Critical Review

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Depolarization Without Reconciliation

Robert B. Talisse

To cite this article: Robert B. Talisse (03 Jan 2024): Depolarization Without Reconciliation,
Critical Review, DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2023.2285116
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 Robert B. Talisse

DEPOLARIZATION WITHOUT RECONCILIATION

ABSTRACT: According to contemporary diagnoses, democracy is foundering

because of polarization. It is natural to think that if polarization is a problem,
the remedy is to reconcile the conflicting sides. Yet reconciliation seems to involve
the disturbing prescription that citizens should reconcile with radicals who have
divested from democratic norms. That assumes, however, that polarization is sym-
metrical, whereby each side is equally responsible for it. But polarization need not
depend on the assumption of such symmetry, such that depolarization may be
possible without reconciliation. If so, polarization may be a problem not only
between political alliances but within them.
Keywords: citizenship; conformity; democracy; depolarization; extremity; partisanship; polarization.

The United States is now classified a “backsliding democracy” in the

Global State of Democracy Report put out by the International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Citing “visible
deteriorations” of democratic norms, the report points specifically to
the popularity of baseless allegations of widespread voter fraud in the
 election. But according to International IDEA’s secretary
general, the “most concerning” feature of American democracy is
“runaway polarization.”

Robert B. Talisse, Robert.talisse@vanderbilt.edu, Philosophy Department, Vanderbilt Univer-

sity, PMB ,  Vanderbilt Place, Nashville, TN -, the author of Sustaining
Democracy (Oxford University Press, ), thanks Scott Aikin, Jeffrey Friedman, Leif Wenar,
and audiences at Stanford University, University of Cincinnati, and Vanderbilt University for
helpful comments and questions.
Critical Review – ISSN - print, - online
©  Critical Review Foundation https://doi.org/./..
 Critical Review

The claim that polarization is a (perhaps the) central ailment of Amer-

ican democracy looms large in popular political commentary across the
partisan spectrum. The diagnosis resonates with citizens, too. It could
be that our divided country is unified by the idea that our main
problem is division itself. Fittingly, Ezra Klein (, xix) calls polariz-
ation the “master story” of what’s “awry” in American democracy.
It’s natural to think that if polarization is the problem, the solution is
depolarization. Accordingly, depolarization strategies are on offer from a
variety of sources. Some advocate large-scale experiments involving
deliberative polls, mini-publics, and citizen assemblies. According to a
proponent of one such approach, people approach consensus once they
“are thinking” in the ways elicted by a curated democratic interaction
(Fishkin , -). Others offer mid-scale interventions: protocols
for respectful disagreement, active listening, and courteous engagement
across political divides. Advocates of these approaches claim their
methods deescalate disputes, uncover common ground, and heal
divides (Curato et al. ).
The polarization framework combines a diagnostic claim that polar-
ization is the “master story” of prevailing democratic ailments with a
prescriptive claim that depolarization is the proper response to them.
Clearly, these two claims are distinct. The diagnostic claim does not
entail the prescriptive claim: one can accept that polarization is the
correct diagnosis, but opt for another remedy, as some epistocrats
and lottocrats do. Further, the polarization framework is modest:
it need not (although it can) claim that polarization is our only
problem; nor must it say that every political disorder is due to polariz-
ation. Instead, it contends that a range of principal political dysfunc-
tions have polarization at their core, and that depolarization is the
proper response.
Although I accept the polarization framework, most depolarization
programs are troubling. One need not oppose peace, love, and under-
standing to acknowledge that democracy is not all sweetness and light.
Democratic citizens inevitably will disagree, sometimes sharply, about
vital political questions. In such disagreements, they are bound to see
their opponents as not only wrong, but in the wrong. Division and rancor
are ineliminable elements of democratic politics.
If polarization is indeed the problem, the remedy must allow for pol-
itical antagonism. Depolarization cannot require that we overcome div-
isions, tranquilize disagreements, and hug it out. If the polarization
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

framework is to be plausible, it must support a conception of depolariz-

ation without reconciliation.
But what is depolarization if not bringing opponents together and
easing animosity? And if political division and hostility are essential to
democracy, then is polarization truly a problem? Might the polarization
framework itself be a mistake, a diagnostic framework that occludes
rather than elucidates our democratic dysfunctions?
Polarization skepticism would answer the last question in the affirmative
in doubting the framework of polarization. Such a stance need not deny
that polarization is real, nor that it is problematic. It, too, is modest: It
denies that polarization is the “master story” of significant democratic
dysfunctions currently at work in the United States, and it rejects
depolarization as the remedy.
This paper addresses a forceful version of polarization skepticism.
Admittedly, “polarization skepticism” isn’t a household name, not
even among political theorists. Yet to be definitively articulated, its ingre-
dients can be gleaned from various sources, academic and otherwise.
When properly assembled, they compose a view that encapsulates, in a
philosophically astute way, some common misgivings about the polariz-
ation framework, as well as providing an occasion for the framework’s
advocates to sharpen their ideas.
The skeptical view I reconstruct is two-pronged, challenging both the
diagnostic and prescriptive claims of the polarization framework. It con-
tends that the diagnostic claim assumes that both sides are responsible for
polarization. This is the symmetry thesis (Anderson , -). That
diagnostic thesis, in turn, underwrites a prescriptive stance of reconcilia-
tionism, the view that restoring democracy requires citizens to forge
common ground with those on the other side of the political divide
(Dutilh Novaes ). The skeptic maintains that reconciliationism is
morally and politically objectionable, because it cedes to the most
extreme parties in a conflict the power to define the middle ground
(Rubin ). The upshot is that the polarization framework must be dis-
placed by an alternative diagnostic tool (Nguyen ).
To defend the polarization framework against skeptics, I begin by
developing an account of the problem of polarization within a self-rein-
forcing loop among two phenomena, both of which are often called
polarization. I then respond directly to polarization skepticism by
showing that my account invokes no symmetry thesis, and by arguing
for a type of depolarization that lacks reconciliation. My aim is less to
 Critical Review

