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Governance of zero deforestation cocoa in West Africa: New forms of public–

private interaction

Article in Environmental Policy and Governance · January 2019

DOI: 10.1002/eet.1841

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Received: 15 May 2018 Revised: 21 November 2018 Accepted: 26 November 2018
DOI: 10.1002/eet.1841

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Governance of zero deforestation cocoa in West Africa: New

forms of public–private interaction
Sophia Carodenuto

Department of Geography, University of

Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada Abstract
Correspondence In March 2017, twelve of the world's leading cocoa and chocolate companies made a
Sophia Carodenuto, Department of
collective commitment to end the deforestation associated with the global cocoa sup-
Geography, University of Victoria, David
Turpin Bldg, 99111 Ring Rd, Victoria, BC V8P ply chain. This marks one of the latest forms of transnational business governance,
5C2, Canada.
whereby state actors share the regulation of environmental and social externalities
Email: carodenuto@uvic.ca
with private authority. This paper responds to the call for more contextual research
into the complex policy ecosystems in which zero deforestation commitments are
implemented and how transnational private authority is interacting with, and possibly
being reconfigured by, domestic governance and territory. Combining policy analysis,
field work on cocoa farms, focus groups, and over 45 interviews, this paper provides
empirical evidence to explain how business commitments to zero deforestation cocoa
interact with domestic political processes to reduce deforestation in key cocoa‐
producing countries. The focus is on three top cocoa producer countries in West
Africa, where smallholder cocoa farming causes environmental degradation due to
deforestation, and socioeconomic progress for smallholders is difficult to achieve. In
these countries, the private sector's commitment to reduce deforestation is situated
in government‐led programs to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation. The findings show that a codependent relationship is evolving between
corporate and state‐led efforts to reduce deforestation, where the success of zero
deforestation cocoa relies on synergistic public–private interaction. Cocoa intensifica-
tion without expansion, supply chain traceability, and jurisdictional commodity
sourcing are the three main areas of future collaboration identified.

KEY W ORDS

private governance, REDD+, transnational business governance, zero deforestation supply chains

1 | I N T RO D U CT I O N tracking, increasingly make agribusiness' sourcing strategies transpar-

ent (Gaveau et al., 2017). Especially, the relationship between agri-
Growing awareness about the negative social and environmental culture and deforestation has become increasingly visible: Latest
impacts of tropical forest loss has prompted new initiatives by both global estimates suggest that commodity production caused 27% of
public and private actors to address the deforestation caused by forest disturbance between 2001 and 2015, and shifting agriculture
global commodity production. Technological advancements in forest caused 24% (Curtis, Slay, Harris, Tyukavina, & Hansen, 2018). Spe-
and land use monitoring, such as remote sensing and supply chain cific to the case at hand, estimates suggest that West Africa lost
2.3 million hectares of forest to cocoa cultivation between 1988
This research was partially carried out during affiliation with the following insti- and 2007 (Gockowski & Sonwa, 2011), with significant impacts con-
tutions: Nuffield College at Oxford University; UNIQUE forestry and land use. centrated in certain deforestation and biodiversity hotspots,

Env Pol Gov. 2019;29:55–66. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eet © 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment 55
56 CARODENUTO

particularly the Upper Guinea Tropical Rainforest (Kroeger, Bakhtary, “Transnational” in this context is understood as entailing not only
Haupt, & Streck, 2017). As a result, conscious consumers and envi- public or private governance initiatives that cross national borders
ronmental advocacy organizations are placing growing pressure on but also the significant efforts of nonstate actors (in this context,
commodity traders and manufacturers (Bartley, Koos, Samel, Setrini, the most relevant nonstate actors are the corporations that control
& Summers, 2015; Higonnet, Bellantonio, & Hurowitz, 2017), who global production networks and have made zero deforestation com-
in turn are searching for new ways to invest in the sustainability mitments) to exercise power when it comes to rule‐making and com-
of their supply chains and downstream producers. The concept of pliance enforcement (Eberlein et al., 2014; Lambin & Thorlakson,
“zero deforestation” supply chains thus arose, whereby private com- 2018). Such forms of private governance are superposed upon
panies commit to eliminate deforestation from their operations and REDD+, which can be understood as state‐led attempts to solve a
supply chains (Curtis et al., 2018; Lambin et al., 2018). Zero defores- domestic governance problem, namely, uncontrolled and illegal
tation commitments have proliferated, with over 760 commitments deforestation. This implies that REDD+ as a public governance pro-
made public as of March 2017 (Donofrio, Rothrock, & Leonard, gram may have unforeseen interactions with the recent zero defor-
2017). The exact definition of zero deforestation varies depending estation commitments. Knowledge about the consequences of
on local contextual factors such as how forests are defined, time- transnational private authority, especially how this interacts with
lines, and whether the commitments refer to net or gross deforesta- and is reconfigured by domestic governance and territory, remains
tion1 (Brown & Zarin, 2013; Kroeger, Bakhtary, et al., 2017). limited and fragmented (Bartley, 2018; Wood, Abbott, Black,
Most countries currently exporting forest‐risk commodities (e.g., Eberlein, & Meidinger, 2015). However, scholars have recently
palm oil, soy, and beef) are in different stages of preparing or argued that the convergence of public efforts to reduce deforesta-
implementing national strategies to reduce deforestation and forest tion and private sector zero deforestation commitments may create
degradation (so‐called REDD+ strategies). REDD+ stands for “Reduc- a window of opportunity to increase the scope and impact of both
ing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, sustainable initiatives (Lambin et al., 2018). They argue that “much remains to
management of forests, conservation and enhancement of forest car- be understood about the complex policy ecosystems in which
bon stocks in developing countries” and was first introduced at the zero‐deforestation commitments are implemented and how multiple,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) often parallel, initiatives influence commitment effectiveness”
in 2005, where it was put forward as the leading strategy for climate (Lambin et al., 2018, p. 6).
change mitigation in the forest and land use sector. The underlying This study uses the case of cocoa in West Africa to illustrate the
principle of REDD+ is the creation of conditional, performance‐based interaction between public and private regulatory governance
incentives for preventing forest conversion (REDD) and for enhancing efforts to address deforestation. Specifically, Africa's top three
forest carbon stocks (through the “+” activities; Sunderlin et al., 2018). cocoa‐producing countries were selected for analysis, as these
More recently, many developing countries have identified REDD+ as countries are all developing REDD+ programs focused on cocoa. As
integral to their Nationally Determined Contributions2 as part of the shown in Figure 1, Côte d'Ivoire is the world's number one cocoa
Paris Climate Agreement (Harris & Stolle, 2016; Hein, Guarin, producer (producing roughly 42% of global cocoa supply), Ghana is
Frommé, & Pauw, 2018), which means that implementing REDD+ will number two (estimated to produce 19% of global supply; Leissle,
remain a key mitigation priority in the coming years. Further, the
Green Climate Fund (GCF)—the main funding body for climate adapta-
tion and mitigation—renewed donor commitment to REDD+ through a
2017 decision to pilot REDD+ results‐based payments (GCF, 2017).
In parallel to public policies such as REDD+, the private sector's
zero deforestation commitments epitomize internationalization
trends in environmental policy making characterized by a shift from
government regulations dominating forest decision‐making to more
complex regulatory governance environments marked by interactions
introduced by transnational business actors (Eberlein, Abbott, Black,
Meidinger, & Wood, 2014; Lambin & Thorlakson, 2018).

