SALVADOR v. PATRICIA, INC.

G.R. No. 195834. November 9, 2016

FACTS:
 This case involves a group of occupants of a parcel of land in the City of Manila.
 The said occupants, herein petitioners, filed a complaint for injunction and quieting of title against the respondent
corporation, Patricia, Inc.
o The suit was brought to determine who owns the property occupied by them and the intervenor, Ciriaco.
o They claim that the improvements on the land should be protected and that the land should be protected
and that the land actually belongs to the City of Manila.
o The injunction was to prevent respondent from evicting them from their respective improvements.
 The complaint was amended to include different branches of MTCs of Manila.
o Thus, a complaint-in-intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the subject land, and another
by Ciriano Mijares alleging that he was similarly situated as the other petitioner/s
 The preliminary injunction was granted and served on the respondents.
 The parties submitted the following documents:
o TCT No. 44247 in the name of the City of Manila
o TCT No. 35727 in the name of Patricia, Inc.
o Approved Plan PSD-38540; and
o Approved Subdivision Plan PCS-3290 for Ricardo Manotok
 Both TCTs are admitted as genuine. Thus, the RTC appointed, with concurrence of the parties, three geodetic
engineers as commissions to determine the boundaries of the respective titles.

 RTC RULING: rendered a judgment In favor of petitioners and against Patricia Inc. permanently enjoining the
latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their respective premises and from collecting any rentals
form them.
o It deemed that the side with two of the commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City is
more sound.
 CA RULING: reversed the decision of the RTC for utter want of merit and that the occupants did not have the
necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title.

ISSUE:
1) Whether the joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title was disallowed by the Rules of Court.
(YES)
2) Whether the petitioners did not have a cause of action for injunction. (YES)

RULING:
1) YES. The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title was disallowed by the Rules of Court.
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court disallowed the joinder, viz.:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (b) The
joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules.

Consequently, the RTC should have severed the causes of action, either upon motion or motu proprio, and tried them
separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such severance was pursuant to Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, which expressly provides:
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an
action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and
proceeded with separately.

The refusal of the petitioners to accept the severance would have led to the dismissal of the case conformably with the
mandate of Section, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
 Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of
the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

2) YES. The petitioner did not have a cause of action for injunction.
The nature of the remedy of injunction and the requirements for the issuance of the injunctive writ have been expounded
in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Carantes, as follows:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which
case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a
prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final
injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled
to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually
restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction.

Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue:

Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The records show, however, that they did
not have any right to be protected because they had established only the existence of the boundary dispute between
Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila. Any violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise to the right of
action in favor of the City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the petitioners at all.

ADDITIONAL RULING/S:
The RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that MTC, METC, MCTC, in civil cases shall exercises Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00).

As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the real action is dependent on the assessed value of the
property in dispute. Simply, the jurisdiction over a real action depends on the assessed value of the property involved as alleged in the complaint.

Here, rhe complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the property. Such failure left the trial court bereft of
any basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC could not proceed with the
case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although neither the parties nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceedings,
the issue did not simply vanish because the Court can hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by
law, and could not be vested by any act or omission of any party.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the ROC ( No Amendment necessary to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence ) did not save the day for
petitioners:
The invocation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court in order to enable the raising of the boundary dispute was unwarranted.

First of all, a boundary dispute should not be litigated in an action for the quieting of title due to the limited scope of the action. The action for the quieting
of title is a tool specifically used to remove of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property; it should not be used for any other
purpose.

Secondly, the boundary dispute would essentially seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of the City of Manila or that of Patricia, Inc., but any
alteration or modification either way should be initiated only by direct proceedings, not as an issue incidentally raised by the parties herein.

To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action for quieting of title would violate Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree by virtue of its
prohibition against collateral attacks on Torrens titles. A collateral attack takes place when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of
title is assailed as an incident in said action. This is exactly what the petitioners sought to do herein, seeking to modify or otherwise cancel Patricia, Inc.'s
title.

The petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to demand either injunction or quieting of title
The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show their authority or other legal basis on which they had anchored their alleged
lawful occupation and superior possession of the property.

On the contrary, they only contended that their continued possession of the property had been for more than 30 years; that they had built their houses in
good faith; and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended.

Yet, none of such reasons validly clothed them with the necessary interest to maintain the action for quieting of title. For one, the authenticity of the
title of the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but was even admitted by them during trial. As such, they could not expect to
have any right in the property other than that of occupants whose possession was only tolerated by the owners and rightful possessors. This
was because land covered by a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or by adverse possession.

Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil Code as builders in good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's
comments, which they did not deny, they had been lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to possession in good
faith, their occupation not being in the concept of owners.

At this juncture, the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for priority development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967,
as amended, did not provide sufficient interest to the petitioners.

Presidential Decree No. 1517 only granted to the occupants of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was true only if and when the owner
of the property decided to sell the property. Only then would the right of first refusal accrue. Consequently, the right of first refusal remained contingent,
and was for that reason insufficient to vest any title, legal or equitable, in the petitioners.