demonstrate that my account is correct, than to show that it is a plausible

version of the polarization framework: one can accept that polarization is
the “master story” without embracing symmetry or reconciliation. I con-
clude by suggesting ways of operationalizing the idea of depolorization
without reconciliation.

Locating the Polarization Problem

In its popular versions, the polarization framework is thin on details. But
what is polarization is and why is it a problem? An answer requires dis-
tinguishing between political polarization and belief polarization.

Types of Political Polarization

When people lament the polarized state of democracy, they typically
are talking about political polarization, which is the ideological distance
between opposed political groups. When it is pronounced, the
common ground dissolves, leaving little basis for cooperation and
compromise. In decision-making contexts, stalemate, deadlock, and
frustration result.
“Ideological distance” can be construed in three ways: by official par-
tisan doctrines; by party leaders; and popular partisan identification.
These are less competing accounts of political polarization than distinct
sites where ideological fissures can emerge.
We can construe ideological distance as a form of party polarization,
exemplified in the official doctrines of the opposing parties. Two
parties are politically polarized to the degree that their political agendas
are opposed or in some other sense incompatible. Party polarization is
endemic to a democratic society, and it can be democratically healthy,
too. It makes salient citizens’ electoral options. But when it becomes
excessive it can impede the work of government.
A second construal is elite polarization. Looking at party leaders and
officials, it gauges the extent of unanimity within the party. Opposed
groups are highly polarized in this sense when their respective constitu-
ents include few moderates or bridge-builders. Since it is typically
accompanied by the attitude that cooperation with the other side consti-
tutes a kind of disloyalty, it tends to shun moderates. Accordingly, when
elite polarization is pronounced, political groups valorize partisan purity.
A vernacular for ridiculing moderates develops. With moderates
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

sidelined, the hardliners take control. The result is deadlock accompanied

by cross-partisan animosity among elites.
Third, ideological distance might be understood as popular polarization
in focusing on the attitudes prevalent among ordinary citizens who ident-
ify with a political party. In popular polarization, rank-and-file citizens
embrace intensely negative attitudes and dispositions towards those per-
ceived to be politically dissimilar from themselves. This type of polariz-
ation need not track actual policy disputes, for the attitudes citizens
take towards their perceived opponents are sometimes distinct from
their attitudes or knowledge of policies (Levendusky and Malhorta ).
The data here are striking. In the United States, popular polarization
has escalated significantly over the past four decades, even though
divides among citizens over key policies have either remained stable or
eased (Iyengar and Krupenkin ; Mason b). Citizens not only
report high levels of dislike for affiliates of the opposing party, they
also see them as untrustworthy, unpatriotic, unintelligent, dangerous,
and divested from democracy. This animosity is directed at fellow citi-
zens, not only the opposing side’s candidates, officials, and spokespersons
(Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes ).
Moreover, this negative affect is generalized. Citizens do not only
dislike perceived rivals’ politics; they also find their nonpolitical behavior
disagreeable: their clothes, vehicles, food, modes of entertainment, and
more all become targets of partisan contempt (McConnell et al. ;
Hetherington and Weiler ). Popular polarization turns partisan
affiliation into a lifestyle, a “mega-identity” (Mason a, ).
Even though popular polarization has escalated in the absence of com-
mensurate policy divisions, citizens believe that their political differences
are extreme and intensifying (Bougher ). They attribute sharply
opposing—and radical—ideas and values to rivals. These projections
are generally inaccurate (Ahler ; Ahler and Sood ).
Heightened levels of popular polarization help explain the prevalence
of elite and party polarization. When citizens intensely dislike those
outside of their own political tribe, elite polarization is incentivized. Poli-
ticians and party leaders seek to win elections, and they do this by extract-
ing political behavior from their base (Lee ). Animosity, distrust, and
contempt are motivationally potent (Iyengar and Krupenkin , ).
Accordingly, when the citizens manifest intense negative affect for the
other side, candidates and party leaders do well to amplify hostility
towards their opposition. This, in turn, rewards parties that adopt
 Critical Review

platforms that punctuate opposition to the rival party’s agenda. Wide-

spread popular polarization makes for easy campaigning. Candidates
simply need to demonize the opposition, valorize intransigence, and
stoke animosity. This feeds back to citizens, fueling negative affect
towards partisan rivals.
The three sites of political polarization thus reinforce one another.
Additionally, popular polarization escalates elite and party polarization.
In the absence of significant popular polarization, the other sites are
more easily constrained. But when the citizenry is divided by intense
cross-partisan animus, parties and officials need to escalate accordingly.
These are familiar dynamics. But why is popular polarization so wide-
spread? Here, we need to look at belief polarization.

