
in Albania in favor of the Turks, inviting and encouraging everyone to join the Turkish Emperor as the
most powerful lord in the world" 83. In fact, defectors also from the aristocracy weakened the ranks of
Skanderbeg, whose defeats were unforgotten and which had no great victory to make up for
them. Instead of warring the Ottomans, AlfonsV. Balkan satellites go to war against Venice; and since the
Signoria de Albanerhern1 had refused the annual allowance, this Venetian area attacked (August 1456)
84, while the Zenebish pressed the Venetian castle Butrint opposite Corfu (November 1456) 85. The
Venetians defeated Ali and occupied the cliffs of Himara86. When Skanderbeg demanded the right of
passage through northern Albania from the Republic of St. Mark, this was denied; in revenge the
Castriota plundered Durazzo and Skutari; the Signoria, for her part, considered Attacking the Neapolitan
Kruja 87 • In the midst of this Kleinlaieg came the news of Leka Dukagjin's raid on the Venetian
Dagno. This brought the Christian opponents to their senses. Abbot Pelinus of Rotezo availed himself of
this and established a standstill between Venice and Skanderbeg 88 in November 1456. He had been
trying desperately to attack the OSI agencies.
In view of the miserable outcome of the campaign, the achievements of the Zenebish in some of the
Schultz plots seemed to indicate that Pope Kalixt IH. gave them effusive praise, even compared them to
the initiates of Christ and renounced them to endure. • The Pope had sent a fleet to the east, but it had
little effect. Again, the rebels did not want to be happy about the winter break. Skanderbeg hoped that
despite two failures Alfonso V would also support him a third time with an expeditionary force. In January
1457, along with many other diplomats, "from various parts of Greece and also the Despot," 91 his envoy
stayed in Sansevero, where the King, after a game of hunting, arranged a splendid feast in a pavilion. On
23. In January, the larkardian ambassador had spoken to Skanderbeg's Elnissar, whose hen had just
survived a heavy ospersonal attack. "He said to his Majesty the 1st (King had promised to give him 1000
riders and 1000 foot slaves until the end of this year ... but I believe that these are only words." 93) The
diplomat did not deceive himself On April 11, 1457, Alfonso only allowed Skanderbeg to export cereals
from Puglia, and on April 19 issued a certificate of privilege to his castle town, Kruja, in which the
Kastriota was not mentioned with a single syllable. 94 Nevertheless, Skanderbeg's relation to Venice
improved, of course ViehnelTI did not need help against the OSlnans, but he needed the support of the
Albanian lord against Leka Dukagjin. At the same time, the Venetians were preparing an attack on the
Zenebish, Alfonso's vassals in the south, before95. Another year of internal struggles in the Albanian area
began in the spring of 1457. Again Venat was in the air; Hamza Kastriota had fled to the Sultan; Georg
Strez Balsi6 was conquered during a conspiracy and deported to southern Italy. 96 • Pope Kalixt
IH. drove again to calf against the East Indians; he wrote to the Bosnian king, ordered the delivery of
crusading money deposited in Ragusa, and allowed Franciscans to disperse into the Albanian
mountains.97 But he could not prevent the war between Venice and the Dukagjin in northern
Albania. Mehlned H., who was at peace in 1457, recognized the opportunity and ordered a large-scale
attack on Skanderbeg. The campaign was again led by a Venäter, Skanderbeg's nephew Hmnza
Kastriota, as well as de Ishak Pasha 98. In the face of the mighty army of the Ottomans, Skanderbeg was
only retreating into castles and mountains; from Naples came no help. Bila Kinnin took up the wife of the
Kastriota9 9; meanwhile the OSlnans advanced from Ochrid through Upper Dibra in the direction of the
great village of Rahovnik. They met
no resistance, inarched by Invenscheleere areas, because Skanderbeg had gone to the RaUlnAlessio,
probably in his castle Rodoni 10o. "He has been deserted by all his captains who have gone to the
Turks." He had therefore given Dibra and Mati Kalnpflos. The Ottomans broke through these landscapes,
penetrating into the innermost core of Skanderbeg's reign, led by the knowledgeable Hamza
Kastriota; even the Serbian chronicles tell of this disaster 102. Then they turned to the shore and
appeared on the 29th of July before Alessio, where they reduced the whole country to
ashes. Evrenosoglu Ali devastated one of the two coastal strongholds of the insurgents, arguably Rodoni
I 03. Skanderbeg fled to "save his" (op! reported the Venetian governor of Durazzo 104. In fact,
Skanderbeg moved into the highlands, the Neapolitans are entrenched in Kruja. The Albanian master
found himself in a desperate situation; he wrote Pope Kalixt IH., he was afraid that he would no longer be
able to withstand the ÜSlnanen; another messenger reported terrible devastation of the landscape and a
heavy defeat of Skanderbeg 106. The Olandische Dluck lasted throughout the summer. Skanderbeg
seemed in the end. Hamza was used by the Ottomans as a vassal prince in Mati l07. On August 2, 1457,
it was said in RoIn that the Ottomans stood in Albania with 60,000 men. The leaf turned; Inassive papal
money and naval aid was mobilized, but above all Skanderbeg had rejoined his followers. Both " to pull
his head out of the noose at the last moment; cornered, as the Ottomans learned, he was far more
dangerous than if he attacked himself. At the same time, the Venetians conquered Dagno and expelled
Leka Dukagjin into the mountains. The two K ... wars had taken place largely independently of each
other. Venice had supplied both fighting parties in central Albania; Durazzo played a dual role, as seven
years earlier in the addition of KIujas. When the Polish commander was bitter about the had been largely
independent of each other. Venice had supplied both fighting parties in central Albania; Durazzo played a
dual role, as seven years earlier in the addition of KIujas. When the Polish commander was bitter about
the had been largely independent of each other. Venice had supplied both fighting parties in central
Albania; Durazzo played a dual role, as seven years earlier in the addition of KIujas. When the Polish
commander was bitter about the
Supplies of supplies to Skanderbeg were denounced, and the Venetian Senate apologized that the
administration in Durazzo had been blackmailed by de Kastriota. Further south, the Venetians were
allowed to be content with the course of events: Simon Zenebish had changed sides again and assumed
the republic of St. Mark in November 1437. He did so out of fear of Evrenosoglu Ali, whom Alfonso V did
not want to protect him. Thus the Signoria emerged as the actual winner of the wars of the year 1457. Her
position became even stronger shortly thereafter. For in 1458, the insurgents became more dependent on
international politics. Two rulers who had actively supported Skanderbeg died in that year: Pope Kalixt
II1. and King Alfons V. The death of his fief gave the Kastriota a heavy blow. For the King of Aragon and
Naples had not only given him empty words, but sent Inehrfach Inassive troops across the Adriatic. A
continuation of this help but seemed impossible: The displaced by Alfons V of Naples Anjou saw the time
had come to regain their possessions. In 1458, a throne conflict broke out between Alfons' son Ferrante
and Rene of Anjou, which was to last for six long years. Naples departed as protection for the insurgents
117 • Luckier for Skanderbeg was the election of a new pope (August 19, 1458): HUInanistAeneas Silvius
Piccolomini had long expressed an interest in the Balkan Christians; he showed himself ready continue
the efforts of his predecessor Uln a large-scale crusade against Mehmed 11 - in the spring of 1458 papal
galleys crossed in the Adriatic, the still Kalixt IH. had sent out 118 - and to involve in this undertaking the
Christian masters on the hemus peninsula; finally, he placed himself on the side of Neapolitan throne
dispute Ferrantes l19. In the PiccolOlninipapst the Kastriota found its firmest support for the next six
years. But the death of the monarch also led to a certain relaxation in relation to Venice, which now
undisputedly dominated the Adriatic and no longer needed to fear any Neapolitan Ostpolitik. An
astonishing turn when Inan remembers that King Alfonso V had told the Venetian envoy Nicolo
Sagundino a few weeks before his death, Skanderbeg was about to invade Venetian - Albania with war,
and planned raids on Drivasto, Skutari and Antivari, whereupon the Venetians in Durazzo had arrested
alleged plotters arrested (spring 1458) 120. The Signoria desired rest in northern Albania and met Init at
the goals of Skanderbeg. Both wanted to make the Dukagjin sing to the Raison, which in the winter of
1458/59 also made peace. In the south, St. Mark's republic cleared the castles that ilu- Simon Zenebish
had just handed over, a step, mn Both wanted to make the Dukagjin a rally, which in the winter of 1458/59
also made peace. In the south, St. Mark's republic cleared the castles that ilu- Simon Zenebish had just
handed over, a step, mn Both wanted to make the Dukagjin a rally, which in the winter of 1458/59 also
made peace. In the south, St. Mark's republic cleared the castles that ilu- Simon Zenebish had just
handed over, a step, mn
To confuse involvements with the nations; the danger of intervention by the Aragonese was no longer
threatened (August 1458) 122. A few months after Alfonso's death, the Venetian senate had consolidated
its position in Albanian space without endangering peace with the sultan. Although the Kastriota had
defused the conflict in the north, but had to do without a large-scale anti-Venetian policy. A silent enmity
remained. To the east he was lucky that Mehlned 11th in 1458 led successful campaigns against the rest
of the Serbian despotate, which he subjugated to the capital Smederevo on the Danube, and against the
Byzantine Morea (Peloponnese). With Skanderbeg only a regional squad occupied, which moved to
Ochrid in the fall of 1458 a camp and made from there a rather hannlosen raid against the Mokra and the
castle Modric undertook. Skanderbeg and some of the sub-chiefs hid in the woods until the onset of
winter brought the Schanzützel to a standstill and a regional truce was negotiated. The return of Hamza
Kastriotas from the Neapolitan dungeon caused a stir; but the remnant cyclist feared the fate of a wife and
children who had been held hostage by Mehmed II. With Skanderbeg's help, he feigned an escape to the
sultan; but he did not succeed in returning to Albania with his fatnil; on the contrary, Skanderbeg's closest
companion died in the fall of 1443 at the Sultanshof; Geliichte wanted to know that he had been
poisoned. While the Orthodox princes of Serbia and the Morea were facing their doom, Skanderbeg still
hoped that aid from Southeastern Europe would kill itself. In the autumn of 1458, the young Hungarian
King Matthias Corvinus first followed in the footsteps of his father Johann Hunyadi and defeated the
Ottomans at his imperial border. Pope Kalixt IH. He had warned him on his accession to the throne in a
letter on March 14, 1458, to continue the work of Hunyadi, referring expressly to our dear son, the
foremost Mr. Skanderbeg in Albania. (166 Matthias immediately responded to this request; Nominally
Hungarian Dubrovnik as a hub In February 1459, Corvinus's envoy, the Serbian stupko from Belgrade,
traveled to Skanderbeg, the contents of which are unknown; On 24 February, the Ragusan senate merely
wrote to his chief superior that the diplomat had set sail on a Dubrovnik ship to Albania. A month and a
half later the king made an energetic dearche in Venice in favor of Skanderbeg, who had evidently
complained of the hostility of the Signoria. Next, the king demanded the Republic 11
Inöge involve the Kastriota in a peace init de sultan. Although the Senate promised no help in the Turkish
war, it was prepared to settle any disputes through negotiations, as the Venetians explained to the
Hungarian ambassador that this had just happened. Skanderbeg had found in Matthias Corvinus a new, if
femen, protector, who put in a good word for him in Italy. Matthias, for his part, sought to protect his
southern border; a strengthening of Skanderbegs kaln ihin thereby. He did not want to make any real help
for the troops, as he was unable to prevent anyone from invariably being able to name Sinederevo
without a stroke of the sword on June 20, 1459, and thus definitively eliminate the Serbian despot. The
Sultan troops were again threatening Belgrade. The end of the Brankovic shook the Balkans. In the year
1460 the blind despot Stefan Brankovic appeared as a refugee at Skanderbeg l30; The two of them would
have known each other from the old days at the court of Murad H. That Stefan just sought refuge in the
Kastriota, given the probable kinship - and the assumed as well. Witnessing a crown prince murder of
1443 - little surprise. The Kastriota took the fallen Prince and married him with his sister-in-law Angelina,
the daughter Araniti Kominos; the Orthodox nobles in the Balkans also relied on necessity
131. Skanderbeg, however, also received a short introduction on the consequences of the Serbian
downfall. Shortly after the fall of Smederevos, Evrenosoglu Ali attacked the insurgents (Solner 1459) and
caused them so much affliction that Skanderbeg considered peace negotiations. Corvinus' intervention in
Venice and the pope's fears bear witness to this war-weariness 132. The Sultan also dealt a blow to the
Venetians, who had previously provided the Kastriota with life-in- content. Scanderbeg's distress was also
shown by the fact that he had to deduct considerable sums from his deposit in Ragusa. The lack of
special help made itself slackly treatable. Dubrovnik, in which Sultan tribute squeezed off, refused to help
the insurgents 135. Towards the end of the Jam-1459 it became apparent that neither the Sultan nor
Skanderbeg believed in a short-term decision in the field. Mehini H. planned the definitive subjugation of
the Peloponnese and the Trebizond kingdom on the East Anatolian Black Sea coast, and Skanderbeg
urgently needed a break in his studio, as it became clear that Pope Pius H., who wanted to give support
to the insurgents, was involved in his efforts To win rulers for these companies,
not from the place kain. The Kastriota, who did not trust Venice, then decided to intervene on the side of F
errantes in the Neapolitan throne dispute, probably in the hope that in a victory of Alfonso son would be
again ships with troops and supplies from Apulia on the Adriatic coast.
ITALIAN JOURNEY every year of the uprising Skanderbeg's rule had approached the West. His cries for
help sounded at first only to the Adriatic Raul, but since the performance of his vassalage, his feudal lord
Alfonso V. had gained him greater prominence by promoting embassies of the Kastriota to the courts of
Milan and Burgundy. Skanderbeg's emissaries were gradually becoming a familiar sight in the council
chambers and law offices of the major southern and western European states. Still, no one could really
get a clearer idea of the Balkan nobleman who fought off Ottoman attacks on the Adriatic beyond year
after year. Skanderbeg had only paid a visit to Dubrovnik; his other travel plans to the west had not been
realized. This was to change in the fall of 1461 as Skanderbeg crossed the sea to assist King Ferrante in
the struggle for the throne. He thus entered the political stage of Renaissance Italy, whose diplomats and
publicists followed the wrestling of Uln, Lower Italy, with the utmost reverence. For half the year he spent
in Italy (around September 1461 to early February 1462), the historian Skanderbeg comes closer than
ever before. The tradition is becoming denser, not just year after year, but soon, half and quarterly, then
almost every day can be traced his ways and actions. Much of his later ruin has been promoted by this
journey, because only then did the political and intellectual elite of the Apeninnenhalbinsel get their own
picture of this man. He was closely watched especially by the Milanese diplomats in HofFerrantes. This
opens up insights into Skanderbeg's character, but also into the mentality differences between your
Albanian lord and the princes of the Italian Ren8: issance. When Skanderbeg translated to Puglia, King
Ferrante, a man regarded as one of the dark figures of Renaissance Italy since Jacob Burckhardt's
description, was in a difficult position. Rene of Anjou, Titular King of Jerusalem, Duke of Anjou, Lorraine
and Bar, Earl of Maine and Provence (1409-1480), had as representatives of his house a man who has
been considered one of the dark figures of Renaissance Italy since Jacob Burckhardt's description, in a
difficult position. Rene of Anjou, Titular King of Jerusalem, Duke of Anjou, Lorraine and Bar, Earl of Maine
and Provence (1409-1480), had as representatives of his house a man who has been considered one of
the dark figures of Renaissance Italy since Jacob Burckhardt's description, in a difficult position. Rene of
Anjou, Titular King of Jerusalem, Duke of Anjou, Lorraine and Bar, Earl of Maine and Provence (1409-
1480), had as representatives of his house
sent his son Johann (1424-1470) to southern Italy with one army. Ferrante's position was immediately
shaken, especially when the mercenary leader Jacopo Piccinino moved to the Anjou camp and there was
an uprising of important noblemen, the so-called conspiracy of the barons. Giovanni Antonio de Balzo
Orsini, Prince of Taranto, emerged as the most eminent ally of the Angevin. The war continued that
century-old struggle for southern Italy, which had begun with the fall of the Staufer (1266/68). Francesco
Sforza of Milan, who feared France's intervention in his 100-billion-state state, sided with Ferrante. His
nephew Alessandro Sforza, Lord of Pesaro since 1445, was to intervene as warlord in the war. Venice
stayed in the background, However, his feelings towards the Aragonese were not friendly. Florence held it
more because of its French trade interests with the Anjou, while the Spa'n Pope Kalixt IH. and his Italian
successor Pius H. Ferrante supported 136. This soon lost large parts of his kingdom, and on July 27,
1460, 1st Piccinino in the Abruzzo Alessandro Sforza. Skanderbeg did not hide all this; the Apulian coast
was just outside his front door, and news of the theater of war would have reached Albania in large
numbers. And so he made the decision to help the son of Alfonso V. to help. This turned out to be
anything but easy. For Skanderbeg first had to defend himself against Ottoman attacks1, then he had the
transfer of a ' whole army to Apulia, a novel challenge for a nobleman who had previously been at war
only on land. Both, truce luations Meluued II and preparations for a troop transport to Puglia, he took in
SOlumer 1460 in the hand. He developed an extensive diplomatic activity. Alu June 9, 1460, his envoy
appeared before the Council of Ragusa and asked UlU assistance in crossing to Apulia. Skanderbeg thus
did not approach Venice, which pursued its own interests in Italian politics, but also the Blasius Republic,
which had close economic ties with the Aragonese. 13 7 • The ruler Martin Muzaki traveled to Rome at
the same time and opened Pope Pius 11th Skanderbegs Italy plans from which the Pope promptly
informed King Ferrante (18. June 1460) 138. Muzaki had also set out Skanderbeg's motives. Pius wrote
to the beleaguered monarch: "The messenger of our beloved Son, the noble Mr. Georg Kastriota, your
subject, has expressed his desire ... to translate in your defense into the Kingdom of Naples, thankfully
remembering the merits of your father and also of you However, we believe that his life will be of great
use to your interests, not only because of the loyalty for which he is thankfully remembering the merits of
your father and also of you ihwl. But we believe that his love will be of great use to your interests, not only
because of the faithfulness for which he is thankfully remembering the merits of your father and also of
you ihwl. But we believe that his love will be of great use to your interests, not only because of the
faithfulness for which he is
through Serbia and the territory of Duke Stefan of Bosnia (Stefan VukCic, p.S) against Durazzo, and from
there to Rome. "12 Under these circumstances Skanderbeg was unable to leave Albania, so he decided
to leave an advance troop under the Command of his nephew Constantine to send. On September 17,
1460, Constantine landed in the Apulian ports of Barletta and Trani, "a handsome young man of 22 to 23
years, in 1111, two ships with crew and horses, a fine troop of noble horses", as the knight Jacopo
Perpinia King reported in l43. The captain of the castle of Trani, Giovanni Antonio de F oxa, and other
dignitaries gave an honorable reception and assigned the Albanians, who had brought 450 horses, to
their quarters. The war for the crown of Naples was fought with quite small armies; in many battles just
about a hundred horsemen participate in it, in addition to 400 to 600 men infantry; Ferrante's entire army
was estimated by a Mantuan ambassador to be 7,000. Konstantin's 450 mounted riders, even if they were
not armored cavalrymen, postponed the balance of power. In the war of movement of the Renaissance
fast riding operations were of considerable importance. And this worried the Anjou. They tried to prevent
Skanderbeg from further intervention. They did so in propaganda intention by a letter from the Prince of
Taranto to the Albanian. There was a correspondence that made all of Italy sit up and proved that
Skanderbeg had grown in a very special way with the diplomatic arts of the Italian aristocracy. The
epistles are known from copies that were sent to the Sforza's archive in 147, but then through a
sharpened summary in the famous history of Pope Pius' H., the "Cementariari." More detailed, however,
are the actual writings: The Prince of Taranto, in his letter issued on October 10, 1460, showed the
following to Kastriota; when he heard Skanderbeg The Prince of Taranto, in his letter of October 10, 1460,
showed the following to Kastriota; when he heard Skanderbeg The Prince of Taranto, in his letter of
October 10, 1460, showed the following to Kastriota; when he heard Skanderbeg
"Don Fenando" - the king's title denied the prince of the Aragonese - offered to bring men to Apulia on
Aragonese galleys and to pillage Brindisi and other areas, he had at first hardly wanted to believe this; but
now Skanderbeg's horsemen and infantry had in fact damaged the lands of King Rene and his own in
Puglia, which greatly astonished him, since King Rene Skanderbeg would never have done anything
wrong; Skanderbeg states that, in memory of the King of Aragorn, the title of King of Naples is again
denied - but he should bear in mind that the King of Franlaeich, numerous other Catholic princes, and
almost all the nobles and unbelievers of the kingdom, oppose this Lord "(meaning Fenante), and that he
and his Albanians" Don F errando " to help kauln enough, but certainly not to harm such inhuman
henen; he should, therefore, refrain from his enterprise, and conclude Init de Duke of Calabria, deputy
king Renes, a peace which should not be his harm. But if he still wished to go to war, he should do so
against the Turks, against whom he could merit fame, rather than a war in which he was barred by
advantages, but only dangers. 148 This skilful mixture of threat and courting was done by Skanderbeg On
October 31st, one of the letters sent out in Kruja, which likewise became very popular in Italy. Point by
point, the Albanian responded to the argument of his adversary. At first he informed the Prince lnit, his
writing and his tone would have astonished him as annoyed; but then: yes, he told the king of the news of
the rebellion - so Skanderbeg offered to help at the beginning of the legitimacy of Fenantes Henschaft -
help; He never reminded King Alfonso V and his vassals without tears, always with the advice, support,
favor, and sacred works of this Angelic King, who saved me and my vassals from oppression and cruel
hands if he did not intervene, the Ottomans would threaten the kingdom on the one hand, and, above all,
he would expose himself to a vile accusation of perfidy and immorality; For the preservation of faith and
faith, he had already put his life on the line many times without hesitation; He particularly proudly rejected
the Prince's threat to the power of France: "I do not recognize him (the King of France) and I do not want
to recognize him, but only see him as an enemy, one thing I say to you: I believe that we Christians in
baptism are all the same, but the unbelievers respect and fear only the glorious banners of the house
Arag6n, for which I want to die ".
Portrait of Skanderbeg from the 16th century, anonymous. - Library of the Albania Institute Munich.
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In the highlands of the Dukagjin, the rival of Skanderbeg in the northern Albanian mountains.
The pass road from Mari to Dibra, connecting Z'Nischen in the core areas of the uprising.
View of Dagno (today: Vau e Dejes) and the beginning of the caravan route from the north Albanian
coastal plain to Prizren on the Amselfeld.
The mountain of KodiadZik at DebarlDibra in what is now Western Macedonia: ruined castle or bare
rock?
Built by Dubrovnik architects Rodoni, the actual main castle Skanderbegs on the Adriatic.
The "White Stone", Bila Kamin (today: Guri i bardhe), Skanderbeg's most important castle in Mati (central
Albania), was conquered on a barely accessible mountain spur in 1467 by Sultan Mehmed 11.
The mountainous area of the Mokra (in today's Border area of Albania and Makedonicn).
The castle rock of Stel1ush in Mati, a typical escape castle Skanderbegs in Central Albania. After
Skanderbeg's defeat, his decades-long personal enemy HIZIT received the castle as a fief.
Ochrid: the church of Sveri Jovan Kaneo and the view of the north shore of the lake, scene of skirmishing
skirmishes against local Ottoman forces.
The Ottoman bridge of Skopje, the most important army camp of the Sultan in the central Balkans.
The castle of Berat, where the army of insurgents in the summer of 1455 suffered a crushing defeat
against the Ottomans.
Drivasto at the entrance to the northern Albanian mountains was in a long feud with the northern Albanian
nobility for pastureland and stubbornly resisted Skanderbeg. The city was completely destroyed by the
Ottomans in 1478.
Before Antivari Skanderbeg and his Serbian and Montenegrin allies suffered in the summer of 1448 a
heavy defeat against Venice.
The Venetian port fortress Dulcigno served Skanderbeg's wife Andronika probably 1467 as a refuge from
the Ottomans.
The helmet attributed to Skanderbeg in the Vienna Hunting and Armory; the lower part is a forgery of the
16th century.
GJt ··
Then Skanderbeg made a devastating judgment when he compared the prince to old women, who
became prostitutes, and with sweet words drew others into their trade-so have the prince! the barons and
the subjects like sheep led to the slaughter. Concerning the Ottoman danger, he replied: "Consider how
much the Greater Turk exceeds yours and the one of the Lord you serve, as I have only remained with
the city of Krljah, which today belongs to the house Aragna and his Your Majesty heard, and I besieged
Wal ~ defended and shielded it against a formidable one
Power until the Turks withdrew in disgrace and then with a small team I regained in a short time what
many enemies had conquered in a long time. "All the more he could hope for the rebuilding of Ferrante's
cause Briefes is Skanderbeg's proud interpretation of Albanian history: "And because you say that I can
not help him enough with Albanians (Ferrante), defend him, do not harm his powerful enemies, I answer
you that ... if our chronicles do not lie, we call ourselves epirotes. And you must take note that at different
times our predecessors have come to the land (lower Italy) that you now possess, and have fought great
battles with the RÖI71, and that we find (in) that they have borne more glory than shame. "He also
contemptuously struck down the prince's advice that he might gain more fame against the Ottomans:" I do
not want advice from you or an urgency; We have not sent our people to return quickly, but to serve King
Ferrante until the restoration of his kingdom, and it is such men who, if necessary, will gladly die in the
service of His Majesty "; He says that he has enough men to fill the whole depopulated Puglia with people
again. "We can not deny the closeness of the Turks you allude to, for we have fought with them for many
years without them Shame, as everyone knows ". But now he has closed a deadlock of three years to
obey the orders of his king. Skanderbeg concluded the letter with the request that the prince should leave
the kingdom alone and fight against the Ottomans, but not against his master. In his "Commentarii" Pope
Pius IL intensified the dramaturgy, basing himself entirely on that against Skanderbeg Accusation of
cowardice concentrated: He puts an insult in the mouth of the Prince of Taranto, which he had never
uttered. The prince, according to Pius, had mockingly called the Albanian lord, who probably meant to
fight against effeminate Turks and warlike Greeks in Italy. "We know your full The the prince should leave
the kingdom alone and fight against the Ottomans, but not against his master. In his Commentarii, Pope
Pius II intensifies the dramaturgy by concentrating entirely on the reproach of cowardice against
Skanderbeg An insult to the Tarentum's mouth, which the latter had never uttered. The prince, according
to Pius, had mockingly called the Albanian lord, who probably meant to fight against effeminate Turks and
warlike Greeks in Italy. "We know your full The the prince should leave the kingdom alone and fight
against the Ottomans, but not against his master. In his Commentarii, Pope Pius II intensifies the
dramaturgy by concentrating entirely on the reproach of cowardice against Skanderbeg An insult to the
Tarentum's mouth, which the latter had never uttered. The prince, according to Pius, had mockingly called
the Albanian lord, who probably meant to fight against effeminate Turks and warlike Greeks in Italy. "We
know your full The He puts an insult in the mouth of the Prince of Taranto, which he never said so. The
prince, according to Pius, had mockingly called the Albanian lord, who probably meant to fight against
effeminate Turks and warlike Greeks in Italy. "We know your full The He puts an insult in the mouth of the
Prince of Taranto, which he never said so. The prince, according to Pius, had mockingly called the
Albanian lord, who probably meant to fight against effeminate Turks and warlike Greeks in Italy. "We
know your full The
Albanians we consider sheep ... You ran away from the onslaught of the Turks. and you can not protect
your own house. If you wanted to break into someone else's, too. "150 Pius H. also decorated
Skanderbeg's answer in a rhetorical and papal sense: the prince was a traitor, after all he was not
forgiven, but the pope forgive the kingdom - Pius Ir The feudal domination of the papacy over the kingdom
of Naples, of which Skanderbeg says in no way in his letter: "You are no better than the Turk, though you
are baptized," throws Pius' Ir, Skanderbeg in the face of the prince; He had always seen Arag6n's yellow
banners on the oceans in battle against the Ottomans, but never the French lilies. This powerful letter -
and its design by contemporary humanists - helped Skanderbeg to great fame. It may be assumed that
the then Archbishop of Durazzo, Paul Angelus, had led the pen to his master. It is a masterpiece of
psychological warfare, but also one of the few documents of political thought in Christian
Albania. Skanderbeg presented himself as a devout Christian, as a fighter against the Sultan and as a
faithful follower of the Aragonese. He emphasized knightly virtues such as loyalty, faith and gratitude. And
he used ancient history as an argument in reminding the Prince of Taranto that Pyrrhus of Epirus had
once achieved great victories against the Romans in southern Italy. Skanderbeg's rhetoric thus fit into the
antiquarian political language of humanist Italy; It suggests the program that was to develop a few years
later: the embedding of the uprising in the tradition of great rulers of the ancient Balkans. Skanderbeg saw
himself as the successor to Alexander the Great and Pyrrhus, both of which had roots in Epirus. The
Balkan knight and the Pope-prized pioneers of Christianity now included the antique cult of the
Renaissance in his political thinking. With considerable skill the Kastriota appeared in Italy as a symbol of
the vassal fidelity. On October 31, 1461, he gave the king a copy of the correspondence with the prince,
and once again made a pledge of faith: "God bless your majesty from evil, from harm and danger." And
then he summed up his ideal in these words: "I will always be a friend of virtue and not of Fortune"
152; he would like to die in the service of the king. The Milanese ambassador to the Neapolitan court,
Antonio da Trezzo, witnessed the audience which Skanderbeg's ambassador received from Ferrante on
June 12, 1461. "" Furthermore, here is an envoy of Skanderbeg
Letter to His Majesty the King has arrived; After their presentation, he elaborated (the content) of the
legation: that said Hen-Skanderbeg, since he had submitted to this house of Arag6n, both from the
affection that he brings him to this, as well as the benefits and the help which the During his lifetime, King
Alfons had proved that he had a great desire to pay a visit to the most fortunate memory of King Alfonso,
and that he would have wanted to do so if the time had come, and he also wanted to visit this present
king he would have liked to have come in peaceful times; but as fate does not want the king to live in
peace, he does not wish to come any less in these times, because if he had come in times of peace, one
might have thought
had come to the service of the king; but when he comes now, in the present state of things in the
kingdom, one understands that he is coming to do what he has always wished to do, to lend his Majesty
all possible help and support, and indeed he (the Envoy, OS), that he, the Lord Skanderbeg, in order to
fulfill his desire, had concluded a standstill with the Turk for six months and he offered himself in that time
for the benefit of the king with 1000 horsemen and 2,000 infantry men or Archers who would be sold at
their own expense, in addition to the crew already in Apulia; and if His Majesty wanted him to come with
more men, he would come with more; and he also said he was the one. Boats ready to cross, every
time In a letter dated October 26, 1461, he called him his "dearest brother," his "cordial and good
brother," and praised the following of Skanderbeg, "so many handsome and useful men, ammunition, and
Von-at." Respectfully, he countered Skanderbeg's attitude: there could be no greater sign of loyalty and
fondest affection for the king than of his own land.
leave and help him. Skanderbeg earned immortal thanks; The king's cause had taken a fortunate turn by
the horror that Skanderbeg had spread. Sasza was a close ally of Ferrante, but he evidently felt more
than an interest in a temporary ally to Skanderbeg. He respected the man who put off his own interests to
come to the aid of the son of his late feudal lord. This behavior was in contrast to the political thinking of
Renaissance Italy. Added to this was the impression that Skanderbeg left behind in the battle. The
historian Sabellico reports that his father, who had participated in the Neapolitan war, told him how
Skanderbeg, with his arms bare, Skanderbeg's fame is essentially explained by this personal encounter
with the Italian elite, with a drawn sword at the head of 600 horsemen. Through his Italian journey, he
became a hero of the Renaissance. Against this background, the actual events of the war almost seem to
fade in their everyday life. For Skanderbeg could by no means immediately translate to Apulia; the
Ottomans threatened Herzegovina, Stefan Vukci6 warned against an attack on Dalmatia and Albania. 158
Rather, it took almost a full year from the time of the major missive to the actual arrival of Skanderbeg in
southern Italy (October 1460, September 1461). For the time being, Skanderbeg's nephew Constantine
fought in the rich, fertile plains of Aplolia; he did this in a well-tried way, who, with these funds, lent their
condottiere Piccinino 161. Konstantin's men must have felt in their element: The coup on rich flocks of
sheep will have reminded them of the raids in the Macedonian Polog. In the long term, this victory should
benefit Ferrante, but in the short term his situation was still unfavorable. Skanderbeg was therefore firmly
decided to appear in person in the theater of war. In the spring of 1461 he negotiated with Mehmed
Ir. about a standstill, with Ragusa about a sanctuary, with Pius Ir. over money assistance and in June
1461, as described above, his envoy stepped before King Ferrante. By the middle of the month the
standstill with Mehmed II had been agreed - the price paid by the Empire of Trebizond, which in the same
summer, more than a quarter of a millennium after his Reason, was conquered. Skanderbeg was,
however, busy with the erection and shipment of his army; He pulled together around 3000 men whom he
had to drive up to Ragusa. There his negotiators endeavored to obtain enough shipping space for the
passage. In Italy they paid great attention to these armours. King Ferrante was waiting impatiently for
Albanian help. Hasty, Skanderbeg's arrival was reported; but the march dragged on, probably also
because Skanderbeg wanted to supply his men themselves and therefore had large quantities of their
own cereals available, but also because it was not possible to sail on ships. At the end of August
Skanderbeg and his army arrived in Ragusa: In Contrary to his desperate visit after the siege of Krujas,
he now hailed into Blasiusstadt. The Ragusan patricians gladly opened the gates for him, because on the
one hand they wished F errant victory, on the other hand they had just "out of fear of the Turks" The
councilors had therefore made sure at an early stage that the Albanian lord would also receive due
consideration. (17 August 1461) 167 A separate committee of the patricians Paladino de Lucarisl
Lukarevi6, Paul de Pozza / Pucic and Nicola de PalmotaJPalmotic, was set up to "honor and entertain the
famous Mr. Skanderbeg, who is said to be coming soon to Ragusa" 168 The House of the Patrician
Junius de GradilGradic was prepared as accommodation Skanderbegs l69. Chancellor Davide Boccaccio
gave a welcome speech in which he took up the motif of Alexander and Pyrrhus; Rider games were
organized. In 70 Ragusa, Skanderbeg also met Ferrante's ambassador Perpinia; both sat down at the
council for the release of the murderer Nikolaus Rusinovic; the backgrounds are unclear. While the sound
of the festival was ringing in the streets, negotiations were being conducted in the Rector's Palace:
Ragusa sold Skanderbeg Biscotti (hard-baked bread) to supply the followers. In addition, Skanderbeg
was given the money earmarked for the crusade. For too long Skanderbeg did not stay in the city. He
knew that Ferrante was waiting "hourly" for him. In Italy, it was assumed that Skanderbeg and also with
auxiliary. While the sound of the festival was ringing in the streets, negotiations were being conducted in
the Rector's Palace: Ragusa sold Skanderbeg Biscotti (hard-baked bread) to supply the followers. In
addition, Skanderbeg was given the money earmarked for the crusade. For too long Skanderbeg did not
stay in the city. He knew that Ferrante was waiting "hourly" for him. In Italy, it was assumed that
Skanderbeg and also with auxiliary. While the sound of the festival was ringing in the streets, negotiations
were being conducted in the Rector's Palace: Ragusa sold Skanderbeg Biscotti (hard-baked bread) to
supply the followers. In addition, Skanderbeg was given the money earmarked for the crusade. For too
long Skanderbeg did not stay in the city. He knew that Ferrante was waiting "hourly" for him. In Italy, it
was assumed that Skanderbeg and also with auxiliary.
troops approaching Alessandro Sforza would turn the tide in favor of F errantes l7 '. After Barletius, the
Archbishop of Durazzo, Paul Angelus, celebrated a solemn service. In his prayer, Skanderbeg is said to
have invoked in particular the Archangel Michael, the patron saint of Gargano. 176 The scholarly
Skanderbegbiographer failed to make a comparison with the Byzantine general Belisarius, who landed in
535 at the behest of Justinian 1 in southern Italy against the Ostrogoths Wari? '. The crossing finally took
place in two sections. On August 26, 1461 Gojko Balsi went ashore with 1500 men on foot and 500
horsemen in Barletta, where King Ferrante was besieged l78; on September 3, Skanderbeg with another
500 mounted and 100 archers already in Baroli aufl79. The Italian campaign had begun. Probably on the
news of Skanderbeg's nearness, but also because of the approach of Alessandro Sforza, Jacopo
Piccinino and the Prince of Taranto had withdrawn to a safe position eight miles from Barletta in the
vineyards of Andria. Skanderbeg was received honorably by the king; in fact, his mere arrival had already
improved the position of the monarch. While the relieved King left Barletta, Skanderbeg and Alfonso di
Davalos were left behind (10.19.1961). 181 Shortly thereafter, the Albanian's first sensational act came:
Alvise Minutolo, Lord of the well-fortified hilltop on Mount S. Angelo captured (early October); Skanderbeg
wanted to slay him, according to his custom, whereupon the intimidated nobleman called to his wife and
children in the castle, they wanted to surrender. So a key position came into Ferrante's hands. The king
will not have forgotten this weapon act because three years later he gave the castle Skanderbeg as a
fief. Francesco Sforza congratulated the King and Queen Isabella on the turn of fortune in a letter of
September 12, 1461. Skanderbeg was on everyone's lips; Isabella mentioned this in her reply to the Duke
of September 14, 1461. Skanderbeg was then in Barletta, Davalos had entered Andria, Pirro dei Balzo,
Duke of Venosa, in Minervino; Alessandro Sforza had not arrived yet. At the same time, a ship from
Pesaro to Venice brought news of a success by Skanderbeg against the Condottiere Piccinino; but here
was the wish father of the thought 18 '. For the moment did not do much. Careful tactics, the shifting of
one unit, war as a game of chess. At the beginning of October, Skanderbeg showed himself more active:
While flags of the Anjou remained with Ascoli, the Albanian lord withdrew against the Duke of
Taranto; what he had threatened by letter, he now put into action; he was supported with funds from the
Count of San Severino 184 on October 4, 1461 he put into action now; he was supported with funds from
the Count of San Severino 184 on October 4, 1461 he put into action now; he was supported with funds
from the Count of San Severino 184 on October 4, 1461
The king bore him to supervise the penitent rebel Marino Caracciolo, Count of S. Angelo, together with
the Duke of Andria and Alfonso di Davalos. In Italy they looked with interest at these slow shifts in the
balance of power. In addition to Skanderbeg and Sforza another commander came on the scene,
Federico von Montefeltro, Lord of Urbino '86 Pope Pius Ir. advocated a swift attack Ferrantes on the
Anjou in Apulia '87 Throughout October, from his bases at Barletta and Andria Skanderbeg pressed
together with Davalos the Prince of Taranto, such as at Altamura; At the same time Ferrantes
commanders advanced in Calabria and subdued the area of Cosenza, including Castrovillari l88- a
landscape, in the soon Albanian refugees from the Balkans should flow. In late October, in Venice, the
news of a defeat of Skanderbeg against the prince around l89 But this was not confirmed. For the prince,
as announced on the 26th of October, asked Skanderbeg for peace; the Albanian lord passed on this
request to Ferrante, who, however, gave the prince "little faith." 90 Slowly Skanderbeg penetrated into the
land of the prince, and drew some nobles, such as the Duke of San Marco and the Count of San
Severino, with him , On October 27, Skanderbeg reported, among other things, the conquest of Gisualdo
l92 Shortly before November 19, he rode into the camp Ferrantes and soon gave a sample of his
thinking. According to the report of the Milanese ambassador da Trezzo, he left Count J.
that he will see who will have the tougher head; and tell him that in every way I try to drive him away from
the mountain where he is. "193 This is one of the very few quotations from Skanderbeg's mouth, the
genuineness of which can scarcely be doubted, and the messenger will have experienced the scene
himself Skanderbeg, then a man of his mid-fifties, appears full of belligerence, chivalrously challenging his
adversary, and in early December he gave further examples of his martial arts, which inspired the
Aragon-friendly sections of the Italian elite, once by escaping an ambush when he arrested the apostate
captain of Trani, Giovanni Antonio de Foxa, a prank that delighted the diplomats: Pope Pius Ir.,
Ambassador da Trezzo, and Mantuan diplomat B. Bonatto l94 and Queen Isabella of Naples. First, the
story of the papal historian: Foxa had conspired with Piccinino and others, Skanderbeg by a ruse
to get in the hand. Graf Piccinino invited Skanderbeg in false friendship to himself and assured him safe
passage. Both met halfway, accompanied by two followers each. Skanderbeg accused the count of
betraying the king and the dynasty he had long served; Piccinino made excuses. He spoke of the
ingratitude of the king, and as he defended himself, he moved slowly, step by step, in the direction where
his men waited. Suddenly he made a sign, but Skanderbeg was faster and escaped to his followers! 95
Soon afterwards, the second incident occurred: Foxa damaged from Trani on land and on water F errant
interests. Skanderbeg then offered the king to get rid of the traitor. Skanderbeg rode against Trani and
met Foxa there, which was accompanied by 16 horsemen, together, ostensibly for a conversation. The
Albanian lord saw Foxa sitting on a fast horse and resorted to a ruse: "He pretended to freeze him, and
he said he wanted to get off the horse and take a few steps on foot to warm up, and so did After a long
conversation, he said to Foxa that it was not good for him to live (Foxa, O. S,) by hounding Barletta, and
that all this was a pity for the king, that she was the enemy, not the enemy He wanted to harm his friends,
and he encouraged him to break the deadlock he had made with the prince (Taranto, p. S). But he seems
to have answered that the king owe him several thousand ducats and that he, until the king has not paid,
remember to live in his own way, and that if he does not pay, he (money) will get it by other means. Then
Skanderbeg said: "Since you do not obey the king's will," said he, seizing him by the breast, and so all
who were with him were taken prisoner and led to Andria. "96: How Skanderbeg often proceeded against
the Ottomans This is described by the report of a Milanese diplomat, with no contemporary source
describing these acts in the mountains of the Balkans, but here the Milanese da Trezzo delights in the
skilful prank, as does Queen Isabella, Francesco Sforza The episodes also show how Skanderbeg was
valued in Renaissance Italy: as a man who faithfully represented the cause of his Lord, in every
conversation the rebels moved to repentance, who was always vigilant and did not even cunning taletics
like Piccinino and F oxa get into the net. This positive Skanderbeg image did not go back to invention and
exaggeration: Rather, the Kastriota impressed his Italian stand enjoyed by his straightforwardness and his
literally gripping nature. Skanderbeg's cunning regained the King Trani, whose deputy captain hastened
to raise the Aragonese flag. The castriota continued to raise the Aragonese flag. The castriota
continued to raise the Aragonese flag. The castriota continued
as commander a Catalan, who had wife and children in Albania; Albanian warriors moved in the
castle. This aroused the suspicion of Ferrante, who, however, did not dare to demand the oath of
allegiance until November of 1463. The episode also shows how much the Neapolitan throne struggle
disintegrated into individual actions in which only a few men were involved. The guerrilla war
continued. After weeks of plundering into enemy territory, Skanderbeg and the Aragonese partisans
accompanying him united their troops with the army of Alessandro Sforza (December 13, 1461). 199 Graf
Piccinino had gone north, where he joined 200 men of Sigismondo Malatesta of Rimini, like Montefeltro
one of the known condottiere of the time, 200 Skanderbeg, this type of warfare must have seemed almost
restful; a few pranks, hardly any losses, war as a noble play, comparable to a hunt. Ferrante showed him
great honors. In a deed dated January 18, 1462 Skanderbeg was called "Lieutenant-General of the King
in Apulia" 20I. But this recovery took only a short time. Mehmed II had returned victorious from eastern
Asia Minor, and the evidence was growing that he would break the deadlock. Skanderbeg decided in
January 1462 for a quick departure home. The journey was supposed to be over Ragusa again. The local
council was deeply impressed by Skanderbeg's Italian fame and hastened to prepare a fitting
reception, which was to be more splendid than in the autumn of 1461. For Skanderbeg's horses a state
ship was provided (February 1, 1462) 202 The route on Ragusan territory was determined; Skanderbeg
was to receive free passage from Konavlje / Canali to Cavtat; and he would be led from Ragusa by the
deputy count of Breno with the men of Zupa (Bezibis to Cavtat, where the governor received him and with
100 men, including at least three patricians, to the border of the city republic situated farther south (Deut
On the following day the Council changed plans, Skanderbeg was to travel in the company of three
patricians as far as Lustica or Budua, in Venetian territory, where he could then go ashore.40 Shortly
afterwards Skanderbeg arrived in Ragusa; he had left most of his men behind in Apulia. in the
Blasiusstadt he pressed for immediate onward journey, but bad weather prevailed. The Ragusan Council
made provision for the food; in Cavtat enough stock should be put on the market; otherwise Biscotti would
be sent from the capital20 '. While the winter storms, the Bora, were raging, on 9 February 1462 the
councilors informed Skanderbeg of developments in the Balkans. Was just one On February 9, 1462, the
councilors informed Skanderbeg of developments in the Balkans. Was just one On February 9, 1462, the
councilors informed Skanderbeg of developments in the Balkans. Was just one
Ragusan ambassador returned from the gate207 Two days later, Skanderbeg requested the release of
five men who had been captured in Ragusan waters20 '. In addition, the Ragusans will have negotiated
the lease of Skanderbegs duties, with success, as proved in the spring of 209. With disquiet Skanderbeg
will have heard the news; Stefan VukCi6 planned an attack on the castle Klis behind Split, but above all
rumors about mighty armor Mehmeds against Bosnien and Skanderbeg um2! O. Perhaps Skanderbeg
still met the envoy his rival Leka Dukagjin had sent to Ragusa (February 26, 1462). 21l It is not known
when the kastriota returned to his homeland. The Ragusan council books, however, show that he was still
caring for his returning retinue in May 1462. 2 In Albania he met a grim situation; Draga Dukagjin had
been slain by Leka, the disputes with the Venetian governors had come to an end. With his departure
from Ragusa Skanderbeg also disappears again the exact look of posterity. For half a year he had been
on intimate terms with the King of Naples and the Italian aristocracy, he had shared the way of life of
dukes and counts, had dived deep into the life-world of Renaissance Italy and become part of it. Ferrante
felt a sense of loyalty to Skanderbeg, as he had once done to Alfonso V; only the young king returned this
less than his father. Personally, Ferrante appreciated his Albanian vassal; he placed him on the same
level as "his own father," as he himself confessed.23 Politically, however, he pursued other plans; the
Italian intrigues overthrew him, and he put the weakening of Venice on the fight against the sultan, to
whom he would soon send his ambassadors, behind his back and also to the detriment of Skanderbeg.2
About Skanderbeg's significance for the outcome of the Neapolitan war - which lasted until 1464 - was
repeatedly argued; he decided not to wrestle, but at one important moment he took influence in favor of
Ferrantes. In the spring of 1464 Skanderbeg received from the king's hand Monte S. AngeJo and S.
Giovanni Rotondo as fiefs, ie those areas, in which he and his followers had distinguished
themselves; the Gargano was a landscape in which the Albanians certainly felt at ease, a mountainous
country, a shepherd country with rich herds, as on the alpine pastures of Mati and Dibra, a fief from which
the view could sweep across the Adriatic, over to the old one Albanian homeland.
FAITH kanderbeg's uprising began and ended with a crusade. It was the victorious march of Johann
Hunyadi, who had only offered him the reason for the elevation (1443). Exactly twenty years later, in the
autumn of 1463, Skanderbeg became General Captain of another Crusade, the last of the Balkan
lands. Skanderbeg's life and struggle is to be understood against the backdrop of the secular struggle
between the Christian states in southern and southeastern Europe and the Islamic Ottoman Empire. His
collection did not have an ethnic character, because on the one hand Balkan Christians of different
linguistic affiliation - Albanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Jews -, then Catholic South and Western Europeans in
his ranks, on the other ethnic Albanians, whether Muslims or Christians, were among his bitterest
enemies. Faith and denomination determined the place of the people on the Haemus peninsula into
modern times, and this was especially true for the Middle Ages. The invasion of the Ottomans was fought
everywhere in Southeastern Europe, ultimately without success, but the resistance alone is already an
expression of a deep contrast. Although the Ottomans took over parts of the Byzantine empire tradition,
they broke with the past in the religious dimension. The Balkan Christians perceived the Ottoman Empire
as Muslim rule. Skanderbeg expressed this contrast when he returned in a highly symbolic way from
Islam to the Christian faith. This act of double homecoming, from the Danube to Mati and from Islam to
Christianity, was at the beginning of the uprising and was followed by many Islamized
Albanians. Nonetheless, it has been controversial until recently what significance the Christian faith has in
Skanderbeg's elevation215. However, the contemporary sources flow abundantly in this question and
convey a differentiated picture. On the one hand, it is important to distinguish between outsiders,
Byzantines and Occidentals, and the late medieval remembrance culture of the insurgents. In the post-
Byzantine tradition of the historians Chalkokondyles and Kritobulos, born after 1453, religion is not
mentioned as the motive of the uprising; not Christians against Muslims, but freedom-loving mountain
dwellers against the new, the Ottoman emperor of Constantinople stand against each other. The sultans
had begun the Byzantine inheritance to overthrow troubled areas on the edge of a Balkan empire.
From the Slavic Balkans are from that time hardly usable stuff. before; the short Serbian chronicles,
marginal notes in manuscripts, are far too scarce, like their Byzantine counterparts, and are of no
value. At most, they reveal that news of the insurrection into the Serbian cultural area has taken place.21
The situation was quite different in the Catholic world.1 In particular, the Adriaanrainer Dubrovnik and
Naples contributed together with the papacy a few years after the start of the elevation to Skanderbeg as
Christian To glorify heroes. The Albanian Lord was credited with the role of defender of the Christian
faith. Skanderbeg's feudal lord Alfonso V presented himself as a crusader. In the instruction for his
viceroy in Albania, Rarnon d'Ortafa, He made it clear that his intervention was to serve the cause of the
Cross: To protect the believers in Christ, d'Ortafa was to work, since he was "beset by the attacks, attacks
and attacks of the damned and foreign Turks ... on all sides In March 1453, the king expressly called on
Skanderbeg to stand up to the last for the matter of faith.219 Ragusa also saw in Skanderbeg the
champion of the Christian faith.220 In a letter of 1452, the patricians praised the Albanian lord for his
incredible greatness and his proven, well-known virtue ... in the defense and preservation of the holy
Catholic faith against the furious Turks, the enemies of the Christian name "; Skanderbeg is " but this is
precisely what makes him feel even more strongly his own cultural otherness. And King Alfons's dreams
of the imperial throne in Constantinople before 1453 were not as outlandish as it might seem at first
sight; finally, he commanded a strong fleet, Catalan ships sailed every corner of the Mediterranean, and
Byzantium was weak.
Skanderbeg's immediate neighbors set the tone. In more remote regions of Italy, however, there was still
uncertainty about the religious affiliation of Skanderbeg ten years after the start of the uprising: When in
January 1454 an envoy of the Albanian gentleman came before Nicholas V, the Milanese ambassadors
described him as "infidels", ie Muslims. and not as Orthodox Christians, whom they would have called
"schismatics" at best. It took several weeks for this misunderstanding to be eliminated. The Milanese
ambassador to the Curia explained to his master in February 1454: "This Sanderbech, of whom I recently
wrote your reign, is not a Turk, but a Christian Albanian, whose name is Georgio Sanderbech." The image
of the champion of Christianity, however, was essentially the popes Kalixt III. and Pius 11.
embossed. Both pontifices saw fighting for the cross in the wars on Albanian soil, and both worked
energetically for the rebuilding of the Albanian Catholic Church, which was so under pressure from the
Ottomans, a work that Pope Nicholas V had already begun. On April 27, 1457 Kalixt III. The Dominican
friar Eugen from Albania commissioned to spread the Christian faith in his homeland. Eugene, the Pope
praised, had already proclaimed many Jabre "the people of the word of the Lord" TI4 Six weeks later, the
Pope turned directly to Skanderbeg, who was cornered by heavy Ottoman attacks at that time: Kalixt
III. encouraged him, " not only to steadfastly serve the defense of the true faith, but also to bravely
increase it "; Skanderbeg may rest assured that" Almighty God will crush the savage attacks of the
barbarians and give strength and power to the soldiers and defenders of the holy faith. [...] God will not
forsake his people, he alone, who by his very signal is able to give his fighters victory over countless
armies. "Kalixt III referred to the unexpected success of the Christians before Belgrade in the Jabre
1456225 but he gave not only empty words, but also sent a papal fleet into the Albanian waters On
September 11, 1457, the papal chancery issued the letter that set Skanderbeg above all other Catholic
princes: "We hear, that you have earned more than any Catholic ruler for Christianity and religion
because of your excellent ability and your memorable actions. But you are of good cheer and steadfast.
"226 The example of Skanderbeg's example that he" did not yield to all the fury and the offensive power
of the raging enemies "will be borne and roused to all believers. And then came the famous phrase:
"Nobody can be so ignorant that he does not join you
on this occasion Skanderbeg was explicitly addressed as a "Catholic prince" (princeps catholicus). In a
letter that was given to the ambassador, the pope expressed his regret that he was only able to give the
Albanian Lord 5,000 guilders. But he found even more famous words for Georg Kastriota: He thanked
God that Skanderbeg like a "solid wall" the invasion of the Ottomans in the Christian world, an
undertaking in which he has covered himself with fame. Would all Catholic princes follow his
example? Then the Pope would have less to worry about the protection of the faith. "Remain, dearest
son, in your faithfulness, your holy and salvific intention, for as you fight for the faith in Christ, you hope
that he, to whom nothing is impossible, ...
Kalixt III. It was not for nothing that he had repeatedly referred to the siege of Belgrade, whose salvation
had been celebrated by the Catholic Church as a great victory. Because there was long time in the West
famous TÜIkenheld, Johann Hunyadi, died of a disease. Skanderbeg was left as the only symbolic figure
of the Christian resistance. After the death of Kalixts III. These reflections were continued unabashedly by
his successor, the humanist Pope Pius H. (Piccolomini). Like his Spanish predecessor, Pius H. worked
towards an alliance of Christian princes, with the aim of ousting the Ottomans from Europe. He wooed
Emperor, Italy, France, Burgundy, but also the Balkan lords from Bosnia to Albania. 233 But he met with
much resistance; the inner Italian tensions, the antagonism between Louis XI. and Burgundy, the new
conflict between Emperor Friedrich III. and the young King of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, all this was on
the plan of a crusade2) "The pope called a FEI conference to Mantua (spring 1459-January 1460), but the
participation of the princes was disappointing.235 In Italy, the fear of Italians rose with each passing year
Scholars and artists became more and more concerned with the danger from the East, and the eyes
glanced anxiously to the other shore of the Adriatic, and the Pope drove incessantly to the crusade, ready
to set an example and lead the crusade himself Skanderbeg in the center of papal considerations and
plans It has already been said, with what disappointment Pius 11 recorded the news of Skanderbeg's
stagnation with Mehmed H. in 1460, but also that the Pope had certainly welcomed the intervention of the
Albanian in favor of F errantes. In the same year 1460, the Pope had already negotiated with
Skanderbeg's ambassador, the knight Martin Muzaki37. In contrast to his predecessors, Pius also dealt
with the history of the Kastriota, with their customs and career. The Pope had long been dealing with the
situation on the Balkan peninsula, especially in his work "De Europa". He knew that a larger army could
only be landed in the Albanian ports, especially in Durazzo, that only the Albanian space, only the Via
Egnatia would allow a rapid advance into the Ottoman Empire. Albania was known to him as a country
with a glorious past, the Albanians as a people with a language, "
But how did Skanderbeg and his advisers respond to this clear perception of their struggle against the
sultans? About Skanderbegs character are only the few notes of Milanese diplomats before, some of
which have already been spread. His ideological motivations can therefore best be deduced from the
programmatic documents and epistles addressed by the Kastriota to Western courts. These were
probably not written by the Albanian Lord himself, but by experienced stylists in his environment. It was
not the Slav writers of his Serbian documents, but rather the learned Catholic clergymen of Drivasto and
Durazzo who gave him the pen. A key role came to the archbishop of the great port city, Paul
Angelus. You may call him the author of the letter to the Duke of Taranto, but also the instruction for
Martin Muzaki, the envoy to Pope Pius H. (1463), suspect. But even though this prince of the church took
over the editorship of the text, he nevertheless gave expression to the political considerations of the
Kastriota itself. One may then ask in these texts about Skanderbeg's attitude to the Christian faith and the
war against Islam. The Christian thought is expressed when it distinguishes between Christians and non-
Christians. The The Christian thought is expressed when it distinguishes between Christians and non-
Christians. The The Christian thought is expressed when it distinguishes between Christians and non-
Christians. The
He sees Ottomans as "our enemies and (enemies) of the Catholic faith" and thus establishes a unity
between the defense of his rule and Christianity44. The commitment to Christianity becomes even clearer
when the Kastriota states that "we are all Christians alike in baptism." The combination of Christian
sentiment and Turkish lassitude is also evidenced by a letter to Francesco Sforza, in which Skanderbeg
mentions the arrival of the country-fleeing Stefan Brankovic reports, "who was expelled from his kingdom
by the savage and wicked Turks because of his love for Christendom" 246. When the Kastriota had to
evacuate the castle Satti in 1459, he complained that he had wrested the castle "from the hands of the
enemies of Christ and from me" 247. He meant the Ottoman-friendly Leka Dukagjin. In internal Albanian
feuds, too, he divided the parties into Christians and Christians. Three years later, the Albanian lord
evolved on the eve of the crusade against Mehmed Ir. a real Christian program. In October 1463,
Archbishop Paul Angelus, abbot of st. Alexander in Mati, Peter Duka, the Apostolic Nuncio in Albania,
Brother Blasius, who was also prior of the Dominican Convent of Skutari, as well as Skanderbeg's faithful
follower, the Celnik Rajan, in the Church of St. Mary on the fortified Cape Rodoni together. On October
29, 1463, they briefed envoy Martin Muzaki, who was to leave for Rome for decisive negotiations. It is
executed how Muzaki had once come before the pope and called on the Catholic princes to fight against
"Machomet, the tyrant of the Turks," who oppressed the Christian faith with his "Turkish accomplices."
We, Georg Kastriot Skanderbeg, lord of Albania, whom we want to be counted among the faithful of
Christ, "raises the instruction, and then elaborates the program of the war:" For the glory of God, and for
the benefit and promotion of our Christian faith, "may Muzaki negotiate a campaign in which" We commit
ourselves to our person. all our goods, lands, castles. Villages, permanent places, armed followers and
our men partly or wholly in defense of the Christian faith and to attack its ... enemies " to be made
available248 This solemn document proves that Skanderbeg set off on a crossroads. Skanderbeg's
warriors, too, evidently understood their struggle in religious categories; the legends about the intact
corpses after the Battle of Berat had sprung up in Albania, glorifying the martyrdom of Christians in a
battle against Muslims.29 But not only in documents, but also in one of the adverse times for modest
church building program, does Skanderbeg's commitment to Christianity. Alessio still remembered more
than the legends about the intact corpses after the Battle of Berat had sprung up in Albania, glorifying the
martyrdom of Christians in a battle against Muslims.29 But not only in documents, but also in one of the
adverse times for modest church building program, does Skanderbeg's commitment to
Christianity. Alessio still remembered more than the legends about the intact corpses after the Battle of
Berat had sprung up in Albania, glorifying the martyrdom of Christians in a battle against Muslims.29 But
not only in documents, but also in one of the adverse times for modest church building program, does
Skanderbeg's commitment to Christianity. Alessio still remembered more than
two centuries because the "great Skanderbeg" the Franciscan church SI. Maria "dignified" according to
his piety "had built 250 that the Albanian nobility, at least in Italian exile, a deliberately Christian
interpretation of the events was maintained, it is clear from the chronicle of Muzaki: Only the faith would
drive the expelled gentlemen back to their homes251. External perception and self-knowledge are largely
in agreement. It remains to be asked whether the insurgents themselves or the Adriatic states had
shaped the religious interpretation of the war. The uprising had begun in the autumn of 1443 with a public
confession of renegades to Christianity. The revenge on the Sultan was certainly a personal motive for
Skanderbeg, but if that had not been enough, to unleash a broad movement. The freedom of the
mountains of taxes and burdens of an empire spurred the warriors. But such disturbances had already
existed in the 14th century against the Byzantine Empire. In the 15th century, however, the uprising was
not only a reflex of the defense, but it was overarched by an idea, the fight against the Ottoman Empire,
whose backing was perceived as Muslim. And this notion was read into the war in the Balkans not only
from the outside. Rather, Georg Kastriota, the charismatic leader of the uprising, saw himself as
champion of Christianity. The return to the Christian faith and the election of the Byzantine double-headed
eagle had not been carried from the outside to the rebellion. The insurgents clearly distinguished
themselves from an opponent, rejected not only as a new empire, but also in the religious dimension. The
commitment to Christianity formed the unifying bond of all insurgents. It was not language or ethnicity that
made the difference, it was religion. Those who fought with Skanderbeg professed Christianity. Whoever
held it with the Sultan could be Muslim or Christian. No self-confessed Muslim but fought in the ranks of
the insurgents. While these dividing lines and the thinking expressed in documents become tangible to
the political elite, the religious motivation of Skanderbeg's non-clerical followers can hardly provide secure
news. Unambiguous statements are not possible, but it may be assumed that the Christian peasant and
pastoral warriors of Skanderbegs viewed faith as at least a clear distinction from their enemy; the miracle
stories about the martyrs of Berat suggest that ideas about a religious war were also in circulation. The
papal support for Skanderbeg did not emanate from pure power-thinking.252 The recipient of the aid saw
himself rather than that
Defender of the Christian faith, as him Kalixt III. had celebrated. This self-image was further developed in
the memory culture of the insurgents in Italian exile: Marinus Barletius and Demetrio Franco glorified the
Albanian lord as heroes of Christian beliefs. However, they did not create any Christian heroes, but only
continued a tradition already existing during Skanderbeg's lifetime.
THE CRUSADE OF THE NEW ALEXANDER In the decade following the fall of Constantinople in 1453,
the popes made the defense of the Baankan Christians and the reconquest of the imperial city their
supreme goal. Kalixt III. and Pius 11 did not stop it with cheering rhetoric. The Spanish Pope had sent
fleets to the eastern Mediterranean. His successor, born in Siena, went even further: he was able to set
himself at the head of a campaign. In this environment, foundry companies found plenty of activity. They
continued an ancient tradition of treatise writers who once had ways to reclaim Jerusalem or the Latin
Empire of Constantinople, which was lost in 1261. The center of such mind-games was Rome. Under the
pontificate Pius' 11th, the importance grew which was assigned to the Albanian Adriatic coast. A landing
company was considered because, as it was stated in a memorandum, "Skanderbeg likes to see the
Italian riders and foot-slaves." 25 The name of the kastriota and the favorable position of his rule were
soon on the lips of all: Duke Philip of Burgundy passed in November 1461 his ambassadors at the Curia
land landing troops in the Peloponnese and Albania - "for in Albania are the territories of Skanderbeg" -
discuss255. Skanderbeg was also called far to the east, in the Anatolia of the Lord of Karaman, Ibrahim
Bey, brother-in-law Murads H., as an important ally; in a memorandum of this powerful Lord, which he
submitted to the Pope and the King of Naples in 1455, Very detailed considerations were made. Ibrahim
Bey envisaged a Hungarian attack on land and a naval attack on Salonilci and Constantinople, while he
himself would advance from Asia Minor. But then he emphasized Skanderbeg's position: "Without two,
Skanderbeg, Lord of the Albanians, must be supported," who should move out together with Italian
troops. So Karaman would attack from the east, Skanderbeg from the west. Pressed by all sides,
Mehmed would be in considerable with his 150,000 men which should move out together with Italian
troops. So Karaman would attack from the east, Skanderbeg from the west. Pressed by all sides,
Mehmed would be in considerable with his 150,000 men which should move out together with Italian
troops. So Karaman would attack from the east, Skanderbeg from the west. Pressed by all sides,
Mehmed would be in considerable with his 150,000 men
Need advised. Whether he would fight one of the attackers with his whole army or divide his army,
Mebmed would always encounter rested opponents, in Europe especially the "Hungarian and the
Albanian army"; even a campaign against Albania would only open the way to the Balkans for the
Hungarians. Ibrahim bey assumed that Mebmed would see his main opponent in Europe in
Skanderbeg. He also knew Skanderbeg's method of fighting in all its details257: He would go into safe
positions with his army, dodge a battle, and strike only on a favorable occasion. Ibrahim estimated
Skanderbeg's power at 30,000. In the case of an Ottoman campaign to Greece and against the
Hungarian army, he recommended an Albanian attack on Epirus: " A far-reaching plan, but revealing
good knowledge of the Balkan conditions, including the mentality of the Christian population under
Ottoman rule; Above all, however, he shows the greatness with which Skanderbeg had arrived in Asia
Minor. The Albanian master became more and more the focus of strategic considerations in the West and
in Anatolia. The planners agreed that the Ottomans should be attacked simultaneously on different fronts,
on the Danube, on the Adriatic, in the Aegean Sea and in Asia Minor. The mood for the realization of such
ambitious plans seemed not unfavorable after 1453. In faraway Burgundy, the duke and the court
committed themselves in sumptuous feasts and solemn oaths, against the Ottomans. The Order of the
Golden Fleece was supposed to bring together the defenders of the Cross. In contrast to this pomp, the
Venetian Republic acted out of practical considerations. Since the fall of Constantinople, she had been
yielding to Mebmed H., challenges had eluded, had been silent on all abuses. But the thread of patience
threatened to break; More and more senators saw not only the honor, but vital interests of the state in
danger. In Venice but vital interests of the state in danger. In Venice but vital interests of the state in
danger. In Venice
the general mood changed, warlike sounds became loud. Pius H. now had the opportunity to win over two
larger states for his plan. But it was necessary to unite the entire Christian state world against the enemy
of the faith. For the thinking of the strategists had influenced the state leaders: on land and at sea
Mehmed H. had to be attacked. The Pope, Venice and Burgundy would lead a fleet of Italian and Western
soldiers across the Adriatic and unite there with native Christians; from the north, however, King Matthias
Corvinus of Hungary would cross the Danube and move along the Morava Valley. To realize such a plan
required a clever diplomacy overseeing European complications; but in addition, the allies on the
Hemusbalbinsel had to be strengthened. In 1463 it was considered in Rome how a fleet of 25 galleys and
two larger sailing ships (for the transport of the guns) could be prepared, a fleet which was to be doubled
with Venetian assistance259. For the campaign on land, 1000 riders and 5,000 men on foot would be
needed in Albania - their pay for four months was estimated at 31,000 ducats. Skanderbeg, it was
calculated, would, as usual, move out with 15,000 men, earmarked for 15,000 ducats (so an Italian
mercenary would receive two and a half times more pay than an Albanian warrior). The strategists
assumed that "these troops would conquer so much fertile land in a few days, the limited military power,
the money spent, the. Attitude of Christians in southeastern Europe. Morosini recommended an attack on
all fronts, proclaimed by Poland, Bohemia, the Serbian despot Stefan Brankovic - a landless lord -, the
voivode of Wallachia, who were to advance together across the Danube; Hungary was to march over
Serbia and Bosnia; a 25,000-strong Italian army invades Albania and Epirus, a fleet of fifty
After all, galleys were supposed to attack from the sea, Morosini built on the aid of "Thessalians, Greeks,
Peloponnesians, Epirotes and Macedonians", but he also included Mehmed's most powerful opponent in
Anatolia, Uzun Hasan, Lord of the White Sheep, would draw upon it with a mighty army of Kinesyns. 262
Morosini's superior authority, the Venetian Senate, also discussed war plans; in an instruction for the
Venetian envoy to Louis XL of France, there is an actual danger: "The common enemy does not sleep"
263, warned the senators, impressed by sad reports from Hungary, but above all, they threatened the
French king southern Adriatic Sea: from Valona, the main Ottoman port, Brindisi is easily accessible, the
"entrails of Christendom" were in danger; The situation of the Bosnian king and Stefan VukCi6 of
Herzegovina was particularly difficult in the Balkans. The most persistent, however, Pope Pius 11 strove
for a campaign in the Balkans, he was aware of Albania's key position as a landing pad and home of
important ally Dominion of the best Christian general in the Balkans. Already in 1459, Venice had sent to
the Curia the dispatch of a 10,000-strong Italian army265, and in November 1459 the pontiff was ready to
provide such a corps with funds266 but Pius II was not hidden how hard the Ottomans devastated this
country between 1455 and 1457, and how particularly the Catholic Church, After all, there was only one
way to gain Skanderbeg, and this passed through the Catholic clergy of the country. In several years of
work, the Pope, together with the high Albanian clergy, rebuilt and rebuilt the broken church As a
congenial assistant turned out to be the new (since 1460) Archbishop of Durazzo, Paul Angelus267 This
unfolded a feverish travel to Italy to prepare for the Ottoman War, As a son of the mountain town Drivasto
but he was also responsible for the Believers in the highlands; those of Kalixt II1. The confirmed statutes
of the cathedral chapter of his hometown were renewed by Pius 11; above all, in November 1462 the
archbishop convened a synod for Mati, Where the church order of this area, hard hit by Ottoman ravages,
was improved, How great was the need, is shown by the rule that laymen were allowed to make
emergency calls in the vernacular; The baptismal formula recorded in the Synod's files is the oldest
written record of the Albanian language, so Paul Angelus went unusual ways. He was considered a
follower of Skanderbeg
wise counselor, but also at the curia he found esteem worthy, as a letter of Cardinal Ludovico Foscarini to
Skanderbeg show68 In his archdiocese seat Durazzo he had the fortifications renewed, because here the
crusade army should go ashore. However, his plan for Albania's future went a long way: if Skanderbeg
were to be won for a crusade - that is, also for breaking his contract with Mehmed 11. - then the Pope had
to offer him a ranger to compensate for the impending danger but in the end the peculiar constitutional
provisional of his rule. The actual negotiations between Pius 11, Paul Angelus and Skanderbeg remain
largely in the dark: they were probably led by knight Martin Muzaki, who as "special envoy" (nuntius
specialis) Skanderbegs left for Rome in November 1463269 The archbishop himself traveled personally
to Italy in early summer 1464, where Pope Pius 11 prepared for the crusade, which was to begin a few
weeks later in the direction of Albania. Angelus went up to Milan, where he received a letter of
introduction from Scanderbeg, to which Duke Francesco Sforza gave him sumptuous pieces of armor:
perhaps a part of that symbol of the Albanian crusade - the Skanderbegs helmet - which was covered
with his goat horns, As I said at the beginning, a replica of the old Macedonian royal crown is "': As new
Macedonian king, as new Alexander Skanderbeg should serve the crusade, Albania raised to the
kingdom of the Epirotes, the Archbishop to be promoted Cardinal 272 A grandiose plan, a plan of two
spiritual humanists. In the campaign of Skanderbeg, the classic idea of the Crusade and the anti-political
political language of the Renaissance should unite; Albania would find its place among the states of
Europe, the ever-threatening rule of Skanderbeg becoming a Catholic bulwark in the southern Adriatic, an
actual crusader kingdom. The historian Paolo Giovio wrote more than half a century later that Pius II had
provided Skanderbeg "as King not only of all Epirns, but also of Macedonia"> 273 These were the hopes,
the expectations in those feverish days of the summer of 1464 but to the establishment of the papal fleet
in Ancona (summer 1464), When the Venetian squadron left, Italy and the Ballcan were troubled; The
Levant had seized upon a great tension, a tension still evident from the reports of Italian diplomats even
after more than five centuries. The year 1462 is a turning point: Mehmed II threw himself with all his might
on Wallachia, but met there the fierce resistance of Vlad the Pf
so possible; and Hungary was troubled by the Ottoman attacks on its borders. Skanderbeg had come
home victorious from Apulia; his fame had never brightened, his self-esteem had seldom been
greater; He showed himself imperious to the Venetian governors in Albania; The senate of the lagoon city
was suddenly accommodating: they feared Skanderbeg and at the same time suspected that they would
soon be needed. 274 Because apart from the faithful Scutarinian patricians, Venice had few followers in
Albania; Draga Dukagjin was dead, Leka no friend. Since the sultan fought in the fich Wallachia,
Skanderbeg could switch at will. In the East, he fended off several attacks led by several Ottoman officers
from the Plane plane to Mokra; he won every time so over Sinan bey in a bottleneck of the Mokra, over
his fellow Muslim Hasan bey Zenebish, the Commander of Tetovo. Even the old Karaca bey did not
succeed from his camp at Livad in the plain of Ochrid. In Albania, where news from the Inner Balkans
converged, people soon heard disturbing news: in the autumn of 1462 there was an open dispute in the
house of Stefan Vukci6; Stefan had taken the bride away from his son Vladislav, 276 whereupon the
offended Vladislav revolted and turned to the Ottomans (probably October 1462). 277 An Ottoman
fortress threatened the Cattaro Bay, in whose reign Venice and VukCi6 had shared; even more alarming
was the news that Mehmed H. was about to march against Bosnia, in addition to the already subjugated
Serbia, the last Balkan territorial state that escaped Ottoman access. The Bosnian King Thomas turned in
despair to his neighbors, Hungary, Venice and Skanderbeg he asked for help 27 '; this and his Adriatic
neighbors, the Tocco of St. Maura (Leukas) and Ragusa sent in the same matter to Pius lI. 279. There
was no doubt. The writing was on the wall. Never before had Italy and the Haemus Peninsula
experienced such diplomatic activity as in 1463. Ships with ambassadors aboard the ship left
Skanderbeg's reign in rapid succession. Skanderbeg spun threads across the Balkans, up into
Herzegovina and into Bosnia. Stefan VukCi6 and King Thornas saw in the Albanian Lord the most
important ally in the region. Skanderbeg's relationship with the Ragusan Council was almost
uninterrupted. In other words, Skanderbeg became the reference figure of the Christian nobility in the
western hemisphere. The family feud of the VukCiCi also concerned Venice, which was working on an
alliance of Stephen with Bosnia (February 1463). "81
derbeg, the father and Solm wanted to reunite: In April 1463, he demanded from Venice the right to
march through Venetian Albania, to bring aid to the Herzegovin 282 VukCic was in high panic; Already in
January he had asked for refuge in Ragusa; he wanted to save himself there with gold, silver, his ducats,
jewelery, expensive clothes and weapons - a list which the knowledgeable Ragusan councilors were
pleased to draw up. 283 In January 1463, a diplomat of the Bosnian king, von Paladino de Gondola,
appeared to Ragusa. Gundulic, the patron of Albania, accompanied by sea to Skanderbeg284. On March
3, the same envoy returned to Blasiusstadt on the way back, from where he continued on to
Split285. What he had discussed with Skanderbeg is unknown; The Kastriota was unable to afford his
help, which was in danger of becoming deadly. On the contrary, he was completely occupied with the
skirmishing work and the care of his followers; he operated both with the help of Ragusa, more precisely
Paladino de Gondolas. Gondola took over the Ragusan diplomacy with Skanderbeg throughout the crisis
year; In the late summer he stayed with Skanderbeg, and in October the council considered his second
posting; Politics and business went hand in hand, for even in times of war noise the patricians did not
forget their Albanian cloth trade. The crippling horror seized the Balkans when Mehmed II's huge army
campaigned against Bosnia; a detachment, probably from the Albanian Sancak, marched hard past
Skutari and then moved north along the eastern shore of the lake, to turn east in the plain of Podgorica,
past the castle Medun into the interior of the Balkans'88. This violation of Venetian territory had
system; for even in Greece Ottoman riders had challenged the republic28 '. Ragusa trembled. At the
beginning of June, the Italian republic of Apulia promoted mercenaries, offered their own land storm, had
churches and houses torn down before the ramparts; At the same time she sent fruits and lemons to the
Großherm and prepared much more sumptuous presents for Mehmed and his grown-ups 90. In the
meantime, the fate of the Bosnian kingdom was fulfilled; with violence and broken promises, the Sultan
and his Grand Vizier, Mahmoud Pasha Angelovic, won the seats; the last king was caught and executed
by a trick; his wife fled to Ragusa, finally on to Rome (June 1463). '' 1 The news caused unimaginable
terror in Italy. In particular, Venice, whose Dalmatian coastal towns such as Zadar / Zara, Sibenik /
Sebenico, Trogir / Trau, SplitiSpalato were previously protected by the Bosnian Kingdom, rightly feared
the immediate vicinity of the Sultan. The fall of Bosnia and Ottoman
On July 28, 1463, the republic declared war on the Sultan, hoping for a crusade, for an alliance of the
Christian states. The struggle was to last sixteen years and end with the defeat of the Signoria , The
situation in Venice proved to be difficult: on a vastly extended front line from Dalmatia, through Albania,
Greece, to the coast of Asia Minor, the naval power of Venice and the Ottoman land empire confronted
each other. and the Ottomans had the advantage of the inner line. For from their gathering places in
Edirne and Skopje they quickly reached the theaters of war on the Danube, on the Adriatic, on the
Aegean; For Venice, however, this meant great uncertainty about the enemy's war aims and a
cumbersome transfer of the fleet from the Adriatic to the Aegean Sea or other places. To make up for this
disadvantage, Venice immediately took the book in hand and opened the attack in the autumn of 1463. It
chose the Peloponnese, which had been subjugated only a few years earlier by the Ottomans, and where
Greek, Albanian and Vlachian Christians could be recruited as auxiliary troops; the Pe1oponnes also had
numerous destinations to conquer with fleet operations. But after a few weeks the offensive momentum
broke before the huge castle hill of Akrokorinth (October 1463). 293 The Republic was more successful in
the field of diplomacy: On September 12, 1463, it formed an alliance with King Matthias Corvinus of
Ungam; and a month later, on October 19, 1463, Pope Pius Il, Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy, and
Venice conjured an armaments union.24 For what had been years of strife, it now came to fruition in a
few weeks. But whoever suspected that Skanderbeg would join this union without hesitation was
mistaken. Once again, the political situation in the Balkans proved to be complicated. Sultan Mehmed Il.,
Accustomed to victories over frightened and weak opponents, was not a little dismayed when the danger
of a powerful Christian alliance loomed. He was particularly afraid of interfering with Skanderbeg. So he
wooed the Albanian Lord with the offer of a lasting peace. And Skanderbeg accepted. There was
confusion in Italy. What had moved Skanderbeg to this step? It was probably many years of experience in
dealing with the Sultan and the Italian states, especially Venice. He knew that he would risk everything
when he entered the war. Before he joined the attack on the Sultan, he had to negotiate hard; an
agreement with the Sultan exerted the strongest pressure on Venetian and papal diplomacy. Apparently
the negotiations were with an agreement with the Sultan exerted the strongest pressure on Venetian and
papal diplomacy. Apparently the negotiations were with an agreement with the Sultan exerted the
strongest pressure on Venetian and papal diplomacy. Apparently the negotiations were with
Pope Pius 11, who had received on Thursday after Easter in his resort to Petriolo envoy Skanderbegs
and Stefan Brankovics, not run after the wish of the Albanian gentleman29 '. Venice did not enter the
open war until the end of July. But before that, Skanderbeg seemed to have to protect himself against the
sultan. The latter, in turn, has been aware of the negotiations on the Bailiff through his spies in Italy; For
the time being, a peace would keep Skanderbeg away from the great game of the powers. The Sultan
emerged as the winner from this game: the Bosnian king did not receive any help from Skanderbeg. With
the conquest of Bosnia, however, Mehmed 11 had interrupted the land connection between Hungary and
Skanderbeg's rule and thus made a combined Christian attack almost impossible. With the fall of Bosnia
Skanderbeg was largely isolated on the Balkan Peninsula. Help could almost only come over the sea. So
all parties took their steps very cautiously, this was especially true of Skanderbeg and his endangered
rule. That he wanted to continue the fight against the Sultan, can hardly be doubted. He knew the
Ottomans too well to suppose that Mehmed 11 would permanently stick to an agreement. Time to
negotiate, to prepare time - this was what the castriota had in mind. And so he sent Georg Pelinus to
Venice in August, a few weeks after the peace agreement with the Sultan. He was followed, probably with
special instructions, by Andreas Smachi, and both appeared before the Senate on August 20, 1463, three
weeks after the beginning of the war. Rarely had the patricians so courted the Albanian lord; He was
weighed on the best and appreciated his fight against the enemies of the faith. All that Skanderbeg had
dared to hope for over the years was now offered: disposal of the Venetian garrisons in Albania, plus 500
horsemen and 500 foot-soldiers for the spring of 1464; for the winter 2000 ducats; More importantly,
Skanderbeg would become the general (gubernator) of these troops, his son - born in 1455 - Captain
Ivan, the latter a pure honorary title, since an eight-year-old child could scarcely command an army
census. Old issues were no longer valid; the annoying confluence over the annual allowance was
withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Venetian governors and assigned to the Venetian Special
Representative (Provisor) in Albania. Skanderbeg's desire for naval support was also slim; not only one,
as requested, several galleys would be available to the Kastriota during the usual Ottoman campaign,
between April and June. Venice also provided reinsurance in the event of defeat: the young Ivan Kastriota
was to be admitted to the Venetian patriciate, hence also to the Grand Council (Maggior Consiglio) of the
Lagoon Republic.
