Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2022) 21:583–602

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09710-1

Qualitative relationism about subject and object

of perception and experience

Andrea Pace Giannotta 1

Accepted: 29 October 2020 / Published online: 9 November 2020

# The Author(s) 2020

Abstract
In this paper, I compare various theories of perception in relation to the question of the
epistemological and ontological status of the qualities that appear in perceptual expe-
rience. I group these theories into two main views: quality externalism and quality
internalism, and I highlight their contrasting problems in accounting for phenomena
such as perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations (the “problem of perception”).
Then, I propose an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism and which
conceives of the subject and the object of perceptual experience as essentially related to
one another (hence relationism) in a process of co-constitution out of fundamental
qualities (hence qualitative relationism). I lend support to this view by drawing on
Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, which I complement with a form of neutral monism.
I argue that the investigation of the temporal structure of perceptual experience leads us
to find at its heart a qualitative process that is more fundamental than the two relata of
perception and that gives rise to them. Then, I extend this account of perception into a
general theory of intentionality and experience and I develop its implications into a
neutral monist metaphysics.

Keywords Phenomenal consciousness . Qualia . Internalism and externalism . Perception .

Phenomenology . Neutral monism . Phenomenal intentionality

1 Introduction

The starting point of this paper is the characterization of ordinary perception as

involving a relation between the perceptual experiences of a subject and objects that

* Andrea Pace Giannotta

andreapacegiannotta@gmail.com

1
Department of Humanities (DILEF), University of Florence, via della Pergola 58-60,
Florence 50121, Italy
584 A. Pace Giannotta

appear as independent from these experiences (or “mind-independent”).1 Furthermore,

perceptual experiences present concrete qualitative features that are evident from the
first-person perspective and that can be defined in the terms of “what it is like” (Nagel
1974) to have or to undergo them.2 For instance, perceiving a yellow lemon I undergo a
perceptual experience that presents the lemon and the quality “yellow”. Starting from
this characterization of perceptual experience as directed at objects and as qualitative,
one can ask about the nature of the qualities that appear in it, e.g. the “yellowness”
when perceiving the lemon. Are they properties of mind-independent objects in the
world? Or, on the contrary, are they merely subjective properties of mental states
through which we possibly come to know a mind-independent world? Concerning this
question, the various theories of perception that are debated in the literature can be
divided according to two options: internalism and externalism. This distinction partially
cross-cuts various theories of perception and allows us to capture differences and
similarities between them that would otherwise be overlooked.
In the first two sections of this paper, I will discuss these two options, calling them
quality externalism (sec. 1) and quality internalism (sec. 2). I shall highlight how each
of these positions has contrasting difficulties when addressing the problems posed by
perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations. These problems put pressure on these
views and lead us to consider an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism.
Qualitative relationism brings into question an idea that comes into play in both
externalism and internalism: the idea that the sensory qualities that characterize per-
ception are intrinsic properties of either mind-independent material objects (for quality
externalism) or subjective experiences (for quality internalism).3 In sec. 3, I shall
question this assumption in the light of the investigation of the temporality of experi-
ence, by drawing especially on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. In particular, I shall
introduce a distinction between two different levels in the analysis of the temporal
character of experience: macro-temporality and micro-temporality. I shall argue that,
whereas when investigating the macro-temporality of experience we can refer to the
relationship between perceptual states and objects and their respective properties, the
investigation of micro-temporality reveals a qualitative process that is more fundamen-
tal than the two relata of perception and that gives rise to them. In this way, I will define
qualitative relationism as the view according to which subject and object of perceptual
experience are essentially related to one another (hence relationism) in a process of co-
constitution out of fundamental qualities (hence qualitative relationism).

1
However, the fact that perceptual objects seem to be mind-independent does not prove that they are, in fact,
mind-independent.
2
I am considering here instances of conscious perception, leaving aside the analysis of unconscious perceptual
states. More in general, I am making use of the concept of “mind” in the sense of “conscious” or
“phenomenal” mind (see Chalmers 1996), leaving aside the analysis of unconscious cognitive phenomena
(e.g. dispositional states and unconscious mental processes in general). In the end, I will claim that the
proposed account is able to account also for these phenomena.
3
In fact, in order to account for phenomena such as illusions and hallucinations, externalists are lead to admit,
together with qualitative properties of worldly objects, also qualities that are internal to the experience.
However, they clearly separate these two kinds of properties (see sec. 2). Furthermore, naive realists conceive
of perceptual states as constituted by the relation with external objects and their properties, but this is
compatible with the claim that the qualitative properties of external objects are intrinsic to them and do not
depend on the relation with a perceiver (see sec. 2).
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 585

The focus of this paper is on the analysis of perceptual experience. However, I will
stress the central role of this analysis in developing a theory of knowledge and
metaphysics. This is because perceptual intentionality seems to be a fundamental form
of directedness of the mind towards an “external world”.4 For this reason, a philosoph-
ical theory of perception should say something about the relationship between “ap-
pearance” and “reality”, “mind” and “world”. When discussing the various theories of
perception, I shall thus highlight their metaphysical presuppositions and/or implica-
tions.5 In line with this approach, I shall develop the qualitative relationist proposal in a
metaphysical direction, by conceiving of it in terms of neutral monism: the metaphys-
ical position according to which there is a fundamental reality whose intrinsic nature is
neither mental (internal) nor physical (external) but neutral between the two. According
to the proposal here developed, this fundamental reality consists of qualitative elements
that are pre-phenomenal and pre-objectual and that, under certain circumstances,
combine into those complex entities that we call subjects and objects.