Belief Polarization
Before identifying what belief polarization is, it should be noted that it is
astoundingly common. It has been studied for more than six decades
and found within groups of all kinds. It does not discriminate between
different kinds of belief. Likeminded groups polarize over banal matters
of fact, matters of personal taste, or deep questions about value. What
is more, the phenomenon operates regardless of the point of the
group’s interaction. They polarize when they are determining what the
group will do, but also when there is no specific decision to be
reached. Finally, the phenomenon is prevalent regardless of subjects’
nationality, race, gender, religion, economic status, and level of
education.
Belief polarization is a doxastic shift that occurs within likeminded
groups. Iterated interactions among likeminded people tend to result
in each person adopting more extreme articulation of their shared
view. When we surround ourselves only with others who reinforce
our ideas, we tend not only to become more confident in their correct-
ness; we also adopt more radical or exaggerated formulations of them.
Interaction with likeminded others transforms us into more extreme ver-
sions of ourselves.
This shift involves an alteration in our grasp of the basis of our beliefs.
We come to overestimate the weight of supporting evidence. We also
become more dogmatic: unreceptive to counterevidence and resistant
to correction. We more readily dismiss detractors as irrational and
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

benighted. We become less inclined to listen to them, and more prone to

interrupt when they speak (Westfall et al. ; Sunstein , ).
Typically, our likeminded associates are similarly situated. Group
members hence escalate each others’ dogmatism. As their views
become more extreme, they also become more disposed to act in
concert. They also become more confident, growing more inclined to
engage in risky behavior together (Stoner ). All the while, their
views of outsiders grow more intensely negative.
But extremification is only part of the phenomenon. Within the
group, members are incentivized to withhold information and hide pre-
ferences that might deviate from what they perceive to be the group’s
expectations (Sunstein , ). Accordingly, belief polarized groups
also tend to become more homogeneous in ways that go beyond their
initial like-mindedness (Hogg ). They also become more invested
in being alike. Our more extreme selves are also more conformist.
This homogenization is easy to explain. Belief polarization intensi-
fies negative affect toward outsiders, leading to a fixation on the
borders between insiders and outsiders. Groups adopt increasingly
exacting standards for authentic membership. As qualifications for
good-standing membership intensify, the group develops means for
detecting poseurs. Standards for authenticity thus come to encompass
behaviors and attitudes that extend beyond the group’s defining
ideas. Compliance with these broader expectations becomes a way of
expressing one’s authentic membership in the group. Accordingly,
belief polarized groups tend also to be highly susceptible to the Black
Sheep Effect—their negative attitudes towards perceived apostates are
more intense than those they take towards outright foes (Marques
et al. ).
As groups become more conformist, they also become more reliant on
centralized standard-setters to establish the markers of authentic member-
ship. Belief polarization hence renders groups more hierarchical and
therefore less internally democratic. Thus, as conformity pressures inten-
sify, even slight deviations from the group’s expectations amplify into
serious infractions. For this reason, belief polarized groups are prone to
factionalize; they tend to shrink into smaller cohorts of hardliners.
Summing up, we can say that belief polarization involves two shifts
within likeminded groups: doxastic extremification and group homogen-
ization. That’s the core of the phenomenon. Yet our picture remains
incomplete until we examine how belief polarization works.
 Critical Review

One possibility is an informational account, which holds that belief

polarization results from the informational filters that operate in like-
minded groups. Alternatively, a comparative account contends that belief
polarization occurs when group members, striving to be seen by peers
as authentic, seek to be slightly above the perceived mean: as the
members are recalibrating simultaneously, the group itself shifts
towards extremity. Neither of these accounts, which I explore elsewhere
(Talisse , ch. ), can be the full story, for neither information
exchange (Myers et al. ) nor in-group comparison (Baron et al.
) is necessary to initiate belief polarization.
More plausibly, belief polarization might be driven by group-affiliated
corroboration of one’s views. Our beliefs become more extreme when we
feel that a group with which we identify holds a belief or attitude that we
espouse. We need not hear new evidence, nor compare ourselves to
other group members. Instead, research suggests that the realization
that one’s view is popular among one’s identity group is sufficient. We
become more extreme in the direction of our perceived peers as a
response to their validation.
The corroboration view treats belief polarization as centrally a matter
of group affinity. However, it recognizes that exchanging information
and performing social comparisons are often ways of situating oneself
within a group; hence the corroboration view need not deny that the
other accounts capture ways of initiating belief polarization. The corro-
borationist holds simply that the mechanism driving the phenomenon has
to do with the positive affect that results from affirmation from one’s self-
ascribed identity group.
This helps to explain why shifts towards extreme positions are more
severe when group membership is primed (Abrams et al. ) and less
pronounced when interaction occurs among likeminded subjects who
do not regard themselves as sharing a group identity (Le ). The
view holds that corroboration from our peers makes us feel good about
our beliefs, and this feeling of affirmation in our self-ascribed identity
leads us to shift towards extremity (Hogg ). Thus, belief polarization
is not only a phenomenon of extremification and homogenization; it also
is a process by which group identity is made salient and centered. According
to the corroboration view, we should think of belief polarization in the
way we think about sports fandom. Just as fans are driven to more
extreme expressions of their support for their favorite team when they
are cheering together in a stadium, individuals are driven to extremity
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