A far-reaching concession from the Signoria, who made every effort to bring Skanderbeg to her
camp. The Kasttiota hesitated. Cardinal Bessation, the highly educated advocate of the Turks, who came
from the faraway Trebizond, beat Cardinal Ammanati a week after the negotiations on August 28, 1463.
Skanderbeg had agreed to a gift of 4000 ducats, pay for 10,000 of his own warriors and those mentioned
1000 Italian mercenaries299 But the hope was premature. On 9 September, the Senate informed Pope
Pius II of the negotiations and stated that it was hoped that the Albanian rulers would have made
peace; there is no question of certainty, but even more so of the strategic importance of Skanderbeg:
through him, If one could muster up to 30,000 to 40,000 men-a number that springs from wishful thinking-
one would do the enemy the most serious damage. The Senate knew that it all depended on the size and
clout of the Italian mercenary army that Skanderbeg demanded. Venice then offered Schlitt all the
promised services for Schlitt: On September 25, 1463, Ivan Kastriota was solemnly admitted to the Grand
Council, funds were made available to Albania on September 29, and the Special Representative in
Albania, Gabriele Trevisan, was dispatched on October 17. finally, on October 19, sent 2000 ducats to
Skanderbeg302. Trevisan was to maintain close contact with the Kastriota throughout the winter,
encouraging him to fight for the cross, preparing the Venetian partisans for the war. meet voivode Stefan
Crnojevic and make peace with Leka DukagjinJ03. As for command of the troops, Trevisan in the field,
the governors in the fortresses, would be responsible. Nothing was said of a commando by
Skanderbeg. Two months later, however, Knight Paul Gasulus arrived in Venice and obtained a
modification of this provision: Venice gave command to Skanderbeg for the duration of the war, including
the Italian troops. Gasulus also discussed with the Senate the possible progress of the war. And here
Skanderbeg's fears of an unfortunate outcome are clearly felt, for Gasulus talked about ships, his
master's inclusion in peace, asylum for wife and child, pensions and dwelling on Dalmatian
islands. Skanderbeg feared both a special Venetian peace and a defeat; he wanted to protect himself,
and if he could no longer protect his country in the event of a catastrophe, at least he wished to arrange
for his family. The senators appeased him; he did not have to worry about the comprehensive
armaments; but they noticed that Gasulus did not say a word about the distribution of prey. Among
themselves, the senators agreed that Skanderbeg something that Gasulus did not say a word about the
distribution of the prey. Among themselves, the senators agreed that Skanderbeg something that Gasulus
did not say a word about the distribution of the prey. Among themselves, the senators agreed that
Skanderbeg something
must offer - namely all profits with Ausnabme Valonas including the nearby castle Kanina and the
stacking place Pirgo. Skanderbeg would have received the mainland, but not a single good port except
Rodoni, which he "certainly" possessed. "Corresponding instructions were given to the Venetian
ambassador to the Hungarian court, Giovanni Emo, on December 3, 1463305. On December 13, 1463,
Leka Dukagjin himself Venice had assumed - including him with assurance that it would be included in a
possible peace - and Stefanica Crnojevic had already taken up arms in August306, Venice could not
confidently expect the New Year.And Skanderbeg? He and his followers completely abandoned their
hopes The Pope and His Promise In October 1463, Martin Muzaki crossed the Adriatic to go to Pius
n. The Albanian nobility expected from Pius Ir. true miracles '°'. Half a century later, in Venetian exile,
Demetrio Franco, then a young man who administered Skanderbeg's finances, reported how Skanderbeg
had proudly threatened an Ottoman envoy that he, Skanderbeg, would personally visit the sultan when
"the great priest of Rome" landed and ordered the crusade308. It was believed that a tidal change had
come. The winter gave all sides a last respite. Skanderbeg, then 58 years old and experienced enough,
knew Venice and the Pope behind him; but he was not a dreamer. He played high, and from long
experience he was aware that the allies could offer him in a defeat no befitting noble life. Only King
Ferrante of Naples, the son of Alfonso V so venerated by Skanderbeg. So Skanderbeg decided to travel
to the Neapolitan court before the beginning of the campaign season in order to personally take the fief-
oath and thus to secure for his family the fief of the Gargano. On December 29, 1463 he asked in Ragusa
for a ship for the wintry trip. On April 14, 1464 Ferrante begged him. In Naples, diplomats, Skanderbeg,
believed that "this important link in this sacred campaign" became Pope Pius Ir. O Skanderbeg himself
had written to the Duke of Milan on March 24, 1464, from Naples, "that the desire had taken possession
of him to seek his Highness," but "urgent business" would deter him from this journey.311 So he returned
to Albania, where the Venetian auxiliary was expected in spring. Ferrante took refuge in distress, but
Skanderbeg had to realize that the king would not take part in the crusade, and that he would not even
carry out the payment of the crusading legacy left by his father.32 Pope's captain, vassal of Naples, ally
and General of Venice - with a multiple coverage Skanderbeg entered a year from which a decision was
hoped.
But it turned out differently: just as the Venetian swing before Hochkorinth broke, was what had to break
at least in the rhetoric like a storm surge over the Ottomans. Only tough were the negotiations, the
armaments in the West; Louis XI. threatened burgundy. Pius II knew how serious Duke Philip the Good
was about a crusade. But France prevented the departure of a larger army. When, on Pentecost, a
Burgundian crusade fleet left the Flemish ports, a bad star stood over the project; during the long journey
around the Iberian peninsula and into the western Mediterranean, storms hit the ships, and finally the
leader of the campaign, the "grand batard" Antoine, returned home inglorious313 • Francesco Sforza of
Milan, Standing for 15 years in correspondence with Skanderbeg, it kept up with France; Although he had
promised the pope 2,000 riders and 1,000 foot-slaves, he took the time to set them in motion; He sent an
envoy to Skanderbeg in the spring of 1464, and in June he himself received Archbishop Paul Angelus, to
whom he bestowed a shell-armor for Skanderbeg, but at the same time paid attention to securing the
frontier against Venice, which in turn reinforced the troops in its western district. Ultimately, the Sforza
fared like the Duke of Burgundy; the will was there, but the fear of the neighbors was greater. And so a
second state left the Crusade alliance. Pope Pius 11. stuck to his plans. During the winter one discussed
at the Kurie a land enterprise in Albania: The Milanese envoy Otto de Carreto reported on November 18,
1463 from Rome, the Cardinal of Pavia, Giacomo Ammanati Piccolomini, had explained how in Albania or
in Ragusa papal, Burgundian and Milanese troops should be united; the Ragusans, but especially
Skanderbeg would secure the passes in the hinterland. The pope, according to the cardinal, was not
afraid of an Ottoman attack, because "the country of Albania was strong" and a safe position could be
chosen there. The pope himself informed the Duke of Milan in a brief of March 17, 1464, that he would
sailing from Ancona to Brindisi "from where the crossing to Albania is easy" J17 In Ragusa all
preparations were actually made at the end of May; Ceremonial ships were to catch up with the Pope and
the Cardinals as well as the Doges of Venice, sprinkling the streets with roses, flowers, fragrant herbs,
houses and streets adorned with expensive carpets; the palaces of the patricians were prepared for the
high dignitaries, splendid festivals preparedJI8. But even in the Papal States, the armor only dragged
on. In May, the pontiff discussed with the Milanese ambassador whether from the gathering place of the
fleet in Ancona from Ragusa or not better Brindisi started
should be. Matthias Corvinus will hardly fight his way to the coast of Dalmatia, the Pope said. His
cardinals complained that the plague was raging in Ragusa, and besides, "there is the Duke Ste / an of
Bosnia, who is not a good Christian, but has often had secret relations with the Turks and could conceive
evil." The princes of the Church resisted the impertinence of having to travel to Ancona and from there to
the front. Pius 11. pushed for departure, for he feared that the already war-weary Venetians could
conclude a special peace with the Sultan "and say that they had done so because the Pope and the Duke
of Burgundy, who had promised to come, had not come" Three weeks later it became apparent how
insufficient the campaign was. 2000 German crusaders were waiting for the crossing in Ancona, but
nothing was prepared for their meals on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. The Milanese ambassador said
that the harvest in Puglia and Sicily was imminent and that he would supply plenty of grain, and that
Skanderbeg was well-disposed. So spring passed; the summer drew up and with him the plague. On July
19, 1464, the Pope made his entry into Ancona, where the plague was already making sacrifices in the
scorching heat. One waited for the fleet of the Doges of Venice, one waited for the Milanese, who moved
slowly by the Romagna. The Pope, "a Sienese stubborn," as Milanese diplomats said, had already started
to lose his temper in June, considered wintering in Brindisi, when the illness took hold of him. The passing
of the pope in Ancona is one of the tragic moments of the Renaissance: on August 14, 1464, the longed
for Venetian fleet, modest ten galleys, arrived in Ancona; The following night, Pius H. breathed out his
spirit. The Venetians returned home, as did the other contingents. In Albania, the news triggered
shock. Skanderbeg's warriors, according to Barletius, were stunned.332 They did not want to admit it,
they talked about murder, poison had gotten rid of Skanderbeg's benefactor. Deep depression was
spreading. The chronicler Muzaki reports: "When this pope died, he (the Albanian nobility, p. S) began to
lose hope." In fact, the blow could not have been worse: the great alliance that had been forged in
1463 . only trummers remained; Venice, which had to fight its war, in the north also Hungary. But Pope,
Burgundy and Milan, as well as Naples, to keep silent about the other states, would not help if Mehmed
11 would take revenge for Skanderbeg's breach of peace. Never should a Pope campaign for
Skanderbeg as Pius 11. did. It was little consolation that the flags for the Turkish war were solemnly
consecrated in Venice on August 27, 146432 '. Skanderbeg stood alone. It was little consolation that the
flags for the Turkish war were solemnly consecrated in Venice on August 27, 146432 '. Skanderbeg stood
alone. It was little consolation that the flags for the Turkish war were solemnly consecrated in Venice on
August 27, 146432 '. Skanderbeg stood alone.
IV TOTAL WAR
kanderbeg's last years are filled with the struggle for existence against the sultan. Mehmed II and his
main adversary in the Balkans clashed in a struggle in which the states of the Apennine peninsula were
as involved as the kingdom of Hungary. Although Skanderbeg had secured himself on all sides, against
the Pope, Venice, Naples, Ragusa and Hungary, he became more and more the plaything of great
diplomacy, and this at a moment when the fate of his uprising was decided. Skanderbeg's life ended in a
dramatic escalation, a unique condensation of all those strands that stretched across the late medieval
Levant. Popes and kings, republic peoples, but also the Ottoman sovereign and Skanderbeg's old
Albanian-Muslim enemies,
BEFORE THE STORM In Venice, Skanderbeg's journey to Naples, the vassalage to Kgg Ferrante, so
soon after the treaty of alliance with Slgnona, could only arouse great distaste and stir up the old mistrust
of the self-assured Albanian prince. The Marlcus Republic remembered the Aragonese viceroy and the
Neapolitan occupation, who had been placed in Kruja Castle by King Alfonso V and threatened the
Venetian harbor of Durazzo, but above all questioned the Venetian maritime sovereignty on the
Adriatic , Skanderbeg homage let the Venetian-Neapolitan, unlike in the southern Adriatic, the dispute
over the Strait of Otranto, the lifeline of Marlcusrepublik, revive,
and this at a moment when, more than ever before, the Christian powers needed more cohesion against
the Ottomans. Already in the spring of 1464, Italian politics cast its gloomy shadow over the Albanian
situation. While in Venice, troops were surveyed for the Albanian theater of war and their commander
Antonio da Cosenza, called Cimarosta, was urged by the Senate, that he Skanderbeg as captain
(capitanio zeneral) subordinate sd and should move together with this and Leka Dukagjin against the
Ottomans, traveled Skanderbeg's envoy, the Durazzini Archbishop Paul Angelus and Alessio Albanese,
to the court of the most important opponent of Venice in northern Italy, the Duke Francesco Sforza of
Milan. Sforza honored the embassy and sent it back to Albania with splendid gifts in June. The Duke
made no binding commitments to Venice in view of the tensions. The primacy of Italian politics over the
Turkish war was a fundamental feature of the entire political situation to the death of Mehmed II, who too
often has lost sight of Southeast European relations. The abundance of Italian sources on the Ottoman
threat must not make us forget that even during the hardest battles at the gates of Italy, the leaders of the
five Italian powers lay in controversy The destiny of the border towns in Romagna was more worrying
than the Ottoman advance. Skanderbeg and his church counselors certainly did not and that's why they
tried not to limit their external relations to one power. Skanderbeg did not speak of all the Powers - at
least according to available source records - except Florence, perhaps because his Ottoman friendly
attitude and little influence in the Adriatic made any request for help seem pointless4. Returning from
Naples to Albania, Skanderbeg united his fighters with the mercenaries Cimarostas and opened hostilities
against the Ottomans. In the midsummer of 1464, numerous rumors about the war in Venice soon
followed, and Skanderbeg did nothing less than play a double game, secretly keeping it with the Sultan,
and even paying tribute to it. Skanderbeg tries, so it was said in an expressive image, "
Troops did not arrive at the rendezvous in Ancona; the promised Burgundian naval squad lacked every
trace. Venice hesitated, as it feared Milan. The reports of the Milanese resident of Venice, Gherardo de
Collis, give a vivid picture of Signoria's policy of disarmament towards her Italian neighbors. 6. The
experienced de Collis knew that Venice was downplaying his difficulties in the Levant, not giving Milan the
impression of weakness What could have led the Sforza to attack in northern Italy? How inaccurate the
spread in Venice rumors about Skanderbegs were supposedly too Ottoman-friendly attitude, shows a
letter of Condottiere Cimarosta of mid-September 1464 from Valikardha, from where Italian mercenaries
and men of Skanderbeg had carried out a successful plunder in the vicinity of Lake Ochrid, envious of this
success, Skanderbeg continued the tactic of rapid raids; first he succeeded in a victory in which more
than 700 Ottomans were caught (probably in July 1464) 8 But then Mehmed H. put the Albanian
renegade Balaban at the head of his regional squad. And immediately the tide turned. The locally skilled
defector put his troops on the heights that tower over the valley of Valkardhi to the east; Skanderbeg had
his camp further up in the valley. In a skirmish, the Kastriota warriors pursued their Ottoman adversaries
to a defile in the steep valley. The most important subordinates of the Albanian lord - Moses of Dibra,
Gjurica Vladen, Muzaki d ' Angelina, Gjin Muzaki, Johann Perlat, Nikola Berisha, George Kuka and Gjin
Manesi - captured by the Sultan's Albanian soldiers, taken to Constantinople and there, as narrated,
martyred to death. Skanderbeg was hit hard by this blow. He was partly to blame for the disaster, for he
had not noticed that one of his scouts was related to Balaban and had sabotaged the Enlightenment of
Balaban's position. 12 The role played by Cimarosta in this severe defeat is unclear. But this defeat and a
futile attack on Ochrid 13 had probably shattered the relationship between Skanderbeg and
Cimarosta. There had also been friction between the Italian mercenaries and the followers of
Skanderbeg. Cimarosta, ailing anyway, retired to the coast in the protection of Venetian positions, where
he probably died in the spring (before June) 1465 l4. His mercenary troops dispersed. The Venetian-
Albanian war of aggression had ended in a complete failure. The old mistrust on both sides awoke
again; for Skanderbeg had approached Ragusa in August 1464, probably during the battles between
Ochrid and Tetovo, and suggested that he himself should come to Blasiusstadt
It is hardly to be understood otherwise than as reinsurance, moreover as preparation for negotiations with
the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus, who fought in Bosnia against the Ottoman army. After just a few
months Skanderbeg saw the alliance with Venice as failed. The son of his old gunmen, J ohann Hunyadi,
seemed to him a far stronger ally, able to venture deep into Bosnia with his land army. In contrast to the
Venetians, the Hungarians were successful in the mountains of the Balkans. In December 1463 they had
expelled the Ottomans from the old Bosnian royal castle of Jajce and, what was much more impressive,
in August 1464 against an attack which Mehmed Ir. personally led, claims. An advance against Zvornik
but failed, and King Matthias had to evacuate large parts of the area won! 6 So high-flying plans, because
in October 1463 the Ragusan Skanderbeg had announced the invasion of the king in Bosnia, and in early
September 1464 Matthias Corvinus had from his camp at Gara in Slavonia Skanderbeg and proposed a
repetition of the pincer attack that his father Johann Hunyadi planned 16 years earlier. 17 Both Venice
and Mehmed II responded to developments in Albania. Venice instructed Giovanni Emo to urge his envoy
to the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus to a Hungarian push to the south and a union of the Hungarian
troops with Skanderbeg 18 This should also be relieved the Venetian troops in the Morea, which soon got
into serious trouble after quick initial successes. Mehmed H., on the other hand, who did not become
Umecht even after the death of Pius Ir. feared a major attack from the West and sat on the back of the
adversaries incited by Venice in Asia Minor, took advantage of Skanderbeg's disillusionment and let him
know that he wanted peace with Venice! 9 The first contact was with Ragusa, then with Skanderbeg. This
began the peculiar series of Venetian-Ottoman peace negotiations, which began shortly after the
beginning of the fighting and which, with interruptions, lasted until the collapse of Venice sixteen years
later, and at first the uncertainty of the Sultan, but soon the piety of the Signoria betrayed that was unable
to to lead the war with determination. The more clearly the senators, who mourned the profits of the
Oriental trade, turned to peace, the more the sultan drove his game with them. Skanderbeg, who knew
the Ottomans better than the gentlemen on the Rialto, warned in vain in Italy against the deceptive peace
offers of the Grand Duke. In Venice people liked to believe in what they believe in
wol! te. In late autumn 1464, however, Skanderbeg and Venice were not as weakened as two years
later; and both went in for the Ottoman offer. The Venetian Provisor in Albania, Gabriele Trevisan, who
had already negotiated the alliances with Skanderbeg and Leka Dukagjin, thought himself well for the
man who could also initiate a peace with the Sultan. His chancellor visited Skanderbeg and discussed this
with him. From his Ottoman informant, a subaltern, Skanderbeg had learned that the sultan offered the
island of Lesvos to the republic and was otherwise prepared to grant "very good conditions". In Venice,
Skanderbeg was taken very seriously as an intermediary and in December 1464 invited him to come to
Venice despite the wintry season. Skanderbeg hesitated, however, and only wanted to travel in company
with Trevisan. Obviously, there was also a certain amount of mistrust of the Signoria in the decision. In
fact, Skanderbeg's relations with Venice deteriorated over the coming months24. But it got even worse:
the old differences between Skanderbeg and the Venetian provincial administration in Albania broke out
again. Skanderbeg did not receive the contractually agreed pension, and he was refused the promised
ships with which he wished to postpone his men on the Albanian coast , For this purpose, Venetian
officials were barring Skanderbeg's trade in the northern Albanian ports2 '. So if Skanderbeg did not quite
break ties with Mehmed 11. He acted as a Realpolitiker and thus differed little from other Albanian nobles
who knew only too well about the fickleness of the Italian allies and especially their preference for the
quarrels of the Apennine peninsula, as that they had dedicated themselves to their cause27 However, it
changed nothing at the bottom line of Skanderbeg's political action; However, the Venetians did not
recognize this, but considered Skanderbeg's tactics a betrayal, an accusation with which the gentlemen
on the Rialto speed! were at hand when they saw their interests injured, while conversely, only a short
time later they were to thwart Skanderbeg's requests for help with the Pope and hardly feel
conscience. With Pius 11th not only the plan of a crusade had fallen into the grave: A few months after
the death of the pope, the Balkan front, which had only half-heartedly erupted in Venice, was largely
quiet. This can be explained by the uncertain situation in Italy and the silence of Mehmed's 11th, which
confused Italian statesmen with weakness. The most important result of the year 1465 in Albania is the
reconciliation of Skanderbeg and Venice by the Archbishop of Durazzo, Paul Angelus,
since he himself had broken his agreement with Mehmed 11. in the hope of the cross, and besides, in
spite of his activity as mediator, he had received no guarantees from the Ottomans for his Central
Albanian sphere of influence, he endeavored to secure his perilous situation. In December 1464, he
conducted negotiations with Helena Brankovi6 regarding the marriage of his nine-year-old son Ivan to
eight-year-old Jerina. He maintained particularly close relations with Ragusa, who in February 1465
granted him builders to complete his escape from Cape Rodoni, 31 and to King Matthias Corvinus of
Ungam. In mid-summer 1465 he sent Frater Alexander as ambassador to Skanderbeg; Ragusa
supported this embassy and commissioned on August 12, 1465, the patrician Paladino de Luccaril
Luucarevi6, to escort the monk to Albania on a Ragusan ship32. On December 15 of the same year, the
brother was back in Ragusa33. Nothing is known about the contents of his legation. However, according
to the Ragusan council books, the Blasius republic accepted Skanderbeg's request to send the patrician
Paladino Gondolai Gunduli6 to Matthias Corvinus as ambassador of the Albanian prince (November 13,
1465). It may be assumed that these embassies were also about the peace feelers, who extended
Mehmed 11th to the Hungarian king and that Matthias, in memory of the brotherhood of his father J
ohann Hunyadi with Skanderbeg, wanted to include him in the planned truce. The Christian allies, of
course, had decided to renounce separate peace with the sultan. Negotiations with Matthias Corvinus,
however, did not prevent Mehmed 11 from acting against Hungarian interests in Bosnia, thus increasing
pressure on the king, for whom the fight against the Ottomans was never one of the primary goals of his
rule. Twilight seemed the attitude of Skanderbegs Lehensherm Ferrante. Thus, in October 1464 in Rome,
it was known that in the Ottoman Valona
to prepare the crossing for the crossing of the Neapolitan king. " King Ferrante, although he did not want
to start any negotiations with the pope's consent, did not even want to let them go ashore. However, the
Milanese envoy in Naples reported in February 1465 that the Ottoman ambassador had been greeted
with great honors and that Mehmed had proposed to the king a marriage covenant; When Ferrante was
reluctant to marry his son to the sultan's Muslim daughter, Mehmed brought into play the Christian brother
and sister of Grand Vizier Mahmoud Pasha Angelovic, and drew attention to his annual income of
allegedly 150000 ducats. Gorgeous gifts, 14 horses, 20 noble dogs, gold cloths, The messenger had
brought with him gold and silver silk fabrics. For example, Skanderbeg's feudal lord did not count as a
group of supporters of a Turk war. From the Sultan's plan to get in touch with Italian princes, Venice
learned of Skanderbeg, who in autumn 1464 himself was in negotiations with an Ottoman subalth in
Albania40. The latter not only tried to persuade Skanderbeg to conclude his peace, but also informed him
that Mehmed H. had sent the Cretan ("greco") renegade Nicolo Corner, who had acted as Ottoman
interpreter in Naples, to Milan to Duke Francesco Sforza, to open a second front in the back of Venice
with Ottoman aid. Also the Albanerherm was offered, the Sultan would ilm "recognize". Skanderbeg. In
the conversation with the Ottomans, I understand that the Italian states, in accordance with those of Pius
Ir. would not lead to separate negotiations41. He refused further intermediary services and immediately
informed Gabriele Trevisan. But Skanderbeg was mistaken in the stability of Italian princes, especially
Ferrantes. For the Neapolitan-Ottoman touch did not remain an episode, but it laid the foundation for the
double-tracked strategy of the Neapolitan king, in whose thinking Southeast European and Italian politics
intimately connected: He woute a Venetian supremacy in central Albania, thus prevent at the gates of his
empire and thus continued the policy of his father, who had once used Skanderbeg to keep the
Serenissima in check. Ferrante had to give the Albanian master a minimum of support. On the other
hand, he parried Venice by playing with the idea of an Ottoman alliance. As a result, he intimidated the
Pope. As the Florentines were not afraid of the sultan, there was hardly anything new about this
attitude. On the other hand, Férante - and the other gentlemen of Italy - was interested in Venice in the
war against the sultan
To keep and to prevent that the republic of St. Mark would throw after a possible withdrawal from the
Levant in Italy their weight in the balance 42 would one do Ferrante Umecht, if one would particularly
emphasize because of this policy: For also Venice operated a double policy and saw through in the
Incidentally, the motives of his supposedly helpful neighbors, as the Milanese ambassador Gherardo de
Collis the Duchess Bianca Maria Sforza reported in May 1466: His Venetian informant told him why
Venice itself in the face of the gravest threat of Mehmed Ir. rather than relying on one's own strength and
rejecting offers of help from third parties: "This matter was discussed several times in the Senate, but it
was decided not to accept the proposal, for the following reason: we see, that the Florentines and the
Genoese also do not want to spend a penny, but that they are feasting on our misfortune. Even the
Pope ... does not want to spend much. Only the King and the Duke of Milan remain The King will help us
in the form of galleys or money. We do not need naval aid, because we have enough ships, and the
crews of the royal ships are forced to serve, so they can not be landed or used for land-based operations,
so that such assistance is useless. If we ask him for money, he will answer that his country has been
destroyed by the last wars and he lacks money. Besides, we know that he does not like to spend money,
and if he contributes 25,000 or 30,000 ducats a year, this will be a big deal. And then he will demand his
part of the conquests ... The (Milanese, 0, S,) help they do not appreciate too high, since they know the
shortage of money (the Milanese, 0. S,).,. In other words, they draw the following conclusion: If we spend
600,000 ducats a year on this business and receive 40000 ducats of aid, it will be said that we would not
have done anything without this support. It is therefore bessel; that they are running the business alone,
without outside help, to prove their great power. "43 This thinking moved Italian politicians in the era of
the downfall of Skanderbeg's rule, and thus it becomes clear how the" sacro egoismo "of the Italian States
had condemned the cause of the insurgents to failure. Although the relations between the Kastriota and
the princes of the Apennine peninsula were never as close as in the years 1463 to 1468, this also meant
a one-sided dependence of Skanderbeg, who had no opportunity to influence his supporters. Without its
own means of pressure, and without such a fine diplomacy as was prevalent in Italy, but rather on the
system of individual
Skanderbeg was unable to compete in this major political game, relying on those who were usually taken
over by members of the Catholic clergy in Albania. Therefore, he maintained relations with the Ottoman
elite in Albania, he tried to gain time and not to be completely side by side with the Italian
states. However, this policy was successful only as long as Skanderbeg faced smaller Ottoman military
commanders. When Mehmed 11. decided on the definitive solution of the Albanian question, Skanderbeg
was limited to his modest own resources, especially since the embassy of his most important advisor,
Archbishop Paul Angelus of Durazzo, had produced little tangible results in Venice (September
1465). While Skanderbeg namely, especially Cartaro and Budua, rose. In addition, Leka Dukagjin, who
had been won only with great difficulty for the alliance against the Ottomans, has again become apostate,
as he probably saw on the example of Skanderbegs, how little fruit brought the association with the
Italians. Incidentally, this remained his only common ground with Georg Kastriota in those months,
because the old hostility between the two rivals was rekindled. In August 1465, as the successor to the
luckless Gabriele Trevisan, the republic of St. Mark sent the able Josafat Barbaro as new provisor to
Albania; but this patrician did not bring more than good words for the angry Albanian masters. If the
Durazzin Archbishop Paul Angelus had not intervened, the Venetian glacis in Albania would have
collapsed. In Venice, one was well aware of this danger and its causes, as the instructions for Barbaro
show; to the disputes already mentioned above at the legation of the archbishop in Venice came
Skanderbeg's now profound mistrust of Italian condortieri, not to speak of the insoluble dispute with the
Venetian governors on the Albanian coast. 47 In August the Kastriota had sent an ambassador to
Venice , to the
=
to claim from the Signoria 500 horsemen and 500 footmen; the delegate from the Republic of Nevada
soberly assessed the situation: "One believes that one will give him good words and nothing else, since
he will no longer benefit". Venice had written off the Albanerherm. After all, Skanderbeg was able to help
himself. He was mainly dealing with Muslim Albanians, J akub bey Muzaki and Balaban. The latter had
his headquarters in Ochrid. He tried by all means - by bribery and hired assassins - to defeat the hated
Kastriota. The two decided to attack Skanderbeg simultaneously from the east and the south. Jakub bey
marched out from Berat, the ancient home of his race; Balaban penetrated into the valley of
Valikardhe. Again his relatives helped him into Skanderbeg's army; The Kastriota was ambushed with five
companions during a reconnaissance. Four followers fell, and the Albanian lord himself fled alone through
the forest thicket to Mati to the castle of Bila Kamin; in the end, only one Osmane chased after him; this
killed Skanderbeg. In Bila-kamin, his mainstay was encamped. He immediately moved east through the
same valley, and repulsed Balaban; but this escaped. A persecution was out of the question, as
Skanderbeg's sister Mamica, the widow of Muzaki Thopia, sent a call for help from the coastal
plain. Jaknb bey approached. On the hills of Kashar, in the coastal plain off Kruja, Skanderbeg struck on
October 28, 1465 the Ottoman army and slaughter numerous opponents; Jakub Muzaki was also among
the dead. The victories did not deceive that Skanderbeg was in a bad position. Local Muslim Albanians
pressed out of the fortresses Berat and Ohrid. The castriota was unable to turn these castles off; on the
contrary, the Ottomans penetrated deep into his Kemland. Not even in Valikardhe could the Kastriota feel
safe. If the Ottoman provincial banns had already put the insurgents under such pressure, what should
happen when Mehmed Ir. would march on? The year 1465 had thus brought another confusion of political
conditions: In Albania Skanderbeg stood against Leka Dukagjin in open, against Venice in barely
concealed dispute, on the northern flank of the Venetian province of Albania war raged between the
Signoria and Ivan Crnojevic. Venice and Naples negotiated separately with the Sultan, Skanderbeg
sought advice and support in Ragusa and especially in Hungary. The other states of Italy kept away from
the seemingly calm Adriatic question. In Constantinople, on the other hand, the Sultan used his year of
rest for comprehensive armaments, of which rumors, which were soon foreboding, came west in the first
months of 1466.
THE ALBANIAN DESTINY MARCH In March 1466 Ottoman troops entered Skanderbeg's homeland. A
leading role again took Balaban. But not he, but Sultan Mehmed 11 personally commanded the army,
which had gathered in late winter in Sofia and moved from there to Skopje, where other units joined the
mainstarst. "The Ottoman Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha told Skanderbeg that the This was not an
exaggeration, for as early as March 1466, strong Ottoman units had reached Central Albania via the
Shkumbintal and had largely broken the resistance in the Araniti area, with the exception of the mountains
of Buzurshek Members of the family fled to Venice ". A second army had advanced to northern Albania
and had overcome the Ottoman enemy Dukagjin under Leka. On March 23, 1466, the nephew of the
Grand Vizier appeared before Dagno at the Drindurchbruch, but had - as Skanderbeg once -
unsuccessfully pull off, of course, not without first devastated the landscape terrible. "Up to Skutari these
associations apparently did not brush, this was the city not in the best condition, for only recently, in
February 1466, had the Venetian Senate ordered the repair of the fortifications.57 The Ottoman troops
would have turned south and united with the units there, but the main thrust was still not overrun by the
Albanian north The Ottoman Skanderbegs dominion, where betrayal was involved. Skanderbeg had as
precaution sold off many fortress guards and sent their families to southern Italy58. But not all had
accepted their disempowerment; on the contrary, some of them opened the gates to the Ottomans and
thus joined a movement which in a short time brought Skanderbeg's dominion to collapse; for one of his
nephews-the name is not known-and the Bishop of Kruja had gone over to the sultan and promised him
an easy victory5. It is also not known how strong the resistance of the Araniti, who controlled the most
important passes, was really. The rapid passage of the Ottomans through the so hard to conquer the
mountains is so understandable. In a letter to Venice Skanderbeg reported that Mehmed H. on 12. 60
Skanderbeg himself had to realize that open resistance was unlikely to succeed. Shortly after the
beginning of the fighting, he sent his family, especially his son Ivan, his wife and sister Mamica, and his
movable possession in the kingdom Neape1 61. He sent a messenger to Ragusa in April and, as a
precaution, asked
I
He took refuge in his castle of Kruja to the Venetian Baldassare Perduzzi, an Albanian-run soldier, whom
Barletius also bestowed upon him. At the end of May 1466, 100 Venetian infantrymen entered the well-
fortified castle. On May 29, 200 Neapolitan gunmen, who had embarked in Trani on the 24th of the same
month, arrived in the Venetian harbor of Dulcigno, but were initially unable to move to Kruja, as Ottoman
ramblers were already swarming around the castle. After all, Skanderbeg succeeded in bringing the
Neapolitans through the Ottoman lines. 64 Skanderbeg's old Starnmburg was thus defended not only by
Venetian but also by Neapolitan soldiers, to whom 1500 of Skanderbeg's men came. The paths of
Skanderbeg itself can be traced only with difficulty in the spring of 1466: First, he apparently retreated to
the recently-built coastal castle at Cape Rodoni, where he could, as it was called in Italy, quickly flee
across the Adriatic. At Rodoni it came to battles, in which Skanderbeg had to suffer a crushing defeat'7 In
addition, the important festivals lost68 Since Kruja was besieged by the Sultan's army, Skanderbeg
remained only the retreat to Venetian territory. Alessio, where he liked to stay, was too unsure of its
proximity to the theater of war and its weak fortifications, so he first visited the port of Dulcigno, where,
probably in May, some Albanians saw him from there on May 29th out to Apulia. Maybe Skanderbeg
hoped In Dulcigno to contact the Venetian naval command, whose chief, the Captain-General of the Sea
Vettore Capello, had been commissioned in the last days of April to cross in the waters off Albania. 70
Skanderbeg's stay in Dulcigno was not lost to the Sultan, and the intimidated Citizens asked for protection
in Venice. In Dulcigno Skanderbeg could not stay, and so he went to the Venetian main fortress Skutari
72. From there he retreated to the mountains, where he gathered teams to relieve the Kruja Castle, which
had been heavily besieged since May 24 by Mehmed H., who had entered Albania on May 10, 73 from
the Ottoman ones known so far and Western sources hardly reveal what Skanderbeg undertook during
the siege of Krujas. After his defeat in the coastal country, he was primarily concerned with scattering
followers and gathering support from the two most powerful Christian gentlemen in the mountains of the
north, Ivan Crnojevics and Leka Dukagjins. for in the rest of Albania the old families had fallen away from
him or found themselves unable to come to his aid. Kruja's relief was impossible as long as the Sultan
himself
lay in central Albania. Skanderbeg was therefore limited to protecting the countless refugees in the
mountains and to wait for the withdrawal of the sultan.75 In addition, he maintained strong relations with
the Italian States. In the north of Albania, however, where the Ottoman troops were represented in lesser
numbers, he struck: Probably in the second half of May, he joined with warrior Ivan Cmojevics - allegedly
15,000 men - who had been summoned by Venice, and defeated an Ottoman unit, who wanted to build a
bridge over the Drin; this certainly happened at the lower reaches of the river, that is below Dagno
Castle. The bridge was to serve an attack against Skutari, which did not happen in 1466. Further south,
Leka Dukagjin fought in his mountains against the Ottomans with some success. " While Skanderbeg
lurked in the mountains, the Albanian flat and hill country went up in flames. The Italian-Albanian crew of
Kruja rejected all storms. Likewise, the attack of the Ottomans on the Venetian fortress Durazzo failed,
whose inhabitants had fled to Apulia; Here lay a strong Venetian fleet under Jacobo Loredan, here
Archbishop Paul Angelus had sent the able-bodied citizens to the 4,000 Venetian mercenaries on the
ramparts... The Great Lord had to realize at the beginning of June that he would not take the
fortresses; moreover, a lack of food was noticeable in the ruined land78; As early as 2 June, rumors were
circulating in Brindisi that he was planning to withdraw79. In fact, Mehmed II set in motion the majority of
his troops shortly thereafter and marched south 80. Before Kruja he left a siege army under Balaban's
command. On the way Mehmed II rewarded the Albanian traitors in his own way: The Albanian bishop,
who had wanted to play Kruja in his hands, and a nephew of Skanderbeg were staked; and the faithless
castle captains were executed81. Then he turned to the hill country of Buzurshek, which belonged to the
Araniti family. 82 This landscape dominated the important rampart on the Shkumbin River, the ancient Via
Egnatia, which Mehmed 11 had to bring under his control when he put pressure on Kruja and northern
Albania wanted to maintain. Although Mehmed failed 11th in the dense woodland ", but he learned
lessons from his defeat, which should have serious consequences for Albania. On the way back he sent
an army unit into the valley of the Black Drin. In Qidhna, the ancient home of the Kastriota, a traitor
showed the Ottomans a remote area in which Skanderbeg had brought several thousand people,
especially members of his followers, into a, to be sure, deceptive security. The hiding place became a
trap. The Ottomans launched a terrible bloodbath as revenge for the failure of their campaign. Many of
the faithful as revenge for the failure of their campaign. Many of the faithful as revenge for the failure of
their campaign. Many of the faithful
Skanderbeg's first followers will have died in the slaughter or lost women, children and relatives84. Their
lord used to retaliate against the retreating Ottomans, but the loss of so many loyal people did not
compensate for this. Even more than two centuries later, people remembered the importance of Qidhna
to Skanderbeg. The folk legend wanted to know that the Kastriota was fleeing the Ottomans found refuge
in a cave whose entrance had been covered by a spider with their net, which is why the Ottomans did not
seek there; since then, the inhabitants of Qidhna would no longer kill spiders87
THE GROOM OF DESPERATION he withdrawal of the Sultan did not mean a victory for Skanderbeg. For
the campaign of 1466 has destroyed society and settlement network of his rule and at the same time laid
the foundations for over four and a half centuries of Ottoman rule. The real turning point in social
conditions was the unprecedented mass exodus that began in February, March 1466. The Venetian
governor of Dagno, Antonio Erizzo, relates that as early as March 1466 the majority of the inhabitants in
his sphere of influence - the Dlindurchbruch - had left their villages "out of fear of the Turks" .88 The
merchant Piero Zane saw the refugees on the coast, where they were desperately waiting for a passage
to Italy. Many had also driven their cattle to the seashore; When they realized that barely enough space
was available for humans, they slaughtered the animals in their distress, hoping to be able to sell at least
skins and meat. 89 The eyewitness accounts give an insight into the tragedy that took place on the
beaches of Albania in the spring of 1466. Zane probably experienced these scenes even before the fall of
Skanderbeg's Rodoni Castle, which cut off people's way to the coast. A second movement began in the
direction of the nearby mountains, where the Ottoman troops did not dare yet and where Skanderbeg with
its 1500 warriors offered protection. This flight into the mountains would have lasting consequences, since
it led to the strengthening of tribal structures in the highlands, which had receded since the 14th
century. The northern Albanian tribal society is also a result of Mehmed II's reckless warfare90 • Southern
Italy faced an unprecedented wave of refugees; "All of Albania flees to Puglia with goods and flowers",
wrote the Milanese resident in Venice already
8 May 1466 91 The Kingdom of Naples was overwhelmed by the supply of refugees92. As bad as the
misery of the fleeing people was, they escaped the fate of countless compatriots who could not save
themselves either on ships or in the mountains. The numbers about those killed and deported are
diverging. About 14,000 people are said to have been killed in the coastal country after the collapse of
Skanderbeg's resistance93. Skanderbeg himself estimated in a letter to Pope Paul II the number of
deported to about 30 000 94. The Ottomans established for the conquered territories a new province, the
Sancak of Dibra, whose center is the castle listed by Mehmed 11 in a few weeks Elbasan
made95. Probably in the late 1466 Ottoman tax officials attempted to to capture the taxable inhabitants of
the subjugated villages and assign them to the various beneficiaries of the new system. These counts
were made in areas that had recently been part of Skanderbeg's heartland, namely Upper and Lower
Dibra, Dolgo brdo, the Matifluss area, Urah, Pedhane (once the land of the Jonima family) and then also
in the immediate vicinity of Kruja, in the mountains of Benda and Kruja itself (as Vilayet Aky ehisar) 96
The information in the register suggests at first glance that the Ottomans a few months after the end of
the fighting - the register was in March Completed in 1467 - enforced full rule over Skanderbeg's
dominion. But the picture is not so monochrome: In the south of the captured country, the resistance had
indeed largely collapsed; Even though Buzurshek had once again resisted the Ottomans, the Ottomans
had taken possession of the former ancestral land of Araniti, the Ernenika; the flight of Despina Araniti
and her sons to Venice in the middle of summer 1466 is the best proof of this Collapse of the old nobility
reign97. Also firmly in the hands of the Ottomans were old castles Skanderbegs, so Stellush. The
Ottoman power area reached to the gates of besieged Kruja, only the landscapes west of the castle, ie
towards the coast toward Durazzo, and north, already in the Venetian sphere of influence, were not
recorded in the register. From a letter Skanderbegs shows, that most of the conquered plains and valleys
had fled to the mountains and flocked there for their leader. Despite the treachery, Skanderbeg still had
some backing from the common people and some nobles who were burning for revenge on the
Ottomans. But Skanderbeg's heartland was devastated and largely depopulated, and important families
had gone over to the Ottomans, the barren or semi-rural
empty Ottoman possessions, their income partly given to Ottoman followers. But the new rule was not
consolidated. This is shown by the events after the withdrawal of Mehmed H., but also the destruction of
agricultural infrastructure in central Albania. The sultan feared the return of Skanderbeg and wanted to
deprive him of any possibility of resuming the guerilla-like battle tactics with a strategy of the scorched
earth. The best result of a severely mutilated Milanese report from Venice is the economic consequences
of the campaign of 1466: the Ottoman army had eaten Albania literally bald, they had harvested the still
green grain, even consumed the leaves of the trees; Up to Skutari there is hope for a harvest, The fate of
devastated Albania provoked distress and consternation not only in the West, although the tears that the
Turkish friend Piero de 'Medici shed in Florence seem quite hypocritical. 102 The Ottoman chroniclers
and critobulos also reverberated with the arson of one whole country '03. Sources from West and East
thus confirm the desolate state of the country. But Albania was not yet completely subjugated, neither did
Skanderbeg and his entourage endure in the mountains. In order to take the lead of the rebellion of the
insurgents' 04, the sultan decided to build a powerful fortress in a central location, which will in future
guard the army road at Shkurnbin. supplying Ottoman troops with supplies and being itself the starting
point of forays into Christian rest of Albania, which, according to established Ottoman strategy, should be
worn down by constant military pressure. The construction of Elbasan sealed together with the
destruction of the economic foundations of central Albania the fall of Skanderbeg. As early as the
beginning of June 1466, details of the Ottoman efforts were known in Rome: 3,000 artisans and 10,000
workers were on the spot
The ruined city of Valmi is building a gigantic fortress at lightning speed. Two months later, in mid-August,
the new castle was largely completed. At the same time, Archbishop Paul Angelus of Durazzo, on the
orders of Skanderbeg, presented to the Venetian Senate the dangers emanating from Elbasan. Venice
was also prepared to support Skanderbeg's attack on the fortress.18 Skanderbeg's failure at this
company promised the worst for Albania. He had undoubtedly succeeded in gaining parts of his former
territory with Neapolitan troop assistance. "He was even able to This was facilitated by the return of
refugees, among them not a few nobles from southern Italy. the "Voivode of Serbia"; Finally, Progon
Dukagjin also fell from his mountains via Skutari. Skanderbeg had left Albania in October 1466. Outside
the Venetian castles and Kruja, which was also defended by Neapolitans, resistance was no longer
achieved. The list of expeditions points instead to another development: two leading Albanian families
had split. The already well-branched Dukagjin had in Pro gon again a leader of the Ottoman
friend- Outside the Venetian castles and Kruja, which was also defended by Neapolitans, resistance was
no longer achieved. The list of expeditions points instead to another development: two leading Albanian
families had split. The already well-branched Dukagjin had in Pro gon again a leader of the Ottoman
friend- Outside the Venetian castles and Kruja, which was also defended by Neapolitans, resistance was
no longer achieved. The list of expeditions points instead to another development: two leading Albanian
families had split. The already well-branched Dukagjin had in Pro gon again a leader of the Ottoman
friend-
found direction. And among the Aranites, the members of the aristocracy who had not escaped to Venice
had also sought to join the Sulan tan. At the end of 1466, any hope of salvation seemed lost. The fact that
Skanderbeg's tremendous defeat came at all was not only due to the strength of the Sultan's army and
the betrayal of good parts of the Albanian nobility; rather, Skanderbeg was also a victim of his
dependence on Italian politics, which went his own way during the struggle for survival of Albania.
The behavior of the Italian states in the face of the Sultan campaign, which also threatened the Apennine
peninsula, can only be understood against the background of the internal Italian conditions. The Italian
states had failed Skanderbeg for very short-term interests. Skanderbeg's cause was already lost when
hardly any Ottoman soldier had set foot on Albanian soil. For the unexpected death of the Milanese Duke
Francesco Sforza in March 1466 had shaken the Italian balance of power. He had acquired Genoa in
1464 and thus, especially in the eyes of Venice, violated the idea of the Italian league. The contrast
between the ambitious heir Galeazzo Maria Sforza and his mother Bianca Maria occupied Italy for many
months and paralyzed the Milanese foreign policy, which in recent years Francesco Sforza had also
sought closer relations with Skanderbeg. Venice, already the main rival of Milan in northern Italy, was
encouraged in his bid to go his own way independently of the Concert of Power 122 This worsened the
already tense relations with Pope Paul Ir., Who, though Venetians himself, met his native city with
heartfelt dislike. King Franrante first welcomed Galeazzo Maria Sforza's accession to power in the hope
of continuing the old alliance between Milan and Naples. But he soon found himself disappointed.
Florence itself was still suffering from a domestic political crisis. For Scanderbeger, the Neapolitan-
Venetian antagonism in the southern Adriatic and the hostility of the Pope towards Venice proved
especially fatal. For the three states that had helped him in earlier years - albeit to varying degrees - now
blocked each other. It is hardly exaggerating to claim that the three states are the fate of Albania
exclusively
in relation to Italian power politics. Skanderbeg could only hope for support, if a protective power
promised advantages in the Italian power struggle. Venice, which owned extensive estates in Albania,
pursued a cool Cabinet policy The peace negotiations with the Sultan were held even more important, as
they had to send their own galleys in defense of the fortress Durazzo in the southern Adriatic Sea and as
Ottoman droves to the Goals from Kruja, Dagno and Slcutari pounded. In 1466 and 1467 Venetian armor
did not arrive until late in the spring. And they were unwilling. Skanderbeg's warnings and cries for help
were already known in March at the Rialto124 but the Senate acted only when the fighting had already
reached its peak in late April. Skanderbeg was beaten when it was just decided in Venice to hire 1200
mercenaries 125 All other measures of Venice were purely defensive nature. Even though the head of
state had caused despair at the Milan ambassador as to Ottoman achievements, 126 not a single
mercenary came across Skanderbeg's warriors. On the contrary, under the - not unjustified - pretext that
Italian mercenaries were reluctant to go to Albania - because it was dying, and not only fought as in Italy -
Skanderbeg was offered money to promote Albanian fighters in February 1466. This beautiful plan was,
of course, not implemented, which means nothing else than that Skanderbeg received no financial aid127
The Signoria protected Skutari; her Commodore Vettore Capello gave only good words to Skanderbeg on
the orders of the Senate 12 '. Durazzo alone was defended 129 and Kruja was kept together with the
unloved mercenaries of King Ferrantes. How little Venice was in Albania is shown by the Senate
resolution of June 4, 1466-the news of Mehmed's withdrawal had barely arrived-of sending no more
galleys to Albania. 130 The Senate favored cheap requests to Ferrante and the Pope grant help to the
desperate Skanderbeg 131. Giovanni Matteo Contarini, new governor of Skutari, was commissioned in
June 1466 to comfort Skanderbeg and to investigate those 2000 ducats that were once intended for the
promotion of Albanian troops. That the Venetian governors in Albania, For decades Skanderbeg had
been handicapped in all sorts of ways - sometimes even against the instructions of the mother city - here
too had her fingers in the game is hardly to be doubted. If further proof were needed, it would suffice to
cite the text which shows the Venetian Rector of Alessio in the winter of 1466-67, in the best agreement
with Balaban, and mentions that Venetian merchants from Alessio and Durazzo in Elbasan
Commerce and Ottoman traders visited the Venetian markets 132 It is therefore not surprising that Venice
only supported Skanderbeg's attack on Elbac san with pious wishes. How Skanderbeg was treated by the
authorities of the Signoria on his flight to Venetian Albania is not known; but he did not spend much time
in Ducigno and Skutari. The selfish attitude of Venice made Skanderbeg most painful. He was not allowed
to hope for help from the city of St. Mark, which had led him into the war three years earlier. Rather, he
found that Venice took advantage of the situation after the withdrawal of Mehmed to expand its own
power; because not otherwise is the friendly reception of the Araniti family in the lagoon city to
explain. Hospitality surpassed everything, Despina Araniti mediated the crossing of the Berisha tribe with
its numerous warriors to the side of Venice 134. Only hesitantly, however, did the Senate issue the
confiscated goods of Skanderbeg's most important adviser, Archbishop Paul Angelus. In Kruja, Venetian
soldiers finally supplanted the Neapolitan part of the garrison. At the end of the year 1466, Venice,
despite all Ottoman forays, had secured its share from the rubble of the Albanian nobility. In addition, it
continued the negotiations with Mehmed 11 on. Peace in the East should give the Republic of St. Mark
the free hand in the Italian masculine game. While the Sultan was in Albania, the Senate dealt with the
supposed or real peace feelers, which the Grand Duke extended over the Chancellor of the former
Venetian Bailo in Constantinople and over the Cretan Jew David (April 1466)! 36 In the winter of 1466-67,
at the time when Skanderbeg desperately sought support in Italy, a Venetian envoy traveled to the
Sultan's court ; that he failed there in fiorentine intrigues also shows the importance of Italian politics for
the Levant, as did the action of the Signoria, who, despite all testimony, abandoned the Christian
inhabitants of the eastern Adriatic coast! 37 How senseless it is to Venice because of its attitude To
blame, a look at the papal policy. Undoubtedly, Paul II sent significant sums to the Hungarian King
Matthias Corvinus in 1465! 38 But the following year, the prince of the church and his consistory put
Ottoman affairs on the back burner. With Ferrante, the Pope fought over the recognition of papal
sovereignty over the southern Italian kingship, with Venice, including the city of Cervia. That this seemed
more important to the successor of Peter than the fate of Albania, should not be a distortion of the
situation. On May 11, 1466, the cries for help from Albania were discussed in the consistory 139 Five
Days later, the Venetian ambassador to the Holy See, Bernardo Giustiniani, urged an intervention by the
Pope! 40 At first sight, however, the pope's greatest admonition implied the greatest impertinence: he
suspected that the Signoria wanted to defend her Albanian provinces through papal - and Neapolitan -
money paid and also bring in the wake of the war, new areas in northern Italy. The sultan's campaign
deepened the gap between Paul Il. and the Republic of St. Mark. The pope became so suspicious that he
withheld his treasures for the feared firefight in Italy and even sent the Hungarian ambassador home with
a tenth of the promised 100,000 ducats Turkish aid! The pope did not touch a finger for Venice. When the
Signoria laid a fleet in front of Durazzo in May 1466, Paul H. felt confirmed. He made an open connection
between the Albanian question and the Venetian politics in Italy: He called Cervia and offered for troop
assistance. The Venetian ambassador may be so indignant; It did not help. His Milanese colleague also
knew that the Curia would not do anything at all, as Naples and Venice would have to defend Kruja Castle
anyway! It provides a deep insight into the thinking of the Pope, whose predecessors had still
campaigned for the Crusade, when the Milanese envoy reported how much Paul Il was occupied with
questions from Cervia, Cesena and Rimini - but remained indifferent to the Albanian refugees, because
after all, this is a matter for Naples! 4 '. In June 1466, envoys from Venice, Skanderbeg, and Naples! 44
arrived in Rome and forced the Pope to comment on the Albanian question. The pope gave Skanderbeg
2000 ducats and summoned the Venetian priests of Rome, to whom he spoke of the Turkish war! 45
However, the Signoria was hardly able to satisfy this. The opposition won much more. The Pope said that
Venice was in negotiations with the Sultan anyway, so he did not need any further help. The Venetian
ambassador in Rome spoke openly what was thought on the Rialto: Pope Barbo wanted to take revenge
on his hometown. Long was the list of points of controversy, again and again Cervia, then the tithe, the
position of the Patriarchate of Aquileia! 46 In these disputes, another call for help from Skanderbeg
almost went under: A Franciscan monk told the pope in mid-June 1466 about the needs of Albania and
asked for money. On the other hand, the pope, always aware of the public effect of his steps, had great-
sounding promise of an 8,000-strong expeditionary force of all Italian states. He knew that would be a
dream; that Skanderbeg urged not to send troops into the starved and devastated
According to the wise Milanese ambassador, the Pope would take the opportunity to abandon the war
plan and do nothing at all. In Italy and also in Albania, one spoke only contemptuously of the allegedly
1000 men, who at the expense of the Pope and under the Command of the Matteo da Canal should go to
Albania. Skanderbeg again urgently asked for money and pointed to the supply situation in his country.
148 The Pope did not respond, nor did he comment on Skanderbeg's plan to regain the lost territories,
but postponed the matter to next year: on the 1st of July he announced that he would convene a meeting
of all the Italian states to discuss the way forward. 149 Thus the papal contribution to Albania was
exhausted. King Ferrante of Naples was next to Venice most directly affected by the Ottoman
advance. The tensions with Venice and the Papal States, as well as the weakness of his empire after the
enthronement of the throne, considerably reduced his scope for action. To secure himself, he sent two
hundreds to Kruja. Because the castle protected the Apulian coast. This, however, stoked the Venetian
mistrust. And the Venetian-Neapolitan hostility was carried so in the middle of the Albanian war
turmoil. Ferrante picked up Skanderbeg's family; the Kastriota were his fiefs on the Gargano, and the king
had not forgotten Skanderbeg's help. The Kastriota each gave him news from Albania. His empire was
overrun by Albanian refugees. But the king did not want to intervene alone. Therefore, he sent messages
about the events in Albania to the Italian courts to make them aware of the need beyond the Adriatic
Sea. At the beginning of June 1466, he finally instructed his ambassador in Rome to put pressure on the
Pope. In June, he also received Skanderbeg's ambassador Martin Muzaki in l52, but waited for the
departure of Mehmed 11 until he took his own steps. At the beginning of July he planned to go personally
to Puglia to supervise the dispatch of auxiliary troops to Albania. 153 These troops actually crossed the
Adriatic and helped Skanderbeg with his short-term successes in late summer 1466. However, the
interaction of Skanderbeg with Ferrante only became Venice even more suspicious. In Venice it was
said Ferrante plans a raid on the Herzegovinian port castle CastelnuovolNovi at the entrance to the
Venetian Bay of Cattaro and Skanderbeg should take over the command of the castle 155. The above-
mentioned rounding Venetian Albania was therefore directed mainly against the Neapolitan influence. In
desperation, Skanderbeg turned again to the son of his old ally Johann Hunyadi. Since the beginning of
the war
between King Matthias Corvinus and Skanderbeg had a lively envoys traffic ruled; but after the failed
advance in Bosnia, the Hungarian monarch had held back. In autumn 1466 Skanderbeg commissioned
the faithful Ragusan Paladino de Gondola! Gunduli6 heading north. The council of his republic told him he
had nothing to do with Dubrovnik itself. Ragusa had lost Skanderbeg, but secretly supported private relief
Ragusan patricians. Also, the Knezen Stjepan Radojevi6, another ambassador of Kastriota, allowed the
trip to Sibenik or Split, from where he probably wanted to go to Corvinus l56. Not much could be expected
from Hungary. In the autumn of 1466, the situation of the Kastriota was conceivably unfavorable: the
Pope was against Venice and was operating, his eyes completely turned upside down; a delaying policy
in the question of the Turkish war; Venice had a not very friendly attitude towards Skanderbeg; and King
Ferrante maintained tense relations with both states. Florence, confidant of the Grand Duke, and Milan,
which was engaged in dynastic struggles for power, retired as Protecting Powers. So Skanderbeg
decided to travel to Italy in person to ask for help in dire need. He hoped that his reputation and his glory,
the power of his personality, would impress the Italian heads of state as in 1461. He also sent his young
son Ivan, an eleven-year-old child, to Italy: the young Venetian patrician was to renounce the Signoria
Ask for support. Behind him Skanderbeg left a ruined land, dominated by its opponents, the Ottomans,
renegade Albanian nobles and Venice. In October 1466 the Kastriota stabbed the Se.e. Skanderbeg's
son Ivan appeared on 9 October in front of the Senate in Venice. The exhausted Venetians will give
nothing, the Milanese resident reported to his Duke. Venice put the responsibility on the pope and asked
him to help the Albanians! 58. When Skanderbeg himself entered a Venetian galley in the same month to
appear as a petitioner at the Italian courts, this betrayed nothing but sheer despair. "59 The fear of the
Lord of the mountains in front of the sea was the slightest, 60 for he knew well, that he was nowhere
welcome, but annoying everywhere. The first humiliation he experienced in Ragusa. There he was before
his last trip to Italy, When he had brought help to Ferenc, he had been celebrated in style (autumn l46l) 16
!. Now the councilors asked him not to enter the city. For the defeated Turk fighter Ragusa wanted his
profitable Balkan trade, the well-being of his merchants in Ottoman
The fact that Skanderbeg had landed in Apulia was known in Rome on November 27, 1663. A source
from the archives of the Marquises of Mantua shows that Skanderbeg did not hurry to Rome at once.64
This would be in view of the old relations with the Aragonese royal house from Naples, the vassal
relationship to King Ferrante, also peculiar to the recent troop relief from Naples. Skanderbeg went rather
to the court of the king. He told him that if he did not get help within six months for the castles he still
defends, he would have to lose his cause. The envoys of the Marquis of Mantua said: "These days the
Lord Skanderbeg has been here and has made the Lord King understand that his cause has reached
such a low point, that it will not be long ... he lost all the rest, and the others would also be lost for want of
food. "165 Ferrante promised support, but pointed to Italy's impending circumstances." Skanderbeg
continued his journey to Rome. He was greeted in the Eternal City on December 12, 1967. He and his
entourage were greeted by - 50 dark-looking riders ("ugly people with ugly faces", as the Milanese envoy
wrote) 168 The Milanese ambassador described the scene: "Yesterday Skanderbeg arrived, to whom his
Holiness made a great honor when moving in, giving him all the cardinal's households, sent to those of
his own house and many other prelates and courtiers; We Botchajians also honored and escorted him.16
The Romans noticed that the Turkish fighter was an old man. At first it seemed as if Skanderbeg's hopes
would come true: Ferrante had ordered his representative in Rome, Graciabetes, the Kastriota to pay his
honor, "always to accompany him and never to leave", the Milanese and Florentine ambassadors paid
him their respects, and Skanderbeg thanked the Milanese for their kind words ("helpze") "with a thousand
expressions of gratitude." 171 The Pope spoke for two days Later, at a gathering of Italian ambassadors,
of the need to support Skanderbeg and Matthias Corvinus. But Skanderbeg soon discovered that that any
involvement of the pope in the Turkish war depended entirely on the settlement of Italian questions. The
pope wanted a land peace, a re-fortification of the Italian league 173. Skanderbeg was unable to do
anything about this. So he waited for a decision of the consistory. He had already welcomed the Milanese
ambassadors to the Holy See, Lorenzo de Pesaro and Augustino de Rubeis, for a courtesy visit on
December 13. The two diplomats wrote
a log of this conversation. This is the only time that Skanderbeg's train of thought has been recorded by
contemporaries: "He
says that if he received only four or five thousand men before mid-February, he would be in good spirits to
withstand the Turks in that country very well, and quickly regain all that was lost. He did not want to stay
longer than mid-February because he says that it is the custom of the Turks to always campaign on the
calendars of March; and if he marched against Albania, he would easily conquer Dalmatia and Slavia (the
southern Slavic hinterland, p. Kruja would still be held, even if it was under pressure; this Skanderbeg has
no more than Albania in this castle. He also says that the Turk had two castles built above two estuaries,
the Venetians on one side of the river and the Turks on the other; so he would let hundreds of galleys go
to sea without resistance; for in that city which the Turk had fortified there, he had provisions of wood, iron
and all other things to build numerous galleys ... Then the same Skanderbeg of long and broad complains
of the Venetians and reports only bad things from them, because they did not keep what they had
promised him. For, he says, they must have entertained him with 500 horsemen and 500 footmen, with
whom he would have behaved well and would not have been in such distress as now. He says that they
would only occasionally send him small units, once 30, once 40, then 50, the same applies to the riders,
so that he would never have had 200 riders or as many foot-knees. And this he understood very well,
namely that the Signoria of Venice only did this, to wear it down and slowly drive it into such desperation
that it would compel them to give them Kruja, whom they would love to possess, and his other
possessions. But he says that he has seen through this intention and will rather burn everything down and
give it a thousand times to the Turks than they have done. "His warnings, his estimation of the situation,
were met: the Ottomans pressed from Elbasan to the Adriatic; The Venetians were only waiting for an
opportunity to seize Kruja, and the Kastriota and his remaining followers would be crushed among the
great powers, and the price would be paid by Italy, which was directly exposed to the Sultan's attacks
towards the Republic of St. Mark, who had intrigued against him again and again and thwarted his
intentions. Not without reason, because, as the Milan diplomats remarked, "the Venetians of Skanderbeg
speak only bad things, viz
that he is more Turkish than the Turks. Some of these Venetians here at the court
In January 1467, the consistory convened for a meeting to discuss Skanderbeg's concerns. The Pope
wanted to give him 5,000 ducats, nothing more, because in Italy, the situation was uncertain. When a
cardinal disagreed, the pontiff became angry, talking about the Neapolitan threat! 80 Five days later, on
January 12, the consistory decided to donate 5000 ducats. Skanderbeg must manage otherwise, the
pope said in l81. Skanderbeg could hardly believe he was treated like this by the Holy See. His hope
turned to despair. Because Kruja stood before the case, and he could accomplish nothing l82 The fact
that not only the supposed fear of Paul H. before Naples the attitude of the consistory determined, was
already clear to the Milanese diplomats in January 1467. For Venice's Ambassador to the Holy See,
Paolo Contarini, was intrigued with great success against Skanderbeg, who had to pay for the aid that
Naples had granted him in the fall of 1466, but had refused to accept St. Mark's republic. Contarini told
the pope that Kruja was now Venetian, so papal help was unnecessary in 1883. So Venice tried to
remove Skanderbeg from the political game. It became lonely around Skanderbeg. In Albania, Venice
expanded its territory at the expense of the Kastriota. In Rome and Naples there was little hope for
help. In this hopelessness, he hardly knew where to turn. So he stayed in Rome until February 13, always
hoping for a change of heart of the Cardinals. It got worse. The Pope intended to pay the aid money from
the Neapolitan church tithes) !. But Ferrante refused to pay him to Rome; by the way! 84, which shows
that Paul H. actually did not want to pay at all! 85 Some Cardinals fought for Skanderbeg, persuaded him
to stay! 86 But their appeals to the Successor of Peter died in the consistory of 13 February 1467. The
Cardinals may pay out of pocket, the Pope said. "And so nothing happened",
the Milanese ambassador remarked dryly. "Skanderbeg's outrage knew no bounds. The promised
payment was an aerial creation, he exclaimed! 88 He left in anger. It was feared in Rome that he would
now seek an agreement with the Sultan! 89 Nothing better shows how wrongly the Italian diplomats
judged Skanderbeg. They considered him an agile Condottiere and did not understand that he was
serious about the Turkish War. Skanderbeg's departure was under the most inglorious
circumstances. While the Cardinals and the Pope minutely chatted for aid for the Albanian, he could not
even pay for his accommodation; a Cardinal gave him the dole of 200 ducats, and the Pope, who was
ashamed of it, finally turned his face to Naples. Skanderbeg also went to King Ferrante because he was
informed there on February 3, 1467, that his wife had sent him important correspondence about his fief on
Monte S. Angelo; they probably reported on the plight of Albania! In Naples, however, Skanderbeg
expected the next disappointment. For King Ferrante had received an embassy of Balaban at the end of
February 1467. 192 In view of the Ottoman successes, the king had every interest in facing the Sultan's
empire and thus protecting his Apulian coastal areas. He therefore instructed his diplomat Bemardo
Lopez to visit Balaban and also the Sultan! "Ferrante did this all the better, as it was now known in Italy
that the legation of the Venetian Jacobo Venier to Mehmed II. had failed and the Grand Lord rather
planned a strike against Albania again. The Venetians therefore changed their attitude. They had just
rummaged in Rome against Skanderbeg, now they recommended him to the Pope with warm words! Just
then the disappointed envoy of Skanderbeg had asked in Venice for dismissal (January 23, 1467), when
his employer again became a valued ally of the Signoria! 95 Archbishop Paul Angelus of Durazzo had
been handed ducats by the Senate 2000. 96 In a few months had passed The diplomatic situation
completely changed: In the autumn of 1466 Venice had turned against Skanderbeg, because it suspected
him of Neapolitan friendships and even wanted to make peace with the Sultan; In the spring of 1467
Franrante hoped for a separate footing with the Ottomans and dropped Skanderbeg for it. The Albanian
was only a plaything of great politics, between the Italian powers and the Ottoman Empire. Ferrante wrote
to Rome on March 26, 1467, and praised his help for Skanderbeg, 1000 ducats in cash - and not just
promises -, some grain consignments, the pay and supplies for the mercenaries. Kruja 197: Skanderbeg
returned empty handed to Albania back.
SKANDERBEG'S LAST VICTORY In January 1467, news of Kruja's affliction in Italy, about the alleged
conquest of the Venetian fortress Alessio by Balaban, was chased in Italy in l989. The Kruja defended by
the Venetians, however, held out. The raids of the Ottomans, but above all the ravages of the previous
year had not broken the spirit of resistance. As soon as Skanderbeg had landed in Albania, the first
reports of Albanian victories against the Ottomans arrived in Italy.199 Obviously Skanderbeg exerted
himself on many people by his return, his renewed presence in the country to many people from a
tremendous attraction. Because they were streaming towards him. Skanderbeg went first to Venetian
Albania, where he now received support after the diplomatic revival in Italy20D He had only one goal: the
dismissal of Krujas, the annihilation of Balaban. At the end of April, a Ragusan who had traveled from the
mouth of the Bojana River near Skutari to Puglia reported that 16,000 men had already gathered around
Skanderbeg and that their numbers were growing daily1. Demetrio Franco makes quite credible
statements when he writes that a total of 13,400 men appeared at the assembly station, including 400
horsemen and 400 excellent foot-slaves; 100 heavily armed armored riders; 500 Italian mercenaries from
Skutari; 1,000 horsemen and 3,000 men on foot from the ramparts of Venetian-Albania, Skutari, Drivasto,
Antivari, Alessio and Durazzo were gathered together on the wide plain in the face of the saddle-shaped
hill of Rosafa. The Skutarin voivod Nikola Moneta, a rich patrician and partisan of Venice, as well as Leka
and Nikola Dukagjin joined Skanderbeg. Together they marched through the wide mouth of the Mati and
made their way through the forests of Jonima to the very limits of Krujas'OJ. Skanderbeg climbed the
steep mountain heights of the Mali i Krujes behind the castle. The other troops lurked in forest hiding
places. At the thunder of a bombard, they set off for the decisive battle between Skanderbeg and the
Balaban clan. First Skanderbeg with 1,500 men beat Balaban's brother, who was named after Barletius
Jonima. Shortly thereafter, on St. George's Day (April 22, 1467), he overran the Ottoman camp at Kruja,
probably in conjunction with some Venetian troops. Balaban was badly wounded by a shot in the throat
and died on the day of the battle. Kruja was saved. Skanderbeg made his entrance into the castle and
provided them with mouthfeeding. • In no time, the news reached Venice, where on May 8, 1467, jubilee
celebrations were held to defeat Kruja'08. In their enthusiasm, the Venetians already saw Albania as a
natural fortress against the Sultan: Leka Dukagjin would block the passes and give access to the Grand
Duke
I
to the Adriatic209 Because the signs were increasing that Mehmed II wanted to complete his work from
last year. This time Venice took a completely different attitude; for in 1467 it was the Neapolitans who
negotiated with the sultan. The ambassador Bernardo Lopez stayed in May 1467 for negotiations in the
Ottoman Valona. He did not return to Henn until June 27, empty-handed. The Venetians had also brought
up his ship on the high seas.2 While Ferrante had been pressing the Pope to help Skanderbeg in the
previous year, Venice made two special ambassadors to the Holy See in early April with a similar
mission. But it would be wrong to assume that Venice suddenly had his augerunerk directed entirely upon
the defense of Albania and abandoned the primacy of Italian affairs. On the contrary; Venice's aggressive
behavior had intimidated its neighbors so much that on 4 January 1467 Milan, Florence and Naples
concluded an alliance in Rome which, although formally open to St. Mark's republic, was barely
countered. Venice responded by sending condottiere Bartolomeo Colleoni to Romagna and Tuscany and
supporting Milan's opponent Savoy. Colleoni was defeated in July 1467, but it was only on April 25, 1468
an Italian peace 2! 2 The Pope was formally not included in the alliance, but the Venetians felt it
necessary to threaten him with secret negotiations, the mentioned Jewish middlemen with Mehmed Ir. still
led! The Sultan knew how to parry Venetian politics. He offered a special peace to the Hungarian king
Matthias Corvinus through a Ragusan ambassador. "4 Corvinus accepted the offer and sent an
ambassador to Sofia, where the sultan collected troops for his Albania campaign." 5 Thus the sovereign
kept his back free. His adversaries in the West were divided or played out by skillful diplomacy. The road
to Albania was open. 4 Corvinus accepted the offer, and sent an ambassador to Sofia, where the sultan
gathered troops for his campaign in Albania. "5 Thus the sovereign kept his back free. His adversaries in
the West were divided or played out by skillful diplomacy. The road to Albania was open. 4 Corvinus
accepted the offer, and sent an ambassador to Sofia, where the sultan gathered troops for his campaign
in Albania. "5 Thus the sovereign kept his back free. His adversaries in the West were divided or played
out by skillful diplomacy. The road to Albania was open.