2 Quality externalism

With “quality externalism” I refer to the idea that the qualities that appear in perception
are properties of mind-independent objects “out there”, in the external world. This view
is shared by two of the main theories of perception: the standard version of naïve
realism and the externalist version of representationalism (e.g. Dretske 1996, 2003; Tye
1995).6
Naïve realism is a form of direct realism that claims that in perception one is
acquainted with objects in the environment and with their qualitative properties, such
as colours, sounds, odours, etc. The standard version of naïve realism presupposes a
distinction between act and object, which are directly related in perception.7 As an
example of such a view, we can consider Gibson’s ecological theory of perception
(Gibson 1966, 1967, 1972). Gibson claims that perception consists in directly picking
up information in the environment, in contrast to those views that appeal to internal
sensations or sense-data (understood as mind-dependent entities). However, Gibson
does not deny that we can have certain sensations, such as after-images or “ringings in
the ears”, which arise from the stimulation of sensory nerves and that appear in the
“theater of consciousness” (Gibson, 1967: 163). These sensory impressions are similar
to other bodily sensations such as pains and itches, which do not seem to pertain to

4
My primary focus here is on sense perception and I am not considering other forms of directedness towards
something that seems to be “external” to the experience of a subject, such as empathy, moral perception, or
mathematical intuition.
5
We will see that in some cases a theory of perception presupposes a certain metaphysics, whereas in other
cases it possibly implies it.
6
A form of quality externalism is also implied by those versions of the sense-data theory that conceive of
them as non-ordinary but mind-independent objects.
7
However, a radical version of this theory conceives of the relation between act and object in terms of
identity. This is the view developed by neutral monists such as Mach and James. The latter claims, for
example, that in perceptual experience perceiver and perceived “fuse” or “merge” (see Stubenberg 2018: 14).
This form of naïve realism is no longer externalist, since it questions the very distinction between internal and
external. I will come back to this view in sec. 4. From now on, with “naïve realism” I will refer to the
externalist version, which presupposes the act-object distinction.
586 A. Pace Giannotta

mind-independent objects in the world. However, according to Gibson, these phenom-

enal features of experience do not have any role in perception and are distinct from
those qualities that appear in perceptual experience, such as the colours of worldly
objects (Gibson 1967: 162; 1972: 77). In perception, we are directly aware of the
qualities of objects in the environment and not of private sensations. Gibson develops
this view as a vindication of common-sense realism (Gibson 1967) and therefore of the
idea that perception gives us direct access to a mind-independent and qualitative
world.8
Naïve realism is also sometimes referred to as “relationalism”, because it conceives
of the perceptual act as constituted by the relation with the mind-independent object. In
this sense, naïve realism conceives of the subjective pole of the perceptual relation as
not independent from the object to which it is directly related. For example, the act of
perceiving a red tomato is constituted by the relation with the tomato. However, this
standard version of naïve realism also conceives of the object as mind-independent and
as endowed with objective properties that are not dependent on the perceptual relation.
For this reason, in the standard formulation, naïve realism is a form of externalism
regarding qualities.9
Another form of quality externalism is the externalist version of representationalism
proposed, amongst others, by Dretske (1996, 2003) and Tye (1995). In contrast to naïve
realism, representationalist theories of perception claim that the relationship between
perceiver and environment is mediated by mental representations, i.e. information-
bearing structures that have a certain intentional content, through which they represent
things as being in a certain way. The externalist version of representationalism claims
that, whereas the vehicle of mental representation is internal to the cognitive system, its
phenomenal content is “external” or “wide”. In line with the externalist theory of
meaning, according to which meaning is not “in the head”, according to Dretske’s
“phenomenal externalism” (Dretske 1996), also “qualia” are not in the head, being
external contents of representational states.10

2.1 The problem of perception regarding quality externalism

Naïve realism (in the standard, externalist version) and externalist representationalism
claim that the qualities that appear in perception are mind-independent properties of
objects in the world. However, these forms of externalism regarding qualities are
challenged by the phenomena of perceptual relativity, illusion, and hallucination.

8
These implications of Gibson’s theory of perception are drawn for instance by B. Smith (1995, 1999) within
the project of a “qualitative ontology” (see Petitot and Smith 1997). In this view, sensory qualities are
objective properties of mind-independent objects in the world. However, it is also possible to understand
Gibson’s theory within a neutral monist framework, which conceives of the relation between act and object in
perception as an identity relation. See Heft (2001), who links Gibson’s view to the neutral monism of James
(1912).
9
This is especially clear when naïve realism is combined with disjunctivism in order to account for the
problem of perception (see below, sec. 2.1).
10
Gow (2018: 5 ff.) stresses the fact that, by conceiving of qualities as external properties of mind-
independent objects, externalist representationalism turns out to be very close to naïve realism. Concerning
the relationship between externalist representationalism and metaphysics, Dretske conceives of his proposal as
a way of “naturalizing the mind” (Dretske 1995), thus finding its place in the natural world.
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 587

For example, the colour of a visual object varies with changes in the environmental
or psychological viewing conditions (intrapersonal relativity), among different per-
ceivers of the same species (interpersonal relativity) and among different types of
animals (interspecies relativity; see Cohen 2004). The phenomenon of perceptual
relativity leads us to question the idea that qualities such as colours are intrinsic
properties of objects in the environment. Also perceptual illusions lead us to question
the external status of sensible qualities. For example, by looking for some time at an
orange lamp and then at a white wall, one experiences a blue after-image. In this case,
the quality “blueness” seems to be a mental (experience-dependent) property and not an
objective property of the wall. Hallucinations constitute an even harder challenge for
externalism since they are indistinguishable from veridical perception and purport to
present objects which, however, do not exist at all outside the experience.
These phenomena lead to the distinction, which is central to quality internalism,
between phenomenal appearance, which can also be illusory or hallucinatory, and
objective reality.
However, in order to maintain the idea that sensible qualities are mind-independent
properties of objects in the world, both naïve realism and externalist representational-
ism can be joined with disjunctivism. According to disjunctivism, even if veridical
perception and hallucination are subjectively indistinguishable, they are different kinds
of mental states: in the “good case” one is acquainted with qualitative properties of
external objects, whereas in the “bad case” one has a different kind of experience,
which involves mind-dependent qualities.
The disjunctivist view is endorsed especially by naïve realists. However, also
externalist representationalism turns out to be committed to disjunctivism (Gow
2018; see also Williford 2013: 514). For example, Dretske claims that “typically”
(Dretske 2003: 68) the qualitative properties that objects are represented as having are
external and objective. This leaves open the possibility that in non-usual cases the
phenomenal contents of representational states have a different nature. In fact, Dretske
seeks to account for cases of non-veridical perception in terms of misrepresentations,
which occur when representational states fail to refer correctly to an object, as in the
case of a malfunctioning thermometer that misrepresents temperature. However, in the
case of phenomenal mental states, the analogy with a physical instrument, such as the
thermometer, does not fully work (see Mcintyre 1999: 436), as the measure of
temperature by the thermometer is merely quantitative and not qualitative – it does
not have any associated “what-it’s-likeness”. On the contrary, when externalist repre-
sentationalism tries to account for the referential failure of perceptual states, which have
a phenomenal content, it is led to admit an internal phenomenal content of the
misrepresenting state. If I misrepresent a tomato as being blue instead of red, because
my experience is altered by the ingestion of a psychedelic drug, the “blueness” must be
an internal phenomenal content of my mental state. This is even more clear in the case
of hallucinations. If one wants to give a positive account of them, and not just a
negative one, one has to appeal to internal phenomenal contents of representational
states. However, when doing so, externalist representationalism turns out to be very
close to quality internalism (see Williford 2013: 514).
Naïve realism also finds analogous problems when appealing to disjunctivism in
order to account for the problem of perception. For example, considering again
Gibson’s view, endorsing disjunctivism would mean blurring the distinction that it
588 A. Pace Giannotta