in the presence of affirming signals of their group identity. The fans

elevate one another’s attitudes and prompt corresponding behavior,
despite the fact that they typically are strangers to one another and do
not exchange information.
Importantly, the relevant corroboration can come by way of highly
indirect channels. For example, presenting a liberal subject with a chart
showing that liberals widely oppose genetically modified food can
prompt belief polarization; similarly, exposure to a poll showing that
conservatives strongly favor a particular military action can produce
an extremity shift in a conservative already favorably disposed to
that action (Baron et al. , ). Moreover, the environmental
prompts need not be verbal, overt, or literal; they can be merely
implicit signals to group members that some belief is prevalent
among them. Hats, pins, campaign signs, logos, gestures, songs,
emblems, and any environmental feature that makes salient a social
identity and the attitudes that are common to it are all potential
initiators of belief polarization for those who share that identity
(Baron et al. , ).
Note a connection between belief polarization and partisan sorting
(Bishop ). As the country has grown more diverse in various
respects, the local spaces that citizens inhabit have become more politi-
cally homogeneous (Chen and Rodden ; Tam et al. ).
Schools, workplaces, occupations, congregations, and neighborhoods
across the country are sorted according to partisan allegiance (Iyengar
and Westwood ; Mason ). Consequently, our daily routines
tend to place us in social interaction only with those who share our pol-
itical identity. Even when these interactions are not explicitly about poli-
tics, our partisan identities have grown so central to our overall sense of
ourselves that our political commitments are nonetheless corroborated.
Sorted social spaces expose us to belief polarization, which in turn
encourages further sorting.

The Polarization Loop

The above typology of political and belief polarization allows me to suc-
ciently describe the problem of polarization as the self-perpetuating loop
of belief and political polarization. Together, these two phenomena
exacerbate divisions, reward divisiveness, and erode our capacity for
responsible democratic citizenship.
 Critical Review

To see how this works, recall that as we extremify, we also come to

adopt increasingly negative stances towards those perceived to be differ-
ent. As we become more extreme, their views look increasingly disfig-
ured, unfounded, and irrational. Those who hold such views strike us
as ignorant, naïve, and malign. We come to see them as a radicalized
monolith, unified around the most extreme versions of the views that
oppose our own. As a result, we more thoroughly embed within our
camp, reinforcing tendencies to regard outsiders as untrustworthy, unpa-
triotic, unintelligent, threatening, and treacherous (Pew a).
Ironically, as we come to regard our opponents in these ways, we
come to fit the description we ascribe to them: we grow more intensely
insular, distrustful, close-minded, and tribal. Once belief polarization has
escalated, even amiable interactions with our political opponents tend to
further our extremification (Bail et al. ). Attempts to “reach across
the aisle” backfire (Nyhan and Reifler ). Often, the other side is
subject to the same forces. A tragically self-fulfilling projection results:
each side paints its opposition in the most unflattering caricature.
This facilitates the polarization loop. Belief polarization escalates popular
polarization, leading us to regard our political rivals as threats to neutral-
ize. Ideals of civility begin to look Pollyannaish, if not positively compli-
cit. Allies hive together, plotting ways to defeat their enemies. This
initiates further belief polarization, which in turn produces more
popular polarization. As was noted earlier, the deepening of popular
polarization activates party and elite polarization. Office holders are
released from electoral pressures to deliver tangible results: they can
win re-election simply by stoking their base’s contempt for the opposing
side (Puglisi and Snyder ; Sood and Iyengar ). This fuels further
popular and belief polarization. And on it goes.
Thus, the problem of polarization does not reside in the bitterness of
our divides. It lies rather with the distortion of our grasp of our political
circumstances and of our political differences. We then easily over-
ascribe extreme ideas and vices to opponents; we attribute to them an
implausible degree of internal unanimity; and we lose the ability to
track the reasons they offer for their ideas. Eventually, we come to see
them as unqualified for democratic citizenship. Politicians strategize
accordingly, which in turn fuels further belief polarization. All the
while, our partisan groups grow increasingly fixated on their favored car-
icatures of their opposition, citizens’ democratic capacities deteriorate,
and the momentous political questions we face as a society are neglected.
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

To put the point differently: Democracy imposes a moral demand on

citizens. They must treat their fellow citizens as their political equals. To
be sure, there are certain political commitments that are “unreasonable”
in the Rawlsian sense: they are beyond the pale; and embracing them
places a person’s fitness for citizenship into question. Bracketing unrea-
sonable views and persons, there remains a broad range of competing pol-
itical commitments whose adoption is compatible with responsible
democratic citizenship. From the perspective of any given democratic
citizen, many of these views are bound to look misguided and incompa-
tible with justice. Nonetheless, proponents of those views remain one’s
political equals, and when they prevail electorally, democratic govern-
ment is required to enact their will. Thus, democracy’s moral demand:
we must treat our (reasonable) fellow citizens as our equals, even when
we believe that their commitments, though reasonable, are incompatible
with justice.
This demand is not easily satisfied. After all, politics matters. It is
difficult to uphold the idea that our political opponents are entitled
to an equal say. Responsible democratic citizenship thus calls for
certain civic capacities that can help us navigate the conflict of regard-
ing our opponents as our equals even though we take them to be
advocating injustice. On any plausible construal of these capacities,
the polarization loop is corrosive because it shrinks our sense of the
range of reasonable disagreement. It leads us to see political opponents
as irredeemably unreasonable. It fosters the profoundly antidemocratic
stance that democracy is possible only among those who agree with
our own views about politics.
Importantly, these points are not restricted to cross-partisan disputes.
As belief polarization increases the pressure to conform to one’s in-
group, it also erodes our ability to navigate disputes among our allies.
To be sure, when we think of political divides, we fix on disputes
between liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, Left
and Right. We thereby overlook significant political disputes within par-
tisan coalitions. Consider the nascent rifts between religious and libertar-
ian-leaning Republicans over abortion, or those between liberal and
progressive Democrats over criminal justice. These, too, are disputes
over justice. There is no reason to think that, once engaged, they
wouldn’t be volatile. A progressive prison abolitionist may tend to vote
for the same candidates as a liberal criminal justice reformer, but each
must nevertheless see the other as advocating for injustice.
 Critical Review