EXPLOITATION AND DEATH kanderbeg's triumph over Kruja had angered the Grand Hath.26 He was
determined to finally overthrow Albania, even if it meant the complete devastation and depopulation of the
country. From previous campaigns he had gained the experience that did not lead to a quick thrust to
Kruja the goal. Viehnehr he had Skanderbeg Messrs
area, especially the inaccessible forest and mountain areas, slowly combing through. In order to deprive
the resistance of the basis, he had to destroy the entire population, not only the fighters, as well as their
livelihood. It was a terrible plan, and it was not Umecht who was called in Italy Mehmed H. the new
Attila.217 The campaign of 1467 was better planned than the company of the previous year. Resistance
nests in the back of the front should be eradicated. The lack of supplies and stockpile that had forced the
sultan to retreat in 1466 was met with far-reaching measures. Immediately after the arrival of the army,
Albania was plundered, and grain and other food was brought to Elbasan, whose invaluable value was
now proved. At the end of June 1467, it was said that in Venice, Elbasan offered the sight of an army
camp teeming with activity; 200,000 people should be stored there, with 60,000 vehicles for the transport
of material and food; Guns were cast'1 '. This time also Venetian Albania should not be spared. For even
in tense relations with the Signoria, Skanderbeg found refuge and help in the Venetian part of Albania,
especially in Alessio and the solid Skutari. To eliminate the Venetian rule in Durazzo, from which the
siege Kruj as could be disturbed. The Grand Lord took his time. He himself did not appear in Albania until
May 1467. Venice too waited until the end of this month for it to send a fleet of 15 galleys into the waters
off Durazzo.219 But Skanderbeg's fate did not settle on the coast, but in the hill country on Shkumbin, in
that landscape Buzurshek, where Mehmed H. had suffered a defeat in his withdrawal last year. The
sources shed no light on the preparations of the insurgents, do not tell who with Skanderbeg protected
the passports. But Skanderbeg suffered the decisive defeat there; his losses must have been great'20
again treachery was in the game, again Albanian imitators of the Ephialtes had been at work. However,
the traitors shared the fate of the betrayed: 3,000 inhabitants of pass areas that had become Sultan were
deported by the Ottomans22 '. What followed was like the events of the previous year, only horror
reached an even higher degree: "He plundered, burned, devastated, annihilated, and wiped out"
223. Fire, death, deportation, Attack on Kruja, Durazzo and Skutari: finis Albaniae. Despite his victory at
Buzurshek, the Sultan had not yet gained control of the mountains. Apparently, many of Skanderbeg's
followers had taken refuge with their families in hard-to-reach areas; "he did not bear the sight of the
army, as if it were a Gorgonian
The Adriatic Sea between Durazzo and Brindisi was full of refugee boats that sailed every hour. Closed
city gates, misery and epidemics awaited the refugees in Puglia'2 '. In the face of the danger, Venice
showed that it was capable of resolute resistance. 18 galleys were brought together before Durazzo, the
ramparts manned with Italian mercenaries. On July 3, the Grand Duke encamped at the ore, about five
miles from Durazzo. But nature opposed the sultan. The river overflowed and turned the already swampy,
salt-panned land into a swamp where the 12-15,000 Ottoman riders got stuck230. After this failure, it was
necessary to break the resistance in the mountains. This should be done by a complete
depopulation. This gave the Ottoman warfare in Southeastern Europe a new dimension. The Ottoman
army used a stratagem-it deceived the trigger-to lure people from their hiding places, especially north and
north-east of Kruja. As soon as they reached their villages, Ottoman troops fell upon them in a single
night and "almost captured them all". At the same time, lightly-armed units roamed the remotest pastures
and rummaged through the remaining people on Kritobulos, telling how birds had reached the Ottomans
on the last rock spur; Mountains, valleys, gorges, caves and every hiding place they would have combed
through; nothing was hidden from them; in two weeks they accomplished a work of destruction. In Venice
it was said until Bila fireplace and put everything in ruins'36. Bila fireplace is probably the supposedly
impregnable fortress, the 286th until Bila fireplace and put everything in ruins'36. Bila fireplace is probably
the supposedly impregnable fortress, the 286th
The Sultan is said to have thinned in the mountains. Farther north, the sultan himself did not advance. On
July 14, 1467, he sent his Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha, with 60,000 riders, to Northen. The target was
Skutari. In order not to fail on the rivers Drin and Bojana, the Ottomans had built bridges there in June
and had them fortified with ski jumps, this time with success; no Skanderbeg prevented them from doing
so. For three days, the Ottomans devastated the wealthy district of Skutari, capturing large numbers of
livestock. "The enemy roamed the plains and the mountains ... so that within a radius of many miles ...
there is no house left, no human being lives anymore." 239 Skutari himself was attacked, and a skutarin
war was fought. in which the lower city went up in flames240 • On 17. In July, Ottoman troops crossed the
Drin and appeared before Dagno. From there
They moved on to the mountains of Leka Dukagjin. Mahmud Pasha then united with the chief army of the
sultan, who had returned from Kruja to the mattress. The aim of the venture against Venetian Albania was
obvious: on the one hand, the inhabitants of this province and their masters were intimidated in the
lagoon city, on the other served the raids of supplying the huge sultan army - of allegedly 200-300000
Marm - that had to live in the country. Significant is also the attack on Leka Dukagjin. He also fought his
Turkish fight, and he also paid a high price: Progon and now Nikola Dukagjin fought on the Ottoman side,
and so were not only in the former rule of Skanderbeg, but also in the mountains of Dukagjin Albanians
against Albanians. Far east, Outside of the scope of the Italian sources, the final battle was fought in
Dibra: "Zar Mehmedbey came to the country Debar", wrote a Slavic short chronicle, another complements
that he was there against the Albanians (Arbanasi) and their leader "Skenderbeg Ivanovic
"Fought'42. Skanderbegs Kemland was completely devastated, the villages burned down, the population
largely killed or abducted. Many people embezzled themselves so as not to fall into the hands of the
Ottomans 24 '. At the end of July or beginning of August, Mehmed 11th retreated. He could be satisfied
with the campaign. Albania was plundered, burnt out, murdered. The sultan marched south and stayed on
4 'in the second half of October, near the important southern Albanian port of Valona. Ottoman units laid
siege to Kruja, Ottoman sub-generals and their Albanian followers prepared for raids. Skanderbeg and
the Venetians should not be given a respite after the heavy fighting. In the hands of the Sultan again
played the Italian squad: The Neapolitan envoy Mehmed 11 had the end of 287
Juli said how much he hates Venice'45. So he dripped diplomatic poison into Italian wounds. The success
came at once. Skanderbeg took help from where he got them. When a Neapolitan unit of 200 Maml
landed in Albania to reinforce Kruja's defenders, Skanderbeg took over. He had to be indifferent to the
fact that he supported F errant's double game. The Venetian squad commander of Kruja kept the gates
locked. Desperately, Skanderbeg turned to the Venetian Alessio. In Venice, one believed to know that
Ferrante has already made an alliance with Mehmed II - and that Skanderbeg on behalf of the king, the
castle Kruja would be handed over to the Ottomans (probably second half of July 1467) '46. This mistrust
was, as far as Skanderbeg was concerned, justified by nothing, because shortly before this humiliation
Skanderbeg had written to the senate of St. Mark's republic and asked for troop assistance for the
recapture of the lost 247. The Venetians, spellbound on Colleoni's expedition to Tuscany, felt no desire
for a comprehensive counter-offensive. As in the previous year, they had maintained their position:
Although the Venetian villages between Dagno and Skutari had been destroyed, no solid place had been
lost. On the contrary: Because of the alleged impending betrayal of the Venetian commandant of Kruja,
Baldassare Perduzzi, the Neapolitan mercenaries partly killed, partly chase away. Officially, Venice
claimed to defend Kruja for the young Ivan Kastriota, a member of the Grand Council of the Mark
Republic. In fact, that had happened which Skanderbeg had predicted to the Milanese diplomats in Rome
in December 1466. After 15 years, the Aragonese were expelled from Kruja. Venice triumphed against
the background of depopulated and cremated Albania'48. Venetian Albania had assumed the importance
of a fortress that covered the sea routes on the Adriatic for the Republic. The fate of the inhabitants was
mainly seen in view of this purpose. Venice also held Kruja and was unwilling to give it to
Skanderbeg. Early on, the Venetian Senate made provision: On September 12, 1467, shortly after
Mehmed II's departure, the Venetian admiral of the Adriatic fleet, Jacobo Venier, was ordered to send a
galley to Apulia for 500 ducats of corn, salted meat, vinegar and buy vegetables, which should then be
made immediately to Kruja. The following spring, the Senate approved 1650 ducats for the maintenance
of the castle and occupation24 '. The weakened Albanian fur was still needed to stop the annoying
Ottoman raids. Venetian galleys appeared at the end of 288
July with Skanderbeg to turn off his nephew, who had nestled with 1300 Ottoman riders at Cape Rodoni -
so dangerously close to the routes of the Venetian galleys250: the bulk
The Venetian fleet had left Albania already at the end of July, the generalissimo on land, Josafat Barbaro,
was withdrawn in September! "Without any support in a strong fortress, Skanderbeg in the fall of 1467
was no longer master of the devastated, largely depopulated country:" He he lost all his dominion, partly
to his Turkish enemies, partly to friends and allies. "252 The success of Rodoni faded in the face of
universal distress More than ever, Skanderbeg was also a victim of the Venetian-Neapolitan
antagonisms. Grated between the two powers, he had lost everything. What more could he do than send
an ambassador to the third Italian power, who had given him a helping hand in earlier times? But at the
end of August, 1467, the pope only showed the envoy of the Albanian his cold shoulder; Skanderbeg,
impoverished, beaten, had become meaningless for Paul 11253. After this refusal Skanderbeg put all
hope on Venice. The Signoria was under heavy pressure from the Ottomans in their Albanian
possessions. After the sultan's departure, the Skutarinian plain was raided and sacked twice by Sinan
bey, then by Feriz bey, Nikola Dukagjin, and the Dobra Ottoman voivode'54. On October 26, 1467, the
Archbishop of Durazzo and Skanderbeg's son Ivan stepped before the Senate and asked for the supply
of Krujas and support in the fortification Rodoni, where had entrenched Skanderbeg. With reference to the
season, the senators comforted the two petitioners'55. Perhaps they will have learned that only four days
later, the Albanian connoisseur Leonardo Boldu left Venice for the Albanian port SI, Sergius near
Skutari. For the Republic of St. Mark, occupied in Italy, exhausted by the Albanian war, which devoured
great Sununs, once again hoped for peace. Mehmed 11, drove the Signoria before him, he threatened
their Albanian province and offered her at the same time negotiations. With the latter, he will hardly have
been serious. Rather, he wanted to know how strong Venice's longing for peace really was'56 He did not
stretch out his antennae by turning on an Albanian master Perhaps they will have learned that only four
days later, the Albanian connoisseur Leonardo Boldu left Venice for the Albanian port SI, Sergius near
Skutari. For the Republic of St. Mark, occupied in Italy, exhausted by the Albanian war, which devoured
great Sununs, once again hoped for peace. Mehmed 11, drove the Signoria before him, he threatened
their Albanian province and offered her at the same time negotiations. With the latter, he will hardly have
been serious. Rather, he wanted to know how strong Venice's longing for peace really was'56 He did not
stretch out his antennae by turning on an Albanian master Perhaps they will have learned that only four
days later, the Albanian connoisseur Leonardo Boldu left Venice for the Albanian port SI, Sergius near
Skutari. For the Republic of St. Mark, occupied in Italy, exhausted by the Albanian war, which devoured
great Sununs, once again hoped for peace. Mehmed 11, drove the Signoria before him, he threatened
their Albanian province and offered her at the same time negotiations. With the latter, he will hardly have
been serious. Rather, he wanted to know how strong Venice's longing for peace really was'56 He did not
stretch out his antennae by turning on an Albanian master For the Republic of St. Mark, occupied in Italy,
exhausted by the Albanian war, which devoured great Sununs, once again hoped for peace. Mehmed 11,
drove the Signoria before him, he threatened their Albanian province and offered her at the same time
negotiations. With the latter, he will hardly have been serious. Rather, he wanted to know how strong
Venice's longing for peace really was'56 He did not stretch out his antennae by turning on an Albanian
master For the Republic of St. Mark, occupied in Italy, exhausted by the Albanian war, which devoured
great Sununs, once again hoped for peace. Mehmed 11, drove the Signoria before him, he threatened
their Albanian province and offered her at the same time negotiations. With the latter, he will hardly have
been serious. Rather, he wanted to know how strong Venice's longing for peace really was'56 He did not
stretch out his antennae by turning on an Albanian master
more Skanderbeg - now negligible in the big game - but Alexius Span, Lord in the Kirital in the mountains
north of Skutari257. As in the previous year, the negotiations failed258. Thus the importance of
Skanderbeg rose again, and his complaints against the Venetian governors of Alessio and Durazzo were
taken more seriously. Already in September, the smart Milanese resident had realized that the Signoria
Skanderbeg
289
marked by a quarter-century of restless fighting, was seized in January 1468 by a fever'61. Musachi
relates that Skanderbeg was exhausted by all the enemies and had little hope left. One of the last to see
the kastriota alive was the calf-bladder Blasius, who was to use his ship to drive the Albanian lord upon
the driveline near Alessio; the sailor spoke of "Skanderbeg of Alessio"; not even a simple man got in
touch with Kruja'63. Nevertheless, when Skanderbeg received the news of an Ottoman raid, he wanted to
ride out again. In that case, the work in progress took him in three days (January 17, 1468). In Ragusa, it
was incorrect to say that an arrow shot killed the hero'64, while the former confidant of the last emperor of
Byzantium, Georg Sphrantzes, who lives on Corfu, reports of a "natural death" ''. Georg Kastriota's mortal
remains were buried in the church of St. Nicholas at Alessio'66. "You can imagine in what condition the
country that had lost such a great centurion was left behind, and there were few sons of the lords left who
had not perished in the long and gruesome wars." The ancients had almost all died, from old age or from
Gram '' 267 The trial of a third Sultan attack was spared Skanderbeg and his country. Nicholas to
Alessio'66. "You can imagine in what condition the country that had lost such a great centurion was left
behind, and there were few sons of the lords left who had not perished in the long and gruesome wars."
The ancients had almost all died, from old age or from Gram '' 267 The trial of a third Sultan attack was
spared Skanderbeg and his country. Nicholas to Alessio'66. "You can imagine in what condition the
country that had lost such a great centurion was left behind, and there were few sons of the lords left who
had not perished in the long and gruesome wars." The ancients had almost all died, from old age or from
Gram '' 267 The trial of a third Sultan attack was spared Skanderbeg and his country.
290
v FAMA PERENNIS
THANKS to a single lament echoing from the Albanian mountains, the news of Skanderbeg's death still
appears after a while. All Albania is in turmoil and despair, according to reports from Durazzo to Venice
'. The Great Albanians flocked to mourn their hero. The suit was approved by Leka Dukagjin, who was
standing by the corpse of his old rival, with whom he had finally pulled together against Kruja. After
Franeo, who was probably an eyewitness, Leka exclaimed: "Oh Skanderbeg, our king, good, holy, all our
consolation, our brother, our umbrella, how could you leave us like orphans, like sheep without
shepherds? Out of the hands of the unbelieving Turks, our so powerful enemies, woe to our poor peoples!
Woe to big and small! Woe to Albania "2 Everywhere in the Balkans, from Corfu to Dalmatia, the Cbrists
took the news with sadness. In Albania, the hero's song and legend took over. The lamentations that
Sabellico's father knew sounded. It was said that Skanderbeg's faithful warhorse, who would have
tolerated no one but his master, shed tears, day and night had stamped and knocked it out, and then,
exhausted, had sunk to the ground so as not to rise. ' While Skanderbeg finally entered the realm of the
legend, the survivors had to act. How small Skanderbeg's power had been in his last months is shown by
a look at the reactions of the Albanian forces. His son Ivan had just returned from Venice. ' On February
26, 1468, King Ferrante invited Andronika Kastriota into his kingdom with warm words; he had given aid
to the living Skanderbeg in accordance with his own political interests. The dead
291
7 Ivan Kastriota and his mother Andronika decided not to go to southern Italy. On their way to Puglia, they
were accompanied by numerous widows of fallen nobles. The Kastriota had left Albania only a few weeks
after Skanderbeg's death. There Venice took over formally power. The Alban, most respected by the
Castriota, Archbishop Paul Angelus, who, unlike Ivan Kastriota, remained in the lagoon city, sent the
Senate to Durazzo. One needed the reputation of Skanderbeg's closest advisor, "a very wise man," as a
Venetian governor meant, 9 in order to consolidate his own power. Angelus enjoyed "faith and prestige in
the wife and son, the following and the subjects of the late Mr. Skanderbeg" ID But the well-broken man
soon followed his master to the grave (before March 1469) 11 The Venetians were concerned above all
about the administration of Skanderbeg's reign; They already had Kruja, and securing the mattress and
the forest area around Kruja was especially important to them. In the spring and summer of 1468, they
therefore sent several hundred mercenaries to Albania J2 At the same time, they made another attempt,
with Mehrned Il. to reach a peace. In addition to the Morea, the Greater demanded Albania and especially
Kruja 13 Mehrned Il. He was determined to avenge the ignominy that had befallen his father once, but
himself three times before that castle. The signoria could only be concerned with reinforcing the fortress
and putting in a competent crew. For the first few months, Baldassare Perduzzi remained in
command. Since he repeatedly defended Kruja against Ottoman attacks, so had proven to be on the post,
there was initially no reason to replace him. It was only when Perduzzi died in the autumn of 1469 that the
Senate decided to formalize Kruja's administration
affiliate of the Republic. Had Perduzzi only the unofficial title of a "govemador" worn, created the Senate
now the office of a governor (provisor) of Kruja; In accordance with the importance of this office and the
danger to the public official to be elected by the Maggior Consiglio, the salary was set at 800
ducats. While the administration of Krujas was still advising in Venice, after the death of Perduzzi, the
patrician Jacomo da Mosto, who was staying in Alessio, was in a hurry after command of the Venetian
governor of Skutari, who commanded all the Venetian villages in the province during the war in Albania
Kruja groped and conducted there for eight months (September 1469 - April 1470) without salary and with
great devotion the defense. It was only in December 1470 that the Grand Council finally proceeded to
elect a proper Provisor: the choice fell on the patrician Nicolo Basegio; Of course, it took another six
months to leave Venice. But Kruja could not be sustained without the help of the neighboring Albanian
nobles. The chronicler Muzaki summarized their situation: "The boys of Albania were almost all dead.
Those gentlemen remained, namely Mr. Araniti Komino, Mr. Gojko Balsa, Mr. Nikola and Pal Dukagjin,
Mr. Gjin Muzaki, my father, Mr. Andrea Thopia and Mr. Peter Span, all of them were old and had largely
lost power and domination, as I have already said, but we defended ourselves as well as possible, even
though we had lost a lot of land "I '. The Middle Albanian nobles could hardly hope for more. The
construction of Elbasan had sealed her fate; the Aranites emigrated to Italy in 16 or went to Islam. The
Muzaki aucb remained only the crossing to Puglia. In turn, Repos Thopia, Skanderbeg's nephew, fell to
Islam and attempted to rule as an Ottoman servant in the depopulated landscape. 17 The Venetians tried
to win him over, but at the same time the Senate ordered that Mamica, Reposs's mother, be for security
reasons of the state of Durazzo 18.
Further north, in the shadow of the Venetian fortresses Kruja and Alessio, life began to stir again. The
BalSiCi, relieved so hard by Skanderbeg, reappeared. Ivan Balsic, whom Skanderbeg had incarcerated
l9, demanded Skanderbeg's legacy before the Venetian Senate on March 24, 1469. And Venice
agreed; Ivan received part of Skanderbeg's annual allowance, the old district of Kruja without the castle, a
house in Dulcigno, promise of asylum - for which he vowed to fight the Ottomans and their followers20. In
Ivan the old indomitable spirit of BalsiCi lived on; In 1470 his tone became more demanding, not least
because Venice lined up with the payment of the annual allowance. This then triggered the violent end of
Ivan
293
slain at a meeting; Alone, in a wild melee, he would have killed himself; the Venetians threw the heads of
their lords into the ambushed men of Ivans and broke through to Kruja (Winter 1472/73) 22 The alliance
with BalSi was extended to Gojko Strez BalSi after Ivan's death (1476), and even after the death of both
gentlemen, Venice continued to make payments to their sons. The Venetian possessions became more
fortunate for the voivods of Skanderbeg in the highlands above Krujas. Based on the Venetian
occupation, some of these men had resisted the Ottoman attacks, according to Vuk Skura in "The
Mountains of Benda ob Kruja '. 24 His help was particularly important, since from 1470 Kruja was under
constant siege by the Ottomans. The Dukagjin were unstable as always: to satisfy them, Leonardo Boldu,
an Albanian patrician who had traveled to Skutari from unsuccessful negotiations with Mebmed II in the
spring of 1468 and assumed the office of governor in Skutari, had reconciled the hostile family parts In the
highlands, Leka and Nikola had arrested their brother Progon and transferred them to Dungeon after
Skutari. Progon had escaped and converted to Islam; after that he had chased away his help from the
brothers with Ottoman help. A few weeks after Skanderbeg's death, Boldu concluded an agreement, and
on March 29, 1468, he was able to make a solemn entrance into Skutari. "But soon the feud broke out
again, and again a Venetian patrician, this time Josafat Barbaro, had to mediate (spring 1469) ). Pro gon
returned to the Christian camp; he died before 1471. Then, however, Leka and Nikola began to
fight; Leka summoned the Ottomans, but was vanquished by Nikola Dukagjin and Josafat Barbaro, as it
had been a decade and a half earlier, on the Drin, by the Black Mountains of Dagno. but many Ottomans
were killed.26 But then Nikola must have fallen away from Venice again, for in 1471 he offered the
Signoria to prove the will = return by luring an Ottoman unit into a trap. It will hardly surprise that two
years later Leka returns to the camp of the Ottomans. Leonardo Boldu pursued him with his Skutarinern
into the mountains and burned down the grain fields (1473) 27. The tiresome back and forth between
Ottomans and Christians, which had marked the history of Dukagjin for decades, continued after
Skanderbeg's death. This wavering was only possible because the Greater pursued goals far away from
the Albanian mountains. Between 1474 and 294
In 1479, however, the fate of the Christian territories of the country was fulfilled. In the early summer of
1474 Skutari narrowly withstood an extremely hard siege by the governor of Rumelia. Ivan Crnojevic had
descended from his mountains and defeated the Ottomans with his shepherd warriors. Three years later,
however, the attempt of the Venetians to horrify the starving Kruja ended with a disaster similar to that of
the Aragonese before Berat, two decades earlier. In 1478, exhausted defenders Krujas finally opened the
gates. The Sultan took revenge on them, after which he had been thirsting since 1450. Then his army
encamped the castle hill Rosafa of Skutari. The fortress stopped. The Republic of Venice, however, gave
up the sixteen-year fight against the Ottomans shortly thereafter. Skutari was handed over to the
sultan. In long columns, the Scutars, carrying the relics, came down from the castle hill and boarded the
galleys, which took them to their new home, Venice and Friuli. Drivasto had previously been stunned, his
so Catholic population was cut down; also fell the castles of Crnojevici at Skadarisee. Alessio, however,
was rashly evicted by the Venetians at the customer of the Ottoman march. The Ottomans followed the
escapes and boarded their ships in the shallow waters of the Drin. "The customer rushed through the
Ballean, in faraway Wallachia the voivode (Prince) let the citizens of the transylvanian trading town of
Kronstadt, beyond the Carpathians, the fall of Christian castles in northern Albania ". The conquerors
Alessios stormed to the church of St. Nicholas and vomited Skanderbeg's tomb: The bones of the dead
hero distributed the Ottoman warriors as an amulet, which was to make invincible, hung around his neck.
• Beyond his death, the hero exerted an uncanny influence on his opponents, superhuman powers,
magical energy attributed to him by the Muslims. With the flight and emigration of the defenders Skutaris
and Alessios ended the history of ancient Albania. His society had been completely circulated, its main
cities destroyed, depopulated or greatly weakened. A deep cultural break separates the Albanian
Christian Middle Ages from the now rising Ottoman period, which was to last until 1912. While many
Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians visit southern Italy,
(Patrilinearity) and marry only women from outside their own kinship association (exogamy). When at the
beginning of the twentieth century the only genealogical pedigrees passed down from generation to
generation to prevent blood-related women from joining the group turned out to be that no tradition dates
back to 1500, that is the tribes had formed as a result of the Ottoman conquest. "Above all, however, the
deep cut in the oral memory was revealed: before the invasion of the Ottomans, before the collection
Skanderbeg had existed a completely different world, which had fallen largely to oblivion. Nothing proves
the deep shock of a whole society better than the change of the name of the people: In the Middle Ages,
the Albanians had referred to a term whose root was "arb" or "alb", which is why the surrounding peoples
they still today as "Albanoi" (Greek), "Albanci" (Serbian), "Arnavud" (Turkish) or "Albanesi" (Italian )33 In
the early modern period, however, the new self-designation "Shqiptar" appears, which in the Middle Ages
is only used as a family name in Drivasto34. The Christian Albanians who had emigrated to Greece and
Italy before or during the Ottoman conquest, however, have until today kept the old proper name
"Arvanite" or "Arberesh". Thus the Ottoman rule had brought about a complete change of society and
self-understanding of the survivors. The old folk name, which was connected with the Christian Albania
Skanderbegs, to which especially the Arbereshen should remember for centuries, was displaced in a
region which became more and more islamised from the 17th century onwards: "Shqiptar" (which is now
outdated). Skipetare "at times also into the German entrance ha ~ in more recent Serbian parlance than"
Siptar ", however, has a contemptible-racist aftertaste) marks a new, entirely on the Ottoman Empire and
its Islamic empire-oriented identity. The demographic catastrophe of the Ottoman conquest had changed
Albania like no other landscape in the Balkans. But what happened to the Kastriota? For a few years, they
disappear from history. Born in 1455, Ivan was too young to intervene in the fight itself. His mother will
have been glad to consume the income of her fiefs. She did not live in the highlands of Gargano, but in
the port city of Manfredonia. This was also Sultan Mehmed II listened to. In the winter of 1473/74, V1atko,
the new Duke of St. Sava, was informed that the Grand Duke was planning to send 30,000 men to
Manfredonia in order to occupy this sanctuary of the Kastriota. In March 1474, the Herzegovinian wrote
warningly to Venice 35. This letter also shows that the Kas296 To send 30,000 men to Manfredonia to
take this sanctuary of the Kastriota. In March 1474, the Herzegovinian wrote warningly to Venice 35. This
letter also shows that the Kas296 To send 30,000 men to Manfredonia to take this sanctuary of the
Kastriota. In March 1474, the Herzegovinian wrote warningly to Venice 35. This letter also shows that the
Kas296
triota continued to communicate with their Slavic neighbors in the Balkans. Also from Albania they
received continuous news. When Krujas's distress was the greatest, Ivan, now twenty-three, offered the
Signoria to blow up the siege ring (January 1478) 36. A little later, however, the castle fell. After the
Venetian-Ottoman peace then became reality, what had been feared in Italy for decades: An Ottoman
fleet sailed from Valona to the lying in sight Apulian port Otranto and stormed this under great bloodshed
(August 1480) 37. In the Balkans, there was no more staying for the Christian masters; Leka Dukagjin
and Ivan Crnojevic fled to Apulia, where so many of their peers already lived. Meanwhile, Ivan Kastriota
rode with his king's army into the spur of Apulia 38. Then a message arrived which, as once the news of
Skanderbeg's death, upset everything: Mehmed 11. was dead, died on May 3, 1481. The sons Bayezit
and Cem quarreled over the succession, the janissaries were in Aufruhi. " In the barely subjugated
Albania, the Christians took to arms, sending to southern Italy and calling for Skanderbeg's son: Nikola
and Leim Dukagjin, with them Ivan Cmojevic, boarded the ships and hurried to their mountains, and Ivan
Kastriota also began to regain his paternal legacy He was helped by Albanian Stradiots from Morea, the
light horsemen who used Venice against the Ottomans, and came up to Albania under their commanding
officer, Kladas. In Durazzo the small army went ashore. Ivan Kastriota rode into his father's country,
cheered on by the old followers. At first, fortune in war seemed to weigh on the young prince. Probably in
August, accompanied by 4600 men, he took the castle of Stellush, conquered territories outside the reign
of his father. But on 25 September 1481 failed his attempt to seize Krujas40. The insurrection had now
also hit the south of Albania, especially the always restless villages on the cliffs of Himara. Kladas landed
there with four galleys and stormed the castle. With his Annbrustschützen he struck back in the rugged
rock country Ottoman relief. In the north, Ivan Crnojevic defended himself against similar
attacks. Meanwhile, the Ottomans had caught again: The Beylerbey of Rumelia had strengthened the
crew of Skutari and set the Sancakbey of Valona in march. The latter broke through an Albanian passport
and scared off Ivan Kastriota, who wanted to clear the battlefield. 42 In fact, there was no basis for a
reestablishment of Kastriota rule; Central Albania had not yet recovered from the devastation under
Mehmed II; moreover, the Ottoman army in the country was far superior to the insurgents. This was not
just 297 Central Albania had not yet recovered from the devastation under Mehmed II; moreover, the
Ottoman army in the country was far superior to the insurgents. This was not just 297 Central Albania had
not yet recovered from the devastation under Mehmed II; moreover, the Ottoman army in the country was
far superior to the insurgents. This was not just 297
Ivan Kastriota, but also Ivan Crnojevic and the Himarioten. The time of the Ottoman war was over. This is
how Ivan's life has continued as part of Neapolitan history. Returning to Puglia, in 1483 he fortified the
marina della montagna in Vieste at the foot of the Gargano and exchanged his fiefs at Gargano and S.
Giovanni Rotondo in 1485 against the county of Soleto and S. Pietro in Galatina, an area that was once
Sl but Balkan refugees in St. Mark's spread the glory of the Tärkenherden. This was not so difficult for
them, because Skanderbeg's name - in contrast to most other South Eastern European Farnese, with the
exception of Hunyadis - by the papal rhetoric, Furstliche letters and Albanian legations to European courts
in southern and western Europe already considerable notoriety in the males had learned the humanistic
scriptures. Through the efforts of the Angelic Circle, Skanderbeg became an almost classical figure of the
European renaissance, the symbol of the Tärkenkarnpfes, which continued to be used throughout the
whole of Europe in other biographies, plays on large and small - such as the 18th century. B. Bavarian
and Tyrolean stages and also a Vivaldi opera was celebrated ' 6 From Italy to Sweden, from Britain to
Russia, Skanderbeg became a common European. Only with the decline of the Ottoman danger around
1800 sank the interest in Skanderbeg as a symbol of Christian-Islamic opposition. A Skanderbegschrift
Benjamin Disrealis 57 from the year 1833 belongs already in another context, the Albania swarming,
which fed from lyrics of Lord Byron, the Beroisch300
male world Albanian warrior sang. The altered relationship with the Muslim Empire of the Ottomans was
expressed by Camille Paganel, whose scandalous biography was translated into German in 1856. The
impression of the Crimean War, when the Ottoman Empire of Great Britain and France was defended
against Russia, is unmistakable: "In the 15th century, Islam was a constant threat from conquest to
conquest / imminent 1m 19. In the twentieth century, the presence of the Turks has become a protective
defense, a condition of general equilibrium, and the cross protects the crescent ... Old hostilities,
centuries of rivalry have disappeared "58. Skanderbeg became in the Western world of the 19th century
to the point of purely scientific interest, to the object of research of fewer specialists, among whom are the
Idingende names: The first biography with scientific claim wrote with elegant pen of the Tyrolean Jakob
Philipp Fallmerayer, the most important Byzantinist of the first half of the century; He was soon followed
by Karl Hopf, the historian of Greece in the Middle Ages, who worked closely with the founder of modern
Albanian research, the Austrian consul in the epirotic Joannina, Johann Georg von Hahn. In addition to
this highly cultural memory, which went far beyond the Albanian milieu and can be described as a pan-
European phenomenon, was born in southern Italy, a popular culture of remembrance, also borne by
Albanian refugees, Those who came from the Peloponnese and the Albanian area into the Kingdom of
Naples and settled there in sparsely populated regions, where they form the group of Arbereshen still
existing today. 60 These brought with them their fight against the Ottomans as a founding myth to Italy
oral tradition, in songs and legends kept awake, and in a pronounced Christian interpretation of
Skanderbeg's fight.6 1 Skanderbeg's name was also remembered as a first name62. For centuries, the
Albanians remembered in the mountain villages of Basilicata, the valleys and hills of Calabria, on the
plateaus behind Palermo of the "Great Time" (Moti i madb) Skanderbegs "at Easter they also celebrated
the memory of their hero". A second strand of folklore was found especially among the Catholic Albanians
in the Balkans, for whom Skanderbeg's struggle constituted an important reference point for their
confessional identity in the early modern period. 6 • Catholics had both an oral tradition handed down in
song and a scholarly one the tradition borne by the small class of the Catholic clergy, which in turn was
linked to the two strands of the memory of Scanderberg in Italy. 301 a tradition borne by the small class of
the Catholic clergy, which in turn was linked to the two strands of the memory of the Scandal in
Italy. 301 a tradition borne by the small class of the Catholic clergy, which in turn was linked to the two
strands of the memory of the Scandal in Italy. 301
Franciscus Blancus, Albanian Frang Bardhi, Catholic bishop of Sappa, Sarda and Pulti, the dioceses on
the middle reaches of the Black Drin, praised the Kastriota as terror of the Turks and in his Latin-Albanian
Dictionary, printed in Rome in 1635, the "Dictionarium latino epiroticum" published in the following year a
biography of the hero, in which he vehemently defended the Albanian origin of Kastriota 67. For the first
time, the question of ethnicity emerges, which has been changing people's minds since the 19th century
up to the present day. While the printed biographies were accessible only to a negligible number of
readers, Skanderbeg lived on in folk tradition, in legends and songs. We talked about the churches of
Skanderbeg - so, that the Cathedral of Alessio was converted into a mosque because it was there that the
hero had buried his grave. Above all, those Christian Albanians invoked Georg Kastriota, who refused to
accept the Ottoman rule: Around 1600, when the Habsburgs were at war with the Sultan, many Albanians
looked hopefully to the Spanish kingdom of Naples, from which they, as once to Alfonso V. Times, help
awaited. Stories were told of "the example of the modern prince Georg Kastriota called Skanderbeg, who
ruled such a small part of Albania ... and with a small army defeated the camp of the Turks, which
numbered more than 200,000 persons, so many times". Conspirators against the Ottomans referred the
Spanish-Italian nobility to Mahmut pasha Bushatlliu, who established his own regional rule around Skutari
in the last years of the 18th century, described himself as the "heir of Skanderbeg," meaning the political -
not the religious - distance to the Sultan in Istanbul70. By the middle of the 19th century at the latest,
however, it can be assumed that the memory of Skanderbeg fell sharply and 302
was essentially tied to parts of the Catholic population. In Muslim central Albania, Skanderbeg's former
center of power, scarcely any trace of popular memory was found around 1850 71. Only a few
Skanderbeglieder can actually go back to the early modern period72. In addition, the Ottoman conquest
meant a real break in the culture of remembrance of northern and central Albania. The enormous
population losses through death, flight and deportation had an effect here. In the northern Albanian star
system, oral tradition refers to relationships that are traced back to a mythical ancestor of the
tribe. Persons not belonging to this association did not play any role in this thinking, and thus were
excluded as objects of memory. " - Religious and social change greatly reduced the potential for a
broader memory of the medieval hero. The decline of the remembrance of Skanderbeg is all the more
astonishing, considering the broad effect of the Skanderbeg myth in the 20th century. The memory of the
symbolic figure of the Albanian national movement that began in the last quarter of the 19th century was
only a few decades earlier anything but an unifying, identity-building element in the Albanian-speaking
West Balkan'4. The rediscovery of Skanderbeg took place in the course of the Albanians in the regional
comparison late incipient national movement. "A catalytic function took the Great Orient Crisis (1875-
1878), which forced the Muslim majority, which until then had been fully integrated into the Ottoman
system, into defensive aletions against its neighbors Greece and Serbia; However, the National
Movement received considerable intellectual stimulus from the Arbereses of Lower Italy, many of whom
had supported the Italian Risorgimento and, in particular, Garibaldi's movement.76 In this context,
Calabrian-born Italo Albanian Vincenzo Dorsa published a book in Naples in 1847 entitled "Su gli
Albanesi, Ricerche epensieri (About the Albanians, Researches and Thoughts), in which Skanderbeg was
celebrated as "Hero of Kruja" and "Ingenious Warrior" .7 Considerably greater broadening found, just
because of the genus, the Skanderbegepos of another Arbereshen, Jeronim de Rada, of a ravaged
Mazzini - and thus familiar with the radical and national ideas of Italy before 184878. His verses also
appealed to an illiterate audience that was easier to memorize bound speech than dry prose. They are an
expression of cultural continuity among the Arbereshen, who describe the myth Skanderbeg in a new, not
just religious, son
Whereas in the Arbereshen Skanderbeg was transferred from national tradition to the high-cultural sphere
in a sense of national romanticism and was rearranged in a modern etnational sense, such a continuous
flow was missing in many parts of the Albanian settlement area in the Balkans oral tradition. In the
Balkans, therefore, the memory did not grow out of broad sections of the population, it was revived from
above by intellectuals or created anew and anchored in the collective memory in a decades-long process.
In addition, local oral histories have been maintained in subregions, but essentially, the Skanderbeg cult
of the National Movement has been enlivened by the Southern Italians and a small group of nationalist
intellectuals. The latter drew inspiration from the emerging Occidental Albanian research as well as from
the Balkan Skanderbeg reminiscences, especially among the Greeks. The song, as a decisive medium,
spread remembrance of the hero into populations that ibn had long since forgotten. A separation of the
highly cultured and the popular Elements that contributed to the modern national cult are difficult and
ultimately artificial. When a French occupying officer in Albania observed during the First World War that
Muslims were lighting candles in front of Skanderbeg's picture, the whole complexity of the question
arises - for it is hardly to be assumed that these were old pictures of Skanderbeg, but pictures that
themselves - or their models - were carried from outside into the society of Albania82. The creation of
new ways of thinking and their processing in oral culture, as well as remnants of a late-medieval memory,
met each other in a productive way in the age of transition from religious to ethnic identities. Here, the
Skanderbeg tradition in the Orthodox neighbor populations was of considerable importance. It is no
coincidence that the South Albanian Orthodox publicist Jani Vreto was educated at the famous Greek
High School of Joannina, the Zosimea, where numerous Albanian elite members were trained in the 19th
century, made aware of the Kastriota by schoolmates. His poem on Skanderbeg written in 1847 was
inspired by the Greek cultural milieu, which had a decisive influence on the emerging Albanian national
cult nalun'3. However, it would take almost half a century before representatives of the numerically small
Albanian national movement, which is mostly active outside the Balkans Skanderbegmotiv worked out
that the Kastriota for 304
symbolic image of a new ethno-national identity and the claim to a separate state. In particular Naim
Frasberis Skanderbegepos marks this increase Skanderbegs (1898) 84. Frasheri was Bektashi. thus not
a Christian, and together with other leading representatives of the national movement, he propagated the
idea of an over the religions and denominations standing Albanian Nationalgefubls that Pashko Vasa in
the formula "The religion of the Albanians is Albanian" compressed, a buzz word, which set a goal but did
not reflect the sociocultural reality, but a buzzword that spurred national elites to create corresponding
realities. In this perspective, the symbol of Albanianism should have no religious
component. Skanderbeg's fight against the Muslim Ottomans was reinterpreted at the end of the 19th
century as a war of liberation against the sultans, devoid of any religious connotation. Thus this
intellectual interpretation of the hero corresponded to parts of the thinned folk tradition in the Balkans,
which saw Skanderbeg as the embodiment of the heroic ideal, but left his opponents in a peculiar semi-
darkness and did not specify against whom the hero was actually fighting. Skanderbeg thus became a
projection surface of national desires, the incarnation of national virtues; at the same time, it was
increasingly abstracted from the historical figure.
But the election of Skanderbeg was also a defensive act like the entire Albanian national movement, for in
the 19th century both Greeks, Macedo-Bulgarians and Serbs regarded him as an important figure in their
own national pantheon. This scandalous reception among the Balkan peoples is well-researched has
shown that a true folklore tradition scarcely existed. The oldest was the tradition of the Latvian writers of
Dalmatia, who in the early modern period sang the Turkish fight and its hero, including Skanderbeg as a
marginal figure. In 1849, the physician Juro Mati6 Sporer, working in Klagenfurt and Ljubljana, wrote a
tragedy entitled "Kastriota Skenderbeg", in which he situates the hero in a purely Slavic milieu. who are
connected by the orthodox faith. Local uprisings against the Ottomans, for example as a result of the
Crimean War (1854), or secret negotiations of the Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Koletti with Tuscan
Muslims were accompanied by Greek Skanderbegschriften, each of which formed a historical interpretive
framework of events. Especially in the second half of the 19th century, the Greek divide
306
With Skanderbeg, more and more a reflection of the changing relationship with the Albanians and Greek
expansion plans to the north. From the 1860s, the Greek origin of Skanderbeg was underlined, especially
with reference to its Greek-sounding name Kastriota (Greek: Kastriotis, Albanian: Kastrioti). When in the
1880s, the Greek Prime Minister Charilaos Trikupis forged plans for a Greek-Albanian state on the model
of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, Skanderbeg offered as a symbol as well as at the end of the 19th
century, when the ethnonational opposites between Greeks and Albanians tightened in Epirus. As late as
1904, he was celebrated as the embodiment of a "Greek-Arvanite kingdom", an idea The latest with the
Balkan wars and the founding of an independent Albanian state (1912) came to an end. How is this
popularity of Kastriota explained in modern Greek journalism? In contrast to the last Byzantine emperor,
Skanderbeg alone was closer to the young Greek state, symbolizing military success against the
Ottomans and the historical closeness of Orthodox Greeks and Albanians, which was much more popular
in the 19th century than in the 20th century. " While the Greek reference to Skanderbeg lost its
importance after 1900, Serbian propagandists used quite contradictory strategies on the one hand
Skanderbeg as a symbol of Serbian (Northern) Albanian merging (1866), on the other, forty years later
and under changed political circumstances, the thinned Skanderbeg memory in large parts of the
Albanian population as evidence of a lack of ethnic identity and even for the alleged Serbian turn of the
medieval hero96. For example, the journalist Spiridon Gopcevic, acting as propagandist of the Serbian
expansion in the Ottoman Balkans, claimed that all the Nordalbans were Serbs and Skanderbeg had
acted out of an injured Serb national feeling. "In Montenegro, whose tribal structures were closely related
to northern Albanian relations, resulting in mental proximity revealed that Skanderbeg was celebrated as
the ideal of heroic masculinity ", as a Slavic warrior and the embodiment of a political expansion of
Montenegro to northern Albania. Towards the end of the 19th
The elevation of Skanderbeg by the Albanian national movement was intended to establish Albanian
sovereignty over this figure in Balkan Rabmen, which was perceived by Christian Balkan peoples as a
Christian Balkan hero. Until about 1880, this interpretation outweighed Skanderbegs, as Albanian
counter-positions were hardly formulated. From about 1900, however, Skanderbeg is classified in an
Albanian-national context. The South Albanian Faik Konica, who lives in BfÜssel and whose newspaper
"Albania" was financed by the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, l01 Austria-Hungary
essentially created the modern Albanian picture of history. The historically interested kuk consul in
Skutari, Theodor Ippen, insisted on it in 1897 . that Skanderbeg would have to play a prominent role in a
planned history of the Albanians; This was also the case in the first extensive Albanian-language national
history, printed under the name of an Albanian, whose true author was the best expert in the Albanian
Middle Ages, the. Magyarized Hungarian German Ludwig von Tha1l6czy (literally: Strammer) was lO2 It
was also Ippen who insisted that Skanderbeg's fight should be singled out, but less his resistance to the
Ottomans - because this did not seem very opportune to the diplomat. He thus contributed to the strange
image of his opponent, who remained strangely vague in the (newly created) song and in the journalism
and merely represented a background for Skanderbeg's heroic deeds, which was to inspire national pride
in the Albanians around 1900. Many Albanian elite members studied in Austria before 1918 and during
the inter-war period, and after their return consolidated this new national view of history. How strong
Skanderbeg was adopted as a symbolic figure throughout the entire Albanian settlement area, is difficult
to determine. But it can be assumed that he, like other modern heroes, found his way into the collective
memory of broader populations. The relevant mechanisms in an oral society are not easy to determine. It
may be assumed, however, that the intellectual transformation of Skanderbeg into folk songs was also
anchored in educational populations, and the myth became - or was - a part of folk memory. The
increased importance of the hero can also be seen in the attempts of foreign powers to exploit the
memory of the Kastriota politically. This applies - in addition to Austria-Hungary - primarily for Italy, from
where anyway essential elements of the new Skanderbegbildes originated and which stood in an
increasing contrast to the Danube monarchy for supremacy on the Adriatic. Already around 1880 308
and their Muslim beliefs were hardly suitable as objects of identification, even less for justifying the claim
to statehood in a Christian Europe. The recourse to the pre-Ottoman period was followed by patterns of
thought of the neighboring countries of southeastern Europe, which also placed medieval empires at the
center of their newly created histories. In the Albanian case, however, it was not only because of religious
differences that personal symbols were missing. There had not been a whole Albanian communication
space so far, and in the northern Albanian tribal structure and family circumstances, as we have seen,
outstanding personalities who did not belong to their own federation, only a very limited meaning -
identification figures beyond national tribes with supraregional charisma, but without Ottoman or
perceptible religious character were not available. An actually broad propaganda of Skanderbeg began in
the interwar period, so after the establishment of an independent Albanian nation state (1912), whose
education began to spread national histories nationwide. Of course, at the beginning of the Albanian state
school system there was no consensus that would have put Skanderbeg at the center of the lesson; on
the contrary, early reading books mention it with no syllable, but tell in detail of far less important Christian
nobles of the late middle age. From the middle of the twenties onwards Skanderbeg appears more
frequently in textbooks, although to be sure there is no quite uniform interpretation. In a textbook from
1924 about the Ottoman rule of the 15th century is described against the background of recent Albanian
experiences with the Ottoman state and as motivation Skanderbeg the term pair "atdM" (Fatherland) and
"koms!" (Nationality) highlighted 108 A textbook from the early days of the President and later King Ahmet
Zogu, however, puts more weight 309 In the light of the recent Albanian experiences with the Ottoman
state, Skanderbeg described the terms "atdM" (fatherland) and "koms!" (Nationality) highlighted 108 A
textbook from the early days of the President and later King Ahmet Zogu, however, puts more weight
309 In the light of the recent Albanian experiences with the Ottoman state, Skanderbeg described the
terms "atdM" (fatherland) and "koms!" (Nationality) highlighted 108 A textbook from the early days of the
President and later King Ahmet Zogu, however, puts more weight 309
on Skanderbeg as - also in its physical appearance - embodiment of the heroic ideal and the protective
wall function of Albania for Europe 109. The Albanian population remained in the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes (so-called SHS state, from 1929: Yugoslavia) except from the increasing, state-
sponsored Skanderbegverehrung 110 The Skanderbegbild received a new impetus from the first
biography with scientific claim, which was given by a The author, Stilian Fan Noli, is one of the most
dazzling figures in modern Albanian history; as a co-founder of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of
Albania, socialist - henceforth known as the "Red Bishop" - head of government in 1924, The victim of a
coup led by Ahmet Zogu with the help of the SHS state and finally an exile intellectual, he played a
significant role in the twentieth century Albanian intellectual history, also because he was captured by the
communist system after 1945 because of his socialist ideology. Noli continues thinking strands that had
already been created in the Frasheri's work, but continues to weave on the legend of Skanderbeg's royal
title and introduces a new dimension - Skanderbeg as an admirer of society - which betrays the influence
of Russian events after 1917: Noli celebrated Skanderbeg as a figure "holy as Louis the Saint, a diplomat
like Talleyrand, a hero like Alexander the Great" ll 1 Noli's work was also reprinted in communist Albania
and, with its nationalist patterns of thought, has probably shaped the Albanian skanderbeg image more
than any other biography. But not Noli, but his opponent Ahmet Zogu from the Matigebiet determined the
development of Albania until 1939. Under Zogu's authoritarian royal dictatorship (since 1928) learned
Skanderbeg another interpretation, which is to be interpreted as an adaptation to the needs of the regime:
Skanderbeg was now, following ideas Sami Frasheris - and unspoken: also Nolis - 112, as the first
Albanian king, thus as a forerunner and legitimizing figure for Zogu 's system of rule: Skanderbeg was
inserted into the newly emerging nationally sponsored national iconography and thus visually present in
the country. Admittedly, the regime was denied access to Skanderbeg's helmet and sword, as Austria,
which had taken possession of the objects from the Habsburg collections, refused to surrender them by
reference to the pledging of these objects. Zogu's eulogists considered the new king and Skanderbeg to
be Albanian in a row understood ancient rulers such as Alexander the Great and Pyrrhus. The
Skanderbeg cult Zogus assumed bizarre forms when the king became the great-grandson of the hero and
Skanderbeg 1II. (after Skanderbeg's son Ivan Kastriota) wanted to celebrate; he had Skanderbeg's
helmet copied and set 310 Zogu's eulogists saw the new King and Skanderbeg in a series with ancient
rulers Albanian as Alexander the Great and Pyrrhus. The Skanderbeg cult Zogus assumed bizarre forms
when the king became the great-grandson of the hero and Skanderbeg 1II. (after Skanderbeg's son Ivan
Kastriota) wanted to celebrate; he had Skanderbeg's helmet copied and set 310 Zogu's eulogists saw the
new King and Skanderbeg in a series with ancient rulers Albanian as Alexander the Great and
Pyrrhus. The Skanderbeg cult Zogus assumed bizarre forms when the king became the great-grandson
of the hero and Skanderbeg 1II. (after Skanderbeg's son Ivan Kastriota) wanted to celebrate; he had
Skanderbeg's helmet copied and set 310
II
I) '
him as a crown, supplemented with an "AZ" (for Ahmet Zogu) on the head 1l4; yet he found little favor
with the people, 5 not only because the embarrassment was out but also because a predominantly
Muslim people had just begun to get used to the Skanderbeg cult - the myth of the national, religiously
"emptied" hero The monarchical dimension of the Italian occupation regime was followed closely by
Vittorio Emanuele III, the king of Albania, who inherited this monarchical interpretation of Skanderbeg
from 1939 to 1943. He had the Albanian delegation set up the "Crown Skanderbegs" Add
Skanderbeghelm to the national flag of Albania; Skanderbeg served as patron saint of an Italian-Albanian
Institute of Science and a literary circle 1l6 At the same time Skanderbeg was celebrated as a symbol of
the close ties of Italy and Albania, referring to Skanderbeg's relations with Venice, Naples and the papacy
"7" On April 16, 1939, In the XVII of the 1mpero, in Italy and Albania, the tricolor and the red banner with
the black eagle Skanderbegs shone side by side in the spring sun. This is a historical fact. The fate of the
Albanian people, whom Skanderbeg wanted to see alongside Italy in his struggle for freedom against the
common enemy, is today linked to the glorious fate of the Italian Impero. Vittorio Emanuele IIf., King of
Italy and Albania,
Naples, the Roman Popes, and the Republic of Venice in an anti-Islamic action of European dimension,
the efficient organizer of national forces for the salvation and revival of a people ; the whole age of his
actions
finally merged with the European idea of the Crusade and the Venetian resistance in the Adriatic
possessions (Venice, pp.). "119 The Catholic component, too, received an uprising, which, however,
ultimately was not too offensive with regard to the Muslim Albanians However, northern Albanian
Catholics played a key role in the development of a fascist view of history.The Third Reich also used the
Skanderbeg myth, especially with the aim of setting up an SS division of the same name in Kosovo: the
racial-heroic element was pushed to the fore to mobilize the war effort'2]. 311
Albanian politicians, including the partisans, communists and anti-Communists alike, summoned
Skanderbeg as a symbol of their movement. But the instrumentalization of Skanderbeg by the king's
dictatorship and fascism did not discredit the myth of Mytbos. Rather, the figure of the communist regime
of Enver Hoxha in Albania and reshaped according to its needs. For those Albanians who are from the
short
Skanderbeg received the function of a symbol of cross-border cultural and ethno-national unity of all
Albanians, especially in view of the until 1966 continuing state repression. The culture of remembrance,
however, did not develop uniformly due to the different nationalities of the Albanians. In Albanian Enver
Hoxhas, the Mytbos Skanderbeg was added to new dimensions: not only as a state founder, he was
interpreted, but also as a social revolutionary, as a leader of the masses 123, as partisan general l2 '- this
socialist reading was adapted to the multiple changes in the direction of the regime12. Especially in the
imported from China Albanian version of the "Cultural Revolution" The picture of the heroic and lonely
fuller surrounded by enemies was drafted under the guidance of a wise, energetic leader. From there, it
was only a small step in the elaboration of a teleological picture of history that saw in Skanderbeg an
important stage in completing the historical mission of the Albanian people in the form of dictator Enver
Hoxha. The more Skanderbeg became ideologized, his image manipulatively redesigned, the weaker was
the scientific examination of the real figure, which would have endangered the ideological construct. This
was the interpretation of the leaders of the state and party, dictator Enver Hoxha, his deputy Mehmet
Shehu, and especially the Vorden- From there, it was only a small step in the elaboration of a teleological
picture of history that saw in Skanderbeg an important stage in completing the historical mission of the
Albanian people in the form of dictator Enver Hoxha. The more Skanderbeg became ideologized, his
image manipulatively redesigned, the weaker was the scientific examination of the real figure, which
would have endangered the ideological construct. This was the interpretation of the leaders of the state
and party, dictator Enver Hoxha, his deputy Mehmet Shehu, and especially the Vorden- From there, it
was only a small step in the elaboration of a teleological picture of history that saw in Skanderbeg an
important stage in completing the historical mission of the Albanian people in the form of dictator Enver
Hoxha. The more Skanderbeg became ideologized, his image manipulatively redesigned, the weaker was
the scientific examination of the real figure, which would have endangered the ideological construct. This
was the interpretation of the leaders of the state and party, dictator Enver Hoxha, his deputy Mehmet
Shehu, and especially the Vorden- his image was manipulatively redesigned, the weaker the scientific
examination of the real figure, which would have endangered the ideological construct only. This was the
interpretation of the leaders of the state and party, dictator Enver Hoxha, his deputy Mehmet Shehu, and
especially the Vorden- his image was manipulatively redesigned, the weaker the scientific examination of
the real figure, which would have endangered the ideological construct only. This was the interpretation of
the leaders of the state and party, dictator Enver Hoxha, his deputy Mehmet Shehu, and especially the
Vorden-
312
years of this national-Stalinist view of history, the later founding president of the Albanian Academy of
Sciences, Aleks Buda. Enver Hoxha gave the guideline: "With our national hero Georg Kastriota
Skanderbeg at the helm, our people fought with brilliant heroism for a quarter of a century, always winning
over the hordes of the Ottoman Empire because of freedom, independence, and independence Ground
fought ... The Albanian people made their way through history with the sword in their hands "l28. M.
Shehu seconded: "Our party, as a Marxist-Leninist party, has armed the patriotic, democratic and
revolutionary traditions of our people, the traditions of the legendary
Fighting for freedom and independence against foreign powers and (the traditions) of the revolutionary
movements for liberation and social progress always properly appreciated. Masterfully, the Party has
used the greatest advanced fighting traditions of the people and raised them to an even higher level for
the education of working people in the
A spirit of patriotism, of freedom and progress, of determination to self-denial in defense of the freedom
and independence of the fatherland, to defend the interests of the people against every enemy and under
all circumstances, has them as an inspirational factor in the mobilization of the popular masses In the
struggle for the liberation of the fatherland from the Nazi-Yashi yoke and in the struggle to build a socialist
society ... In these not only for the Albanian people, but for all peoples of Europe critical and tragic
circumstances, our people, the smallest people of the Balkan peninsula and Europe, under the leadership
of Georg Kastriota Skanderbegs on the historical responsibility taken to liberate the country and the
advance
to oppose the Ottomans and to open them up on Albanian soil, at the gates of Europe. It has famously
fulfilled this historic duty for 25 years, the whole time Skanderbeg was in the lead. Many historians ask
and have not yet understood how the small Albanian people, led by Georg Kastriota Skanderbeg, wanted
to rise with arms in hand against the largest and most powerful empire of that time, to wage a fight for 25
years, one titanic struggle, une [. to win brilliant victories that have astonished the world. We Marxist-
Leninists understand very clearly what were the causes of this "miracle" of our ancestors, the Albanian
people under the leadership of Skanderbeg. The decisive factor and the sole source of heroic resistance
and victory in this long and unequal struggle were the peoples, especially the peasantry. 313
The popular masses formed the counterbalance to the fickleness and betrayal of the feudal lords, they
took the initiative for a general uprising, they stood unbowed in this bloody struggle, they deserved first
and foremost the glory of victories, they gave that splendor to Albanian history For centuries it shone. The
popular masses of our country, led by Skanderbeg in the struggle against the power of the Ottomans in
the fifteenth century, laid the foundations of that heritage of valuable morality that later generations
developed into their patriotic and rhetorical traditions, and our party to a much higher level has lifted; so a
kalossale force of the movement arose to the achievement of their goals: To liberate the country from the
foreign power, to overthrow the exploiting classes, to build socialism and defend the historical victories of
the people against every enemy. The masses of the people of Skanderbeg plunged unreservedly into the
struggle for their independent economic, social and cultural development in order to defend the country's
freedom and independence, defend the material and spiritual values it had created, national
values. Under the leadership of Skanderbeg, all have participated in the fight against the Ottoman power:
men, women, children. "12 At most, the historical ideologist Buda set himself apart from the party
politicians with a slightly sharper rhetoric:" Skanderbeg is, to put it in graphic terms, one those giant
mountain oaks that you have to look at from a distance to notice how much they tower over their
surroundings ... Skanderbeg and the great struggle against the Ottoman invasion of Albania in the
fifteenth century can only be realized if our hero is placed in the context of interdependence with the
popular masses from which he emerged It was the expression of the virtues and vitality that the Albanian
people have demonstrated at every turn of the centuries. In the midst of great, aggressive empires, and
under the assimilation of the civilizations that represented them, in the Middle Ages the Albanians made a
difficult historical journey to defend their existence, their language, and their culture. They have proven
their vitality and extraordinary energy, they have destroyed any attempt to drive them from their fertile
areas in the plains, from the main roads, from the coast, and to keep them isolated, like fossil remains, in
the shell of a primitive economy and society, and to incur the legions of the Caesars to use the Byzantine
emperor and the Serbian kings. With sword in hand, like comrade Enver Hoxha in bril314
Merely summarizing and representing the centuries - long tradition of our ancestors, the Albanian people
had to pave their way to economic, social, political and cultural progress to gain the place that was among
the other peoples of the peninsula ... Among these Conditions, the war took on the character of a typical
people's struggle "130 The important Albania connoisseur Giuseppe Valentini called this interpretation as
a nationalist concept ... with racist features" 131. Skanderbeg became the symbol of an isolationist,
atheistic, paranoid and xenophobic regime, whose legacy still weighs on Albanian society today. This
Skanderbeg cult was unproductive and soon froze in meaningless rituals, which helped to stabilize a
system that eroded rapidly after Hoxha's death in 1985. Bizarre acted under Hoxha's successor Rarniz
Alia organized commemorations to the 517th, 519th and 52l. Death of the National Hero and the 544th
Anniversary of the League of Alisonio 132 A state-enforced monumental culture, which is also reflected in
its history. a, found in still images and the National Museum in Kruja J33, made in conjunction with the
education system for a widespread dissemination of the myth and its anchoring in the collective
consciousness of the population. The situation was different for the Albanians in what is now Communist
Yugoslavia: For them, Skanderbeg was a central symbol of their ethnic identity and especially of political
liberalization after 1966, when after the fall of Tito's Interior Minister Aleksandar Rankovic ended a more
than two decades of serious repression against the Albanian population. The use of national symbols was
also permitted to the Albanians in parallel to the granting of political autonomy. This was expressed in a
Scanderbeg Congress in PristinaJPrishtina, which received the greatest attention in the press: Kosovo
Albanian and Serbian historians were to treat the state ideology of "brotherhood and brotherhood" in
Skanderbeg's treatment Demonstrate unity; The presence of a large delegation from Albania documents
the improved relations of neighboring countries. As a result, however, it was above all the import of the
republican-banish Skanderbeg interpretation that l3 " how much the intellectual influence of Albania on
the developing Kosovo Albanian intelligentsia was very strong. This in turn formed at the University of
Prishtina numerous Albanian students from Macedonia, resulting in a gradual intellectual dependence in
the Albanian-speaking Balkans from the People's Republic of Albania to Kosovo and Kosovo to
Macedonia. JJ
315
Skanderbeg was interpreted as an ethno-national hero while the social revolutionary component
receded; The religious dimension of a Christian hero remained completely unnoticed in a traditionally
Muslim and superficially socialistically overshadowed society. 1) As in Albania, there was no actual
scholarly confrontation with Skanderbeg in Kosovo. Rather, thought patterns were adopted in the
People's Republic of Albania. Skanderbeg celebrations took place on a much more modest scale in the
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, where, compared to Kosovo, there was hardly an intellectual Albanian
elite. At the end of the 1980s, the Skanderbeg cult was anchored in the Albanian settlement area, but the
real figure was hardly known. Skanderbeg Was a project area for national desires and social ideas and
ideals; at the same time he was solidified by naming schools, clubs and a cognac brand as a largely
empty symbol in everyday life. The collapse of the communist system in Albania survived the scandal-
worship as once the overthrow of 1944/45, although in the chaotic transition phase, fewer resources for a
state-directed hero worship were available. In the Albanian settlement areas of Yugoslavia, on the other
hand, Skanderbeg maintained an important position, especially during the crisis of the 1990s. It served
the Kosovo Albanians as an important symbol of struggle and resistance against the Serbian government
137 Also the underground army U <; K ("Liberation Army of Kosovo" ) used the Skanderbegruythos -
even if the essential reference figures were taken from the twentieth-century Kosovar history - 138, a
model that radical Albanians, who in 2001 made an armed uprising in Malawi, lingered in their political
self-expression. 139 The downfall of the communist systems also brought about the end of the elite's
interpretive sovereignty: media diversity, but above all the Internet, created a new public and a new
plurality of opinion. The secular elites continued to regard Skanderbeg as a central symbolic figure. 140
This became clear in the creation of a Scanderbeg statue in Prishtina, which in 2001 demonstrated the
changed balance of power as well as the intellectual orientation towards Tirana:
316
see border through the Albanian settlement areas of western Macedonia led to the Macedonian
capital. The inauguration of the monument was used by Makedo-Albanian party politicians to position
themselves within the bipartisan Albanian-speaking community of the country - the statue not only sends
out a message to the Slav Macedonian majority population, but also accepts a special connotation for
Albanian-speaking Macedonian citizens 142 Skanderbeg's symbolic function for the political emancipation
of the Albanians of the former Yugoslavia was highlighted in autumn 2005 by congresses in Prishtina and
Skopje. The presence of the political elite and media interest underscored the political dimension of the
events. The interpretations, however, were not consistent. In Kosovo, Skanderbeg is primarily seen as a
symbol of state independence and freedom struggle, reflecting the current political interests of the Kosovo
Albanians. In Macedonia, Albanian journalists celebrate Skanderbeg as a symbol of ethno-national
identity and Albanian supremacy. The appearing in Skopje newspaper "Fakti" awarded on
26./27. November 2005 on its front page expressed this thinking: "It is a well-known fact throughout the
world that GK (Georg Kastriota, OS) confirms Skanderbeg in all documents and sources first-hand and
writes that he is the lord of Epirus, Macedonia and Albania be, and he's fanning a historical truth that
these areas were inhabited in unbroken continuity from the time of the Illyrians to their time by Albanians
and he was master of these regions, where the Macedonians were mostly servants or simple
mercenaries, which did not play an important role in his state, his army and his government played. They
were never a National Skanderbeg in blood and language. "144 This blood and ground rhetoric is to be
seen against the background of the civil war-like conflicts in Maledonia, but essentially represents an
intellectual product of Albanian Skanderbeg interpretation by Fan Noli and Hoxhaalbanian historiography.
To be sure, on the Macedonian side there are also unqualified statements, such as those of a publicist
who denied the Albanians the ability to form a state.
Non-native Albanian historians in the former Yugoslavia also try to define Skanderbeg as a counterpart,
not from Albania, but from Kosovo and Macedonia, a notable
At the same time, Tirana seeks to dispute the sovereignty of interpretation over the national hero, an
expression of the increased cultural self-confidence of the Yugoslavian Albanians in relation to the
motherland. Tensions between the Tuscan Southern Albanians and the northern Albanian counterpart
can also be seen in dealing with Skanderbeg. It is no coincidence that the Tirana Academy organized the
chronologically last of the three congresses (in December 2005): historians in Tirana are increasingly
exposed to a plural interpretation of national history whose centers are in Prishtina and the Macedonian
Tetovo, where Two universities have recently emerged. Striking is that in Albania, the European
dimension of Skanderbeg was emphasized by the organizers at least in the congress title, expression of a
closer integration of Albania in a Mediterranean-European context, which was admittedly hardly reflected
in the lectures. At all meetings a scientific discussion hardly took place. A critical historiography-critical
examination of interpretation was only by a Tiranaer
The assessment of the pre-Ottoman epoch in Albanian history and, in particular, the assessment of
Skanderbeg is of key importance. It involves two theses: first, that the Albanians before the Ottoman
conquest were a European people like all others, which had been torn by the Ottoman conquest of an
organic development, ie from a Christian-European context. Skanderbeg can - depending on the
perspective - be interpreted as a champion of a unified Christian Europe - they even went so far as to
regard the crusading leader Pius H. as a forerunner of NATO. 51 The counter-thesis sees the acceptance
of Islam as a positive step, since the Albanians so before one through the ortbo318 that the Albanians
before the Ottoman conquest were a European people like all others, which had been torn by the
Ottoman conquest of an organic development, ie from a Christian-European context. Skanderbeg can -
depending on the perspective - be interpreted as a champion of a unified Christian Europe - they even
went so far as to regard the crusading leader Pius H. as a forerunner of NATO. 51 The counter-thesis
sees the acceptance of Islam as a positive step, since the Albanians so before one through the
ortbo318 that the Albanians before the Ottoman conquest were a European people like all others, which
had been torn by the Ottoman conquest of an organic development, ie from a Christian-European
context. Skanderbeg can - depending on the perspective - be interpreted as a champion of a unified
Christian Europe - they even went so far as to regard the crusading leader Pius H. as a forerunner of
NATO. 51 The counter-thesis sees the acceptance of Islam as a positive step, since the Albanians so
before one through the ortbo318
Thus, there are voices that diverge from the national consensus that Kastriota laitildos is considered a
hero. A group of younger intellectuals in Tirana uses Edward Said's theories to accuse journalists who
emphasize Albania's Christian heritage of "orientalism", an "escape from the Orient", a departure from - in
this perspective - grown structures of a predominantly Muslim people 153.
This touches on a dimension that the historians trained in communism predominantly avoid or consider as
secondary, namely the question of the religious character of Skanderbeg's uprising. This is an expression
of a greater religious dynamic of the Albanian-speaking Balkan population: while Christian Albanians
perceive Skanderbeg as a champion of the Christian element, socialist, often agnostic Albanians from
Muslim families, as well as religious Muslims, insist on Kanderbeg's purely ethno-national role; from time
to time it is also alleged that Muslims have fought with the Kastriota.154 Sporadic speeches are made
that do not accept a Christian as the central myth of a majority Muslim people. At the same time, the
Balkan perspective opened by Skanderbeg is considered negative vis-à-vis ethnonational. The Kastriota
is accused of having harmed what is today defined as a national interest through its interaction with
Orthodox Balkan tribes of non-Albanian origin. Modern ethnonational conflicts between Albanians and
Serbs as well as Macedonians are being read into medieval history. The newspaper of the Albanian
Arnéee went so far as to ask whether the renegade Balaban would have been more inappropriate as a
national alliance. 7 The variety of current interpretations is a reflection of a rapidly changing society
seeking its place between Europe and the Middle East and that, through the Internet, is growing into a
communication community for the first time,
in Central and Northern Europe and overseas. The mass of statements stands in marked contrast to the
actual gain of knowledge of Albanian-speaking historians, which, with a few exceptions, repeat essentially
known and remain old thought patterns. The Skanderbeg myth is not only an Albanian, but also a Balkan
and pan-European phenomenon with a considerable migratory potential. It was only with the return of the
heroic cult to the Albanian-speaking Western Balkans in the late 19th century that it was transformed into
that exclusively Albanian phenomenon that is currently predominant and has moved far from its historical
form.
