Wlnter 1993

JOURNAL
Secretary of the Air Force
Dr Sheila E. Widnall

Air Force Chief of Staff

Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air Education

and Training Command
Gen Henry Viccellio, |r.

Commander, Air University

Lt Gen Jay VV. Kelley

Commander, College of Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education
Col Paul R. Dordal

Editor
Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor
Maj Gwendolvn D. Favne

Professional Staff
Hugh Richardson, C on tribu tin g E ditor
Marvin VV. Bassett. C on tribu tin g E d itor
Steven C. Garst. D irector o fA r t a n d Production
Daniel M. Armstrong, Illu strator
Thomas L. Hovvell, P rep ress P ro d u ctio n
M an ag er

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 THE ART OF HIS ESSA Y IS the “final product”

INTELL1GENCE,
by th e GENERAL
T of a future deputy chief of staff for
i n t e l l i g e n c e , U n ite d S t a t e s A ir
F o r c e . T h e au th o r, an u nnam ed
general, enjoyed an almost 30-year career
as an intelligence officer spanning 1987 to
the spring of 2017. Faced with the impact
of the information explosion on the quan-
Ed it e d by Co l G a r y D. Pa v t on, USAF tity of “raw data” available to intelligence
professionals, he undertook a project to
distill intelligence to its very essence. The
principies and tenets described here form
the fundamental truths of the art.
Now the reason the enllghtened prince and the Styled in the manner of Sun Tzu’s clas-
wlse general conquer the enemy whenever they sic T h e A rt o f War, as tr a n s la te d by
move and thelr achlevements surpass those o f Samuel B. Griffith, and using the same
ordinary men Is foreknowledge. technique of assertion and expert com-
— Sun Tzu mentary, this essay describes the princi-
 ARTOFINTELLIGENCE 17

pies and tenets of intelligence that are uni- gic Command, the general watched and
versal across time and stand the test of learned how intelligence supported— or
changing technology. failed to support— military commanders.
His ex p erien ce with the 48th T a ctica l
F ig h t e r W in g in S a u d i A r a b ia d u r in g
BIOGRAPHY OF THE O p e r a t io n D e sert S to r m a n c h o r e d h is
GENERAL e n t ir e c a r e e r . As a ju n i o r o f f ic e r , he
devoted months at Royal Air Force (RAF)
The ultim ate objectiv e o f in telligen ce is to L a k e n h e a th in E n g la n d to g a in in g the
enable action to be optimized. confidence of the pilots and weapons Sys-
—Dr R. V. Jones te m s o f f i c e r s w h o fle w th e v e n e r a b le
Chief. British Scientific Aardvark.2 During the prewar buildup, he
Intelligence, World War II
and his en listed in te llig e n c e sp e c ia lists
The general died Monday while TDY to honed their skills in building target fold-
San Antonio. His last day in the Pentagon ers, briefin g and d e b rie fin g crew s, and
was like h u n d r e d s of o t h e r s — q u ic k providing the wing commander with com-
reviews of intelligence background papers prehensive intelligence reports on Saddam
for the chief, planning for the upcoming H u sse in ’s forces. But w hen the air war
Sênior Intelligence Officers’ Conference, began, n o th in g he c o u ld do at the unit
and telephone calls regarding the place- levei could get poststrike satellite imagery
ment of colonels in key positions around of the military targets into their hands fast
the Air Force. Late Friday, after he stuffed enough. T h eir appetite for imagery was
the last few folders in his briefcase and insatiable and could not be met.3 Despite
turned to leave the office. he flipped the the m a n y s u c c e s s e s o f i n t e l l i g e n c e in
keys of his locked desk to his executive Desert Storm , a generation o f future Air
officer. “Just in case!” the general called. Force leaders convinced them selves that
“Just in c a s e , ” r ep lied the ex ec as he intelligence failed because they as pilots
caught the keys and dropped them into his were unable to get timely pictures of their
desk. It was a departure ritual they had strike missions.
carried out countless times. This time was In the 1970s and 1980s, when an intelli-
the last time. g e n c e o ffic e r was c h a r a c te r iz e d by the
He had been the best of a new breed of nature of his or her technical training (e.g.,
intelligence officers—a “generalist” skilled being viewed as a SIGINTer, a photo inter-
in intelligence operations and intelligence preter, or a HUMINTer), the opportunity
application. Unlike the many deputy and to lead large numbers of Air Force people
assistant chiefs of staff for intelligence was not equally available to junior intelli-
before him, he had not progressed in a gence officers. When career emphasis and
“stovepiped” discipline of signals intelli- training shifted to a “g e n e r a lis t” m ode,
gence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence, or officers like him began to receive assign-
human resources intelligence (HUMINT). ments to key positions across a wide range
Rather, the career path he followed had of major commands based on their leader-
been envisioned by sênior intelligence ship skills and managerial ability, not just
officers in the 1980s and codified by major on their past affiliation with a technical
changes to Air Force specialty codes in the s p e c i a l t y . T h e g e n e r a T s fu t u r e w as
early 1990S.1 shaped by the breaking down of these his-
Acros s a se rie s of a s s ig n m e n ts that torie barriers.
included wartime duty with an F - l l l As a captain, he had served as a flight
fighter wing. leadership at a major signals commander at one of the Air Intelligence
intelligence collection site, and joint duty A gen cy’s (AIA) most important overseas
on the unified command staff at US Strate- field sites, the 6903d Electronic Security
18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

