Ag V Hook

STATE v.
HOOK (2003)
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
The STATE, Respondent/Petitioner, v. Roy Edward HOOK,

Petitioner/Respondent.
No. 25752.
Decided: November 24, 2003
Katherine Carruth Link, and South Carolina Office of

Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for petitioner/respondent.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, and Assistant
Attorney General Melody J. Brown, of Columbia; and
Solicitor Barbara R. Morgan, of Aiken, for
respondent/petitioner.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals'

decision 1 holding that petitioner/respondent Hook's statement to
his probation officer was inadmissible at Hook's trial for driving
under the influence (DUI) third offense. We affirm as modified.
FACTS
At trial, the State introduced evidence Hook was involved in an

automobile accident in the early morning hours of January 15, 1999.
He failed to yield the right of way at an intersection and collided
with a Williston city police car. Both Hook and the police officer
were taken to the hospital.
Trooper Cruz, who was called to the crash scene, went to the
hospital to question both parties. Cruz asked the treating doctor
whether he could speak with Hook and the doctor gave his
permission. According to Cruz, Hook appeared intoxicated and
“somewhat in pain” although Cruz observed no physical injuries.
Cruz smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Hook's breath and on his
person. When Cruz asked if he had been drinking, Hook replied
that he had “consumed alcohol, mainly beer, at 2400 hours which
was 12 midnight.” The wreck had occurred between 1:30 and 2:30
a.m. Hook denied he had used any illegal drugs. Cruz placed Hook
under arrest, read him his Miranda rights and, with permission from
the doctor, transported Hook to the detention center for a
breathalyzer test which Hook ultimately declined to take. During
the next few days, while in jail, Hook began spitting up blood and
had to seek further medical attention. He eventually had surgery
to remove a ruptured spleen.
Hook testified he drank three beers at home before dinner on the

evening before the wreck between 6:00 and 7:30 p.m. He went to
bed between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. but awoke later around 1:00 a.m.
and decided to return to his former residence to pick up a television
set. On his way, the wreck occurred.
On cross-examination, Hook denied he had used illegal drugs on the

evening of the wreck. The State then moved to impeach Hook with
a statement he made to his probation officer admitting he had
snorted cocaine on the evening before the wreck and that he was
impaired at the time the wreck occurred. Hook strenuously
objected that the statement was privileged and inadmissible under
S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-290 (Supp.2002) which provides:
All information and data obtained in the discharge of his official

duty by a probation agent is privileged information, is not receivable
as evidence in a court, and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone other than the judge or others entitled under
this chapter to receive reports unless ordered by the court or the
director.
The trial judge ruled that Hook's statement to his probation officer
was admissible for impeachment only.2
When cross-examination resumed, Hook testified as follows:
Q: So you did not tell [your probation officer] that you sniffed
powder cocaine the night of the accident?
A: No. The night of the accident was-when I went to sleep it was

the 14th and, you know, I woke up that night and really, you know,
when it's 1:00 or so, I still consider that even though it was actually
the 15th, I was still thinking of it as the 14th.
Q: What did you tell [your probation officer]?
A: Um-I told him that I had used powder cocaine a couple of days
before the accident.
Q: How about did you tell anyone else about this powder cocaine
usage?
A: Um-there was my other probation officer, Judy Brown.
Q: You did not tell Judy Brown that you used powder cocaine on
the night of this accident?
A: I say the day before the accident. In other words, I was

thinking of the day of the accident as the 14th. Even though it was
actually passed over to 12:00 and turned into the 15th, you know, it
was Thursday the 14th is what I was considering, although it had
crossed over to 12 midnight, I was still thinking of it as the 14th.
Q: So are you denying telling Judy Brown, the officer Judy Brown,
that you sniffed powder cocaine on the night of this accident and
that it led to this accident?
A: Yes, I am denying that.
Q: Mr. Hook, do you admit or deny use of cocaine on the 14th, the
night before the morning of the accident?
A: It-I deny it, it was on the 13th.
Q: And do you admit or deny that you told someone that cocaine
caused this accident?
A: Yes, I do deny that.
In reply, the State called Judy Brown, Hook's probation officer.