320
Twenty-five years of an uprising, a whirlwind of struggles, diplomatic intrigues hard to survey were at the
center of the story of Skanderbeg's life. The elevation of the Kastriota posed the greatest challenge to the
Ottomans in subjugating the Balkans. But the presentation must not leave it at the mere portrayal of the
events. It must try to arrive at an interpretation which the
classification into other contexts, asking about their essence. Two dimensions stand out: once the
"anatomy of an uprising" mentioned at the beginning, an interpretation of the movement against the
sultan. On the other hand, the figure of Skanderbeg himself - for his memory survived the centuries, his
person was worshiped in the Balkans and the West not long after his death. The survey and its leader are
almost impossible to separate. Any understanding of those tremendous upheavals in the forests and
mountains of the Western Ballcan must therefore proceed from the question of who the rebels against the
Sultan were and what drove them; but also who did not follow them. For only in this way does it become
clear that on both sides, the insurgents and the followers of the sultan, the fault lines are not along clear
spatial, rather, the uprising had deeply divided the space between the Adriatic and the mountain slopes of
the Polog, in supporters and opponents of a new imperial order in the Balkans. Trenches were torn
between city and countryside. The cities in the north were under Venetian rule. Not only did they deny
Skanderbeg any allegiance but 321
fought ibn repeated times. The Kastriota failed to separate the citizenship of Venice, even with war and
violence. Equally unsuccessful, he was in the Ottoman-dominated south: Berat, Valona and Gjirokastra
were beyond his reach. Although citizens of the city and insurgents spoke the same language, it was of
no importance: behind the ramparts, hardly anyone spoke for the rebels; on the contrary, they were
defeated by Berat and beaten back. The gates of the major cities of Ohrid and Skopje were closed off to
the east as well. The townspeople defended their interests, free trade routes, fields and pastures against
the claims of rebellious nobles and their followers. Skanderbeg led mountain farmers and shepherds into
the plains that looted and robbed there. Bergland stood against lowland, the mountaineers got what they
needed in their barren homeland. This hardly drew the city dwellers on the side Skanderbegs. The
Ottomans and Venice kept the fortress towns firmly under control, as they provided protection to the
townspeople. Skanderbeg remained the landscape and its small castle town. But even here he did not
succeed in binding the population in a big way. The townspeople dismissed the rule of the nobles of the
hinterland, they favored the well-ordered administrations of the Venetians and Ottomans, and so did
many peasants. Venice, like the Ottomans, had built up a layer of village notables and laymen in the
plains, people who had much to lose when the nobles from the hinterland took power: Skutarinian
patricians and village chiefs fought against the insurgents as well as the privileged Orthodox villagers in
western Macedonia and southern Albania, or the well-paid Muslim and Orthodox Timur riders. But even at
higher altitudes, many men refused the insurgents: The mountainous region of the Dukagj made in the
subjugation attempts of Skanderbeg continued and successful resistance. The law of mountain and plain,
the social, economic and cultural contradiction of city and country, is emerging here, a model that needs
to be further refined, as Skanderbeg had not bound the whole mountain world or the whole village society
to it. So the insurgents were left with a rather slender urban band around Kruja, in the Matital and in Dibra
as well as in the northern part of central Albania, in the hinterland of Durazzo and along the
Shkumbinfluss. This area, with its fading borders to the south, was made up of the dominions of the
Araniti, BalSic, Thopia and Kastriota families. It was almost constantly the target of Ottoman attacks that
led to the descent or military extermination of the sexes. 322
II
II
Looking at the social structure of the rebel movement, the rift across the Albanian region becomes even
clearer: significant parts of the regional Ottoman elite are composed of Albanians who have converted to
Islam, whether or not they are representatives of old families such as the Muzaki, Zenebish and Dukagjin,
whether social climbers, who owed everything to the sultan. Generals, underlings, simple soldiers the
armies that fought against Skanderbeg consisted of the native population, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs,
VIaehen. The Sultan's army also fought for Turkish Muslims, and they also had timely loans in the
Western Balkans. Nevertheless, it is clear that no "foreign" invaders fought the rebels, but locals who
followed the new empire,
manic time back. Many Albanians had good reasons not to join the rebellion. Neither language nor
belonging to an ethnic community has been the driving force behind the movement. Rather, religion could
be understood as an element of demarcation, but here too caution should be exercised: On the
insurgents' side, the confession to Christianity was clear, but the confession to a certain denomination
was less clear: Orthodoxy and Catholicism overlapped in the Albanian region; A clarification of the
denominational orientation to Rome took place only with the time and reached its peak after 1460. Above
all, the Christian confession is to be understood as a sign of belonging or opposition. The survey was
essentially prepared by converts, who proclaimed their descent from the sultan by their public return to
the Christian faith. All insurgents were Christians or renegades who had publicly re-adopted their original
religion. Muslims did not fight in their ranks. But the uprising had not touched large parts of the Christian
population in the Albanian area. The Catholics in Venetian Albania, but also many Orthodox subjects in
the Albanian south or in the west of the Maçcedonian area had stayed away. Some of the Christian
ministers had remained faithful to the Sultan, Christian Timur lords, Christian passport guards, and finally
the large number of Christian auxiliaries contributed to the suppression of the rebellion. Certainly, the core
troops of the Ottomans were Muslims; religious unity prevailed on the Ottoman side but
not. Skanderbeg's rebellion is Christian because it was carried by Christians, but it was not a general
uprising of Christians. It is even more difficult to answer the question of the religious character of the
survey, if it includes a metaphysical dimension. That many people in the categories of "Christ" against
"Mus323
lim thought, may be suspected, but what they meant exactly, is not easy to clarify: Was the "Muslim"
above all a follower of the Sultan, who expressed by his faith his allegiance to a new imperial elite? Or did
the rebels fight not only the followers of the sultan, but also his faith in principle? Conditions seemed clear
to the Western view: the papal rhetoric, but also the political language of the Catholic Adriaanrainer,
celebrated Skanderbeg as the "athlete of Christ" and shield of the faith. It would be cheap to see behind it
only power calculus and to deny to the contemporaries any religious feeling - the back projection of
modern agnosticism is just as problematic as the uncritical assumption Skanderbeg had carried out a
pure religious war. Sources from Skanderbeg's background show that the rebel leader thought in religious
terms when dividing friend and foe into "Christians" and "Christian enemies" - to the latter he also
included Christians like his adversary Leka Dukagjin. It is also certain that Skanderbeg used in his last
decade of life a Christian rhetoric that was probably brought to him by his spiritual counselors. But even
here it would be too easy to dismiss Skanderbeg's commitment to Christianity as a pure influence of the
Albanian Catholic clergy. Skanderbeg had a strong political will and has been able to determine even the
programmatic direction of his work. To some popes like Kalixt III. and Pius 11 he used a very close, to
Pius 1I. probably a trusting relationship. Although this is under the pontificate of less interested in Albania
PaullI. The relationship with the Catholic Church in Albania has always been extremely important. At the
latest since 1450, the Catholic Church in Central and Northern Albania formed the actual support of the
insurrection, which, in contrast to all other allies and followers, was never shaken by
betrayal. Skanderbeg's following did not constitute a socially unified or stable community: First, a
distinction should be made between his noble allies, who had formed a war bond with the Ottomans in the
spring of 1444, and that partnership based on loyalty and personal relationship. So the followers in the
narrower sense. The group of noblemen did not see the Alliance as a means of creating a new, more
extensive rule on the southeastern Adriatic; rather, it was about restoring the largely anarchic condition
that existed in the period between the collapse of Serbian sovereignty in the Albanian region (in the
1370s). Years) and the enforcement of Ottoman rule (finally around 1430) 324
would have. They refused to pay taxes to the new empire, to recognize its laws, and to provide its
followers. By "freedom" they understood the control of followings and the small-scale dominions that they
had dissolved from any supremacy at the end of the 14th century. A program that would have put
something new in place of the Ottoman power, they did not possess. Rather, they pursued the goal of the
Alliance, after the expulsion of the Ottomans continue their own small-scale feuds, especially against the
citizens of the Venetian-administered cities of Skutari and Drivasto. Most men relied on a narrow power
base, but most of all they were never ready to subordinate themselves to Skanderbeg, whom they had
chosen as their captain in 1444. As far as can be seen from the sources, none of the gentlemen gave the
command of his followers from the hand. It should also be remembered that the retainers had a loyalty
allegiance to their immediate lord who provided for them, and not to Skanderbeg, who appeared as the
head of a rival confederation. In the best case, the nobles traded with each other, but it remains
questionable whether Skanderbeg had actually reached the position of a first among equals or was he not
only the same among equals. The nobility used its forces in feuds against Venice and the northern
Albanian cities, fights that it waged together with the Serbian despot and the Lord of the Black Mountains
in the interests of the Kingdom of Naples. In 1450 the sultan's arrival broke up; only the hard core around
Skanderbeg and Araniti Komino continued the fight. It turned out that the weak gentlemen hung their flag
on the wind and quickly adapted to the respective power relations. When the Sultan stood in the country,
they ran over to him, withdrew, reconsidered their attitude, and joined Skanderbeg again. Since the
nobles also had large parts of the already scarce fields and pastures of the plains in possession, their
interests clashed with those of Skanderbegs: For the Kastriota was dependent on grain and salt exports
to use the capital thus acquired to seed his team and buy weapons. The refusal to subordinate oneself, to
provide allegiance and land to the uprising, had to lead to a violent conflict: who did not follow
ibm, Forcing Skanderbeg down with a hard hand. It is not surprising that many nobles leaned towards
foreign powers: the Ottoman Empire, Venice and Naples like to list the men humiliated and oppressed by
Skanderbeg. And so all of them - albeit at different times - fell away from Skanderbeg: his father-in-law
Araniti Komino and his relative Stefan Cmojevi6 ended their careers as Veneeans
Zian chiefs; the BalsiCi were driven out or deported to Italy; the land of Thopia, whose allegiance had
fallen to Berat in 1455, had become part of the Kastriota; the Muzaki, with their close proximity to the
Ottoman border, hardly mattered; Finally, Moses of Dibra was temporarily set up by the Ottomans as a
counter-ruler. The Dukagjin escaped the pull of Skanderbeg's will to power. What had begun as an
uprising of the nobility ended as a lonely fight Skanderbegs. If the insurrection drove such a wedge into
the already few nobility, it split the family of Skanderbeg almost even more deeply: he was only partially
able to rely on his kinship, which had a central significance in the society of the Western Balkans through
the centuries. His brothers had either died before the uprising or barely appeared. His brothers-in-law
supported him only lukewarm. The nephews, however, were in a difficult relationship with their
overpowering uncle: some followed him to the death, others, whose fathers had been reset by
Skanderbeg (the Thopia), or who hoped to succeed (Hamza Kastriota), not only denied the submission,
but repeatedly went over to the Ottomans. It is no coincidence that Repos Thopia, son of 1455 fallen
Muzaki, whose land had snatched Skanderbeg, wanted to recapture his country with Ottoman help at the
death of his uncle, it is no coincidence that the most dangerous defector to the Ottomans was Hamza
Kastriota , one of the first hour's danger. To Skanderbeg, members of the younger generation, especially
families who had lost much of their power or were directly threatened by the Ottomans, were the
nobility. but also village chiefs and - mostly Orthodox - village priests from the hill and mountain areas of
Tumenisht (around Kruja), Mati and Dibra. Their appendage consisted of peasants and shepherds who
gladly left their barren highlands to invade the plentiful plains - which they were to do until the beginning
of the 20th century. Many of these men felt loyal to Skanderbeg's father, who transferred them to the son,
whose exploits in the Ottoman army honored them and whose need for revenge they shared. The lack of
sources makes it extremely difficult to grasp the essence of Skanderbeg's allegiance in detail. But it
becomes clear that these are social structures that characterize Balkan highlanders even in the early
modern period: a village society without a village in a densely forested, rugged hill and mountainous area,
where people lived at lower altitudes of arable and orchards, and where high altitude farming (especially
with sheep). The wandering 326
from the summerv, in the mountains to the winterv, reiden in the plain
shaped the rhythm of life of an important part of the Balkan people into the 20th century. Especially since
the shepherds were characterized by mobility, modesty, endurance and terrain knowledge. As the
mountain areas hardly able to feed strong warrior federations, the followers of Skanderbeg counted
usually no more than 2000 to 3000 man, often less well. This moving crowd was rewarded by
Skanderbeg with loot, trade receipts and aid from Italy; the leader also provided for the protection and
upkeep of families - not a feudal system with fixed facilities, but fidelity and a close personal bond with the
leader, who literally took his men out of trouble, characterizing this community. To the innermost circle of
Following were some chancelleries, Dalmatian merchants and clerics as well as members of the Catholic
clergy in central and northern Albania, abbots, monks, archbishops and bishops. It was thanks to them
that their master became famous in the Occident and not just a little-known rebel leader in the distant
mountains of the Balkans. They came before foreign rulers and councilors, they got money, bought
weapons. Linguistically, this group was mixed: Albanian clergy, Ragusan patricians, and Slav-Dalmatian
middlemen, with the latter often pursuing their own business interests in Skanderbeg's dominion. As few
as men belonged to this core, however insignificant offices and dignities were, they proved themselves to
be supple and able to act; but above all, they escaped the attacks of the Ottomans rather than the law
firms and courts of the Orthodox Balkan empires. Skanderbeg's investigation was not a one-dimensional
fight against the Ottomans. Rather, he fought almost uninterruptedly on several fronts. He constantly
made feuds with Christian opponents. Around meadows and fields he and his noble peers fought with the
citizens of the northern Albanian cities. Almost hateful the wrestling raged with a branch of
Dukagjin. Adding to the quarrel in the Kastriota home, it becomes clear that Christian Albanians in the
immediate vicinity brought the rebellioner almost constantly into distress. On a second level Skanderbeg
was involved in the wrestling, the Venice and Naples for the supremacy on the Adriatic leave. The
Albanian coast had served as a venue for such hegemony fights for centuries. The great Kastriota did not
escape this as it were geographical compulsion. Early on he had turned to Naples and sworn allegiance
to vassals in 1451 - he was protected and shielded by King Alfonso V, but at the same time Skanderbeg
became a party in his war 327
against the republic of St. Mark Like his feudal lord he fought on two fronts, against the Ottomans and
against the Signoria. His rule was only one link in a wide-ranging system of Neapolitan vassals in the
Balkans, against which Venice had built its own network of salaried Regionalfursten. For example, Italian
proxy wars were fought in the Balkans, and Skanderbeg was to fall victim at the end of his life. For when
Venice supplanted Neapolitans from Central Albania in 1467, the star of the Kastriota finally
perished. The enmity with Venice, which had at least been influenced by Naples, had given the rebellion a
blow which almost broke his neck. But not the Serenissima, but the Ottomans finally threw Skanderbeg
down after decades of fighting. The Kastriota had faced mostly not the Sultan, but his mighty frontier
patrons in the Vardar basin and Thessaly, gentlemen who came from Ottoman warrior dynasties, had
considerable wealth and a strong military following, equal generals, Skanderbeg, with whom they shared
before 1443 against the Enemies of the sultan had fought. So they knew each other, the old veterans of
the sultan army, who were now warring each other in the forests of the Western Balkans. Skanderbeg
was favored by the fact that the Sultan pursued other war aims with his main army for years and left the
fight against the uprising in the mountains of the west to its subordinates. Attack the Sultan himself, but
the appearance of his in all respects superior calamity brought the insurgents into extreme distress, as
Murad's II attack on Kruja (1450) had shown, which had indeed failed, but Skanderbeg had driven to the
brink of destruction. As soon as the sultan had decided to use all means to destroy the rebels, he
succeeded, albeit at the price of a huge bloodbath and the extensive destruction and depopulation of the
enemy territory. Mehmed's 11th campaigns in the northern Balkans and Asia Minor had been
instrumental in ensuring that the Flarrnne of the uprising was not leaked much earlier. Skanderbeg, who
had been thrown back on his own power base in 1466 and 1467, did not have the slightest chance of
survival against the Sultan's army. The Kastriota had already recognized this before the beginning of his
elevation and designed his plans accordingly. He had never before envisioned the establishment of a
small dominion on the edge of the Ottoman Empire-the fate of the Serbian despotate and Wallachia had
warned him, the frontier commander in Nikopol on the Danube. From the beginning he had gone to great
lengths, the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in a mighty pincer attack from all sides was his
goal. 328 the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in a mighty pincer attack on all sides was his
goal. 328 the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in a mighty pincer attack on all sides was his goal. 328
He made three attempts to implement this ambitious plan with allies. And so little was the prospect of
success. 1443 marched from the east Ibrahim of Karaman, from the north JohaniJ. Hunyadi with Georg
Brankovic, from the west approached Burgundian and Venetian ships, in the Balkans rose Christians in
the Albanian area, in the Pindos Mountains, in the Peloponnese, in Serbia and Bulgaria - the company
failed because of the overlong communication lines, which a temporal fine
prevented voting. The Ottoman Empire, however, was plunged into an existential crisis. A key role was
played by those Islamized Balkan nobles who, at the decisive moment, weakened the Ottoman resistance
in the Morava valley with their desertion. Five years later, surprisingly soon after the devastating defeat of
the Hungarians at Varna (November 1444), the strategy was taken up again: again Johann Hunyadi
advanced from the north, Skanderbeg - too late - from the west. Once again the fighting was fierce, the
survival of the Ottoman Empire was not fixed from the beginning. The third effort took 1463/64 Pope Pius
II, Venice and Matthias Corvinus. The death of the pope, the Western policy of the young Hungarian king
prevented a success. Clearly, all three offensives have a connection: Skanderbeg's friendship with the
House of Hunyadi, the determined opponent of the Ottomans and Hungarian Governor J ohann Hunyadi
and then his son Matthias Corvinus. This shows that Skanderbeg promised victory not by Italian aid, but
by the largest Christian land force in south-eastern Europe: the Hungarian armored riders, the gun-wagon
warriors who rolled down the Morava, seemed more promising than the small, often infrequent, Balkan
warriors Condottieri. Johann Hunyadi and Skanderbeg will probably have met during the invasion of
Transylvania, at that time still in the wake of an Ottoman army, at the beginning of the 40s. Both were
determined not only to defeat the Ottomans, but to destroy them; both were charismatic warrior
leaders, and they will have respected each other. For two decades Skanderbeg was allowed to build on
the Hungarians. When Matthias Corvinus turned to the West following his failure in Bosnia (1464), his
feud with Emperor Frederick III., The pressure that had always weighed on the Ottomans from the
Danube gave way: their way to the Adriatic was clear. So Skanderbeg paid the price for the Austrian and
Bohemian dreams of Corvinen. However, the Kingdom of Hungary was not the only south-eastern
European neighbor on which the Kastriota relied. At least as closely interwoven was his uprising with the
dominions of his Byzantine and South Slavic neighbors. The orthodox Balkan aristocracy was by
numerous 329 When Matthias Corvinus turned to the West following his failure in Bosnia (1464), his feud
with Emperor Frederick III., The pressure that had always weighed on the Ottomans from the Danube
gave way: their way to the Adriatic was clear. So Skanderbeg paid the price for the Austrian and
Bohemian dreams of Corvinen. However, the Kingdom of Hungary was not the only south-eastern
European neighbor on which the Kastriota relied. At least as closely interwoven was his uprising with the
dominions of his Byzantine and South Slavic neighbors. The orthodox Balkan aristocracy was by
numerous 329 When Matthias Corvinus turned to the West following his failure in Bosnia (1464), his feud
with Emperor Frederick III., The pressure that had always weighed on the Ottomans from the Danube
gave way: their way to the Adriatic was clear. So Skanderbeg paid the price for the Austrian and
Bohemian dreams of Corvinen. However, the Kingdom of Hungary was not the only south-eastern
European neighbor on which the Kastriota relied. At least as closely interwoven was his uprising with the
dominions of his Byzantine and South Slavic neighbors. The orthodox Balkan aristocracy was by
numerous 329 So Skanderbeg paid the price for the Austrian and Bohemian dreams of
Corvinen. However, the Kingdom of Hungary was not the only south-eastern European neighbor on which
the Kastriota relied. At least as closely interwoven was his uprising with the dominions of his Byzantine
and South Slavic neighbors. The orthodox Balkan aristocracy was by numerous 329 So Skanderbeg paid
the price for the Austrian and Bohemian dreams of Corvinen. However, the Kingdom of Hungary was not
the only south-eastern European neighbor on which the Kastriota relied. At least as closely interwoven
was his uprising with the dominions of his Byzantine and South Slavic neighbors. The orthodox Balkan
aristocracy was by numerous 329
Married so closely together that he can be regarded as a unified group, united by the Byzantine heritage
and the Orthodox faith. The ethnic origin was of little importance, when Greeks, South Slavs and
Albanians concluded their marriages. There was also a deep rift in this elite: most of the old genders split
into one Ottoman-friendly and one Ottoman-hostile branch, with links between the two not inevitably
broken. The upper classes of the Balkans were deeply divided over the Ottoman advance. Help against
the new empire was to be expected only from the Catholic West, which most orthodox princes rejected
with the deepest faith. Many, such as in Serbia and Herzegovina - where
the heretic Bosnian Church was influential, they tried to keep the Sultan and the Catholic princes of the
West from playing off the great powers against each other. This required high diplomatic skill,
maneuverability and smoothness, because from West and East the pressure to finally confess increased
from year to year. Although the Kastriota did not belong to the old nobility, the gripping Ivan and his
famous son George quickly gained high reputation, the basis for their extensive marriage policy with more
important Albanian genders. Since time immemorial, the relations with the Serbian princely family of
BrankoviCi have been very close. Here was probably a blood relationship already at the time of
Skanderbeg's father; certainly the connection is for the younger generation of Kastriota: Skanderbeg's
son Ivan married Irene Brankovic, whose mother was a Byzantine princess of imperial blood. The
families, the ancient, glorious BrankoviCi and the young, aspiring Kastriota, were mutually supportive; the
Kastriota took on the landless BrankoviCi and strengthened the common bonds through marriage. This
did not mean that the leaders of the two families shared the same political beliefs: Georg Brankovic saw
himself as an orthodox prince and therefore accepted the sultan's offer to govern his despotate as the
Ottoman vassalage. Skanderbeg, also originally an Orthodox Christian, decisively rejected the vassalage
and, in contrast to the Serbian prince, chose the clear reference to the Catholic West. As the only
orthodox Lord of the Balkans, he resolutely decided to orientate himself in the West. Otherwise the
rejection of the Catholic Church and the "Latins", in Serbia, in Byzantium, in the Peloponnese, prevailed
everywhere else. Skanderbeg's development has therefore been of paramount importance. It removed
him from the context of the Orthodox Balkans and made him at European courts alliance, because with
the political was also a denominational change connected. From ortho- It removed him from the context of
the Orthodox Balkans and made him at European courts alliance, because with the political was also a
denominational change connected. From ortho- It removed him from the context of the Orthodox Balkans
and made him at European courts alliance, because with the political was also a denominational change
connected. From ortho-
330
Doxen became a Catholic Christian - another unique step. But this turning to the West did not mean that
Skanderbeg had broken with his orthodox Nachbam. Orthodox were all gentlemen in Albania, the
CrnojeviCi in the Black Mountains, the Greek relatives (the Ralles and Palaiologists) in the
Peloponnese. The whole southeastern Adriatic Sea was in family or political relationship with
Skanderbeg. But even inland the Kastriota enjoyed a high reputation. The archive loss also forbids a
precise picture here. But the masters of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not only heard of the acts of war
done by Skanderbeg, they had exchanged letters with him, traded with him, and hoped to move in from
him in the year 1463. Skanderbeg was thus recognized by the powerful men of the late medieval Balkans,
by the Bosnian king, by Stefan Vukcic of Herzegovina and the Serbian despot Georg Brankovic as one of
their own, which in Albania probably only the old Araniti Komino was granted. Of course, the gentlemen
could not afford actual help. Nature was already opposed to that; huge mountains hinder the exchange of
news, but above all warriors between the southern Slavic and the Albanian Balkans; above all, however,
Bosnians, Herzegovinians, and Serbs themselves were constantly threatened, often paralyzed by internal
feuds, and so incapable of attacking. It can hardly be doubted, however, that a sense of togetherness and
mutual assistance existed: Serbian remittances, Albanian grain ships and Bosnian cries for help bring this
to light. As a next extension of Skanderbeg's work is the attitude of the Western Adriatic. The strong ties
to the royal feudal lord in southern Italy, the fighting community with the Hunyadi family in the north, but
also the relations with the southern Slavic neighborhood supported his rule, which in the Albanian area
itself could hardly rely on the noble lords. With the help of Alfonso V, the castriota directed his cries for
help to the Western Occident - Central Europe, while the German Reich did not enter his field of
vision. Although smaller states like Siena were barely able to help, larger ones like Milan were
threatened. But the calls from the Balkans did not fade completely, on the contrary: even in ferne
Burgundy was twice, 1444 and 1464, prepared for the crusade, certainly not only because of
Skanderbeg's request, but in the context of crusades in which the Kastriota was involved. Of the Western
powers, the papacy was the strongest advocate for the Christian insurgents in Albania. For Kalixt III. and
Pius II, who prepared both attacks against the Ottomans, counted Skanderbeg among the most important
most common ally at a landing for which contemporary strategists had selected the Albanian coast. Kalixt
III. celebrated Skanderbeg as a shining example for the princes of the West, as Athleta Christi; He and his
successor, Pius II, thus created the foundations of that image of the heroic champion of faith that had
been spread throughout Europe for centuries. This was not mere crusade rhetoric, the two pontifices were
serious. The fame of the popes also gave Skanderbeg tangible political advantages: joining with the
papacy offered him a way out of dependency on Naples and the one with it. connected enmity with
Venice. The offer of Pius II to crown Skanderbeg as king seemed so tempting because, as a third power,
the papacy would have dissolved the Venetian-Neapolitan stalemate on the eastern Adriatic. The creation
of a Catholic kingdom of "Epirotes and Macedonians," as it should be termed in the language of
humanism, was less fantastic than might be supposed: since the High Middle Ages, popes had promised
or bestowed crowns to Southeast European rulers. Skanderbeg was in the tradition of important Serbian
and Bulgarian rulers; if he agreed to this plan, which would provide his young and unsecured rule with the
strongest possible legitimacy. The failure of this project, which was bound to Skanderbeg's attack on the
sultan, eventually brought down Skanderbeg. He had aspired to high things, dared and lost. His political
strategy of always attacking himself, if possible, and avoiding the defensive, had grown out of the
experience of earlier uprisings, from the impressions of the Ottoman army. But all the offensives failed: in
1444, 1448 and 1464 it proved impossible to coordinate the advance of the allies from almost all of
Europe and Asia Minor. The Ottomans always had the advantage of the inner line, the shorter
communication paths. But in contrast to many planning games at western courts, these attacks actually
came about. To be sure, Skanderbeg, with his lightly-armed followers, was never at the center of the far-
reaching strategies, but he formed an important link between the Adriatic and the Balkans: the Kastriota
would not force the Sultan down, ibm but hard to clog. The end of his struggle confirmed the correctness
of the attack strategy: Skanderbeg could not withstand the main army of the sultan. Without Skanderbeg,
the great Christian revolt would not have occurred, and without him he would never have lasted twenty-
five years. The uprising remains incomprehensible unless the attempt is made to capture the personal,
the biographical dimension, at least in some ways; in An332 to grasp the biographical dimension at least
in some beginnings; in An332 to grasp the biographical dimension at least in some beginnings; in An332
sentences, because more is hardly possible in the poor sources. Skanderbeg's actions can be reasonably
reconstructed, his thoughts and plans remain largely in the dark. They are to interpret, deduce from his
actions. Out of the few a character picture is to be designed, the picture of a man who lived at a time in
different cultures. He was influenced by multilingualism, but also by the fact that he belonged to many
Balkan varieties of the two world religions, Christianity and Islam. Mastering several languages was not
unusual among the Balkan nobility; but few gentlemen will have spoken as many languages as the widely
traveled Skanderbeg. What distinguished him more clearly from his peers, however, was the multiple
change of faith: Many orthodox noble sons had converted to Islam, but hardly any returned to the religion
of his ancestors. Skanderbeg had not only become Muslim, he had probably carried out the change of
faith in the milieu of dervishes, which in part
tense relationship to the Sunni faith of the sultans. Educated as an Orthodox Christian, converted from
Dervishes, he will have outwardly portrayed himself as a Sunni Muslim. In 1443 he returned publicly back
to Christianity. It remains unclear, however, whether he professed Christianity of Orthodox character -
which is obvious, or whether he had already begun to approach the Catholic faith. In the early stages of
the uprising he used orthodox symbols - the double eagle, and the turn to the Roman church took place
only when he had lost important areas in the East and, especially after 1450, urgently needed the help of
the Catholic clergy, both in Alhania and in Rome, was instructed. The Neapolitan vassalage also brought
him closer to the Catholic world. With this Skanderbeg carried out the above-mentioned Western
application, which distinguished him from all other Balkan princes. While this political dimension of religion
becomes tangible in the sources - the creed as it were understood as a political message - the question of
Skanderbeg's personal religiosity is difficult to answer. That he understood himself as a Christian ruler is
suggested by the few letters and letters from his office; but a confessional confession is found there only
in so far as he welcomed in 1463 the common struggle with the Pope. Which traces of the years of
dissimulation at the Ottoman court, which have left multiple changes of faith in his psyche, can only be the
subject of speculation. In the few reports of men he met in person, Religion is of little
importance. However, other characteristics are emphasized: A sense of loyalty, especially towards the
House of Aragon, which is not in feudal scales
because it was transferred beyond the death of the liege lord and without oath binding to his son; a strong
sense of honor, pride in dealing with the sultan, but also Adriatic powers, personal bravery and courage,
pronounced cunning and skill - think of the ambushes in the Apulian war - a clear strategic thinking, as
emerges from the minutes of the Milan diplomats. Skanderbeg was perceived by contemporaries as an
extraordinary figure, on the one hand, as he met expectations - so the Balkan heroic ideal, and on the
other because he just did not do so: his unselfish weapon assistance for Ferrante astonished the Italian
state leaders, in their political thinking unconditional Loyalty, especially at the price of high personal
sacrifices, had lost much in importance. In the sources, the Kastriota emerges as a Balkan nobleman and
as a Renaissance figure. The core was probably the Maun from the inner Balkans: Skanderbeg moved in
a society that maintained clear ideas of a leader who celebrated the heroic fighter in the tradition of oral
tradition. Skanderbeg is to be regarded in the context of a "heroic way of life" (G. Gesemaun), which
continues in parts up to the very latest time, which must appear strange to a German-speaking reader
after the experiences of the Second World War. The use of the hero concept in the interpretation of
Skanderbeg is therefore to be seen against a Southeast European tradition: The importance of Kastriota
among many Balkan peoples can be explained by the fact that it corresponded to the heroic ideal of the
Highlanders, as expressed in the Albanian and Serbian folk songs. His actions in the field helped him
achieve fame with both friend and foe. He did not obey the traditional rule of a Southeast European
monarch residing in palaces surrounded by a large court, chancelleries and scholars. Rather, he
appeared as a man of mountains and struggle, a warrior by profession and vocation, which proved an
unusual personal resilience: He counted about forty years at the beginning of the uprising, a mature man
for medieval conditions. As a fifty-year-old, as a Venetian patrician describes, he cut open the escape
route for his men at the Battle of Berat. At the age of almost sixty, he himself captured an Italian
nobleman and, to the astonishment of Italian observers, threw him like a bundle on his horse. When he
shocked Kruja in 1467, he was in his sixty-second year. There was hardly a nobleman in Europe who was
still personally on the front line at such a high age. He distinguished himself not only in the arms trade, but
above all as a leader. In the Ottoman. Army service, in Anatolia, in the Balkans, in 334
Transylvania, he had come up with rich experience, studied the fighting style of the Ottomans and their
opponents, Janissaries, Hussite wagon castles, Anatolian cavalry - he had seen everything. The horny
knowledge of the enemy, the familiarity with the mentality of his followers, but also with the nature of the
country made it possible for him to adapt his warfare to the best possible conditions. His warriors, without
armor, lightly armed, were hardly a serious opponent for Ottoman armored riders and janissaries in open
battle; but terribly they appeared to the Ottomans advancing in the valleys, when they flashed out of the
woods, from the heights, when they struck at night, advancing swiftly in the rough terrain. Skanderbeg
appeared as the epitome of the Balkan guerrilla leader, the forest and mountains are considered the most
loyal allies. Again and again, this particular charisma mobilized supporters from the highlands. He and his
warriors avoided field battles and fortress wars, but they were not equipped for that; besides, they had
experienced in Kruja in 1450 how dangerous it was to be surrounded by a superior opponent in one
place. On the Ottoman side, Skanderbeg aroused admiration. Even there, he had early been considered
an ideal of the warrior - his nickname Iskender bey is an expression of this appreciation. This was
frightening as the Ottomans advanced into the forest canyons of Dibra. They attributed magic powers to
Skanderbeg. Even death did not put an end to this charisma: The bones of the Kastriota were regarded
as a victorious and protective amulet. The Imagination of Ottoman Warriors, which is otherwise closed off
from lack of sources, becomes tangible here: The horror which the mountain world inspired the Ottomans,
was reinforced by the magical leader of the insurgents. From this Balkan side Skanderbegs Italian
observers will have noticed very little: they created their heroic image from completely different ideas. The
thought of the Crusades and the flourishing humanism stamped that Zwievesicht Skanderbegs in the
West, the Athleta Christi and the new Alexander. Papal rhetoric and humanistically influenced state letters
celebrated Skanderbeg even at a time when this was still an unknown, distant figure in the mountains of
the Balkans. When the Kastriota himself appeared several times in Italy, he was perceived as part of the
political world of the Renaissance, as an exotic phenomenon, however, a warrior faction who not only
commands but is also on the front line; a hard man who kills instead of bargaining; the leader of a sombre
and sinister following that came from an alien world where war was not art but brutal struggle for
survival. Skanderbeg not only acted as a Turk fighter, but he also attacked, 335
if only for a short time, into the interior Italian events: this
helped him to the cheers and praise of his temporary allies, but did not protect him from the mechanics of
the Italian power system. The virtues celebrated by his royal and princely eulogies - altruism, selfless
fidelity - soon harmed the Kastriota. He was exotic not only by his belligerents, but also by his way of
thinking, with which he had to fail in a new time.
What distinguished Skanderbeg from all other Balkan noblemen was his unconditional will to fight. In
contrast to his neighbors, he wanted not only to secure his political survival, to lavieren between the great
powers, but he aimed at the destruction of Ottoman rule in Europe. His drive was strong and personal,
revenge for his father. This motif is of crucial importance. It explains the stubbornness of the Kastriota,
who, unlike other Balkan nobles, did not want to compromise with the Sultan. Neither religion nor great
politics were at the beginning of a survey which was soon to reach European historical
dimensions; rather, the Kastriota defended his injured honor, following ideas, who later on were to
assume a position in Albanian customary law which was hardly to be overestimated. He acted according
to tradition, obeying the expectations of his society of origin. The uprising was also - but not only - a feud
with the house Osman, a showdown with two sultans, Murad 11th and his son Mehmed 11. The
relationship of the opponents will probably never be fathomable, since the secrets of the year 1443 In the
background, the enigmatic figure of Sultana Mara Brankovic, the murder of the Ottoman crown prince
created probably a complicity between the most power-conscious characters of the Balkans of that time, a
complicity, the turned into a fight to the knife, only briefly interrupted by negotiations and armories, with no
prospect of lasting agreement; a feud that could end only with victory or defeat. Since Skanderbeg
wanted to follow this path to the end, he had prepared the uprising well. In the six years between the
death of his father and the uprising, those years about which little is known, those relationships emerged
that were to be influential for the next quarter of a century. For what characterizes the rebellion at the
highest level - an almost intimate familiarity of the opponents, continues on a lower level. On the one
hand there were rivalries among Islamized Balkan Christians, former Christian nobles and peasants. The
enmity with HlZlrbey ent336 which could end only with victory or defeat. Since Skanderbeg wanted to
follow this path to the end, he had prepared the uprising well. In the six years between the death of his
father and the uprising, those years about which little is known, those relationships emerged that were to
be influential for the next quarter of a century. For what characterizes the rebellion at the highest level -
an almost intimate familiarity of the opponents, continues on a lower level. On the one hand there were
rivalries among Islamized Balkan Christians, former Christian nobles and peasants. The enmity with
HlZlrbey ent336 which could end only with victory or defeat. Since Skanderbeg wanted to follow this path
to the end, he had prepared the uprising well. In the six years between the death of his father and the
uprising, those years about which little is known, those relationships emerged that were to be influential
for the next quarter of a century. For what characterizes the rebellion at the highest level - an almost
intimate familiarity of the opponents, continues on a lower level. On the one hand there were rivalries
among Islamized Balkan Christians, former Christian nobles and peasants. The enmity with HlZlrbey
ent336 about which so little is known, those relationships emerged that should be influential for the next
quarter of a century. For what characterizes the rebellion at the highest level - an almost intimate
familiarity of the opponents, continues on a lower level. On the one hand there were rivalries among
Islamized Balkan Christians, former Christian nobles and peasants. The enmity with HlZlrbey
ent336 about which so little is known, those relationships emerged that should be influential for the next
quarter of a century. For what characterizes the rebellion at the highest level - an almost intimate
familiarity of the opponents, continues on a lower level. On the one hand there were rivalries among
Islamized Balkan Christians, former Christian nobles and peasants. The enmity with HlZlrbey ent336
burned around the castle headquarters of Kruja; it lasted for more than thirty years. HlZlr bey's family
fought in three generations against the Kastriota, in the end they conquered its ancestral land back. A
second feud divided Skanderbeg and his father's former retainer, Balaban; this also used his family in the
fight against Skanderbeg. Deep personal hatred for the Sultan and his Albanian followers were at the
beginning of Skanderbeg's uprising. He also fought against Islamized classmates, Jakub bey Muzaki or
the governor of Tetovo from the family of Zenebish. Everywhere close ties are required, personal
enmities. Such opposition also existed with the governor of Skopje, Isa bey, whose father had subdued
Skanderbeg's father Ivan - again, Feud and hatred for generations, even here close intimacy. The same
applied to Skanderbeg's allies of the first hour, Johann Hunyadi, probably also Georg Brankovic, later to
the neighbors in the Black Mountains, Herzegovina and Bosnia. On the side of the Ottomans and their
Christian opponents fought men who were related to each other or from the same social class, the same
region. It was precisely this closeness that made struggling so difficult that it split families and small-scale
societies. Many noblemen converted to Islam had no reason to follow Skanderbeg - and it remains to be
seen if it would ever have risen if the sultan had not killed his father. It is striking which rooms and social
areas were outside of Skanderbeg's relationship system, These were above all the cities and the
mentioned patrician and Doric elites of the lowlands. The Kastriota remained a highlander throughout his
life; he feared the sea, but loved the mountains. His character is reflected in the fact that he repeatedly
overcame the fear of the sea and traveled to Dalmatia and Italy. To the service of his fight he also
subordinated this discomfort. Skanderbeg had begun to rebuild an old world by destroying the new
empire in the Balkans. He saw himself as a new Bala. Ur., So at first he also thought in small regional
traditions, probably not to frighten his noble peers. When they refused to follow him, he led the creation of
their own larger rule under Neapolitan vassalage. which he hoped to raise to a kingdom of papal
graces. He took the idea of being a new Alexander, a hero of the Occident against the Orient, founder of
a new empire in the Balkans: so high-flying the plans were, so deeply followed by the fall. At his death
Skanderbeg left a ruined, depopulated country. In the end he was all alone, the followers dead or 337
slain, betrayed by many nobles, even men of the closest kinship, a victim of the Italian power
competition. Even if the basic features of insurgent society can be determined in this way, it is still difficult
to clarify the true motives of Skanderbeg and his followers. One reason that explains everything, one can
not make out, too different were the individual groups that joined the survey, too strong the temporal
dynamics of a war, the itself
stretched over a quarter of a century. Various motifs are to be exposed: On the one hand, the leaders,
Skanderbeg, initially inspired by personal revenge, which did not make him blind, but drove to participate
in a wide-spread conspiracy against the Ottoman Empire, were involved in the vast parts of the Southeast
European nobility. He should weaken the Ottoman army by desertion. For this he needed allies in the
Ottoman elite and the support of dissatisfied subjects of the sultan. He found both: in the circle of the
newly converted former Balkan Christians there must have been tensions, which were apparently mostly
personal, not social, because some of the young nobles remained loyal to the Sultan, another fell away
from him. Only with some rebellious officers Skanderbeg would never have lasted long: The inhabitants of
Dibra, Mati and the land of Kruja took up arms. These village societies wanted to regain their "old
freedom," that is, that they rejected the Ottoman Empire and its new order, taxes and legal systems, that
they did not want foreign judges, no access from a distant ruler to their local affairs. The remote mountain
areas resisted the new empire. Contemporary observers spoke of the special mentality of the mountain
dwellers. Then a war also offered them the opportunity to descend from their barren highlands into the
plains to loot in Ottoman and Venetian territories. Similar motives moved the numerous noble gentlemen
of the south-western Balkans: they had lost their countries partly to the Ottomans already, partly they
feared the deposition by the Sultan; they, too, hoped for a return to "old freedom," an unbounded rule
without strong emperors, without taxes and military service. Finally, the Catholic Church defended a
thriving province, the most southeastern extremity of the Roman rite on the mainland of the Balkans,
ancient archbishoprics, bishoprics and monasteries against the advance of the Muslim Ottomans. A
whole bundle of motives emerges, which are difficult to separate from each other, especially considering
the tremendous acceleration that the uprising assumed by war, betrayal, flight, by the repeated
reorganization of the rebel group.
as an identity-forming element against a Muslim adversary. Religion was not the sole driving force of the
insurrection, but it was not a mere secondary consequence. The self-understanding of the insurgents and
their perception in the West interacted; this reached its climax, as Skanderbeg was involved in far-
stretched crusade plans of the popes. The desire for freedom of the mountain wanderers in the south-
western Balkans was unable to survive any help from southern and western Europe. But even with the
support granted repeatedly, the rebel prospects were low from the start. The poor, urbanized landscapes
of Tumenisht, Mati and Dibra were unable to bear the burden of war in the long term. Skanderbeg's life
was therefore no triumph, but rather marked by a constant struggle for survival, by defeats, hopelessly
seeming situations, but also often enough sudden turns of fate. Without the will of the leader, the
exhausted followers would sooner have succumbed to the Ottomans. But just the will to win the Kastriota
tore the highlands ultimately in the downfall. He had overwhelmed them, subordinated to his unconditional
fight against the Ottomans. The sultans had responded with unprecedented severity to the outrageous
challenge of their renegade officer. Thus, Skanderbeg's life and uprising has become the tragedy of his
region of origin, which like no other landscape in the Balkans was devastated and depopulated by the
Ottomans. Skanderbeg's loneliness in his last days is downright emblematic: his father's avenger, the
adversary of two sultans, the athlete of Christ, the new Alexander stood alone on the ruins of his
work. Around ibn, a whole world had fallen into the grave, popes and rulers who had promised and sent
him help, his Christian neighbors in the Slavic and Greek Balkans, many of his peers in Albania, but
above all his small, faithful following. Posterity did not want to know about this tragedy; she longed for a
victorious hero in the struggle for survival against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the great Kastriota lived as
a brilliant hero in the memory of Christians in the Balkans and in the West, and it was forgotten that he
was actually the tragic figure of an era. Around ibn, a whole world had fallen into the grave, popes and
rulers who had promised and sent him help, his Christian neighbors in the Slavic and Greek Balkans,
many of his peers in Albania, but above all his small, faithful following. Posterity did not want to know
about this tragedy; she longed for a victorious hero in the struggle for survival against the Ottoman
Empire. Thus, the great Kastriota lived as a brilliant hero in the memory of Christians in the Balkans and
in the West, and it was forgotten that he was actually the tragic figure of an era. Around ibn, a whole world
had fallen into the grave, popes and rulers who had promised and sent him help, his Christian neighbors
in the Slavic and Greek Balkans, many of his peers in Albania, but above all his small, faithful
following. Posterity did not want to know about this tragedy; she longed for a victorious hero in the
struggle for survival against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the great Kastriota lived as a brilliant hero in the
memory of Christians in the Balkans and in the West, and it was forgotten that he was actually the tragic
figure of an era. faithful following. Posterity did not want to know about this tragedy; she longed for a
victorious hero in the struggle for survival against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the great Kastriota lived as
a brilliant hero in the memory of Christians in the Balkans and in the West, and it was forgotten that he
was actually the tragic figure of an era. faithful following. Posterity did not want to know about this
tragedy; she longed for a victorious hero in the struggle for survival against the Ottoman Empire. Thus,
the great Kastriota lived as a brilliant hero in the memory of Christians in the Balkans and in the West,
and it was forgotten that he was actually the tragic figure of an era.
339
APPENDIX FROM THE WORKSHOP OF THE HISTORIAN The source of the research on Skanderbeg
has to do with the early biographies, those of Marinus Barletius, Demetrio Franco and GM Biemmi's so-
called Anonymus antivarinus. The opinions of the historians are divided "He found long after his death
several life writers, one of which was a Fabler (meant Barletius, 0. S), the other a cunning dodger
(Biemmi)," wrote Franz Babinger1 and thus takes the an extreme attitude: He refers these narrative texts
largely into the realm of fantasy. On the other hand, there are mainly Albanian historians, starting with
Fan Noli and going to Kristo Frasheri, who fully trust the biographies, although Frasheri in his introduction
admits certain reservations, which he then ignores in his presentation. 2 It is undoubted that the entire
Skanderbeg tradition in the Occident and in the Balkans is based on Barletius, which is why the question
of its source value is of crucial importance Taking over his work, scientific research of the 20th century
has been reserved for the Skutarinian priest. The most thorough study was made by the historian of Cluj-
Napoca, Francisc Pall, who worked out how strongly Barletius used ancient classics, especially Titus
Livius, as role models. "Pall rightly pointed out that the numerous speeches inserted into the narrative are
a stylistic device of the historiography of antiquity . have fictional character, and that the reproduced also
in Barletius government letters are not originals. He also showed Barletius chronological
inaccuracies. Since Pall presented his findings just before World War II, numerous new sources have
been found that allow a different evaluation. Without commenting on the entire text of Barletius - a critical
edition
340
!I
II
with historical annotations is a desideratum of research - can be noted: Where parallel sources, usually
Italian and Dalmatian files, are present, they confirm the report of Barletius. It can therefore be assumed
that his presentation can also be adopted where no additional certificates are available. Therefore, in this
book Barletius is used as the main source, in contrast to the early Skanderbeg research, such as a case
merayer, the story is not constructed around his "Vita" around. So it tries to keep the middle between the
two described extremes in the evaluation of Barletius. He is by no means a "Fabian." Rather, he offers a
reliable report, except in chronology. admittedly in the guise of humanistic historiography. The
tremendous success of Barletius rested not only on the burning relevance of his subject, but also on his
literary mastery: With his references to ancient models, the use of classical stylistic devices, he cast a
spell over the readership. This did not prevent him, in particular, to accurately record the oral tradition of
Skanderbeg's followers, whether it was the memory of the conversion to Islam in the dervish milieu or the
description of landscapes and language groups. His wide view across the Balkans, he proved in the
portrayal of the Slavic world: Poland and the Hussites were a household name. Barletius was a well-read,
highly-cultured man, in whose work the oral heroic tradition of the Balkans merged with the culture of
classical antiquity and the Renaissance. The fact that he judged Skanderbeg as a Christian hero, as
shown, corresponded to his own ideological attitude, but reflected before all the self-image Georg
Kastriotas. Only in the description of the role of Venice Barletius corrupted the course of events: Here he
had to take account of the state, which offered him and many other Christian refugees asylum; but
presumably Barletius felt a sincere loyalty to Venice, which he also praised in his early work "The Siege of
Skutari" (De Scodrensi obsidione) (Siege of 1474). Largely dependent on Barletius is the much shorter
account of Demetrio Franco, who is not Latin, but Italian wrote. Like Barletius, Franco, who came from
Drivasto, served as a Catholic priest in the Veneto (in S. Giovanni Battista di Briana near Treviso); his CV,
which F. Pall also examined, is of course better known. Franeo brings only a few additions to the
biography of Skutariners. He claims to have managed Skanderbeg's finances in his youth. His narrative
also takes up oral traditions of a legendary nature; for that, keep themselves antique managed
Skanderbeg's finances in his youth. His narrative also takes up oral traditions of a legendary nature; for
that, keep themselves antique managed Skanderbeg's finances in his youth. His narrative also takes up
oral traditions of a legendary nature; for that, keep themselves antique
Essentially umstnttener as Barletius and Franeo is the source value of the so-called Anonymous
Antivari. In 1742, Brescia-born priest Gian Maria Biemmi published a scandalous biography, allegedly
taken from a cradle of Erhard Radolt in 1480, a work whose beginning and end were supposed to have
been lost to Biemmi. This early print is said to have been written by antivariist contemporaries and
represent the earliest biography. It took 200 years for Kurt Ohly and Franz Babinger to expose this book
as an extremely skilful forgery, the work of a man who invented other works in the eighteenth century. 6
But in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Biemmi had credible historians Source served, and a
not inconsiderable part of Albania's state-sponsored scandal-bearing tradition is based on this
forgery. Generations of Albanian historians, from Athanase Gegaj to Fan Noli and recent representatives,
have repeatedly defended and used Biemmi. Kristo Frasheri's attitude, though aware of the falsification,
but nevertheless drawing on it as it contains essential elements of a cherished tradition, characterizes the
character of important parts of Albanian research. The only one who opposed Kasem Bi, oku, who in his
Skanderbegbibliograpme of 1997 clearly spoke of a forgery and in his own Skanderbegbiografie Biemmi
has not considered7 The fate of Biemmis fake shows in a peculiar way, which power can be used to
make narratives when there is a political and cultural will to believe them. Although the professional
historians move away from Biemmi in the Balkans, the fantasies of the gifted Lombard priest will continue
as historical facts in broader sections of the population, but also in the state culture of remembrance
(such as the museums of Kruja and Lezha). Source criticism is easier when dealing with other
contemporary narratives of native authors. What has been preserved has been created in Italian
exile. Noteworthy is the short but important biography of Skanderbeg by the Bishop of Dulcigno, Martinus
Segonus. He was born in Nova Brdo, the mining town in Kosovo. He earned a doctorate in Padua and
spent his life fighting against the Ottomans. Thus, he wrote a treatise on the history of the land of Pope
Sixtus IV, which is one of the most reliable geographic texts about the region. As a local, he had good oral
sources, especially at the early years of Skanderbeg. Segonus owes details to Skanderbeg's brothers
and especially to the campaign for Transylvania; Thus, the connection of Kastriota to Johann Hunyadi is
only really tangible. 342 Segonus owes details to Skanderbeg's brothers and especially to the campaign
for Transylvania; Thus, the connection of Kastriota to Johann Hunyadi is only really
tangible. 342 Segonus owes details to Skanderbeg's brothers and especially to the campaign for
Transylvania; Thus, the connection of Kastriota to Johann Hunyadi is only really tangible. 342
Also written by a man from the region are the memories of Giovanni Musachi, who lived in southern Italy
at the beginning of the 16th century '. Their value is based on two elements: On the one hand, the work
conveys many unknown details, and on the other hand - unlike Barletius, it offers no heroic song, but
rather the critical view of the Albanian nobility on a man who, despite his outstanding achievements
Abilities were admired, but at the same time was considered the enemy and spoiler of the Albanian
nobility. From this point of view, however, Musachi has so far hardly been evaluated, since Albanian
historical research in particular emphasized the national unity of the actors. Barletius and Musachi were
decisively influenced by the family of Durazzin Archbishop Paul Angelus, In the late fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, through a cleverly operated policy of remembrance, they acquired a prominent
position in the society of their new homeland. The brother of Peter Angelus, who died in 1469, came to
fame in Venice after 1479. In their luggage, the Angeli had brought a manuscript convolute from Italy to
their home Drivasto, in which real documents and forgeries form a difficult unraveling whole. This
collection is today partly in the library of the Museo Correr in Venice, partly in the Biblioteca laurenziana in
Florence. The Florentine manuscript Ms. Ashburnham 1184, which contains, among other things, the
already mentioned Albanian baptismal formula, can be considered the main work of this Catholic-North
Albanian culture of remembrance, representing the Angelus family as descendants of the eponymous
Byzantine imperial dynasty (at the end of the 12th century) and thus as a noble noble family, which was
related to all important aristocratic houses of BaUcans. Also in Barletius the praise of the family is sung,
which is due to the influence of the Venetian Angeli on the biographer. Members of the family also
maintained close ties to the hero's second biographer, Demetrio Franco, whose aunt was supposed to
have been the mother of the great archbishop Paul and his brother Peter, who died in 1512. "Angeli's
documentary and handwriting portrayal sheds light on the intellectual world of those circles that around
1464 wanted to build a catholic kingdom Albania, whereby, as told, the archbishop would have received
the cardinal's hat. Not all documents are fake, of course; some prove the actual position of the family as
influential patricians in Drivasto. Narrative sources from the Balkans are next to mention the late or post-
Byzantine historians and their Ottoman counterparts. Your source value has been analyzed
above. Especially the Byzantine authors Chalkokondyles and Sphrantzes have long been used
strangely, while the much more substantial Kritobulos enjoyed no such popularity. Its importance for
military and environmental history. his fine analysis of the insurrectionary motives is hardly
exceeded. There are a few marginal notes by Serbian and Byzantine manuscripts on native Christian
sources - so-called short chronicles, which essentially provide only arid information on military
campaigns. After all, they prove the fame of Skanderbeg outside his narrow sphere of influence. The
Ottoman sources, on the other hand, were not worked up until the twentieth century. there is a Serbian
translation of the relevant passages written by the inter-war Skopiotist Ottomanist Glisa Elezovic, which is
supplemented by a collection published three decades later by the most important Albanian Ottoman man
of the Hoxha period, Selami Pulaha. 2 Equally important are the investigations of the Kosovo-Albanian
Orientalist Hasan Kaleshi, who works in Prishtina. By contrast, the Ragusan chronicles, which are also
regional sources, offer very little (especially the work of the Junius RestilRestic). Scattered can be found
in the History of Antonio Bonfini to Hungary in the 15th Century Of the Italian authors of the 15th century
Pope Pius 11 is the first to call, then the Venetian Sabellico. The authors of the 16th century already drew
inspiration from a tradition shaped by Barletius. While Pius 11. expressed genuine interest in the Balkans,
not least in view of a planned crusade, After all, the world seemed quite foreign to other scholars. But they
contributed significantly to the fame of Skanderbeg in the West. The Venetian chronicles, whose authors
often had access to lost material today, wrote to the glory of their republic and devoted a figure, who
appeared mostly as an opponent of Venice, little space. But the disorderly collection of materials of the
Stefano Magno, which is composed of copies of documents and other chronicles, offers valuable material.
Outside of Italy no narrative works were created that do not go back to Barletius; their source value is
therefore extremely low. The main questions of Skanderbeg's life, however, can only be clarified by
documentary material, which is available in great abundance and one-sidedness. With the exception of
very few pieces, which are mostly kept in Dubrovnik, has received nothing from Skanderbeg's office
14. This forces you to look at the castriota from the outside, because a look from within is almost
impossible. The overwhelming majority of the files and documents are from Italian collections and
naturally illuminate the relationship between Skanderbeg and the states of the Apennine
Peninsula. Fragments are also for
344
the relationship with Burgundy before. The loss of sources is extraordinarily large here too. 15 Several
archive tragedies have destroyed large parts of contemporary file traffic. The most devastating effect on
the Skanderbeg research, the two fires in the Doge's Palace of Venice in the 70s of the 16th century. In
the process, that section of the archive that contained the Venetian authorities' correspondence from
Southeastern Europe was completely destroyed. If this stock had survived, you could follow Skanderbeg's
paths day by day. This catastrophe survived the section of the archive in which the outgoing
correspondence, that is, instructions and decisions of the Venetian central authorities, was kept. Since the
decision was given in each case, These texts offer an echo of the lost reports from Southeastern
Europe. An idea of the richness of these official reports is provided by individual copies, which have been
preserved in particular in the State Archives of Milan. The Duke's dynasty of the Sforza established in the
second half of the fifteenth century the establishment of permanent diplomatic representatives at foreign
courts. These residents kept telling their masters about political developments and often analyzed them
very thoroughly. The Milanese residents in Venice, Naples and Rome, ie states that pursued strong
interests in the Balkans, therefore included Skanderbeg in their reporting. Sometimes they put their
"dispacci"
Dogen handed over received, partly also by espionage acquired. The Battle of Berat is known in detail
from such copied reports. The Milanese "dispacci" are among the most important sources in the world.
The Ganzaga family in Mantua maintained such a news service, but it was less comprehensive than that
of its much richer and more powerful northern neighbor, the Sforza. Remnants of the Venetian authorities
are also located in the State Archives of Zadar, especially in the archive of the island of Korcula. Here are
copies of the official correspondence of the Venetian governor with the doge, which contain some
supplementary messages. Korcula was an important transit port on the way to Venice. Since the reporting
on Albania was mainly entrusted to the governors in Venetian Albania, the news about Skanderbeg from
Korculaj was only sporadic. All in all, the news fund on Skanderbeg, which was created in Venice or in the
Venetian system of power, offers the view of the Venetian central authorities due to the loss of
sources. 345
Even more devastating is the loss of sources for the Kingdom of Naples, whose archive in 1943 burned
down during combat operations. Only documents surviving before this date have been translated by
historians. In general, the number of sources in southern Italy is very modest compared to the Venetian
stocks. Perhaps research in local Apulian archives could still provide a few supplementary pieces. But
also in the Notarsarcbiven is expected to significant loss of sources. Rome, as the third major news
center, also suffered enormous damage to its archive holdings in the Sacco di Roma of 1527. Therefore,
the Vatican inventory, which has been researched by numerous historians since the 19th century, also
contains only one. surprisingly small number of source pieces. These have often been published several
times. The loss of source makes it particularly difficult to investigate details of the negotiations between
Skanderbeg and the popes. Here, too, Milanese and Mantuan dispacci must be resorted to in order to
reconstruct the papal attitude towards the insurgents. The Dubrovnik Archive has been extremely
thoroughly evaluated since the end of the 19th century. The Acts of the Grand Council and the Minor
Council generally contain only brief resolutions and are far less substantive than the Venetian Senate
decisions. From the short and dry information can be read diplomatic traffic, but not its content. Significant
are the various series of notary files: They provide information on the trade of Ragusan merchants in
Skanderbeg's territory. The archives of the Kotor belonging to Venetian Albania also provide information
on the history of trade, but scarcely to Skanderbeg itself. For the first time for the Skanderbegforschung
fruitful made in this work are the notaries of the archive of Korcula in Zadar. Albania's neighboring islands
of southern Dalmatia fed substantial quantities of Albanian grain and maintained close ties with the
Albanian nobility and the great Venetian ports of Alessio and Durazzo. The trading structures resembled
those of Dubrovnik and Kotor. The archives of Corfu, where the main Venetian fortress lay in the Ionian
Sea, were severely damaged during the siege of 1540. Whether there could possibly have received
individual pieces related to Skanderbeg, could not be eroded yet. The regional archives (Dubrovnik,
Zadar, Kotor) offer a very different point of view than the large Italian holdings, but they extend access to
the economy, and in part also society of the insurrection area, beyond a heroic warfare, as the narrative
history suggests
lenden sources is presented. The everyday business of the grain and arms trade is revealed here, as well
as the tedious procurement of capital by the insurgents. With a strong focus on sources of diplomatic
history, all from Western European archives, research risks neglecting Skanderbeg's external relations
with his Balkan neighbors and his struggle against regional Ottoman dignitaries. The Italian sources see
only the great protagonists, that is, especially the Kastriota and his adversary, the sultan. They limit their
view of the Albanian coast. The mountains and the interior of the Balkans are beyond their reach. The
Balkan side of Skanderbeg's fight - in other words: the very core of his life - can be read from local
documents and Ottoman tax registers. The documents of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Serbian despotate
are largely lost. The relations between the southern Slavic principalities and Skanderbeg can only be
examined with source materials from Ragusa. A modest replacement is offered by Byzantine and Serbian
short chronicles 17. There are hardly any surviving texts from Ochrid and the Greek Byzantine towns in
Epirus. The view of Orthodox Christians from the region can not be reconstructed - the previously
mentioned post-Byzantine historiography - with the exception of Georgios Sphrantzes, who spent his old
age on Corfu - arose far from the inner Balkans. Ottoman tax registers were created after the Ottoman
conquest and thus reflect the state after the devastating destruction that had made possible the success
of the sultan. Conclusions on the pre-Ottoman period are hampered by loss of population (through
murder, flight and deportation); Nonetheless, forms of denomination, denominational affiliation, social
stratification and especially forms of agriculture (cereals, livestock farming, mills) emerge from the
otherwise arid notes. These tax registers were essentially made accessible to Macedonian Ottoman
Studies (by M. Sokoloski and A Stojanovski) 18. More recently, especially D. Gorgiev engaged in the
interpretation of socio-historically important information From the Albanian side, Selami Pulaba has
opened part of the defector of 1467 l '. The tax registers also provide crucial clues for the analysis of
followers and opponents of Skanderbeg; they first show that the fault lines ran right through regional
society, not along the lines of etymology but through the language communities. 347
Principles of a Bibliography raisonmie The number of Scanderbeg biographers is a legion, but the amount
of biographies in no way corresponds to their scientific quality, let alone one can assume that newer
works offer advances in knowledge over their predecessors. By the middle of the 19th century,
Skanderbeg journalism written in many European languages was almost entirely based on Marinus
Barletius. Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, who also used Barletius as the main source, but also used the
Byzantine and Ottoman historians who had been tapped at the time, presented the first account with
scholarly claims20. He did not, however, investigate archive material. Fallmerayer's work, although
contentually obsolete in many parts, remains undoubtedly the most stylistically brilliant biography that
uniquely captures the heroic character of Skanderbeg. The great historian of medieval Greece, Kar! Hopf.
"He had extensively researched archives in almost all of the archives mentioned in his book" History of
Greece in the Middle Ages ", which dealt with Albanian space, the first scientific account of the Albanian
nobility Giovanni Musachi, whom he evaluated together with the Albanian connoisseur Johann Georg von
Hahn.The study presented by Hahn and Hopf is one of the - unjustly forgotten - fundamental works on the
Albanian nobility. Somewhat after Hopf, the Russian Vinkentij Makusev began extensive work in Italian
archives; Although he was initially sources to the Slavs in the Middle Ages, but he met especially in Milan
and Mantua on significant documents on the history of the Albanians. MakuSev had the great merit to
have used the Dispacci of the Milan archives for the first time "- after Hopfund Makusev flattened the level
but off .. The Austro-Hungarian consul in Joannina, Julius Pisko, published in 1894 a narrow ribbon, in
which he also Milan archival material Prancing confidence in the counterfeiter Biemmi had a devastating
effect, as more and more proved that almost every scandi biographer copied from his predecessor, often
without quoting it or dealing critically with his source work, Errors were passed on from book to book. This
did not apply to the alexandrical works of Ludwig von Thalloczy, Milan of Sufflays and Konstantin Jireceks
- only these Austro-Hungarian scholars concentrated on researching the time before Skanderbeg. Sufflay
was murdered in 1931 by the Serbian secret service. The archival footage he and Thalloczy wrote in
years
This work was published in 1941 by Jirecek's pupil, the eminent Serbian historian (and representative of
Greater Serb nationalism) Jovan Radonic. This source work is still an essential basis for any work on
Skanderbeg: documents from Dubrovnik, including the Serbian documents of the Kastriota, but also
material from Venice, Rome, Milan and Mantua and - particularly significant - from Barcelona are
reprinted in large style ; in Barcelona are important parts of the archive of Skanderbeg's feudal lord Alfons
V. In the interwar period experienced the Skanderbeg research a flowering: biographies presented by the
Albanians Fan Noli and Athanase Gegaj and the Italian Alessandro Cutolo ''. All three biographers
followed the forger Biemmi and contributed substantially to the dissemination of its inventions beF'- Noli's
ideological assessment of Skanderbeg has already been addressed. Gegaj saw the kastriota as a
"perfect commander, of an impressive exterior, of rare physical strength, an enemy of luxury and
debauchery, devout and very considerate of the weak" (162). Although he could not snatch Albania from
the Ottomans, he said: "By halting the Ottoman flood that threatened to flood Italy, Skanderbeg and his
people made a lasting contribution to saving Western civilization" (163). Gegaj is thus a representative of
the antemurale-christianitatis interpretation of Skanderbeg. Cutolo simply wrote out in part Noli's
biography ". More valuable than these attempts at general presentation were the individual studies of
Francisc Pall and Constantin Marinescu, two Romanian historians. In particular, Marinescu explored the
rich archives of Aragon and presented a history of Alfonso V's Ostpolitik that is still valid today27. Pall's
merits in source criticism have already been mentioned. He also made his mark in the exploration of
Milanese material and as a critical observer of scandal heritage historiography. "Pall continued his
research after World War II, focusing more and more on themes of Romanian history. who had to develop
a socialist national history in the service of the party. While the small start-up generation often studied in
western and central European countries (Austria, France), the post-war generation was educated in
Moscow until the early 1960s. After the break-up of the dictator Enver Hoxha with the Soviet Union, that
isolationism developed, which drove the scientific life into nationalistic and often xenophobic narrowness,
from which it is now only with great effort and effort. With the power of the totalitarian state communist
Albania spread its Skanderbegbild. Of the 349th which drove scientific life into nationalist and often
xenophobic narrowness, from which it is now only with great effort and effort. With the power of the
totalitarian state communist Albania spread its Skanderbegbild. Of the 349th which drove scientific life
into nationalist and often xenophobic narrowness, from which it is now only with great effort and
effort. With the power of the totalitarian state communist Albania spread its Skanderbegbild. Of the 349th
From the late 1960s to the present, essentially the same historians determine the interpretation of the
national hero. Only recently have the first tentative signs of a scientific critique emerged. Although
Skanderbeg was instrumentalized by the regime, as shown, as a symbol of a civil religion, the research
on the historical figure, which deviated strongly from the official view of history, hardly progressed. The
somewhat paradoxical situation arose that Skanderbeg became more and more present in the Albanian-
speaking societies, but at the same time that apart from stereotypical formulas and fixed narratives one
hardly knew anything about his actual life circumstances. Skanderbeg became a memorial, the
immovable iron figure gazing gloomily down from the monuments in the large squares and in the
reception hall of the Presidential Palace. Outside Albania, the study of the subject continued. Giuseppe
Valentini, a Jesuit who worked in Shkodra before the war, published his vast collection of Venetian
sources, which is still the basis of every work on the topic to this day.'9 In the Vatican archives, new
source finds were also uncovered in 1968 for the jubilee year pulled and made accessible especially by
Valentini and Ignazio Parrino30 Alain Ducellier opened the archives of Dubrovnik and
Kotor; Simultaneously with him worked the Serbian historian Bogumil Hrabak trading history. Ivan Bozic
studied the rural society of northern Albania and Montenegro and presented a synthesis of Albanian
history in the Middle Ages. Momcilo Spremic dealt with Venetian rule and church history. Skanderbeg
also took into consideration overviews of the late Crusades, for example in KM Setton and N.
Housley. Although vividly written, the posthumously published book by the British spy (and subordinates
of lan Fleming) offers Harry Hodgkinson little new source material. Its value lies in the knowledge of the
author of landscape and mentality, especially of the mountain dwellers, under whom the author was
engaged in the Second World War. "1 Ten years after the end of communist Albania appeared almost
simultaneously two Skanderbegbiografien from the pen of well-known Albanian Historian32. Essentially
new was the work Kasem Bi, okus. On the one hand, because he drew on the Ottoman tax registers
published by the Macedonian Ottomans, thus placing more emphasis on Skanderbeg's opponent; on the
other hand, he also opened up the historical geography as a source through systematic terrain
preparation. He developed the thesis that Skanderbeg's space of action was to be moved far to the east,
deep into the territory of today's Republic of Macedonia. The cornerstone of the argument is the
Lokalis350 discussed above
Svetigrads in the region of Demir hisar, from Modric in the valley of Treska before Skopje. This thesis is
not undisputed and, given the shortage of sources, can only be based on an uncertain basis33. Even if
Bil'oku does not agree on this question, his merit remains an important methodological enrichment of the
Skanderbeg research, which, as mentioned, despite the numerous commemoration sessions, is
essentially stagnant. Like the second biographer, Kristo Frasheri, one of the leading representatives of
communist historiography, however, he is unable to leave the framework of national history and thus an
ethno-national interpretation. The retrojection of modern ethnic identities into the Middle Ages is still
hardly questioned in Albanian research today. Modern theories on nation-building hardly noticed. In
addition to the historian Aleks Buda, mentioned several times, methodological considerations have been
made by several historians outside Albania, but they have hardly been noticed by scholars, especially in
Albania. Francisc PalI, the East German historian Willy Steltner, Giuseppe Ghetti and especially
Giuseppe Valentini have made attempts to critically evaluate sources and especially historiography and to
provide methodological guidelines in dealing with the problem of scandals34. Valentini emphasized the
tension between written sources and oral tradition, including the danger of the heroic dimension of
Skanderbeg, ie his perception as a hero by the society of Albanian space, neglected by a one-sided focus
on the mostly outside of the Balkans originated documents. He then grappled critically with the
Skanderbeg image in communist Albania, where he saw historical materialism and nationalism in
conflict. From the perception especially of the Italo-Albanians he emphasizes as basic elements the
heroic ideal, the memory of Albania as homeland and the Christian faith. A significant advance in
knowledge enabled the work of the Ottomans in Turkey, Macedonia and Albania after 1945: chronicles,
but above all the important tax registers exist in editions and translations and allow a more detailed
analysis of social and economic structures. Moreover, in view of the sheer volume of sources, the Vatican
Archives are more likely to find coincidences; also in Venice, where in the notaries, wills or the stock of
Procuratori di S. Marco one or the other still to find 351 Moreover, in view of the sheer volume of sources,
the Vatican Archives are more likely to find coincidences; also in Venice, where in the notaries, wills or
the stock of Procuratori di S. Marco one or the other still to find 351
should be. So far disappointing were the sources, which were made accessible from southern Italian
archives. All in all, however, these are material inventories that can only be researched through many
years of work on Scanderbegiana, a task that local historians are far better able to carry out than
outsiders.
REMARKS ON THE MEANING OF LANGUAGE GROUPS AND ROOMS AND ON LOCAL AND
PERSONAL NAMES The concept of spaces, places and people is a methodological problem in
Southeastern European history, inasmuch as in modern social and political discussions pieces of
reference from history are often used as arguments and ambiguity When dealing with the relevant
terminology, misunderstandings can be promoted. Therefore, the procedure in this book is explained in
some detail.
Space Conceptuality The central space terminus is "Albania". But this does not mark a state or a fixed
space. Rather, "Albania" is one of those very unstable spatial concepts of the medieval Balkans (such as
"Macedonia" or the "Scl.vonia"), which in the course of time could designate very different spaces. The
concept of space "Albania" is linked to the existence of speakers of Albanian, but this does not mean that
they have actually made a majority in all the areas ever called "Albania" in the Middle Ages. As an
isolated language within the Indo-European language group, Albanian speakers fell in a Greek Slavic or
Italian milieu on In the late-natal age, the Albanian language area expanded greatly due to migration from
today's central Albania. Thus, the first written evidence of the existence of the language from the
hinterland of Dubrovnik (1282), where there was hardly a closed language area. Around 1400, an Italian
pilgrim called the epirotic coast opposite the port of Patras "Albania", since at that time an Albanian-
speaking aristocratic fern had settled there and Albanian-speaking warriors, peasants and shepherds as
new immigrants, especially in the 352nd
Eye sting. After 1400, the term "Albania" moved north and reached the bay of Cattarol-Boka kotorska in
today's Monte negro. This is due less to an Albanian imperfection that did not exist there, but to the
administrative notion of the Republic of Venice, which summarized its possessions between Cattaro and
Durazio under the term "Albania." Albanians, Slavs, urban Balkan novels lived in this Venetian Albania
Thus, there was no linguistic unity, and even more ambiguous is the demarcation to the east: today's
Albanian settlements in Kosovo and Western Macedonia were not called "Albania" in the Middle
Ages. Albania is a purely geographical, spatially and temporally strong fluctuations of the concept of
space, which is not congruent with a closed language area, but - with all due care - as perception space is
to be understood, ie as a space in which a striking presence of the Albanian language was determined. In
the late Middle Ages, apart from "Albania," the antiquarian concepts of space "Epirus" and "Macedonia."
The Scanderbegbiograf Barletius means with "Epirus" the Albanian language area, which he
distinguishes from "Bulgaria", he also indicates where essentially the Linguistic border, namely in the area
of the modern state border between the republics of Albania and Macedonia, via the northern section, the
present border between Albania and Kosovo, he does not speak on the other handJ6. But he also uses
the term Mayonia, like other contemporaries, sometimes for what other sources refer to as
"Albania". "Macedonia" may soon mean the Vardartal, the heartland of today's Republic of Macedonia, or,
based on ancient understandings of space, parts of present-day Albania.
Ethnonymic ethnonyms such as "Albanian", "Slavic", "Serbian", "Bulgarian", "VIaehe" and "Turk" often
appear in the medieval sources, but it is inadmissible to equate them with members of today's
ethnonationally defined groups Language differences were perceived by the inhabitants of the late
medieval Balkans and led to the formation of an appropriate division of people into speech communities,
but certain ethnonyms have even more levels of terminology: a "Vlache" Spokesman of a Balkan-Romany
language related to today's Romanian, but he has 353
Residents of the hinterland without Stadtbürgerrechtl8. Ethnonyms should be used with considerable care
for these reasons. As with space notions, some sources use ancient terminology. Barletius speaks of
"Epiroten" (Albanians) and Triballern (Slavs); Pope Pius II also of lllyrians, meaning Slavs39.
Place Names The medieval sources - Italian, Ottoman, Greek and Slavic - often offer diverging views,
none of which is "right" or "wrong". In addition, individual place names changed their shape over time:
when the Ottomans compiled a tax register in the Matigebiet in 1466/67, they recorded an important
castle of Skanderbeg as "Bila Kamin" or Barletius calls the place Petralba. Form "Guri i bardhe", which
means "white stone" in each case, the form "Bila chimney" is used because it is in Barletius' "Petralba" a
humanist Latinization, in "Guri i bardhe" for a first later occupied Albanian form acts - whereby, of course,
can not be excluded karm, that the Albanian form had already existed in the Middle Ages. Only source
documents are missing. Using today's official place names raises other issues. The border between the
Republic of Albania and its neighbors to the east was not drawn until 1912. In the Middle Ages, there was
a wide transitional area in the same region, with a strong linguistic mix. To draw a dividing line is therefore
artificial and does not do justice to the historical circumstances. In addition, especially in today's Dibra
many place names represent Albanised forms of Slavic toponyms41 Der Unter354 The border between
the Republic of Albania and its neighbors to the east was not drawn until 1912. In the Middle Ages, there
was a wide transitional area in the same region, with a strong linguistic mix. To draw a dividing line is
therefore artificial and does not do justice to the historical circumstances. In addition, especially in today's
Dibra many place names represent Albanised forms of Slavic toponyms41 Der Unter354 The border
between the Republic of Albania and its neighbors to the east was not drawn until 1912. In the Middle
Ages, there was a wide transitional area in the same region, with a strong linguistic mix. To draw a
dividing line is therefore artificial and does not do justice to the historical circumstances. In addition,
especially in today's Dibra many place names represent Albanised forms of Slavic toponyms41 Der
Unter354
The difference between the Slavic Borovo (probably of "bor", pine) and the Albanian Borove (or in the
specific form: Borova) is external nature '' '- Even larger landscapes in Albania bore Slavic names, such
as the' ermenika (slav. Cermenika, perhaps from Slav. Cerven, red - with respect to the reddish earth in
this region) 4J. The proportion of Slavic place names in today's East Albanian districts, ie the Debarillibra
Skanderbegs, is quite high: it is in Gora at the Black Drin 76.3%, in Upper Dibra 56.8%, in Lower Dibra
48.6%, in Dolgo (or Golo) brdo / alb. Golloborde 79%, further south in the Ermenika 45,9%. In contrast,
the Slavic influence on the place names in Central Albania around Kruja (8.7%) and the catchment area
of Mati (Mirdita 11.1%, Fandi 5.2%) is very low 44. Since the Middle Ages Slavic (whether in its Makedo-
Bulgarian or Serbian form) has retreated eastward. The Slavic place names have partly remained as a
reminiscence of a different linguistic stratification of the population in the Middle Ages. The toponyms in
the Inner Balkans (Mati, Dibra) were also recorded by Ottoman officials in the 15th century, who adapted
the names of the Turkish pronunciation. In modern editions of Albanian and Macedonian historians, these
forms were reproduced in the respective modern vernacular languages, sometimes without the Ottoman
variant. Whichever system of replay is chosen, there is a danger of being inconsistent or ahistorical. In
this book, as an attempt at a Solomon's solution, the procedure is as follows: For the smaller inland
places, the official spelling in force today, ie Macedonian forms for places in present-day western
Nakedonia with a majority Albanian population (ie Tetovo and not Tetova), but Albanian forms for Slavic
toponyms on today's Albanian territory. On the other hand, the large towns on the eastern coast are
known for their Italian names used until the early 20th century (Alessio, not Lezha, Skutari, not
Shkodra). This should point to the mixed cultural character of these in the south Gri.echisch-Albanian, in
the north Romance-Albanian-Slavic cities. For the cities lying on today Croatian territory alternatively the
Slavic and the Italian form are used (Dubrovnik - Ragusa, Split - Spalato).
Person names Just as difficult is the reproduction of the personal names. Like other European
historiographies, Albanians have become accustomed to adapting personal names to modern
usage. Skanderbeg's father and son 355
are called "Gjon" (Johann). This form is mentioned in no medieval source. Rather, the two Kastriota
appear in Latin, Italian and Greek (chalkokondyles) texts as
"Ivan", "Ivanus" or "Ivanis". Since Italian chancellors had no reason to Slavisieren a Christian baptismal
name - if they had Latinized him (John) or transferred to Venetian (Zuan) - one may assume that the
Kastriota have used the Slavic name form itself. Even the Ottomans did not speak of "Gjon's land", but of
"Yuvan-ili", using the Serbian name variant "Jovan" ''. Therefore, in the following, the Slavic variant
applies. However, it can not be emphasized enough that a personal name does not allow any conclusion
about the ethnic or linguistic affiliation of a person. Certainly cultural influences can be read. This can also
be demonstrated by the example of ethnically mixed nobility in the Albanian area: Slavic endings on -ie
were obviously considered noble. The non-Slavic family of Thopia in Central Albania named after its most
famous representative the KarloviCi (sons of Charles) 47. The great dynasty of the north appears under
the forms "balsa" and Bal ;; iCi. Their ethnic affiliation - whether Albanian, Slavic or Balkan-Romany - can
not be determined. Skanderbeg's nephew was referred to in the acts of the Venetian chancellery as Ivan
Bal; i6 (Balsic in the texts) ''. It is not allowed to change the name to an albanised "Gjon Balsha" unless it
is clearly marked as a deviation from source-language usage. Christian names from Ottoman tax
registers are usually rendered in the form used by the Macedonian or Albanian editors. Not unproblematic
is the reproduction of Muslim proper names, for the Turkish, Albanian and Macedonian forms exist. Here,
the Turkish variant is given preference, since it was either Turkish-speaking Muslim Ottomans or
converted to Islam Balkan Christians, who also adopted the Ottoman culture. This cultural change is to be
expressed through the use of the Turkish forms (which are provided for convenience in modem-Turkish
spelling). Which language these converts used, does not emerge from the sources. In oral
communication, they will largely maintain their mother tongue, have used the Ottoman as a new Reich
language in correspondence. All in all, this system, which in the end is not without inconsistencies, is
intended to be the middle between historically proven forms, the specific ones
=
356
language and culture mixture in the late Middle Ages illustrate and maintain an orientation of modern
Namensfonnen that facilitate the orientation particularly in place names, in any case should be
emphasized that no ethnonational interpretation late Middle ratios are read from the use of names in the
following text may,
concordance of place and terrain names used in text Alessio Antivari Bojana Budua Cattaro Curzola
Dagno Dibra Drivasto Dulcigno Durazzo Gjirokastra Joannina Lepanto Lesina Medua Pago Ragusa
Rotezo Sibenik Skopje Skutari Split St. Sergius Tetovo Zadar
Albanian Lezha
Tivari
Serbiscb / Croatian
other
LjeS Bar
Buna
Drishti Ulqini
Durresi
Lannina N aupaktos (gr.) Hvar Shen Gjin Pag Dubrovnik Ratac Shkupi Shkodra
Shirgji Tetova
357
pitches
PriStina
o
~ - "~ '- oPrilep
() Kastoria
imara GjirOkager
o loannina
358
Larisa
345
11
B. Heinz-R. Wunderlich (ed.), 1l1omas Coryate, description of Venice 1608. Helde! Berg 1988, 109
(reference by Sabine Engel, Berlin). 12 GB Marino, La Galeria del Cavalier Marino. Distinta in Pitture &
Sculture. Venice 1620, under "Ritrntti": (123) "Per virtu sol di mie robust bracciald'altro Alessandro
insuperbisce I'Epiro! In battaglia il guemer, la fera in cacciaiprodiglOso il mio valor sentiro.l Since] Lerror
sol del norne, e dela [acetal intimoriti I Barbari fuggirOl e senza trattar spada, 0 vibrar dardol spesso piu
marriage Yes man, n'uccise il guardo. (See also S. Engel, Berlin.) 13 For more details see below 14 S.
Lexikon der Mittelalters Vol. J, eds. 354-366 sv Alexander dGr., In Art and Literature, on the Alexandrian
issue especially for the Albanem s Bi90ku, Aleksandri 1 Madh ne kujtcsen historie te Skenderbeut e te
Shqiptareve. Sfudime
Barlctius 4-5. To him still best F. Pall, Marino Barlezio, uno storie umanista. Metanges d'hisloire generale
2. Cluj-Napoca 1938. Barletius 1. Pall, BariezlO 18ff. A compilation of Skanderbegdru. with K. Bicoku - 1.
Kastrati, Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeu. Bibliography 1454-1835. Tirana 1997, 72f .; the German edition was
reprinted in Frankfwt am 1561 (for the Skanderbegbibliografie see the critical discussion by M. Schmidt-
Neke in southeast · Forschungen 57 (1998) 480-482).
Ibid. 87,91.
It was printed in 1567; Jacques de Lavardin published a French version in 1576, 1588 the Spanish
translation, 1596 the English translation. Adaptations of the text were put into print: 1592 in Transylvania
(Koloszvär, CIuJ), reprinted in Debrecen (1597) in Hungary, 1609 in Hanover, 1709 left Paris (the Histoire
de Scanderbeg, Roy d'Albanie des Pere lean-Nicolas Duponcet ); in the 19th century followed the
triumphal procession of the biography of Barletius among the masterminds of the Balkan national
movement; to summarize: OJ Schmitt, Skanderbeg rides again. Recovery and invention of a national
identity, in: U. Brunnbauer - A. Helmedach S. Troebst (ed.), Interfaces. Society, Nation, Conflict and
Remembrance in Southeastern Europe. Festschrift H. Sundhaussen. Miniature 2007,401-419. 9
Comrnentario delle cose de Turchi, et dei S. Giorgio Scanderbeg, principe di Epyrro, con la sua vita, et je
uittorie per lui fatte. Con] aiuto de I'altissimo DlO, et le inestimabili forze & uirtu di that 110, degne di
memoria. MD .XXXIX .; F. Pall, Di nuovo sulle biography scanderbegiane del XV] secolo. Review of
etudes sudesf europeennes 911 (1971) pp. 91-106; Bi90ku - Kastrati. 76. 10 V. MaJaj, L'Opera
"Scanderbeg" dell'Abate Vivaldi. ShejzatlLe Pieiadi 12 (1968) 40-43 91-106; Bi90ku - Kastrati. 76. 10 V.
MaJaj, L'Opera "Scanderbeg" dell'Abate Vivaldi. ShejzatlLe Pieiadi 12 (1968) 40-43 91-106; Bi90ku -
Kastrati. 76. 10 V. MaJaj, L'Opera "Scanderbeg" dell'Abate Vivaldi. ShejzatlLe Pieiadi 12 (1968) 40-43
20 (2005) 123-144. 16 Schmitt, Skanderbeg as the new Alcxander 143; the interpretation is due to the
Munich Althisloriker Peter Robert Franke. As will be explained below, only the upper part of the helmet, ie
the two goat hammers, can be considered true.
359
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11
12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19
20
21 22
23
360
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24 25 26
27
28 29
30 31
32
33 34
35
36
37
14 (1982) 69-141; E. Grozdanova, miners (mndenci), salt winners (tuzcu) and celeps as population
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during the first centuries of Ottoman rule (15th and 16th century). Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der
Neuzeit 5 (2005) 7-14; B. Gjuzelev, The Bulgarian-Albanian Ethnic Frontier Stojanovski, Demographskite
promeni from Debarskata kaza (15-16 vek). Glasnik na Institufot za nacionalna islorija 45/1 (2001) 69-
85; D. Gjorgiev, Islamization in the Macedonian-Albanian border area during the first centuries of Ottoman
rule (15th and 16th century). Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 5 (2005) 7-14; B. Gjuzelev,
The Bulgarian-Albanian Ethnic Frontier Stojanovski, Demographskite promeni from Debarskata kaza (15-
16 vek). Glasnik na Institufot za nacionalna islorija 45/1 (2001) 69-85; D. Gjorgiev, Islamization in the
Macedonian-Albanian border area during the first centuries of Ottoman rule (15th and 16th
century). Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 5 (2005) 7-14; B. Gjuzelev, The Bulgarian-
Albanian Ethnic Frontier
38 39 40
41
42 43
361
in the middle of the Middle Ages. Etudes balkaniqucs 1991 / 3,78-92 Barletius 17. ibid. M. Sokoloski,
Turski dokumenti za istorijata oa makedonskiot narod. Op. Liren popisen defter od XV vek. Vol. 2. SkopJe
1973,315 [; s. also K. Biyoku, Dlbra the Koxhaxhiku ne kohen e Skenderbeut, in: ders., Per
Skenderbeuno Tirana 2005, 104-133; The same author, however, revised his LokalisielUng shortly
thereafter and now assumes. Svetlgrad was to be identified with the West-Macedonian Demir hisar; K.
Biyoku, Shtrirja hndore e zoterimeve te Kastrioteve, in: F. Dulea (ed.), Sk2nderbeu dhe Evropa, 61-
82. The character of the RegIon as an ethnic transition area s. D. Gjorgiev, Islamization in the
Macedonian-Albanian border area during the first centuries of Ottoman rule (15th-16th century). Wlener
Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 5/2 (2005) 7-14; id., The population in the Makedoo-Albanian
border area in the 15th and 16th centuries according to osmam sources. Southeast Research 65/66
(2006/07), II 7-136. Sokoloski 323: Albanian name forms: Pop Gerg, Gon Sope. Bulgarian name-series:
Dimitri Petkov, his brother Dapce, Neno Stanislav, Dapce Bogoslav, Petko Kosnicani. Serbian name
forms: Stepko Pekovic, Milos, litovar, Voin P .. dovic (the original), his father Prado, Bojo Stani51c, Durica
Stani§ic, Ivce Jankovic, his brother Pano, Duro Solovit, whose brother Dirnltri, Ivce Danculovic, Dejan
Kartovic, Pano Rubanic. Miho Trajkovlc, his brother Stojko, Mi1ovan, his brothers Petko and Stante, Petar
Jankovic, Neno Tihanovic. Other names: pop Nikola, Nikola Likatin, his brother Stance, Nlkola Protuger,
Mino son of Kova ~. Elité List of Albanian Names in the 1. G. von Hahn, Albanian studies. Volume 1
Vienna 1853, J 16ft '. Sokoloski 324. Bi ~ oku, Dlbra 114ff .; Hopf, Chroniques greco-romanes inedites ou
peu connues. Berlin 1873 (in it: Giovanni Musachi, Despoto d'Eplro, Historia della casa Musachia,
270340, cited as Musachi). HIer 290, Ochrid pays to Dibra. The Byzantine district (theme) Debrai 1st
occupied in the 13th century, s. G. Prin · zing, Demetnos Cbomatos, Ponemala diaphora. The file corpus
of the Ohrid Archbishop Demetrios Chomatos. Berlin - New York 2002, 392. The same applies to
the pays Ochrid to Dibra. The Byzantine district (theme) Debrai 1st occupied in the 13th century, s. G.