1
Net deforestation is the annualized net change in forest area, combining losses
from deforestation and gains from forest regeneration and/or tree plantations.
The lack of distinction between primary and secondary forest is relevant
because forest countries may be replacing primary forest (that serve as biodiver-
sity hotspots and store significant amounts of terrestrial carbon) with monocul-
ture tree crop plantations or degraded forests due for example to shifting
cultivation.
2
Through the Paris Climate Agreement, each country communicates their post‐
2020 climate actions in their so‐called Nationally Determined Contributions,
including efforts to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of cli- FIGURE 1 Map of cocoa production [Colour figure can be viewed at
mate change. wileyonlinelibrary.com]
CARODENUTO 57

2018). With an estimated 6% of global cocoa supply, Cameroon is 2 | L I T E R A T U R E RE V I E W : I NT E R A C T I O N

Africa's third largest cocoa producer but ranks fifth at the global BE T WEE N STA T E A N D N O N S TA TE
scale, after Indonesia and Ecuador (Leissle, 2018). All of these coun- R EG U L A TO RY G O V E R N A N CE
tries have REDD+ strategies that focus predominantly on the cocoa
supply chain as a key entry point to reduce deforestation at the This literature review focuses on the relationships between transna-
national or subnational jurisdictional level. Combining policy analysis, tional business governance and domestic government. There exists a
field work on cocoa farms, focus groups, and over 45 interviews, this rich and diverse literature on private regulatory governance, spanning
paper explores how private sector commitments to zero deforesta- the disciplines of public policy, international relations, development
tion cocoa and REDD+ are evolving together and whether the studies, law, economics, business, and sociology (Baumann‐Pauly,
relationship can be characterized as synergistic, antagonistic, or 2017; Vogel, 2008). Private governance arose as complex global issues
somewhere in between. such as climate change and poverty became recognized as challenges
Based on historical precedents, including the absence of a closely linked to international commerce that cannot be tackled by
legally binding international forest law, forests are generally adminis- national political systems alone (Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999).
tered by the discretion of sovereign states. Although forests are Rather, individual firms (often in formal or informal collaboration with
highly privatized in many parts of the world, states are the official other firms) have increasingly provided a form of global order by
owners of forests in most contexts in Africa (Wehkamp, Aquino, agreeing to voluntarily regulate their own activities (Haufler, 2001).
Fuss, & Reed, 2015). Reflecting this, REDD+ is the result of interna- Transnational private governance thus became a substitution or gap
tional negotiations between country governments as parties to the filler that addressed problems beyond national jurisdiction
UNFCCC. REDD+ channels finance to support capacity building (Baumann‐Pauly, 2017). Private regulation is however not intrinsically
and institutional development in preparation for the ultimate aim altruistically motivated but driven rather by social pressure and con-
of REDD+, which is to financially compensate developing countries sumer demand towards companies to act (Mayer & Gereffi, 2010;
for verified forest‐related carbon emissions reductions. Although Vogel, 2008). Tropical forestry and agriculture arose as key issue areas
REDD+ may be implemented through a plethora of nonstate actors in the past decades, explained by the recognition that the production
and voluntary forest carbon projects, the UNFCCC requires REDD+ of beef, palm oil, soy, and wood products in just seven tropical coun-
countries to develop a national approach to REDD+ design, tries was responsible for 40% of global tropical deforestation from
implementation, and monitoring (Ravikumar, Larson, Duchelle, 2000 to 2011 (Henders, Persson, & Kastner, 2015). In response, vol-
Myers, & Tovar, 2015). This is because the state is considered the untary sustainability standards emerged as multinational corporations
key actor responsible for establishing a robust forest monitoring and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) recognized the impor-
framework. The responsibility of the state includes avoiding leakage tance of managing the social and environmental impacts of global sup-
and ensuring the permanence of net emission reductions within ply chains (Lambin & Thorlakson, 2018). Examples of voluntary
national territories (Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010), as well as sustainability standards include the Forest Stewardship Council, an
ensuring compliance with social and environmental safeguards such international nonprofit, multistakeholder organization established in
as respect for human rights of indigenous forest communities 1993 to promote responsible management of the world's forests
(Visseren‐Hamakers, McDermott, Vijge, & Cashore, 2012). As a (Meidinger, 1997); and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, which
result, scholars often describe REDD+ as top‐down and thus prone was established in 2004 with the objective of promoting the growth
to reinforcing and centralizing public authority in developing and use of sustainable oil palm (Lambin & Thorlakson, 2018).
countries' political‐administrative systems (Hickmann, Fuhr, Höhne, As private governance schemes proliferated, business strategy and
Lederer, & Stehle, 2017; Ribot & Larson, 2012). However, REDD+ corporate social responsibility scholarship sought to explain why and
donors, civil society, and advocacy groups often see REDD+ as an how corporate entities may voluntarily decide to address the environ-
opportunity to empower nonstate actors (Dkamela, Brockhaus, mental and social harms that result as consequences of business strate-
Djiegni, Schure, & Mvondo, 2014; Somorin, Visseren‐Hamakers, gies in contexts where state‐based governance may be weaker
Arts, Sonwa, & Tiani, 2014). (Baumann‐Pauly, 2017; Börzel & Risse, 2010; Moon, 2007). In parallel,
The following presents a literature review of private regula- scholars from other disciplines such as international relations and devel-
tory governance with a focus on how new forms of transnational opment argued that the “privatization” of environmental governance
business governance interact with existing public policy and does not simply shift power away from states towards firms but also
state‐based regulatory authority. Thereafter, a brief background results in a more complex public–private nexus where state and
to the challenges facing cocoa production in West Africa is nonstate actors are increasingly interdependent (Börzel & Risse, 2010;
provided, including the introduction of zero deforestation com- Falkner, 2003). Scholars have long recognized private authority as a
mitments in this context. Subsequently, the findings are pre- nuanced form of “governance without government” (Cutler et al.,
sented according to three areas of collaboration around which 1999). More recently, scholars describe transnational private regulation
public–private relationship is rapidly evolving. The next section to be a de‐territorialized form of authority where governments offload
discusses these findings in light of the aim to better understand regulation to the private sector, partly reflecting neoliberal ideas about
how private governance initiatives interact with state‐led the power of markets to solve social problems (Bartley, 2018: 12). How-
attempts to solve global transboundary problems, followed by ever, these same scholars call for dispensing the idea that private gover-
concluding remarks. nance and corporate responsibility can bypass or transcend existing
58 CARODENUTO