makes between sensory impressions (internal and not entailed in perception) and
qualitative properties of external objects (directly perceived). In the “bad case”, what
seems to be an objective property is, in fact, an internal phenomenal appearance.
So, in order to account for the problem of perception, both naïve realism and
externalist representationalism are led to endorse disjunctivism. This implies
commitment to an internalist account of illusions and hallucinations, admitting
that the sensory qualities involved in these cases are merely internal phenom-
enal contents of mental states. However, at this point, an objection is that the
same internalist account could be employed to account for veridical perception,
claiming that in it we are also acquainted with merely internal phenomenal
appearances. In particular, when trying to give a positive account of hallucina-
tions, the disjunctivist can appeal to physical processes in the brain, conceived
of as the proximal cause of the hallucinatory experience, but the same account
can be also applied to the veridical case, and this would make the reference to
mind-independent qualities in the veridical case unmotivated. This objection
puts pressure on quality externalism, pointing at the difficulty in maintaining a
purely externalist account of sensory qualities and offering a reason for con-
sidering the opposite view, i.e. quality internalism.11

3 Quality internalism

With “quality internalism”, I refer to the idea that the qualities that appear in
perception are “internal” to the experience of a subject. A significant motivation
for this position is the possibility of unitarily accounting for perceptual relativ-
ity, illusion and hallucination, claiming that the sensory qualities that appear in
these experiences are properties of conscious mental states and not mind-
independent properties of external objects. Quality internalism, therefore, makes
use of a distinction between phenomenal appearance, “in the mind”, and mind-
independent reality.12 This view can be found in various theories of perception:
the standard version of the sense-data theory; adverbialism; and those internalist
versions of representationalism that admit the existence of qualia.
In particular, I would like to take a close look at a recent development of just such an
internalist view of qualities, in the so-called phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT). At
the heart of this view, there is the criticism of separatism (Horgan and Tienson 2002:
520), which consists in treating phenomenal consciousness and intentionality as posing
two distinct problems for the philosophy of mind. The central claim of PIT is that

11
I am not claiming that this is a wholly conclusive reason for abandoning quality externalism but that it
constitutes a difficulty of this view and a reason for considering other options. In fact, disjunctivists attempt to
answer this kind of objection in various ways (for an overview see Crane and French 2017). Suffice for me to
highlight here the difficulties in the externalism regarding qualities and, in the next section, leverage the
arguments from the opposite view, i.e. quality internalism. In the end, my aim is to show that qualitative
relationism is another, overlooked option that better addresses the issues at stake.
12
Again, I am using here the term “mind” in the sense specified above, i.e. as “conscious” or “phenomenal”
mind.
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 589

phenomenality and intentionality are essentially linked to one another, as the original
form of intentionality is grounded on “phenomenology”.13
PIT is a general theory of intentionality, which seeks to account for the directedness
of mental states towards objects in terms of phenomenal consciousness (i.e. in the terms
of their “what-it’s-likeness”). However, the analysis of perceptual intentionality has a
central role in this view, since perception is our fundamental form of directedness to an
(allegedly) “external world”. In fact, the main arguments in support of PIT are based on
the analysis of perceptual intentionality. These arguments lead to the claim that
intentional states represent objects in virtue of a phenomenal content that is narrow
(i.e. internal, as opposed to “wide” or “external”).14 This claim is motivated by the
logical conceivability of scenarios that involve the duplication of a conscious being’s
experience – “logical conceivability” meaning that these possibilities, for essential
reasons, cannot be ruled out a priori. One can conceive of the exact duplication of a
phenomenal experience, whereas the corresponding world “outside” the mind is very
different. Indeed, I can conceive of a “phenomenal duplicate” that possesses phenom-
enal states that are identical to mine but, for example, lives on Twin Earth, is deceived
by an evil demon, or has been raised as a brain in a vat (Farkas 2008; see also Horgan
and Tienson 2002; Loar 2003; Horgan, Tienson, and Graham 2004; Kriegel 2007).
The logical conceivability of phenomenal duplicates supports the thesis that the
phenomenal content of intentional states logically supervenes on the subject’s internal
states and not on “external” factors, thus being “narrow”. Kriegel defines the narrow-
ness of phenomenal intentionality in terms of non-relationality: “an intentional property
is narrow just in case it supervenes on the subject’s non-relational properties, that is, is
‘locally supervenient.’” (Farkas 2013: 5). This means that the phenomenal properties of
a mental state (e.g. the yellowness in perceiving a ripe lemon) are intrinsic or monadic
properties, i.e. non-relational features of mental states that are not constitutively
dependent on the existence of an external object.
Now, I would like to highlight a problem in this view: in the definition that we have
just seen, it is not clear what is meant by “internal” and “local”. In fact, it is common to
make a distinction between “internal” and “external” by referring to the boundaries set
by the skin or the brain of a minded creature, thus presupposing the existence of entities
such as brains and bodies. However, this is a metaphysical assumption that should not
be taken for granted when defining internalism (see Farkas 2003). In fact, the paradigm
of an internalist position is in Descartes (2008), who develops it as an epistemological
inquiry that leads to a dualist metaphysics. Descartes’s internalist argument consists in
claiming that the first-person investigation of experience shows, first of all, only the