Group at Osan Air Base, Korea. He had His d a ily a c t i v i t i e s ranged from team
been thrust into the role of leading over 40 building and goal setting to working the
specialists in their around-the-clock task dozens of personal problems (caused by a
of providing vital intelligence support to year’s separation from family in the States)
the commander, Seventh Air Force, and to his su b ord inates brought to him. And,
the US and South Korean chain of com- m o st im p o r t a n t , a lo n g th e w ay he
mand. absorbed the myriad of details associated
“Up close and personal" had character- with high-tech intelligence collection. He
ized the generaFs leadership opportunity learned the strengths and the weaknesses,
in Korea. He had led his flight by per- and he began to ponder the enduring prin-
sonal example. He motivated. He dele- cipies and tenets of intelligence in support
gated. He empowered. He disciplined. of military operations.
Years later, as the US Strateg ic Com-
mand’s director of intelligence, or J-2. the
general served in Omaha as a principal
a d v iso r to h is fo u r-sta r c o m m a n d e r in

In 1982 Israeli Air Force F-16s (left) were part of a

successful threat against 17 Syrian missile sites that
used SA-6 missiles similar to these (below). Accurate
intelligence served as a powerful force enhancer.
 ART OF 1NTELLIC.ENCE 19

chief on such criticai issues as the Strate- e n e m y ’s se cre ts w h ile p ro tectin g o n e ’s

gic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty own.4
III and global weapons of mass destruc- It wasn’t until Thursday, after the major-
tion. He recognized clearly the political ity of the details for the Arlington Ceme-
impact of his counsel when his military tery funeral were ironed out, that the gen-
views on treaty compliance clashed with eral’s executive officer opened the locked
those of the Departm ent of State or the desk. Patiently, the exec separated per-
Central Intelligence Agency. He saw first- sonal items from official docum ents and
hand how timely and accurate intelligence classified messages. In the bottom drawer
shaped policy on issues vital to the secu- in a hanging folder marked “Art’’ that was
ritv of the United States. bulging with dozens of yellow highlighted
For nearly three decad es, the general and annotated articles and clippings, he
served as an intelligence officer. From the found the draft manuscript and the illus-
aircraft s h e lte rs o f S a u d i A rabia to the trative com m ents the general had asked
halls of the Pentagon, he helped shape his closest confidants to prepare on each
in tellig en ce products delivered to com- major subject.
m a n d e rs. F ro m “b o m b s on t a r g e t " to T h e f o llo w in g e x c e r p t s o f th is fin a l
n a tio n a l s e c u r it y d e c is io n m a k in g . he product of the general, T h e Art o f In telli-
u n d e r s to o d th e v a lu e o f p i e r c i n g th e g e n c e , were first published four m onths
after his death.