forms of domestic state‐led governance (Bartley, 2018). This is because 3 | BA C K G RO U N D T O C O CO A

domestic governance is not a void to be filled (even in countries of the P R O D U C T I O N A N D TH E B I R T H OF Z E R O
Global South), but rather, it shapes and reconfigures how transnational D E F O R E S T A T I ON C O M M I T M E N T S
private governance plays out and gains effectiveness depending on the
specific context (Bartley, 2018). This is because implementation of pri- To understand the challenges that come with the governance of
vate governance schemes often “requires clear property rights and pub- cocoa, it is helpful to understand cocoa production process and
licly available information on land ownership and land use to ensure associated environmental and social impacts. The primary ingredient
traceability along supply chains” (Lambin & Thorlakson, 2018). A com- in chocolate is cocoa beans from the tropical Theobroma cacao tree.
mon theme that can be traced throughout this literature is the transfer More than 70% of the world's cocoa originates in the West African
and sharing of power and authority from the public to the private sec- cocoa belt, reaching from Sierra Leone to southern Cameroon (Leissle,
tor—and vice versa—and that one side cannot effectively function with- 2018; Schroth, Läderach, Martinez‐Valle, Bunn, & Jassogne, 2016).
out the other (Cashore & Stone, 2012). Traditional cocoa production systems are characterized by agrofor-
Of relevance to the case at hand, the literature on multistakeholder estry, where cocoa is grown under a canopy of other trees (i.e., shade
initiatives explains whether and how the transfer of regulatory power cocoa; Gockowski & Sonwa, 2011). If managed appropriately, this type
from traditional democratic nation‐state processes to private gover- of agroforestry can support biodiversity comparable with that of virgin
nance schemes is legitimate (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). This responds to rainforest (Sonwa, Weise, Nkongmeneck, Tchatat, & Janssens, 2017).
the long‐standing inquiry in political science about the role of powerful However, recent studies show that increasing deforestation is attrib-
corporate organizations in shaping the policy process so as to produce utable to cocoa production, especially in Africa, due to the shift in
outcomes that are relatively innocuous to them (Lindblom, 1977). many countries towards full‐sun cocoa production systems, which
Bartley (2018) explains that the “neoliberal model of private governance requires clearing most or all of naturally occurring trees (Ruf, 2011; Saj,
generally accepts rather than challenges the power of northern transna- Durot, Mvondo Sakouma, Tayo Gamo, & Avana‐Tientcheu, 2017). Due
tional corporations and NGOs” (p. 44). Current scholarship emphasizes to the smallholder nature of cocoa production, attributing deforestation
the importance of understanding the power relations that underlie to cocoa is challenged by the technological limits of spectrally
multistakeholder dialogues, including covert and latent power, which distinguishing cocoa from forest, mixed crop, or monoculture systems
often go less explored (Cashore, Rayner, & Berstein, 2014). Covert using most satellite imagery, especially in Sub‐Saharan Africa (Curtis
power refers to cases in which powerful actors influence problem defi- et al., 2018; Ordway, Asner, & Lambin, 2017); but estimates suggest that
nitions and the subsequent identification of policy solutions, limiting the West Africa lost 2.3 million hectares of forest to cocoa cultivation
discussion to issues that are less harmful to them (Bachrach & Baratz, between 1988 and 2007 (Gockowski & Sonwa, 2011). Further studies
1994). Latent power refers to structures and agent relationships in estimate that cocoa production accounted for 57% of agriculture‐driven
which power becomes so dominant that it shapes the interests and deforestation in Sub‐Saharan Africa from 2000 to 2013, and cocoa
ideas of disempowered and marginalized organizations, individuals, witnessed the highest expansion rate as compared with other export‐
and communities so as to limit their own conscious grievances and oriented crops (Ordway et al., 2017).3 In terms of underlying drivers of
thereby diminish the scope of policy options (Lukes, 1974). This may deforestation (Geist & Lambin, 2002), cocoa from West Africa is a cash
become problematic because in the context of private governance, it crop destined almost exclusively for export markets (domestic consump-
is often the business actors who regulate while being regulated them- tion of chocolate in West Africa is minimal), explaining how deforestation
selves because they are creating the rules that monitor their own busi- is partly attributed to increasing global demand for cocoa and chocolate
ness operations (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000). (Abdulai et al., 2018; Li & Mo, 2016).
In summary, although a rich body of interdisciplinary research From a global perspective, the deforestation associated with
exists on the interaction that emerges as a result of transnational busi- cocoa production is most pronounced in West Africa (Ordway et al.,
ness governance (Eberlein et al., 2014), scholars are calling for more 2017; Saj et al., 2017). Cocoa from this region is grown primarily on
contextualized work in looking at how private governance schemes small, family‐owned farms; the West African cocoa belt comprises
intersect with public regulation in their domestic settings (Bartley, about 2 million smallholders who depend on cocoa sales for food
2018: Lambin et al., 2018). Especially with regard to regulating social and income security (Kroeger, Bakhtary, et al., 2017; Schroth et al.,
and environmental externalities, regulatory governance scholars posit 2016). A high proportion of these cocoa farmers are suffering from
that more research “is needed to advance scholarly understanding of severe poverty, defined as per capita income of less than USD 1.90
the dynamics and effects of transnational business governance inter- per day (Abdulai et al., 2018). Poverty is often attributed to low pro-
actions” (Wood et al., 2015, p. 368). Given that interaction is multifac- ductivity of cocoa farms. With few exceptions, the yield gap4 of cocoa
eted, these authors state that emerging research should embrace the farms in West Africa is systematically high. Smallholder farmers are
diversity of interaction, treating the nature of interaction as an empir- not encouraged and often unable to invest in deforestation‐free cocoa
ical question, not an assumption (Wood et al., 2015, p. 361). This production systems, as these require knowledge and resources to
paper responds to this call for empirical research by looking closely
at how the new forms of private governance schemes promoting zero 3
Note that crops produced for export generally expanded at lower rates than
deforestation cocoa interact with existing political processes to reduce crops destined for domestic markets.
deforestation in the domestic contexts of key cocoa‐producing 4
Yield gap is the difference between yield potential and average farmers' yield
countries. over a specified area and period.
CARODENUTO 59