Consequently, the need to cultivate and sustain democratic capacities

does not derive solely from the requirement to recognize political
enemies as our equals, but also from the requirement to treat our allies
as our equals. This requires accommodating reasonable disagreements
with them and maintaining our political alliances. Belief polarization
erodes our capacity to meet the requirements of citizenship with
respect to foes and friends alike.
In short, the polarization loop is a downward spiral of mutually rein-
forcing dysfunctions that erode the democratic capacities citizens need
if they are to perform their civic role responsibly. That is the problem
of polarization.

Addressing Polarization Skepticism

This depiction of the problem may evoke some degree of polarization
skepticism on at least two grounds. First, if the framework of polarization
appears to symmetrically blame “both sides,” the skeptic claims that
polarization might, in fact, be asymmetrical. Second, the possibility of
asymmetrical blame undermines the prescription for partisan opponents
to “come together” and “find common ground”; for the skeptic, this
amounts to a concession to the other side—often conservatism. After
all, if the partisan cleavage is due to conservative radicalization, then
the “middle ground” itself has shifted to the Right. The prescription to
depolarize calls for liberals to surrender; the requirement to seek reconci-
liation thus appears politically suicidal and morally repugnant.
Polarization skepticism is formidable. It might be decisive against
certain versions of the polarization framework. However, it presents
no objection to the account on offer.

Defending the Diagnostic Claim

Polarization skepticism treats all polarization as political polarization, equat-
ing polarization with the rancorous deadlock resulting from the expand-
ing ideological distance between partisan camps. It takes two to make a
standoff, so the skeptic concludes that the framework falsely assumes a
symmetry between both sides.
The account sketched above does not locate the problem within par-
tisan cleavages and thus suggests no such symmetry. It need not deny that
in the United States, one party might have shifted towards its radical pole
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

while the other maintains a generally moderate posture. It can remain

agnostic on the sociological details about the differential ideological
shifts within the major political parties. It seeks the source of our
divides, holding that the polarization loop warps citizens’ perceptions
of one another and corrodes their democratic capacities, while also incen-
tivizing intransigence among parties and elites. The (main) problem is not
partisan animosity or the abandoning of common ground. It’s that our
political antagonisms are driven by distortions that dismantle our
democratic capacities.
Polarization skeptics might here detect a tacit symmetry thesis. They
may argue that I am claiming that the dysfunctions of polarization fall
on both sides of the political divide, in which our divides result from
forces that distort our views. But while I am suggesting that people are
similarly vulnerable to belief polarization, there is nothing objectionable
about this kind of “symmetry”: this is a documented cognitive tendency
in likeminded groups as such, including nonpolitical groups.
This is not to say that rank-and-file citizens are equally in the grip of the
phenomenon. Rather, whatever differences there are in the degree to
which conservative and liberal citizens experience polarization, their
causes are not the content of liberal and conservative ideas, but sociological
factors surrounding group membership.
It helps to remember that belief polarization concerns how the social
environment makes salient and foregrounds group identity. The extent to
which partisans exhibit the dysfunctions is explicable mainly by features
of the social spaces they inhabit. Though embracing a certain partisan
affiliation may correlate with holding more extreme beliefs, it does not
follow that those of an alternative affiliation are invulnerable. Moreover,
assuming that belief polarization is most severe among conservatives,
belief polarization may be also a problem among liberals.
Supposing arguendo that conservatives are far more in the grip of the
polarization loop than their liberal counterparts, liberals might be polar-
ized in ways that could be far more damaging to their political objectives.
Although a group’s vulnerability to belief polarization is not a matter
of the content of its commitments, the impact of belief polarization may
depend on the group’s views.
To see this, imagine a coalition of politically progressive Millian-
Deweyan democrats. They strive for a community of heterogeneous
social experimenters. Their project advances when, within broad con-
straints, members innovate, improvise, and renovate. Perhaps a rival
 Critical Review

Arnold-Oakeshott alliance is more thoroughly belief polarized.