13
The central claim of PIT is that there is a basic form of intentionality that is grounded on phenomenal
consciousness. Then, different versions of this view differ in how they account for the relationship between
basic (or “source”) intentionality and other, derivative, forms of intentionality, ranging from weak versions to
strong versions of PIT (according to which all intentionality is phenomenal). There is also an ongoing debate
concerning the extent of phenomenal intentionality, e.g. concerning the distinctive phenomenology of thinking
(“cognitive phenomenology”), the phenomenology of agency, etc. See Kriegel (2013); Bourget and
Mendelovici (2017) for an overview.
14
Concerning the role of the analysis of perception in PIT, the usual way of conceiving this view is in the
terms of an internalist form of representationalism, in contrast to the externalist representationalism of e.g.
Dretske and Tye (see sec. 2). Kriegel (2007) proposes this view as a generalization to all representations of the
adverbial account of sense perception. At the same time, PIT can also be likened to an internalist version of the
sense-data theory.
590 A. Pace Giannotta

existence of subjective experience. It is through further argumentation that Descartes

can overcome solipsism and reach the dualist conclusion (by appealing to the innate
idea of a God that cannot deceive).
One must therefore distinguish, from amongst the arguments in support of PIT,
between the logical conceivability of a “brain in a vat” (whose internal states supervene
on the physical states of the brain, thus presupposed) and the logical conceivability of a
disembodied mind, with no relation to an external world.15 The latter possibility is
admitted by Kriegel, who claims that one can conceive of a “soul, floating through
otherwise empty space but (by sheer luck) undergoing conscious experiences that are
phenomenally indistinguishable from yours” (Kriegel 2007: 321). In this example, if
one drops the reference to the indistinguishability of these experiences to those of an
embodied subject, what is left is the conceivability of a disembodied soul, i.e. a solus
ipse.

3.1 The problem of perception regarding quality internalism

Therefore, PIT is a form of internalism concerning the qualities of perception.16 Its

main advantage over quality externalism is that it can account for veridical perception,
illusion and hallucination, by conceiving of all these states as representational states
endowed with an internal phenomenal content. However, taking the internalist stance to
its logical conclusion leads us to raise the classic skeptical point: is there an external
world at all that corresponds to those experiences that purport to refer to mind-
independent objects? How can I know that I am not a solus ipse? Concerning the
analysis of perception, this is the problem when accounting for the difference between
veridical perception, that purports to refer to mind-independent objects, and experi-
ences such as dreams and hallucinations.
This issue is made explicit by Chalmers when considering a form of quality
internalism in his (Chalmers 1996). Chalmers raises “Descartes’s problem about the
existence of the external world” (Chalmers 1996: 75), which is due to the fact that “It is
compatible with our experiential evidence that the world we think we are seeing does
not exist; perhaps we are hallucinating, or we are brains in vats.” (Chalmers 1996: 75). I
stress again that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis still presupposes the existence of a mind-
independent brain. Strictly speaking, on the same basis, it is possible to claim that
experiential evidence is compatible with the possibility that “I am a solus ipse”.
According to Chalmers, the internalist can simply quell the skeptical doubts with an
inference to the best explanation (Chalmers 1996: 75), but “the in-principle possibility
that we are wrong remains” (Chalmers 1996: 75). The same kind of issue is raised by
various proponents of PIT. Farkas (2013: 108) claims that her account of phenomenal
intentionality is situated “on the phenomenal level” and that it is compatible with the
possibility that one is a brain in a vat, because “an embodied person and his brain-in-a-
vat Doppelgänger share narrow contents possessing phenomenal intentionality” (Farkas
2008: 285). Farkas also turns from the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis to the idealist

15
These two cases are often conflated in the literature. For instance, Horgan and Tienson (2002: 524) tell us to
imagine a phenomenal duplicate that is “a brain in a vat or a disembodied Cartesian mind”.
16
As I have already claimed, PIT can be taken as representative of various versions of quality internalism such
as the standard (internalist) version of the sense-data theory, adverbialism, and internalist representationalism.
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 591

hypothesis, admitting that her view is compatible with idealism, even if she does not
endorse it (Farkas 2013: 114 fn. 6).
The compatibility with subjective idealism or solipsism does not constitute a
conclusive reason to abandon quality internalism. The internalist can argue that we
must live with this possibility and that, nevertheless, quality internalism is still the best
theory that is available. However, this problem puts pressure on this view and gives a
reason for searching for an alternative position, which would not give rise to the
sceptical hypothesis. It is precisely this alleged advantage over quality internalism that
is claimed by proponents of naïve realism, whose thesis that we are in direct contact
with mind-independent objects should dismantle the sceptical scenarios. For example,
Gibson claims that a virtue of his theory of direct perception is that it avoids the
“ridiculous pit of solipsism” (Gibson 1967: 171). However, as I have argued (sec. 2.1),
when trying to account for the problem of perception, both naïve realism and externalist
representationalism become very close to quality internalism and this means that they
cannot really rule out the solipsistic hypothesis.

4 Qualitative relationism

At this point, we can see that each of the two options concerning the nature of sensory
qualities – internalism and externalism – play on the difficulties of the other when
addressing the problem of perception. This opposition between two views motivates
the search for an alternative that can address their respective difficulties.
I shall now argue that qualitative relationism is the alternative sought. In particular,
qualitative relationism brings into question an idea that is shared, in different ways, by
quality externalism and internalism: the idea that sensory qualities are intrinsic prop-
erties of either conscious mental states or external objects – an intrinsic property being
possessed by one of the two poles of the perceptual relation, regardless of the relation
with the other. In fact, externalism and internalism take, as a starting point, the view of
perception as a relation that presupposes two poles: conscious mental state and object.
Subsequently, they conceive of the qualities as properties that pertain to one of the two
poles of this relation, independently of the other.17 Qualitative relationism questions
this starting point by showing that it pertains to a preliminary level of inquiry that is
confined to the investigation of the macro-temporal structure of experience. I will now
argue that, by “deepening” this inquiry, we can conceive of qualities as primal elements
out of which internal qualitative properties of mental states and external qualitative
properties of objects, i.e. the two poles of the perceptual relation, are co-constituted in
reciprocal dependence.18
In order to motivate this view, we must now consider the temporal nature of
experience. In fact, even if we usually refer to mental states and objects as if they
were static entities with a certain set of properties, they are processes that unfold over
time. In particular, we can investigate the temporal nature of experience within two

17
As I have argued, this applies also to the standard version of naïve realism which, at least concerning
veridical perception, conceives of qualities as objective properties of mind-independent objects, at the same
time taking into account illusions and hallucinations in terms of internal qualities of mental states.
18
I will elaborate on this concept of co-constitution below.
592 A. Pace Giannotta

different levels of analysis, by focusing on its macro-temporal or its micro-temporal

structure. With these expressions, I refer to the difference between a coarse-grained
analysis of the temporality of experience – e.g. when considering a succession of
experiences in perceiving a tomato from various points of view – and a finer-grained
analysis of the inner temporality of each moment of the experiential process – e.g. when
considering single moments in the perception of the tomato “now”.