implement improved agricultural practices (e.g., establishing new farms

without clearing naturally occurring shade trees), access to high‐yield
agroforestry varieties, and the financial security to renovate senesced
cocoa stands. As old cocoa trees become unproductive, farmers often
plant in new areas to mine the fertile soil of new cleared forest as
opposed to renovating or rehabilitating existing farmland (Kroeger,
Bakhtary, et al., 2017). Some farmers have received support from
NGOs to obtain voluntary sustainability certifications for improved
cocoa production. Among the most prominent in the context of West
Africa are UTZ5 and Rainforest Alliance. Farms certified through
Rainforest Alliance must leave a minimum of five trees per hectare
(and 30% canopy cover) in order to be certified (RA, 2017), but the
prevalence of this program remains mitigated and the premiums
received by farmers are unable to lift them out of poverty (Kroeger,
Bakhtary, et al., 2017).
FIGURE 2 Cocoa value chains actors
Consumer awareness of the deforestation embedded in choco-
late products generally remains mitigated, especially when compared
with the attention received by other global commodity drivers of 4 | M E TH OD O LO GY
deforestation such as soy and palm oil (Dauvergne, 2017). But this
may be changing. In 2017, the investigated report “Chocolate's Dark This study draws on different data sources, including policy and docu-

Secret: How the Cocoa Industry Destroys National Parks” sensation- ment analysis of supply chain initiatives to reduce deforestation, pri-

alized the illegal clearing of tropical rainforests in Côte d'Ivoire's vate and public commitments to zero deforestation cocoa, and

remaining national parks due to cocoa production (Higonnet et al., national and subnational REDD+. For the latter, the information

2017). Media attention surrounding this report exemplifies the grow- reviewed included REDD+ strategy documents available online

ing public concern about the link between chocolate consumption through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, especially the Emis-

and tropical forest loss (Nelson & Philipps, 2018). In response to the sion Reduction Program documents submitted to the Forest Carbon

growing concerns surrounding the sustainability of the cocoa supply Partnership Facility Carbon Fund.6 Primary data were gathered

chain, 12 of the world's leading cocoa and chocolate companies through interviews and an in‐depth country case study in Cameroon.

agreed in March 2017 to a collective commitment to work together, Field work was carried out in Cameroon from October to Novem-

in partnership with producer country governments and other stake- ber 2017, where interviews were conducted with over 45 public and

holders, to end the deforestation and forest degradation attributed private stakeholders at the national level. Interview partners were

to cocoa production. At the Conference of Parties in Bonn to the selected from research, government, the private sector (including

UNFCCC in November 2017, these companies released Frameworks farmer cooperatives and industrial scale buyers and traders), and civil

for Action to end deforestation and restore forest areas in key society. These experts were identified by contacting the main govern-

cocoa‐producing countries in West Africa. In 2017, 62% of global ment ministries and administrations of relevance to the cocoa sector,

cocoa production is sourced from companies with deforestation com- as well as cocoa producers and trading companies. Subsequently, the

mitments (Kroeger, Bakhtary, et al., 2017). snowball method was employed to identify further experts. The field

Beyond the smallholder production level, the cocoa value chain is work included travel to key cocoa producing areas in Cameroon,

highly concentrated among a small number of traders, grinders, and where interviews were carried out with over 15 cocoa farmers and

chocolate producers that dominate the 16 billion USD chocolate extension officers in three main cocoa producing regions. Following

industry (Leissle, 2018). It is these powerful and more visible supply the field work, a focus group was organized in the capital Yaoundé

chain actors such as traders (e.g., Barry Callebaut and Cargill) and with over 25 participants. This focus group meeting was one of the

retailers for mass market (e.g., Mars and Hersheys) who have publicly first times that private sector and government actors engaged in the

declared zero deforestation commitments (see Figure 2). The chal- cocoa sector were brought together to discuss REDD+.

lenge for them is to effectively engage the millions of smallholders Following this field research, key informant interviews were car-

and transform current cocoa production practices in a way that pro- ried out with cocoa industry representatives and sector experts from

tects remaining forests and restores degraded landscapes. But these Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana via Skype or in person at the Innovation

zero deforestation commitments are not being implemented in a pol- Forum: How business can tackle deforestation in London, November,

icy void. The producer country governments of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, 2017.7 Informants included individuals from the cocoa industry, advo-

and Cameroon are all developing (sub)national strategies to reduce cacy organizations, and other global stakeholders in the cocoa supply

emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+; Camer- chain. These interviews focused on understanding opportunities and

oon, 2016; Côte d'Ivoire, 2015; Ghana, 2017).