However, as belief polarization involves homogenization, it poses a
greater threat to the Mill-Dewey project, even in lower doses. Thus,
even assuming that liberal coalitions are subject to comparatively lower
degrees of belief polarization, it may nonetheless present a serious threat.
The skeptic could retort that my account remains objectionable
because it casts the most radical citizens as fundamentally unresponsible
for their radicalization. It calls upon all citizens to recognize that, given
the right conditions, they too would shift into unreasonableness. This
suggests that reasonable citizens should adopt a kind of sympathy for
their radicalized foes. The skeptic regards this “love your enemies”
posture as unacceptable: radicalized foes need to be overpowered,
not coddled. My account makes their divestment from democracy
our problem.
Indeed, my account regards the radicalization of your foes as a
problem for you and your allies. But how this is objectionable?
Assume that your partisan foes are indeed beyond the pale. What to do
about them is obviously a problem. However, on my account, the
problem that unreasonable opponents pose is not that of rescuing them
from the fringe, but that, in suspending democratic relations with our
foes, we set the conditions by which conformity pressures are likely to
intensify among our allies. Once we dismiss our unreasonable foes, the
polarization dynamics do not dissipate. They turn inward. For this
reason, mitigating polarization is especially urgent for coalitions whose
opponents are unreasonable. Their radicalization is our problem, not
because we must love them or assume the burden of their rehabilitation,
but because their divestment threatens the democratic sustainability of
our alliances.
The foregoing arguments are meant to demonstrate only that there is
one version of the polarization framework’s diagnostic claim that invokes
no problematic kind of symmetry. But polarization skeptics tend to be
interested in the symmetry issue because they see it as setting the stage
for reconciliationism, which is their real target.

Defending the Prescriptive Claim

The skeptic takes the prescription to depolarize as a call for reconciliation.
Reconciliation with the other side can seem objectionable, especially if
it has embraced antidemocratic and otherwise odious ideas.
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

I agree that sometimes the directive to forge common ground is per-

verse. Further, popular versions of the polarization framework that
emphasize the toxicity of cross-partisan relations often call for reconcilia-
tionism: “healing divides” (Waldorf ), “finding common ground”
(Himmelman ), and “befriending” enemies (Abernathy ). But
I see democracy as more agonistic than these programs allow (see, e.g.,
Talisse , ch ), and have no interest in calling for reconciliation.
But depolarization need not be reconciliationist. The toxicity of cross-
partisan relations may be troubling, but the problem of polarization is not
fundamentally about ideological fractures between groups. Rather, since
belief polarization occurs within groups, it shifts the site of depolarization
away from cross-partisan relations and towards the interior dynamics of
partisan coalitions.
As I argued earlier, belief polarization causes groups to become more
homogeneous, and ultimately more conformist. They become less com-
petent in navigating intra-group disagreement and variation. As a result,
members’ conception of what is acceptable among allies narrows. I have
mentioned that escalating conformity poses a problem for political
coalitions: it causes them to expel members, and shrunken coalitions
tend to be less successful. The point here is slightly different. Since polar-
ization erodes democratic capacities, the internal dynamics of political
alliances provide a site for cultivating and exercising them. That is, to
depolarize is to mitigate the effects of the polarization loop within our alli-
ances. This calls us to take steps to expand our sense of the spectrum of
reasonable disagreement among our allies. We can pursue that by endea-
voring to stretch our conception of the range of doctrinal and behavioral
variation that is consistent with good-standing coalition membership.
Depolarization thus calls for the de-escalation of conformity pressures
within our alliances.
When coalition members expand their conception of what makes for
authentic allyship, incentives for political polarization weaken. As
coalitions become more accepting of internal diversity, parties and cam-
paigns will have a harder time activating a shared store of animosities.
Furthermore, the strategic value of stoking cross-partisan resentments
and anxieties diminishes. Diversified coalitions are less easily targeted
by campaign strategies that depend upon elevated levels of popular polar-
ization. We thus disrupt the polarization loop.
Along the way, we might also dislodge misperceptions of our
opponents—not because we will have befriended them, but because in
 Critical Review

embracing a broader range of allies, our conception of what is reasonably

thinkable in politics will expand beyond our narrowly defined partisan
identities. Our conception of our political foes will be less driven by
dynamics that deform our perceptions. We may nonetheless despise
their politics, but as we become better at detecting variations in their
views, we become more adept at engaging them.
Further, recall that belief polarization is a process that centers a social
identity in a person’s self-understanding. As social environments in the
United States are sorted according to political affiliation, belief polariz-
ation codifies partisan identity (Mason a). In contrast, depolarization
helps decenter partisan identity. Decentered partisan identity does not
mean diluting political commitment. Instead, it means that one’s political
engagements are more likely to draw from an accurate grasp of where
allies stand and what opponents think. In this way, decentered partisan
identity makes for a more democratically authentic mode of partisanship.
The important thing to note is that reconciliation is not part of this
type of deploarization. Decentering partisan identity and deescalating
in-group conformity by expanding the spectrum of doctrinal variation
among allies is consistent with maintaining an adversarial stance
towards one’s political opponents. Partisan divides, gaps, fissures, and
hostilities can all remain. Depolarization is not a matter of finding
common ground; instead, it is the project of establishing conditions
within our coalitions where rifts with our partisan opponents can be
more substantive, because less driven by distortions.