The Art of Intelligence

PRINCIPLES and the economy of combat forces to achieve
their objective.
Intelligence is an instrument o f conflict. It
consists o f words, numbers, images, sugges- The historian: Accurate intelligence serves as a
tions, ap p ra isals, in citem en ts. It con sists powerful force enhancer. In the largest single
also o f truths that enlighten or m islead, or o f air battle of the second half of the twentieth
outright falseh ood s. Because it is immaterial, centurv, the Israeli Air Force (1AF) devastated
intelligence cannot wound. But its use has the Syrian Air Force on 9 june 1982. To sup-
led to the killing or saving o f millions. port “Operation Peace for Galilee,” the IAF's
mission was to neutralize Syrian SA-6 sites and
—Ângelo Codevilla destroy reacting enemy fighters. At every junc-
ture, planning and execution were enhanced by
Accuracy accurate intelligence. In the one-year period
following the April 1981 introduction of SA-6
The general said: missiles into the Bekaa Valley, Israeli military
1. Accuracy is the prime principie of military intelligence had focused on the new surface-to-
intelligence. With accurate intelligence. all air threat. Their successes allowed aircrews to
aspects of strategic, operational. and tactical rehearse the strike missions in the Negev
planning and execution proceed on the basis of Desert against highly accurate replicas of the
fact. Without accurate intelligence on the missile sites. On the day of the attack, superb
enemy’s location. capability. and intent. plan- tactical intelligence contributed to success.
ning is an unfocused and wasteful exercise, Syrian airspace was scanned by E-2C surveil-
and execution may result in defeat. lance aircraft flying off the Lebanese coast. A
2. Accurate intelligence is a necessary condi- Boeing 707 signals intelligence platform moni-
tion for victory. It is not. however, a sufficient tored Syrian Communications and radar activ-
condition to gain the victory. Intelligence does ity. With F-15 and F-16 pilots flying combat
not pilot air and space vehicles, or field armies, air patrols, IAF F-4s armed with Shrike, stan-
or sail ships at sea. Instead, intelligence sup- dard antiradiation, and Maverick missiles, and
ports the maneuver, the surprise, the security. F-16s loaded with standoff weapons and con-
20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1993