6
https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/ (accessed 10.05.2018).
5 7
UTZ is a program and label for certified sustainable farming, which will merge https://innovation‐forum.co.uk/deforestation‐london‐2017.php (retrieved
with Rainforest Alliance in 2019. 21.02.2018).
60 CARODENUTO

barriers to integrating zero deforestation commitments into existing has been introduced whereby support for zero deforestation cocoa is
and planned REDD+ schemes. The data were analyzed through concentrated in select landscapes that reflect administrative bound-
inductive coding and memoing, an iterative process of reviewing the aries to allow for state‐led governance reforms and policy adjust-
extensive field and interview notes to extract key emerging themes ments. It is important to note that these findings do not suggest that
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). Data analysis was a continuous the public–private interaction is limited to these three concepts.
process during and after the field work, as the key themes emerging Rather, the three areas of collaboration identified generally represent
from the data were presented, discussed, and further refined during the current state of thinking that emerged from the data collected in
the focus group. External validation was sought during subsequent the three case countries at the time of writing.
expert interviews after the field work. It is important to mention a
key limitation of the research design, which is that because the zero 1. Government‐led land use planning and enforcement is required
deforestation commitments are not yet implemented, data from inter- to ensure that the private sector invests in sustainable cocoa
views mainly allow for conclusions about how stakeholders envision intensification.
the interaction between public and private governance initiatives.
There is not yet evidence about how the interaction is actually Increasing national cocoa production is a priority for all three
unfolding beyond the planning stages. countries reviewed for this paper because cocoa is a strategic agricul-
tural commodity that contributes significantly to West African econo-
mies through employment, incomes, and foreign exchange earnings.
5 | FINDINGS Recognizing that investments in cocoa can generate multiple social,
economic, and environmental benefits, all three countries have priori-
Data analysis showed that the interaction between private gover- tized sustainable cocoa programs in their REDD+ strategies, especially
nance efforts for zero deforestation cocoa and state‐led attempts to for the Emission Reduction Programs (Cameroon, 2016; Côte d'Ivoire,
reduce deforestation through REDD+ in the three West African coun- 2015; Ghana, 2017). The main objective is to increase smallholder
tries is a priori mutually reinforcing. A priori because the initiatives productivity, as this achieves socioeconomic goals and has the potential
(both REDD+ and zero deforestation supply chains) remain largely at to produce verified emission reductions that lead to REDD+ performance
the planning stage in all countries, characterized by agenda setting, payments while ideally leading to poverty reduction. Although the price
joint strategizing, and the development of action frameworks. Even of cocoa paid to farmers is an important component of poverty reduction
though REDD+ has existed for at least a decade in all countries, for among farmers, many informants, especially the private sector representa-
the most part, concrete REDD+ implementation on the ground has tives interviewed, explained that increasing the farm‐gate price of cocoa
yet to occur. Although large cocoa industry actors such as Olam, for farmers is not the only solution. Rather, they argue that farmer income
Cargill, and Barry Callebaut all have sustainability programs whose should first and foremost be increased by reducing yield gaps: Montant de
activities may likely be the same as what is required for zero defores- la prime n'est pas important, c'est la volume (translation: its not about paying
tation efforts, the joint Action Frameworks recently released for zero farmers more for improved practices but rather finding a way to increase
deforestation cocoa have yet to be operationalized. Despite it being the amount that they are producing). The farmer perception differs here
early days, the data analyzed reveal general trends about how the in that cocoa farmers interviewed explained that the main poverty
ideal public–private interaction is conceptualized by policy‐makers alleviation strategy should be to increase the price paid to cocoa farmers.
and business actors. From a business perspective, the logic underlying The farmer often does not have the same interest in increasing yield.
corporate commitments to zero deforestation include reputation In all three countries, yields are often two to three times below
building, increasing or securing markets, reducing risks, and ensuring international benchmark production levels. A representative from a
a sustainable supply of cocoa into the future. From the state's per- development organization in Cameroon explained: “Bonnes practiques
spective, improving the sustainability of national cocoa production is (Good Agriculture Practices) can get you from 300 or 400 kg/ha to
a priority because cocoa is a strategic agricultural commodity that con- 1,000 to 1,500 kg/ha.” This implies that farmers could increase their
tributes significantly to West African economies through employment, income by applying good agriculture practices that are known to
incomes, and foreign exchange earnings. Generally, a codependent increase yields. These good agriculture practices include replanting
and mutually reinforcing relationship has been conceived at this early overaged farms with improved cocoa varieties, fighting pests and dis-
planning stage of the policy cycle. ease through responsive shade and cocoa tree management, thinning
The public–private collaboration in this context mutually relies on and pruning, and proper application of agrichemicals.
each other in three ways: (1) Government‐led land use planning and Numerous informants, both within and outside of the cocoa farm,
enforcement is required to ensure that the private sector is attracted emphasize the importance of increasing farmer productivity, arguing
to invest in intensifying cocoa production without that leading to fur- that cocoa farmers can easily increase yields by applying best prac-
ther deforestation; (2) the measurement and monitoring of impacts tices, but lack the resources, knowledge, and capacity to do so. That
requires supply chain traceability, which begins with cocoa farmer is where the private sector plays an important role: They provide
mapping, a task that must be led by the state albeit supported by busi- improved farm inputs (seedlings, fertilizer) and disseminate knowledge
ness' technological capacity; and finally, (3) to achieve up‐scaling about how to improve practices. Further, the private sector (especially
where a sizeable number of smallholder farmers can benefit from the its network of cocoa buyers) has the on‐the‐ground presence to reach
zero deforestation cocoa program, the idea of a jurisdictional approach cocoa farmers, as well as the incentive to support intensification.
CARODENUTO 61