Prin · zing, Demetnos Cbomatos, Ponemala diaphora. The file corpus of the Ohrid Archbishop Demetrios
Chomatos. Berlin - New York 2002, 392. The same applies to the pays Ochrid to Dibra. The Byzantine
district (theme) Debrai 1st occupied in the 13th century, s. G. Prin · zing, Demetnos Cbomatos, Ponemala
diaphora. The file corpus of the Ohrid Archbishop Demetrios Chomatos. Berlin - New York 2002, 392. The
same applies to the
44
45
46
47
48
49
50 51
Landscape Mokra. Today, Mokra is a region west of Lake Ohrid (near the Albanian town of Pogradec); in
this form, the Ottomans used the term. Barletius, however, refers to another region further to the
northwest, which he describes as densely populated and "to the tribal" (Serbs). (Barletius 34) Detailed
description of the sources at Biyoku, Shtrirja 71f T. Filiposki, The Ochrida-Debra region and the region of
Arbanon (Albanian) in the XIIth century, m: F. Duka (ed.), Skenderbeu the Evropa, 18 ~ 33. Evidence
from the 13th century on Demetrios Cbomatos text 327 (Albanian name forms: Giones == Gjon, Tanuses
"" Tanush, Gines "" Gjin) Gorgiev, population 119, 1467 were counted after heavy fighting about 11000
people; after a strong demographic recovery in 1537/39 around four times more; here it is assumed that
this corresponds approximately to the conditions before the Ottoman conquest. A. Matkovski,
Nomadskoto stocarstvo of Makedonija or XIV do XIX vek. Skopje 1996. A particularly strong vlachisehe
population is assumed for the adjoining landscape (: ermenika in the today's east central Albania,
Stojanovski, Raja 45) in the following is spoken for stylistic reasons of "Albanern", "Slavs" or "Serbs" and
"Bulgaren" It should also be expressly pointed out here that this refers exclusively to bearers of Albanian,
Serbian, etc. names, who as a rule, but not always, used the corresponding language, and members of
ethno-national groups in the modern sense. Barletius 208; s. the older but rich monograph of AM
Seliscev, Polog i ego bolgarskoe naselenie. Sofia 1929. Barletius 139f. "superior Debar montuosa est, &
aspera, ferax tamen, & Macedonia tum ipsa loci vicinitate, turn simi-litudine morum contingens". On the
significance of the perception and the handling of linguistic differences in European, especially German
humanism s. C. Hirschi, The Competition of Nations. Constructions of a German Ehrgemeinschaft at the
turn of the Middle Ages to modern times. Gbttingen 2005. Barletius 139. Barletius 139.
52 53 54 55
56
57
58 59
60
61
62
63
Muscari 290. Musachi 290. D. Evyenidou ~ 1st Kanonidis ~ Th. Papazotos, TIle Monuments of
Prespa. Athens 1991, 26ff. Major excavations were carried out by N. Mutsopulos, s. its treatise:
Anaskaphe tes basiltkes tu Hagiu Achilleiu. EEPS Aristotelelon panepistemion Thessafonikes 5 (1971-
1972) 47-461. A. Ducellicr, La fac; ade maritime de l'Albany au moyen-ege. Durazzo et Valona du Xle au
XVe siecle. Thessaloniki 1981,522. Musachi wrote at the beginning of the 16th century in Italian exile in
Italian; he belonged to the milieu of the Italian Albanian diaspora nobility. Therefore, the name form used
by the author himself in his chronicle is used here. The Fonn "Gjon Muzaka" mentioned in Albanian
scientific papers is not proven in the source If, however, spoken by the working in the Albania of the 15th
century noble family of this name, is used to distinguish the two milieus of action the form
"Muzaki". Musachi 295. For a different origin. namely from the region Has at POllen, enters Kasem
Biyoku (Skenderbeu 75ff.); He relies mainly on the 1636 published Skanderbegsch.rift by Frang
Bardhi. Although Musachj actually expresses his reservations about the castriota, he is otherwise always
very precise in the topographic. Therefore, there is no reason not to believe in his comments on the origin
of the Kastriota. Decisive are the detailed explanations of K. Frasheri, Skenderbeu. Jeta the vepra. Tirana
2002, 54ff. P. Bartl, Sources and Research on Albanian History In the 17th. and 18th century (Albanian
researches 20). Munich 1979, 110-112. OJ Schmitt, Skanderbeg rides again. Recovery and invention of a
national hero, in: U. Brunnbauer ~ A. Helmedach ~ S. Troebst (ed.), Interfaces. Society, Nation,
Konfiiktund Memory in Southeastern Europe Festschrift for Holm Sundhaussen on the occasion of his
65th birthday. Mlinchen 2007,401-418. See in detail the concluding chapter. In the 17th century, the North
Albanian Catholic clergyman Franciscus Blancus J Frang Bardhi defended Skanderbeg's Albanian
heritage ["L Konfiiktund Erinnerung in Southeastern Europe Festschrift for Holm Sundhaussen on his 65th
birthday. Mlinchen 2007,401-418. See in detail the concluding chapter. In the 17th century, the North
Albanian Catholic clergyman Franciscus Blancus J Frang Bardhi defended Skanderbeg's Albanian
heritage ["L Konfiiktund Erinnerung in Southeastern Europe Festschrift for Holm Sundhaussen on his 65th
birthday. Mlinchen 2007,401-418. See in detail the concluding chapter. In the 17th century, the North
Albanian Catholic clergyman Franciscus Blancus J Frang Bardhi defended Skanderbeg's Albanian
heritage ["L
64 B. Petrovski, Voisava Tnbalda, in: Cerg Kastrioti Skenderbeg. Skopje 2006, 67-78. As "Voisava sua
moglie e figha deI Principe de Tribali" in an anonymous biography of the 16th century: Siena Bibliotcca
Comunale. Ms. K IX 33 f. 46-61v "Vita et fatti di Giorgio Scanderbeg Albanese" f 46r. (This manuscript,
which essentially follows Barletius, was discovered by Claudia Märtl, Munich, whom I would like to thank
for the provision of a copy). L. Malltezi, Nje document i ri per Skenderbeuno ekskluslve (magazine
published in Prishtina; OS) 20 (2001) 61-64; Ivan Kastriota's widow appears in this play under the name
Jella; this contradicts the opinion of the narrative sources (all listed by Petrovski). An explanation of the
claim is difficult. 65 Musachi 334 " Scanderbeg huomo valente e per natura Serviano, le virtil dei quale
furno tantc eh 'era estiroato non solum dall' Albanesi, ma anco da ogn'altra nabone "66 V. Petkovie,"
Arbanaski pirg "u Hilandaru, Arhiv za arbanasJcu starinu, jezi "I etnologiiu 1 (1923) 196-197; A. Fotie,
Sveta Gora and Hilandar and Osmanskom Carstvu XV-XVII BC. Belgrade 2000, 247f with image of the
tower on a drawing from 1757. 67 A. Ducellier, La fayade maritime de la principaute of the Kastriote de la
fin du XIVe siecle a la mort de Skanderbeg, in: ders., L 'Albanie part VII, 119-136; F. Duka, Tokat e
Kastrioteve: zona Kruje - Diber (shek XV - gjysma e pare e shek. XVI), in: ders., Skenderbeu dhe Evropa,
34-47; S. Pulaha, Les Kastriote devant la conquete ottomane annees 1420-1430. SA 8/1 (1971) 103-
127; o. Radeshi, Principata e Kastrioteve. Bulefin i Universiletil Shteteror te TiMos. Seria e shkencave
shoqerore 15/4 (1961) 27-41. 68 AAV 3169. 69 AAV 1505. 70 Ducellier, Fayade maritime des Kastriote
126 [71 AAV 2658. 2667. 72 AAv2702; Schmitt, The Venezuelan Albania 280. 73 L. Malltezi, Rreth
historicise se Keshtjelles se Krujes the zones se sa) ne vitet 1392-1415. SfudimehiSlorike 198912, J57-
177; AAV2017, 2779. 74 In this order in Musachi 295. 75 Musachi 295; Frasheri, Skenderbeu 72. 76
Frasheri, Skenderbeu 80. 77 AAV 3169, Radonic No. 2, Lv Thall6czy - K Jlrecek, Two Documents from
Northern Albania, in: L. von Tha1l6czy (ed.), Illyrian-Albanian 72 AAv2702; Schmitt, The Venezuelan
Albania 280. 73 L. Malltezi, Rreth historicise se Keshtjelles se Krujes the zones se sa) ne vitet 1392-
1415. SfudimehiSlorike 198912, J57-177; AAV2017, 2779. 74 In this order in Musachi 295. 75 Musachi
295; Frasheri, Skenderbeu 72. 76 Frasheri, Skenderbeu 80. 77 AAV 3169, Radonic No. 2, Lv Thall6czy -
K Jlrecek, Two Documents from Northern Albania, in: L. von Tha1l6czy (ed.), Illyrian-Albanian 72
AAv2702; Schmitt, The Venezuelan Albania 280. 73 L. Malltezi, Rreth historicise se Keshtjelles se Krujes
the zones se sa) ne vitet 1392-1415. SfudimehiSlorike 198912, J57-177; AAV2017, 2779. 74 In this order
in Musachi 295. 75 Musachi 295; Frasheri, Skenderbeu 72. 76 Frasheri, Skenderbeu 80. 77 AAV 3169,
Radonic No. 2, Lv Thall6czy - K Jlrecek, Two Documents from Northern Albania, in: L. von Tha1l6czy
(ed.), Illyrian-Albanian
Researches Vol. 1 Leipzig - Munich 1916, 125-167, 142f. 78 Ducellier, Fayade maritime of the
Kastriote; AAV 3169. 79 AAV 2944, 3169, 3562. 80 AAV3169. 81 Radonie No. 3, 4th P.Hr. Ilievski,
Manastir Sveti Jovan Bigorski. Skopje 1994; V. Petkovic, Pregied crkvenih spomenika kroz povesnicu
srpskog naroda. Belgrade 1950, 24 [; C. Marjanovic, Manastir Sv. Jovana Bigorskog kod Debra. Degree
in 1924. I owe this statement to M. Popovic, Vienna; see. Stoyanovsky -Gorgiev 185,223. 82 Cf. Recent
B. Bojovic, MontAthos, les princes roumains, Jean Castriot and Ia Tour albanaise (Arbanaski pirg),
dependance de Chilandar. Bolconica 37 (2006) 81-87. 83 Barletius 17. 84 Musachi 295. 85 Pertusi,
Segono 125: "Stanisam, maximum natu, paucis ante annis cum plerisque adolescentibus Castriotus
amurato miserat". 86 AAV 3169. 87 AAV 3169. 88 AAV3169. 89 AAV 3169 ,,. History Bd. 2, 412fI; S.
Dmitrov, 0 missii bolgarskogo knjaza Fruzina v Albanii v 1435 g. Studia albonica 196812, 103-109. 95 S.
Pulaha, La paysannerie, force motrice de la lutte pour la liberte, dans les annees 1420-1430, in:
Deuxieme conference des etudes albanologiques a l'occasion du Se centenaire de la mort de Georges
Kastriote Skanderbeg. 3 vols. Tirana 1969-1970, vols. 1.51-59, 54ff .; Imber, Ol
toman empire 115; 1. V A. Fine Jr., TIle Later Medieval Balkans. Ann Arbor 1987, 535; AAV
3574,3575,3579 (to Nikola Dukagjin), 3508 (tug), 3592, 3623; to the fights: 1. Gelcich - L. Thall6czy,
Diplomatarium relativeum Reipublicae Ragusanae cum Regno Hungariae. Budapest 1887, no. 236, 237,
238 and 240 according to the file from the Ragusan Archives; Ottoman pretender: ibid., n. 244,
245; Ottoman chronicles: S. Pulaha, Lufta shqiptaro-turke ne shek. XV. Burmese osmane. Tirnna 1968,
43 and 257; Aranitis Eid: Setton, Papacy vol. 2, 88. 96 I. Dujcev, Georgi Kastrioti Skenderbeg v
slavjanskata literatura ot XV-XVII v., In: Georges Kastriote Scanderbeg 1468-1968. Sofia 1970, 79-11 O.
here 91. 97 MusachI 299: "talk about sissanta tre". 98 Jirecek, State II 28f .; a list of medieval names in
Polog at Seliscev 10 I f. 99 Radonic No. 4; Fotie, Sveta Gora 247f. 100 Pertusi, Segonus 125 solves a
long research controversy about exact dating; see. BHroku, Skenderbeu 90ff. and, other message,
Frasheri, Skenderbeu 74ff. 101 AAV 3169. 102 Barletius 6. For the conversion rite, B. and L. Bennassar,
Les Chretiens d'AlIah. 3. Edition. Paris 2006, 369. 103 Kind regards by Irene BeldiceanuSteinherr. 104 I.
Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Seyyid Ali Sultan d'apres les regestes ottomans. L'installation de I'islam heterodox
en Thrace, in: E. Zachariadou (ed.), Tbe Via Egnatia under Ottoman Ruke (1380-1699). Rethymnon
1996, 45-66; S. Parveva, Intercultural Contact and Interaction in the Ottoman Pcriod: the Zavlye
Kavak. Baba anel the Church ofthe Holy Forty Martyrs ID tbe Real and Imaginery World of Christ ans
Muslims in the Town of Veliko Tärnovo. Btlfgarian Historical Review 3011-2 (2002) 13-54; S. Raduschev,
Demographic and Ethnographic Processes in the Western Rhodopes in the Xv. - XVIII. BIJIgarian
Historical Review 30 / 3-4 (2002) 3-49. 105 A. Baldacci, ltinerari albanesi (1892-1902). Rome 1917,
300; 1. Swire, Kmg Zog's Albania. London 1937, 242f. ! 06 M. Kiel, Ottoman Architecture in Albania 1385-
1912. Istanbul 1990, 174f. can not date the beginning of DefY {] choruses in Kruja; see. H. Kaleshi,
Albanian legends about Sari Saltlk. In: Actes du premier international congresses etudes balkaniques et
sud-est europeennes. Sofia 1971, 815-828; M. Kiel, A Demographic and Ethnographic Processes in the
Western Rhodopes in the Xv. - XVIII. BIJIgarian Historical Review 30 / 3-4 (2002) 3-49. 105 A. Baldacci,
ltinerari albanesi (1892-1902). Rome 1917, 300; 1. Swire, Kmg Zog's Albania. London 1937, 242f. ! 06 M.
Kiel, Ottoman Architecture in Albania 1385-1912. Istanbul 1990, 174f. can not date the beginning of DefY
{] choruses in Kruja; see. H. Kaleshi, Albanian legends about Sari Saltlk. In: Actes du premier
international congresses etudes balkaniques et sud-est europeennes. Sofia 1971, 815-828; M. Kiel,
A Demographic and Ethnographic Processes in the Western Rhodopes in the Xv. - XVIII. BIJIgarian
Historical Review 30 / 3-4 (2002) 3-49. 105 A. Baldacci, ltinerari albanesi (1892-1902). Rome 1917,
300; 1. Swire, Kmg Zog's Albania. London 1937, 242f. ! 06 M. Kiel, Ottoman Architecture in Albania 1385-
1912. Istanbul 1990, 174f. can not date the beginning of DefY {] choruses in Kruja; see. H. Kaleshi,
Albanian legends about Sari Saltlk. In: Actes du premier international congresses etudes balkaniques et
sud-est europeennes. Sofia 1971, 815-828; M. Kiel, A Istanbul 1990, 174f. can not date the beginning of
DefY {] choruses in Kruja; see. H. Kaleshi, Albanian legends about Sari Saltlk. In: Actes du premier
international congresses etudes balkaniques et sud-est europeennes. Sofia 1971, 815-828; M. Kiel,
A Istanbul 1990, 174f. can not date the beginning of DefY {] choruses in Kruja; see. H. Kaleshi, Albanian
legends about Sari Saltlk. In: Actes du premier international congresses etudes balkaniques et sud-est
europeennes. Sofia 1971, 815-828; M. Kiel, A
Nole on the date of the establishment of the Bektashi Order in Albania, in: A. Popovich-G Veinslein (ed.),
Bektachiyya. Etudes sur I'ordre mystique des Bektacbis et les groupes de Hadji beklach. Istanbul 1995,
265f. According to oral tradition, at the time of Mehmed's 11th Bektashimönche in the Macedonian Kozani
and epirotic Konitsalalb. Konica. 107 Barletius 8fl. "108 The Senesi Biography for 47r - v; Giovio at J.
Radonic, Burad Kastriot Skenderbeg i Albanija u XV veku (Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, SpomenikXCv.,
Drogi razred) Belgrade 1942,233, 109 Barletius 7,110 As mentioned above, Serbian and Bulgarian
influences intersected in the area of the Kastriota.111 OJ Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years -
Westeastern Interplay of Diplomacy and War (1464-1468). SUDOSF FOUNDATIONS 63/64 (200412005)
56-123, Supplements to the sources, Supplement text 2, 122. "Intende et parIa bene italiano corno
cascuno de noy". 112 Barletius 6; the Senesi biography f.46v; Giovio at RadOßlC 233; see. also D. Egro,
Skenderbej: identifies i ndryshuar apo titulature turkoosmane, in: F. Duka (ed.), Skenderbeu the Evropa.,
113-124. lJ3 At Radonic233. 114 Archivio dl Stato di Milano. Arehivlo visconteo -sforzesco B. 640. Copia
del conseio'overo parer dei Signor Caraman circha le provixlon bixogna volendo eazar Turchi della
Grezia & anehe seguitar I'in Axia mandato aHa Sanctita deI Summit Pontlfke & alla Maiesta del
Illustrissimo Re de Ragona. (0.d.). lJ5 AAV3169. 116 Duka, Tokat39; Pulaha, Force motrice 121. 117
Duka, Tokat 36. 118 Duka, Tokat 39. J 19 Pulaha, Les Kastriote 120ff .; DUka, Tokat 40. To Misia
s. Todorov - B. Nedkov, Turski izvon za baJgarskata istorija. Serija XV - XVI / 2 Sofia 1966, 161. The list
is dated by the Herbors in the middle of the 15th century. To Nicopolis s. RP Kovacev, Opis na
Nikopolskija sandiak ot 80th godini na XV vek. Sofia 1997; E. Radou ~ ev, Ottoman Border Periphery
(serhad) in the Nikopol Vilayet, First half of the 16lh century. E / Ildes balkaniques Todorov - B. Nedkov,
Turski izvon za baJgarskata istorija. Serija XV - XVI / 2 Sofia 1966, 161. The list is dated by the Herbors
in the middle of the 15th century. To Nicopolis s. RP Kovacev, Opis na Nikopolskija sandiak ot 80th godini
na XV vek. Sofia 1997; E. Radou ~ ev, Ottoman Border Periphery (serhad) in the Nikopol Vilayet, First
half of the 16lh century. E / Ildes balkaniques
364
127 Franeo 4r-v. 128 Arcbivio di Stato dl Milano. Arcbivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 41 Report of diplomats
Sceva de Curte and lacobo Trlvulzio to Duke Francesco Sforza. Rome 10.1.1454. "Qua e glonto uno
cavalero ambasatore d 'uno Signore chi dice de Grecia e chi de Albania chiamato quel Signor
Xandrebech et one fiddle ... per hodio privato ha cum el Turcho, 10 quurches Turcho fece marire 10
padre de quel tal Signor e questo tal Signore ha facto morire and fratello dei Turcho ". The message,
Skanderbeg SCI an infidel, improved the Milanese ambassador shortly after (Radonic No. 76); The news
of the murders was corrected. 129 AAV 3826. These requests were answered by the Senate at the end of
March 1438, ie one year after the date of the death data published in Serbian sources. Equal, whether to
put Ivan's death in the spring of 1437 or 1438, at any rate his son Georg went on a murder. L. Malltezi,
Nje document 1 ri per Skenderbeun. eksklusive 20 (2001) 61-64, here 64 the discussion summarizes that
Skanderbeg's name has been deleted from the relevant file; but this is precisely what the view supported
by the report on the murder of Ivan Kastriota says that Skanderbeg was brought from Albania to the
Danube in the spring of 1438. 130 AAV 3826. 131 Barletius 11 says that Skanderbeg hid his grief for his
father; Giovio at Radonic 233; the Sienese biographer f. 48r-v. 132 C. Imber, Tbe Crusade of Varna,
1443-1445. Alden; hot 2006, llff. To the connections to Hungary s. Barletius 16. 133 Angiolello at Radonic
228; Barletius 14. 134Imber, Crusade 16. 135 Babinger, Mehmed 2lf .; B. Cvetkova, La bataille
memorable of the peuples. Le Sud-est europeen et la conguete ottomane, fin XIVe-premieremoitie du
XYe s. Sofia 1971,274. 136 Babinger, Mehmed 22f. 137 S. Ljubie, Listine odnosajib izmedju juznoga
slavenstva i Mletack republike (Monumento Slavorom mendionalium vol. 1-5; 9; 12; 17; 21; 22). Zagreb
1868-189, here vol. 8, 212; AAV 2667 His father Ivan had sent him there It is not clear what son it was, it
is to be assumed that Stanisa, as the oldest, took this road 138 Radonic No. 70-71, POPOV1C 132f,
Spremic, Despot 646. 139 pp. The biography of Popovie.
365
140 Simplified according to the family tree bel M. Spremic, Burad Brankovic. Belgrade 2006, 239. 141
Barletius 318. 142 Jirecek, Geschichte Bd 2, 173ff; Spremie, Despot 206ff .; S. Cirkovie, Archieplscopus
Craynensls. ISlorijsla zapfsl 73 / 1-2 (2000) 47-54. 143 S. Cirkovie, Stefan Vukcic Kosaca i njegovo
doba. Beigrad 1964. 41ff .; Spremic, Despot 242ff. 144 F. Cerone, Politica orientale di Alfonso
d'Aragona. ASPN 27 (1902) 3-93; 380-456; 556-634; 774-852 and 28 (1903) 154-212; C. Marinesco,
Alphonse V, roi d'Aragon et de Naples, and I 'Albanie de Skanderbeg. Melanges de ['Ecole Roumaineen
Fronce 1 (1923) 1-135; C. Mannescu, La politique orientale d'Alfonse V d'Argon, roi cle Naples (1416-
1458). Barcelona 1994. S. now La Corona cl 'Aragona ai tempi di Alfonso 11 el Magnanimo, 2 vols.
Naples 2000, in it: MM Costa, Re1acions entre Alfons el Magnanim i els Paisos Balcanlcs. Testimonis
documentals, 199-211, especially 206 f .; M. Spremic, Alfonso il MagnaDimo e la sua politica nei Balcant,
741-753. 145 Pali, Skanderbeg and Janco de Hunedoara. Studio albanico 1968/1. 103-117, 106 this can
be classified as he considers - rightly - the alleged correspondence between Ladislaus and Skanderbeg
reproduced in Barletius. This is certainly true in the Fonn - Pall has made a diplomatic analysis - but
Barletius has probably reproduced a truly existing exchange of letters. 1461mber, Crusade 184 147
lrober, Crusade I2ff; Setton, Papacy II 67ff; F. Pall, Le condizioni egli echi intemazionali della lona
antionomana deI 1442-1443, condotta da Giovanni di Hunedoara. Revue des etudes sud-esf
europeennes 3 (1965) 433-463; Cvetkova, La bataille 271ff. see. also A. Hohlweg, The crusade of the
year 1444: Attempt of an artificial alliance for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, in: K. - D.
Grothusen (ed.), Turkey in Europe. Göttingen 1979, 20-37; F. Babinger, From Amurath to Amurath, in:
ders., Essays and Treatises on the History of Southeastern Europe and the Levant Bd. 1. Munich 1960,
128-157, here 128ff .; Spreffiu :, Bmnkovi6 278 [,; KP Matschke, Italians, Greeks and Turks in the context
of the crusade of 1444. II Mar nero 3 (1997/98) 159-177. 148 The Polish historian Jan Dlugosz quotes
Imber, Crusade 17. From Amurath to Amurath, in: ders., Essays and Treatises on the History of
Southeastern Europe and the Levant Bd. 1. Munich 1960, 128-157, here 128ff .; Spreffiu :, Bmnkovi6 278
[,; KP Matschke, Italians, Greeks and Turks in the context of the crusade of 1444. II Mar nero 3 (1997/98)
159-177. 148 The Polish historian Jan Dlugosz quotes Imber, Crusade 17. From Amurath to Amurath, in:
ders., Essays and Treatises on the History of Southeastern Europe and the Levant Bd. 1. Munich 1960,
128-157, here 128ff .; Spreffiu :, Bmnkovi6 278 [,; KP Matschke, Italians, Greeks and Turks in the context
of the crusade of 1444. II Mar nero 3 (1997/98) 159-177. 148 The Polish historian Jan Dlugosz quotes
Imber, Crusade 17.
Already in May 1443, the Byzantine Minister JD Venice spoke of the expulsion of the Ottomans from
Greece; AAV 4807. 150 Jirec.ek, History II 183; Pall, Skanderbeg et lanco 7. 151 AAV 4892. 152
Barletius 37 (in free reproduction). 153 So the Ottoman chronicler Oruy at Pulaha, Luf1: a45. 154 Schmitt,
Jahrbücher 137. 155 Barletius 16 "multi dicunt Huniademque prius de singulis deferred by nunCLOS from
eo instructum, atque accersitum maximo studio cum copiis." 156 Barletius 15f; Angiolello at Radonic 228.
157 Musachi 274; see. also T. Gemil, Romanii ~ i Otoman! i in secolcle XV-XVI. Bucharest 1991, 120.
158 Barletius 17. 159 DUka, Tokat 35. 160 Barletius 17. 161 So the Seneser BiOgraph f. 49v-50r. 162
Musachi 274, Venier near Magna, Schmitt, Jahrbücher 137; Franco Sr. 163 The Senesary biographer f
50r 164 Musachi 274. 165 Barletlus 24f. 166 AAV 4892. 167 Babmger, Amurath 131; to the Fourth Imber,
Crusade 18ff .; Spremic, Br.mkovic 328ff. 168 Cvetkova, Bataille 295 169 Babinger, Amurath 136ff. 170
Babinger, Amurath \ 38; Cvetkova, Bataille 306; Setton, Papacy II 78ff. 171 J. Paviot, Les Ducs de
Bourgogne, la Croisade et l'Orient (fin XIVe siecle - XVe siecle). Paris 2003, 94ff. 172 Cvetkova, Bataille
306. 173 Babinger, Amurath 145ff. 174 Babinger, Amurath l50f. 175 Barletius 30. 176 Barletius 20f. and
after him the Senesi biographer f. 50r. 177 Barletius 22 and after him the Senesary biographer 50r-v. 178
Musachi 299. 179 Important remarks by I. Bone, which have received too little attention, 0 Dukat1inima,
in: ders., Nemirno Pomorje. Belgrade 1979,332-384, here 363. 180 Barletius 37f 181 Barletius 38; to you
I. Boiie, Spani - Spanje. Glass SANU3212 (1980) 37-60. 182 Franeo 8r. 183 Barletius. 184 AAV 5009.
185 AAV 5062.
366
186 AAV 5009. 187 Venetian reports, written by the governors of Alessio, Durazzo and Skutari, were lost
in the two fires of the Doge's Palace in the 1870s. So far no copy of these reports has been discovered by
other ArcI11Ven. 188 Musachi 274f 189 Franeo 8r. 190 Schmitt, Jahrbucher 137. 191 Franeo 8r. 192
Chalcocondylcs (220 at Radonie) and Kritobulos at Radonie 224 193 Barletius 30. 194 Basic is M.
Spremic, VazaJi laalja Alfonsa Aragonskog. ZFFB 12 (1974) 455-469, HIer 455ff. Important remarks to
the years 1448/49 at! Mber, Ottoman Empire 139ff. 195 AAV 4493,5003. 196 AAV 5062, 5064. 197 MV
5069. 198 AAV 5113, 5136-5139. 199 p. The considerations of Pall, Skanderbeg et lanco de Hunedoara
5-9, who suspects not Skanderbeg, but Araniti Komino had received more attention from
Hunyadi; Marinescu, Politique 140. 200 Jorga, Notes Vol. I, 2e serie, 25; Bd. 1.44. 201 Marinescu,
Politique 156. 202 AAV 5053. 203 Spremic, Brnnkovic (Banja Luka edition) 495; the same, Krusevac and
XIV i XV veku, in: the. Prelanut uspon 107-125; 1mber, Vama 81. 204 Barletius 70ff. See Duka, Tokat 39
Fn. 17 after the chronicler Ne. ;; ri; Of course, it is unclear. whether its report refers to the early years of
the uprising. The Ottoman historian Oru9, in Radonic 253. 205 BarietlUS 65ff .; Franco 9r-v. 206 So the
historian AntonJO Bonfini at Radonic 229. 207 AAV 5396. 208 All this to Pall. Skanderbeg et lanco de
Hunedoara 10, which uses as sources the Ragusan Council records, as well as the historians
ChalkokondyJes and Antonio Bonfini. 209 Exquisite Spremlc, Burad Brankovic 394ff. 210 Barletius 38; D.
Dhamo, Kisha and Shen Mense ne Vaun e Dejes. Study · hisforike 1964. 53175; G. Sara9i, Te dhena te
reja per kishat e Danjes. Iliria 1989/1, 241-252. 211 Barletius 90f .; Impressions of ewer tour in July 2007.
212 V. Novak - M. Suffayay, Statuta et ordinationes capituli ecclesiae cathedralis Drivastensis. Bel-
degree 1927, In the introduction Suffiay offers the best representation of the city's history; see. the
classical representation of the ruins at Th.! ppen, Skutari and the northern Albanian coastal
plain. Sarajevo 1907. In addition recently Antonovic, degree 57ff., 244ff .; 265ff. See also lrmgard
Mahnken, Relations between Ragusanem and Albanians during the Middle Ages, m: Contributions to the
study of Southeast Europe on the occasion of the 1st International Balkan Balkan Congress in
Sofia. MG.nchen 1966, 339-390; B. Krekie, AIbanians in the Adriatic citles: observations on some
ragusan, venetian and dalmatian sources for the history of the Albanians in the middle age, in The
Medieval Albanians 209-233. 213 Schmitt, Venetian Yearbooks 139f., Schmitt, The Venetian Albania
300; Bozic, 0 Dukadinima, in: ders., Nemirno Pomorje 332-384, here 364ff .; AAV 5297, 5303. Schmitt,
JahrbUcher 141ff. Details of the deportation in Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 12 Cover 19 Number
1 Koreulanski knezovi Frnncesco Lombardo. Korespondenclja 1448-1450 f. 11r. October 28, 1448 Doge
Fr. Foscari to the comes Francesco Lombardo. 222 Cf. Barletius 84. 223 AAV 5357, 5361. 224 AAV
5375. 225 Detailed discussion of the question by Schmitt, Skanderbeg, and the Slavs in the
makedOßlscben room (in press); s. the other special literature K. Bilroku, Dibra the Koxhaxhiku ne kohen
e Skenderbeut. Studying hisrorike 2003 / 1-2, 7-29; The same author, however, briefly revised 223 AAV
5357, 5361. 224 AAV 5375. 225 Detailed discussion of the question by Schmitt, Skanderbeg and the
Slavs in the makedOßlscben room (in print); s. the other special literature K. Bilroku, Dibra the
Koxhaxhiku ne kohen e Skenderbeut. Studying hisrorike 2003 / 1-2, 7-29; The same author, however,
briefly revised 223 AAV 5357, 5361. 224 AAV 5375. 225 Detailed discussion of the question by Schmitt,
Skanderbeg and the Slavs in the makedOßlscben room (in print); s. the other special literature K. Bilroku,
Dibra the Koxhaxhiku ne kohen e Skenderbeut. Studying hisrorike 2003 / 1-2, 7-29; The same author,
however, briefly revised
367
on his localization and now assumes that Svetigrad is to identify with the said castle near the West
Macedonian Demir hisar. VgL also T. Tomoski, Pitanje KodZadzika (prilog istoriji Debra i susednih
predala u doba Skenderbega), in: Simpozijum 0 Skenderbegu, 195-200; S. Anloijak, Kade bil
Svetigrad? Glasnik no Instilulot za nocionalna Istorija 1977 / 2-3, 6-92; ders., Ku gjendej
Sfetigrad? Gjurmime albanologjike 8 (1978) 4772 (excellent and probably best discussion of the research
question); A. Stojanovski, Obid da se otfrli pretpostavkata deka Svetigrad e Kodzadzik. Glasnik na
Institutat za nocionalno [starija 1978 / 1-2, 225-237. FilrKodZadZiktritt, admittedly without convincing
arguments, M. Bislimi, Svetigrad, lokalizacija, hronologija i osvojuvanjeto ot strana na Osmanlite, 10:
Gerg Kastrioti Skenderbeg. Skopje 2006, 232 BarietiUs 236. 233 Guboglu Mehmet 57 (from Oru ~). 234
Radonie 255. 235 RadonieNr. 27. 236 Radonic No. 243, 253. 237 Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 12
Cover 19 Number 1 Koreulanski knezovi Francesco Lombardo. Korespondencija 1448-1450, f 7v: Report
of comes to the Doge F rancesco Foseari of 24 September 1448: "... whether exereitum quem
Scandarbegus inimicissimus dominii vestri preparabat, voeabat ipsam galeam ad dictum vestrum locum
Durachl1 pro conservatione illius quapropter ego eonfestim expedivi barcham unam pro eundo ad
invemendum dic
Korespondeneija 1448-1450 f. 15v. .15. March 1449. The comes Francesco Lombardo warns the Doge
Francesco Foscari of an impending Serbian attack on Venetian Albania. 246 AAV 5500. 247 AAV 5468.
248 AAV 5467. 249 AAV 5467, 5491. 250 Dria.vni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 12 Cover 19 Number 1
Koreulanski knezovi Franeesco Lombardo. Corespondencija 1448-1450 f. 26v o. D (but July 1449) comes
Francesco Lombardo to the Doge:,. (..) Sccundo questa ho habudo una letera da Durazo de 6 DE questo
da Marco Malipiero, e \ qual me avixa ali 3 DE questo II a Durazo azonse do ambasarie. una de
Scandarbego e una de Araniti, before the Re de Ragona vegn ia e che subito zontJ. ai suo signori
refferitoge la sua ambassada de presenle quelli per el paolo fexe comandamento before tute homo puo
portar aone siano presti e dise farper andar sopra la Valona e ch'el Re ha manda per mar molte galee per
haver source e che pii! presto el se dubita non vadano a Durazo che in altro luogo, e \ qual luogo me
avixa in tuto esser deffacendo e de homenl e de vltoane ct altn bixogni da deffenderse. "251 Barletius
150ff. 252 Barletius 159. 253 MV 5500; Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku Consilium rogatorum 3/11 f., 154v.
254 Pertusi, Segono 130: Mlkp ~ azade at Radonic 243. 251 Barletius 150ff. 252 Barletius 159. 253 MV
5500; Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/11 f. 154v. 254 Pertusi, Segono 130: Mlkp ~
azade at Radonic 243. 251 Barletius 150ff. 252 Barletius 159. 253 MV 5500; Driavni arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/11 f. 154v. 254 Pertusi, Segono 130: Mlkp ~ azade at Radonic 243.
368
255 DrLaVnl arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 12 Cover 19 Number 1 Koreulanski knezovlFrancesco
Lombardo. Corespondencija 1448-1450 f. 62r: Korcula July 6, 1450 comes Francesco Lombardo to the
Doge:, (...) Item Dominationi vestre intimo per navigium quoddam vestrum Scutarense quod huc applicuit
isto the habui certe quod in partibus venerat maxima quantitas Teucrorum et est ipse Imperator
Teucrorum 10 destructionem Scandarebegl et Areniti et quod lmposterum habebo DominatlOni vestre
quamprimum notificabo. "Radical No. 36. 256 Schmitt, Jahrbucher 147. 257 Driavni arhlv u Zadru.Arhiv
Koreule 12 Cover 19 Issue 1 Koreulanski knezovi.Frnncesco Lombardo.Korespondencija 1448-1450 f.
64r: Korcula August 22, 1450, Francesco Lombardo come to the Doge: "(... ) Preterea notam reddo
Dommationi Vestre qualiter Sicutl heo per Iirteras mihi emanatas a DJrachio datas ibidem primo presentis
et similiter per litteras vestri potestatis Budue datas xviiii instantis Teucer cum toto eius exercitu erat
circum CrOlam quam civitatem pugnabat. sed dicitur camouflage loeus i! le esse quodammodo
inexpugnabilis nichil ci nocere posse. Verum omnes ilh parvi domini Albanenses se eoinqulOaverunt ipsi
Teuero qui ice facit optimam societatem. Ceterum prout haso per ipsas litteras a Dirachio et Budua idem
Teucer cum recedet a Croia, intendlt ire Dagnum et illud omnino obtinere. 258 Chalcocondyles at
Radonic 220f. 259 Anglolello speaks of 800 defenders, including 400 Italians; Radomc 228; Pali, Barlezio
75. 260 S. Masci, Le relazioni italo-albanesi al tempo di Giorgi 0 Castriota Scanderbeg. RlVisto d
' Albania 2 (1941) 163-173, here 163. 261 Sources of the siege: Radonic Nos. 31 and 36; Chalcocondyles
at Radonic 220-221; Angiolello at Radonic 228; Schmitt, yearbooks 146--147; AAV 5586. 262 E. Bulletti,
Un autograph of Scanderbeg alla Signoria di Siena. Bollertino Senese di Sorria parria 1/9 (1940) 77-
78. 263 For siege s. Babinger, Mehmed 63 [; K. BilfOku, Skenderbeu. Tirana 2005, 122-127, Frasheri,
Skenderbeu 162-163. 264 Barletius 168f. 265 These details by Angiolello at Radonic 228. 266 Barletius \
70f. 267 Barletius 171. 268 AAV 5586. 269 Schmitt, Yearbooks 147. 270 Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv
Koreule 12 Cover 19 Number 1 Koreulanski knezovi. Bulletti, Un autografo di Scanderbeg alla Signoria di
Siena. Bollertino Senese di Sorria parria 1/9 (1940) 77-78. 263 For siege s. Babinger, Mehmed 63 [; K.
BilfOku, Skenderbeu. Tirana 2005, 122-127, Frasheri, Skenderbeu 162-163. 264 Barletius 168f. 265
These details by Angiolello at Radonic 228. 266 Barletius \ 70f. 267 Barletius 171. 268 AAV 5586. 269
Schmitt, Yearbooks 147. 270 Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 12 Cover 19 Number 1 Koreulanski
knezovi. Bulletti, Un autografo di Scanderbeg alla Signoria di Siena. Bollertino Senese di Sorria parria 1/9
(1940) 77-78. 263 For siege s. Babinger, Mehmed 63 [; K. BilfOku, Skenderbeu. Tirana 2005, 122-127,
Frasheri, Skenderbeu 162-163. 264 Barletius 168f. 265 These details by Angiolello at Radonic 228. 266
Barletius \ 70f. 267 Barletius 171. 268 AAV 5586. 269 Schmitt, Yearbooks 147. 270 Driavni arhiv u
Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 12 Cover 19 Number 1 Koreulanski knezovi. 270 Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv
Koreule 12 Cover 19 Number 1 Koreulanski knezovi. 270 Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 12 Cover
19 Number 1 Koreulanski knezovi.
Francesco Lombardo. Korespondencija 14481450 f. 64r: Korcula August 22, 1450 comes Francesco
Lombardo to the, Doge. An attack on the important dag
no. 271 MV 5599. 272 AAV 5568. 273 Spremic, Brnnkovic 410ff .; Schmitt, yearbooks 146f. 273 AAV
5546. 275 Schmitt, Jahrbucher 146. 276 Babinger, Mehmed 63, probably after Barletlus. 277 This is
reported three years after Skanderbeg's death, in particular, Mexican diplomats from Venice: Archivio di
Stato di Milano. Archivio Sforzesco. Busta 357. Hercules de Mayno's report of 3 January 1471: "Vara cum
effecto Croya, cita de Albania, la quaIe altre volte fo tiranizata da Scanderbech suo rebel, de la quale ha
facto continuo gran caso". Very similar is also the report of Gherardo de Colis of August 3, 1471 on
Venetian-Ottoman peace negotiations, in the context of which Mehmed Ir. on the assignment Krujas
consists "... ma Croya qual fu de Scanderbeg, 10 patre de questo Turcho li vien a campo dove ji steti pUl
de mesi cinque con le bonharde et re infecta corno desperate si partl et tornando in camino mori. Questo
Turcho mo ho sia que que la la morte de l'morte de l'patre ho sia, before la sia forte de silo. (A description
follows of the construction of the Ottoman fortress of Elbasan.) 278 Schmitt, Jahrbücher 147. All
references to the alleged death of Murnd before KruJa are discussed by Pali, BarIezio 90. 279 Schmltt,
Jahrbücher 147. 280 Pertusl, Segono 130. 281 Babinger Mehmed 64. 282 Radontc No. 36. 283 Radonic
No. 36. 284 AAV 5634; Radonic No. 36. 285 AAV 5634. 286 Radonic No. 32-34 287 Radonic No. 36. 288
Radontc No. 37. 289 Paviot 127 Pali, Rapporti 126. 290 Pertusl, Segono 130. 291 Radonic No. 36. 292
Radonic No. 38. 293 Pali, Rapporti No. 4, where Skanderbeg himself died five years. ter referred to as the
"vassal and captain" of the king. Albanian historians have until recently wanted to see in this agreement a
treaty between equals: Bi \ = oku,
369
Skenderbeu 127f .; Frasheri, Skcnderbeu 309ff. 294 F. Sterti, Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli vol. 4 (10
gennaio-26 dicembre 1461). Naples 1998, No.130. 295 Radonic No. 43-44. 296 Radonic No. 45-46. On
May 29, 1451, King Alfonso V established his vassal Stefano Vukclc: "In this case, Albania duos nostros
comestabulos eum centum peditibus in subsidiary and adiutorium spectabilis et magnifici Georgi Castrioti
domini Croye adversus Theucros". He asks the Lord of Herzegovina to facilitate the relations between
Bemardo Vaquer and Lohann Hunyadi ("provideatis de tuto tritu"); 1. v. Tha1l6czy, Studies on the History
of Bosnia and Serbia in the Middle Ages. Munich - Leipzig 1914,387. 297 Radoni6 No. 48. 298 1. v.
Chr. Thall6czy, Studien 396. 299 So Marillescu, Politique 165. 300 Radonic No. 48; Marinescu, Politique
172ff. 301 Radonic No. 48.
Academy of Sciences in Giiengen. Phi / -hist. Class third episode 203). Gottingen 1994, 86-105; E.
Cbrysos (ed.), IIpaKtl1
I II! I
37 Franco 25v. 38 Barletlus 237. 39 This also applied to Skanderbeg's neighbors; the Lord of the Black
Mountains, Stefan Cmojevic, regularly went down with his shepherd warriors to Herzegovina to plunder
(Ljubic, Listine vol. 10, 74); Such raids were carried out by the Montenegrins well into the nineteenth
century. 40 Franeo 30r. 41 Franeo 214r, 25v. 42 pp. The old collection of M. Sirdani, Skander ~ begu
mbas gojedhänash. Shkodra 1926. 43 G. Marlekaj, Scanderbeg nelle tradlZioni popolari albanesi, in:
Convegno. 221-238, here 229ff. To the "drangue" sv Hahn, Albanesi ~ see studies 163. 44 G. Valentini,
Un cunoso documento sulla statura dl Scanderbeg. Shejzatlle Pleiadi 15 (1971) 7-8; on the basis of a
Venetian cloth present of 18 cubits of cloth (1 cubit = 0.58 m) for two magnificent garments. Giovio
reprinted at Radonic 234. 45 Franeo 45v; s. the pictures at Frasheri, Skenderbeu. 46 Valentini, Un
curioso documento, and Masci 168. 47 Pali, Rapporti No. 2; vgL the excellent remarks by Pali, Barlezio
76f [48 Sabellico, 922. 49 All evidence in the chapter, Jtaliem's Journey. "50 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last
Years, Quellenan_hang, supplement text 1. 51 Archivio di Stato di Milano.Archivlo visconteo - sforzesco
B. 342. Antonio Guidobono to Francesco Sforza Venice May 7, 1455: "Questa. Illustrissima Signoria
mando per domenegha passata et disseme che in quella hora uno Signore chiamato Schanderbech de
Albania gli haveva mandato dui belli astori de quello paexe and dui Iivreri Turchi quali me volvo dare acio
li mandate ad la Excellentla Vostra piu. presto ch'io poteva. Io gli acceptay cum bone et grate parolle
circha Cl () conveniente semper regratiandolli et holli in caxa et facione tignire bon acura. Fra quali gli 1 ::
uno de 11 astoriJudicato bellissimo et harne dicta uno Abbate (probably Georg PeJinus, OS) de quello
paixe che 1 :: dicto astore el miglore che may fosse veduto et co pigla perdice, anedre salvatiche, oche
saJvati_ marriage et tra fine ad li capriolli. L'altro ancora 1 :: pure bello, ma non tanto ... "52 Driavni arhiv
u Dubrovniku ConSllium rogatorum 3/18 f 150v 53 F. Ilia, Kanuni i Skanderbut mbledhe e kodifikue nga
Irnzot Frano Um.Shkodra 1993 K. dicto astore el miglore che may fosse veduto et co pigla perdice,
anedre salvatiche, oche saJvati_ ehe et tra fine ad li capriolli. L'altro ancora 1 :: pure bello, ma non
tanto ... "52 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku ConSllium rogatorum 3/18 f 150v 53 F. Ilia, Kanuni i Skanderbut
mbledhe e kodifikue nga Irnzot Frano Um.Shkodra 1993 K. dicto astore el miglore che may fosse veduto
et co pigla perdice, anedre salvatiche, oche saJvati_ ehe et tra fine ad li capriolli. L'altro ancora 1 :: pure
bello, ma non tanto ... "52 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku ConSllium rogatorum 3/18 f 150v 53 F. Ilia, Kanuni i
Skanderbut mbledhe e kodifikue nga Irnzot Frano Um.Shkodra 1993 K.
371
54
55
56
57 58
59
Frasheri. Mbi kanunin e Skenderbeut. Studler hislorke 1977f2, 125-143; see. also the article by M.
Schmidt-Neke, The Kanun of the Albanian Mountains: Background of the Northern Albanian Way of Life,
in: R. Eisie, Der Kanun. Peje 2001, 11-34; L. v. Tha116czy, Kanuni i Lekes A contribution to the Albanian
common law, m: Ders., Llylyisch-albanlsche researches Bd. I, 409-462. Lucia Nadin - Gh. OrtaUi (ed.),
Statuti di Scutari (Corpus statutario delle Venezie 15). Rome 2002;, A. Pertusi, Per la storia di Dulcigno
nei secoiJ XIV-XV e dei suoi statuti cittadini. Studi Veneziani 15 (1973) 213-271. Oral information of Dr.
med. Matthias Pfaffenbichler, Hofjagd- and Rüstkammer of the Kunslhistorisches Museum Vienna,
September 19, 2007. That helmet and sword were given such a significant function in Albanian society of
the 20th century, iSl attributed, inter alia, to the first Albanian history in the Albanian language, written by
the Hungarian historian Ludwig von ThalI6czy and translated by the Albanian Stefan Curani; to the new
edition with extensive introduction by Ralm BeluIi: Ludwig von ThaIIoczy, Te ndodhunat e Shqypnls preJji
Gege qe don vendin e vet. Perktheu nga gjerrnanish ~ a Stefan Curam. G. Zippel, Le vite di Paolo II of
Gaspare da Verona e MlChele Canensi. CittiJ. di Castello 1904, 149 fn.1. P. Bartl,
Albaniasacra. Vol.1. Wiesbaden 2007, 137. See the biographies of Bi ~ oku and Frasheri soWle in
particular the historical works of K. Krisafi - Z. Ballanlca A. Luarasi - G. Gjika, Bistoria e shtetlt dhe e se
drejtes ne Shqiperi. Vol. 1. Tirane 1997, as well as A. Luarasl. Shteti dhe e drejta shqiptare ne epoken e
Skenderbeut. Tirane 1998. Radonic No. 199: "Georgius Castrioctus, aka Scanderbego" (1460); No. 200
"Servitore et vassallo de Vostra Maesta Georgio Castrioto decto Scanderbego" (1460); "Georgius
Castrioto aka Scanderbeg, Lord of the Provinces of Albania" (1456) (PaH No. 4), "Excellent, Magnificent
and Mighty Mr. Georgius Castriot, also known as Skanderbeg, Lord in Albania · '(1460) (AAV
6993 ); Three years later, as "Lord of Albania" (Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Carnera Apostolica, Diversa
Cameralia 30 f., 134r-v. (Kindly note by Claudia Märtl) .The Siegelkunde, which also has only a few
originals, hardly helps: Georgius Castriotius Scendarbic is read, Servitore et vassallo de Vostra Maesta
Georgio Castrioto decto Scanderbego "(1460);" Georgius Castrioto aka Scanderbeg. Lord of the
Provinces of Albania "(1456) (PaH No. 4)," Excellent, splendid and worthy Mr. Georgius Castriot, also
called Skanderbeg, Lord in Albania · '(1460) (AAV 6993), then three years later as "Lord of Albania"
(Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Carnera Apostolica, Diversa cameralia 30 f., 134r-v. (Friendly Note by
Claudia Märtl) The seal, which also has few originals, hardly helps: Georgius Castriotius Scendarbic
reads you, Servitore et vassallo de Vostra Maesta Georgio Castrioto decto Scanderbego "(1460);"
Georgius Castrioto aka Scanderbeg. Lord of the Provinces of Albania "(1456) (PaH No. 4)," Excellent,
splendid and worthy Mr. Georgius Castriot, also called Skanderbeg, Lord in Albania · '(1460) (AAV 6993),
then three years later as "Lord of Albania" (Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Carnera Apostolica, Diversa
cameralia 30 f., 134r-v. (Friendly Note by Claudia Märtl) The seal, which also has few originals, hardly
helps: Georgius Castriotius Scendarbic reads you, Mr Georgius Castriot, also known as Skanderbeg,
Lord in Albania · '(1460) (AAV 6993); Three years later, as "Lord of Albania" (Archivio Segreto Vaticano,
Carnera Apostolica, Diversa Cameralia 30 f., 134r-v. (Kindly note by Claudia Märtl) .The Siegelkunde,
which also has only a few originals, hardly helps: Georgius Castriotius Scendarbic is read, Mr Georgius
Castriot, also known as Skanderbeg, Lord in Albania · '(1460) (AAV 6993); Three years later, as "Lord of
Albania" (Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Carnera Apostolica, Diversa Cameralia 30 f., 134r-v. (Kindly note by
Claudia Märtl) .The Siegelkunde, which also has only a few originals, hardly helps: Georgius Castriotius
Scendarbic is read,
in addition an abbreviation of the title "dominus AIbaniae". See Biyoku, Skenderbeu 160f .; D. Egro,
Skenderbej: Identitet i ndryshuar apo tltulature turko - osmane, in: F. Duka (ed.), Skenderbeu the Evropa,
113-124; T. Geci, Mbi sfragjistiken e Kastrioteve, in: SimpozlUmi by Skenderbeun - Simpozijum 0
Skenderbegu 9-12 maj 1969. Prishtinal Pri tina 1969, 229-247. Nor did Skanderbeg's gradual turn to the
west and his submission to the Neapolitan crown bring about a change in the rulers' tithe. The earliest
evidence of Skanderbeg's title comes from letters from Western princes: Alfonso V spoke to him in
December 1447 as "famed and powerful Mr. Georgius Castnotus alias Squenderbech, Lord of Kruj a and
the provinces of Arbania, our dearest friend" (Radoni6 No. 16 :, Jllustri et potenti viro Georgio Castrioto
aka Squenderbech, domino Croie provinciarumque Albanie "). Striking is the important position that
dominion over Kruja takes, while the further spatial description, the" provinces of Albania ", vaguely flows
out. When the ties became narrower in the context of the negotiations of 1451, the Neapolitans dropped
the addition and spoke only of "Georgms Castriori, Lord of KruJa" (Radonlc 43, 44). For Alfonso V, as the
feudal lord, Skanderbeg was no longer Lord of Kruja as early as 1452, but only "the faithful Lord
Scandarberch, our beloved faithful and devoted" (Radomc No. 55); in the year 1454 the "magnificent and
proficient (austuus as usual attribute for mercenary tutors in Renaissance Italy; OS) Georgius
Castrioti, called Scandarbeeh, Captain-General of our troops in the Albanian lands, and faithful alderman
"(Radonic No 79," Magnifico et strigio viro Georgio Castrioti dicto Scandarbech gentium armorum
nostrorum in partibus Albanian generali capitaneo consiliario fideli "). However, the vocabulary of the law
firm was not unanimous; for in the same year Skanderbeg was granted the title of "Lord in the Albanian
lands" (Radonic No. 85), but omitted in 1456 (Radoni6 No. 117); In 1457 it was only said that "Georgius,
called Scandarbeh", without any title (Radonic No. 134) - although there is no political motive to identify
it.The Venetians, to whom the Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a dome in the eye, Skanderbeg
in official Like to write as "Mr. von Krueger" General Captain of our troops in the Albanian lands and
faithful alderman "(Radonic No 79," Magnifico et strigio viro Georgio Castrioti dicto Scandarbech gentium
armorum nostrorum in partibus Albany generali capitaneo consiliario fideli "). However, the vocabulary of
the law firm was not unanimous; for in the same year Skanderbeg was granted the title of "Lord in the
Albanian lands" (Radonic No. 85), but omitted in 1456 (Radoni6 No. 117); In 1457 it was only said that
"Georgius, called Scandarbeh", without any title (Radonic No. 134) - although there is no political motive
to identify it.The Venetians, to whom the Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a dome in the eye,
Skanderbeg in official Like to write as "Mr. von Krueger" General Captain of our troops in the Albanian
lands and faithful alderman "(Radonic No 79," Magnifico et strigio viro Georgio Castrioti dicto
Scandarbech gentium armorum nostrorum in partibus Albany generali capitaneo consiliario fideli
"). However, the vocabulary of the law firm was not unanimous; for in the same year Skanderbeg was
granted the title of "Lord in the Albanian lands" (Radonic No. 85), but omitted in 1456 (Radoni6 No.
117); In 1457 it was only said that "Georgius, called Scandarbeh", without any title (Radonic No. 134) -
although there is no political motive to identify it.The Venetians, to whom the Neapolitan takeover of
Krujas was always a dome in the eye, Skanderbeg in official Like to write as "Mr. von Krueger" magnifico
et stricto viro Georgio Castrioti dicto Scandarbech gentium armorum nostrorum in partibus Albania
generali capitaneo consiliario fideli ") but the linguistic usage of the chancellery was not uniform, for in the
same year Skanderbeg was granted the title" Lord in the Albanian lands "(Radical No. 85), but omitted
again in 1456 (Radoni, No. 117), in 1457 it was only said that "Georgius, called Scandarbeh," without any
title (Radonic No. 134) - although no political motive is to be found out. The Venetians, for whom the
Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a cathedral in the eye, described Skanderbeg in official letters
as "Lord of Bohemia". magnifico et stricto viro Georgio Castrioti dicto Scandarbech gentium armorum
nostrorum in partibus Albania generali capitaneo consiliario fideli ") but the linguistic usage of the
chancellery was not uniform, for in the same year Skanderbeg was granted the title" Lord in the Albanian
lands "(Radical No. 85), but omitted again in 1456 (Radoni, No. 117), in 1457 it was only said that
"Georgius, called Scandarbeh," without any title (Radonic No. 134) - although no political motive is to be
found out. The Venetians, for whom the Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a cathedral in the eye,
described Skanderbeg in official letters as "Lord of Bohemia". However, the vocabulary of the law firm
was not unanimous; for in the same year Skanderbeg was granted the title of "Lord in the Albanian lands"
(Radonic No. 85), but omitted in 1456 (Radoni6 No. 117); In 1457 it was only said that "Georgius, called
Scandarbeh", without any title (Radonic No. 134) - although there is no political motive to identify it.The
Venetians, to whom the Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a dome in the eye, Skanderbeg in
official Like to write as "Mr. von Krueger" However, the vocabulary of the law firm was not unanimous; for
in the same year Skanderbeg was granted the title of "Lord in the Albanian lands" (Radonic No. 85), but
omitted in 1456 (Radoni6 No. 117); In 1457 it was only said that "Georgius, called Scandarbeh", without
any title (Radonic No. 134) - although there is no political motive to identify it.The Venetians, to whom the
Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a dome in the eye, Skanderbeg in official Like to write as "Mr.
von Krueger" 134) - although there is no political motive to make out. The Venetians, for whom the
Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a cathedral in the eye, described Skanderbeg in official letters
as "Lord of Bohemia". 134) - although there is no political motive to make out. The Venetians, for whom
the Neapolitan takeover of Krujas was always a cathedral in the eye, described Skanderbeg in official
letters as "Lord of Bohemia".
yes "(AAV 6067" magnificus et potens dominus Georgius Castriota Croye "); they expressed IDdirekt's
reservations about the Albanian policy of King Alfonso V. (Such as 1453, when it came to Venetian-
Neapolitan skirmishes, RadoDlc No. 72). The Papal Curia used the designation "Georgius CastrlOtti
Scandarbech, Lord of Albania" (1457) (Radoni No. 151, 153, 168 [rur 1458]). Locally farther princes such
as the Milanese Duke Francesco Sforza saw in Skanderbeg the "Lord of Albania" (September 1451) or
"Lord of the Provinces of Albania" (October 1456) (Radoni6 Ne. 49; 125), but then, The particular poetic
situation determined the degree of politeness In this external perception was rarely a clear distinction
between the Christian name, Georg Kastriota, and the. Ottoman nom de guerre, Skanderbeg - often also
in the close to the Turkic form "Skenderbeg" (about Radonic no. 25-28, 30 from the Venetian and
Ragusan correspondence) met. Only the Neapolitan chancellery at the time of Alfonso V gave preference
to the form Georg Kastrioti (Radonic Nos. 37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46). It falls on the Albanian (but also the
Greek) related ending on -i. Skanderbeg himself preferred the form "Kastriot" or "Castriot". 61 Fmnco 7v:
"Aquilanera con duoi capi in campo rosso". Albanian historians interpret the flag as a national symbol, in
Frasberi, Skeoderbeu ch. XII. The Fam. Kastriota used in the early modern times allusions to the
emperor's origin: K. Biyoku, Aleksandri i Madh ne kujtesen historik te Skenderbeut e te
Shqiptareve. Sludime hislorilce 2005 / 1-2, 7-29, here 14f. 62 Valentini, Un curioso documento.
372
63 Tafd VII at Radonic. 64 Stojanovski, Raja 44ff. to "primikur" and "Jagator" 65 D. Gorgiev, The
population in the Macedonia-Albania borderland in the 15th and 16th centuries according to osmam
sources Sf1dostResearches 65/66 (2006/07) 117-136 The landscapes are recorded Cermenika, Golo
(Dolgo) Brdo Reka, Upper and Lower Dobra 66 In Venice, the population, which had withdrawn into the
mountains in the summer of 1467, was estimated at around 50,000 people: Sehmitt, Skanderbeg's last
years, the source of the number 49; Number at Radonic No. 371. 67 Barletius 256: "Optimates and
nobiliores, accurrebant & alij plerique voluntarij. atque iuventus annata ex omnibus locis solo pra.edae (ut
assolet) studio, atque sic confectus extemplo est non ignobilis exercitus. "68 Storti, Dispacci sferzeschi
vol. 4 no. 140, 152; Pali, Rapportl No. 27; Radonic No. 216. 69 Radonic No. 250. 70 Pall. Rapportl No. 2:
Araniti Komine stood 1455 mH 6000, Muzaki Thopia with 5000 men before Berat. 71 Sokoloski 310 and
passim. 72 Sokoloski 300. 73 Sokoloski 306, 309. 74 Sokolosla 304, 3 I 1. 75 Detailed information on
them in the chapter "Treason". 76 Stojanovski, Raja 45 mentions the office of landscapes Reka and
Cermenika. In the village Prisojnica Progon, a man with Albanian name, officiated. 77 Stojanovski, Raja
44ff. 78 Barletius 236. 79 Franco 34v. Barletius 338: 1464 acted as subordinate to Svetigrad:
Skanderbeg's nephew GOjko Strez BalSic, Tanush Dukagjin, a Muzaki, Paul Manesi, Peicus Manueli,
Demetrius Bensha and Rajan Kuka; ibid. 345: Tanush Thopia and Zacharias Gropa are mentioned 80
Franco 44v. 81 Barletius 193. 82 Musachl274. 83 Musachi 275. 84 Franco 34r. 85 I. Parrino, Nuovi
contributi alla conoscenza di Scanderbeg nel quadro della Crociata Bolletrino della Badia greca di
Grottalerrata ns 23 (1969) 77-144, 134; Martin Musachi or his familiaris Johannes Jacobi get
20:11. Archivio di Stato di Roma Camerale I Mandati vol. 837 f.225r; on 26.10. receives Musachi
50ft .; ibid. f.23 I r. Skanderbeg's credentials have also been preserved for his envoy:
86 87
88 89
90 91
92 93
94 95 96 97
98
99
373
Archivio Segreto Vaticano. Camera apostolica. Diversa cameralia 30 f. 134r-v; For these references I
thank Claudm Mart! A. Greve - E. Lehailly sous in the direction of W. Paravicini, Comptes de l'argent de
Charlcs le Temeraire, duc de Bourgogne. Vol.! Paris 2001, 241 No. 1012 July 1468. Egro, Chnstianity
192f. K. Giakumis, Kisha e Shen Gjerg] it Keshtjellen e Krujes dhe tradita bizantine, in: F. Duka (ed.),
Skenderbeu dhe Europe 218-235. F. Senatore, Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli I (1444-2Iuglio
1458). Naples 1997 No. 115. Archive! O di Stato di Milano. Archivio visconteo-sforzesco Busta 59 Report
from Rome June 24, 1466: "Fece impallare uno Vescovo albanese, parente del Vescovo de Ancroya.,
Qual pare foot stato casone de condurlo 1ll quel paese con prometerli certamente de darli Ancroya ne le
mane. Un gli essendo reuscito el pensiero gli fece fare el servicio. corno e dicto "; G. Soranzo (ed.),
Cronaca dl anOfilmo veronese 1446-1488 Monumenti storici pubblicali dalla Real diputaceans Venera di
slana pafria ser. IIl. Cronache e Diari Vol. 4 Venice 1915, 235. H. Gelzer, The Patriarchate of Achrida
Leipzig 1902-21f K. Beduli, Un ouvrnge bagiographique du XVIe siecle et ses donnees sur I'epoque de
Skanderbeg, in: Deuxieme conference des etudes albanologiques a l'occasion du 5e centenaire de la
mort de Georges Kastnote - Skanderbeg, Tirana 12-18 janvier 1968. 3 vols. Tirana 19691970, here vol 1,
773f Radosslc No. 24, 51. Archivio Segreto Vaticano, CameraApostolica, Diversa cameralia 30 f., 134r-v.
Kind regards by Claudia Märtl. Acta Albaniae Vaticana No. 204. Radonic No. 184, 185. Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's last years 67. Archivio d! Stato di Milano.Archivio Sforzesco Busta 59: 16 June 1466:
Augustino de Rubels to Bianca Maria and Galeazzo Maria Sforza :: Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No.
19. Archivio Segreto Vaticano. CameraApostollca. Diversa cameralia 30 f 134r-v. Friendly note from
Claudia Märtl. Rich material to him in M. Spremic, Ratacka opatija kod Bara Zbornik jilozojskog lahlteta u
Beogradu 8 (1964) 191-215. Pelinus comes from an ethnic transition area; among his numerous kinsfolk
are men with Albanian and Slavic (AAV 5243 a nephew "sclavus natione") Diversa cameralia 30 f 134r-
v. Friendly note from Claudia Märtl. Rich material to him in M. Spremic, Ratacka opatija kod Bara Zbornik
jilozojskog lahlteta u Beogradu 8 (1964) 191-215. Pelinus comes from an ethnic transition area; among
his numerous kinsfolk are men with Albanian and Slavic (AAV 5243 a nephew "sclavus natione") Diversa
cameralia 30 f 134r-v. Friendly note from Claudia Märtl. Rich material to him in M. Spremic, Ratacka
opatija kod Bara Zbornik jilozojskog lahlteta u Beogradu 8 (1964) 191-215. Pelinus comes from an ethnic
transition area; among his numerous kinsfolk are men with Albanian and Slavic (AAV 5243 a nephew
"sclavus natione")
Name. A Slavic name of his name is attested in a Netariatsakt from the nearby Slad CattarolKelor, d. The
fact that the abbot also used the Serbian name suffix in his environment in Latin documents is not
unusual when one thinks of similar phenomena among the Central Albanian nobility (BaIsiCi, Thopia as
Karovici). The document at S. Markovic, Benediktinska epatija Sv. Manje Ratacke kod Bam. Acta et
dipiomata iuridica Crootica Christiona Periodica 53 (2004) 151-202, here 196 deed dated 21 November
1436 "Georgius Pellinouich". 100 A.AV 5117. 101 A.AV 6680. 102 A.AV5117. 103 AAV 5076, 5213, 5240,
5301. 104 A.AV 5441. lOS AAV 5563, 5570, 5741. 106 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium minus 5/15
f171r (1461). 107 A.AV 6680. 108 AAV6541. 109 AAV 574 [, 6473, 6540, 6541, 6543, 6553, Liber
brevium No. 298, AAV 6676, 6680, 6683, 6683, 6694, 6932, 7132, 7207, 7214, 7449. 110 To Him:
Schmltt, Paul Angelus; ders., Skanderbeg as a new A1exander. There also all the evidence for the
below. 111 Bibliotheque nationale de France. Manuscrits italy 1587 f. 117r Screaming Skanderbegs from
Alessio, April 8, 1456 (signed with "Georgius Castrioth aka Scanderbegh Dominus 1n Albania"). 112
Schmitt, Skanderbeg as new Alexander 131 Fn.37. 113 Bibliotheque nationale de France. Manuscrits
italiens 1590. Writing Skanderbegs (GeorglUS Castriot aliter Sehenderbeg Aibanie Dominus) to
Francesco Sforza; Naples 24. 3. 1464. \ 14 The best work on this subject R. Mihaljcie, Slovenska
kancelarija arbanaSke vIastele, m: Simpoziumi by Skenderbeun - Simpozijum 0 Skenderbegu (9-12 maj
1968). Pnshtina / Priina 1968,219227; on the legal relations in Serbia s. L. Maksimovie, The law firm of
Serbian rulers, in. Ch. Hannlck (Hrng.), Law firm and law office languages in Eastern Europe. Cologne -
Weimar - Vienna 1999, 25-53; and to the nearby Raguse s. K. Jlrecek, The medieval chancery of the
Ragusans. Archiv for slavlsehe Philologie 25 (1903) 501-521 and 26 (1904) 161-214; Bl Bojovie, Raguse
et I'empire ottoman (1430-1520). Paris 1998. The diplomatic investigation into the medieval Albanian
space is pending.
115 AAV 6993. He probably came from the village Smaka in Kurbin. Andreas Smachi accompanied the
Abbot Pelinus in 1463 to Venice. 7449. 116 Radony No. 178. Da..avni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium
rogatorum 3116, f. 26v, SIr-v, where it is mentioned as "nuncius" Skanderbegs 117 Radony No. 180 118
Radical No. 180. 119 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku Procurae de notana 30/3 f 215r: "publico Instrumento
manu Radicii de Hilihis notarii m 1461 indictione x the xxvi aprihs sigillato solite sigillo dicti domini
Georgii. 120 He is occupied in 1459 and 1463. RadoDle No. 178, 180. 181, 182; ArChlVio Segreto
Vaticano. CameraApostolica. Diversa cameralia 30 f. 134rv. Friendly hint from Claudia Märt !. 121 Driavni
arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diver5a Notariae. 26/36 f.88r; AAV 6993; Archivio Segrete Vaticano. Camera
Apostolica. Diversa cameralia 30 f. 134r-v.
122 This is also evident from the Ragusan council books: Driavni arhlv u Dubrovniku. Consilium
rogatorum 3 / 161458-1461 f. 25v. 123 Radony No. 40. J. Tadie, John Gazulus, dubrovacki humanist XV
veka. ZFFB 8 (1964) 42H54. 124 Radonie Nr. 40 125 Radoni6 Nr. 41. 126 DriaVlll arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Diversa notariae 26/36: 18.3.1452. 127 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum
3/14 f. 87v, 24.9.1454: "Prima pars est de dando libertatem dommo Rectori et minon consilio offerendi
magistero Johanni Gazulo ambassiatori Sehenderbechi usque ad unum milliare veretonorum a balestra
et etiam dando libertatem domino Rectori et minori consilio respondendi in reslduo ambassiate dicto
magistro Johanni Gazulo ambassiatori predicto et se excusando prout domino Rectori ct minori consilio
melius videbitur.Pro omnes videlicet 29 ". 128 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/14
f240v, 19.2. 1455: "Prima pars estde dando hbertatem dammo Rectori et suo mineri consilio faciendi
Magistra Johanni Gazulo Ambassiatori Schanderbeg iuxta mtentiones Consilii rogatorum dissuadendo
sibi quod faciat oppldum ad Redonos ..." See also A. Ducelher, La fa ~ de maritime de la principau de la
Kastriote de la fin du XIVe sH ~: c1e i la mort de Skanderbeg, in: Ders., L'Albanie Part VII, 119-136. 129
Ddavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa cancellariae 25/5 f. 133r, 16.12.1455: "VenerabIlis vlr dominus
magister Jahannes de Gazuhs nominee
374
II
III
et al vice dictus dominus magister John nomine prelibali domini promisit ipsum Blasium traducere in
Albaniarn expensis suis et si bi dare et solvere pro eius mercede et salario omni mense et rationes
mensis ducatos quatuor et panem et vinum pro usu ipsius Blasii et terminus salarii debeat ineipere a de
qua ipse Blasius hune recedet petiturus in Albaniam. BQ Gelclch - Thall6czy, Diplomatanum 745. 131
The most important material compiled by Pall, Rapporti 160 Fn. 154. 132 Radonic No. 77. 133 Masci
167; Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3115 f 222v 1.5. 1458:, .. Prima pars est de
acceptando a RaJan Celnicho et domino Paulo de Gazulis nuneiis IIlustris domini Georgi Castriott dicti
Schenderbegh in depositum In comune nostrum ducatos auri duo milia quadringentos praut ipsis
videbitur, Friendly HinwCJ5 by Claudia Mlirt !. 140 Driavni arhlV u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3115
f. 184r, ibid. Diversa cancellariae 25/68 f. 102r.
141 Acta Albaniae Vaticana no. 307; Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B.
46.11. 2.1458: "Quel Cavaliero Inghilese marriage fu hora I'anno a Milano per annarsi, si Lrova qui
ambasciatore di Scandarbech ct richiede subsidiary as Papa per resistere al Turco, Noslro Signore non
ha molto bona inforrnationc di lui, Credo si tornern cum le trombe nel sacho ". 142 Archivio di Stato Roma
Camerale 1. tesoreria segreta vol. 1288 f.73r. Friendly note from Claudia Märtl. 143 AAV 6973, 6993
there as • .maistro ZOTZi quondam Alegreto de Raguxi ore chorno chornesso de miser Don Zorzi Polloni
abate de Sanla Maria cle Rotezo "; s also 7045. 144 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa Notariac 26/49 f
-143r 145 ArchlVio di Stato cli MilanO.ArchivlO visconleo - sforzesco B. 353: June 22, 1466, Extract from
a petition of Ruscus Theodori from Cattaro. 146 Gelcich - Tha1l6czy. Diplomatarium 756, 758, Radonic
No. 254, 260, 262. 147 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium minus 5/15 f. 228v, II 1462: "Ser Bartolus
de Goze, this Jacobus Marini cle Gondola, this Michael de Volto electi furunt officlales ad cortizandum
Schenderbegh si in reditu suo de Appulea appeals to Ragusium"; Consilium rogatorum 3117 f. Sir,
4.2.1462: "Prima pars est comittendo domino Jacobo de Gondola et sociis officialibus ad cortizandum
Iilustrem dorninum Schenderbeg quod ire debeant ex parte clorninii nostri ad ipsum dominum et eum
rogare ut faciat unam litteram patent munitam sua bulla revocatoriam retractatoriam et annullaloriarn
protestus ex parte domini prefati facti contra galleas nostras et dominiu nostrum, per XXXIii contra iii
". 148 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa nolarlac 26/48 f. 34r, 5. 4.1464: "... condur in porto de Rausa
stara duamiliaseptecento cinquanta dc grano bono novo de Albania de logi dei Signor Sehenderbego Ii
quali siando cangati dieno vigmr a Ragusi 149 Driavni arhiv u Dubravmku Consilium rogatorum 3/17, 85r,
3.4.1462: "Prima pars est de faciendo tres qui debeant ordinare ct ordinata in scriptlS portare presenti
ConsJiJo litterns scribendas Sehenderbecho. Jacobo de Bona. pro xxx contra iiii "; Consilium rogatorum
31J8 f. 203r, 18.8.1465" Electio unius oratoris ad Schenderbegh loeo ser Paladini de Lucharis qui
refutavit. Marinus ... de Bona ~; f.219r-v, 224 rv; ibid. Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium
rogatorum 3/17 f. 46v, 22.1. 1462: "Great pars 34r, 5. 4.1464: "... condur in porto de Rausa stara
duamiliaseptecento cinquanta dc grano bono novo de Albania de logi dei Signor Sehenderbego Ii quali
siando cangati dieno vigmr a Ragusi 149 Driavni arhiv u Dubravmku Consilium rogatorum 3/17, 85r,
3.4.1462: "Prima pars est de faciendo tres qui debeant ordinare ct ordinata in scriptlS portare presenti
ConsJiJo litterns scribendas Sehenderbecho. Jacobo de Bona. pro xxx contra iiii "; Consilium rogatorum
31J8 f. 203r, 18.8.1465" Electio unius oratoris ad Schenderbegh loeo ser Paladini de Lucharis qui
refutavit. Marinus ... de Bona ~; f.219r-v, 224 rv; ibid. Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium
rogatorum 3/17 f. 46v, 22.1. 1462: "Great pars 34r, 5. 4.1464: "... condur in porto de Rausa stara
duamiliaseptecento cinquanta dc grano bono novo de Albania de logi dei Signor Sehenderbego Ii quali
siando cangati dieno vigmr a Ragusi 149 Driavni arhiv u Dubravmku Consilium rogatorum 3/17, 85r,
3.4.1462: "Prima pars est de faciendo tres qui debeant ordinare ct ordinata in scriptlS portare presenti
ConsJiJo litterns scribendas Sehenderbecho. Jacobo de Bona. pro xxx contra iiii "; Consilium rogatorum
31J8 f. 203r, 18.8.1465" Electio unius oratoris ad Schenderbegh loeo ser Paladini de Lucharis qui
refutavit. Marinus ... de Bona ~; f.219r-v, 224 rv; ibid. Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium
rogatorum 3/17 f. 46v, 22.1. 1462: "Great pars condur in porto de Rausa stara duamiliaseptecento
cinquanta dc grano bono novo de Albania de logi dei Signor Sehenderbego Ii quali siando cangati dieno
vigmr a Ragusi. 149 Driavni arhiv u Dubravmku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17, f. 85r, 3.4. 1462: "Prima pars
est de faciendo tres qui debeant ordinare ct ordinatas in scriptlS portare presenti ConsJiJo litterns
scribendas Sehenderbecho.ser Jacobo de Bona., Pro xxx contra iiii"; Consilium rogatorum 31J8 f. 203r,
18.8.1465 "Electio unius oratoris ad Schenderbegh loeo ser Paladini de Lucharis qui refutavit ser Marinus
... de Bona ~; f.219r-v, 224 rv; ibid Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f 46v,
January 22, 1462: "Prima pars condur in porto de Rausa stara duamiliaseptecento cinquanta dc grano
bono novo de Albania de logi dei Signor Sehenderbego Ii quali siando cangati dieno vigmr a Ragusi. 149
Driavni arhiv u Dubravmku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17, f. 85r, 3.4. 1462: "Prima pars est de faciendo tres
qui debeant ordinare ct ordinatas in scriptlS portare presenti ConsJiJo litterns scribendas
Sehenderbecho.ser Jacobo de Bona., Pro xxx contra iiii"; Consilium rogatorum 31J8 f. 203r, 18.8.1465
"Electio unius oratoris ad Schenderbegh loeo ser Paladini de Lucharis qui refutavit ser Marinus ... de
Bona ~; f.219r-v, 224 rv; ibid Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f 46v, January
22, 1462: "Prima pars 3.4. 1462: "Prima pars est de faciendo tres qui debeant ordinare ct ordinatas in
scriptlS portare presenti ConsJiJo litterns scribendas Sehenderbecho.ser Jacobo de Bona., Pro xxx
contra iiii"; Consilium rogatorum 31J8 f. 203r, 18.8.1465 "Electio unius oratoris ad Schenderbegh loeo ser
Paladini de Lucharis qui refutavit ser Marinus ... de Bona ~; f.219r-v, 224 rv; ibid Consllium rogatorum
5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f 46v, January 22, 1462: "Prima pars 3.4. 1462: "Prima pars est de
faciendo tres qui debeant ordinare ct ordinatas in scriptlS portare presenti ConsJiJo litterns scribendas
Sehenderbecho.ser Jacobo de Bona., Pro xxx contra iiii"; Consilium rogatorum 31J8 f. 203r, 18.8.1465
"Electio unius oratoris ad Schenderbegh loeo ser Paladini de Lucharis qui refutavit ser Marinus ... de
Bona ~; f.219r-v, 224 rv; ibid Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f 46v, January
22, 1462: "Prima pars 224 rv; ibid. Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f. 46v,
22.1. 1462: "Great pars 224 rv; ibid. Consllium rogatorum 5/15 f. 20lv; Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f. 46v,
22.1. 1462: "Great pars
375
est de miltendo pro ser Paulo de P07.za qui fuit patronus unius ex galeis nostris and the infor mation
nostro consilio de pretextu facta by Andream Gazulum nomine Illustris domini Schenderbegh. per xxviii
contra i "150 Barletius 171. 151 Radon No. 112. 152. Kntobulos at Radonic 225. 153 Schmltt,
Skanderbeg's last years, n. 10,21, 22; Pulaha, Lufta 47 and 159 (Oru and BitlIsi). 154 Kritobulos 199. 155
All figures, compiled from Ottoman tax register, at Gorgiev, population VgL the older work of Sk. RizaJ,
Transfenmet, deportimet dhe dyndjet e Shqipwevet ne kohen e Skenderbeut, in: Simpoziumi by
Skenderbeun - Simpozijum 0 Skenderbegu 9-12 maj 1969. Prishtinal Pristina 1969, 145-153, which,
however, does not quantify the extent of demographic changes 156 Musaehi 334. 157 A of Godin, The
Albanian Common Law. Zeitschriftfor comparative law 56 (1953) 1-46; 57 (1954) 5-73; 58 (1955/56) 121-
198; F. Baron Nopcsa, The Mountain Tribes of Northern Albania and Their Common Law, Ill: F. Baxbaku -
K. Kaser, The Tribal Societies of Northern Albania. Reports and researches of consular and scholarly
East Europeans (1861-1917). Vienna - Cologne - Weimar 1996, 205-428; S. Pulaha, Mbi gjallerimlll e
lidhjeve farefisnore the krijimin e fiseve ne Shqiperine e veriut ne shek. XVIXVII. Stl.ldlme historike
1975/2, 121-145; S. Pulaha., Formation of the Region de selfgouvernement dans les Malessies du
sandjak de Shkoder aux XVe-XVlIe siec \ es. Studia albanica 1976, 173-179; K. Kaser, shepherds,
fighters, tribal heroes. Origins and Presence of the Balkan Patriarchality. Vienna - Cologne - Weimar
1992. 158 p. The genealogies in the appendix of Ch. Hopf, Chroniques, here board 9. 159 Driavni arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f. 93r, 25.5.1462: "Prima pars est de dando libertatem domino
Reetori et suo minori Consilio respondendl Dimitrio nuntiO Ivani Balsieh nepotis domini Schendribeeh pro
eo quod querit contra Paulum ID John of Poua per incantu grani offersendo siv iusticiam et rescribendi
dlcto Ivano. Pro omnes ". 160 Radonic No. 216, Pall, Rapporti No. 27; Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi Vol. 4,
No. 170. 161 Pali, Rapporti 148; it is unclear whether Konstantm and Gojko are identical; Pall suspects
this. Johannis de Poua pro incantu grani offersendo siv iusticiam et rescribendi dlcto Ivano. Pro omnes.