ventional munitions attacked 19 SA-6 sites and century. When we solved the data compaction
several SA-2 and SA-3 sites. problem of the multispectral imaging satellites,
In a superb example of real-time intelligence we could at last take full advantage of virtual
application, the IAF strike commander moni- reality (VR).a It had all come together before
tored the ongoing operation from video pro- the Iranian military launched the Second Gulf
vided by forward orbiting Scout and Mastiff War in 2010.9 Timely intelligence produced a
remotely piloted vehicles (RPV). On the first dramatic impact on operational planning and
day of the air campaign, 17 SA-6 sites were tactical execution. In the battle cab at the Air
destroyed along with several SA-2 and SA-3 Operations Center in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
installations. On 9 June, the Israelis downed the joint force air component commander
23 Syrian MiG-21s and MiG-23s. On 10 }une, (JFACC) swiveled into a VR depiction of his
they shot down 15 more MiGs. By the end of next day’s air tasking order. The image genera-
September, Israeli pilots had destroyed 29 sur- tors driven by a direct digitized satellite feed
face-to-air-missile (SAM) sites in seven raids, produced a detailed, three-diinensional image
85 Syrian MiGs, and had lost only two IAF air- of the air campaign. By selecting the appropri-
craft to enemy ground fire.5 Accurate intelli- ate icons, the commander viewed Iranian air
gence contributed mightily to this successful defenses, advancing divisions, and ballistic
air campaign. missile trajectories. He then overlaid the
friendly air attacks accelerated in time.
Tim eliness In addition to allowing the commander to see
his own air forces move across the border to
The general said: attack Iranian targets, virtual reality enabled
3. Victory in battle is gained by the side that him to move in space and to have a “God’s
operates at the faster tempo or rhythm. The eye” view of how his incoming air and missile
tim eliness of intelligence contributes directly attack looked from the Iranian commander’s
to the commander’s ability to observe, orient, perspective.10 Not only did timely intelligence
decide, and act. With timely intelligence, the aid his observation and orientation by creating
commander is able to act at a faster tempo, gen- a telepresence of our attack from the Iranian
erate confusion and disorder in the adversary, viewpoint, the JFACC could "get inside the
and achieve victory. Without timely intelli- mind” of his opposing commander.11
gence, the commander’s observation and orien- Results at the squadron levei were equally
tation are delayed. His decisions and actions, impressive. The virtual reality advanced plan-
therefore, are slower, and initiative and lever- ning system was based on near-real-time threat
age are lost to the enemy.6 data. The imagery intelligence and signals
intelligence feeds were linked with weather
The engineer: The delivery of evermore timely information and inerged with the mapping data
intelligence was a central focus of the intelli- base. In short, aircrew s could plan and
gence-engineering community in the two rehearse the mission and select weapons
decades following the 1991 Persian Gulf War. employment alternatives based on intelligence
Our initial combat successes following Desert data collected just minutes prior to takeoff.12
Storm were based on collocating the intelli- Timely intelligence successfully contributed to
gence collection and Communications assets of an even faster decision-making tempo. Sus-
the Air Intelligence Agency with the air opera- tained across the first weeks of the campaign,
tions center of the Air Combat Command the tempo forced the Iranian offensive to col-
forces.7 When the 366th Wing at Mountain lapse into itself.13 The remaining leaders in
Home AFB, Idaho, deployed to Tunisia in 1995 Tehran complied with all coalition demands
in response to the Libyan incursion, AIA’s spe- for conflict termination.
cialists worked side by side with the wing’s
own intelligence and planning staff. With an
organic collection capability and on-line access U s a b ility
to national intelligence networks, timely intel-
The general said:
ligence kept the commander’s decisions and
actions inside Libya’s own decision cycle. Our 4. Intelligence must be usable to have value.
greatest successes, however, flowed from the If it is not tailored to meet the needs of the
engineering breakthroughs at the turn of the commander, intelligence has no usability and
 A fíT OF1NTELLIGENCE 21

makes no contribution to military planning and that's what his intelligence analysts and mid-
execution. dle managers first thought. In fact, his harsh
5. Intelligence is a product. Users of intelli- editorial comments were consistently aimed at
gence are customers. If the product delivered making the array of intelligence products more
to the customer is unusable, then the cus- usable to the customer. He developed this sim-
tomer's intelligence needs go unsatisfied, and ple “Usability Checklist":
the production costs of creating the product are 1. Does this intelligence product meet the
wasted. customer’s needs? How do you know? How
6. Making intelligence usable is a part of do you know you know?
effective marketing. First, determine what the 2. Does it answer the question asked?
customer wants and needs. Wants and needs 3. Is the main point “up front”?
are not often identical. Second. tailor the intel- 4. Is it as concise as you can get it?
ligence-production process to create the
agreed-upon product. Third. deliver an accu- Across the spectrum of intelligence products,
rate and timely product in a usable format. the general sought to make them usable to the
Fourth, ask the customer for feedback on the customer. Does the draft of the National Intel-
product’s usability. Fifth, absorb the feedback ligence Estimate provide a focused analysis of
and begin again. the issue so the National Security Council can
develop a new policy option? Does the esti-
The execu tive o fficer: I first worked for the mate of an enemy weapon have sufficient
general in Omaha. He was a brutal editor, or detail to enable the USAF research and devel-