Intensification can in theory avoid deforestation through land sparing, of cocoa farmers. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, for example, a large por-
that is, the Borlaug hypothesis, whereby yield increases on existing tion of cocoa farmers are migrants from Burkina Faso, whose land ten-
farmland avoid encroachment into forests. This, however, can only ure security has been manipulated by political strongmen to fuel past
be assured with the proper function of government‐led land conflicts. In such contexts, the lack of a comprehensive map of cocoa
administration. farms is largely explained by the sensitivity of land tenure issues.
The foundational premise of this mode of public–private interac- The complexity of the task should not be understated, as accord-
tion is that increasing the productivity of existing cocoa farms must ing to a supply chain traceability expert, it is not only current farmers
be combined with land governance improvements in order to reduce that need to be engaged but especially also the farmers of tomorrow:
pressure on standing forests. Sector experts explained that effective “The three to five‐year lag between deforestation events and com-
land governance is required because productivity improvements have mercialization of cocoa means there is a need to identify and engage
been known to have a rebound effect, known as Jevon's paradox, future farmers operating at the forest frontier who risk creating new
whereby gains in resource efficiency counterintuitively lead to more cocoa farms that do not comply with zero deforestation standards.”
use of that resource. Scholars have found that this paradox is espe- There is also the generational challenge relating to the aging farmer
cially pronounced in the agriculture sector in developing countries population that there may not be farmers of tomorrow unless the
(Byerlee, Stevenson, & Villoria, 2014; Ceddia, Sedlacek, Bardsley, & socioeconomic problems associated with cocoa production are solved
Gomez‐y‐Paloma, 2013). Therefore, to ensure that cocoa productivity and cocoa becomes an interesting business opportunity. The key
gains do not result in an acceleration of deforestation, interventions question for public–private interaction is how to adjust the cocoa
that increase on‐farm cocoa yields must be combined with state‐led industry's current incentive structure to channel private investment
land governance measures such as land use planning and law enforce- into these future farmers. Given the complexity of the supply chain,
ment to avoid unplanned expansion into forest. Given the realistic risk business cannot be assured that the investments they make in these
of a rebound effect resulting from cocoa intensification, the success of forest frontier areas will accrue to them or whether the cocoa will
zero deforestation cocoa is contingent on public policy reform and be sold to a competitor. Here, it is the role of the government to
reinforcement of state capacity to effectively govern land use through create an investment climate that attracts investment not only for
REDD+. renovating old and unproductive cocoa farms but also in areas at high
risk for deforestation.
2. Measurement and monitoring of impacts requires supply chain Recognizing the enormity of the task, numerous informants
traceability, which begins with cocoa farmer mapping, a task that explained that the state requires additional technical and financial sup-
must be led by the state albeit supported by business' technolog- port to create a map of cocoa farms. Private agribusiness can address
ical capacity. government capacity gaps by providing technical support in the form
of GPS technology and supply chain knowledge, but government
Controlling deforestation begins with supply chain traceability. counterparts must initiate and follow through with the land adminis-
The success of zero deforestation initiatives hinges on agribusinesses' tration process. In other words, nonstate actors would need to help
ability to trace commodities through their supply chains and link prod- address a governance gap in the state's regulatory capacity. Sector
ucts to (lack of) deforestation. Credible and transparent verification experts explained how the lack of documented property boundaries
and monitoring along each node in the supply chain is critical to ensur- remains a major constraint that must be addressed in order to sustain-
ing that deforestation goals are achieved. In the case of cocoa in the ably increase cocoa yields while limiting deforestation. Informants
studied countries, the complexity of the supply chain makes it very dif- explain that the state must lead the farmer mapping process to ensure
ficult to trace products to their origin and understand whether these that all the relevant government institutions contribute as necessary
products are connected to deforestation. Cocoa production is carried and that any grievances or conflicts are dealt with in an appropriate
out by thousands of smallholders operating in remote areas. Further, and timely manner. Private business, NGOs, and consulting firms such
transporting cocoa beans from farm to port involves numerous formal as landmapp8 in turn provide technical support to the government.
and informal traders and other intermediaries. Further, individual cocoa traders have maps of their farmers, which
Expert informants familiar with supply chain tracing explain that could be consolidated by the government (albeit reportedly this is pro-
the first step required in determining whether a chocolate product prietary information). Informants in Cameroon suggested that part of
can be considered deforestation‐free is to map cocoa farms. Such a the REDD+ Readiness grant funding should be used to support these
map does not exist for any of the case study countries. This kind of mapping efforts.
map would allow for linking batches of cocoa beans to specific geo-
graphic locations and incentivizes the private sector to make the nec- 3. To achieve up‐scaling where a sizeable number of smallholder
essary investments for zero deforestation cocoa, because they can link farmers can benefit from the zero deforestation cocoa program,
specific suppliers to land use practices. the idea of a jurisdictional approach has been introduced
Farmer mapping is not an easy task, however, because this invari- whereby action is concentrated in select landscapes that reflect
ably involves some degree of land tenure clarification and formaliza- administrative boundaries to allow for state‐led governance
tion. The three case study countries each have unique land and tree reforms and policy adjustments
tenure regimes, characterized by different forms of legal pluralism, his-
8
torical trajectories, institutional hierarchies, and sociocultural diversity http://www.climate‐kic.org/start‐ups/landmapp‐2/
62 CARODENUTO