Towards Depolarization without Reconciliation

The foregoing arguments suffice to rebut polarization skepticism. Still,
this victory may seem pyrrhic unless we can get a concrete sense of how
depolarization without reconciliation operates.
First, a conceptual point. A lot of thinking about depolarization pro-
ceeds as follows: Were our democracy not in the grip of toxic levels of
polarization, opposed partisans would be able to communicate civilly
across their differences and thereby forge common ground; therefore,
the way to depolarize is to create conditions under which opposed par-
tisans are incentivized to interact as they would, had they not been polar-
ized. When one takes the problem of polarization to lie strictly with
partisan divisiveness, this inference is attractive. Still, there is an essential
difference between preventing something and reversing it. And once we see
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

that the problem with polarization is the polarization loop and its deterio-
ration of our democratic capacities, the story of depolarization gets more
complicated. Specifically, depolarization becomes a task within us and
inside our alliances.
The most obvious place to start is by acknowledging our own vulner-
ability to the dysfunctions of the polarization loop. Specifically, we need
to recognize that to some degree our political thinking and our relations
with our fellow citizens are shaped by the dynamics of polarization.
This is not a “both sides” maneuver. It is a reasonable inference from
well-established results. We are quick to sese polarization and extreme
thinking in our political opponents. It is naïve to think that we are not
vulnerable to the same forces that we routinely cite when diagnosing
the other side.
As we shift towards extremity, our views look to us more obviously
correct; thus, our conception of the scope of reasonable disagreement
shrinks. Accordingly, we can operationalize depolarization without
reconciliation by creating occasions for reminding ourselves that our pol-
itical thinking is not beyond reasonable criticism. To be clear, this does not
require us to adopt a Millian fallibilism, the stance that beliefs are never
quite the entire truth and are perpetually in danger of becoming dead
dogma. Instead, it calls for the more modest stance that we are epistemi-
cally improvable. This is consistent with thinking that our political beliefs
are correct as they are. It involves only the recognition that our articula-
tion, appreciation, and grasp of them could be deepened, sharpened, and
refined. Acknowledging the possibility of reasonable criticism does not
require divestment from our commitments, but only the acknowledge-
ment that we could do better by them by exposing ourselves to occasions
where we could improve our command of them.
Under conditions of more modest polarization, we could introduce
“Devil’s Advocate” norms that encourage allies to perform the service
of internal criticism. The worry is that in especially active political
coalitions, conformity pressures have escalated to such a degree that
Devil’s Advocacy leads only to ostracism. The task is to introduce mech-
anisms of self-criticism without activating the group dynamics that press
our alliances into insularity. This means that we will need to engage with
our opponents.
Many depolarization programs seize on the idea that respectful dis-
agreement is essential; they promote interventions where opponents
must civilly engage their differences and give their opponents a chance
 Critical Review

to make their case. The interaction is organized around a controversial

issue, and the question put to the participants is “who’s right?” This
“hearing the other side” way of structuring civil political disagreement
surely has its virtues, but it often presupposes the kind of fallibilism men-
tioned above; it therefore smacks of reconciliationism.
Consider a different model. If the aim is to expand one’s conception
of permissible variation among allies, engagement with opponents
should be focused on hearing their criticisms of one’s views rather than
their positive arguments for their own. That is, the proper mode of
engagement is focused not on determining “who’s right,” but on disco-
vering why the other side remains unconvinced by one’s arguments and
what they see as the main weaknesses of one’s view. This exposes us to
the different ways in which our position can be articulated, grasped,
and engaged. We learn that certain ways of expressing our position
are more easily misunderstood or misconstrued than others. We
might come to revise or correct our beliefs in light of what our critics
identify as their flaws, but that is not the aim of the exercise. Rather,
the aim is to better appreciate the various ways our position can be
articulated. This enables us to acknowledge that there are sites of
reasonable disagreement among our allies.
The trouble is that we tend to think that our partisan opponents are
incapable of reasonable criticism. We see them as either in the grip of a
distortion or willfully devoted to caricatures of our positions. Engaging
them for the purpose of hearing reasons why they are unconvinced
seems futile. In many cases, this stance is justified.
What then? Here is an admittedly counterintuitive suggestion:
Depolarization requires solitude. Recall that polarization produces parti-
san sorting and the corroboration view of belief polarization: surrounded
by partisan prompts (overt and implicit nudges to express our partisan
allegiance), partisan rifts are omnipresent, as are sites for signaling allyship.
If neither our allies nor our opponents can serve as reasonable critics of
our political ideas, we must occasionally withdraw. Elsewhere, I argue
that citizens need to engage together in cooperative activities where pol-
itical affiliation is simply beside the point (Talisse ). My point here is
different. Depolarization calls for us to occasionally engage in politics
alone, away from the pressures of allies and foes. This is not to urge us
to withdraw from politics. Rather, it is to say that we engage better in poli-
tics when we occassionally engage in solitary political reflection. Typi-
cally, we figure out where we stand politically by looking to our
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

partisan allies. Depolarization requires that we sometimes engage in pol-

itical reflection by detaching ourselves from the dynamics of the polariz-
ation loop—that we engage in occasional civic solitude.
Our social worlds are already colonized by the categories and pressures
of partisanship. Consequently, civic solitude calls for distance. Citizens
need space to grapple with political ideas that are not prepackaged in
the political fissures of the moment. Depolarization involves expanding
our political imagination by reflecting in ways that remind us that the
spectrum of opinion available to democratic citizens is both wider and
deeper than what can be fit into the politics of the day. By encountering
a broader palate of political ideas, democratic citizens can more accurately
position their own commitments and rivalries. They thereby more
reliably distinguish between the unavoidable disputes among fellow citi-
zens and unbridgeable gaps between democratic ideals and those of
various species of antidemocracy.
The details of civic solitude cannot be spelled out here. The point is
simply that if we are submerged in the polarization loop, depolarization
requires us to extricate ourselves from the morass. This will involve
exposing oneself to political ideas that are alien to the prevailing categories
and debates, ideas that are not immediately translatable into the idiom of
the politics of the moment. Perhaps this is achieved by reading ancient
political theory, immersing oneself in the politics of a foreign democracy,
or studying the political art of nineteenth-century America. In the end it
does not much matter, so long as the process is undertaken in a way that
permits the material to remain detached from the politics of the day.
This may sound outlandish or perhaps expected: A philosopher
making the case that democracy depends on detached contemplation.
Quelle surprise! We are accustomed to thinking that democracy is about
action. A Google search of the phrase “this is what democracy looks
like,” instantly returns thousands of images depicting roughly the same
thing: masses of people gathered in a public space to express a
common political message. To be clear, this is what democracy looks
like. Citizens must be active participants in collective self-government.
However, citizens must also be reflective. We have seen that prominent
modes of democratic action activate social and cognitive forces that
unravel our capacities for political reflection. In the absence of those
capacities, our political action might feel even more urgent and necessary,
but it is also more likely to be directed by distortions that ultimately con-
tribute to democratic backsliding. Reengaging our capacities for political
 Critical Review