4.1 Macro-temporality and phenomenal intentionality as constitution

The investigation of experience in its macro-temporal structure comes into play

especially in the phenomenal intentionality view. In fact, one can consider the inten-
tionality of “mental states” in somewhat static terms, in analogy to the representational
character of e.g. signs and pictures, which “stand for” something else. In this abstract
consideration, propositional attitudes such as “John perceives the lemon” (or, also,
“John thinks about Pythagoras’ theorem”, which means that he is consciously thinking
about it) are intentional states. However, upon closer investigation this turns out to be
an abstraction, as perceiving, thinking, imagining, desiring, etc. are processes that
happen over time, i.e. they have a conscious duration. In fact, all these mental processes
are temporal and, insofar as they are conscious, they have a phenomenal character, i.e.
there is something it is like to have or to undergo them.
This point is stressed by the first proponents of PIT. Horgan and Tienson note that
“Experience is not of instants; experience is temporally thick.” (Horgan and Tienson
2002: 521) and Loar highlights the “compelling intuition” that mental life is “a stream
of conscious thoughts, feelings and perceptions.” (Loar 2003: 293) at the same time
noting that, however, “Conceptions of mental content in the analytic tradition have
tended to be phenomenologically impoverished, largely because of the emphasis on
language and reference.” (Loar 2003: 292–293). This means that phenomenal inten-
tionality has a temporal structure. In particular, the investigation of this temporal
structure comes into play in the way that some proponents of PIT seek to account for
the relationship between perceptual states and their intentional objects, by making use
of the notions of constitution and construction.
For instance, Farkas (2013) claims that perceptual states, which seem to be
directed at something beyond themselves, do that in virtue of having a certain
structure, thanks to which they “construct” an external world. According to Farkas,
the other-presenting character of perceptual intentionality comes from the relations
between phenomenal contents which, in themselves, are not presentational (Farkas
2013: 110). When certain phenomenal qualities come to be structured in a certain
way, “the impression of an external world emerges” (Farkas 2013: 110). This other-
presenting structure of perceptual intentionality is missing in other kinds of expe-
riences, such as pain. This leads Farkas to distinguish between the mere sensation
(e.g. the sensation of red when experiencing an afterimage) and the “same sensa-
tional feature” (Farkas 2013: 113) in the presentation of an external object, e.g. in
seeing a red tomato. The difference between the two cases is in the structure of the
experience and not in the phenomenal content, which is the same. I stress the fact
that, in this account, the structure in question is the macro-temporal structure of a
series of experiences, which gives rise to perceptual intentionality, conceived of as
a relation between mental acts and objects.
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 593

Also Masrour (2013) develops PIT in order to account for the intentionality of
perceptual experience, which is “other-presenting” and has “phenomenal objectivity”
(Masrour 2013: 116). In particular, he develops a Kantian account of the “constitution”
of the objects of perception based on phenomenal intentionality. According to Masrour,
mental representations that have an internal phenomenal content acquire objective
significance “in virtue of necessary temporal connections between them” (Masrour
2013: 120). Masrour’s Kantian thesis is that perceptual experience acquires phenom-
enal objectivity in virtue of having a structure called “schematic dynamical unity”
(Masrour 2013: 122 ff.). When a series of experiences has this structure it is schemat-
ically unified and the object is constituted.
In both Farkas and Masrour, we find confirmation in the idea that perceptual
intentionality has a certain temporal structure that accounts for how narrow contents
of experiences come to constitute allegedly “external” objects. This is a diachronic
structure that concerns the relationship between series of experiences, which come one
after the other in an experiential course and are somehow linked together. In this
approach, it is the temporal connection between the experiences that leads to the
constitution of the intentional correlate, whereas the singular experience is confined
to the momentary “now”. In this way, perceptual intentionality turns out to be a feature
of series of experiences which, in turn, are taken as partial moments of the experiential
flow.
At this point, I would like to compare these accounts of perceptual intention-
ality in terms of constitution of objects, in PIT, with Husserl’s phenomenology of
perception. In fact, Husserl too conceives of perception as a process of constitu-
tion, understanding this process in terms of a combination of intentionality (form)
and quality (matter). According to Husserl, the intentional structuring of qualities
leads to the constitution of the object as the correlate of perception. In this view,
we must distinguish between the internal contents of perceptual experiences, e.g.
continuously changing colour sensations, and the properties of the perceptual
object, e.g. its colour (see Husserl 1983: 74–75). This means that, with the term
of a quality such as “red”, we can refer, at the same time, to the sensations of
redness, which are internal contents, and to the redness of the tomato, which is an
objectual property: the latter are constituted by means of the intentional structuring
of the former. According to Husserl, an advantage of this theory is that it accounts
at the same time for the relativity of perception – the fact that an object appears
differently when changing the circumstances of perception – and for perceptual
constancy – the attribution of a certain qualitative property to an object, such as a
specific shade of red in a homogeneously coloured region of the surface of the
tomato. Furthermore, it can account for the fact that the same sensory qualities can
be intentionally structured in different ways, as in the case of Gestalt figures, thus
leading to the constitution of different perceptual objects (see Williford 2013:
508).
Therefore, in Husserl’s phenomenology we already find, as in PIT, a view of
perceptual intentionality in terms of constitution of objects on the basis of “narrow”
contents of experiences. However, both in PIT and Husserl’s phenomenology, this
analysis of perception is situated on the “phenomenal level” (Farkas 2013: 108) and can
be conceived of as metaphysically neutral, i.e. not committed to any specific view
594 A. Pace Giannotta

about the metaphysical nature of subject and object, mind and world – and therefore not
committed to metaphysical views such as materialism, dualism, or idealism.19
At the same time, I have already stressed the relevance of the various theories of
perception for the metaphysical investigation, because sense perception is a fundamen-
tal form of directedness of a subject of experience towards an (allegedly) “external
world”.20 For this reason, we can ask about the possible metaphysical implications of
the account of perceptual intentionality as constitution of objects, in PIT and Husserl’s
phenomenology. However, doing so we are again faced with the problem of the
external world, because this account of perception is compatible with scepticism
concerning the existence of a mind-independent reality and is therefore compatible
with subjective idealism, phenomenalism or solipsism. I will now argue that, by
deepening the analysis of the temporal structure of perceptual intentionality, we can
finally find a way out of this issue.