Numerous informants especially from Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana are efforts to reduce the deforestation embedded in the cocoa supply
touting the idea of a jurisdictional approach for zero deforestation chain. The risk when linking commodity sourcing to jurisdictional
cocoa. This concept emerged in the international REDD+ discourse REDD+ is that because carbon monitoring occurs over an entire polit-
as implementing and donor countries realized the limits in terms of ical administrative region, results‐based payments hinge on perfor-
scope and scale of a project‐based approach to REDD+. A similar tran- mance at the jurisdictional level. Because deforestation may be
sition can be perceived in the context of sustainable commodity caused by numerous factors that are outside control of a given supply
sourcing, where the transition from farm‐level sustainability efforts chain, there are risks involved when linking zero deforestation com-
to sector‐wide and/or landscape‐level efforts is explained by the mitments with REDD+ at the jurisdictional level. Another issue that
inability of sustainability standards such as Rainforest Alliance or is likely to arise is the discrepancy in the modus operandi between gov-
UTZ to scale their impact beyond small‐scale projects, which have ernment and business. With REDD+ being a predominantly state‐led
been some term “islands of excellence” (Nelson & Phillips, 2018). exercise, it is important to recognize the significant amount of time
Exploration of jurisdictional approaches to supply chain sustainability and resources that have been dedicated to operationalizing REDD+,
is advancing rapidly, and many countries are linking these initiatives and all countries have not yet succeeded in fully implementing
to their on‐going efforts to implement REDD+. Ghana is currently REDD+ in terms of generating result‐based payments. The chocolate
piloting the Ghana Cocoa Forest REDD+ Program, a REDD+ jurisdic- industry is less flexible in terms of timelines, as business operations
tional program that aims to source sustainable cocoa from a 5.92 mil- depend on meeting production deadlines. Another practical challenge
lion hectare area (Ghana, 2017). relates to the limited communication opportunities available for public
Although numerous informants (especially at the national level and private actors to exchange knowledge and engage in dialogue. The
rather than those working at the international policy level) are not focus group meeting conducted for this study in Cameroon was one of
familiar with the term jurisdictional sourcing, it became clear during the first times that private sector and government actors engaged in
the interviews that they were often referring to a very similar strategy. the cocoa sector were brought together to discuss REDD+.
To briefly explain the so‐called jurisdictional approach, the jurisdic-
tions correspond to national or (more often) subnational administra-
tive boundaries, allowing for scaling up impact across a larger 6 | DISCUSSION
geographic area beyond single companies or community development
The findings show that the stakeholders' perception is generally in
projects while involving multiple sectors and stakeholders in an inte-
agreement about the importance of aligning public policy with private
grated fashion. A jurisdictional approach facilitates implementation of
zero deforestation commitments in a way that is mutually reinforcing.
state‐led policy adjustments that have the potential to reduce defores-
This is corroborated by other studies (Lambin et al., 2018: Kroeger,
tation across the entire designated jurisdiction in a sweeping manner
Bakhtary, et al., 2017), but how this relationship evolves beyond the
(e.g., removing subsidies that act as perverse incentives, or reforming
planning stage remains to be seen, as the full picture of zero defores-
policies that make land tenure conditional on developing the land).
tation cocoa commitments from pledges to impact has yet to material-
When applied to zero deforestation initiatives, jurisdictional commod-
ize in the case of cocoa in West Africa (Kroeger, Bakhtary, et al.,
ity sourcing implies that state governments join forces with business
2017). In other words, it remains unclear how this interaction will con-
and other stakeholders and commit to ensuring that sourcing within
tinue to evolve into the future and lead to effective implementation.
their jurisdictions does not cause deforestation within a given
The three areas of public–private interaction demonstrate that a code-
timeframe. Informants generally agreed with the need to develop
pendent relationship is indeed evolving that builds on landscape part-
sweeping programs that involve some form of state‐ or nonstate‐led
nerships and collaborative governance. In the following, the findings
extension service scheme to farmers. A representative from the Min-
are discussed with the aim to relate the findings to the more theoret-
istry of Agriculture in Cameroon explained the problem of cocoa farm
ical literature on the role of the state and provide policy guidance sur-
expansion into forests very succinctly: “You have to understand WHY
rounding transnational business governance interactions.
they go into the forest: soil fertility. To solve the problem, you need
ingrès (inputs) to create farms on jachères (fallows). Since inputs for soil
fertility are very expensive, you need REDD+ to pay for that.” This 6.1 | Roles and responsibilities for regulatory
kind of a program would combine land use planning to identify fallow governance
or degraded land with large‐scale provision of key agriculture inputs to
farmers, allowing them to have productive farmland without needing The findings demonstrate that there is significant optimism about how
to continuously expand into forest in the search for fertile soil. public and private actors can work together to jointly solve the peren-
Under a jurisdictional approach, governments convene nial problem of unsustainable cocoa production. The informants often
multistakeholder initiatives in order to establish a system of control- state that the success of zero deforestation cocoa is simply a matter of
ling and monitoring deforestation for a given jurisdiction. This clearly defining responsibilities for who does what. For example, infor-
approach is touted for bringing actors from different sectors (not only mants explained how zero deforestation cocoa depends on the effec-
agriculture) together to address the issue of deforestation in a com- tiveness of a supply chain traceability system. The state must lead the
prehensive way that optimizes land use allocation. Despite the general framer mapping and ideally use REDD+ funds to support this tremen-
optimism, a number of informants cite the realistic challenges to dous task, and the private sector supports in the development and
achieving a synergistic relationship between the public and private implementation of technical solutions to cocoa tracing. What appears
CARODENUTO 63