The use of virtual reality (VR) in the Second Gulf War

of 2010 is a prime example of successful intelligence.
The JFACC was able to use images generated by
direct digitized satellrte feed (left) to produce a detailed
three-dimensional image of the results of the next
day s air campaign (above).
22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTEfí 1993

opment community to plan the Air Force’s The historian: On 1 January 1945, the Luft-
next-generation system? Does the current intel- waffe conducted a highly successful attack
ligence briefing provide unique insights or (Operation Goldregen) against Allied aircraft
information to aid the commander in deciding located on liberated Belgian airfields. In a
on a course of action? Is the myriad of elec- postattack assessment, the intelligence staff of
tronic order-of-battle information delivered in a the 12th Army Group Headquarters realized
usable format to the mission planner, the elec- they h a d received adequate SIGINT and
tronic warfare officer, or the pilot? Is the threat HUMINT reporting to have provided tactical
data streaming into the cockpit of the orbiting warning to the commander. The reports, how-
F-22 usable in aiding the pilot to conduct his or ever, were not fused. Highly compartmented
her defensive counterair mission? Ultra intercepts received before the German
A trivial example illustrates the principie of attack indicated Operation Goldregen was
usability. The general shocked his Pentagon being launched. The SIGINT specialist had no
intelligence staff the day he directed that all knowledge from his source of an Operation
written replies to the chiefs questions would Goldregen. Filed elsewhere in the headquar-
be limited to two data screens or one printed ters, a prisoner of war interrogation report (an
page. He hammered the point. The customer aspect of HUMINT) of a former Luftwaffe
needed concise, to-the-point replies directly clerk in Berlin described aspects of Operation
answering the question—no room to showcase Goldregen—a plan to employ low-flying air-
personal knowledge of air and space power in craft in large numbers. No fusion. Extensive
the twenty-first century, and no room to pro- compartmentalization. Single-source intelli-
vide flowing prose amplifications of supporting gence information held within “stovepiped”
data. Understand the need. Answer directly. stru ctu res. Airmen died. Aircraft were
Get the main point “up front.” Be concise and destroyed.14
be done.
Relevancy
The general said:
Fusion 10. Intelligence has relevancy if it contributes
to the commander’s ability to execute his mis-
The general said: sion at his levei of military operation. No mat-
7. Fused intelligence is a finished intelli- ter how accurate, timely, or fused the intelli-
gence product produced from more than one gence is, if it is not germane to the comman-
source of intelligence information. Fu sion der's needs, it could detract from overall mis-
draws upon the complementary strengths of sion accomplishment.
signals intelligence (what they said or what 11. What is highly relevant intelligence at
their radars emanated), imagery intelligence one levei of military activity may be of limited
(what it looks like), human intelligence (infor- relevance at another levei. Intelligence produc-
mation derived from a human source revealed tion, therefore, must be geared to meet the dis-
through overt or covert collection). tinctive needs of commanders across the full
8. Fused intelligence creates the most accu- spectrum of military operations.
rate and complete picture of what is known The wing com m an d er: As the wartime com-
about an activity. In the absence of fused intel- mander of an F-125 fighter-bomber wing, I
ligence, products are one-dimensional. While faced similar challenges in the Second Gulf
the levei of detail in single-source reports may War that my predecessors faced in 1991. Intel-
be sufficient to meet narrowly defined cus- ligence must be relevant to the mission it sup-
tomer needs, fused reports are essential to gain ports. If the intelligence lacks relevancy, it
an in-depth understanding. extracts a price in time required to read it,
9. Because the enemy will try to deceive you, watch it, or be briefed on it. Twenty years ago,
guard against placing unquestioned trust in a field commanders criticized much of the Desert
single-source intelligence report. What you Storm intelligence as being designed for high-
hear, what you see, or what you are told may level policymakers. It was too general, too
be a lie or a fabrication. It is far more difficult broad-gauged. Much of what they got at the
to be deceived when yòu rely on fused intelli- wing, division, and brigade levei wasn t rele-
gence. vant to mission planning and execution.15
 ARTOFINTELLIGENCE 23