Brown testified that on January 15, at the detention center, she had
a conversation with Hook in which he told her that a friend had
brought some powder cocaine to Hook's home “and he sniffed it and
he said that's what led to the accident.” Hook appealed the
admission of this evidence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new
trial holding that (1) information received by a probation officer is
privileged under § 24-21-290 and (2) because Hook's statement was
involuntary due to his medical condition, it was not admissible as
impeachment evidence.
ISSUE
Is Hook's statement to his probation officer inadmissible for

impeachment under § 24-21-290?
DISCUSSION
Section 24-21-290 provides:
1) all information received by a probation agent in his official

capacity is privileged;
2) this information is not receivable as evidence in court; and
3) this information may not be disclosed to anyone other than the

judge and those specifically entitled to receive reports unless
ordered by the court or the director.
The State contends the phrase “unless ordered by the court” in

phrase (3) means the information received by a probation agent in
his official capacity is receivable as evidence whenever it is so
ordered by the court, and therefore Hook's statement was properly
admitted.
To the contrary, we find the phrase “unless ordered by the court”

modifies only phrase (3), which relates narrowly to disclosure, and
does not modify the information's receipt as evidence in court,
which is specifically prohibited under phrase (2). We hold the Court
of Appeals properly ruled § 24-21-290 does not allow the admission
of a probationer's statement as evidence in court simply because
the judge orders it.
In opposition to the State's position, Hook contends § 24-21-290

prohibits such a statement's admission in court for any purpose,
including impeachment. We agree.
By its terms, § 21-24-290 makes information given by a probationer

to his probation agent inadmissible as evidence in court with no
exception. A plain reading of the statute leaves no room for
grafting onto it an exception to exclusion when the evidence is used
for impeachment purposes. See State v. Muldrow, 348 S.C. 264,
559 S.E.2d 847 (2002) (the words of a statute must be given their
plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced
construction to limit or expand the statute's operation). The
question of admissibility under § 21-24-290 is simply one of
legislative intent. Unlike judicially-crafted rules regarding
unconstitutionally seized evidence,3 whether the statement is
voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant here. Under § 24-21-290, a
probationer's statement to his probation agent is inadmissible for
impeachment regardless of whether it is voluntarily or involuntarily
given.
Because the Court of Appeals found the voluntariness of Hook's

statement dispositive rather than simply finding the statement
inadmissible under § 24-21-290, we affirm as modified.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
FOOTNOTES
1. State v. Hook, 348 S.C. 401, 559 S.E.2d 856 (Ct.App.2001).
2. The trial judge had previously ruled the statement was not
admissible in the State's case-in-chief under § 24-21-290.
3. Cf. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64
L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (unconstitutionally seized evidence admissible
for impeachment); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43
L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (statement obtained in violation of fifth
amendment right to counsel is admissible for impeachment); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)
(statement obtained in violation of Miranda admissible for
impeachment); see also State v. Brown, 296 S.C. 191, 371 S.E.2d
523 (1988) (statement from previous trial where conviction was
overturned on appeal for legal error is admissible for impeachment
in subsequent trial).
Justice MOORE:
TOAL, C.J., WALLER, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur.

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STATE v.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

The STATE, Respondent/Petitioner, v. Roy Edward HOOK,

Decided: November 24, 2003

Katherine Carruth Link, and South Carolina Office of

We granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals'

At trial, the State introduced evidence Hook was involved in an

Hook testified he drank three beers at home before dinner on the

On cross-examination, Hook denied he had used illegal drugs on the

All information and data obtained in the discharge of his official

When cross-examination resumed, Hook testified as follows:

A: No. The night of the accident was-when I went to sleep it was

A: Um-there was my other probation officer, Judy Brown.

A: I say the day before the accident. In other words, I was

A: Yes, I am denying that.

A: It-I deny it, it was on the 13th.

A: Yes, I do deny that.

In reply, the State called Judy Brown, Hook's probation officer.

Is Hook's statement to his probation officer inadmissible for

Section 24-21-290 provides:

1) all information received by a probation agent in his official

2) this information is not receivable as evidence in court; and

3) this information may not be disclosed to anyone other than the

The State contends the phrase “unless ordered by the court” in

To the contrary, we find the phrase “unless ordered by the court”

In opposition to the State's position, Hook contends § 24-21-290

By its terms, § 21-24-290 makes information given by a probationer

Because the Court of Appeals found the voluntariness of Hook's

1. State v. Hook, 348 S.C. 401, 559 S.E.2d 856 (Ct.App.2001).

TOAL, C.J., WALLER, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur.

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