"160 Radonic No. 216, Pall, Rapporti No. 27, Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi, Vol. 4, No. 170. 161 Pali,
Rapporti 148, it is unclear whether Constantm and Gojko are identical, Pall suspects this. Johannis de
Poua pro incantu grani offersendo siv iusticiam et rescribendi dlcto Ivano. Pro omnes. "160 Radonic No.
216, Pall, Rapporti No. 27, Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi, Vol. 4, No. 170. 161 Pali, Rapporti 148, it is unclear
whether Constantm and Gojko are identical, Pall suspects this.
162 Storti, Dispacci sforzesehl Vol. 4, Ne. 170 "Andretto, nepote de Scanderbeeh." 163 Archivio di Stato
di Milano, Archivio Viseonteo - sforzesco Busta 353 Venice 22nd November 1466. Gherardo de Collis to
Galeazzo Maria Sforza 164 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Jalm: NT 22. 165 Bibliotheque national de France
Manuscrits italy 1590 f 429rFrnncesco Sfona to Bartolomeo de Sfondratis:, .Havemo inteso before the
donna deI quondam Signor Dispoto de Servia ha una fiola ala quale monstra volere dare XV 0 XX M
ducati in dote et ulterius comprarli tante possessione et terre marriage aseendano ala soma de ducati CM
". 166 Bibliotheque nationale de France. Manuscrits italy 1590 f.523: "Della conditione della lllustre
Madona Helena vasilissa de Senria before quello che so io perehe non solum ho noticia de essa, sed
etiam cum quella ho familiarita .. Ne ha etiam una terza per nomeJerina de anni circa VII per la qual e
stata in pratica per desponsarla ad uno figliolo deI Signor Scanderbegh, ma non sono remasti
d'achordio ... Et In la pratica cb'e! haveva cum Schanderbegh, la qual me passo per mane el norne della
dote dante ducati VIM omnibus computatis. "167 Tb. Ganchou, La familie Koumouses (KoUlloUcrll9 a
Constantinople et Negrepont avant et apres 1453, in: Bf; \ IcrlCl- EullolCl ) 1: 0 ci'pmo 0 "1" 0 Nqpo11:
ovu: Athens 2006, 45107, here 79 fn. 82. 168 Edited in Schmitt, The Venetian Albania 599 fn. 14. 169
Ljubic, Listine vol. 10, 469; Maisano, Giorgio Sfranze, Cronaca Rome 1990, 176. 170 Kritobules at
Radonic 223. 171 DJiavni u Zadru, Arhiv Sibenika Notar Antollio Campolongo 1440-1443 f 119r 172
AAV6683 173 AAV 6543, 6553. 174 Schmitt, The Venetian Albania 389. 175 Schmltt, The Venetian
Albania 360. 176 There are numerous works on the history of the story: A. Ducellier, La fayade maritime
de la pnncipaute of the Kastriote de la fin du XIVe siecle à la mert de Skanderbeg. in: Ders., L'Albanle
Part VII, 119-136; , Les echelJes de l'Adriatique meridionale aux XIVe et 15e siecles, produits et victimes
des douanes, in: NG Moschonas (ed.)., Meney and markets in tbe Paleologan era. Athens 2003, 25-
48; B. Hrilbak, Dubrovnikasit the Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeu. Perpanmi 196711, 125-168 and 1968/2,
304-309; ders., Privreda Albanije u XIV i XV veku, m: Simpoziuffil by Skenderbeun-Simpo- La fayade
maritime de la pnncipaute of the Kastriote de la fin du XIVe siecle à la mert de Skanderbeg. in: Ders.,
L'Albanle Part VII, 119-136; , Les echelJes de l'Adriatique meridionale aux XIVe et 15e siecles, produits
et victimes des douanes, in: NG Moschonas (ed.)., Meney and markets in tbe Paleologan era. Athens
2003, 25-48; B. Hrilbak, Dubrovnikasit the Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeu. Perpanmi 196711, 125-168 and
1968/2, 304-309; ders., Privreda Albanije u XIV i XV veku, m: Simpoziuffil by Skenderbeun-Simpo- La
fayade maritime de la pnncipaute of the Kastriote de la fin du XIVe siecle à la mert de Skanderbeg. in:
Ders., L'Albanle Part VII, 119-136; , Les echelJes de l'Adriatique meridionale aux XIVe et 15e siecles,
produits et victimes des douanes, in: NG Moschonas (ed.)., Meney and markets in tbe Paleologan
era. Athens 2003, 25-48; B. Hrilbak, Dubrovnikasit the Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeu. Perpanmi 196711,
125-168 and 1968/2, 304-309; ders., Privreda Albanije u XIV i XV veku, m: Simpoziuffil by Skenderbeun-
Simpo- Dubrovnikasit the Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeu. Perpanmi 196711, 125-168 and 1968/2, 304-
309; ders., Privreda Albanije u XIV i XV veku, m: Simpoziuffil by Skenderbeun-Simpo- Dubrovnikasit the
Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeu. Perpanmi 196711, 125-168 and 1968/2, 304-309; ders., Privreda Albanije u
XIV i XV veku, m: Simpoziuffil by Skenderbeun-Simpo-
376
zijum 0 Skenderbegu 9-12 maj 1969. Prishtinal Pristina 1969, 67-82, ders., Eksportimi i dritberave nga
Shqiperia ne shej. XIII, XIV e Xv. Gjurmime aLbanologjike 1- 2 (1970) 2390; the same, Trgovina
arbanaskom i krfskom solju u XIII, XIV i XV stolecu. Balcomco 3 (1972) 237-272; ders., ArbanaSko drvo u
Dubrovniku. Historijski zbornik 37/1 (1984) 61-86; ders., Poslovanje pomoraca i trgovaca iz Boke kotorske
u AlbaniJl do 1600. Godine. Spomenik SANU. Odeljenje iSlorijskih nouka 5 (1986) 9-47; ders., ItaliJanskl
pnvrednici u Albamjl (1280-1500). To Verzitetska misoo. Drustvene nauke 1 (1993) 5-11; 1. Malltezl,
Conflicts per tregjet e kripes ne kohen e Skenderbeut, in: Gjergj KastrlOti-Skenderbeu ne historine e
Shqiptari! Ve, 84-96. 177 AAV5009. 178 AAV 5009, 5062. 179 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa
notariae 26/48 f. 3v-4r. 180 AAV7205. 181 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku Consilium rogaterum 3/18 133v f
150r. 182 Driavm arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium roga [orum 3/18 f. 266V. 183 Ddavm arhiv u Dubrovniku
Consilium rogatorum 3/17 290r and 296r-v; 3/18 f. Cloth merchant Boiie Pavlovic may only sell cloth in
Skanderbeg's area (1463); see. C. Truhelka., Dubrovack vijesti 0 godini 1463. Glosnik zemaljslwg muzeja
and Bosni i Hercegovini 22 (1910) 1-24,23. 184 AAV 5871: Cattaro bess 1452 Send the shepherd chiefs
("stipani") cloth. 185 Dü..avni arhiv u Dubrovniku Consilium rogatorum 3/18 133v f.150r; Acta Albaniae
Vaticana no. 305; Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa cancellariae 46 f. 78r, 10.7.1462: Berto Belfradelh
from Florence, factor of the house Albizzi and Strozzi in Barletta suing Stefan de Natala de Rauxa overo
de Malfo ditto Morgenovich, captain, it is about "charichar in Albanm de legname da fuocho andate
adrettura a Barleta con dette legne segondo a fonna dei nojizato fatto". ebda, Diversa notariae 26
f. 129R. To the Florentine banks in Dalmatia s. T. Raukar, Firentinci u Dalmaciji u XlV. stoljeeu, in: ders.,
Studlje 0 DalmaciJi u srednJem vijeku. Split 2007, 53-68. , J86 Dria'o'ni arhiv u Dubrovmku. Consilium
rogatorum 15 f. 214v 28. 3. 1458: "Prima pars est loquendi aut loqui faciendi cum Martino Chierin
mercatore florentino pro facto ducatorum quos has solver Schanderbegho per iitternm cambii in ipsum
directam per societatem de Pa Firentinci u Dalmaciji u XlV. stoljeeu, in: ders., Studlje 0 DalmaciJi u
srednJem vijeku. Split 2007, 53-68. , J86 Dria'o'ni arhiv u Dubrovmku. Consilium rogatorum 15 f. 214v 28.
3. 1458: "Prima pars est loquendi aut loqui faciendi cum Martino Chierin mercatore florentino pro facto
ducatorum quos has solver Schanderbegho per iitternm cambii in ipsum directam per societatem de
Pa Firentinci u Dalmaciji u XlV. stoljeeu, in: ders., Studlje 0 DalmaciJi u srednJem vijeku. Split 2007, 53-
68. , J86 Dria'o'ni arhiv u Dubrovmku. Consilium rogatorum 15 f. 214v 28. 3. 1458: "Prima pars est
loquendi aut loqui faciendi cum Martino Chierin mercatore florentino pro facto ducatorum quos has solver
Schanderbegho per iitternm cambii in ipsum directam per societatem de Pa
also data on grain exports via the Venetian ports of Durazzo and Alessio; it can be assumed that this was
about purchases in the territory of the Albanian nobility. Driavnl arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv Koreule 16 Cover 31
Issue I KOrCulanski knezovi Domenico Morosini. Korespondencija 1461-1463 f.12r (all examples from
1463): The Venetian merchant Dominicus Laguri produced from Durazzo 500 staria cereals; Ambrosius
Pantaleonis from Alessie 170 staria cereal; Blasius de Durachio also transported 500 staria with the
permission of the Venetian governor of Skutari (ibid., f.13r). 194 Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhlv Koreule 16
Cover 30 Issue 9 f. 13v-14r "Ivanus nepos domini Scanderbegi". 195 Barletius 159. 196 AAV 6906. 197
AAV7570. 198 AAV 6602. 199 Bartl, Albania sacra, 63, 92, 137 with source examples from the early
modern period 200 AAV 5009. 201 AAV 6545, before July 1457. 202 N ~ ri near Pulaha, Lufta
92; Kritobulos ed. Reinsch 196f .; Schmitt, Skanderbegs last years, source share, supplement text 2. 203
Blbhotheque nationale de Fronce. Manuscri's Italy 1590 f. 523r of 14. 12.1464. 204 Franco 8v-
9r; Barletius 53. 205 Radiation No. 160, 161. 206 Franco 14r; Radonie 126. 207 Radonie Nr. 110: In 1456
Venice demanded of Skanderbeg alone for the damage that the Para-
377
trizier Geronimo Foscolo had suffered 200 ducats. 208 AAV 5468. On the possession of Balkan
magnates in the plains s. G. Weiss, Joannes Kantakuzenos - statesman, emperor and monk in the social
development of Byzantium in the 14th century Wiesbaden 1969, 21f. 209 R. Mueller, A Venetian
Commercial Enterprise in Corfu, 1440-1442, in: NG Mosehonas (ed.). Money and Markets in the
Paleologan era. Athens 2003, 81-95, here 91 f. 210 J. Kolanovic, Izvori za povijest trgovina i pomorstva
srednjevjekovnih dalmatinsklh gradova sosobltim osvrtom na Slbenik. Adriatica maritima 3 (1979) 63-
150,119. 211 Barletius 307: "Multi ex Barbaris, qui vivi capti fuere, pecuniis redempti sunt, quas
Scanderbegus simul cum reliquis spoliis & impedimenti militibus sUls donavit". 212 Barletius 206f.,
33l. 213 Bojovic 2Iff .; general s.1. Boiic, Dubrovnik i Turska u XIV i XV veku. Be! Grad 1952. 214 Boiie,
Dubrovnik i Turska 145ff. 215 Radol1JC No. 3, 14. 216 Radonjc No. 24; Bojovlc 27. 217 Radonic No. 34.
218 Radonic No. 57.60: Skanderbeg was rhetorically praised. 219 In addition M. Spremic, Dubrovnik i
Aragonci (1442-1495). Belgrade 1971. 220 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3117 f.173v
(January 20, 1463). 221 In addition, the different assessments of P Bartl, Relazloni fra Scanderbeg e
Venezia, m: V convegno internazionale di studi albanesi Atti IX. Palenno 1968, 161-175 and K. Biyoku,
Quelques aspects of rapport entre Skanderbeg et Venise, in: Deuxieme eonferenee vol. 1, 77-S6. 222
AAV 5396. 223 AAV 5396, cf. also 5375. 224 Sun 1458 Mareo Salamon and 1460 Bartolomeo
Taiapetra; AAV 6664, 6938. 225 AAV 6304. The chamberlain, Bartolomeo Camuceio, was then made
because of these and other offenses of the process 226 ZB AAV 5537; see. Schmitt, The Venetian
Albania 361 ff. 227 Radonic No. 63. 228 AAV 5964. 229 Radonic NT. 67, AAV 6064, 6056, 6067. 230
AAV 6398; 6540 231 AAV6411. 232 Masei 460. 233 AAV 6903, 7449. 234 Sehmitt, Actes No. 17, 18, 20,
21, 45.
235 Arehivio di Sillto di Milano. Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 351 Gh. De Col! Is to Franceseo Sforza
24th time 1464: "Me dicbano molti gentilhomeni ehe do poy hano principiata questa guerra deI Turcho,
computando I'uno mese con I 'altro hano hauto de spesa meglio Before Ix.M ducati 10 read ". 236
Sehmitt, Aetes No. 59, 60. 237 Radonic No. 37, 47. 238 Pali, Rapporti 132f. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last
Years 89. 240 Schrnitt, Aetes No. 36. 241 G. Capra, Skanderbeg nel quadro della politiea
pontlficia. Boflertino delta Bodia greca di Grottaferrata NS 22 (1968) 71-84. 242 Radonic No. 36, 40, 41,
51. 243 Ljubic, Listine Vol. 9, 407. 244 Radoni6 No. 72. 245 Radonic No. 76. 246 Archivio di Stato cli
Milano. Arehivio viseonteo - sforzesco B. 41 Report by diplomats Seeva de Curte and Jaeobo Trivulzio to
Duke Franeeseo Sforza. Rome 10.1.1454. "... e volese obligare e fare bona cautlone de dare a fare al
Turcho havendo questo tal judgmentimento before non usiriJ 10 Tureho contra Chnstiani per terra ni per
mare in questo anno a venire, e non full tochare denari, rna econtento siano pagati a mese per mese
secondo 10 suo scrvire, e fara bona cautione de lestituire el tuto s'e! Turcho veramente (a word illegible)
". 247 Acta Albaniae Vaticana no. 305, 306. M. Sciambra - G. Valentini - 1. Panino, Il "liber brevium" di
Caliisto lll. La crociata,] 'Albama e Skanderbeg. Palenno 1968; J. Gill, Pope Callistus III and Scanderbeg
the Albanian. Orientaba Chrisliana Periodica 33 (1967) 534-562. 248 Ibid. 306. 249 On April 19, 1466,
2000 gulden, on June 7, 14662050 gulden; in autumn 1466 5000 ducats, a sum, the many cardinals
considered too modest; on the 17th Apnl1467 2700 guilders and on the 1st of September 1467 another
1100 guilders, thus altogether 5000 ducats and 7850 guilders. Archivio di Stato di Roma. Camerale I.
Depositefla della Croeiata. Bd. 1235: (126v, 134v, 140r, 141r, 143v, 148v.) FUT the details thank you
Claudia Mart! See also Sehmitt, Skanderbegs last years 86ff. 2501. Parrino, Skanderbeg nell'azione
pontificla cli difesa europea V convegno internazionale dl studi albanesi, Palenno 1969, 119-160, 160. 25
Arehivio cli Stato dl Milano Arehivio visconteo - sforzeseo B. 351 Gh. De C01lis to F. Sforza
27.8.1464 .252 Musaehi 284. Depositefella della Croeiata. Bd. 1235: (126v, 134v, 140r, 141r, 143v,
148v.) FUT the details thank you Claudia Mart! See also Sehmitt, Skanderbegs last years 86ff. 2501.
Parrino, Skanderbeg nell'azione pontificla cli difesa europea V convegno internazionale dl studi albanesi,
Palenno 1969, 119-160, 160. 25 Arehivio cli Stato dl Milano Arehivio visconteo - sforzeseo B. 351 Gh. De
C01lis to F. Sforza 27.8.1464 .252 Musaehi 284. Depositefella della Croeiata. Bd. 1235: (126v, 134v,
140r, 141r, 143v, 148v.) FUT the details thank you Claudia Mart! See also Sehmitt, Skanderbegs last
years 86ff. 2501. Parrino, Skanderbeg nell'azione pontificla cli difesa europea V convegno internazionale
dl studi albanesi, Palenno 1969, 119-160, 160. 25 Arehivio cli Stato dl Milano Arehivio visconteo -
sforzeseo B. 351 Gh. De C01lis to F. Sforza 27.8.1464 .252 Musaehi 284.
378
253 Musachi 298f. 254 Barletius 276f 255 Biyoku, Dibra and the, Shtrirja; the sources at H. Sabanovlc,
Krnjiste Isa - bega lshakovica. Zbimi katastarski popis iz 1455 godme. Sarajevo 1964, 95 [256 Barletius
208f Basic is Seliscev, Polog; Barletius 276 [and passim raises, "or that Mokra formed the eastern edge
of Skanderbeg's dominion (" tamen Epiroticum imperium ab hostiurn agris distinguunt "); Polog clearly did
not belong to the Aufstandsgebiet. 257 Schmitt, Actes No. 67. 258 Radonic No. 149: In August 1457, the
Ottomans occupied the plains, while Skanderbcg had entrenched themselves in rocky outcrops.] Barletius
276 [260 Barletius 277. 261 Critobulos at Radonu: 223. 262 Barletius 208t [263 Barletius 307. 264
Barletius 308; Pulaha , Lufta 257 (to Tetovo) 265 Pertusi, Segono 108. 266 The Ottoman chronicler Neri
at Pulaha, Burirne 92. 267 Barletius 310 speaks (probably to 1462) of "by Dibras in Triballorum usque
fines," but not by entering the territory of the Triballians (Serbs). Schmitt, Skanderbegs lasted years,
supplements to the source text I; Pall, Rapporti No. 62. Skanderbeg had intended to attack a place 20
miles from the Simiea. This may most likely mean the mining-rich area of Trepea near Mitrovica. 269
Barletius 277. 270 Barletlus 310 names the place, Livad "Stojanovski - Gorgiev 129. 271 Stojanovski -
Gorgiev 97. 272 Interesting military technology Remarks in an Austro-Hungarian manual: Military
geography Macedonian basin with the Albanian coastal areas 1886.7 Hf. 273 AAV 6019, 6472, Radonic
No. 126. 274 AAV 6473, 6784, 6792. 275 AAV 6784. 276 Pali, Rapporti No. 2. 277 A.rchivio di State di
Milane. Archivio visconteo-sforzesco. B. 195 Alberico Malletta to F. Sforza. Naples 8. 10. 1455: Diceno
pero moltl before s'el Papa se accordase col conte Jacorno e 10 facesse passare a questo bon tempo in
Albania ebe mandando la Maesta dei Re xvi 0 xx galee a questo bon tempo contra la Valona ale
confine de questo suo regname che el conte Jacerno eurn 10 adiutorio del signor Scanderbech el jellyfish
gli vegneria cum molte migliara de persone se poteriä metere campo ala Valona per terra e aqua e
anchora questo anno se gli faria bono fruto et maxime perehe la MaesliJ. del Re ha aviso eh'el Gran
Turco ha dehberato de venire in Albania a questo bon tempo contra Scanderbech e s'e1 gli vegnera
corno se crede, el ne fara piu soliciti ale commissioned before vegncri alle confine de ltalia E questi di
passati siando mi ala presentia de la Maesta dei Re capitaneo dele galee diceva before the la terra de
qua 10 the name of la terra de la Turcho non li sono piG. de xlv in xviii miga de pasagio, ma da
habitatione de terra deta perfine ala Valena giene sono lx.ta. 278 Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio
visconteo - sforzesco B. 342. Joachim Castiglione to Frnncesco Sforz.a, Venice 18 September 1455. 279
Archivio de la Carona de Aragón. Caneel! Eria reg. 2662 f. Letter from Alfonso V. of August 26, 1456 to
Skanderbeg; friendly HmwelS by Daniel Duran i Duelt; AAV 6466. 280 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years,
Supplements to the Source Supplements Text 2. 281 Barletius 201; In 210 he speaks of the neighboring
valleys of Mokra and "Modrissum". Barletius 209. A. Stojanovski, De ", endzistvoto of Macedonia, Skopje
1974, 244f., The localization is derived from Barletius (276), who describes how the Ottomans march
through Polog against Modrie, which gives access to Mokra and Upper The location of the castle has
caused a discus- sion, as there are places of this name in western Macedonia. 1) Modric on the Treska,
northeast of Klcevo, 2) Modric by Dibra in the Dolgo brdo landscape, as well as 3) Modrista or Medrie
southwest of Tetovo. Lctzterer place also carries the Greek name "Pirgos" (tower). Frasheri, Skenderbeu
320 places the castle in the Drintal. K. Bi90ku, on the other hand (5 th of his skendering book 127) locates
Morine further to the east, at the Treska. But Modnc is relocated to the Black Drin region. Because the
place at Barletlus (276) excludes a relocation of the castle east of the Polo level. A trip by Pirok (Pirgos) in
July 2007 did not give any indication of a rume; one of these was in the nearby town of Gradec. Freely
there is no castle listed in the Ottoman registers for the 15th century; Stojanovski Gargiev 58. and 3)
Modrista or Medrie southwest of Tetovo. Lctzterer place also carries the Greek name "Pirgos"
(tower). Frasheri, Skenderbeu 320 places the castle in the Drintal. K. Bi90ku, on the other hand (5 th of
his skendering book 127) locates Morine further to the east, at the Treska. But Modnc is relocated to the
Black Drin region. Because the place at Barletlus (276) excludes a relocation of the castle east of the
Polo level. A trip by Pirok (Pirgos) in July 2007 did not give any indication of a rume; one of these was in
the nearby town of Gradec. Freely there is no castle listed in the Ottoman registers for the 15th
century; Stojanovski Gargiev 58. and 3) Modrista or Medrie southwest of Tetovo. Lctzterer place also
carries the Greek name "Pirgos" (tower). Frasheri, Skenderbeu 320 places the castle in the Drintal. K.
Bi90ku, on the other hand (5 th of his skendering book 127) locates Morine further to the east, at the
Treska. But Modnc is relocated to the Black Drin region. Because the place at Barletlus (276) excludes a
relocation of the castle east of the Polo level. A trip by Pirok (Pirgos) in July 2007 did not give any
indication of a rume; one of these was in the nearby town of Gradec. Freely there is no castle listed in the
Ottoman registers for the 15th century; Stojanovski Gargiev 58. Bi90ku, on the other hand, (5) his
skendering book 127 locates Morine further to the east, at the Treska. But Modnc is relocated to the Black
Drin region. Because the place at Barletlus (276) excludes a relocation of the castle east of the Polo
level. A trip by Pirok (Pirgos) in July 2007 did not give any indication of a rume; one of these was in the
nearby town of Gradec. Freely there is no castle listed in the Ottoman registers for the 15th
century; Stojanovski Gargiev 58. Bi90ku, on the other hand, (5) his skendering book 127 locates Morine
further to the east, at the Treska. But Modnc is relocated to the Black Drin region. Because the place at
Barletlus (276) excludes a relocation of the castle east of the Polo level. A trip by Pirok (Pirgos) in July
2007 did not give any indication of a rume; one of these was in the nearby town of Gradec. Freely there is
no castle listed in the Ottoman registers for the 15th century; Stojanovski Gargiev 58. one of these was in
the nearby town of Gradec. Freely there is no castle listed in the Ottoman registers for the 15th
century; Stojanovski Gargiev 58. one of these was in the nearby town of Gradec. Freely there is no castle
listed in the Ottoman registers for the 15th century; Stojanovski Gargiev 58.
379
283 A visit took place in July 2007; I am very grateful to Muharrem Dezhgiu, Institute of the History of the
Albanian Academy, and myself from the region. Barletius 25. 284 BarletJus 25; G. Sarayi, Kalaja e
fshehte e Skenderbeut prane fshatit Daule (rrethi i Krujes) .lliria 1987 / 1,203-220; G. Karaiskaj, Elementet
arkitektonike ne fortrifikimet mesJetare shqiptare dhe vendi i tyre ne arkitekturen ushtarake te
kohes. Monuments! 199011, 5-34; D. Komata, Petrele - unforteresse avancee de Kruje durant les guerres
de Skanderbeg, in: Deuxieme conference Bd. 1,349-375; Schmitt. The Venetian Albania 198ff. 285
Archivio di Stato dl Milano. Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 342. loachim Castiglione to Francesco
Sforza. Venice 18 September 1455. 286 BarleLius 201. 287 Barlel1us 201. 288 QJ Schmitt, ,, 1461
another document in the Venetian Alessio from (Radonic No. 202), his guest. But the bourgeois Stefan
Brankovic wrote on the same day from Kruja to Francesco Sforza (Radonic No. 201). 291 Corgiev,
population. 292 AAV 5062. 293 Bel La (j: i the warriors of Skanderbeg returning from Puglia landed in
1462. Barletius 306. 294 Radoni <: No. 56. 295 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku Consilium rogatorum 3/14 f.
240r No. 158. 297 Chalcocondyles near Radoni <: 221. 295 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium
rogatorum 3/14 f. 240r. 296 Radical No. 158. 297 Chalcocondyles near Radoni <: 221. 295 Driavni arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/14 f. 240r. 296 Radical No. 158. 297 Chalcocondyles near Radoni <:
221.
298 Radonic No. 291 299 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa notanae 26/49 f. 43r: Ragusan wood
man! with Rodoni (just before Mehmed's attack in March 1466).
300 Archivio Segreto Vaticano. CameraApostolica. Dlversa cameralia 30 (134r-v. Kind regards by
Claudta Ml1rt1 301 Archivio di Stato di Milano, Archivio Viscontee - sforzesco B. 59: Rome 6th LUDI
1466. Augustino de Rubeis to Bianca Maria and Galeazzo Maria Sforza. "Ma con la persona sua et con la
famiglia s'era reducto ad uno suo porto de mare molto forte chiamato Rondon per stare a vedere li
progressi dei Turcho et al. soccorso potesse havere da le potentialie Christane, et anche pur quando
vedesse cl periculo de poterese trans [ ectare ad salvamento in Puglia "302 Schmitt, Skanderbegs last
years 72. 303 Driavni arhlv u Dubrovniku Consilium rogatorum 3/19 f 266v 304 ibid 305 Radoni (nr. 380.
306 VV MakuSev, Monumenta historica slavorum meridionalium vicinorumque populorum de · prompta e
tabulariis e librarians italicis. 2 Vols. Warsaw 1874 - Belgrade 1882, Vol.2, 29-30; AAV 5798, 6517, 6940.
307 To the following Schmitt, The Venetian Albania 537ff. 308 MV 6108. 309 AAV 6295. 310 Schmitt,
Actes No. 16. 311 AAV 6637, 6639. 312 AAV 570 \. 313 MV 7213. 314 Schmitt, Skanderbegs last years
73. 315 Schmitt, ibid., 316 Schmitt. Ibid. 317 Schmitt, Actes No. 66. 318 Barletius204. 319 Senatore,
Dispacci sforzeschi Vol. I, No. 121. 320 Schmitt. Skanderbegs last years source part supplement text 2.
In September 1464, Italian condottia rode for inspection, preferred the flat land between Kruja and
Durazzo, guards were placed against Svetigrad and Valona 321 Musachi 296, 300th The best
representation is P. Petta, Despoti d'Epiro, Principi di Macedonia. Lecce 1999 322 Musachi 275. 323 MV
5383. 324 Radoni ': No. 54, 79, 84, 85. 325 Musachi 300. 326 Radoni': No. 54.
380
327 Radonic No. 79 328 1456 they fought in Dibra against the renegade Moses, Barclus 247f. 329
Musaehi 300: "Fe prigione il Signor Giovanni e il Signor Coiea Balsa fratelli li al mare al Re Ferrante
vecchio in Napoli, che te lesse prigioni, e li tolse il stato loro eh'era tra Croia et Alesio, dico il paese della
Misia" , 330 Musachi 300. 331 Schmitt, Actes No. 67, 68, 69. 332 Musachi 296. 333 Ibid. 334 Franco
8r. 336 Musachi 298. 336 Radonic No. 91, 92. 337 Radonic No. 96 After Barletius 232 there also fell a
Georg Thopia. The number of 3000 killed is quite impossible, considering that Muzaki Thopia could offer
between 3,000 and 8,000 workers to the Venetians; Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio visconteo -
sforzesco B. 342. Joachim Castiglione to Francesco Sforza, Venice 18 September
1455; Senatore, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 1, no. 121. 338 Senatore, Dispacci sforzeschl vol. 1, Ne. 121.
339 MV 7040. 340 F. Babmger, Arianiti Comneno, father-in-law of Skanderbegs. SA 1964/1, 138-147; F.
Babinger, The End of the Ananites (Bayerische Akademie der WISsenschaften, Phil-hist class
Sifzungsben'chte 1960/4). Munich, 1960; DS Shuteriqi, Les relations enrre Skanderbeg and Georges
Arnnite dans les annees 1449-1450, in: Deuxleme conference Vol. 1, 105-116; DS Shuteriqi, Arianiti, emri
dhe gjcnealogjia, in: Studying per epoken vol. 2. 37-83; DS Shuteriqi, eternity of Zoterimet, in: Studime
per epoken vol. 2, 84 --- 119; DS Shutcnqi. AranitJa ne vitin 1467. Sludime his / orice 198111, 133-
141; Petta, DesPOtl 137ff. 341 Radonie Nr. 54. 342 p. Cirkovic, Tradition interchanged: Albanians in the
serbian, Serbs in the albanian late medieval texts, in: Tbe Medieval Albanians 195-208. here 196f .; to the
language skills s. an essay in preparation by Claudia Märtl and Oliver Jens Schmitt. 343 Cited by Pall,
Rapporti 14 ~ Fn. 77. 344 AAV 6432. 345 Archivio segreto vaticano. Introitus et exitus vol. 438
f.76v. Friendly HinwelS by Claudia Märtl. 346 Cirkovie, Tradition IßLerchanged 196f. In 1459 he sent an
ambassador to Venice in 1459 asking for his annual allowance;
ArchlVio dl S13Lo di Venezia. Senato MaL Rcg. 6 f. 349 AAV 7042, 7043, 7449. 349 Musachi 287. 350
AAV 7467, 7469. 351 Babinger, late 27, Schmitt, yearbooks 156. 352 Schmitt, Actes No. 13. 353 Schmitt,
Actes No. 38. 354 Schmitt, Actes no 40. 355 Schmitt, Actes No. 37. 356 Schmitt, Actcs No. 40. 357
Schmitt, Actes No. 43. 358 Babinger, end; to Despina m Italy s. a review by Claudia Mänl and Oliver Jens
Schmltt. 359 Babinger, end of 19, fn. 2. 360 Outstanding is I. BOiie, 0 Dukadinima, in: Ders., Nemirno
pomorje 332-384; see. now also L. Malltezi, Dukagjinet the Skenderbeu, in: F. Duka (ed.), Skenderbeu
the Evropa, 83-102. 361 Musachi 292. 362 To the Skutarins Dukagjin s. Schmitt, The Venetian Albania
Index, sv 363 AAV 6695. 364 Musachi 300. 365 ibid. 366 Barletius 49. 367 Barlctius 49. 368 ibid. 91. 369
AAV 5375, 5339, 5399. 370 MV 5554. 371 AAV 5659, 5770. 5798. 372 Radical No. 58. 373 J. Gill, Pope
Callistus and Scanderbeg Lhe. Albanian. Orien / alia Chrisliana Periodica 33 (1967) 534-562. here
550f. 374 Radomc No. 138. 375 AAV7164. 376 Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio visconLeo - sforzesco
B 41. Rome August 8, 1454: "Scanderbecho hascripto corno ha facto pace con uno Signore de Albania
col quale havea grande guerra, il che sentendo il Turcho s'l ': ritratto tre giornate indnetto, 10 qual Tu
( Gap, probably: Turcho) era intrato gJiI in Albania, before havemo per bona novella ". 377 Radonic No.
84, 85. 378 MV 6379. 6388, 6390. 379 AAV 6508. 380 AAV 6388.6508; s. the chronicle of the Venetian
albums connoisseur Piere Venier in Magno yearbooks, Schmitt, Jahrbücher 148 [,; Radonic Nos. 127,
128: In Milan you would need Skanderbeg had been behind the plot; but there is no evidence of it being
Venetian
381
Swell. The picture of Skanderbeg with Venice refutes this suggestion also in an implausible way. 381
Radonic No. 174. 382 cbd. 383 Ibid. 384 AAV 6508. 385 MV 6475. 386 Schmitt, The Venetian Albania
272. 387 AAV 648l. 388 MV 6473. 389 AAV 6481,6484,6505,6520. 390 AAV 6677, the date of vasality
can not be determined. One may assume that Leka after the defeat against Drivastiner and Skutariner in
December 1456 barely left a different choice. 391 MV 6606, 6650; Schmitt, JahrbUcher 150. 392 MV
6695, 6569. 393 AAV 6572, 6583. 394 MV 6599, 6695. 395 AAV 6676, Radoni6 No. 174. 396 AAV 6717:
Palatium; Aimelle "'" Hajmel; Petra rubea; Scaramanum "'Shkaraman; S.
Martinus; Fontanella .; Chimechichl; jansi; Craglianum; Fisla "'"
Fishta; Chermixi; Caxonglini; Stephanbergum. 397 Ibid. Cotarri "' "Koterr; Claret; Cruti. 398 AAV 6717.
399 MV 6727, 6743. 400 Radonic No. 174. 401 AAV 6761. 402 AAV 6784. 403 MV 6792. 404 AAV 7164,
7172, 7633. 405 Both citations AAV 7633. 406 Noteworthy But if the objection is K. Bi ~ o kus, the "Kanun
of the Leka," much could be related to the living memory of Alexander the Great in the Albanian region,
for which Bityoku collects the case of evidence in: Ders. Aleksandri i Madh ne kujtes !! n the historic
Skenderbeut e te Shqiptareve. Studlme hislorike 2005 / 1-2,7-29. 407 Barletius 253f .; Pali, Barlezio
78; Stavrides 64f. 408 At Radonic 227. 409 Barletius 211. 410 Barletius 237. 41 \ Barletius 237. 412 Ibid.
413 Barletius 243. 414 Barietius 245-251. 415 The Ottoman, who took him prisoner, Jakub by name,
received as a reward a timely loan Cruti. 398 AAV6717. 399 MV 6727, 6743. 400 Radonic No. 174. 401
AAV 6761. 402 AAV 6784. 403 MV 6792. 404 AAV 7164, 7172, 7633. 405 Both citations AAV 7633. 406
Note, however, the objection K. Biocous The Leka "kanun" could be associated with the memory of
Alexander the Great in the Albanian region, for which Bityoku collects the case of evidence in: Ders.,
Aleksandri i Madh ne kujtes !! n historike te Skenderb e te Shqiptareve, Studlme hislorike, 2005 / 1-2, 7-
29, 407 Barletius, 253f, Pali, Barlezio, 78, Stavrides, 64f., 408 At Radonic, 227. 409 Barletius 211. 410
Barletius 237. 41 Barletius 237. 412 Ibid 413 Barletius 243. 414 Barietius 245-251.415 The Ottoman, who
took him captive, Jakub by name, received as his reward a timely loan Cruti. 398 AAV6717. 399 MV
6727, 6743. 400 Radonic No. 174. 401 AAV 6761. 402 AAV 6784. 403 MV 6792. 404 AAV 7164, 7172,
7633. 405 Both citations AAV 7633. 406 Note, however, the objection K. Biocous The Leka "kanun" could
be associated with the memory of Alexander the Great in the Albanian region, for which Bityoku collects
the case of evidence in: Ders., Aleksandri i Madh ne kujtes !! n historike te Skenderb e te Shqiptareve,
Studlme hislorike, 2005 / 1-2, 7-29, 407 Barletius, 253f, Pali, Barlezio, 78, Stavrides, 64f., 408 At Radonic,
227. 409 Barletius 211. 410 Barletius 237. 41 Barletius 237. 412 Ibid 413 Barletius 243. 414 Barietius
245-251.415 The Ottoman, who took him captive, Jakub by name, received as his reward a timely
loan Much could be related to the living memory of Alexander the Great in the Albanian region, for which
Bityoku gathers a record of evidence in: Ders., Aleksandri i Madh ne kujtes, histori te Skenderbeut e te
Shqiptareve. Studlme hislorike 2005 / 1-2,7-29. 407 Barletius 253f .; Pali, Barlezio 78; Stavrides 64f. 408
At Radonic 227. 409 Barletius 211. 410 Barletius 237. 41 \ Barletius 237. 412 Ibid. 413 Barletius 243. 414
Barietius 245-251. 415 The Ottoman, who took him prisoner, Jakub by name, received as a reward a
timely loan Much could be related to the living memory of Alexander the Great in the Albanian region, for
which Bityoku gathers a record of evidence in: Ders., Aleksandri i Madh ne kujtes, histori te Skenderbeut
e te Shqiptareve. Studlme hislorike 2005 / 1-2,7-29. 407 Barletius 253f .; Pali, Barlezio 78; Stavrides
64f. 408 At Radonic 227. 409 Barletius 211. 410 Barletius 237. 41 \ Barletius 237. 412 Ibid. 413 Barletius
243. 414 Barietius 245-251. 415 The Ottoman, who took him prisoner, Jakub by name, received as a
reward a timely loan 408 At Radonic 227. 409 Barletius 211. 410 Barletius 237. 41 \ Barletius 237. 412
Ibid. 413 Barletius 243. 414 Barietius 245-251. 415 The Ottoman, who took him prisoner, Jakub by name,
received as a reward a timely loan 408 At Radonic 227. 409 Barletius 211. 410 Barletius 237. 41 \
Barletius 237. 412 Ibid. 413 Barletius 243. 414 Barietius 245-251. 415 The Ottoman, who took him
prisoner, Jakub by name, received as a reward a timely loan
in Moses' old one. Hemchaft; the same applies to the Albanian Gjon and the Jusuf, who overcame
Muzaki d'Angeiino; G. Palikruseva - A. Stojanovski, Debarska oblast and sezdesetim godinama XV veka,
in: Sirnpoziumi by Skcnderbeun-Simpozijum 0 Skenderbcgu 9-12 maj 1969. Prishtinal Pristina 1969, 181-
194, here 190. 416 MusachI 300. 417 Barletius 215. 418 Musachi 300. 419 MV 2779. 420 Duka, Tokat
40. 421 Franco 34r. 422 Bi ~ oku, Dibra and ders, Shtrirja; the sources in H. Sabanovic, Krajiste Isa-bega
lshakoviea, 95f. Balaban's son, captain of Modric, died in the year of the Hegira 866 (21.2.1461-
2.3.1462). Assuming he had fallen in the fight and that this was the case of Sobri's defense, Skanderbeg's
scope of action could be extended to Derven. However, the source translated by Sabanovic does not
show where Ilyas, son of Balaban, died. 423 Sabanovic 95. 424 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years 77. 425
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years 89. 426 Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivo Visconteo - sforzesco Busta
353 Venice December 31, 1467. Gherardo de Collis to Bianea Maria and Galeazzo Maria Sforza: "In
Albania 10 rector deAlexio ha mandato apresentare alcune cosse a Balabanbeg, capltano dei Tureho, e
dice che I'a veduto voluntieri et coneesso che quelli de Alexio et da Dumzo possano anciare et traficare
ad Valma, quella nova cita e nel paese deI Turcho, et e conversso. " 427 Arehivio di Stato di
Milano. Archlvio Visconteo - sforzeseo Busta 353 Venice 22nd November 1466. Gherardo de Collis to
Galeazzo Maria Sforza. 428 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years 90. 429 Barletius 333. 430 BarletlUS
334; Franeo 36r also speaks of "simil! Dom li nmando indireto sumutuosi presenti di uilla, doue Ballaban
era nato, cioe sacchi di miglio & altri grani d! Piu pretJo". 431 Musachi 297, Franco 34r. 432 ibid.
"Animosamente", "virilmente". 433 Critobulos at Radomc 226. 434 J.Swire, King Zog's Albania. London
1937, 213; Frasheri, Skenderbeu 454 Fn.l. 435 In addition 436 Senatore, Dispacci sforzeschi Ne. 121 437
Radonic No. 142. Dispacci sforzeschi Ne. 121 437 Radonic No. 142. Dispacci sforzeschi Ne. 121 437
Radonic No. 142.
382
439 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years Source Part No. 22. 439 Ljubic Vol. 10, 363: Many rebels had
brought their property to safety after Venetian Albanians; In 1466 Skanclerbeg demanded the publication
of these G llter. 440 Franco 35v: "Onde con malta pecunia corroup la guardia che staua fuori dell'esercito
cll scanderbeg nellaquale erano alcuni Albanesi suoi consanguinei, neliquali Scanderbeg assai si fidaua,
non sapendo before fussero di quel pessimo sangue". Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years 92. 442 Pulaha,
Lufta 326: ff .; vOrz [Possible Analysis by Palikruseva - Stojanovski 189ff. 443 Pulaha, Lufta 326. 444
Ibid. 362. 44S Duka, Tokat 39. 446 Schmitt, Venetian Albania 644. The same Vlk (Vuk) appeared in 1475
as envoy of the Sancakbey Sinan of Herzegovina in Ragusa; Bojovu :, Raguse 39. 447 Stojanovskt, Raja
30ff. 448 Sokoloski, Turski dokumenti 301. 449 Ibid. 313. 450 Ibid. 451 Ibid.314. 452 Ibid. 317-318. 453
ibid. 323ff. 454 ibid. 365ff .; Stojanovski, Raja 83. 455 Sokoloski, Turski dokumenti 387. 456 Sokoloskl,
Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-328. 459 ibid. 304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462
Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid. 340. 466 Ibid. 338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This confirms the
statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had been in Dibra for the most part; The
biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469 PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast
190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011
(1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius 186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473
Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. Turski dokumenti 301. 449 Ibid. 313. 450 Ibid. 451 Ibid.314. 452 Ibid. 317-
318. 453 ibid. 323ff. 454 ibid. 365ff .; Stojanovski, Raja 83. 455 Sokoloski, Turski dokumenti 387. 456
Sokoloskl, Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-328. 459 ibid. 304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid.
307. 462 Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid. 340. 466 Ibid. 338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This
confirms the statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had been in Dibra for the most
part; The biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469 PalikruSeva -
Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog
faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius 186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at
Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. Turski dokumenti 301. 449 Ibid. 313. 450 Ibid. 451
Ibid.314. 452 Ibid. 317-318. 453 ibid. 323ff. 454 ibid. 365ff .; Stojanovski, Raja 83. 455 Sokoloski, Turski
dokumenti 387. 456 Sokoloskl, Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-328. 459 ibid.
304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462 Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid. 340. 466 Ibid.
338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This confirms the statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had
been in Dibra for the most part; The biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469
PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac
Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius
186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. 449
Ibid. 313. 450 Ibid. 451 Ibid.314. 452 Ibid. 317-318. 453 ibid. 323ff. 454 ibid. 365ff .; Stojanovski, Raja 83.
455 Sokoloski, Turski dokumenti 387. 456 Sokoloskl, Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-
328. 459 ibid. 304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462 Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid.
340. 466 Ibid. 338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This confirms the statement of the Barlctius, according to which
Skanderbeg had been in Dibra for the most part; The biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius
204). 469 PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac
Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius
186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. 449
Ibid. 313. 450 Ibid. 451 Ibid.314. 452 Ibid. 317-318. 453 ibid. 323ff. 454 ibid. 365ff .; Stojanovski, Raja 83.
455 Sokoloski, Turski dokumenti 387. 456 Sokoloskl, Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-
328. 459 ibid. 304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462 Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid.
340. 466 Ibid. 338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This confirms the statement of the Barlctius, according to which
Skanderbeg had been in Dibra for the most part; The biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius
204). 469 PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac
Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius
186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic
223. 323ff. 454 ibid. 365ff .; Stojanovski, Raja 83. 455 Sokoloski, Turski dokumenti 387. 456 Sokoloskl,
Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-328. 459 ibid. 304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462
Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid. 340. 466 Ibid. 338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This confirms the
statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had been in Dibra for the most part; The
biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469 PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast
190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011
(1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius 186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473
Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. 323ff. 454 ibid. 365ff .; Stojanovski, Raja 83. 455 Sokoloski, Turski
dokumenti 387. 456 Sokoloskl, Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-328. 459 ibid.
304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462 Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid. 340. 466 Ibid.
338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This confirms the statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had
been in Dibra for the most part; The biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469
PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac
Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius
186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. Turski
dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-328. 459 ibid. 304f. 460 Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462 Ibid.
289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid. 340. 466 Ibid. 338. 467 Ibid. 330ff. 468 This confirms the
statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had been in Dibra for the most part; The
biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469 PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast
190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011
(1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius 186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473
Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. Turski dokumenti 382. 457 ibid. 372f. 458, ibid. 323-328. 459 ibid. 304f. 460
Ibid. 306. 461 Ibid. 307. 462 Ibid. 289ff. 463 Ibid. 294. 464 Ibid. 303. 465 Ibid. 340. 466 Ibid. 338. 467 Ibid.
330ff. 468 This confirms the statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had been in Dibra
for the most part; The biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469 PalikruSeva -
Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog
faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius 186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at
Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic 223. 468 This confirms the statement of the Barlctius,
according to which Skanderbeg had been in Dibra for the most part; The biographer freely refers to the
Oberland (Barletius 204). 469 PalikruSeva - Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M.
Spremic, Harac Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471
Barletius 186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic
223. 468 This confirms the statement of the Barlctius, according to which Skanderbeg had been in Dibra
for the most part; The biographer freely refers to the Oberland (Barletius 204). 469 PalikruSeva -
Slojanovsky. Debarska oblast 190. 470 In addition M. Spremic, Harac Skenderbega. Zbomik filozofskog
faculteta u Beogradu 1011 (1968) 251- 258. 471 Barletius 186; Spremic, Harae 253. 472 Critobulos at
Radonic has 223 hm. 473 Critobulos bel Raclonic 223.
474 Barletius 201. 475 Spremic, Harne 256. Archivio cli Stato di Mantova. Archivio Gonuga B. 1622 May
and 30.7.1464: "Havendo (scit: the Sultan, 0. S.) mandate altre gente in Alball1a contro Scanderbego,
I'haveva stretto a mandarli el tributo per il che se tiene sia d 'acordo ·'. 476 Spremic, Harae 256. 477
Kntobulos bel Radonic 223 (freely translated). 478 Acta Albaniae VatJcana No. 412. Pius Commentarii,
2382: The stagnation had come to fruition after the report of Pope Pius II, as Skanderbeg had been
defeated by the Ottoman invasion of Skopje; It is uncertain whether this was a statement by the Albanian
court against the pontiff. Pope Pius II was unfortunate, but showed some understanding of Skanderbeg's
behavior, as the Ottoman pressure had become too strong. 479 Stortl, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 4, 130.
480 This is already observed by Franco 25v-26r. 481 Franco 25v-26r. 482 Schmitt, Jahrbücher 154. 483
Barletius 310-311; This alleged letter is dated May 1461. 484 Most recently DucelJier, Les echelles de
l'Adriatique meridionale. 485 Barletius 312 (probably a fictitious letter from June 1461). 436 Barletius 311-
313; In any case, the correspondence lacks any meanness. 487 Barletius 313. 488 AAV 7469. 489
Barletius 322f. 490 D. Malipiero, Annali Veneti da! Anno 1457 al 1500. Archivio ston "co iroliano 7 (1843)
36:" E quando esso scanderbec voglia interponerse, promette de recognoscerio ".491 Ibid.36-37. 492
Bibliotheque nationale de France, Mans., Italians, 1590 f., 52 ff., 493 Ljubic, Listine, Vol., 10, 359. 494
Segonus at Pertusi, 108. 495 p. Italian Journey "496 Franco 30r; 35r-v:" Vedendo Ballaban non poter
pacificarsr occultamente with Scanderbeg accio sotto mane potesse farglr qualche assassinamen-l to
all'lmproulso & meno sperando mai poter uincerlo palesamente si ingegno ricercar modo & the diable
eseguire Ia sua intentione per superare l'esercito cli Scanderbeg. Scanderbeg nellaquale erano alcuno
Albanesi SUOl consanguinel, neliquali Scanderbeg assai si fidaua, non uia di poter eseguire Ia sua
intentions per superare l'esercito cli Scanderbeg. Scanderbeg nellaquale erano alcuno Albanesi SUOl
consanguinel, neliquali Scanderbeg assai si fidaua, non uia di poter eseguire Ia sua intentions per
superare l'esercito cli Scanderbeg. Scanderbeg nellaquale erano alcuno Albanesi SUOl consanguinel,
neliquali Scanderbeg assai si fidaua, non
383
Najstariji vakufski dokumenti u Jllgoslaviji na arapskom jeziku. Pristina 1972, 65f. 514 Pertusi, Segono 94.
515 Kalesi, Vakufski dokumenti 89ff. 516 Inalclk, Social and economic history 25. 517 Bojovic,
Raguse27. 518 Sabanovie 69ff. 519 ibid. 66-68. 520 ibid. 87. 521 ebd.85ff.
ibid., 91. ibid., 95. ibid., 97. ibid. 103. Probably that Jakub the Albanian, of whom Franco speaks, 36v: "Il
capimno lagup amauth ualentissimo, che uol you lagup albanese". 526 Ibid. 104. 527 Bi ~ oku, Dibra in
the., Per Skenderbeun 125. Some examples (from Sabanovic 70ff.): The village Hvaliste (today: Faliste),
southeast of Tetovo, received in 1463, 1464, 1466 and 1469 one new master. Gorni Tur ~ ni (prey: Veliko
Tureane, southeast of GostlVar) was assigned to the Kaslm Dukagjin in 1463, and in 1466 to a
vJachischstiimmigen JaDitscharen, which was relocated in 1468. 528 Detailed presentation with detailed
map at Stojanovski, Dervendiistvoto VQ Makedonija. 529 Stojanovskl, Dervendzistvoto 170 (Volkovija),
173 (Galicnik was uninhabited in 1466/67), 174 (Garje, also uninhabited), 204 (Jablanica). 208 Janborja
(Kodiadzlk), 210 (Kicinca), 244f. (Modric). 530 N. Jorga, Nots et extraits POUf servir al'hlstoire des
croisades au XV siede. 5 Vols. Pans - Bucharest 1899-1915, here vol. 1 2e sene 284f. 531 Mlkpa ~ ade
at Elezovic (m Radonic) 243; SadeddlD speaks of an engagement already in 1438, ibid. 272. 532
Chalcocondyles at Radonic 221. 533 Pal ~ Rapport! No. 2; Chalkocondyles bel Radonic 222. 534
Barclass 175 calls him "Sebalias Ieurensius". 535 BarletlUS 175. 536 Barletius 233. 537 Barletius 236.
538 BarletJUS 240. 539 H. InaIcIk, Arnawutluk, in: Encyctopedie de l'lslam. Nouvelle edition Bd. 1 Leiden
- Pans 1960,670-678, here 676 540 AAV 6602 541 MV 6603; to EvrenosogluAli s. Pan, Rapporti 156 fn.
146. 542 AAV 6602. 543 Barletius 256. 544 ibid. 545 Stavrides 63 546 Barletius 270, 273; Stavrides 62 In
1478 he returned to Alhamen during the siege of Skutari; Babinger, Mehmed 398 [547 pp. The detailed
Biogrnfie of Stavrides 104ft '. 548 In detail, Stavrides, 164ff. 549 Bibliotheque nationale de
France. manuscrits
384
Italy 1590f. 523r and 525v "Inlendemo perho ch'cl dicto Bassa vedendo che non gli succede el suo
intento via via de Ragusl, ha comenzeto de tenter questo facto via la schenderbegh, sapiamo corno habia
ad seguir questo fueto". 550 Schmitt, The Venetian Albania 644ff. 551 Stavndes 220ff. 552 Spremic,
Despot Burad Brankovic 495, 508; Archivio ci Stato di Milano. Archivio viseonteo-sforzesco B. 647.
Report from Ragusa of 20.8.1454, 553 Schmitt, The Venetian Albania 644ff. Barronius 307. A Sinan sat in
1467 as captain of the castle in Skanderbeg's old fortress Modric, Sokoloski, Turski dokumenti 380. 555
Barletius 309. At Karaea bey and his services in the army of Murad II. S. Oru ~ (by Guboglu-Mehmet
57f.). A Beylerbey of Anatohen named Kamea fell in 1444 at the Battle of Vama (Imber, Crusade 96); this
can hardly be meant. A Karadia is mentioned bel Sabanovic 26 as Timarherr in the villages Doljani and
Bulgari at Mrtrovica in the Amselfeld; He was followed in 1463 in Doljani his son Bekluci; he also had a
loan in Krnvic bel Raska (ibid. 30). where his son Timur succeeded him in 1463. Maybe Barletius names
the famous Beylerbey and another commander of the same name here. 556 Barletius 306. 557 Archivio
di Stato di MllanO.Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 351. Gh. De Collis to Francesco Sforza. Venice 25.
11.1465: "... e cus] Scanderbeg ali xxviii deI passato ha dato alcuna rotta ad uno capitassIo del Turcho e
na tagliato a peze molt!"; Barletius 348. 558 Pulaha, Lufta 364. 559 Pulaha, Lufta 364. 560 Ibid. 372. 561
Ibid.370. 562 Sokoloski 300 (the freedman Behidar in the Drintal). Karagöz in Sine 339.
572 Schmitl Yearbooks 141, 144; RadollJc No. 250; AAV 7475; Pali, Rapporti No. 2. 573
Schmitt. Skanderbegs last years source part Nr.l0. 574 Pall, Rapporti No. 2. 575 Pius 11, Commentarii
1160. 576 Radonic No. 222. 577 Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 4, 236. 578 MarlekaJ. 236. 579 Radonic
No. 58. See G. Skrivanic, Oruzje LI srednjovekovnoj Srbiji, Bosni i Dubrovniku (SAN Posebno izdanja
Knjiga 292. Ode / jenje drustvenih nouka Knjiga 24). Belgrade J957; R. Drishti, L'utilisation des armes a
feu par les troupes de Skanderbeg, in: Deuxieme conference2,217-220. 580 Radonic No. 14. 581 DIiavni
arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/19. f 42v. May 11, 1466: "Prima pars est de adlUvando
Illustrem dominum Schenderbegh cum pulvere de bombarda de salnilrio el sulphore pro xxxiii contra
iiii. Prima pars est de dando sibi tantum salnitrii et sulphieris. per faciendo unum rnilliare pulveris pro xx
contra xvi "582 Radonic No. 47. 583 Ljubic, Listine Vol 10, 359 584 AAV 4921 (1444 the Bosnian King
wants to recruit 200 cross-bred men in Dalmatia) 5467; Ljubic, List / ne Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years
No. 17. 585 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku Consilium rogatorum 3114 f 87v 586 Barletius 159-160 A Thomas
Thcutonicus served the Venetian units in Albania, AAV6991 587 Masci 167 588 Barletius 160. 589
Driavm arhiv u Dubrovniku Consiji rogatorum 3 /] 9 f 3r: 15.2.1466: "Prima pars est de concedendo unum
bombarderium dommo Sehenderbech expensis suis. (deleted) secunda pars est de excusando no. per
xxilii contra x. "590 M. Zeqo, Codex Sca. nderbeg (she) - Libri i Skenderbeul Tuana 2005; In this book it is
largely about the imprint of photographs of the manuscript; the introduction has hardly scientific
character; Robert Elsie, The Bellifortis Text and Early Albanlan. Journal / Balkanology 22 (1986) 158162,
suggested that some hard-to-interpret words were Old Albanian terms. 591 Radonic no. 16.62. 592
Archivio di St, llo di Milano. Archivio visconteo -sforzesco. B. 46. 28.10.1457. llo di Milano. Archivio
visconteo -sforzesco. B. 46. 28.10.1457. llo di Milano. Archivio visconteo -sforzesco. B. 46. 28.10.1457.
385
593 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa Notariae 26/45 f.96v. 594 Storti, Dispaccl Sforzeschl Vol. 4, no.
130. 595 DIiavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Diversa Notariae 26/44 f.137v. 596 Pall, Rapporti No. 25 597 Storti,
Dlspacci Sforzeschl Vol. 4, No. 162 598 Radonic No. 229. 599 AAV 7449. 600 AAV 7634. 601 DriavDl
arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/18 f7v of 29. 12. 1463. 602 Driavni arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/18 f. 133v from 24.3.1465. 603 Driavni arhlv u Dubrovniku. Diverna
notariae 26/49 142v-143r: 26.9.1466: "Chenese Stepan Radoevich orator ut dixit illustris domini
Scanderbegi conduxit et naulizavit duas barchas de Budua Impresentiarum eXistentes in ponu Ragusii
quarum Usslus est patronus Vuchaz Glavlch de Budua et alterius est patronus Vuchaz Bubich. 604
Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku, Diversa Cancellariae 25/65 f. Blasius Ostojic. 60S Truhelka 21. 606 Radonic
No. 254. 607 Schmitt, Actes No. 10. 608 Barletius 251, 276 "spectatorum genus"; vgL Schmitt, The
Venetian Albania 493f. 609 Archivio di Stato d! Milano. Archivio visconleo - sforzesco B. 41 Report of the
diplomats Sceva de Curte and Jacobo Trivulzio to Duke Francesco Sforza. Rome 10. I. 1454. "Dice cose
mirabilissime dela potentia del Turcho et delo apparato fa per questo bon tempo." Fra I'altre cose dice
ch'el Tureho non era uxato poter fare galee large, perche non havea li lcgni, mo dice ha facto tagliare
tanti legni a Constantmopoli e facti conducere ad Andronopoli et ogni di ne fa conducere et ha tanti mestri
in the quali etiam of sonno molti Christiam che fa 10 mundo de galee E giil dlce esserve facte aunt e
conducere a Constantinopoli che parano U.N' Consilium rogatorum 3117 f 33r. 612 He informed the
Republic of Venice of events in the Balkans; Even from Wallachia he wrote about exact news, eg B.
ArchivlO di Stato dl Milano. Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 647. Letter from St. Maura (Leukas) of 29
September 1459. from Consilium rogatorum 3117 f 33r. 612 He informed the Republic of Venice of events
in the Balkans; Even from Wallachia he wrote about exact news, eg B. ArchivlO di Stato dl
Milano. Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 647. Letter from St. Maura (Leukas) of 29 September 1459. from
May 26, 1462, January 10, 1475, and July 31, 1475. Leonardo's reign was actually "in the mouth of this
dreadful little dachshund" (as in the first letter), and only by skillful tactics did he survive, until finally the
Venetian defeat Mehmed H. (1479) also sealed his end. 613 Malipiero 36; Schmitt, Actes Ne. 9. 614
Franco 18r-19r. 615 Clear in Chalcocondyles at Radonie 223f; Kritobulos ed. Reinsch 136f. The Milanese
envoys are year after year full of rumors of Mehmed's 11th possible targets, rumors that occurred mostly
in January or February; s. OJ Schmitt, The "Tragic Downfall" Negroponte in the Mirror of Italian
Diplomatic Reports of the Renaissance, in: K. Belke - E. Kislinger - A. Ktllzer - MA StasslDopoulou
(ed.). Byzantina Mediterranea. Festschnft for Johannes Koder's 65th birthday. Vienna - Cologne - Welmar
2007,569-580. 618 Barletius 164. 619 Barletius 165. 620 Critobulos at Radonic 223. 621 Senatore,
Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 1, llO. 622 Schmitt, Skanderbegs lctzte years Source Part Supplement Text 2.
623 Barletius 161. 624 Barletius 162. 625 Critobulos at Radonic 225. 626 Ibid. 627 Barletius 264. 628
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years Addendum to supplement text 2. 629 On Reminiscences of Skanderbeg
in Lura s. Marlekaj 230. 630 Critobulos ed. Reinsch 136f .; Radonic No. 145 to release the Pass in 1457.
631 Critobulos at Radonic 223. 632 Critobulos at Radonic 223, and 224 (freely translated). 633 Critobulos
at Radonic 223f 634 Schmitt, Skanderbegs last years Source Appendix Ergllllung Text 1. 635 BarletlUS
277. 636 Barletius 310. 637 Barletius 203. When the coldness of the mountains in the mountains was
greatly increased, the retreat of a cattaro from Cattaro, which was supposed to protect the pelts in the
highlands of the Black Mountains, showed; AAV 6910. 638 Barletius 264. 639 Barletius 265
386
640 Sehmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years Source Part Supplement Text 1. 641 Barlelius 159. 642 Barlctius
159. 643 Critobulos bel Radonic 223. 644 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 21. 645 Geleich -
ThaU6czy 789. 646 Radical No. 134; AAV 7570. 647 AAV 6906, 6907: 1460 were delivered 600 staria
(39 tons) '648 Sehmitt, Skanderbegs last years No. 21, 23, 30 649 AAV 5500. 650 Arcbivio di Stato di
Milano. Archivio visconteo - sforzesco R 640. "Copia deI conseio overo parer del signor Caraman cireha
1e provixion blxogna v01endo eazar Turehi della Grezia & anebe seguro I'in Axia mandato aUa Sanctita
dei Summit Pontifice & alla Maiesta dei Illustrissimo Re de Ragona. (0. Deliberandose pur 1ui personaliter
con tuti suo exemti andar in Albania & trovarse insieme intro el paese de Albania., nui intendemo
marriage andando lui pen; onaliter con tuto el suo exerzito che allora el Signor Scandarbech con 10 suo
exerzlto ehristiano se redueha! TI loeho abele segondo sun in source parti de I 'Albania a valley modo
before non li parendo non piglia bataglia con el dicto Tureho & parendoli avantazo prenda partito. "651
cited by Pali, Rapporti 131. 652 Schmitt, Skanderbcgs last years Source Part Supplement Text 1. 653
PalI, Rapporti No. 62. 654 Bibliotheque nationale de Franee., Manuscrits of Italy 1590 f.523. , al paese ba
facto grande danno, et ad se puocho utile ". 655 Arcbivio di Stato di Milano.Archivio viseonteo - sforzesco
B. 41 Bencht of Giovanni Pietro Missalia to Duke Franceseo Sforza Naples 23 May 1455: " La Maesti dei
Re questa Pascha mandoe Palermo al Shanderbech in Albania a provender quel payxe et perend come
fosse apto a sufficiente a sostentatione de gentedarme, mo etomato et harni caricato before the quest ne
scrivesse ad Vostra Signoria recommendandose a quella ct significandola marriage la prelibata Maesta
ha deliberato remandarlo al prefato Scanderbech cum fanti mille ducento et il Signor Texeo Savello
et. Sancto Garillo cum cavallo cinquecento ", 656 Radonic No. 112 -115, 657 Senatore, Dispacci
sforzeschi Vol. 1 No. 186. 658 Radonlc No. 112, Milher 84, J. Paviot, Les Ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade
et l ' Orient (fin XIVe siede-XVe siede) Paris 2003, 127, 145, 164, mo e ntomato et harni caricato ere di
questo ne scrivesse ad Vostra Signoria recommendableo quella ct significandola before la prelibata
Maesta ha deliberato remandarlo al prefato Scanderbech cum fanti mille ducento et il Signor Texeo
Savello et. Sancto Garillo cum cavallo cinquecento ", 656 Radonic No. 112 -115, 657 Senatore, Dispacci
sforzeschi Vol. 1 No. 186. 658 Radonlc No. 112, Milher 84, J. Paviot, Les Ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade
et l ' Orient (fin XIVe siede-XVe siede) Paris 2003, 127, 145, 164, mo e ntomato et harni caricato ere di
questo ne scrivesse ad Vostra Signoria recommendableo quella ct significandola before la prelibata
Maesta ha deliberato remandarlo al prefato Scanderbech cum fanti mille ducento et il Signor Texeo
Savello et. Sancto Garillo cum cavallo cinquecento ", 656 Radonic No. 112 -115, 657 Senatore, Dispacci
sforzeschi Vol. 1 No. 186. 658 Radonlc No. 112, Milher 84, J. Paviot, Les Ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade
et l ' Orient (fin XIVe siede-XVe siede) Paris 2003, 127, 145, 164, la croisade et l 'Orient (fin XIVe siede-
XVe siede). Paris 2003, 127, 145, 164, la croisade et l 'Orient (fin XIVe siede-XVe siede). Paris 2003,
127, 145, 164,
183,275,285.
659 PalI, Rapporti 160 fn. 155 "maximus conftuxus crucesignorum". 660 AAV 7449; Ljubic, Listine vol. 10,
372. 661 Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 4, 162: "vole fare la guerra al modo suo, eioe amazare chi gli
venne all mane et non fare presoni". 662 Senatore, Dispacci sforzeschi I 322. 663 Military
Geography. Macedonishe basin belongs to the Albanian Kilstengcbicte. Vienna 1886.122. 664 AAV 5062.
665 Radonic no. 16. 666 AAV 6432; Ljubic, Listine 10,71. 667 AAV 5467. 668 Acta Albaniae Vatic.ana
494. 669 Commentani 2382, 2384: "pro religione pugnans". 670 Radomc No. 204. 671 Radonic No. 205.
672 AAV 7633, 7634. In 1466, on the island of Korcula and Hvar, too, V1adislav of Herzegovina received
a refuge; LJubic vol. 10.347. 673 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/18 f. 149v. A family
" Scanderbego "is mentioned in the first half of the 16th century on Hvar, but as it has no socially
prominent position, it is unclear whether they were descendants of the Kastnota, see Driavni arhiv u
Zadru, Arhiv Hvara I, f Archivio Visconteo - sforzesco B. 59: Rome June 6, 1466. Augustino de Rubeis to
Bianea Maria and Galeazzo Maria Sfona. "Ma con la persona sua et con la farniglia s". era reducto ad
uno suo porto de mare molto forte chiarnalo Rondon per stare a vedere Ii progressi dei Turcho et che
soccorso potesse havere da le potentialie Christiane, et anche pur quando vedesse el peneulo de
potere., transfeetare ad salvamento in Puglia ". 675 Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio Visconteo -
sforzesco. B. 59: Trani June 6, 1466. The harbor cape of Apulia to King Ferra te of Naples; ibid. Naples
June 7, 1466: King Ferrante to his envoy Protonotar Guglielmo Rocca in Rome: "Et che dicto
Scanderbegh ha abandonato el suo paese et se e riducto a Seutri"; R 62: Rome May 8, 1467. Augustino
de Rubeis to Galeazzo Maria Sfofza 676 I. Zamputi, documentary shekull! T XV per hlstorine e
Shqiperise. Vol. 4. Part 1. Tirana 1967, No.114. 677 Schmitt, Actes No. 66. 678 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's
Final Years 79. 679 Barletius 276 describes a partition of Skanderbeg near Ochrid. Documenta shekull! T
XV per hlstorine e Shqiperise. Vol. 4. Part 1. Tirana 1967, No.114. 677 Schmitt, Actes No. 66. 678
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Final Years 79. 679 Barletius 276 describes a partition of Skanderbeg near
Ochrid. Documenta shekull! T XV per hlstorine e Shqiperise. Vol. 4. Part 1. Tirana 1967, No.114. 677
Schmitt, Actes No. 66. 678 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Final Years 79. 679 Barletius 276 describes a partition
of Skanderbeg near Ochrid.
387
680 Barletius 277 "dueto eautissime per saltus quosdam & incommoda loea"; 276 "latent per sectas
valles & monium secessus movens agmen ignarum hostem a longe est secutus" 68. Critobulus at
Radonic 223. 682 Pertusi, Segono 130. 683 This is a continuum of Albanian history, still practiced at the
end of the nineteenth century lightly armed tribal Ottoman troops, who were struck out with heavy artillery
and machine guns, fierce and effective resistance, see E. Deusch, The Revolt in the Malesia e
Mbishkodres of 1883, and the relationship of the Albanian Catholics to Austria-Hungary. 64 (2004/05)
261-301 684 Critobulos at Radonic 224. 685 Critobulos at RadODlc 225. 686 Impressive description of an
Ottoman cluonist at Guboglu - Mehmet 322. 687 The Structures in the Romanian FÜI'Stentllmem s. C.
Giurescu, Tara romäneasca in secolele XIV-XV. Bucharest 1973, especially 332ff. for warfare; N. Grigo ~,
Tara romäneascä a Moldovel de la intemelerea statului pinn la ~ tefan cel Mare. Chi ~ jnuu 1992; F.
Solomon, Politica. <; I confesiune la inceput de ev mediu moldovenesc. in 2004; for the political history of
the defensive O. Cristea, Acest domn de la miazänoapte. Stefan cel mare In documente inedite venet-
iene. Bucharest 2004; Babinger, Mehmed 215ff., 368ff. 688 In addition, H. Binder Iijima - V. Dumbrava
(ed.), Stefan the Great - Fllrst the Moldau. Symbolic function and change of meaning of a medieval
ruler. Leipzig 2005; M. Cazacu. Dracula. Pans 2004. Tara romäneascä in secolele XIV-XV. Bucharest
1973, especially 332ff. for warfare; N. Grigo ~, Tara romäneascä a Moldovel de la intemelerea statului
pinn la ~ tefan cel Mare. Chi ~ jnuu 1992; F. Solomon, Politica. <; I confesiune la inceput de ev mediu
moldovenesc. in 2004; for the political history of the defensive O. Cristea, Acest domn de la
miazänoapte. Stefan cel mare In documente inedite venet-iene. Bucharest 2004; Babinger, Mehmed
215ff., 368ff. 688 In addition, H. Binder Iijima - V. Dumbrava (ed.), Stefan the Great - Fllrst the
Moldau. Symbolic function and change of meaning of a medieval ruler. Leipzig 2005; M.
Cazacu. Dracula. Pans 2004. Tara romäneascä in secolele XIV-XV. Bucharest 1973, especially 332ff. for
warfare; N. Grigo ~, Tara romäneascä a Moldovel de la intemelerea statului pinn la ~ tefan cel Mare. Chi
~ jnuu 1992; F. Solomon, Politica. <; I confesiune la inceput de ev mediu moldovenesc. in 2004; for the
political history of the defensive O. Cristea, Acest domn de la miazänoapte. Stefan cel mare In
documente inedite venet-iene. Bucharest 2004; Babinger, Mehmed 215ff., 368ff. 688 In addition, H.
Binder Iijima - V. Dumbrava (ed.), Stefan the Great - Fllrst the Moldau. Symbolic function and change of
meaning of a medieval ruler. Leipzig 2005; M. Cazacu. Dracula. Pans 2004. i confesiune la inceput de ev
mediu moldovenesc. in 2004; for the political history of the defensive O. Cristea, Acest domn de la
miazänoapte. Stefan cel mare In documente inedite venet-iene. Bucharest 2004; Babinger, Mehmed
215ff., 368ff. 688 In addition, H. Binder Iijima - V. Dumbrava (ed.), Stefan the Great - Fllrst the
Moldau. Symbolic function and change of meaning of a medieval ruler. Leipzig 2005; M.
Cazacu. Dracula. Pans 2004. i confesiune la inceput de ev mediu moldovenesc. in 2004; for the political
history of the defensive O. Cristea, Acest domn de la miazänoapte. Stefan cel mare In documente inedite
venet-iene. Bucharest 2004; Babinger, Mehmed 215ff., 368ff. 688 In addition, H. Binder Iijima - V.
Dumbrava (ed.), Stefan the Great - Fllrst the Moldau. Symbolic function and change of meaning of a
medieval ruler. Leipzig 2005; M. Cazacu. Dracula. Pans 2004. M. Cazacu. Dracula. Pans 2004. M.
Cazacu. Dracula. Pans 2004.
9 10 11 12 13
14 15
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
234
5678
PaU, Rapporti No. 4. Also to be found in the chapter "Italian Travel". Radonik No. 49, Paviot 127.
Sokoloski 380: 1467 all residents of Modric wore Slavic names, often with Serbian suffixes: Pop Nikola,
Dimitri pe.seOlc, Tlho Dejanic, Nikola MiSie, Dragee son of Dragoslav, Petko Tupancevlc (or Topancevic)
, Cvetko PortarOVH;:. Barletius 201, 276; Stojanovski-Gorglev 142. Babinger, Mehmed 74f. BarletlUs
202. Barletius 202.
37
38
388
Barletius 203f. Gill, Calixtus 550f. MV 5870, 5871. MV 5894, 590L AAV 5894. In Jabre 1452
ScbeintAlfons V. paid little attention to his new vassal. On 18.2.1452 he wanted his and his
neighbors. Kömg Stefan von BOSOlen and Stefan VukCic of Herzegovina, the sending of miners; Tha!
16czy, Studies 388. Radonic No. 63. Archlvio de la Corona de Arag6n. Reg. 2798 f 56-57. Kind note from
Daniel Duran i Duelt. Barletius 205ff. Barletius 208ff Drfuvni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Lettere di Levante 27/15
f. 13. Radolllc .62--66. Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/13 f. 240r. Driavni arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/13 f. 168v, 207r, 234v, 240r. Cirkovic. Stefan VukCic 195. AAV 6018,
6019. AAV 6064, 6056. AAV 6067. Cited in Marinescu, Politique 182 fn.3. Radonie No. 74. AAV 6123.
AAV 6178. AAV6108.6182. Radonic No. 79. Radonic No. 79. AAV 6323. AAV 6293. Radonic No. 93. The
history of the city is well worked up; in addition to the review by Nicol, Despotate s. the recent
investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit 193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of the author)
and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the early Ottoman
period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175
households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk,
Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo,
Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. AAV 6178.
AAV6108.6182. Radonic No. 79. Radonic No. 79. AAV 6323. AAV 6293. Radonic No. 93. The history of
the city is well worked up; in addition to the review by Nicol, Despotate s. the recent investigations of P.
Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit 193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati
n !! koh !! n osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk,
Sureti-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius
312. 1431 paid the region around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .:
Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; =
ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. AAV 6178. AAV6108.6182. Radonic
No. 79. Radonic No. 79. AAV 6323. AAV 6293. Radonic No. 93. The history of the city is well worked
up; in addition to the review by Nicol, Despotate s. the recent investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit
193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n
osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i
Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid
the region around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya,
Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;:
- the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. 6182. Radonic No. 79. Radonic No. 79. AAV
6323. AAV 6293. Radonic No. 93. The history of the city is well worked up; in addition to the review by
Nicol, Despotate s. the recent investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit 193ff. (based on the
unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n osmane. Tirana 2001 as the
actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara
1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region around Berat
numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre
Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking
Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. 6182. Radonic No. 79. Radonic No. 79. AAV 6323. AAV 6293.
Radonic No. 93. The history of the city is well worked up; in addition to the review by Nicol, Despotate
s. the recent investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit 193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis
of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the
early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat
counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region around Berat numerous Christian
Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo,
Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic
names. AAV 6323. AAV 6293. Radonic No. 93. The history of the city is well worked up; in addition to the
review by Nicol, Despotate s. the recent investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit 193ff. (based on the
unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n osmane. Tirana 2001 as the
actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara
1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region around Berat
numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre
Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking
Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. AAV 6323. AAV 6293. Radonic No. 93. The history of the city is well
worked up; in addition to the review by Nicol, Despotate s. the recent investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat
eArberit 193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n
osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i
Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid
the region around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya,
Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;:
- the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. The history of the city is well worked up; in
addition to the review by Nicol, Despotate s. the recent investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit
193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n
osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i
Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid
the region around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya,
Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;:
- the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. The history of the city is well worked up; in
addition to the review by Nicol, Despotate s. the recent investigations of P. Xhufi, Dilemat eArberit
193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n
osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i
Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid
the region around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya,
Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;:
- the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. Dilemat eArberit 193ff. (based on the
unpublished doctoral thesis of the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n osmane. Tirana 2001 as the
actual city monograph of the early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara
1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region around Berat
numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre
Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking
Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. Dilemat eArberit 193ff. (based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of
the author) and F. Duka, Berati n !! koh !! n osmane. Tirana 2001 as the actual city monograph of the
early Ottoman period. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat
counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region around Berat numerous Christian
Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo,
Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic
names. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175 households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region
around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk, Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak,
Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo, Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is
striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names. An · kara 1954, 56; In 1431 Berat counted 175
households. Barletius 312. 1431 paid the region around Berat numerous Christian Timarioten, s. Inalclk,
Sureti-i Defter-i 57ff .: Ostoya, Angelos, Muz · ak, Gin, Andre Bobza, Petro, Pavlo, Pavel Matranik, liiyo,
Dimo lstepan, Hrai; = ko, Milo,;: - the mixture is striking Albanian, Greek and Slavic names.
39 Chalkocondyles 221 40 Pertusl, Segono 93. 41 Think of the story of the shield smashed by Nikola
Dukagfin. 42 Babinger, Mehmed 131ff .; Spremi6, Despot 504ff. 43 AAV 6326. 44 Senatore, Dispacci
sforzesehi vol. 1, 83. 45 Archivio de la Corona de Aragón. Reg. 2660 f. 154r; Kind regards by Daniel
Duran i Duelt 46 Senatore, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 1,91. 47 Published by PalI, Rapporti No. 1-2. This is
the basis of the following narrative; see. Chalcocondyles at Radonic 221f. 48 Pali, Rapporti 153 and Fn.
136. 49 This number may apply, s. the discussion at Pall, Rapporti 154 fn. 139. 50 In the upper course of
the Osum many Timor loans had been issued in 1431-32; Inalclk, Süreti-i Defter-i, card sheet. 51 Pali,
Rapporti No. 2. 52 Barletius 236f, on the reaction in Dibra 238. 53 Barletius 250. 54 Radoni6 No. 95. 55
Radonic No. 95. 56 Senatore, Dispaccl sforzeschi Vol. 1, 92. 57 Senatore, Dispacci sforzesehi Vol. 1, 9 J.
58 ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Senatore, Dispacci sforzesehi vol. 1, 93. 61 AAV6344. 62 AAV 6363. 63 Archivio de la
Corona de Aragón. Cancelleria reg. 2700 f. IOlv-IOlr; Kindly by Daniel Duran i Duek Edited in Tha1l6czy,
Studies 409--411. 64 Radoni6 no. 100. 65 B. 195 Alberico Malletta to F. Sforza Naples 23.12.1455:
"Etetio dio e tanto 10 orJO che luy porta a Venetiani che times voluntera aude nominar before sta league
per su resperto et arecordare con fede et devotione a Vostra Signoria che quanta mancho ella po la
voglia fare (gap) dimostratione et instantia per questa hga.
66 67 68 69
70 71
72 73 74
75 76
389
Turcho in Albania et fano ogni instantia che le sue lerre pervengano ale mane del T ureho. Et questi d]
passati mandarono 10 Archiepiscopo de Durazo ad eonfortar et pregar li capitani dei Turcho che
venesseno avanti perche obtinerevano el tutto et cossi veneno et oeeuparono terre assay et molti
Cbristiani che fuzivano a Durazo li Venetiani non li volevano acceptare el 1i Turchi li prendevano by fin su
le porte. "Radoni6 No. 103. Senatare, Dispacci sforzesehi Vol. 1, 110. Radical No. 106. Archivio di Stato
di Milano, Archlvio viscooleo - sforzesco B. 195 Alberico Malletta to F. Sforza, Naples 6.11. 1455 to
Piccinmo: "... el bisognando (Alfons V) etiamdio mandar par ter terra in Albama le quaie quente with
Scanderbeeb habiano ad romper contra el Turcho da quella banda corno vedern la Signoria Vostra per li
avisi dei Caramano li quali ve mando ineluse in un'altra littera. Ala quale before non gli provedc
facilmente per quella via intraria in ltaha eome dicc de voler fare "; B. 195. Alberico Malletta to F. Sforza,
Naples 22.10.1455:" ... e provedesi contra ei Turcho dei qua qua namento habiamo aviso marriage fa de
grandissimi apareghi per venire in Albania ", B. 196 Alberico Malletta to F. Sforza, Naples 18 L 1456: to
Piccinino, in ciphers, B. 196 Antonio de Trezzo to F. Sforza Naples 21.3.1456: to plan, 1. to send
Piccinino to Albania, see also the bencht of 21.3 .: "non poria andare m Albania cum manco de cavalJi
2000 utiE et fanti 2000, whether he should go with the Ottomans or not (!); ibid. 228.
Radomc NT. 115 = ArChlVio de Yes CorOna de Arng6n. Cancelleria Reg. 2662 f. 22r-v.
Kind regards by Daniel Duran i DuelL 80 Radonic NT. 117; Barletius 252ff.
81 Radonic No. 118. 82 Radomc NT. 119; Senatore, Dispacci sforzeschi, Vol. 1, 186. 83 Thus the report
of the Milanese ambassador to Venice, Radonic NT. 123. Cirkovl \ ::, Stefan VukCic 230, sees in it above
all the expression of Venetian mistrust of St. VukCic.
84 85 86 87 88
MV 6450. AAV 6472. AAV 6466. Radonic NT. 126. AAV 6473. 89 RadOllH: NT. 126.
li I:
90 ActaAlbaniae VaticanaNr. 129 of 5.12.1456; vgL also NT. 130. 91 Senatore, Dispaccl sforzschl, vol. 1,
186. This refers to the despot of Morea, Thomas Palaiologos. 92 Senaton ::, Dispatchi sforzeschi Vol. 1,
187. 93 Senatore., Dispacci sforzeschi Vol. 1, 186. 94 Radonic No. 136, 137. 95 Schmitt, JahrbUcher
150_ 96 Barletius 249f. 97 Acta Albaniae Vatlcana 199, 201, 204. 98 Stavrides 60f. to the prosopographic
difficulties of accurately identifying the shape. 99 Barletius 260. 100 Barletius 263f. 101 Radonic No. 142.
102 L. Stojanovic, Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi. Belgrade 1927, 120 and 241 (= nos. 266 and 721). 103
AAV 6602. 104 Radonic No. 142. 105 RadOnJc No. 142, 144, 149, 150; Masci 166. 106 Acta Albaniae
Vaticana Nos. 228 and 260. 107 Barletius 266; this confirms AAV 6602, of course without naming
Hamza. 108 Radonic No. 144. 109 To locate Frash-ri, Skoderbeu 348f. according to research by
archaeologist Hasan Ceka. 110 Masei 166. 111 Barletius 266ff .; Archivio dl Stato di Milano. Archivio
visconteo - sforzeseo B. 46. 2.10.1457: "Qui si dice che Turchi hanno havu
La congiura dei baroni del Regno di Napoli contra 11 Re Ferdinando. Reprint Venosa 1989; F. Senatore -
F. Storti, Spazi e tempi della guerra nel Mezzogiomo aragonese: l'itinerario militare di Re Ferrante (1458-
1465). Salerno 2002. 118 Acta Albaniae Vatieana 340. 119 From the rich literature s. only: G. Voigt, Enea
Silvio de'Piccolomini as Pope Pius II and his era. 3 Vols. Berlin 1856-1863 ~ Pastor, History of the Popes,
vol. 2; Z. by Martels A. VandeIjagt (ed.), Pius II "e1 pii! Expeditivo pontifice". Selected studies on Aeneas
Silvius Pieeolomini (1405-1464) Leiden - Boston 2003; A. Esch, Enea Silvio Pieeolomini as Pope Pius 11.
Rule practice and self-expression, m; H. Boockmann - B. Moeller - K. Stackmann (ed.), Life teachings and
world designs in the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times. Göttingen 1989. 112-140; to Pius'
Il. Crusade policy: 1. Helmrnth, Pius 11th and the Turks, in: B. Guthmüller - W: Ktlhlmann (ed.), Europe
and the Turks in the Renaissance. TUbingen 2000. 79-137; to Pius' ll. Personality in the aforementioned
volume by Martels - Vanderjagt: C. Märtl, Everyday at the Curia. Pope Pius 11 (1458-1464) in the Mirror
of Contemporary Reports, 107-145; this., Of mice and elephants. Animals at the Papstbof in the 15th
century. German Archive for Research of the Mittelalzer 60 (2004) 183-199. To Pius H. and Albanlen
s. Schmitt, Skanderbeg as new Alexander. 120 MV 6637, 6639, 6655. 121 MV 6676, 67171. Personality
in the aforementioned volume by Martels - Vanderjagt: C. Märtl, Everyday at the Curia. Pope Pius 11
(1458-1464) in the Mirror of Contemporary Reports, 107-145; this., Of mice and elephants. Animals at the
Papstbof in the 15th century. German Archive for Research of the Mittelalzer 60 (2004) 183-199. To Pius
H. and Albanlen s. Schmitt, Skanderbeg as new Alexander. 120 MV 6637, 6639, 6655. 121 MV 6676,
67171. Personality in the aforementioned volume by Martels - Vanderjagt: C. Märtl, Everyday at the
Curia. Pope Pius 11 (1458-1464) in the Mirror of Contemporary Reports, 107-145; this., Of mice and
elephants. Animals at the Papstbof in the 15th century. German Archive for Research of the Mittelalzer 60
(2004) 183-199. To Pius H. and Albanlen s. Schmitt, Skanderbeg as new Alexander. 120 MV 6637, 6639,
6655. 121 MV 6676, 67171.
390
122 AAV 6691, 6696, 6701. 123 Barletius 275tT. 124 Barletius 28l. 125 G. Rasz6, The Turkish Politics of
Mattluas' Corvinus. Acta Historica Academiae Scientiorum Hungaricoe 32 (1986) 3-50; Babinger,
Mehmcd 165f .; To the relations of the king to Renaissance Italy s. S. Graciotti (ed.), 1talia e Ungheria
all'epoca dell'umanesimo corviniano. Florence 1994, as well as others (ed.), Spiritualita lettere nella
cultura italiana e nonherese del basso medioevo. Florence 1995. 126 Acta Albaniae Vaticana No. 314.
127 Radonic No. 175, 178. 128 Radiation no. 183; AAV 6798. 129 Babinger, Mehmed 174; Spremic,
Despot 637. 130 As early as November 1459, Stefan's ambassadors had traveled to Albania via
Dubrovnik.: Driavni arhlv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3115 f. 82v, where they were treated pretty
vile. 131 Spremic, Despot 646. 132 RadoDlc, p. 254, Acta Albaniae Vaticana No. 412; Schmitt,
Jahrbucher 152, Kritobulos 223f. J33 Schmit !, Yearbooks 152. 134 1500 of a total of 2400
ducats; Radonic No.178. 135 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/16 f. 5lr-v (requests from
Ninac are answered in turn). 136 M. Jacoviello, Relazioni poiltiche tra Venezia e Napoli nelle seconda
meta dei XV secolo. ASPN 96 (1981) 67-133, here 76tT .; ders., Venezia e Napoli nel
Quattrocento. Naples 1992; Pali, Rapporti 148-150; ders., Renseignements inedits on the participatlOn
albanaise a la la guerre de Naples (1459-1463), m: Actes du premier congres international d'etudes
balkaniques et sud-est europeennes, vol. 3 (Histoire). Bucharest 1966, 469-475; G. Galasso, Il Regno di
Napoli. 11 Mezzogiorno angioino e aragonese (12661494). Turin J992, 625ff. 137 Drlavni arhiv u
Dubrovnilcu. Consiglium rogatorum 3/16 f. 146r "... respondendi ambassratori Schenderbegh otTerendo
sibi parigia hinc in Appuliam expensis suis ..." (= Radonic no. 195); to Ragusa and Aragon s. M. Spremic,
Dubrovnik i. A. ragonci ~ 442-1495. Bejgrnd 1971. 138 Acta Albaniae Vaticana no. 494; Archivio di Stato
di Roma. Camerale I. Mandati Bd. 834 f. 165v (friendly note from Claudia
Märt1). 139 Acta Albaniae Vaticana no. 494. 140 ibid. 495.
141 Schmitt, yearbooks 154; MV 69GI 142 Archivio di Stato dl Mantova. .A.rchivio Gonzaga. B. 1431
f. 382 of the 26th ~. 1461: "Jiano qualehe noticia ch'el menacia de vegnire per la Scrvia et 10 territorio deI
ducha Steffano de Bossina ad Durazo cum animo de la de andare ad Roma." 143 Pali, Rapporti No. 6.
144 ibid. 145 Archivio di Stato dl Mantova .A.rchivio Gon7.aga. B. 841 f., 363, 1.9.1461, 146. Senatore-
Storti, Spazi, 79f., 147 That the letter of the First of Tarent and Skanderbeg's reply was distributed
relatively well, also goes out Archivum di Stato di Mantova, Archivio Gonzaga B.841 f 296 from
6.1.11461: ".. 152; Driavni arhlV u Dubrovniku. Consihum rogatorum 3/16 f. 277v; ibid. Diversa notariae
26/45 f. 96v. 164 Radonic No. 208, 209, 215. 165 Pali, Rapporti No. 18; Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi Vol. 4
No. 162. 166 Dravni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/16 f. 2r. 167 Driavni arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f. 5r v. 168 Radonlc No. 211. 169 Radonic No. 212. 170 Bar1etius
286.
391
172 Radonic No. 210. 173 Radonic No. 214: Excerpt from the Ragusan Chronicle of Junius Resti; Driavni
arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorurn 3/17 f.5r. 174 Pall, Rapporti No. 18. 175 Pali. Rapporti No. 21.
176 Barletius 290. 177 Barletius 291. 178 Radonic No. 216; see. Pali, Rapporu No. 27. 179 Radonic No.
217. 180 Pali, Rapporti No. 27, 28, 181 Radonic No. 218, 219; Died, Dispacci sforzeschi
vol. 4 no. 177. 182 Pall, Rapporti no. 30; Storti, Dlspacci sforzeschi Vol. 4 No. 190. 183 Pali, Rapportl No.
37.
I 'I
li
II
Vol. 4, nos. 189, 192, 193. 185 Pall, Rapporti, No. 44. 186 To him B. Roeck - A. Tönnesmann, The nose
of Italy. Federico da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino. Berlin 2005. \ 87 Pall Rapporti No. 45. 188 Pall,
Rapporti No. 47; Sterti, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 4 no. 193. 189 Pall, Rapporti no. 51. 190 Stortl, Storti,
Dispacci sforzschl vol. 4 no. 201. 191 Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 4 no. 201. 192 Storti, Dispacci
sforzeschi Vol. 4 No. 203; see. also Pali, Rapporti No. 54. 193 Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi Vol. 4 No. 212.
194 Archivio di Stato di Mantova. Archivio Gonzaga. B. 841 f. 495. 195 Pius 11th Commentarii 1160-
1162. 196 Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi Vol. 4 No. 220, 222. Another version in No. 236; the numerous
reports prove the deep impression the episode made on contemporaries. 197 Pall, Rapporti no. 58. 198
Bibliotheque nationale de France. Manuscrits italy 1589 f. 276 Antonio da Trezzo to Francesco Sfona,
November 1463. Since Trezzo feels guilty, the king spoiled his stomach at the meal after the work of the
Albanians. 199 Pall, Rapporti No. 56. 200 Storti, Dispacci sforzeschi vol. 4 p. 391 fn. 3. 201 Driavni arhiv
u Dubrovniku. Diversa cancellanae 26/46 f. 6v-7r. 202 Radonic No. 229. 203 Radonic No. 230. 204
Radoni6 No. 232. 205 Pall, Rapport! No. 59, 60. 230. 204 Radoni6 No. 232. 205 Pall, Rapport! No. 59,
60. 230. 204 Radoni6 No. 232. 205 Pall, Rapport! No. 59, 60.
206 Radonic No. 231-234. 207 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatOlllm 3/17 f. 33r. 208 Radoni6
No. 235. 209 Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consihum rogatomm 3/17 f. lUv, 1I3r, 125v. AAV 7205; 7720.
210 MV 7116; RadomcNr. 236. 211 Drlavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f. 62v. 212
Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3 / 17f. 91V. 213 Radonic No. 389. 214 A study of
Ferrante's Ostpolitik is missing; An introduction is offered by F. Babinger, Six Unknown Arngonesian
Sendschrelben, in the., Late Middle Ages Frankish Epistles from the Grand Seraglio to Stambul. Munich
1963, 76-95. 215 pp. The chapter "Remembering, Forgetting, Reminiscing". 216 Gathered by
Stojanovic; the Greek short chronicles are published by P. Schreiner, The Byzantine KleinchroDlken. 3
vols. Vienna 1975-1978. This is also where Georg Sphrantzes with his n Qchternen notes belongs (cd R.
Maisano). 217 From the extensive literature on the perception of the Ottomans in the framework of the
late Crusades, let us mention only: J. Hankins, Renaissance Crusaders. Humanist Crusade Literature in
the Age of Mehmed 11. Dumbarton Gala Papers 49 (1995) 111-207; R. Schwoebel, The Shadow of the
Crescent. The Renaissance Image of the Turk (14531517). Nieuwkoop 1967; AM Cavallann,
L'umanesimo ei Turchi. Lettere ifaiiane 32 (1980) 54-74; L. Schmugge, The Crusades from the
perspective of humanist historians. Basel-Frankfurt 1987; A. Höfert, "Describing the
enemy". "Tilikengefahr" and European knowledge of the Ottoman Empire 1450-1600. Frankfurt aMua
2004. 218 Radoni6 No. 52; see. also no. 80 with very similar formulations. 219 Radonic No. 62. 220 On
ragusan rhetoric on the state, especially in dealing with the various religions in the Balkans, p. For the
case of the "Bosnian Church" now D. Lovrenovic, Models of Ideological Exclusion: Hungary and Bosnia
as Ideological Opponents Based on Different Christian Denominations. Southeast research
392
222 Archivio cli Stato cli Milano. Archivio viscontco - sforzesco B. 41 Report by diplomats Sceva de Curte
and Jacobo Trivulzio to Duke Francesco Sforza. Rome 10. 1.1454. 223 Radonic no. 76. 224
ActaAlbaniae Vaticana no. 204. 225 Act.aAlbaniae Vaticana no. 228. 226 Ibid. 260 in free translation. 227
AIchivio di Stato di Milano. AIChlVio Visconteo - sforzesco B. 46. In a letter to Duke Francesco Sfol "7.a
of Milan of 8.10.1457 it says:" Subsidies Scanderbecho fortissimo Christi Athletes non modicam
prebuimus. "228 Acta Albaniae Vaticana No. 260. 229 Acta Albaniae Vaticana No. 263, 262, 263, 264,
265, 267, 275, 305; GiU 535ff. 230, ibid., 266. 231, ibid., 306. 232, ibid., 340, see also No. 342. 233 1.
Helmrath , Pius H. and the Turks, G. Valentim, La Crociata dl Pio II dalla documentazione vencto d
' archivio. Archivum his / oriae pontificiae 13 (1975) 249-282. 234 To Burgundy Müller and Paviot; 1. K.
Hoensch, Matthias Corvinus. Diplomat, general and Mazen. Graz 1998; K. Nehring, Matthias Corvinus,
Kaiser Friedrich III. and the kingdom. Munich 1989, J. Heers, Louis XI. Paris 1999; J. HeJmrath, The
German Reichstag and the Crusade, m: N. Housley (ed.), Crusading m tbe Fifteenth Century. Message
and Impact. Basingstoke et al. 2004, 53-69. 235 Babinger. Mebmed 179ff. 236 C. Mirtl, Donatello's Judlth
- A memorial to 15th century Turkic propaganda? Pirckheimer - Yearbook 20 (2005) 53-95; F. Cardini,
Sacro e menzogna. Croe18ta e propaganda antimusulroana nell 'eta dl Pio II, in: L. Secchi TarugJ (ed.), II
Sacro dei Rinascimento. Florence 2002, 631-659. 237 Acta Alban12e Vaticana Nt. 495. 238 De Europa
ed. Van Heck 92. Also Barleuus (36) speaks of it with reference to Pius Ir. 240 Oe Europe ed. Van Heek
92. 241 Ibid. 242 Ibid. 243 Acta Albamae Vaticana no. 412. 244 Radical no. 199 "da le o ppresione et
erodele mane de Turehi, inimiei nostri et de la fede eatholica". 245 Radonic No. 199 "tueti siamo in
quanto al batisimo equali Christiani". 246 Radonic no. 202. 247 Radonic no. 179 "dde man de \ o inimigo
de
Christo et mio, "which he even repeated twice in this deed.A 249 S. 250. Bartl, Albania sacra.,
CameraApostolica., Diversa cameralia 30 f., Ö4r-v., Kind regards by Claudia Märtl. Spiritual Visitation
Reports from Albania, Vol. I. Diocese of Alessio, Wiesbad, 2007, 177. 251 Musaehi 277. 252 Helmrath,
Pius H., and the Turks 253 Examples of all of Franco's work: 6r: Skanderbeg's warriors are called
"Christians"; r: "alhora Scanderbeg uedendo tanla prosperita del suo nimico in preiudicio & dispregio di
tutra la sacrosanta fede catolica minaeeiando aochorn. pigliare molti altn degni paesi de Christiani "; 26r.,
Anne Amore dei nostro Signore Iesu Chnsto times negaua elemosma a. pouero alcuno, before gli
chiedesse pero in quelli giomi fece dispensare elemosine abondantemente & massime a piu figllOli de
signori discoeeiati dal Turco & a piu nobiE forestIeri. Aliquali non soIamente faceua distribuire dcnari &
uestlmento, ma anchorn di bone possesSlOne accio poteua honestamente uiuere da christianl by honore
di Dio & quello preparo "; 43v-44r: Leka Dukagjin complained about Skanderbeg's corpse:" Guai alla
Albania, & a lutte I ' altre nation i eireumuicine, si lamcnlauano & si doleuano. before Scanderbeg era
I'occhio, & il cuore di tutti li fideli ehristiam & aroalo da quelli cordmment ben habhe habodo in odio da
falsi, iniqui & maligni diseepoli di Juda Scarioth, before tradi Iesu christo nostro signore "; 47r Skanderbeg
had reigned: "et tutto eio sia by 10 meglio, ad honor & Gloria di Oio & a salute deli 'anime et corpi de fideli
christiani "254 Archivio di Stato cll Milano.Archivio viseontco - sforzesco B. 646, see Schmitt, Skanderbeg
as new AJexander 138f., F. 71. 255 Arehivio dl Stato di Milano, Arebivio viseonteo - sforzeseo B. 52 Otto
de Carreto to Francesco Sfol "7th to 17th November 1461. 256 AIchivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio
Vlseontco -sforzesco B. 640. Copia dei conseio overo parer de Signor Caraman eircha le provixion
bixogna volendo cazar Turchi della Grezia & anche seguro J'in Axia mandato alla Sanctita dei Summit
Pontlfice & alla Maiesta deJ Illustrissimo Re de Ragona. (0.0.). VGL G. Szekely, La CaramanJe
anatolienne dans les projets antiottomans 11 deux fronts, in: L. Balletto (ed.). Oriente e Oecidente tra
Medioe "Vo ed eta moderna, 2nd Genoa 1997, 1187-1197. 257 Ibid.
393
277 AAV 7240 on 13.11.1462 Vuk6c Gesal1dte triumphed in front of the Venetian Senate. 278 Pius
ll. Commentarii 2164. 279 ibid. 2264. 280 Dr2avnl arhlV u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f 172r,
173v, 174r. See S. Cirkovic, Burad Kastriota Skenderbeg i Bosna, in: Sirnpoziumi by Skenderbeun-
Simpozijum 0 Skenderbegu 9 ~ 12 maj 1969. Prishtina / Pnstina
258 Paviol 121ff_ 259 Acta Albaniae Vaticana Ne 527. 260 ibid. 261 RadonicNr. 226. 262 Ibid. 263
Radical No. 227. 264 cbd. 265 AAV 6834. 266 AAV 6849. 267 The following is executed with sources
references in Schmitt, Paul Angelus and the like, Skanderbeg as the new Alexander. 268 Austrian
National Library ead. 441 f. 58v-59r. Schmitt, Skanderbeg as new Alexander 138.
19G9,51 ~ 56.
270 Bibliotheque nationale de France. Manuscrits of Italy J 590 f. 85. The letter of "Georgius Castriot
aliter Sehenderbeg Albanie Dominus" to Duke Francesco Sforza is exhibited in Naples on 24th of March
1464. 271 Unlike the Helmreif, the Ziegenhömer did not originate until the 16th century;
272 273
Chamber of the Kunsthistorisches Musem Vienna, 19 September 2007. Barletius 319 and 321; Schmitt,
Skanderbeg as new Alexander 142ff. Radonic 233. The two terms are, as mentioned in the beginning,
geographically inaccurate; they probably meant Skanderbeg's dominion in Albania all the way to
Mokra. AAV 7132. Franco 26v; Barletius 307ff. speaks of a Sinan, Hasan bey and Karaca bey. Cirkovic,
Stefan VukCic 247ff .; s. Stefano Magno ÖNB Cod. 6216 f. 189r ~ v:, I'inimicicia fo fra i ditti ch'essendo i
ditti maridadi in the village of Todesca, lolto el padre la madre, e'l fiolo la fia, venetian source in nese
paese visto Steffano la nuova ch'ern molto bella dise questa non bacon da fantolini e volsela per lui, e per
questo vein in division, sono chi dicono before discazzada Steffano dei Pasese fuzi alla marine a Narenta
suo paese, dove seguido da Turchi quello fuzi at aa fusta a Ragusi, e da a la Castelnuovo in Colfo de
Cataro, el quaVf. 189v: msieme con Rissano conservo, lasso in Narenta Zarco al govemo e custodia di
quel paese, el qual con Turchi s'accordo e fattoll el paese tributario de source rimase Signor, ma un suo
fradel \ o fratte dell'ordine de San Francisco d 'osservantia chiamado [ratt' Agustin trovandosi aRoma con
licencia e dispensation of the daddy andoli e discazzo ditto Zarco del domlDiO e fessen lui SIgnor, non so
quando fusse questo ".
II
281 AAV 7294. 282 AAV 7329. 283 Truhelka 9. 284 Truhelka 10. 285 Truhelka 11. 286 Driavni arhiv u
Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f. 192r and f. 265v; Truhelka 21. 287 All sources bel Truhelka 21 ~
23; Driavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/17 f. 290r rum cloth trade. 288 Section, Yearbook
155. 289 Babinger, Mehmed 242. 290 Truhelka p. 12 ~ 18. 291 Babinger, Mehmed 234ff .; Stavrides,
Mahmud 146ff .; SM Diaja, Confessionality and Nationality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pre-semantic
phase 1463 ~ 1804. Munich 1984, 21ff. 292 p. The classic essay by R. Lopez, 11 principio della guerra
veneto-turca nel 1463. ArchilJio veneto. 5th Series 15 (1934) 45 ~ 131. 293 Babinger, Mehmed
243f; Stavrides, Mahmud 150ff. 294 AAV 7478, 7542. 295 The details of this agreement are difficult to
establish; It is mentioned in the following sources: AAV 7469, 7475, 7488. The first source is an embassy
of Despina Arranitis, which was heard before the Senate on September 3, 1463. If one sets the travel
time to at least two weeks, this embassy has left Albania in the middle of August. This is the terminus
ante quem for Skanderbeg's peace treaty. One may put it with some caution in the July 1463, thus after
the FalJ of the Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged correspondence between the two
cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in May 1463. 296 MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii
2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly attested in the document by which Skanderbeg's son was
to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" = Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250. 7475, 7488.
The first source is an embassy of Despina-Arranitis, which was heard before the Senate on September 3,
1463. If one sets the travel time to at least two weeks, this embassy has left Albania in the middle of
August. This is the terminus ante quem for Skanderbeg's peace treaty. One may put it with some caution
in the July 1463, thus after the FalJ of the Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged
correspondence between the two cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in May 1463. 296
MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii 2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly attested in the
document by which Skanderbeg's son was to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" =
Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250. 7475, 7488. The first source is an embassy of Despina-Arranitis, which
was heard before the Senate on September 3, 1463. If one sets the travel time to at least two weeks, this
embassy has left Albania in the middle of August. This is the terminus ante quem for Skanderbeg's peace
treaty. One may put it with some caution in the July 1463, thus after the FalJ of the Bosmschen
kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged correspondence between the two cases; Mehmed's letter is
said to have been issued in May 1463. 296 MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii 2542. 298 The Slavonic
form of name is clearly attested in the document by which Skanderbeg's son was to annul the patrician
order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" = Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250. is an embassy of Despina Arranitis,
which was heard on September 3, 1463 before the Senate. If one sets the travel time to at least two
weeks, this embassy has left Albania in the middle of August. This is the terminus ante quem for
Skanderbeg's peace treaty. One may put it with some caution in the July 1463, thus after the FalJ of the
Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged correspondence between the two
cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in May 1463. 296 MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii
2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly attested in the document by which Skanderbeg's son was
to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" = Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250. is an embassy
of Despina Arranitis, which was heard on September 3, 1463 before the Senate. If one sets the travel
time to at least two weeks, this embassy has left Albania in the middle of August. This is the terminus
ante quem for Skanderbeg's peace treaty. One may put it with some caution in the July 1463, thus after
the FalJ of the Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged correspondence between the two
cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in May 1463. 296 MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii
2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly attested in the document by which Skanderbeg's son was
to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" = Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250. If one sets the
travel time to at least two weeks, this embassy has left Albania in the middle of August. This is the
terminus ante quem for Skanderbeg's peace treaty. One may put it with some caution in the July 1463,
thus after the FalJ of the Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged correspondence
between the two cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in May 1463. 296 MV 7488. 297
Pius H., Commentarii 2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly attested in the document by which
Skanderbeg's son was to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" = Ivanus 299 Radonian
NT 250. If one sets the travel time to at least two weeks, this embassy has left Albania in the middle of
August. This is the terminus ante quem for Skanderbeg's peace treaty. One may put it with some caution
in the July 1463, thus after the FalJ of the Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged
correspondence between the two cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in May 1463. 296
MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii 2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly attested in the
document by which Skanderbeg's son was to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" =
Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250. One may put it with some caution in the July 1463, thus after the FalJ of
the Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.) Gives an alleged correspondence between the two
cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in May 1463. 296 MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii
2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly attested in the document by which Skanderbeg's son was
to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253): "Juannus" = Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250. One may put it
with some caution in the July 1463, thus after the FalJ of the Bosmschen kingdom. Barletius (322ff.)
Gives an alleged correspondence between the two cases; Mehmed's letter is said to have been issued in
May 1463. 296 MV 7488. 297 Pius H., Commentarii 2542. 298 The Slavonic form of name is clearly
attested in the document by which Skanderbeg's son was to annul the patrician order (Radonic No. 253):
"Juannus" = Ivanus 299 Radonian NT 250.
394
300 AAV 7475. 301 AAV 7488. 302 Radonic no. 253; AAV 7506, 7540, 7543 303 AAV 7540. 304 AAV
7634. 305 AAV 7665. 306 AAV 7460, 7633. 307 Schmitt, Skanderbeg as the new Alexander 138 (after
Musachi). 308 Franco 30r. · 309 Druvni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3fl8 f. 7v. 310 Pali,
Rapporti 132f .; Schmitt, Actes No. 4. 311 Bibliotheque nationale de France. Ms. italiens 1590 f.85r. 312
Pall, Rapport! 133. 313 Muller 125-126. 314 Pall, Rapporti 131 ff. 315 Pali, Rapporti 139. 316 Archivio di
Stato cli Milano. Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 55. Report of 18 November 1463. 317 Pali, Rapporti
130 318 V. Lisiear, Program dubrovackog Senata za docek papa Pija II (1464). Croalla sacra 3 (1933) 97-
109. 319 Archivio di Stato Milano Archivio visconteo -sforzesco B. 56. OUo de Caretto to Francesco
Sforza .. Rome 26 May 1464. Archivio di Stato di Milano.Archivio visconteo - sforzesco B. 56. Otto de
Caretto to Francesco Sforza. Rome June 16, 1464. 321 Pall, Rapporti 138. 322 Barletius 332. 323 Franco
32v. Schmitt, Skanderbeg as new Alexander 138; Barletius 331f. with a pope's panegyric biography. 325
Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio visconteo-sforzesco B. 315. Gherardo de Collis to Francesco
Sfona. Venice 27th August 1464.
78
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 Notes to Chapter IV
234
56
I. ~
This chapter is based on parts of my essay "Skanderbeg's Last Years". Schmitt, Actes No. 2, 3, 5.
Radonic No. 268-270. Franz Babinger, Lorenzo de Medici and the Ottoman court, in: ders., Splinter
medieval Franconian farms from the Grand SeraIlI to Stambul. Munich 1963, 1-53. Radonic No. 274.
Radonic No. 278. The Venetians claimed,
395
even if Skanderbeg went to the Ottomans, Venetian-Albania was protected because it was surrounded by
inaccessible areas. Gourardo asked Gollard de Collis. how the papal expeditionary army and the
Venetian troops were to cross the same mountains to attack the Ottomans in the central Balkans, a
business for which the Pope had requested Milanese troops, which the Signoria diligently fought, thereby
weakening the troops of the country hoped in northern Italy. Pali No. 62. Magno in Schmitt, JahrbUcher
157. This message was sent to Venice on August 10, 1464; For the way from Dibm to Italy probably four
to six weeks are estimated. Barletius (331) names Skanderbeg's adversary "Seremetius", meaning $
eremet Barletius 335. The valley is deeply engrossed. In the north of the village Valikardhf! the Maja e
Temles rise to 1703 m and the Mali i Komeshit to 1485 m; in the south, the Maja e Murrizes at 1637 m,
sildlich of which go up the heights to over 1800 m. The valley bottom is about 500 m. It may be surmised
that Skanderbeg camped on a large part of the upper valley floor, perhaps in Fushaj, while Balaban made
his ambush in a defile east of Valikardhe. Barletius 336. Barletius 337. Fmnco 35v. Radosslc No. 283.
Schmltt, Actes No. 14. Radonic No. 276 and 277 (Excerpt from the ChrOnik of the Ragusan Junius
Resti). Bablllger, Mehmed 245ff .; J. Mrgic - Radojcic, Donji Kraj. Krajina srednjovekovne
Bosne. Belgrade 2002, 125ff. Truhelka 23; Bibliotheque nationale de France. Manuscrits italy 1590 f
381v. Copy of a letter from the Venetian ambassador in the Hungarian army camp at Garn, 6.9. 1464 ("za
ha scripto Sua Maesta a Shanderbech marriage quella fara se possa unir cum lui., The etiam eh 'io
serivesse a Vostra Signoria before comandasse a source of Albania marriage aeorendo bixogno se
potesseno unirse cum Sua MaestU"'); Critobulos at Radonic 226. The plan was known to the Ottomans,
otherwise the historian from Imbros would not have been able to tell him. A pincer attack was also
discussed 1m December in Rome (Ms. italiens 1590f.513). Critobulos at Radonic 226. The plan was
known to the Ottomans, otherwise the historian from Imbros would not have been able to tell him. A
pincer attack was also discussed 1m December in Rome (Ms. italiens 1590f.513). Critobulos at Radonic
226. The plan was known to the Ottomans, otherwise the historian from Imbros would not have been able
to tell him. A pincer attack was also discussed 1m December in Rome (Ms. italiens 1590f.513).
18 Radoni6 No. 284. 19 Malipiero 36f. 20 BibllOthcque nationale de France. Manuscrits italy 1590
f. 523r. 21 Stavrides, 212ff. 22 Summary of the Trevisan report to Malipiero 36f. 23 Schmitt. Actes No. 9-
11. 24 Radonic No. 287. 25 In addition Schmitt, Albania 386ff. 26 Radoni6 No. 301. 27 Spremic, Hara, e
Skenderbega. 28 Schmitt., Actes No. 16; to the archbishop s. Schmitt, Paul Angelus. 29 I. Nagy - I.
Nyary, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek Matyas kiraly konib611458-1490. 4 vols. Budapest 1875-1878, Vol.
I, 323f. 30 Bibliotheque nationale de France. Manuscrits of Italy 1590 f.523. 31 Radoni6 No.
167; see. also Karaiskaj, Te dhena, and Luda Nadin, Capo Rodoni nella storia, in: Luigl Za (with the
collaboration of Lucia Nadin), I villaggi del Dio Rodon. Frammenti di vita rurale albanese. Leece 2001,
25f., 31f. 32 Radonic No. 274, 299. 33 Radoni6 No. 308. 34 Radoni6 No. 306. 35 Cf. Karl Nehring,
Matthias Corvinus Hoensch, Matthias Corvinus. 36 Babinger, Six Unknown Aragonian Letters, M: so.,
Spll.tmittelalterliche Frankish Epistles 80. 37 Archivio di Stato d] Milano. Archivio Vlsconteo-sforzesco N.
56. Letter from the Archbishop of Milan to Francesco Sforza. Rome, 17th October, 1464. 38 Bibliotheque
nationale de Fronce. Manuscrits italy 1591 f. 20r-v. A. da Trezzo to Fr. Sforza. 20.2. 1465. 39 Malipiero
36. 40 Maliplero 36. 41 Malipiero 37. 42 Maliplero 38, this is also the offer of assistance of the Italian
Fllrsten to understand Italy. 43 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 5 (here translated freely). 44
Radonic no. 301. 45 ArchlVio di Stato dl Milano. Archivlo visconteo-sforzesco B. 352. Gherardo de Collis
to Francesco Sforza. Venedig2 !. June 1465. 46 Schmitt. Actes no. 17 with the very detailed instruction
for Barbaro. Barbaro was elected on 4 July 1465, after Bertuccio Contarini had rejected the difficult
post; Schmitt, Actes No. 15. 47 In his commendation of the Durazzin Archdiocese
48
49 50
51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58
59
60 61 62 63 64 65
66 67 68
396
Gabriele Trevisan does not conceal the authority of Skanderbeg's complaints, which casts a significant
light on the Venetian provincial administration; Schmitt. Actes No.16. ArchivIO di Stato di Milano. Archlvio
visconteo-sforzesco B. 352. Gherardo de Collis to Franceseo Sforza. Venice August 30, 1465. Barletius
342f .; Frauco 36v ff. ArchivlO di Stato di Milano. Archivio visconteo-sforzesco B. 352. Gherardo de CoJlis
to Francesco Sforza. Venice November 25, 1465; Franeo 37v-38r; Barletius 348 both confirm the Nagy
bloodbath - Nyary Bd. 2, 7f., 12f .; Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 1, 2, 3. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's
Last Years No. I; March 23, 1466 = Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 2; Nagy - Nyäry Bd. 2 12f
Schrnitt, Skanderbeg's last Jabre No. 2. Tevarih-i-Al-i - Osman at Radonic 26l. To do
that. Schmitt, Albania Appendix 643. Schritt, Actes No. 19. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 17.
Unfortunately, the names of the castle captains are not given. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No.
22; Reports of betrayal were also known in Mantua, Radonic No. 324. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years
No. 5. Schmitt, Skanderbegs last years No. 3. RadonicNr.314. Schmitt. Albania 451, 608; Barletius 352.
Schmitt. EI cuor nostro. Schmitt. Skanderbeg's last years No. 11, speaks of 200 Neapolitan
crossbowmen; ebda no. 17 stating the number of troops of Skanderbegs Mannem; ebda No. 15; On 6
June 1466 Ferrante, the harbor captain of Puglia, reported that 100 Venetian servants had arrived in
Kruja; ibid. No.14. Schmitt. Skanderbegs last years No. 13. Radical No. 320, 323. Schmitt, Skanderbegs
last years No. 14 means with "
69 70 71
72
73
74 75 76
77 78 79
80
81
82 83
Ir. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years, No. 14. Schmitt, Actes No. 23. Schmitt, Actes No. 26. The Senate
resolved on June 4, 1466, on the site of the ancient city of Valmi Help for Dulcigno; If one considers the
travel time from Dulcigno to Venice, it can be assumed that the Dulcignoter legation set out for Venice at
the beginning of the second half of May, which would mean that Skanderbeg was in the city at the
beginning of May. At the beginning of June, two Venetian galleys already crossed Dulcigno, Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's last years No. 14. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 15, when exactly Skanderbeg was
in Skutari, goes from the remark of the king ("Sca.nderbegh ... se e riducto a Scutri "). The date in
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 15. This is probably the arrival of the person of the Grand Master,
but not meant the encirclement of the castle. Schmltt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 10. Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's last years No. 19. The information comes from a follower of Skanderbeg's sister Mamica,
who was in southern Italy, and are listed in the letter of Prince Fedeflco = Schmitt, Skanderbeg last year
No. IO. Schmitt, Albania 602f .; Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 10. This hitherto unknown fact is
CIWähnt in Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 23. So Prince Federico = Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last
years No. 10. Magno sets the deduction on 23.6.1466 (Schmitt, Yearbooks 158). This was the fault of a
Franciscan on the orders of Skanderbeg to Naples; Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 19; Venice
reported the withdrawal in a letter to Ferrante on June 23, 1466. s. Schmitt, Actes, n. 33. It is not clear
from the accounts whether it is the Bishop of Kruja or a relative of his; s. the just mentioned report,
s. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 19 and Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years NI. 21; see. also the
letter to the anonymous cardinal, Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 19. The penchant of a nephew
Skanderbeg is also mentioned in a letter GA Campanos of June 24, 1466; Zippel, Le vite di Paolo II 140
Fn.3. So in the report Antonio Erizzo at Schmitt, Albania Annex 643. It is not known who the victorious
A1ba whether it is the Bishop of Kruja or a relative of the same; s. the just mentioned report, s. Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's last years No. 19 and Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years NI. 21; see. also the letter to the
anonymous cardinal, Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 19. The penchant of a nephew Skanderbeg is
also mentioned in a letter GA Campanos of June 24, 1466; Zippel, Le vite di Paolo II 140 Fn.3. So in the
report Antonio Erizzo at Schmitt, Albania Annex 643. It is not known who the victorious A1ba whether it is
the Bishop of Kruja or a relative of the same; s. the just mentioned report, s. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last
years No. 19 and Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years NI. 21; see. also the letter to the anonymous cardinal,
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 19. The penchant of a nephew Skanderbeg is also mentioned in a
letter GA Campanos of June 24, 1466; Zippel, Le vite di Paolo II 140 Fn.3. So in the report Antonio Erizzo
at Schmitt, Albania Annex 643. It is not known who the victorious A1ba The pledge of a nephew
Skanderbeg is also mentioned in a letter GA Campanos of June 24, 1466; Zippel, Le vite di Paolo II 140
Fn.3. So in the report Antonio Erizzo at Schmitt, Albania Annex 643. It is not known who the victorious
A1ba The pledge of a nephew Skanderbeg is also mentioned in a letter GA Campanos of June 24,
1466; Zippel, Le vite di Paolo II 140 Fn.3. So in the report Antonio Erizzo at Schmitt, Albania Annex 643.
It is not known who the victorious A1ba
led. Despina Araniti and her sons appeared before the Senate on August 26, 1466, asking for Venetian
patronage over their territory, which they apparently did not want to entrust to Skanderbeg. But this alone
shows the contrast between the Araniti and the Kastnota; Schmitl, Actes No. 38. 84 Franco 39r; Barletius
353. 85 Ibid. Magno reports of a victory of Skanderbeg on September 12, 1646 (Schmitt, Jahrbücher
158). 86 P. Bart !, sources and materials on Albanian history in the 17th and 18th centuries. Bd. 2. Munich
1979,! L0. 87 G. Marlekaj, Scanderbeg nelle tradizioni popolari albanesi, in: Convegno 221-238, 234. 88
Schmltt, Albania Annex 643. 89 Schmitt, Albania Annex 644f. 90 Schmitt, Albania 562ff. 91 Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's last years No. 5; see. ibid., no. 7. 92 Schmitt, Albamen 602f .; Radonic No.
320; Schmitt, Actes No. 29; to the flight movements s. A. Ducellier - B. Doumerc - B. Imhaus - J. de
Miceli, Les Chemins de I'exil. Bouleversements de l'Est europeen et migrations vers l'ouest a la fin du
moyen. Paris 1992; to the Albanem s. B. Imhaus, Le minoranze orientali a Venezia 13001510. Rome
1997. 93 Radonic No. 323, 325. 94 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 21; same number in writing to
the anonymous cardinal. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 22; King Ferrante told the Pope about
20,000 prisoners; ibid., no. 10. 95 M. Kiel, Ottoman Architecture in Albania 1385-1912. ! stanbulI990, 20.
96 InaicJk, Regions 230f. 97 Schmitt, Actes No. 37, 38. Despina was in late August 1466 in the city of St.
Mark. 98 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years NT. 21. One would only like to know who were the "tutti li
zentilhomem" mentioned in this text. 99 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 23. 100 Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 22. 101 CritobuJos 197. 102 Cutolo 207, on Florentine Politics cf. Babinger,
Lorenzo dei Medici Sf. 103 The Ottoman Chronicles bel Pulaha: ünu ;; (47); Tursun Bey (99ff.); Ke ', rami
(1110; Bitlisi (155ff.); See a list of other Ottoman sources in Stavrides 162 fn. 42; Krltobulos 196ff. 104
Already on June 24, 1466, it was known in Rome that Skanderbeg was convinced that the conquest
of Tursun Bey (99ff.); Ke ', rami (1110; Bitlisi (155ff.); See a list of other Ottoman sources in Stavrides 162
fn. 42; Krltobulos 196ff. 104 Already on June 24, 1466, it was known in Rome that Skanderbeg was
convinced that the conquest of Tursun Bey (99ff.); Ke ', rami (1110; Bitlisi (155ff.); See a list of other
Ottoman sources in Stavrides 162 fn. 42; Krltobulos 196ff. 104 Already on June 24, 1466, it was known in
Rome that Skanderbeg was convinced that the conquest of
397
prepared areas, s. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 21; see. also ibid. No.24. 105 cuts. Skanderbeg's
last years No. 17. 106 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 26; to the construction of Elbasan s. Franz
Babinger, The Founding of Elbasan, as well as essays and essays on the history of Southeastern Europe
and the Levant. Bd. 3 Munich 1962,201-210. 107 Schmitt, Actes No. 35. 108 Radonic No. 334. 109
Schmitt, Actes No. 39; Babinger, Elbasan 204. 110 Schmitl., Skanderbeg's last years, No. 27. 111
Skanderbeg urged King Ferrnnte in June to repatriate the refugees; Schmitt. Skanderbeg's last years No.
11 and No. 10 (return of Mamicas Kastriotas). 112 Thus A. Erizzo in Schmitt, Albania Appendix 643. 113
Schmitt. Skanderbeg's last years NT. 37. 114 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 28. 115 A. Erizzo in
Schmitt, Albania Appendix 643. 116 Schmitt, Actes No. 39-41. 117 A. Erizzo m Schmitt, Albania Appendix
643. 118 A Erizzo in Schmitt, Albania Appendix 643644; see. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 28,
where the kidnapping of 3000 Christians is mentioned. 119 Reports by Fior Jonima and Stefano Sabin
from Skutari in Schmitt, Albania Annex 646647. These dates are to be dated to late October or
November, for on November 22, 1466, you were known in Venice; Schmitl, Skanderbeg's last years No.
28; Gherardo de Collis speaks of 6,000 Osmanl riders who captured around 3,000 people and stole many
cattle. 120 secrets of successes of Skanderbeg, which circulated in Venice at the end of December,
should be recorded with caution (Nagy - Nyary Vol. 2 45); for Skanderbeg had already left Albania in
October 1466. Perhaps the reports relate to Schanmlelt in the early autumn of 1466, and perhaps also to
clashes between Skanderbeg's remaining followers in Albania and Ottoman associations; perhaps it was
only the hope of Christian victory. 121 Babmger's account of "The End of the Arianites" contains a gap of
some twenty years between the Ottoman conquest of Albania and the nineteen-fifties of the fifteenth
century. Due to unknown archival material, the story of this important family will soon be supplemented
significantly elsewhere. 121 Babmger's account of "The End of the Arianites" contains a gap of some
twenty years between the Ottoman conquest of Albania and the nineteen-fifties of the fifteenth
century. Due to unknown archival material, the story of this important family will soon be supplemented
significantly elsewhere. 121 Babmger's account of "The End of the Arianites" contains a gap of some
twenty years between the Ottoman conquest of Albania and the nineteen-fifties of the fifteenth
century. Due to unknown archival material, the story of this important family will soon be supplemented
significantly elsewhere.
122 M. Jacoviello, Venezia e Napoli nel Quattrocento. Naples 1992, 52ff. 123 V. llardi, Towards the
Tragedia d'ltaha: Ferrante and Ga! Eazzo Maria Sforza, friendly enemies and hostile aUies, in: D.
Abulafia (ed.), The French Descent into Renaissance ltaly, 14941495, Aldershot 1995, 91- 122, beer
96f. 124 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 2. 125 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 3; on April
18, the Senate had ordered the publicity of 150 slots; Radomc NI. 312. 126 Nagy-Nyary vol. 2, 13. 127
Schmitt, Actes NT. 20, 31. 128 Schmitt, Actes No. 23-26. 129 Schmltt, Actes No. 27. 130 Schmitt, Actes
NT. 28. 131 Schmirt, Actes NT. 29, 30. 132 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 31. 133 Schmitt, Actes
NI. 37 (Despina Araniti lodged in the palace of Giovanni Tiepolo m Castello, and they served their platter
with Malvasia IVI, poultry! and cereals), No. 38. 134 Schmitt, Actes No. 43. 135 Schmitt, Actes No. 36.
136 Nagy-Nyary vol. 2 16f .; In addition to Chancellor Giovanni Dledo, the governor of Negroponte was
also included; Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 4; Malipiero 40f., Cf. also Stavrides 213ff. In 1466
Venice let the pope know that it had been flogged by the Sultan and was now in negotiations with the
Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha. The warnings to the pope are to be interpreted with caution, because in the
spring of 1466 St. Mark's Republic and Holy See were quite hostile towards each other (see below). 137
Malipiero 41f .; Nagy - Nyäry Bd. 2 30ff. and 36f. Mehmed's Jewish physician Jacobo da Gaeta was
involved in the negotiations; the legation was led by Jacobo Venier. That Venice is its ally in southeastern
Europe. including the Hungarian king, but also Skanderbeg and Leka Dukagjm wanted to engage in a
peace agreement with. is not a sign of the republic's consideration of its allies. Rather, this was part of the
treaty of understanding with Hungary and with the Albanian lords. Matthias Corvinus in turn was in
negotiations with the Sultan, and Venice was afraid separate agreement its composites · ten and
delusion, therefore, at least in a first Verhandlungsschntt, diplomatic Fonnen. 138 Pastor, History of the
Popes Vol. 2, 357. 139 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 6. For his part, Matthias Corvinus was in
negotiations with the sultan, and Venice feared separate agreements of his associates and therefore, at
least in a first bargaining round of negotiations, cautioned the diplomatic fives. 138 Pastor, History of the
Popes Vol. 2, 357. 139 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 6. For his part, Matthias Corvinus was in
negotiations with the sultan, and Venice feared separate agreements of his associates and therefore, at
least in a first bargaining round of negotiations, cautioned the diplomatic fives. 138 Pastor, History of the
Popes Vol. 2, 357. 139 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 6.
398
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last year No. 7 Schmitl, Skanderbeg's last year No. 8. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last
years No. 10. Sehmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 10. 144 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 15. 145
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last No. 146. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 17. 147 Schmltt, Skanderbeg's
last years No. 19. How little Milan intended to do, is shown by the sharp reprimand of the Sforza to
Augustino de Rubeis, who unilaterally had a participation in the Expeditionary Corps had promised
(ibid.). 148 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 21. 149 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 24. 150
Radonic No. 183-184. 152 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 15. 152 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years
No. 15. 153 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 24. 154 Schmltt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 27. 155
So with Magno; Schmitt, Jabrbücher 158. 156 DIiavni arhiv u Dubrovniku. Consilium rogatorum 3/19
f. 136v, 138r and Diversa. Notariae26 / 49 f. 142v-143r. 157 Radical No. 336. 158 Schmitt, Actes No.
42; not to forget that at the same time Venice sent Jacobo Venier to the gate. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last
years No. 28. Skander Beg has evidently changed his plans in the course of the journey; after his arrival
in Naples, the Mantuan resident learned of Ferrantes court, Skanderbeg intend to continue to Venice
(Schmitt, Skanderbeg last years No. 30). Why this was finally omitted, can not be clarified beyond
doubt; but it is probable that the long stay in Rome and the news of the renewed preparations of
Mehmed's 11th against Albania prompted Skanderbeg to return in the late winter of 1467. 160 " 337)
accepted the admission of Skanderbeg, but then reversed it on the same day, November 2, 1466.
Skanderbeg was supplied with supplies of mouth (No. 338). 163 Pali No. 63. 164 A reference to this
sequence of visits to Pall No. 64 165 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 30. 166 Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 30. 337) accepted the admission of Skanderbeg, but then reversed it on the
same day, November 2, 1466. Skanderbeg was supplied with supplies of mouth (No. 338). 163 Pali No.
63. 164 A reference to this sequence of visits to Pall No. 64 165 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No.
30. 166 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 30.
167 Pall no. 65. 168 Schmitl, Skanderbeg's last years Addendum to the supplement to text 2 "brota gente
et eon brute fogie". This evidently corresponded to the Albanian image that was common in the Adriatic in
the fifteenth century, and that is found in modern travelers. 2nd BG Hartmann, Wilhelm Tzevers:
Itinerarium terre sancte. Introduction, Edition, Commentary and Translation. Wiesbaden. 2004, 94: "...
Albania, ubi homines grossissiml, brutales, loquelam propriam, que non potest scribi aut articulari ... Et
obproprium est, curo dicitur ad aliquem Albanese!". 197 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years Source
Supplements Supplement Text 2. 170 Radomc No. 340. 171 Scbmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years Source
Supplements Addition Text 2. 172 Pali No. 66. 173 PaU No. 68. 174 Pali No. 69. 175 Schmitt,
Skanderbegs last years addendum supplement text 2. Radonic No. 350. 199 In Rome already on March
25, 1467, Pali No. 82. This news is worthy of note. 200 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 41.
399
201 Pali no. 84; see. also Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 38 and 39. 202 Franeo 39v-40r. Franeo
served as a young man in Skanderbeg's entourage. 203 Barlettus 359.
204 Franeo 40r. 205 Radonic No. 359; Barletius 359. 206 Schmltt, Skanderbeg's last years, No. 41. 207
St. George's Day is stated independently of one another: A. Erizzo at Schmitt, Albania, Appendix 643,
and Pali, No. 84; Radonic No. 359, 360.
208 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 4L 209 Schmltl, Skanderbeg's last years No. 40 210 Pali No.
85- & 8. 211 Nagy - Nyary Bd. 52f .; two other diplomats, Pietro Morosini and Giovanni Soranzo, were
commissioned on 2 June 1467 to increase pressure on the pope; Nagy - Nyfuy vol. 2, 59f.
212 M. Fossati - A. Ceresatto, Dai Visconti agli Sforza, in: G. Antenna - R. Bordone - F. 80-
213
214
215
maini - M. Vallerani (ed.), Comuni e signone nell'Italia settentrionale: la Lombardia Turin 1998. 625ff .; ME
Mallett, Venezla e la politica italiana, in: A. Tenenti - U. Tucci (ed.), Storia di Venezia. Bd. 4th Rome
1996254; G. Cozzi - M. Knapton. La Repubblica di Venezia nell'et3 modema. Dalla gUell di ChiOggia al
1517. Turin 1986, 56f. Nagy - Nyary Vol. 52f. The circumstances of the policy at the time illustrate the
jubilation of the Mayan resident in Venice over the failure of the Ottoman - Venetian negotiations, for
which he thanked God; ArchiviO di Stato cli Milano. AIchivio visconteo-sforzesco B. 353 Gherardo de
Collis to Bianca Maria and Galeazzo Maria Sforza, Venice 2 February 1467. Critobulos (bel Radonic 226)
reports that Skanderbeg had requested and received help from Corvinus at that
time. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years, nos. 40, 45. Venice and Hungary mutually informed each other of
their respective negotiations with the sultan, fearing that the other ally could make a separate
peace; Nagy - Nyary Vol. 2 50-52; 56-58; 64-66. On August 6, 1467, Venice met a Hungarian Embassy
no less than 756 riders (ibid., 66f.) Kntobulos 203. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years, No. 51. Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's last years, No. 50. Schmitt, Actes No. 49 ; ders., Skanderbeg's last years No. 45 August
1467 Venice met a Hungarian embassy no less than 756 riders (ibid., 66f.) Kntobulos 203. Schmitt,
Skanderbeg's last years, No. 51. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years, No. 50. Schmitt, Actes No. 49; ders.,
Skanderbeg's last years No. 45 August 1467 Venice met a Hungarian embassy no less than 756 riders
(ibid., 66f.) Kntobulos 203. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years, No. 51. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years,
No. 50. Schmitt, Actes No. 49; ders., Skanderbeg's last years No. 45
Erizzo at Schmitt, Albania Appendix 644. Radonic No. 366. Radonic Ne. 366. Kritobulos bel Radonic 226
ibid. Radonic No. 366; ASMn AG 843 Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga to his mother, the Margravine
Barbara Gonzaga in Mantua, Rome June 11, 1467 = Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 47. The
chronology (Angnff on Kruja, then march north and return to Kruja) goes best from the Erizzo report
(Schmitt, Albania Annex 644). 226 Schmitt, Jahrbücher 159. 227 Critobulos (Reinsch) 204. 228 Radonic
Nr. 369. 229 Schmitt, Actes Ne. 49; Radonic Nos. 367, 369, 371 230 Radoni ': No. 367,369,375,376. 231
Schmitt. Skanderbeg's last years Ne. 17 (this is probably to be understood as "quel paese da Croya
insora"). 232 Radonic No. 369 (there the quote). 233 Kntobu10s (cd Reinsch) 204. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's
last years No. 50, there also the quote. See also Radonic Ne. 371: the Sultan had all the prisoners
executed for seven years; even this spring spews about 50,000 people in the mountains. To the
massacres among the civil population also Radonic No. 370. 235 Kritobulos 203 [, 236 Enzzo at Scbrnitt,
Albania Annex 644; his "Pria bianca" is Bila kamin 237 In addition Stavrides 163f. with the Ottoman
sources in Fn. 44. 238 Schmltt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 50. 239 Thus the Skutariner Stefano Sabin
at Schmitt, Albania Appendix 647. 240 Report of 241 Dujcev 93. 243 Krltobulos ed. Reinsch 199. 244
Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No. 56. 245 Radoni ': No. 374. 246 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years No.
51, Malipiere 42. The Senate discussed the letter on July 28, 1467; Radoni ': No. 373. 248 Description by
Magno (Schmitt, Jahrbücher 160f). The Resident of Milan in Venice spoke on September 18, 1467, that
the Venetians used Fcrrante's
400
Captain deputized from the fortress ("hano tolto 10 castelano") and replaced by a Venetian
commander; but he does not indicate when this happened. But since Skanderbeg and the Neapolitans
accompanying him did not announce their entry into Kruja in July, the Venetian seizure of power must
have taken place before this scandal. At that time there were 500 Venetian mercenaries in Kruja. Scbmitt,
Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 55. 249 SChmitt, Actes No. 53, 55. Skanderbeg was involved in the
transport of grain, meat, and vegetables. 250 Radon 1c No. 377. 251 Radonic No. 377; Schmit !, Actes
No. 54. 252 Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Years No. 51; Gherardo de Co !! is playing with the latter on the
Venetians and Albanian nobles. 253 This hitherto unknown embassy in Schmitt, Skanderbeg's last years
No. 53. 254 reports by Fior Jonima and Stefano Sabin at Schmitt. Albania Annex 646f. 255 Radonic No.
380; Schmitt, Actes # 57 (Gifts to Ivan Kastriota); during the stay of the two ambassadors, the Venetian
State repaid its debts to Skanderbeg; The latter had lent money to the Venetian general [Jmächtern
Josafat Barbaro (Schmitt, Actes No. 59, 60). Nothing shows better the Venetian attitude: even one gave
hardly anything, but one paid the defense of the own provinces with the money of an economically living
ally, which one at the same time politically fell behind. 256 So with good reasons Stavrides 220. 257 On
the Span s. BoZlc, Spani Spani. 258 Stavrides 218ff. Schmitt, Skanderbeg's Last Jallre No. 55. 260
Schmitt, ActesNr. 6l. 261 Radon1c No. 386 according to a report by the faithful Gherardo de
Collis; MUSilchi 275; so also Giovio at Radonic 233. 282 Musachi 275. 263 Driavni arhiv u Zadru. Arhiv
Koreule 15 [11r. 264 Radonic no. 391265 Sphrantzes ed. Maisano. 266 Radonic No. 386; Musachi 275,
299; see. Frasheri 467ff. Skanderbeg is not buried in the church, which is today shown in Lezba as his
tomb; Frasheri 471 ff. 267 Musachi 275.
2345678
9 10 11
12 13
14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29
401 j
Radonic no. 387. Franeo 43v. Franco 44r. Radonic No. 382; on December 15, 1467 he was received in
Ragusa. Radonic No. 389, 390. Radonic No. 390. Radonic No. 389. Musachi 334; her destinies fit for
Petta, Despoti. When exactly the Kastriota started the journey. is not known. The Venezuelan golf captain
Jacob
30
31
32
33
34
35
to, Lcs = Alessio and Zabiak = Zabljakarn Skutansee, in today's Montenegro. Barletius 371. Probably the
first owner of the edition I used (library of the Albania Insitute in Vienna), the Schaflhauser Johann
Schwarz, remarked on the edge: "do not lie." A peculiar reverberation of this tradition can be found in an
anonymous Skanderbegschrift. , Le Grand Castnotto d'Albanie, Histoire, A Francfort chez, JJ Kesler,
1779, 110f The anonymous author in Istanbul is said to have met the Reis-efendi ,, 05rnan-Angar, who
told him, "qu'il ne donnernit pas cet os de Scanderberg pour quélque prix que ce füt, car il assuroit qu'il
etolt certain de n'etre pas poignarde en trahison, ni tue dans une bataille ". Whether the anonymus simply
embellished the message of Barletius imaginatively or if the matter has a true core can not be
determined. Ducellier et al., Chemins de l'exile; Imhaus, Minoranze; S. Dedja, Emigrimi shqiptar n ~ Itali
nt! fund t ~ mesjetes si problem historiography. Studying hislorike 200111-2, 7-23. L. Nadin, MlgrazJOni e
integrazione. 11 caso degli albanesi a Venez13 (1479-1552). Rome 2008. F. Baron Nopcsa, The Miners'
Club NordalballlCTIS and Their Right of Solicitation, ed. by F. Baxhaku- K. Kaser, The Tribal Societies of
Northern Albania. Reports and Researches of Austrian Consuls and Scholars (1861-1917). Vienna -
Cologne - Weimar 1996,205-428. A polemic against the term "arher", which is considered "dangerous" as
well as a "sectarian religious attitude" (because of the emphasis on the Christian tradition, OS), in G.
Shpuza, Etnonimi shqiptar - hapi i pare i madh drejt afinnimit te kombit. Studi historica 2001 / 1-2,147-
160. L. deo Tba1l6czy - K. Jirecek - Ae. de Suffiay, Acta et diplomata res Albaniae mediae aetatJs
illustrantia 2 vols. Vienna 1913-1918, Index SV SChipudar. Archivio di Stato dl Milano. Archivio visconteo-
sforzesco. B.353: Copy litterarum Ducis Sancte Sabe nuncupatl Vlatichl ad Ducem Venetorum, datarum
in Castro Nova the XVIII Martii 1474: "... si disposto de velllre ad Venexia per fare tuto 10 times che pud &
in Puglia ha clehberato mandare xxx. M cavalli & pedom by metterh la dove si dice che tene la mogliere
de Scanderbech cioe Manfredonia, la quale se dice leglermente se puo pigliare & havendo la dicta terra
fortili.
36 Archivio di Stato di Vcnezia. Senato Secreta Reg. 28 f. 87 [. 37 Babinger, Mehmed 431. 38 Zamputi Nt
79. 39 Babmger, Mebmed 444fT. 40 Zamputi No. 79 to Magno. 41 Zamputi no. 81 to Malipiero. 42
Zamputi No. 79. 43 N. Barone, note stonche raccolte dai Registri Curiae della cancellaria
aragonese. Naples 1890.8. 44 After Petta, Despoti 30ff. 45 Petta, Despoti 33ff. 46 Petta, Despoti 38 47
Petti, Despoti 41 ff 48 Rightly so P. Petta, Despoti 38. E. Deusch, Albanian candidate for the throne. Em
contribution to the history of the Albanian state foundation. Mimchner Zeilschrift for Balkan Jamde 4
(1981/82) 89-150, especially 90- J03. Already in 1770 slch turned from the Dutch Leiden an alleged
descendant of Skanderbeg, Felix Antoine Castrioto, to the Empress Catherine II, who was at that time in
the war against the osmamsche Reich, requesting the support of his rights; G. 1. Ars, H Pcoma Kat Ta.1
[a.oaAhcto; AAßo; via ~ Kat H1tEipou 17591831. 'ETI'P (l (pet pro (JlKcllV apxe: imv [Russia and the
pakks of Albania and Epirus Athens, 2007, 50-53 At the end of the 19th century, descendants of
Skanderbeg appeared: the Marchese cli Auletta, who enjoyed Italian support, and Don Aladro Castriota y
Perez y Velasco on how the memory of Skanderbeg was used by Italy as a political instrument against
Austria-Hungary (93) In the course of the Great Orient Crisis (1875-1878) the name of Skanderbeg
emerged more and more frequently in diplomatic Scrafift traffic. that an emissary specifically visited the
Marchese di Auletta and had his genealogy reviewed. He reported on the father of the Marchese, whose
appearance in the family was called 'Albaneshead': 'But he is more like a retired Lieutenant Governor
than any Balkan type. The good Marchese Giovanni has not the slightest idea of Albania, of the Albanian
language, or of the nature of the Balkan affairs ... His only son, Francesco (* 1875) is studying law ...,
likes to hunt, always revolves around with a revolver. Cares little about his ancestors. By the way, many,
especially those Albanians, seem to be at ibm of Albanian language or of the nature of the Balkan
affairs ... His only son Francesco (* 1875) studied law ..., likes to hunt, always revolves around with a
revolver. Cares little about his ancestors. By the way, many, especially those Albanians, seem to be at
ibm of Albanian language or of the nature of the Balkan affairs ... His only son Francesco (* 1875) studied
law ..., likes to hunt, always revolves around with a revolver. Cares little about his ancestors. By the way,
many, especially those Albanians, seem to be at ibm
402
Deusch, 95) Don Aladro, too, had his bag for his political aspirations (Deusch 97ft.). The remarks
following in this chapter are strongly based on my essay: Skanderbeg rides again. Recovery and
invention of a national hero, in: U. Brunnbauer - A. Helmedach - S. Troebst (ed.), Interfaces. Festschrift H.
Sundhaussen. Milking 2007, 401-419. 49 F. Pall, Marino Barlezio, uno storico umamsta. MeIanges
d'histoire gemirale 2. Cluj-Napoca 1938; ders., Di nuovo sulle biographie scander · begiane del XVI
secolo. Revue des etude. Sudest europeennes 9/1 (1971) pp. 91-106. 50 Schmitt, Skanderbegal's new
Alexander; ders., Paul Angelus. 51 Schmitt, Paul Angelus. 52 Petta, Despoti. 53 This is most clearly
shown by the remark of Barletius (160) "Castriotum nunquam ... dc fide Venetorum conquestum". 54
Barletius 368 with a Venetorum louse. Only the war for Dagno Barletius could not conceal. 55 O. 1.
Schmitl, Venezia e la sua Albania. Percezloni reeiproche di dominanti e dominati nel Quattrocento, in: S.
Winter (ed.), Venezia, I'altro e I'altrove. Rome 2006, 23-55. 56 Bi'Yoku - Kastrati, Gjergj Kastrioti
Skenderbeu. Bibliografi; Brief review by M. Schmidt-Neke in Sildos / -forschungen 57 (1998) 480-482; M.
Schmidt-Neke, To Skan · derbegs 525th anniversary of death. The end of a literary motif. Albania's Notes
1993/1, 18-19; ders., Skanderbeg 10 of European literature. Albanian issues 1996/3, 18-20 with important
information especially on little-known German skanderbegverarbeltungen at the beginning of the 20th
century (including Alfred Döblin's "Berlin Alcxanderplatz"); V. Malaj, L'Opera "Scanderbeg" dell'Abate
Vivaldi. ShejzatIL Pleiadi 12 (1968) 40-43; K. Rexha · Bala, Skenderbegu (SIC) ne letersln
suedeze. Shejzat / Le Pleiadi 12 (1968) 196-211; HJ KJssling, A Swedish Skanderbeg · Acting, m: Studia
albanica monacensia. Munich 1969, 122-128 (on TG Rudbeck, Skanderbeg, Stockholm 1835); N. Hö! Zl,
Skanderbeg's freedom fight in Alttiroler Spiele. Shejzat / Le Pleiodi 12 (1968) 212-214; important is the
article by J. Innscher, Skanderbeg and Germany. Studia albanica 196812, 217-233; s. Also Schmirmt ·
Neke, Skanderbeg as a topic of historical · Alfred Döblin's "Berlin Alcxanderplatz"); V. Malaj, L'Opera
"Scanderbeg" dell'Abate Vivaldi. ShejzatIL Pleiadi 12 (1968) 40-43; K. Rexha · Bala, Skenderbegu (SIC)
ne letersln suedeze. Shejzat / Le Pleiadi 12 (1968) 196-211; HJ KJssling, A Swedish Skanderbeg ·
Acting, m: Studia albanica monacensia. Munich 1969, 122-128 (on TG Rudbeck, Skanderbeg, Stockholm
1835); N. Hö! Zl, Skanderbeg's freedom fight in Alttiroler Spiele. Shejzat / Le Pleiodi 12 (1968) 212-
214; important is the article by J. Innscher, Skanderbeg and Germany. Studia albanica 196812, 217-
233; s. Also Schmirmt · Neke, Skanderbeg as a topic of historical · Alfred Döblin's "Berlin
Alcxanderplatz"); V. Malaj, L'Opera "Scanderbeg" dell'Abate Vivaldi. ShejzatIL Pleiadi 12 (1968) 40-43; K.
Rexha · Bala, Skenderbegu (SIC) ne letersln suedeze. Shejzat / Le Pleiadi 12 (1968) 196-211; HJ
KJssling, A Swedish Skanderbeg · Acting, m: Studia albanica monacensia. Munich 1969, 122-128 (on TG
Rudbeck, Skanderbeg, Stockholm 1835); N. Hö! Zl, Skanderbeg's freedom fight in Alttiroler
Spiele. Shejzat / Le Pleiodi 12 (1968) 212-214; important is the article by J. Innscher, Skanderbeg and
Germany. Studia albanica 196812, 217-233; s. Also Schmirmt · Neke, Skanderbeg as a topic of historical
· Skenderbegu (SIC) ne letersln suedeze. Shejzat / Le Pleiadi 12 (1968) 196-211; HJ KJssling, A Swedish
Skanderbeg · Acting, m: Studia albanica monacensia. Munich 1969, 122-128 (on TG Rudbeck,
Skanderbeg, Stockholm 1835); N. Hö! Zl, Skanderbeg's freedom fight in Alttiroler Spiele. Shejzat / Le
Pleiodi 12 (1968) 212-214; important is the article by J. Innscher, Skanderbeg and Germany. Studia
albanica 196812, 217-233; s. Also Schmirmt · Neke, Skanderbeg as a topic of historical · Skenderbegu
(SIC) ne letersln suedeze. Shejzat / Le Pleiadi 12 (1968) 196-211; HJ KJssling, A Swedish Skanderbeg ·
Acting, m: Studia albanica monacensia. Munich 1969, 122-128 (on TG Rudbeck, Skanderbeg, Stockholm
1835); N. Hö! Zl, Skanderbeg's freedom fight in Alttiroler Spiele. Shejzat / Le Pleiodi 12 (1968) 212-
214; important is the article by J. Innscher, Skanderbeg and Germany. Studia albanica 196812, 217-
233; s. Also Schmirmt · Neke, Skanderbeg as a topic of historical · Studia albanica 196812, 217-
233; s. Also Schmirmt · Neke, Skanderbeg as a topic of historical · Studia albanica 196812, 217-
233; s. Also Schmirmt · Neke, Skanderbeg as a topic of historical ·
political publics of the early 18th century: David Fassmann's "Totengespr'dch" between Cyrus and
Skan'derbeg, in: K. · D. Grothusen (ed.), Albania Past and Present, International Symposium of the
Southeastern European Society 1989. Mülnchen 1991, 28-46; G. Grimm, Scanderbeg in Freising. Munich
Bulletin for Balkans 7-8 (1991). 355-365. An excellent analysis of Skanderbeg as a theater notary offers
W. Puchner, Skenderbey 10 of the European and Balkan drama, in: the., Contributions to the theater
science of Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean area. Bd.I. Vienna - Cologne - Weimar 2006, 163-
190 (admittedly with minor mistakes in the historical part). 57 R Elsie, Benjamin Disraeli and
Scanderbeg. The novel "The Rise of Iskendar" (1833) as a contribution to Britain's literary discovery of
Albania.
52. 58 C. Paganel, History of Scanderbeg or Turks and Christians in the 15th Century. TDbingen 1856,
Il. 59 J. Ph. Fallmerayer, The Albanian Element in Greece III (Treatises of the Royal Bavarian Academy of
Sciences, Hisroric Classe 9th Volume, Division I). Munich 1862; JG von Hahn, journey through the areas
of Dnn and Wardar. Memoranda of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. Philosophical / Jewish Classe 15
(1867) and 16 (1869), in it as "Third Division. First Section: Contributions to the History of Central Albania
after the Findings of Prof. Dr. Kar! 60 M. Mandala, I 500 Anni del la Fondazione di Piana degh Albanesi
(1488-1988), Breve profi10 storieo e Ietterano di un anniversano.Sildost-Forschungen 47 (1988) 209-222
with full bibliographical references To: Folklore shqiptar. Sena IIl. Epika historike. Vol. 1 TJrana 1983,
26f. 62 F. Altimari, Miti i Skenderbeut or Arbereshet e ltalise, in: Duka. Skenderbeu the Evropa 306-3 J3,
here 311. 63 Altimari 312. 64 Altiman 312f. 65 documents for the 15.-17. Century (especially the historical
work of the Venetian Marcantonio Sabellico, the visitation report Marino Bizzis from the year 1610, a
writing Pietro Budis from the year 1621) are put together in Folklar shqiptar. Seria 1II. Eplka historike. Vol.