to be a clear division of simple tasks, however, may end up stalled by has developed with producer country governments whose economic
contextual realities related to land tenure and capacity constraints. As stability depends on the export of cocoa.9 Compared with these
explained in the second section of the findings, the success of credible powerful actors, the voice of smallholder cocoa farmers appears less
supply chain traceability begins with a map of cocoa farmers. The state audible. Further, there are documented issues of corruption in the
is formally responsible for land administration, which includes the gen- sector, whereby famers are cheated out of the full price that they
eration, verification, and management of geospatial boundaries of should be paid for their product (Leissle, 2018).
farms. However, the literature confirms that farmer mapping is not Given these power structures, it is relevant to question the moti-
an easy task because this invariably involves some degree of land ten- vation underlying the current discourse that smallholder support pro-
ure clarification and formalization (Asamoah & Owusu‐Ansah, 2017). grams should focus on increasing productivity as opposed to other
Instead of looking for other more localized solutions to clarifying land options, such as increasing the price of cocoa paid to smallholders.
tenure, the zero deforestation community is staunchly touting exter- Leissle (2018) explains how the current political economy in Côte
nally conceived supply chain traceability systems that may simply d'Ivoire and Ghana makes it extremely difficult to raise the farm‐gate
not work in the context at hand. Examples abound of the challenges price of cocoa at a scale that reaches a sizeable amount of farmers.
of transnational initiatives when attempting to use highly technical Even price premiums for cocoa certified by the Fair Trade label does
systems to solve environmental governance challenges. In the case not provide enough additional income to bring smallholder cocoa
of information transparency, Gupta and Mason (2016) explain how a farmers out of poverty (Kroeger, Bakhtary, et al., 2017). Therefore,
“technocratization” rationale has come to rely on the design of cocoa buyers and traders encourage smallholders and their organiza-
elaborate systems of professional auditing and certification, partly tions to increase yields per hectare rather than (or in addition to) advo-
in response to accelerating technological gains and interconnected cating for better cocoa prices. Given this discourse appears to
information and communication systems. Although these systems dominate the multistakeholder processes surrounding jurisdictional
aim to support informed citizen decision‐making, they more often approaches that integrate REDD+ and private sector zero deforesta-
become exclusionary, limited to the experts who understand how tion initiatives, it is relevant to question whether power may have
the complex system works (Gupta & Mason, 2016). In a similar vein, inadvertently limited the scope of policy options that are currently
Carodenuto and Ramcilovic‐Suominen (2014) found that the overly on that table.
technical nature of the timber tracing and legality assurance systems
proposed by the European Union's Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance, and Trade Action Plan were an important barrier to
6.3 | Emergence of private authority and possible
implementation.
long‐term consequences

Understanding the motivation underlying zero deforestation commit-

ments may help to reveal their potential for meaningful change. From
6.2 | Unveiling power in jurisdictional approaches
a business perspective, the logic underlying corporate commitments to
zero deforestation include reputation building, increasing or securing
In the context of sustainable cocoa in West Africa, a coalition of gov-
markets, reducing risks, and ensuring a sustainable supply of cocoa
ernments, donors, NGOs, and the cocoa industry are supporting
into the future. The state, on the other hand, is theoretically motivated
jurisdictional/landscape approaches. The jurisdictional approach is in
by the desire to regulate, that is, decrease illegal expansion into for-
many cases synonymous with a landscape approach, which refers to
ests, but at the same time create an enabling environment that
a conceptual framework whereby stakeholders aim to reconcile com-
attracts private investment to foster economic development. One area
peting social, economic, and environmental objectives, through inte-
where these logics converge is the mutual desire to increase total
gration at different levels (Wolosin, 2016). These initiatives aim to
cocoa production. The challenge introduced by zero deforestation
reduce deforestation at the landscape level by combining private sec-
cocoa commitments is that there are now significant constraints to
tor action along agricultural supply chains with public sector planning
how total cocoa production is increased.
and efforts to integrate smallholders (Kroeger, Koenig, Thomson, &
Smallholder cocoa farmers, in all their diversity and dispersity, are
Streck, 2017). Corresponding to national or (more often) subnational
the key players whose behavior will dictate the success of zero defor-
administrative boundaries, jurisdictions allow for scaling up impact
estation cocoa efforts because deforestation occurs at the smallholder
across a larger geographic area beyond single companies or commu-
level. However, given the limited technical and economic capacity of
nity development projects while involving multiple sectors and stake-
smallholders to enact the necessary reforms on their own, it is the
holders in an integrated fashion (Wolosin, 2016).
companies, governments, and NGOs that need to take action
In practice, these approaches are multistakeholder dialogues
(Kroeger, Koenig, et al., 2017). This has potentially significant implica-
where representatives from the above‐mentioned coalition sit
tions for matters of regulatory governance. Given the capacity con-
together to discuss issues and potential solutions. Given the possibility
straints of government in West Africa, a number of nonstate actors
that power may be covert and latent (Bachrach & Baratz, 1994; Lukes,
have entered into partnerships with the government to help the state
1974), it is difficult to determine precisely how underlying power
create supply chain transparency. Nonstate actors are thus helping to
structures and political economy realities influence problem defini-
tions and proposed policy options. What is visible, however, is the 9
The International Finance Corporation estimates that cocoa represents around
decades‐long relationship that the multibillion dollar cocoa industry 20% of GDP in Côte d'Ivoire and 9% of GDP in Ghana.
64 CARODENUTO

address a governance gap in the state's regulatory capacity. But the ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
lines between supply chain transparency and law enforcement are Research was supported by UNIQUE forestry and land use through a
blurred. Business would simultaneously play the role of regulator and project supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
regulated, which may shift incentives to dilute or generously interpret Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Cameroon, specifically the Programme d'Appui
how certain aspects of zero deforestation definitions are applied in the à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de développement du secteur rural—
field (Kroeger, Bakhtary, et al., 2017). This suggests that there may be Volet Forêt Environnement (ProPFE). The views expressed in this article
trade‐offs to expanding the role of nonstate actors in fostering trans- are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the
parency and enforcing compliance, as shown by previous studies above‐mentioned institutions. The field work was carried out with
looking at forest certification in China and labor in Indonesia (Bartley, Duncan Gromko, who provided a sounding board for the ideas pre-
2018). The literature on governance theory is cautious about the long‐ sented in this paper. This paper also benefits from comments received
term consequences of the emergence of private authority (Hall & during the workshop “Private Authority and Public Policy in Global
Biersteker, 2002). Scholars have stated that there might be unin- Context: Competition, Collaboration or Coexistence” at Copenhagen
tended long‐term consequences, for example, often discussed is that Business School in March 2018.
private authority weakens state authority in the long term (Hall &
Biersteker, 2002). ORCID
Sophia Carodenuto https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2765-746X

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