reflection thus requires occasions for solitary distancing. Accordingly, our

conception of our civic responsibilities must be expanded to include
acts of contemplation that occur out of the presence of political allies
and foes alike.

NOTES

. https://www.idea.int/gsod/global-report#chapter--democracy-health-check:-
an-overview-of-global-tre
. One recent poll shows that over % of Americans do not believe that Joe Biden
won the  election fairly. https://www.surveymonkey.com/curiosity/axios-
january--revisited/
. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news//nov//us-list-backsliding-
democracies-civil-liberties-international
. A sample: In the New York Times, Thomas Edsell (, ) warns that polarization
in the U.S. may have reached a “point of no return.” In The New Yorker, Eliza-
beth Kolbert (, ) asks “how did politics get so polarized?” President Biden’s
Inaugural Speech was animated by the by the concern that America’s political
divisions have reached the breaking point. On the th anniversary of the
/ attacks, G. W. Bush () lamented the “malign force . . . that turns
every disagreement into an argument, and every argument into a clash of cul-
tures.” In his op-ed about the January  Insurrection, Jimmy Carter (, )
urged Americans to “resist the polarization that is reshaping our identities
around politics.” In announcing that she would not support changing Senate
filibuster rules, Kyrsten Sinema (, ) declared that she “will not support sep-
arate actions that worsen the underlying disease of division infecting our
country”; Mitch McConnell (, ) offers a similar argument in support of
the filibuster.
. Most citizens believe that the country is more divided than ever, that political
divisions are likely widening, that they’re politically noxious, and that politics
has grown too rancorous (https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/
polarization-december-). They say they want more civility and cooperation
in politics (Pew b).
. Jason Brennan () sees polarization as democratically dysfunctional but
endemic; he concludes that epistocracy should be tried. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-
Vij () also accepts the diagnosis, but his prescription is that politics must
be de-moralized. Alexander Guerrero (, -) claims that a central advan-
tage of lottocracy is that it politically defuses various kinds of epistemic
dysfunction.
. Much of the literature devoted to debating whether the U.S. is polarized strikes
me as merely semantic: it fails to keep different ways of construing the metric
explicit and distinct.
. In the United States, the terms “RINO” (“Republican in name only”) and
“neoliberal” (a professed liberal who nonetheless endorses capitalist markets
and protects corporate interests) serve this purpose.
. This is often called affective polarization, but this term is not ideal in the present
context for reasons that will become clear below. See Iyengar, Lelkes, Leven-
dusky, Malhotra, and Westwood  for a review.
 Talisse • Depolarization Without Reconciliation 

. It may come as no surprise, then, that in the United States popular disapproval of
inter-partisan marriage is now more pronounced than disapproval of inter-faith
and inter-racial marriage (Iyengar and Westwood , ). Perhaps this is for
good reason: co-partisanship is the most reliable predictor of long-term relation-
ship success among those paired on online dating platforms (Huber and Malhotra
; Iyengar and Konitzer ).
. See also the “perception gap” data presented in Beyond Conflict  and by
More in Common: https://perceptiongap.us/.
. Or the public expressions associated with these forms of polarization. In the
United States, the parties and party members are not as divided over political pol-
icies as they present themselves as being.
. Hence Lamm and Myers (, ), “Seldom in the history of social psychology
has a nonobvious phenomenon been so firmly grounded in data from across a
variety of cultures and dependent measures.”
. The appendix in Sunstein  summarizes the most important findings.
. The phenomenon is often called “group polarization.” Here, this more common
name is misleading. I am distinguishing political polarization and belief polariz-
ation, and both have to do with groups. Also, it should be noted that I’m using
the word “doxastic” broadly to refer to all matters concerning belief.
. I deploy the Rawlsian terminology with trepidation. My point is that any con-
ception of democracy needs to countenance a category of political views that
are normatively incorrect, but nonetheless not beyond the pale. I take it that
Rawls’s term “reasonable doctrine” captures this.
. I am not asserting that belief polarization is in fact more pronounced among
American conservatives. The empirical work is ambivalent on this point. I’m
only noting that even were one to adopt the view that belief polarization is
more prominent among conservatives, there’s still reason to think that citizens’
vulnerability to belief polarization does not vary significantly with the content
of one’s political commitments.
. Hence Rawls’s remark about unreasonable citizens, they must be “contained like
war and disease” (Rawls , n).

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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