4.2 Micro-temporality and genesis of intentionality

At this point, I would like to show how investigating the micro-temporal structure of
perceptual intentionality allows us to address the problem of the external world, by
“deepening” the account of perception in terms of temporal structuring of qualities.
In fact, as I have already claimed, the analysis of perception as constitution by
means of the intentional structuring of narrow phenomenal contents is focused on
the temporality of perceptual experiences considered at a coarse-grained level. For
example, I perceive a tomato by moving around it, thus looking at its various
sides. Each “portion” of this perceptual process can be considered as a perceptual
“state” that has a certain content (e.g. the quale “red” that is intentionally struc-
tured in order to constitute the perceptual experience of the tomato). In this coarse-
grained analysis, the experiences that take part in the constitutive process are
taken as given temporal units (Husserl 1983: 171). However, this is, in fact,
another abstraction, since each of the moments of experience has a more fine-
grained temporal structure, being part of a continuous experiential flow. The
analysis of this deeper temporal structure of experience is the topic of Husserl’s
“genetic phenomenology”, which is centred on the analysis of time-consciousness
(see Husserl 1991, 2001). According to Husserl, the investigation of the macro-
temporal structure of experience - which he calls “static-descriptive” - has to be
complemented by the “genetic-explicative” phenomenological method, which
investigates what I am calling the micro-temporality of experience (Husserl
2001: 624). This fine-grained analysis of the temporality of experience sheds light
on the “genesis of constitution” (Husserl 2001: 644), i.e. the process through

19
Concerning the “metaphysical neutrality” of Husserl’s phenomenology, I refer to the fact that from the onset
it does not take a stance on metaphysical debates and that it is maybe compatible with various metaphysical
positions (as argued e.g. by Yoshimi 2015). However, I will later claim that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology
can be complemented with a version of “neutral monism”, which is a specific metaphysical position. This is a
different sense of “neutrality” and I will propose it as a development of genetic phenomenology, rather than an
interpretation of it. More on this below.
20
Of course, this holds only if one thinks that it makes sense to ask about metaphysical questions in the first
place.
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 595

which the intentionality that constitutes objects is itself constituted in the first
place.21
Consider, for example, the perception of a melody. This perceptual process occurs
over time and requires a continuous synthesis of momentary tones – “now” – in a
unitary consciousness of the melody. The individual tones are qualitative components
of a continuous flow of experience. In order to be aware of the melody in its entirety
and not just of its momentary components, there must be at play a process of synthetic
unification of the manifold tones.22 Husserl accounts for this phenomenon arguing that
each tone occurring “now” is a “primal impression” that has to be “retained” in the flow
of consciousness and has to be joined with the “protention” towards the tone that will
come next. These “retentions” and “protentions” are functions that give structure to the
qualitative contents and confer unity to the perception of the melody in its subjective
and objectual sides, giving rise to what James (1890) calls the “specious present”, i.e. a
present that is not punctual but encompasses more than a singular moment in time. In
this way, investigating the fine-grained temporal structure of perceptual intentionality
we find a deeper level of the structuring of qualitative elements (the “primal impres-
sions”). In other terms, in the light of this inquiry, the “phenomenal content” of
intentional states turns out to be constituted itself out of a continuous qualitative flow
(e.g. the flow of tones), which is structured by means of retentions and protentions.
These structuring functions give unity to the series of experiences and give rise to
perceptual intentionality.
Now, I would like to stress that, in Husserl’s view, this is an account of conscious
experience in general and not only of sense perception. In fact, the “primal impres-
sions” are the qualities that constitute the “phenomenal character” of experience in all
of its modalities.23 For instance, Husserl claims that also “a judging consciousness of a
mathematical state of affairs is an impression” (Husserl 1991: 95/100) and that “belief
is actual belief, is an impression.” (Husserl 1991: 103/109).24 Furthermore, this view
sheds light on the process through which both the object of experience and the
subjective pole of experience are constituted at the same time. On this point, Husserl
claims that genetic phenomenology investigates the genesis of what he calls “monadic
individuality” (Husserl 2001: 635), referring with this expression to the concrete

21
I am focusing here on perceptual constitution, leaving aside the phenomenological analysis of the
constitution of other “regions of being” and its relationship with the phenomenology of perception.
Concerning the latter, Husserl claims that it is a fundamental form of “originarily presenting intuition”
(Husserl 1983: 156) and develops its analysis in terms of constitution. I am not addressing here the question
of whether and to what extent a similar analysis can be developed concerning other forms of intuition (e.g.
empathy, moral perception or mathematical intuition). Also, I am not addressing the problem of the
constitution of ideal objects in Husserl’s phenomenology. In the end, it seems to me that the proposed account
of perception and its development into a neutral monist metaphysics is compatible with Husserl’s theory of
essences and his doctrine of eidetic intuition, but a detailed analysis of this issue is matter for further inquiry
(see also fn. 24, 25).
22
As is known, this is the remark made by Kant to Hume’s theory of experience as a succession of
impressions. Kant claims that we must distinguish between the succession of impressions and the conscious-
ness of this succession and argues that the latter requires a process of synthetic unification of the sensory
manifold.
23
On this point see Henry (2008: 23).
24
In this way, Husserl anticipates a thesis that is dear to the proponents of so-called “cognitive phenomenol-
ogy” (e.g. Pitt 2004). However, as I have said, I will not tackle here the complex issue of the ontological status
of the objects of e.g. mathematical thinking, which are ideal objects. This is a matter for further inquiry.
596 A. Pace Giannotta

subject of experience. We can see this point by looking at the structure of perceptual
experience: the fundamental process of structuring of qualities leads, at the same time,
to the constitution of a certain object, e.g. the perceived melody, and of the subjective
pole of the cognitive relation, i.e. the act of perceiving the melody. Perceiving the
melody and the perceived melody turn out to be both grounded on the flow of primal
qualities and on their structuring through retentions and protentions. In this way, the
investigation of the temporal micro-structure of experience reveals a process of co-
constitution of subject and object of perceptual experience in reciprocal dependence:
the process of constitution of objects is at the same time the process of constitution of
perceptual acts, on the basis of a more fundamental process of structuring of primal
qualities. This account can be extended from perceptual intentionality to “phenomenal
intentionality” in general, i.e. the intentionality that is grounded on phenomenal
character, thus constituting an account of the genesis of subject and object of experi-
ence in general. The idea is that all experiences, insofar as they are conscious “mental
states” (e.g. episodes of thinking, imagining, desiring, feeling, etc.), involve a process
of retention and protention of qualities by means of which the two poles of the
experience are reciprocally constituted.25
In particular, this idea of the co-constitution of subject and object of experience is
highlighted by those scholars who stress the relationist dimension of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology. According to Bernet, Husserl’s phenomenology describes a form of
“intentional interlacing of subject and object that precedes their separation and oppo-
sition” (Bernet 1994: 232). Gallagher and Zahavi also claim that in the phenomeno-
logical view “mind and world are not distinct entities, rather, they are bound constitu-
tively together” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 142). According to Zahavi, the investi-
gation of experience in phenomenology “questions the very subject-object split” and
stresses the “co-emergence of self and world” (Zahavi 2004: 58). Varela (1996: 339)
also stresses that phenomenology seeks to move beyond the separation between subject
and object, in order to reveal the fundamental correlation of the two poles of
cognition.26,27
The qualitative relationism that I am here proposing is based on this view. I define
qualitative relationism as, first of all, the view of perception that, in contrast to
internalism and externalism, conceives of the two poles of perceptual experience as
essentially correlated in a process of co-constitution that involves the retentional and
protentional structuring of fundamental qualities. Extending this account to intention-
ality and experience in general, qualitative relationism conceives of the subject and
object of experience as co-constituted out of qualities or “primal impressions”.