At my levei, I wanted to know about Iranian supported by facts. The same moral courage
targets. When your mission is to kill road- and intellectual honesty must extend to report-
mobile Khomeini intermediate-range ballistic ing even what you do not know, no matter how
missiles at night, you need intelligence on cam- unpleasant that may be in the short term.
ouflage and concealment techniques, dummy 14. Intellectual honesty must drive the intel-
launchers, reload and refire capability, and ligence professional to distinguish for the cora-
relocation schemes. Therefore. incoming mander those conclusions that are solidly
reports on intemational political developments grounded in fact and those that are extrapola-
and domestic reactions in foreign capitais are tions or extensions of the fact. The commander
not my ideal of relevant intelligence. Don’t get cannot be left with uncertainty in his mind
me wTong, I understand the value of such intel- regarding what is fact, what is an estimate, and
ligence at other leveis. But when you’re in the what is opinion.
thick of it, if intelligence isn’t contributing to
putting ordnance on target, then I don’t want to T he m en to r: My colleagues at the agency
hear it! always knew I was an Air Force intelligence
Consider what my wing’s intelligence needs analyst in the Pentagon of the 1970s. Occa-
were when the sênior Iranian military leader- sionally, one of them who had studied the
ship relocated to the Shiite religious center of record would ask, “Was the Air Force estimate
Qom. Nondestructive or "disabling" munitions that the Soviet Backfire bomber had interconti-
were the only option to drive them out.16 High nental capability intellectually honest?” I have
explosives, even from our best precision concluded over the years that the answer to the
guided munitions, were absolutely out of the question must be no. Let me explain.
question. The task, then, was to shut down the When the new supersonic bomber appeared
entire electrical grid in the city. You’ve heard at the Kazan aircraft plant in 1969, it validated
the old adage “Precision weapons need preci- the long-held Air Force prediction of a new
sion intelligence.”17 We needed it. We got it. Soviet bomber. In 1971, the aircraft, now des-
And it was relevant: precise coordinates for ignated the Backfire, was noted in aerial refuel-
every power station and substation serving the ing from a tanker near the test center of Ramen-
city, detailed engineering reports from the skoye, just east of Moscow. The mission of the
Japanese contractors who built the transform- bomber, peripheral attack or intercontinental
ers, and satellite imagery that drove the image attack, now became one of the most fiercely
generator in our virtual reality advanced plan- contested intelligence debates of the cold war.
ning system. We got it all. Then we planned The predominant view of the Washington intel-
the mission, rehearsed it in VR, and executed. ligence community was that the Backfire was a
We completely “put their lights out!" With rel- peripheral attack weapon and would not play a
evant and precise intelligence contributing to significant role in a strategic air attack on the
mission success, the Iranian generais were dri- United States. Supporting this position was
ven out of the sanctuary of Qom and back to the Backfire’s limited payload, modest self-
Tehran. defense capabilities, and anticipated difficulty
in staging the aircraft from far northern Siberian
bases.18 The Air Force strongly dissented and
Intellectual Honesty consistently argued the Backfire cou ld be used
for intercontinental attack—even if the aircraft
The general said: flew one-way missions.19 The key variable was
12. In tellectu al hon esty must be a cardinal the estimate of the range of the aircraft. A
element in intelligence reporting. Accuracy series of competitive analyses to determine the
and honesty are not the same. Accuracy is the range produced dissimilar results and failed to
absence of factual mistakes or errors. Honesty, conclusively end the debate.20
however. is the adherence to facts and truthful- In short. though we lacked hard evidence
ness with which those facts are interpreted and that the Soviet Long Range Aviation Backfires
presented. ever rehearsed intercontinental strikes, the Air
13. Moral courage is required to remain intel- Force estimate of range and intent drove our
lectually honest and to resist the pressure to institutional position that it could and would
reach intelligence “conclusions" that are not be used in an attack on the United States.21
24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