1, 24, which emphasizes the continuity of oral tradition, but at the same time the history of the Venetian
Marcantonio Sabellico; the visitation report Marino Bizzis from the year 1610; a letter from Pietro Budis in
1621) are put together in Folklar shqiptar. Seria 1II. Eplka historike. Vol. 1, 24, which emphasizes the
continuity of oral tradition, but at the same time the history of the Venetian Marcantonio Sabellico; the
visitation report Marino Bizzis from the year 1610; a letter from Pietro Budis in 1621) are put together in
Folklar shqiptar. Seria 1II. Eplka historike. Vol. 1, 24, which emphasizes the continuity of oral tradition, but
at the same time
403
66
67
68
69 70
is concealed that the number of leather is limited to Skanderbeg time. This is detected by the attempt of
the Ottomans to extinguish the memory of Skanderbeg, the great temporal distance and the overlapping
of the memory with new events. It should be emphasized that the song prefers to deal with current forms
and developments, and thus does not necessarily represent the primary medium of service. It is also
pointed out that in many regions it is more reminiscent of local nobles than Skanderbeg. South of the
Shkumbin about - in Berzeshtc; Polis and Shpat - are the songs of Gjorg Golemi, di Scanderbeg's father-
in-law Aramti Komino. In the northeast, in Kukes, TropQja and Puka Leka Dukagjin takes a central
step. In the southern part of Dibra Moise Golemi is remembered (ibid. 25). Further evidence in P. Bartl,
sources and materials on Albanian history in the 17th and 18th centuries. Volume 2, 1978, 57, 73, 96,
110. It is a visitation report from the beginning of the 18th century by Vincent ZmaJevic. Of particular
importance is the remark that Alessio's Cathedral was, in fact, a mosque, "per esser stato in quella
sepolto il famoso Scanderbeg" (73); also around 1700 the churches of Skanderbeg were remembered in
Alessio, so the Franciscan church SL Maria (96); see. also 1 Zamputi, Le nom et la tradition de
Skanderbeg dans les efforts of the Albanals pour la liberte durant les premiers Slecles de la domination
ottomane. Studia albanica 1967/2, 85-94 goes to the beginning of the 17th Century and benl11zt the
essential sources mentioned above. In addition to the ones in Fo. 65 documents mentioned s. The review
by Q. Haxhihasani, Les contes populaires sur l'epoque de Skanderbeg. Studia albanica 1967/2, 135-
154. Bio;: oku-Kasuati 174ft: An Albanian translation by SI Prifti, Frang
Bardhi. Skenderbeu.Apologji. Tiran !! 1957. Silk BCiSplele at P. Bartl, The Western Balkans between
Spanish monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Mt. J974, 232f. Haxhihasam, Contes 152. Thus the Russian
consul in Dalmatia, Antonios Palladokes in a report of April 25, 1787; in: Ars, H Pwcria, 68; see. also a
report by Antonios Tzikas dated October 12, 1794, on Mahmut: "siger en Souverain absolu de l'Albanie, a
l'exemple de son ancien compatriote Scander · Begh". Some of the main sources mentioned above. In
addition to the ones in Fo. 65 documents mentioned s. The review by Q. Haxhihasani, Les contes
populaires sur l'epoque de Skanderbeg. Studia albanica 1967/2, 135-154. Bio;: oku-Kasuati 174ft: An
Albanian translation by SI Prifti, Frang Bardhi. Skenderbeu.Apologji. Tiran !! 1957. Silk BCiSplele at P.
Bartl, The Western Balkans between Spanish monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Mt. J974,
232f. Haxhihasam, Contes 152. Thus the Russian consul in Dalmatia, Antonios Palladokes in a report of
April 25, 1787; in: Ars, H Pwcria, 68; see. also a report by Antonios Tzikas dated October 12, 1794, on
Mahmut: "siger en Souverain absolu de l'Albanie, a l'exemple de son ancien compatriote Scander ·
Begh". Some of the main sources mentioned above. In addition to the ones in Fo. 65 documents
mentioned s. The review by Q. Haxhihasani, Les contes populaires sur l'epoque de Skanderbeg. Studia
albanica 1967/2, 135-154. Bio;: oku-Kasuati 174ft: An Albanian translation by SI Prifti, Frang
Bardhi. Skenderbeu.Apologji. Tiran !! 1957. Silk BCiSplele at P. Bartl, The Western Balkans between
Spanish monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Mt. J974, 232f. Haxhihasam, Contes 152. Thus the Russian
consul in Dalmatia, Antonios Palladokes in a report of April 25, 1787; in: Ars, H Pwcria, 68; see. also a
report by Antonios Tzikas dated October 12, 1794, on Mahmut: "siger en Souverain absolu de l'Albanie, a
l'exemple de son ancien compatriote Scander · Begh". Haxhihasani, Les contes populaires sur l'epoque
de Skanderbeg. Studia albanica 1967/2, 135-154. Bio;: oku-Kasuati 174ft: An Albanian translation by SI
Prifti, Frang Bardhi. Skenderbeu.Apologji. Tiran !! 1957. Silk BCiSplele at P. Bartl, The Western Balkans
between Spanish monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Mt. J974, 232f. Haxhihasam, Contes 152. Thus the
Russian consul in Dalmatia, Antonios Palladokes in a report of April 25, 1787; in: Ars, H Pwcria,
68; see. also a report by Antonios Tzikas dated October 12, 1794, on Mahmut: "siger en Souverain
absolu de l'Albanie, a l'exemple de son ancien compatriote Scander · Begh". Haxhihasani, Les contes
populaires sur l'epoque de Skanderbeg. Studia albanica 1967/2, 135-154. Bio;: oku-Kasuati 174ft: An
Albanian translation by SI Prifti, Frang Bardhi. Skenderbeu.Apologji. Tiran !! 1957. Silk BCiSplele at P.
Bartl, The Western Balkans between Spanish monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Mt. J974,
232f. Haxhihasam, Contes 152. Thus the Russian consul in Dalmatia, Antonios Palladokes in a report of
April 25, 1787; in: Ars, H Pwcria, 68; see. also a report by Antonios Tzikas dated October 12, 1794, on
Mahmut: "siger en Souverain absolu de l'Albanie, a l'exemple de son ancien compatriote Scander ·
Begh". Skenderbeu.Apologji. Tiran !! 1957. Silk BCiSplele at P. Bartl, The Western Balkans between
Spanish monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Mt. J974, 232f. Haxhihasam, Contes 152. Thus the Russian
consul in Dalmatia, Antonios Palladokes in a report of April 25, 1787; in: Ars, H Pwcria, 68; see. also a
report by Antonios Tzikas dated October 12, 1794, on Mahmut: "siger en Souverain absolu de l'Albanie, a
l'exemple de son ancien compatriote Scander · Begh". Skenderbeu.Apologji. Tiran !! 1957. Silk BCiSplele
at P. Bartl, The Western Balkans between Spanish monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Mt. J974,
232f. Haxhihasam, Contes 152. Thus the Russian consul in Dalmatia, Antonios Palladokes in a report of
April 25, 1787; in: Ars, H Pwcria, 68; see. also a report by Antonios Tzikas dated October 12, 1794, on
Mahmut: "siger en Souverain absolu de l'Albanie, a l'exemple de son ancien compatriote Scander ·
Begh".
71 JG von Hahn, journey through the areas of Drin and Vardar. Vienna 1867, 23 and 50. Extensive, but
little considered, examination of A. Schmaus, relics of the Skanderbeg epic in the popular poetry of the
Italo-Albanians, in: H. Kulm - K. Schier (ed.), Mlirchen, Myth, seal. Festschrift for the 90th birthday of
Friedrich von der Leyens on 19 August 1963. Munich 1963, 231-242. 72 Puchner 166. 73 This is evident
from the oral traditions of the northern Albanian tribes: F. Baron Nopcsa, The Mountain Tribes of Northern
Albania and Their Common Law, ed. by F. Baxhaku K. Kaser, The Tribal Society of Northern
Albania. Reports and Researches of Austrian Consuls and Scholars (1861-1917). Vienna - Kbln - Weimar
1996, 205-428. This is also clearly emphasized in Ismall Kadare's most recent essay: Identiteti evropian i
Shqiptareve. Tirana 2006, 22, even if the claim. The memory of Skanderbeg was expressly forbidden in
the Ottoman Empire, it can not be proven. Kadare also speaks of a return of the myth to Albania through
European mediation. 75 p. Skendi, Skenderbeg and Albanian National Consciousness. Sudast Research
27 (1968) 83-88; see. also the same., Religious in Albania during the Ottoman Rule. To essay. Southeast
Research 15 (1956) 311-327. 76 lectures by M. Mandala and F. Altimari at the Skanderbag
Conference. Palenno February 2006 (files in print). 77 N. Clay, Aux origines du nationalisme albanals. La
naissance d'une nation maJoritairement musulmane en Europe. Paris 2007,177. 78 p. Also G. de Rada,
Opere. A cura di Girolamo de Rada Junior e Vmcenzo Selvaggl. Cosenza 1965, the narrative ,, Girolamo
de Rada. Opera omnia. Vol. VI. Skanderbeku pafän (Skanderbeg sventurato). Soveria Mannelli 2005. 79
Clayer, Aux origines 170ff. 80 clays, Aux origines 20r. 81 Puchner 166f. points out that Skanderbeg -
does not appear in the Greek folk song and found its way into the southern Slav folksongs "from above",
through the song cycle of A. I MICMiosic (printed 1756) Girolamo de Rada. Opera omnia. Vol.
VI. Skanderbeku pafän (Skanderbeg sventurato). Soveria Mannelli 2005. 79 Clayer, Aux origines
170ff. 80 clays, Aux origines 20r. 81 Puchner 166f. points out that Skanderbeg - does not appear in the
Greek folk song and found its way into the southern Slav folksongs "from above", through the song cycle
of A. I MICMiosic (printed 1756)
404
h, l
82 1. Bourcart, L'Albany et les Albanais. Paris 1921,104. 83 Clayer, Aux origines 191 f. 84 P. Bartl, On
the History Myth of the Albanians, in: D. Dahlmann (ed.), Myths, Symbols and Rituals: the historical power
of the signs in Southeastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. FI in: Studia Albanica
Monacensia. Munich 1969, 129-140; A. Schmaus, The Skenderbeg cycle at AK Mio ~ ic. Shejzatl Le
Pleiad, 10 (1966) 320-335. 92 On the Romanian fanatics s. N. Ciachir G. Maksutovicl-D. Polena. La
personnalitc du heros albanais Georges Kastriote-Skanderbeg dans quelques ouvrages roumains. Studia
albanica 1968/2, 121-130, only a few examples of the Romanian SkanderbegrezeptlOTI can be
enumerated; The earliest document is found in Dimitne Cantemir (124). 93 J. Matl, A Croatian
Skanderbeg drama, in: Studia Albanica Monacensia. Munich 1969, 141-145. 94 Giochalas, LKtvttpll'tETl
~. I 18ff. 95 Giochalas, IKEY "t" Ep! LJtS1l ~, 133fI. 96 D. MUHer, citizen of WideffiJf. Jews and Muslims
as Aging Partners In Romanian and Serbian Nation Codes. Ethnonational Citizenship Concepts 1878-
1941. Wiesbaden 2005, 120,189. 97 S. Gopcevic, The Principality of Albania, its past, ethnographic
conditions, political situation and prospects for the future. Berlin 1914, 10th 98th Clayer, Aux origines
441.528. 99 So Ludwig von Thall6czy, quoted in R. Beluli's edition of his Albanian history. 75. 100 R.
SamardZic (ed.), Kosovo and Metohija in Serbian history. Lausanne 1989, 397. 101 Clayer, Aux origines
441f. 102 Clayer, Aux origines 416. 103 Quoted in R. Beluli's edition of Thaliczy's Albanian history. 55 ..
t04 K. Gostentschnigg, The Interweaving of Science and Politics Using the Example of Austro-Hungarian
Albanology. Southeast Research 58 (1999) 221-245. 105 E. Deusch., Albanian candidate for the
throne. A contribution to the history of the Albanian state foundation. Munich Zeitschniji for Balkanlamde 4
(1981182) 89-150, especially 91ff. 106 Deusch 96ff. Austria-Hungary took this so seriously that the
historian and politician Ludwig Gostentschnigg, The Interweaving of Science and Politics Using the
Example of Austro-Hungarian Albanology. Southeast Research 58 (1999) 221-245. 105 E. Deusch.,
Albanian candidate for the throne. A contribution to the history of the Albanian state foundation. Munich
Zeitschniji for Balkanlamde 4 (1981182) 89-150, especially 91ff. 106 Deusch 96ff. Austria-Hungary took
this so seriously that the historian and politician Ludwig Gostentschnigg, The Interweaving of Science and
Politics Using the Example of Austro-Hungarian Albanology. Southeast Research 58 (1999) 221-245. 105
E. Deusch., Albanian candidate for the throne. A contribution to the history of the Albanian state
foundation. Munich Zeitschniji for Balkanlamde 4 (1981182) 89-150, especially 91ff. 106 Deusch
96ff. Austria-Hungary took this so seriously that the historian and politician Ludwig
405
von Thalloczy undertook particularly in lower-linguistic Arcllven requisitions, which did not serve purely
historical purposes; Deusch 94f. 107 Kendime per Shkolle te te te Shqypnis. Libri j dyte and Libri i
treU! 2nd edition) o. Oo o. J., especially the 3rd volume. Chapter 6 "Kallxime Historijet", which referred to
the treatment of the Slavs in Alballlen, 186ff., Immediately to the noble families of the Muzaki and Thopia
(188ff.) And from these to Sman Pasha of Shkodra, 108th Kendime per Kåñasen te kicked Shkollave
1915, 106-108 and 108ff., 109 Kendime per rendm eeste te shkollave fillore, Hartuem prej ie Papanstos e
S. Harrit Tirane 1927, 199-2001, 1101. RedZepagi6, Razvoj prosvete i skolstva albanske narodnosti na
teritoriju danaSnje Jugoslavlje do 1918. godine, Pristina 1968, D. Kostovicova, " Autonomous regimes in
East-Central and South-Eastern Europe 1919-1944. Paderbom - Vienna 2001, 349378, here360. 115
Schmidt-Neke 206. 116 Francesco Jacomoni di San Severino, La politica dell'Italia nelle testimoniale di
Francesco Jacomoni di San Severino. o. O. 1965, 139ff. For instance, in the memoirs of Mussolini's
governor Albania (see footnote 16). 118 G. Fini, Giorgio Castnota Scanderbeg, 1939. Rassegno
Nazionale 27 (1939) 326-330, here 330, bel G. Ghetti, Giorgio Castriota quotes Scanderbeg nella
storiogrnfia. ShejzatILe Pleiadi 1211-3 (1968) 13-36, 34. 119 F. Cordignano, L 'Albania nella storia e nella
vita ossia visione panoramica di un piccolo La politica dell'Italia nelle testimoniale di Francesco Jacomoni
di San Severino. o. O. 1965, 139ff. For instance, in the memoirs of Mussolini's governor Albania (see
footnote 16). 118 G. Fini, Giorgio Castnota Scanderbeg, 1939. Rassegno Nazionale 27 (1939) 326-330,
here 330, bel G. Ghetti, Giorgio Castriota quotes Scanderbeg nella storiogrnfia. ShejzatILe Pleiadi 1211-3
(1968) 13-36, 34. 119 F. Cordignano, L 'Albania nella storia e nella vita ossia visione panoramica di un
piccolo La politica dell'Italia nelle testimoniale di Francesco Jacomoni di San Severino. o. O. 1965,
139ff. For instance, in the memoirs of Mussolini's governor Albania (see footnote 16). 118 G. Fini, Giorgio
Castnota Scanderbeg, 1939. Rassegno Nazionale 27 (1939) 326-330, here 330, bel G. Ghetti, Giorgio
Castriota quotes Scanderbeg nella storiogrnfia. ShejzatILe Pleiadi 1211-3 (1968) 13-36, 34. 119 F.
Cordignano, L 'Albania nella storia e nella vita ossia visione panoramica di un piccolo Giorgio Castriota
Scanderbeg nella storiogrnfia. ShejzatILe Pleiadi 1211-3 (1968) 13-36, 34. 119 F. Cordignano, L 'Albania
nella storia e nella vita ossia visione panoramica di un piccolo Giorgio Castriota Scanderbeg nella
storiogrnfia. ShejzatILe Pleiadi 1211-3 (1968) 13-36, 34. 119 F. Cordignano, L 'Albania nella storia e nella
vita ossia visione panoramica di un piccolo
mondo primitivo. Rivisfa d'Albalia 2 (1941) 19-33, 29. 120 Cf. about the role of the Jesuit Gmseppe
Valentini in the years after 1939; Valentini, like Cordignano, is one of the most valued medieval histories
of Albania, and has also emerged as a major stylist in the opposite variant of the Albanian
language; Jacomoni 134, 183, 188, 270; Among others, Valentilll advised the Italian army in the Greek
campaign 1940. 121 N. Malcolm. Kosovo. London 1998, 309ff. 122 A. Mustaqi, L'echo de la figure de
Georges Kastriote · Skanderbeg dans les chants populaires de la Lutte de liberation nationale et la period
d 'edification socialiste en Albanie. Stu_ dio albanica 1967/2, 171-179. 123 This is the sequel to the
picture drawn by SF Noli; see. G. Valentini. Problemi storiograii.ci castriotani. ShejzatILe Pfeiadi 10
(1966) 77-82; This essay belongs to the Beg. th, which was geschedben over Skandcrbeg, but because
of the remote Ernchemungsort also to the least acquaintances. 124 Mustaql, L'echo de la figure de
Georges Kastriote-Skanderbeg with text example! 125 Lubonja 96 Venveist, inter alia, on the Soviet
Albanian film about Skanderbeg from 1957, which compared the Ottomans as Asian hordes and Venedlg
as an exploitative capitalist power to the morally superior Albanian people! IL 126 In addition, A. Hetzer,
Aspects of Subjectivity in Albanian Cultural Politics (1965) -1975). Bremen 1979. 7ff. and especially
44f. (there an analysis of the most important originated in Hoxha-Albania Skanderbeg novel by Sabn
Godo). 127 To the following Bartl 136ff .; LubonJa 94ff .; O. 1. Schmitt, Comrade Aleks and his party
or. On Pohtik and Geschichtswlssenschaft in communist Albania (1945-1991). in: M. Krzoska- H.-
Ch. Maner (ed.), Occupation and vocation. History and nation building in East Central and Southeastern
Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. Münster 2005, 143166 (these remarks should be supplemented by
the recently published memoirs of Aleks Budas, edited by his daughter, which go as far as the end of
World War II: T. Haxhimihali, Aleks Buda, Kujtime, Tirana 2005); on the concept of understanding
Skanderbeg as the central figure of the civil religion s. Egin Ceka, Albanian civil religion and Skanderbeg
myth. Museum tour of a different kind. Manuscript. Vienna 2006; see. ders., Outlines of the Albanian
National Identity of the Socialist History and nation building in East Central and Southeastern Europe in
the 19th and 20th centuries. Münster 2005, 143166 (these remarks should be supplemented by the
recently published memoirs of Aleks Budas, edited by his daughter, which go as far as the end of World
War II: T. Haxhimihali, Aleks Buda, Kujtime, Tirana 2005); on the concept of understanding Skanderbeg
as the central figure of the civil religion s. Egin Ceka, Albanian civil religion and Skanderbeg
myth. Museum tour of a different kind. Manuscript. Vienna 2006; see. ders., Outlines of the Albanian
National Identity of the Socialist History and nation building in East Central and Southeastern Europe in
the 19th and 20th centuries. Münster 2005, 143166 (these remarks should be supplemented by the
recently published memoirs of Aleks Budas, edited by his daughter, which go as far as the end of World
War II: T. Haxhimihali, Aleks Buda, Kujtime, Tirana 2005); on the concept of understanding Skanderbeg
as the central figure of the civil religion s. Egin Ceka, Albanian civil religion and Skanderbeg
myth. Museum tour of a different kind. Manuscript. Vienna 2006; see. ders., Outlines of the Albanian
National Identity of the Socialist which lasted until the end of World War II: T. Haxhimihali, Aleks
Buda. Kujtime. Tirana 2005); on the concept of understanding Skanderbeg as the central figure of the civil
religion s. Egin Ceka, Albanian civil religion and Skanderbeg myth. Museum tour of a different kind.
Manuscript. Vienna 2006; see. ders., Outlines of the Albanian National Identity of the Socialist which
lasted until the end of World War II: T. Haxhimihali, Aleks Buda. Kujtime. Tirana 2005); on the concept of
understanding Skanderbeg as the central figure of the civil religion s. Egin Ceka, Albanian civil religion
and Skanderbeg myth. Museum tour of a different kind. Manuscript. Vienna 2006; see. ders., Outlines of
the Albanian National Identity of the Socialist
406
to this day. Continuities and fractures, in: D. Segert (llisg.), Postsozia \ Jsmus. Legacies of state socialism
and new capitalisms in Europe. Vienna 2007, 101-121. Buda still enjoys a high reputation today, and his
role has not been critically questioned so far. His interpretation of Skanderbegung - was recently reprinted
several times, including by the Academy of Kosovo: H. Islami - F. Rexhepi - T. Haxhimihali (ed.), Aleks
Buda. Studio histonke. Tekste tezgjedhura. Prishtine 2006,147-337. In his essay "Fan S. NoH, historian i
Skenderbeut" (ibid. 228-250), Buda sums up the instrumentalization of Skanderbeg by the Communist
regime: "After the great anti-fascist struggle, in which the participation of the masses of the people plays
such an important role had played in the annihilation of the occupiers, It is noteworthy that Skanderbeg
was also celebrated in other parts of Yugoslavia as a symbol of Balbnvblker's partisan campaign against
the "Turks conqueror." This was the opinion of later Croatian President Franjo Tudman in his book, Rat
protiv rata, Partizanski rat u proslosti i buducnosti "[War on the war. Partisan struggle in the past and
future]. 2nd edition Zagreb 1970, 109 (kind note by Alojz Ivani ~ evic, Vienna). 136 Rifinrjja 10 May 1968,
10. 137 D. Kostovicova, Kosovo. The Politics of Identity and Space. London - New York 2005, 175 138
About Bel. B. Tahiri, veins Jashari Legjende e legjendave. Prishtine 2006, 38. later Croatian President
Franjo Tudman in his book Rat protiv rata. Partizanski rat u proslosti i buducnosti "[War against the war:
Partisan struggle in the past and future] 2nd edition of Zagreb 1970, 109 (kindly by Alojz Ivani ~ evic,
Vienna) 136 Rifinrjja 10 May 1968, 10. 137 D. Kostovicova, Kosovo The Politics of Identity and Space
London - New York 2005, 175 138 About Bel B. Tahiri, Veins Jashari Legjende e legjendave, Prishtine
2006, 38. later Croatian President Franjo Tudman in his book Rat protiv rata. Partizanski rat u proslosti i
buducnosti "[War against the war: Partisan struggle in the past and future] 2nd edition of Zagreb 1970,
109 (kindly by Alojz Ivani ~ evic, Vienna) 136 Rifinrjja 10 May 1968, 10. 137 D. Kostovicova, Kosovo The
Politics of Identity and Space London - New York 2005, 175 138 About Bel B. Tahiri, Veins Jashari
Legjende e legjendave, Prishtine 2006, 38. The Politics of Identity and Space. London - New York 2005,
175 138 About Bel. B. Tahiri, veins Jashari Legjende e legjendave. Prishtine 2006, 38. The Politics of
Identity and Space. London - New York 2005, 175 138 About Bel. B. Tahiri, veins Jashari Legjende e
legjendave. Prishtine 2006, 38.
139 F. Veliu, UCK nga beteja ne beteje. Tctove 2005, pp. S 209. 214. On the occasion of Skandje
congress in Skopje, the Makedo-Albanian newspaper "Faki" (26.11.2005, p. 16) printed the essay on the
theme of the 600th anniversary of the birth of Skanderbeg and 50. Birthday veins of Jasharis "(one of
Kosovo's hero-worshiped KLA battles, see S. Schwandner Sievers, The Legendary Commander: The
Construction of an Albanian master-narrative in post-war Kosovo.) Naions and Nationalism 1213 (2006)
513-529) and thus created a pandlele between the historical national hero and a new symbolic figure. 140
This is populated in the interpretations of the Historia e Shqlptar. Vol. I. Tirana 2002, 490ff. as well as
from P. Thengjilli, Historia e popullitshqiptar 395-1875. Tirana 1999, 182-189, where (I 84f.) After all,
different interpretations. Kral na Eplr i Makedonija i vtor Alelcsanclar Makedonski. Skopje 2005, in:
Gfasnik na INI 49 (2005) 369-383. 146 Thus the speeches of the Macedonian Academy President C.
Grozdanov and of the Academic Committee G. Todorovski in Skopje on November 25, 2005. Printed with:
Gerg Kastrioti Skenderbeg (1405-1468). Materijali od naucniot sobir po povod 600 godini od negovoto
raganje, odrlan by Skopje na 25 i 26 nocmbri 2005. Skopje 2006. 9-11. Neue Zürcher Zeitung December
19, 2005, p. 3. 147 Neue Zürcher Zeitung December 19, 2005, Kral na Eplr i Makedonija i vtor
Alelcsanclar Makedonski. Skopje 2005, in: Gfasnik na INI 49 (2005) 369-383. 146 Thus the speeches of
the Macedonian Academy President C. Grozdanov and of the Academic Committee G. Todorovski in
Skopje on November 25, 2005. Printed with: Gerg Kastrioti Skenderbeg (1405-1468). Materijali od
naucniot sobir po povod 600 godini od negovoto raganje, odrlan by Skopje na 25 i 26 nocmbri 2005.
Skopje 2006. 9-11. Neue Zürcher Zeitung December 19, 2005, p. 3. 147 Neue Zürcher Zeitung December
19, 2005, Materijali od naucniot sobir po povod 600 godini od negovoto raganje, odrlan by Skopje na 25 i
26 nocmbri 2005. Skopje 2006. 9-11. Neue Zürcher Zeitung December 19, 2005, p. 3. 147 Neue Zürcher
Zeitung December 19, 2005, Materijali od naucniot sobir po povod 600 godini od negovoto raganje,
odrlan by Skopje na 25 i 26 nocmbri 2005. Skopje 2006. 9-11. Neue Zürcher Zeitung December 19, 2005,
p. 3. 147 Neue Zürcher Zeitung December 19, 2005,
407
p.3.
148 L Veliu, Skenderbeu 600 vjetorin e lindjes. Ken; ov !! 2005, on the title page. 149 Biyoku, Skenderbeu
78. 150 D. Egro, Kritika e historiografise shqiptare: rasti i SkeDderbeut, in: Gjergj Ka.strioti - SkeDderbeu
ne histonDe e Shqipweve, 120-137. S. Dun D. Egro, Histona dbe ideologia. Tirana 2007. 151 SulsLarova,
especially the chapter "Orientahzmi bashkekohor: shqiptar, 203ff. 152 Most clearly formulated by the
Kosovar Ottomanist H. Kaleshi, The Turkishee advance in the Balkans and the Islamization - factors for
the preservation of the ethnic and national existence of the Albanian People, in: Southeastern Europe
under the Crescent Moon, Munich 1975, 125-138, recently taken by P. Xhufi, Dllemat, 272ff .; 278f., Is
spoken of as having a "programmed assimilation policy". These theses are mainly based on the fact that
Albanian speakers in ethnic mixed regions such as Eastern Albania, Western Macedonia and Kosovo
(here the current borders are all meant) often bore Slavic names. It is therefore concluded by
Anthroponymen on Etlmizitat, a conclusion that is considered in the name research as extremely
problematic. Above all, such theses are based on an essentialist idea of diachronically stable
ethnonational identities. 153 Besides Sulstarova about Adlian Brisku, Oksidentahzrni i se shkuares dhe
orientalizmi i se tashmes: Identiteti "evropian" i Shqiptareve sipas shkrimtarit Ismail Kadare e Presidentit
Aleksander (1) Moisiu. Perpjelg'a 23 (2006) 52-b9. 154 L Ve1iu, Ski:! Nderbeu 298ff. 155 Lubonja 102; as
an example: ,, http: Eme clear criticism of the theses in P. Thengjilli, Rreth mbi pikepamjes ndarjen ne
Skenderbegas dhe vasal-balte mbi figures e Skenderbeut in: Gjergj Kastrioti - Skenderbeu ne hlstorine e
Shqlptareve, 37-83. 157 "Ushtria" 25. 10.2005. Eme clear criticism of the theses in P. Thengjilli, Rreth mbi
pikepamjes ndarjen ne Skenderbegas dhe vasal-balte mbi figures e Skenderbeut in: Gjergj Kastrioti -
Skenderbeu ne hlstorine e Shqlptareve, 37-83. 157 "Ushtria" 25. 10.2005.
23
Babinger, Mehmed 160. See my review in Southeastern Research 63/64 (200412005), 717-724. Pali,
Marino Barlezio. An overview also in G. Ghetti, Giorglo Castriota Scanderbeg nella storiografia. Shejzal /
Le P1eiodi 1211-3 (1968) 13-36, here 13-21. F. Pali, Di nuovo sulle biography scanderbcgiano.
789
10 11 12 13 14 15
16
17
18
408
Gtammaria Biemmi, Istoria del GlOrgio Castriotto detto Scander-begh Giammaria Biemml prete
Bresciano. Brescia 1742. K. Ohly, A Fake Radolt InklabeL GUlenberg Yearbook 1933, 53-61; vgL
Babinger's remarks in the introduction to reprinting by G. Petrovitch, Scanderbeg. Essai de bibliographIe
raisonnee. Paris 1881 (reprinted Munich 1967) as well as to Babinger's "End of the Arianites" (altercation
with F. Noli, who had turned against Ohly and Babinger); s. also Ghettl 26f., especially 28, where he
quotes A. Buda's remark that if Blemmi were to be renounced, Albanian society would have to renounce
many familiar elements of the Skanderbeg Radion, and to this day Biyoku-Kastrati 258-60 is hardly
prepared to do so. The following after Pertusi, Segono. Introduction. Published in C. Hopf, Cluoniques
grecoromanes inedites ou peu connues. Berlin 1873 (in it: Giovanni Musachi, Despoto cl 'Epiro, Historia
della casa Musacbia, 270-340). The following after Schmitt, Skanderbeg as new Alexander. Pali, Dl
nuovo 96f. G. Elezovic in 1st Radonrc, Burad Kastriot; Pulaha, Lufta. Schmitt, Venetian Yearbooks; ders.,
Venezia e 1a sua Albania. In addition R. Miha1jcic, Slovenska kancelanja arbana..ske vIastele. Decisive
are the preliminary remarks by G. Valentmi, Problemi storiografici castriotani. Shejzat / Le Pleiadi 1011-2
(1966) 77-82, here 77f. To the Dispacci s. Scl1mitt, The "tragic downfall" 569-573; ders., Skanderbeg's
last years, 57f. L. Stojanovic, Stari srpskr rodoslovi j letopisi. 1927; P. Schreiner, The Byzantine
Kleinchromken.3 vols. Vienna 1975-1978. M. Sokoloski, Turski dokumentl za istorijata na
makedonskiot narod. Opsiren popisen defter od XV vek .. vol. 2. Skopje 1973; ders., Turski dokumenti za
istoriJata na makedonskiot narod. Op ~ imi popisni defteri od XV vek .. Vol. 3. Skopje 1976; A.
Stoyanovsky. Turski dokumenti za istonjata na makedonskJot narod. Opposite poplsen defter od XV
vek .. vol. 4. Skopje 1978. 19 Pulaha, Lufta.
35
To relieve the annotation apparatus, only the most important titles are recorded. All the works mentioned
are easily accessible via the bibliography.
36
20 J. Ph. Fallmerayer, The Albanian element in Greece IIl. 21 JG von Hahn, journey through the areas of
Drin and Wardar. Memorandum of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. Philosophical-historical C / osse 15
(1867) and 16 (1869), in it as, third division. First Section: Documents on the History of Central Albania
after the Findings of Prof. KaTi Hopf '. 22 VV Makusev, Monurnenta historiea s Javorum
meridionalium. 23 J. Pisko, Skanderbeg. Vienna 1894. 24 Historia e Skenderbeut (Gjerq Kastnotit)
Mbretitte Shqiperise 1412-J468 preJ Peshkpit Theofan (= Fan S. Noli). Boston 1921; A. Gegaj, L 'Albanie
ct I'invasion turque au XVe siede. Paris 1937; A. Cutolo, Scanderbeg. Matland 1940. 25 Count VIIf even
approves of the first rank before Barletius. 26 Ghetti 34f. 27 C. Marinesco, Alphonse V, roi d ' Aragon et
de Naples, and J 'Albanie de Skanderbeg. Metanges de l'Ecale RalJmoine enFrance 1 (I923) 1-135; C.
Marinescu, La politique orientale d'Alfonse V d'Arngon, Toi de Naples (1416-1458). Barcelona 1994. 28 F.
PaU, Marino BarJezio, uno storico umamsta. Ders., I rapporti italo-albanesi alla meta. dei Secolo
XV .; ders., Di nuovo. 29 J. Valentini, Acta Albania Veneta. 30 1. Parnno, Acta Albaniae Vaticana Vol.
1; M. Scmmbra - G. Valentini - I. Pamno, Il "liber brevium". 31 H. Hodgkinson, Scanderbeg (edited by B.
Destafll-W. Cooper). London 1999. 32 K. Frashen, Skenderbeu. K. Biyoku, Skenderbeu. 33 K. Biyoku,
Shtrirja Lindore. 34 F. Pall, The Story of Skanderbeg in the Light of Recent Research. Leipzig
Quarterly Ecale RalJmoine enFrance 1 (I923) 1-135; C. Marinescu, La politique orientale d'Alfonse V
d'Arngon, Toi de Naples (1416-1458). Barcelona 1994. 28 F. PaU, Marino BarJezio, uno storico
umamsta. Ders., I rapporti italo-albanesi alla meta. dei Secolo XV .; ders., Di nuovo. 29 J. Valentini, Acta
Albania Veneta. 30 1. Parnno, Acta Albaniae Vaticana Vol. 1; M. Scmmbra - G. Valentini - I. Pamno, Il
"liber brevium". 31 H. Hodgkinson, Scanderbeg (edited by B. Destafll-W. Cooper). London 1999. 32 K.
Frashen, Skenderbeu. K. Biyoku, Skenderbeu. 33 K. Biyoku, Shtrirja Lindore. 34 F. Pall, The Story of
Skanderbeg in the Light of Recent Research. Leipzig Quarterly Ecale RalJmoine enFrance 1 (I923) 1-
135; C. Marinescu, La politique orientale d'Alfonse V d'Arngon, Toi de Naples (1416-1458). Barcelona
1994. 28 F. PaU, Marino BarJezio, uno storico umamsta. Ders., I rapporti italo-albanesi alla meta. dei
Secolo XV .; ders., Di nuovo. 29 J. Valentini, Acta Albania Veneta. 30 1. Parnno, Acta Albaniae Vaticana
Vol. 1; M. Scmmbra - G. Valentini - I. Pamno, Il "liber brevium". 31 H. Hodgkinson, Scanderbeg (edited by
B. Destafll-W. Cooper). London 1999. 32 K. Frashen, Skenderbeu. K. Biyoku, Skenderbeu. 33 K. Biyoku,
Shtrirja Lindore. 34 F. Pall, The Story of Skanderbeg in the Light of Recent Research. Leipzig Quarterly I
rapporti italo-albanesi alla meta. dei Secolo XV .; ders., Di nuovo. 29 J. Valentini, Acta Albania Veneta. 30
1. Parnno, Acta Albaniae Vaticana Vol. 1; M. Scmmbra - G. Valentini - I. Pamno, Il "liber brevium". 31 H.
Hodgkinson, Scanderbeg (edited by B. Destafll-W. Cooper). London 1999. 32 K. Frashen,
Skenderbeu. K. Biyoku, Skenderbeu. 33 K. Biyoku, Shtrirja Lindore. 34 F. Pall, The Story of Skanderbeg
in the Light of Recent Research. Leipzig Quarterly I rapporti italo-albanesi alla meta. dei Secolo
XV .; ders., Di nuovo. 29 J. Valentini, Acta Albania Veneta. 30 1. Parnno, Acta Albaniae Vaticana Vol.
1; M. Scmmbra - G. Valentini - I. Pamno, Il "liber brevium". 31 H. Hodgkinson, Scanderbeg (edited by B.
Destafll-W. Cooper). London 1999. 32 K. Frashen, Skenderbeu. K. Biyoku, Skenderbeu. 33 K. Biyoku,
Shtrirja Lindore. 34 F. Pall, The Story of Skanderbeg in the Light of Recent Research. Leipzig
Quarterly The story of Skanderbeg in the light of recent research. Leipzig Quarterly The story of
Skanderbeg in the light of recent research. Leipzig Quarterly
37
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
47 48
409
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VALENTINI, L'e1emento vloh nella zona scutarina, in: Southeastern Europe under the crescent. Milk
1975, 269-277 A. VESELINOVIC, Driava srpskib despota [The State of the Serbian Despot]. Belgrade
1995 P XHUFI. Dilemat e Arberi !. Studying mbi Shqlperine mesjetare [Dilemmas of Arberia. Studies on
medieval Albania]. Tirana 2006 L. zA (with the collaboration of L. Nadin), I villaggi deI Dio
Rodon. Frammenti di vita rurale albanese. Lecce 2001
EA ZACHARLADOU, Marginalia on thc HisLOI) of Epirus and Albania (1380-1418). Wiener Zeif.schrijr for
the customer of the Orient 78 (1988) EA ZACHARLADOU (ed.), The Via Egnatia under Ottoffian Rule
(1380-1699). Rcthymnon 1996 L ZAMPUTI, Le nOm et la tradition de Skanderbeg dans les efforts of the
Albanais pour la liberte durant les premiers siecles de la dommation ottomane. Studio albanica 1967/2,
85-94 M. ZEQO, Codex Scanderbeg - Libri i Skenderbeul Tlrana 2005 A. ZOTOS, De Scanderbeg a
Ismail Kadare. 8aintEtienne 1997
REGISTER Not included are the terms Albania, Mehmed 11. and Skanderbeg. Abdullabu, son H1ZJ1
beys 167 Adnanopel sa Edime 18,37,52,156,174 Ahmet bey, Timariot 309 ff. Akyehisar, sa Kruja 167 f,
270 Acrokorinth 250 Albanes, Theodor 60 Albanum, Bishopric 30, 94 Albizzi, Bank 107 Albulena 165, 177
AJessio (Le7..ha) 25, 30, 33, 35, 41, 43, 55 ff., 59 f., 63, 67 f., 78, 98, 103, 106, 108 f., III f., 116 f ., 119,
122ff., 126, 129, 131, 137, 141 f., 147, 167,188,190,201,241,267,274,283,285, 288 ff., 293, 295, 298,
302, 305, 315, 346, 355,357 Alexander the Great 13, 15 f, 39 f., 88,159,226, 229,247,310,335,337
Alexander, frater 261 Alfons v., King of Neape143, 47,50,59-62,64, 68,70 f., 76 ff., 87, 93,112 f., 120, 123,
125 f., 128 ff., 132, 134, 136, 139 f., 144, 155, 165, 171 f, 181 f, 187, 189-192, 195 ff., 199 f, 202 f., 205 f.,
208
Angelus, Pau145, 95, 97, 113, 125, 158, 226, 230, 240 f., 246 f., 254, 257, 260. 264, 268, 272, 275, 282,
292, 293, 437, 402, 054, 434, 438 d 'Angelina, Muzaki 32, 55, 103, 147, 168, 258 Angelovic see below
Mahmut Pasha Anjou 47, 202, 206 f., 228, 230 f. Ankam 20, 30 Antlvari (Bar) 46 f., 65, 95, 106, 125, 141,
170, 202,217,222,283,342,357 Antoine, "grand biitard" 254 Araniti 23 f., 32, 35 f, 45, 50, 119 ff., 128 f.,
131134, 136,266,268,270,273,275,322 Araniti, Angeina 131, 133,204 Araniti, Despina (Petrinella
Franeone) 131, 133 f, 270,275 Araniti, Komino (Komninovic) 32, 35 f., 55 f., 60 ff., 68,70- Aranitl,
Konstantin 131 Araniti, Moses Golem 55,134,144--148,152,168, 194,199,258,326 Araniti, Thomas 131,
133 f. Aramti, Vladin Golem 32, 103,131,144 Arbanasi, Nikola 150 Arta 169, 174 Ascoi 230 A ~ lkpru ;;
azade 159 f. Athens 169 Athos 33, 37, 94 Anika 245 Babinger, Franz 10 f., 340 BayezitI. 30 Bayezit 11.
297 f.
424
104, 145-149, 152, 163, 166 ff., 258, 265 f, 268, 272, 274, 282 f, 319, 337 Balldren 64 BalSa IlI. 31,57 f.,
337 BalSie 31,56 ff., 90, 103, 121, 128 f, 190, 293 f., 322,326,356 Balste, Georg Ir. Stracimuovie 19
BalSie, Georg Strez 55 f, 128 f., 200 BalSie, Gojko Strez 32, 55, 104, 129, 131, 230, 294 Balsie,
Constantlll 104 Balsie, Ivan 104, 108 f., 128 f., 293, 356 Balsie, Paul Strez 32 BalSie, Stefan 32, 104
Balzo, Antonio dei 206 Balzo, Francesco dei 228 Balzo, PiITO del230 Barbaro, Josafat 264, 289, 294
Barcelona 12, 349 Bardhi, Frang (Blancus, Franciscus) 302 Barletius, Marinus 8, 11, 13 ff., 26, 38 f, 41,
45, 49 f., 56 f, 59 f, '67, 71, 73, 84, 92 f, 108, tI6 ff., 121, 126 f. , 135f, 144f, 147, 155f, 165f., 169, 171,
176, 178, 188f, 201, 210, 230,243,255,267,283,299,302,340-344, 348,353 f. BarJetta
77,107,207,228,230 ff. u. Berat BeJica 151 Belisar 230 Belove 151 Benda (Landscape) 167,270,294
Berat 23 f., 78, 86, 93,119 ff., 125, 128, 130, 144, 148,154,161, 164f., 170, 174, 176f., 181 f, 191-
195,220,241 f, 265, 295, 322, 326, 334, 345 Berguzzi, Nikolaus 76 Berisl1a (tribe) 92,134,275 Berisha,
Nikola 92,147,258 Bessarion, Kardlnal 252 Bi (j: oku, Kasem 11 f, 342, 350 f Biemmi, Giammaria 340,
342, 348 f Bigorskj, Svetl Jovan (monastery) 33, 116 Birina 115 Bitola see below Monastir Blasius,
Kalfalterer 99, 290 Blasius de Lino, frater 95,241 Bleaea 67 Boceaccio, Davlde 229 Bogdan Ripe 24
BalabanPa ~ a u. Berat BeJica 151 Belisar 230 Belove 151 Benda (Landscape) 167,270,294 Berat 23 f.,
78, 86, 93,119 ff., 125, 128, 130, 144, 148,154,161, 164f., 170, 174, 176f., 181 f, 191- 195,220,241 f, 265,
295, 322, 326, 334, 345 Berguzzi, Nikolaus 76 Berisl1a (tribe) 92,134,275 Berisha, Nikola 92,147,258
Bessarion, Kardlnal 252 Bi (j: oku, Kasem 11 f, 342, 350 f Biemmi, Giammaria 340, 342, 348 f Bigorskj,
Svetl Jovan (monastery) 33, 116 Birina 115 Bitola see below Monastir Blasius, Kalfalterer 99, 290 Blasius
de Lino, frater 95,241 Bleaea 67 Boceaccio, Davlde 229 Bogdan Ripe 24 BalabanPa ~ a
Bojana 126,283,287,357 Boldit, Leonardo 289, 294 Bollam, Giovanni 125 BonaJBunic 100 Bonatto, B.
231 Bonfini, Antonio 344 Borova 355 Boiie, lvan 11,350 Brankovie (family) 29, 45, 104, 204, 330
Brankovie, George 41-49, 51 f., 60 ff., 64 f., 69 f., 74,89,99, 107, 133, 158, 189, 198,329 ff., 337
Brankovie, Grgur 29, 32, 45 Brankovie, Helena 45,261 Brankovic, Irene 32 , 45, 298, 330 Brankovic,
Lazar45, 104 Brankovie, Mara 23, 44 f, 51, 336 Brankovie, Stefan 44 f, 131, 133,204,241,245,
Cesena 276 Chalkocondyles, Laonikos 58, 67, 191,235,343 Chilandar 29, 33, 37 ChioggJa 264
Cimarosta, Antonio 180,257 f. Claver, Juan 192, 199 <; okadar, Ali bey 163 Colleoni, Bartolomeo 284,
288 Collis, Gherardo de 155,258,263 Contarini, Luca 141 Contarini, Matteo 274 Contarini, Paolo 281
Cordignano, Fulvio 311 Corner; Nlcolo 262 Corvinus, Manhias su Matthias Corvil1uS Cosenza 231
Cosenza, Antonio da, su Cimarosta Crnojevic 32, 34, 56, 61, 64 f., 103, 129, 163, 188, 295,331
CrnoJevic, Gojcin 60 Cmojevic, Ivan 131, 170, 264 f, 267 f, 295, 297 f. Cmojevic, Stefan (Stefamca) 32,
47, 55 f., 60, 64 f., 107, 126, 132, 188, 195,252 f., 325 Curte, Sceva de 42 Cutolo, Alessandro 349 Dagno
(Vau e Dejes) 56, 63-68, 72 f., 75,109,112, 128,135 f., 138-142, 166, 171, 190, 199,201, 213,266,268 f.,
272, 274, 287 f., 294, 357 Davalos, Alfonso 228, 230 f David 275 Debar su Dibra Delvina24 Demli Hisar
66, 351 Dervenik 66 Derven66, 117, 146 Dibra 17,25-30,39,50,55,59,66 f, 71, 73, 88, 91 f., 101 f , 115 f.,
118, 121, 136, 143 ff., 147 f., 150 ff., 159, 163 f., 166, 168, 170, 175179,181,185,189,192,194,199 ff., 211
ff., 234,158,170,287,289,322,326,335,338 f ., 354 f., 357 Dibra, Moses of s. u Araniti, Moses Golem
Dlbrishte 163 Dirjan 150 Disreali, Benjamin 300 Dobruja 19 Dolfin, Antonio 138 f Dolgo brdo 150 f., 270,
355 Danube 8,19 f, 23,41 ff, 46 f., 49 f, 52 f, 68, 74, 77, 160, 162, 192, 197 f., 203, 235, 244f, 250, 328
f. Dorotheos, Archbishop of Ochnd 94 Dorsa, Vincenzo 303 Dracul, Vlad 43, 52, 158 150 ff., 159, 163 f.,
166, 168, 170, 175179,181,185,189,192,194,199 ff., 211 ff., 234,158,170,287,289,322,326,335,338 f.,
354 f., 357 Dibra, Moses of s. u Araniti, Moses Golem Dlbrishte 163 Dirjan 150 Disreali, Benjamin 300
Dobruja 19 Dolfin, Antonio 138 f Dolgo brdo 150 f., 270, 355 Danube 8,19 f, 23,41 ff, 46 f., 49 f, 52 f, 68,
74, 77, 160, 162, 192, 197 f., 203, 235, 244f, 250, 328 f. Dorotheos, Archbishop of Ochnd 94 Dorsa,
Vincenzo 303 Dracul, Vlad 43, 52, 158 150 ff., 159, 163 f., 166, 168, 170,
175179,181,185,189,192,194,199 ff., 211 ff., 234,158,170,287,289,322,326,335,338 f., 354 f., 357 Dibra,
Moses of s. u Araniti, Moses Golem Dlbrishte 163 Dirjan 150 Disreali, Benjamin 300 Dobruja 19 Dolfin,
Antonio 138 f Dolgo brdo 150 f., 270, 355 Danube 8,19 f, 23,41 ff, 46 f., 49 f, 52 f, 68, 74, 77, 160, 162,
192, 197 f., 203, 235, 244f, 250, 328 f. Dorotheos, Archbishop of Ochnd 94 Dorsa, Vincenzo 303 Dracul,
Vlad 43, 52, 158 328 f. Dorotheos, Archbishop of Ochnd 94 Dorsa, Vincenzo 303 Dracul, Vlad 43, 52,
158 328 f. Dorotheos, Archbishop of Ochnd 94 Dorsa, Vincenzo 303 Dracul, Vlad 43, 52, 158
Dragoman (pass) 48 Drenok 150 Drin 25, 28, 31, 63, 65, 67 f., 120, 135, 139-142, 150 f., 164,
166,266,268 f, 287, 290, 294 f Black Drin 25 f. , 28, 30, 33, 56, 91, 95, 116, 121, 151, 76 f., 211, 268, 302,
355. Drisht su Drivasto Drivsto (Drisht) 56, 63 et seq., 97, 125, 137 et seq., 141, 199, 202, 212, 240, 246,
283, 295 f , 325, 341, 343, 357 Dukagjin 32, 56, 63-67, 113, 119 f., 128 f., 132, 135 f., 137-143, 163, 166,
169, 188-191, 199 f., 202, 212, 266, 272, 287, 294, 298, 322 et seq., 326 f. Dukagjin, Draga 135, 137,
140 ff., 234, 248 Dukagjin, Georg 131 Dukagjin, Leka (the Elder) 135, 137 Dukagjin Leka (the limgere)
63, 88, 96, 133, 135, 137, 139-143, 200 f ., 234, 241, 252 f., 257, 260.264 f., 267 f., 283, 287, 289 ff., 297
Dukagjin, Nikola (the Elder) 35, 56, 63 f., 68, 72, 131, 135-138, 283, 287, 293 f, 297 Dukagjin, Nlkola (the
Younger) 135, 137, 285, 289, 293 f, 297 Dukagjin, Pal (older line) 128, 140 Dukagjin, Pal Gilngere line)
56, 63, 68, 72, 136 ff., 140 Dukagjlll, Pal (c. 1468) 293 Dukagjin, Progon 125, 135, 137,272,287,294
Dukagjin , Tanush 131 Dulcigno (Ulcinj) 31, 60, 69, 81, 95,123,126,183, 222,267,275,293,342 Durazzo
(Durres) 15, 19,25,30,35,41,47,49 f., 56,65,68,70-74, 86, 95, 97 et seq., 105, 108 f., 111 f., 116, 121-125,
128, 130, 132, 134, 141, 146 et seq., 170, 190-194, 196, 199, 201 f , 207, 226,230,239 f, 246 f., 256, 260,
264, 268, 270, 272, 274, 276, 282 f., 285 f, 289-293. DuSan, Stefan 17, 19,95,162 DuSman 129
Du.'iman, Boiidar 13 7 Du.5man, Leka 56 Dusman, Paul138 Dusman, Peter 56 Edime (Adrianople) 23, 37
f., 47 f., 52 et al., 74,160, 162,175,250 Egnatia, Via 19,22,47,56,66,72,119,147,184, 239,268 Elbasan
133, 144, 147, 160, 184,219,
426
Eme, Gieyanni 253, 259 Erebare 151 Enzzo, Antonio 269 Ertogrul18 Erzen 119, 121, 167,286 Este,
Ercole d '228 Eugene IV., Pope 36, 46 f., 53 f., 60, Eugen, Franciscan n. 94,141 f. Eugen,
Dominikanennönch 237 Eyrenosoglu (family) 22,123,164,169 Evrenosoglu, Ali 165, 199,201 f., 204
Fallmerayer, Jacob Philipp 301, 341, 348 Fani 99,117,135 ff., 141 f. Federico von Montefeltro 231 Feraj,
Hysamedin 319 Fenz bey, voivode of SiLnica 61, 166,289 Ferrante I, King of Naples 85, 102, 111, 113,
129,147,155,172,183,187 f., 202, 205-208, 225-234,239,253,256,261 ff, 274 f. , 277 ff., 281 f., 284, 288,
291 f., 298, 334 Ferrara 134 f., 228 Filelfo, Francesco 132, 179 FIidfo, Xenophon 172 Fleming, Ian 350
Florence 46, 106, 206, 257, 271 , 273, 278, 284, 343 Foscari, Francesco 132 Foscarini, Ludovico 247
Foxa, Giovanni Antonio de 207,231 f. Francone, 01iYiero 133 Franeone. Petrinella (Araniti, Despina) 131,
133 Franeo, Demetrio 38. 57 f., 84 f., 87, 92, 109. 127, 129, 135, 147, 155,243,253,283,291,299, 340-343
Fransheri, Kristo 340, 342, 351 Frasheri , Naim 305, 310 Frashen, Sami 305, 310 Fravesh 167 Frederick I
Barbarossa 264 Frederick III. 52, 90, 134,239,329 Fruzin, Tsar 36 Galatina 298 Gahcnik 164 GalJipoIi
18,53 Gardi 28 Gargano 183,228,230,234,253,277,296,298 Garibaldi, Giuseppe 303 Garillo, Santo 191
Gasulus (family) 98, 101 Gasulus, Andreas 99 Gasulus, John 98 f. GasuJus, Paul 99, J 97,252 Gegaj,
Athanase 342, 349 Genoa 20, 273 Genniyan, Hacl 151 310 Fravesh 167 Frederick I Barbarossa 264
Frederick III. 52, 90, 134,239,329 Fruzin, Tsar 36 Galatina 298 Gahcnik 164 GalJipoIi 18,53 Gardi 28
Gargano 183,228,230,234,253,277,296,298 Garibaldi, Giuseppe 303 Garillo, Santo 191 Gasulus (family)
98, 101 Gasulus, Andreas 99 Gasulus, John 98 f. GasuJus, Paul 99, J 97,252 Gegaj, Athanase 342, 349
Genoa 20, 273 Genniyan, Hacl 151 310 Fravesh 167 Frederick I Barbarossa 264 Frederick III. 52, 90,
134,239,329 Fruzin, Tsar 36 Galatina 298 Gahcnik 164 GalJipoIi 18,53 Gardi 28 Gargano
183,228,230,234,253,277,296,298 Garibaldi, Giuseppe 303 Garillo, Santo 191 Gasulus (family) 98, 101
Gasulus, Andreas 99 Gasulus, John 98 f. GasuJus, Paul 99, J 97,252 Gegaj, Athanase 342, 349 Genoa
20, 273 Genniyan, Hacl 151
GlOyio, Paolo 40, 247 Gisualdo 231 GiUstinianl, Bemardo 276 Gjadri 141 f. Gjinovec 150 GJirokastra 23
f., 35, 49, 56,128, 161,165,322, 357 Gjurica, Moise 92 Gjurica, Vladen 258 Go1ubac 52 Gondola
Gundund de (Family) 100. 107 Gondolo, Michael de 100 Gondola, Paladino de 100, 173, 249, 261 , 278
Gondola, Paulus Marini de 100, 123 Gonzaga (family) 134,345 Gonzaga, Francesco 281 Gopcevic,
Spiridon 307 GostlVar 163 f. Graciigo 279 Gradenigo, Pasquale 43 Gradi / Gradic, Junius de 229
Grammatikos, Johannes 133 Grillis, Bonus de 98 Gropa. Zaharias 27, 71, 92 Guazzi, Giovanni-Battista
dal 78 Gunduhc su Gondola Guonimi 115 Habsburg 14, 88. 298, 302, 310 Hahn, Johann Georg v.
Chr. 66, 301, 348 Halil Pasha 52, 54 Hamza su Jahja Hamza (= Ivan Kastriota), father of Skanderbegs
32, 35,240 Hamza bey 110,189,193 Has 189 Creation 151 Himara 56,120,134,199,297 f. H1ZlT at 40 f.,
55, 151, 166 ff., 216, 336 f. Hobok 151 Hodgkinson, Harry 8, 350 Hopf, Kar1301, 348 Housley, Nonnan
350 Hoxha, Enver 312-317, 344, 349 Hilm (Herzegovina) 46 Hunyadi, Johann 29, 41 ff., 47-50, 53, 60, 62
, 68 f., 74.77.94, 110.153 f., 160, 173 f., 198.203, 235, 239, 259, 261. 277, 300, 329, 331, 337, 342 Ialomi
ta 41 Ibrabim of Karaman 40, 44, 47 f., 53, 179,329 Ilyas, Renegade 168 llyas, son of Balaban 146, 163
Ingleti, Michaeli 09 Ippen, Theodor 308
427
Isa bey 162-166, 193,337 Isabella, Queen of Naples 87, 230 ff. Ishak pa.; A 144, 165,200 Ishmi30, 107,
117, 119 Jab1anica 164 Jacomoni, Francesco 311 Jahja and Hamza (brother) 39 Jajce 180,259 Jakub
bey (Muzakl) 24, 49,163,265,337 Jakub, Timariot 150 Jerina su Brankovlc, lrene lerusalem 135 f., 205,
243 Jirecek, Constantine 11, 348 Joannina 34, 81, 301,304,348 Jonima 24, 30, 40, 150, 270, 283 Jonima,
brother Balabans 283 Jonima, Dhimiter 167 Julius 11, Pope 134, 298 Juri6, Daniel 65 Justinian l. 230
Calabria 82,149,208,231,301,303 Kaleshi, Hasan 11,344 Kalixt IlI. (Pope) 113 f., 198,200 ff., 206,
237240, 243, 246, 324, 33 \ [. Kalkandelen s. also u. Tetovo 24, 116, 163, 357 Kalor 136 Kanina 23, 27,
49, 78, 93, 1 \ 9, 165,253 Kara Hldr pa;; a 44 Karaca bey 118, 166, 178,248 Karaman su Ibrahim of
Karaman Charles VII, King of France 132 Kar! Kallhne, Duke of Burgundy 56, 93,129 Karlo, Andrea 41
KarloviCi (Thopia) 56, 129, 356 Kastriota (Family) 27 ff., 32, 34, 37, 50, 60, 68, 86,
105,108,122,128,141,143,151,164,166f, 240,277 [. , 292, 296 ff., 302, 307 ff., 322, 327, 330,356
Kastnota, AndronJica 32, 126, 131,291 [. Kastriota, Angelina 32,103 Kastriota, Ferdinando 28 Kastnota,
Hamza 59, 103, 143, 152, 165,200 f., 203,326 Kastriota, IvanlJovan, Skanderbeg's father 15,24,
30,32,34,36 f, 42, 45, 50, 99 , 106 f, 168, 187,190 f, 201, 356 Kastriota, lvan, son of Skanderhegs 32, 45,
131, 251 f, 278, 288, 292, 297 [., 310, 330 Kastriota, JeI (l) a 32, 55 Kastriota, Constantine, Brother
Skanderhegs 32 f., 37,42, 103 Kastriota, Constantine, Bishop of lsemia 298 Kastnota, Mamica 32, 104,
129 f, 170,265 f., 272, Andrea 41 KarloviCi (Thopia) 56, 129, 356 Kastriota (Family) 27 et seq., 32, 34, 37,
50, 60, 68, 86, 105, 108, 122, 128, 141, 143, 151, 64, 166f, 240, 277 [., 292, 296 et seq., 302, 307 et
seq ., 322, 327, 330,356 Kastnota, AndronJica 32, 126, 131,291 [. Kastriota, Angelina 32,103 Kastriota,
Ferdinando 28 Kastnota, Hamza 59, 103, 143, 152, 165,200 f., 203,326 Kastriota, IvanlJovan,
Skanderbeg's father 15,24, 30,32,34,36 f, 42, 45, 50, 99 , 106 f, 168, 187,190 f, 201, 356 Kastriota, lvan,
son of Skanderhegs 32, 45, 131, 251 f, 278, 288, 292, 297 [., 310, 330 Kastriota, JeI (l) a 32, 55 Kastriota,
Constantine, Brother Skanderhegs 32 f., 37,42, 103 Kastriota, Constantine, Bishop of lsemia 298
Kastnota, Mamica 32, 104, 129 f, 170,265 f., 272, Andrea 41 KarloviCi (Thopia) 56, 129, 356 Kastriota
(Family) 27 et seq., 32, 34, 37, 50, 60, 68, 86, 105, 108, 122, 128, 141, 143, 151, 64, 166f, 240, 277 [.,
292, 296 et seq., 302, 307 et seq ., 322, 327, 330,356 Kastnota, AndronJica 32, 126, 131,291 [. Kastriota,
Angelina 32,103 Kastriota, Ferdinando 28 Kastnota, Hamza 59, 103, 143, 152, 165,200 f., 203,326
Kastriota, IvanlJovan, Skanderbeg's father 15,24, 30,32,34,36 f, 42, 45, 50, 99 , 106 f, 168, 187,190 f,
201, 356 Kastriota, lvan, son of Skanderhegs 32, 45, 131, 251 f, 278, 288, 292, 297 [., 310, 330 Kastriota,
JeI (l) a 32, 55 Kastriota, Constantine, Brother Skanderhegs 32 f., 37,42, 103 Kastriota, Constantine,
Bishop of lsemia 298 Kastnota, Mamica 32, 104, 129 f, 170,265 f., 272, 292, 296 ff., 302, 307 ff., 322,
327, 330,356 Kastnota, Andronica 32, 126, 131,291 [. Kastriota, Angelina 32,103 Kastriota, Ferdinando
28 Kastnota, Hamza 59, 103, 143, 152, 165,200 f., 203,326 Kastriota, IvanlJovan, Skanderbeg's father
15,24, 30,32,34,36 f, 42, 45, 50, 99 , 106 f, 168, 187,190 f, 201, 356 Kastriota, lvan, son of Skanderhegs
32, 45, 131, 251 f, 278, 288, 292, 297 [., 310, 330 Kastriota, JeI (l) a 32, 55 Kastriota, Constantine,
Brother Skanderhegs 32 f., 37,42, 103 Kastriota, Constantine, Bishop of lsemia 298 Kastnota, Mamica
32, 104, 129 f, 170,265 f., 272, 292, 296 ff., 302, 307 ff., 322, 327, 330,356 Kastnota, Andronica 32, 126,
131,291 [. Kastriota, Angelina 32,103 Kastriota, Ferdinando 28 Kastnota, Hamza 59, 103, 143, 152,
165,200 f., 203,326 Kastriota, IvanlJovan, Skanderbeg's father 15,24, 30,32,34,36 f, 42, 45, 50, 99 , 106
f, 168, 187,190 f, 201, 356 Kastriota, lvan, son of Skanderhegs 32, 45, 131, 251 f, 278, 288, 292, 297 [.,
310, 330 Kastriota, JeI (l) a 32, 55 Kastriota, Constantine, Brother Skanderhegs 32 f., 37,42, 103
Kastriota, Constantine, Bishop of lsemia 298 Kastnota, Mamica 32, 104, 129 f, 170,265 f., 272,
293
Kastriota, Maria 32 Kastnota, Paul 28, 32 Kastriota, Repos (Karagöz) 32 f, 37, 40, 50, 103 Kastriota,
Stam ~ a 32, 182 Kastnota, Vlaica 32, 55.104 Kastriota, Voisava 37.45 Kashar 167, 265 Caucasus 239
Kelo;: yra (Kleisura) 165 Konstantin, nephew Skanderbegs 104 KöpGlu, Murad bey 165 Kero;: ishte 66,
151 Kicevo 164 Kieinca 164 Cilicia 40 Kimrza, Andreas and Dhimitri 167 Kin 56, 63 f, 289 Kladas 297 Klis
234 Klos 150, 167 Kolettis, loannis 306 Kommo Aramti s, u. Araniti, Komino Koniea, Faik 308 Koro;: a 23,
93 Korcula (Curzola) 72,107,183,345 Corfu 35, 51, 78 f, 109, 120, 192, 195, 199,290 f., 346 f. Corinth 48
Kosarin, Nikola 150 Kosovo 61, 63, 81,118,163,192,307,311,315318,342,344,353 Kosovrasti 164
Constantinople 18 ff., 42, 46 f, 58, 66 f, 75, 89 f, 94,112,114, 146f, 153, 157, 159 f., 164,168, 174,187 f,
190, 194,235 f, 243 f, 258,261, 265,
428
La ~ i (Cape) 122 f. Lalemi, Nicolo 192 Lazar Hrebeljanovic, Prince 19 Lazar, Abbot 60 Lazarevic, Stefan
31 Leda 91 Leo, Death 150 Lesbos 260 Lezha su Alessio Lily 197 Lino, Blasius de 95 LIS (m Mati) 138,
150, 167 Livad (near Struga) 178,248 Livy, Titus 84, 299, 340 Lodi 42,190 Lokavica 164 Lopez, Bemardo
61, 282, 284 Luccaril1..ukarevic, Paladino de 229, 261 Louis the Hellige, king of France 310 Louis XL,
King of France 239, 246, 254, 308 Lukash, Gjin ISO Lura (landscape) 151, 177 Lustica 233
Magno, Stefano 344 Mahmud Pap (Angelovic) 165 f., 168, 249, 262, 266,287 Makusev, Vinkentij 348
Malatesta, Sigismondo 233 Mamurras 40 Manesi, Gjin 92, 147,258 Manesi, Paul 92 Manfredonia 296
Mangiacavalli, John 95 Manisa (Magnesia) 54, 59 Maqellare 151 Maramonte, Francesco 100, 197 Mara,
Bernabo de la 228 Maranaj (Mountain) 65 Marica 18 Marinescu, Constantin 11, 349 Marche 140
Martanesh 146, 167 Mati 8, 28, 30, 32 C, 39 , 51, 55, 59, 65, 71, 88, 91-94, 101, 115 et seq., 119, 121,
126, 129, 136, 138 f, 144, 146, 151, 159 f, 165, 167 f, 170, 175 ff., 181, 185, 192, 201; 211 f, 215 f., 234
f., 241, 246, 265, 270, 283, 286 f, 292, 310,322,326,338 f., 354 f. Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary 95,
99, 111, 115, 180,203 f, 239, 245, 250, 255, 259, 261, 275,278 f, 284, 329 Mavrovo 163 Muzini,
Gmseppe 303
Medici, Piero de '271 MehmetL312 MelitaIMljet (Island) 183 MercanaJMrkan (Island) 183 Merisht 137
Mesid bey 42 Mesih p ~ a 165,201 Mevlana, KadI 151 Miladin 163 Milosevic, Radoje 107 Milot 117, 136
Minervino 230 Minutolo, Alvise 230 Misia (Landscape ) 41, 115, 129 Modri,;: 121, 150 f, 188,203,351
Mokra (landscape) 55, 61, 116 ff., 127, 163, 166, 175,189,203,215,248 Moldova 20, 47, 185 f. Molendmo
94 m in, Cresio de 141 Monastir (Bitola) 23,162,169 Moneta, Nikola 283 Monte S. Angelo 230 f, 234, 282
Montefeltro, Federico 231, 233 Morava 19,50,62, 197, 245, 329 Morea (Peloponnese) 48 , 52 f, 61, 78,
154, 165, 203,259,292,297 Mora, Cristoforo 179 Moro, Lorenzo 142 Morosmi, Paolo 245 f. Mosto,
Jacomo da 293 Mrkan s u. Mercana Murad I. 19, 69.191 Murad Ir. 20, 23, 33 f., 37 f, 39-42, 44 ff., 49, 51-
54, 59, 61 ff., 66 f, 69 f, 72, 74 ff., 103, 137, 148,
429
245 f., 250, 301, 329 ff. Pendavic, Nenko 150 Perduzzi, Baltassare 267, 286, 288, 292 f. Perlat, Izvoniko
150 Perlat, John 92,147,258 Perlat, Peter 67, 94 Perpindl., Jacopo 207 Pesaro 206, 230 Pesaro, Lorenzo
de 279 245 f., 250, 301, 329 ff. Pendavic, Nenko 150 Perduzzi, Baltassare 267, 286, 288, 292 f. Perlat,
Izvoniko 150 Perlat, John 92,147,258 Perlat, Peter 67, 94 Perpindl., Jacopo 207 Pesaro 206, 230 Pesaro,
Lorenzo de 279
Peshkopia (Piskupija) 25 f., 151 Peter, Abbot 32, 149.343 Petrela 51, 54. 56, 120 f., 130, 148, 167
PetrioJo 251 Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy 53, 197, 240,243,250,254,298 Piccinmo, Jacomo 120,
196 f., 206, 228, 230-233 Picccilomini, Aeneas Silvius su Pius 11th Piccolomini, Agostino Patrizi 149
Piccolomini, Giacomo Ammanati 252, 254 Piero, misser 100, 269. 271 Pmdos (Mountains) 48, 52, 329 Pir
Ömer bey 146 Pirgo 109,253 Pirot48 Pisko, Julius the Great. Plush H. (Piccolomini), Pope 7, 10, 15 f, 87,
93, 97, 113 f., 141, 144, 155, 157, 170, 183,202,204, 206 f, 225 ff., 229 , 231, 237, 239 f., 243, 245248,
250-255, 259 f, 262, 318, 324, 329, 331 f, 344, 354 Plutarch 13, 15, 84, 299 Position 151 Polog 20, 26, 29
, 116 ff. • 136, 154, 163 f, 175, 177, 188 f, 228, 248, 321 Ponorishte J 63 Popovic, Stanisa 150 Poz7..a!
Pucic 104 Po7.Za/Pucic, Paul de 229 Prespa 27 Preza 51, 121 Pribic, Kole ISO Prilep 169 Prizren 30,
63,136,180,189,191,213 PuJaha, Selami 11, 344. 347 Pulti 135,302 Pyrrhus of Epirus 13, -
75,87,97,226,229,310 Qidhna 28, 104, 176,268 f Rada , Jeronim de 303 Radeljic, Antun 107 Radie 98
Radojevic, Stjepan 100, 173,278 Radolt, Erhard 342 Radonic. Jovan 349 Radostuse 33 Ragona to
Rodoni Rajan, ceJnik 98, 107,241 Rallaina, Irena 32, 104 Rue 104,331 Randesia 115 Rankovic,
Aleksandar 315 Redoni to Rodoni Rene of Anjou 202, 205 f
430
Mariano de 238 Setton, connoisseur. Meyer 350 Sfondratls, Bartolomeo de 104, 109, 180 Sforza 134,
197,207,345 Sforza, Alessandro 206, 230, 233 Sforza, Bianca Maria 263, 273 Sforza, Francesco
15,42,87,100,104,130,187, 197,206,227 f., 230 tE, 241, 247, 254, 257 f, 262,273 Sforza, Galeazzo Maria
273 Sguros, Aesop 99 Shehu, Mehmet 312 Shen Gjin 167,357 Shkodra su Skutari Shkumbin
24,119,129,144,184,266,268,271 f., 285,322 Shufada 33. 99, 107 Sibenik (Sebemco ) 65, 100, 106, '109,
173,249, 278,357 Transylvania 8,42,329,334,342 Skopje 12, 17, 19, 30, 116 ff., 146, 154, 162-165, 168 f,
175, 192 f., 220, 224, 250 , 266, 317, 322, 333, 355, 357 Skutari (Shkodra) 13, 24 ff., 30 f., 38, 46 f., 56,
60, 63 ff., 67 f. 70, 73 f., 92, 95, 97, 106, 109, 119, Alessandro 206, 230, 233 Sforza, Bianca Maria 263,
273 Sforza, Francesco 15,42,87,100.104,130,187, 197,206,227 f., 230 e, 241, 247, 254, 257 f, 262,273
Sforza, Galeazzo Maria 273 Sguros, Aesop 99 Shehu, Mehmet 312 Shen Gjin 167,357 Shkodra su
Skutari Shkumbin 24,119,129,144,184,266,268,271 f., 285,322 Shufada 33,999, 107 Sibenik (Sebemco)
65, 100, 106, '109, 173,249, 278,357 Transylvania 8,42,329,334,342 Skopje 12, 17, 19,30,116 ff., 146,
154, 162-165, 168 f, 175, 192 f., 220, 224, 250, 266, 317, 322,337,351,357 Skutari (Shkodra) 13,24 ff., 30
f., 38, 46 f. , 56, 60, 63 ff., 67 f. 70, 73 f., 92, 95, 97, 106, 109, 119, Alessandro 206, 230, 233 Sforza,
Bianca Maria 263, 273 Sforza, Francesco 15,42,87,100.104,130,187, 197,206,227 f., 230 e, 241, 247,
254, 257 f, 262,273 Sforza, Galeazzo Maria 273 Sguros, Aesop 99 Shehu, Mehmet 312 Shen Gjin
167,357 Shkodra su Skutari Shkumbin 24,119,129,144,184,266,268,271 f., 285,322 Shufada 33,999, 107
Sibenik (Sebemco) 65, 100, 106, '109, 173,249, 278,357 Transylvania 8,42,329,334,342 Skopje 12, 17,
19,30,116 ff., 146, 154, 162-165, 168 f, 175, 192 f., 220, 224, 250, 266, 317, 322,337,351,357 Skutari
(Shkodra) 13,24 ff., 30 f., 38, 46 f. , 56, 60, 63 ff., 67 f. 70, 73 f., 92, 95, 97, 106, 109, 119, 357 Shkodra
su Skutari Shkumbin 24,119,129,144,184,266,268,271 f., 285,322 Shufada 33,999, 107 Sibenik
(Sebemco) 65, 100, 106, '109, 173,249, 278,357 Transylvania 8,42,329,334,342 Skopje 12, 17,
19,30,116 ff., 146, 154 , 162-165, 168 f, 175, 192 f., 220, 224, 250, 266, 317, 322, 333, 355, 357 Skutari
(Shkodra) 13, 24 ff., 30 f., 38, 46 f., 56, 60, 63 ff., 67 f. 70, 73 f., 92, 95, 97, 106, 109, 119, 357 Shkodra
su Skutari Shkumbin 24,119,129,144,184,266,268,271 f., 285,322 Shufada 33,999, 107 Sibenik
(Sebemco) 65, 100, 106, '109, 173,249, 278,357 Transylvania 8,42,329,334,342 Skopje 12, 17,
19,30,116 ff., 146, 154 , 162-165, 168 f, 175, 192 f., 220, 224, 250, 266, 317, 322, 333, 355, 357 Skutari
(Shkodra) 13, 24 ff., 30 f., 38, 46 f., 56, 60, 63 ff., 67 f. 70, 73 f., 92, 95, 97, 106, 109, 119,
121, 150 f. 154,164,188,191,194,351 Szeged 53 Tabris 158 TaJleyrand 310 Taranto 206 f, 226, 228, 230
ff., 240, 298 Tiirnovo 19 Tetovo s. also u. Kalkandelen 24, 116 ff., 146, 163, 166,
169,248,258,318,337,355,357 Thalloczy, Ludwlg of 11, 308, 348 Tiepolo, Giovanni 134 Timur steering
20, 30 Tirima 12, 72, 167,316,318f Tyrol88 Thessaly 19,22 f., 27,35, 56,161 f, 164, 168, 244 f., 328
Thodor 107 TI1Omai, Thoma 316 Thopia (family) 24, 55,103, li9 ff., 128 fr., 190, 193 f., 196,
199,322,326,356 Thopia, Ali 24 Thopia, Andreas 49, 56, 293 Thopia, Aranit Golem 49 Thopia, George 45
431
Thopia, Karl 56 111 Opia, Muzaki 32, J03 f, 12J, 124f, 129 r., 132, 164, J90 [, 193,265 Jhopia, Niketa 31
Thompm, Repos 104 f., 140 f., 272, 293, 326 Thopia , Tanush 49, 56 Topkap188 Tocco (Famllie) 82, 84
ff., 158,248 Tocco, Carlo 81, 83, 86 Tocco, Leonardo III. 45, 174,261 Tomorista 115 Topojan 151 Trani
77, 107,207,228,231 f., 267 Trebizond J56, 204, 229, 252 Trebishte 151 Tren 151 Trevisan, Gabriele
87,179 ff., 252, 260, 262, 264 Treuo, Antonio da 226, 231 f. Trikupis, Charilaos 307 Trivulzio, Jacobo 42
Trogir (Trau) 249 Troshani 141 Tumenisht 117, 122, 127, 129, 167,201,326,339 Turahanoglu 22,162
Tursun bey 159 f.
Vasa, Pashko 305 Vasilijevic, Antun 100 Velipoja 179 Venier, Andrea 66 Venier, Jac,? Bo 282, 288
VenOsa 228, 230 Vieste 298 \ fittorio Emanuele W. 311 Vivaldi, Antonio 7,14 Vlatko, Duke of St. Sava
296 Vladislav , Filrst of Herzegovina 107, 189,248 Vlk 149 Vlora su Valona Volkovija J 64 Vrana Conte
40, 71, 74, 93, 150, 178 Vranjina 195 Vreto, Jani 304 Vukcic, Stefan 46, 60, 70, 89, 95, 183, 188 f., 195,
198 f., 207, 228, 234, 246, 248 f, 331 Vukosalic, Ninac 98, 173 Weber, Max 81
Ulcinj s. 11. Dulcigno Uraka 167 Uzun Hasan 246 Vagenitia 78 Valentini, Giuseppe 11, 315, 350 f Valona
(Vlora) 23, 27, 49,56,71,78, 119-122, 128,161,193,195,246,253,261,284,287, 297,322 Valilmrdha 176-
180,265 Valmi s. also u. Elbasan 144, 147,272 Vaguer, Berndardo 77 Vardar 19 f., 23, 30, 66, 116, 118,
151, 154, 162, 164,178, 193, 197f, 328,353 Varna 53, 75,159,174,185,329
Zadar (Zara) 12,249,345 f, 357 Zadrima 135 , 141 f. Zagrad 151 Zaharia (family) 30, 56, 58, 63 f, 68, 171
Zaharia, Leka 56, 63 Zane, Piero 269 Zellbish (family) 23 f, 120, 128, 134, 148, 152, 161, 165, 195 , 199
f., 323, 337 Zenebish, Depe 35 Zenebish, Hasan bey 24,163,166,168,248 Zenebish, Simon J92, 202
Zlatica (passport) 48 Zogu, Ahmet 309 f. Zojmen 167 Zotko, Evgeni 150 Zuppana, Andreas Thomasi of
173 Zvoffitk 259
PICTURES Library of the Albania Institute Munich · 209, 210 Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien: 223 o. OJ
Schmrtt: 2Il, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,217,218,219,2200., 221,222,224
432
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DEATH ON THE NILE
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AT THE PEAK OF POWER
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