25
In my view, this account is not necessarily in contrast with the phenomenological doctrine of eidetic
intuition, according to which individual beings have an essential nature that is known by means of an eidetic
seeing (Husserl 1983: 9–10). Claiming that subjectivity and objectivity are co-constituted is still compatible
with the idea that the experiencing subject has intuitive access to the essential structure of the various objective
domains and to their essences. However, a detailed analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this paper (see
Zhok (2012) for an useful analysis of the ontological status of essences in phenomenology).
26
This idea is also at the basis of the enactive approach of (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991), which takes
from the Madhyamaka philosophy and from phenomenology the concept of the co-origination of subject and
object, mind and world: “Knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual
specification or dependent coorigination.” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991: 150).
27
In these views, the epistemological and metaphysical plane are strictly related, since the co-constitution of
subject and object of cognition is also understood as co-constitution of mind and world.
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 597

However, at this point, we must ask: what are, exactly, the “primal impressions” that
the genetic-phenomenological inquiry finds at the basis of the co-constitution of subject
and object? The term “impression” seems to refer to something that is experienced by a
subject, i.e. a phenomenal quality. In this way, the co-constitutive process would
presuppose a more fundamental subject that has impressions. But this would make
the problem of the external world even worse: by “deepening” the “internalist” view in
PIT and phenomenology we would reach, in the end, a form of idealism. Is this the only
option available? In the next section, I will explore an alternative to it.

4.3 Neutral monism

The alternative metaphysical option that I would like to propose now as a development
of qualitative relationism is neutral monism. In this view, proposed first by Mach
(1914), James (1912), and Russell (1921), there is an ultimate reality that is made up of
qualitative elements and whose intrinsic nature is neither mental nor physical but
neutral between the two.28 This qualitative and empiricist version of neutral monism
has been also recently called panqualityism (Coleman 2015, 2016; see also Chalmers
2016a: 40–44; Goff 2017: 116) and it is carefully considered as a viable solution to the
mind-body problem and to the “hard problem” of consciousness.29
In the light of this view, I propose to conceive of the qualitative elements that are at
the heart of experience as fundamental qualities that are neutral to the distinction
between subjective and objective, and therefore as pre-phenomenal qualities that are
at the basis of the co-constitution of mental processes and objects. In this approach, the
fundamental qualities are not yet phenomenal qualities of experience. They become the
contents of experiences, correlated to objects, only under certain circumstances, when
they combine into those complex entities that we call minds and physical objects.30
However, a classic objection to such a view is that the allegedly neutral elements are,
in fact, mental entities, and that neutral monism is subjective idealism under disguise.
This objection is also due to the fact that proponents of neutral monism often refer to
neutral entities by using terms that refer to experiential qualities, such as sensations
(Mach) and pure experiences (James). However, these are unfortunate terminological
choices. Mach, who is the first proponent of this view, clarifies that he uses the term
“sensation” to describe the neutral elements just because “most people are much more
familiar with the elements in question as sensations (colours, sounds, pressures, spaces,
times, etc.) (…)” (Mach 1914: 16). For this reason, scholars such as Parrini (2018) and
Banks (2003) stress the fact that Mach’s view is not subjective idealism or phenome-
nalism. The crucial point is that, in this view, both subjects and worldly objects are
made up of complexes of neutral elements, but the elements can exist also indepen-
dently of the cognitive relation (see Parrini 2018: 40). We can conceive of the basic
qualitative elements as, first of all, “unsensed sensa” (Chalmers 2016a: 42) or

28
This empiricist and qualitative version of neutral monism must be distinguished from other versions, such
as Sayre’s neutral monism of information (see Stubenberg 2018: 22).
29
Nowadays, neutral monism is an object of renewed interest in philosophy of mind and metaphysics (see
Banks 2003, 2010; Stubenberg 2018).
30
This is a “neither view” of the neutrality of the elements and must be distinguished from a “both view”,
which claims that the basic entities are physical and mental at the same time (Stubenberg 2018: 3). The latter is
better understood as a dual aspect monism or a form of panpsychism.
598 A. Pace Giannotta

“unexperienced qualia” (Coleman 2016: 249), i.e. “qualitative without being yet
phenomenally qualitative (i.e. intrinsically conscious).” (Coleman 2015: 84) because
“capable of existence outside of consciousness” (Coleman 2015: 69–70). Only under
certain conditions can these qualities become the phenomenal contents of a subject’s
mental states and the qualities of objects.31
The most serious problem for this view is to account for how pre-phenomenal
qualities can turn into the phenomenal contents of the experience of a subject. This is
the so-called “combination problem” for panqualityism (Chalmers 2016b; Coleman
2016), which is due to the existence of a nonsubject/subject gap (Chalmers 2016a: 38).
However, combining Husserl’s genetic phenomenology with neutral monism can help
us in addressing this problem. As we have seen, the phenomenological analysis of the
“genesis of constitution” that is at the same time “genesis of monadic individuality”
(i.e. genesis of the concrete conscious subject) sheds light on the process of co-
constitution of subject and object. Combining this account with the neutral monist
metaphysics, we can conceive of this process in terms of the structuring of pre-
phenomenal qualities, conceived of as the fundamental constituents of reality. In this
view, the structuring of these elements is the process through which a “phenomenal
field”, and therefore a subject of experience, comes to light, thus turning the funda-
mental qualities into phenomenal qualities (correlated, in turn, to objectual proper-
ties).32 As for the investigation of how this process of structuring of the fundamental
qualities takes place, we can combine the phenomenology of time-consciousness with
the findings of a phenomenologically-based neurobiology, following Varela’s project
of a neurophenomenology (Varela 1996, 1999). In Varela’s view, we can investigate
the biological counterparts of the structures of experience. In particular, it is possible to
establish a correlation between the impressional-retentional-protentional dynamics of
time-consciousness and certain neural processes (Varela 1999; Thompson 2007: 329
ff.), because the temporal structure of experience is “structurally mirrored at the
biological level by the self-organising dynamics of large-scale neural activity” (Thomp-
son 2007: 329).
Varela conceived of this view as a way of “naturalizing phenomenology”, without,
however, developing it into a metaphysical position.33 On the contrary, I suggest to
develop neurophenomenology within a neutral monist framework. In this view, the
biological domain is made up of complexes of neutral elements (i.e. pre-phenomenal