The most troublesome aspect about the sona. Some are scholars. Some are showmen.
“intellectal honesty” of our intelligence esti- Some take on the outward appearances of the
mate was the connection between the threat commander they serve. The particular persona
estimate and Air Force hardware procurement. that develops is irrelevant. What is important
At the time, the Air Force was fighting for the is that the style they adopt helps them commu-
B-l as a replacement for the aging B-52. F-15 nicate the intelligence.
fighter production was expanding to produce When they engage the mind of the one they
large numbers of highly capable air-to-air fight- serve, they can successfully influence the for-
ers. mulation of a policy or plan or the execution of
There is an eth ical difference between a dangerous mission. They can be an aid to
“worst-case analysis” of the threat and the pru- victory and a contributor to saving lives. If
dent planning and procurement that flow from they fail to communicate the intelligence well,
the analysis and the deliberate overstatement of the commander will continue toward the objec-
the threat to drive budget increases for tive but without the full power of foreknowl-
expanded weapon buys. In the first case, intel- edge.
ligence serves to warn the nation’s leaders in
sufficient time to respond deliberately. In the AFTERWARD
second case, intelligence is prostituted to the
goal of “buying more metal.” While the end What is c a lle d “fo rek n o w led g e" can n ot be
result may be the same, one end is derived at elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by
honestly and the other dishonestly. analogy with past events, nor from calcula-
tions. It m ust b e o b tain ed from m en who
Communication know the enem y situation.
The general said: —Sun Tzu

15. The power of intelligence to aid the com-

mander in planning and executing military The general said:
missions is nothing if the intelligence is not Intelligence is an art and not a Science
co m m u n ica ted . Knowledge of the enemy’s because it is a creation of people, not nature.
intent, capabilities, and location has no worth People collect intelligence. People analyze
until the commander receives, understands, intelligence. People make human judgments as
and acts upon the intelligence. an intelligence product is created. And, ulti-
16. It is the responsibility of the intelligence mately, a person communicates the intelligence
professional to choose the most effective way to the commander.
to inform the commander. Choosing the spo- Thus far, I have described the principies of
ken word, the written word, the picture, or the intelligence as the fundamental truths of the
map is a criticai decision. Only by knowing art. Accuracy, timeliness, usability, fusion, rel-
well the commander whom he or she serves evancy, intellectual honesty, and the require-
can the intelligence officer choose wisely. ment to be com m u n ica ted are all principies
The teacher: If my students fail to communi- inherent in intelligence and are not bounded
cate, they fail to serve. Behind the delivery of by time or changing technology. While these
an accurate and timely intelligence product is a principies form the basics of the art, they are
vast, multibillion-dollar structure designed to complemented by the supporting tenets of poli-
manage, collect, process, and analyze informa- tics, timing, and the m ultilevel nature of mili-
tion. Yet, decades of technological and human tary operations. These tenets further character-
investment are wasted if the intelligence officer ize intelligence as art.
cannot communicate. In te llig e n c e is a p o l i t i c a l process. It
In the schoolhouse, I teach my students to involves the judicious relay of intelligence
think critically. I teach them to write with pre- from a person to a commander who is empow-
cision. I teach them to brief with clarity and ered to act upon the intelligence. It involves
conciseness. When the teaching stops, it is interaction between groups of people who rep-
their responsibility to learn and to do. To do resent powerful institutions. Typically, these
well is to communicate. interactions are between intelligence profes-
The intelligence officers who most effec- sionals and operations professionals. And,
tively serve their commanders develop a per- ultimately, the success of the intelligence
 ART OFINTELL1GENCE 25