31
This point marks the difference between the qualitative version of neutral monism (or panqualityism) and
panpsychism. Chalmers (2016a) defines panqualityism as a version of panprotopsychism (i.e. the view that
fundamental entities are not conscious per se but are precursors to consciousness).
32
I have to clarify that this is the proposal of a possible development of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and
not strictly an interpretation of it. That is, I am not claiming that, in the end, Husserl was a neutral monist. It
may well be that, in the end, he was a metaphysical idealist (as claimed e.g. by Yoshimi 2015) or that he
remained faithful to the “metaphysical neutrality” of phenomenology (in the sense that phenomenology is not
committed to any metaphysical view). I am just suggesting that neutral monism is a viable way of developing
genetic phenomenology that is worthy of being considered.
33
In fact, Varela proposes neurophenomenology as a “methodological remedy” to the hard problem of
consciousness (Varela 1996) that, in continuity with the enactive approach of (Varela, Thompson, and
Rosch 1991), does not have any metaphysical commitment (this “anti-metaphysical” aspect of Varela’s view
and of the original version of enactivism is highlighted for instance by (Vörös et al. 2016; Bitbol 2012; Bitbol
and Antonova 2016).
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and... 599

qualities), which, when they acquire a certain structure – investigated by neuroscience

and phenomenology - give rise to a field of consciousness.34

5 Conclusion

In the first two sections of this paper, we have seen the two main views concerning the
sensory qualities of perception: quality externalism and quality internalism. In my view,
qualitative relationism constitutes an alternative to these views that can overcome their
respective difficulties, at the same time maintaining some of their opposite virtues. By
distinguishing between two levels in the investigation of the temporality of experience, we
can admit that, within the macro-temporal level of inquiry, qualities appear at the same time
as phenomenal properties of mental states and sensible properties of perceptual objects. In
fact, common sense and ordinary language refer, depending on the case, both to qualities of
objects (e.g. the redness of the tomato) and sensations and qualitative appearances (e.g. red-
sensations in the case of afterimages or other anomalous situations, plus those phenomenal
states such as pains and moods that do not seem to pertain to mind-independent objects in
the world). A virtue of qualitative relationism is that it can maintain both characterizations of
qualities (as “internal” and as “external”), without forcing us to choose one at the expense of
the other. This is because, at the same time, we can admit, within the qualitative relationist
view, a more fundamental qualitative dimension that grounds the two poles of the perceptual
relation. Considering, for instance, the case of colour, in the qualitative relationist view,
“redness”, when considered at the micro-temporal level, is a primal qualitative process out of
which the relation between “sensation of red” and “perceived redness of the object” are
correlated and co-constituted, when certain qualitative elements are combined in the
reciprocal constitution of perceiver and perceived.
In this way, qualitative relationism is able to better address the respective problems
of quality externalism and internalism. Concerning the problem of perception, it can
unitarily account for veridical perception, perspectival variation, illusion and halluci-
nation, claiming that in all of these cases the same process is taking place, i.e. a flow of
qualities. This qualitative flow can give rise, depending on the case, to veridical
perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. In this account, the difference between these
experiences is not in their qualitative content but in their different macro-temporal
structuring. What we call an “external” object is constituted as correlate of a series of
experiences that are concordant and motivated one by the other,35 in contrast to those
experiences in which the experiential synthesis is deficient. It is the coherence between
a series of experiences that testifies the “external” status of the object which, however,
is itself constituted by sets of qualitative elements.36

34
The following passages from Mach (1914) help to illustrate this proposal: “bodies do not produce
sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensations) make up bodies”, “all bodies are but
thought-symbols for complexes of elements”, and “the elements in question form the real, immediate, and
ultimate foundation, which it is the task of physiologico-physical research to investigate” (Mach 1914: 29).
35
On the concept of motivation see Husserl (1989: 62).
36
An issue that I have just mentioned in the introduction concerns how to account, within this framework, for
unconscious cognitive states. This would require a detailed analysis, but I don’t see problems, in principle, in
addressing it within the proposed framework, since these phenomena can be analyzed in the same way as other
physiological processes (e.g. digestion, which is a bodily process of which I am mostly not aware of).
600 A. Pace Giannotta

Concerning the problem of the external world and the possibility of solipsism, the
development of qualitative relationism as a form of neutral monism has the advantage
of being positioned beyond the alternative idealism-materialism. This is because it
admits the existence of a primal dimension of reality that precedes the dualities of
subject-object, internal-external, mind-world. In doing so, it can avoid the solipsist
hypothesis, which implies that one of the two poles of the subject-object relation is an
absolute domain that is enclosed in itself. On the contrary, according to this view,
subject and object refer to each other, being essentially correlated in a process of
reciprocal constitution out of fundamental qualities.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Philipp Berghofer, Krys Dolega, Alberto Peruzzi, Tobias Starzak,
Elmarie Venter, Alfredo Vernazzani and Silvano Zipoli Caiani for useful comments on earlier drafts of this
paper. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for some valuable comments which helped me to
elaborate and refine this paper in various points. This work was supported by grants from the Deutsche
Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD, Annual Research Grant) and from the Österreichischer
Austauschdienst (OeAD, Ernst Mach Grant).

Availability of data and material Not applicable.

Authors’ contributions Not applicable.

Funding Open access funding provided by Università degli Studi di Firenze within the CRUI-CARE
Agreement. This work was supported by grants from the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD,
Annual Research Grant at the Department of Philosophy II, Center for Mind and Cognition, Ruhr-Universität
Bochum) and from the Österreichischer Austauschdienst (OeAD, Ernst Mach Grant at the Department of
Philosophy, University of Graz).

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflicts of interest/competing interests No potential conflict of interest.

Code availability Not applicable.

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