process may rest on the personal relationship dramatic, can be offset with other local victo-
developed over time between the intelligence ries. At the operational or theater levei, intelli-
officer and the commander whom he or she gence has a lengthier period of usability. With
serves. To work best. this relationship must an emphasis on enemy force disposition and
involve trust, mutual respect, and a shared capability, the gravity of operational intelli-
dedication to the mission. gence greatly exceeds that of the tactical levei.
To have the greatest impact on the com- Should major intelligence errors occur, the
mander. the timing of the delivery of the intel- impact on the theater campaign may be disas-
ligence is crucial. The principie of timeliness trous and not recoverable. At the strategic
and the tenet of timing are not the same. Tim- levei, intelligence supporting national security
ing involves the calculation of when to present decision making has a much longer usability.
the intelligence to the commander. If the tim- Likewise, it must reflect the political, eco-
ing is wrong and the commander is unable to nomic, as well as the military characteristics of
focus on the intelligence, the impact of the the adversary nation. At this highest levei, the
information delivered may be diminished. It is consequences of misestimation are nationally
the responsibility of the intelligence officer to profound.
pick the best timing for the delivery of the most Intelligence, then, is art created by people.
important intelligence. And, the impact of that art on the decisions of
Finally, intelligence has a m ultilevel charac- the commander is greater than that of any other
ter as it supports missions at the tactical, opera- input he receives. Indeed, the “words, num-
tional, or strategic leveis of warfare.22 When bers, images, suggestions, appraisals, (and)
supporting tactical operations, intelligence is incitements” describe the enemy and help the
highly perishable. The usability of the infor- commander “optimize” his action to accom-
mation may be measured in hours, minutes, plish the mission. And, in the victory that fol-
and increasingly in seconds. Should intelli- io ws, the commander can claim he was served
gence fail, the impact, while deadly and locally well by the art of intelligence.
Washington, D.C.
19 April 2017

Notes
1. Joe West, "Specialty Codes to be Renumbered Novem- 11. William Safire, "Virtual Reality," New York T im es
ber 1." Air Force Times 53 (29 March 1993): 3. Magazine. 13 September 1992, 20.
2. Susan B. Cibson. chief of intelligence. 48th Tactical 12. Louisa Griffin, “U.S. Mission Planning Systems Strive
Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, U. K., interview with author, for Portability," D efen se E lectro n ics 24. no. 2 (February
4 April 1993. 1992) : 38—41.
3. Department of Defense. Conduct o f lh e Persian G ulf 13. Boyd seminar.
Conflict: An ínterim Report Io Congress (Washington, D.C.: 14. “Notes on Strategic Air Intelligence in World War II
Government Printing Office. 1991), 338. (ETO),'' Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.. October
4. Paul Seabury and Ângelo Codevilla. War: Ends an d 1949, 32. cited in Charles N. Culbertson, "Air Intelligence
M ean slNew York: Basic Books. Inc., 1989), 185. and the Search for the Center of Gravity." Research Report
5. Benjamin S. Lambeth. "M oscow's Lessons from the (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 1988). 24.
1982 Lebanon Air War," in War in th e Third D im ension: 15. Conduct o f the Persian G ulf Conflict, 340—42.
Essays in Contem porary Air Power. ed. R. A. Mason (Lon- 16. Alan W. Debban, "Disabling Systems: War-Fighting
don: Brassey s Defence Publishers. 1986), 127—48. Option for the Future," A irpow er Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring
6. John R. Boyd. “A Discourse on Winning and Losing," 1993) : 45.
Air War College seminar. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 -8 April 17. Campen. 53.
1993. 18. John Prados. T he Soviet E stim ate: U.S. Intelligence
7. Julie Bird, "Battle Planned without Middleman," Air Analysis an d Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton. N.J.: Prince-
Force Times 53 (29 March 1993): 16. ton University Press, 1986), 257-68.
8. Jenish D'Arcy, "Fantastic Voyages," M aclean's 105 (14 19. William E. Colby and Peter Forbath. Honorable Men: My
December 1992): 43—46. Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 424.
9. Charles J. Duniap. Jr., “The Origins of the American 20. Bonner Day, “Soviet Bombers: A Growing Threat,” Air
M ilitary Coup of 2 0 1 2 ," P a r a m e te r s 2. no. 4 (W inter Force Magazine 61 (November 1978): 85-86.
1992-1993): 11. 21. "Cassandra and the Cold War." N ew sw eek 89 (10 Janu-
10. Alan D. Campen. "Communications Support to Intelli- ary 1977): 24.
gence. in The First Information War: The Story o f Commu- 22. Michael I. Handel. "Intelligence and Military Opera-
nications, Computers, an d Intelligence System s in the Per- tions," in Intelligence an d Military Operations. ed. Michael I.
sian G ulf War. ed. Alan D. Campen (Fairfax. Va.: AFCEA Handel (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd.. 1990), 27.
International Press. 1992), 58.