Case Digests- Legal and Judicial Ethics

JD - 1

1. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates
of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners. March 18, 1954

Facts:

RA 972 also known as the Bar Flunkers act of 1953 was enacted on June 21, 1953
without the signature of the executive. It was a law to reconsider those who flunk. The
reason for relaxing the standard 75 percent passing grade, according to the author, is to
admit students, who took up law soon after the liberation from japanese occupation, and
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. After its
enactment, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions.

Issue: Whether R.A. 972 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes. RA 972 enacted by Congress was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional

responsibility of the Supreme Court. The ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law and to determine who will be admitted to the bar belongs exclusively to
the Supreme Court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated
by SC, BUT the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in
the Supreme Court.

2. Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

Facts:
Respondent Monsod was nominated by President Corazon to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner Cayetano opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification provided in sec 1(1), Art
IX-C of 1987 Constitution, specifically the qualification in question, that the Chairman
should have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod
enumerated that after he passed the bar he worked in the law office of his father,
become chief executive and chairman of different agencies from year 1963 to 1990.

Issue:
Whether Monsod met the required qualification to be appointed as Chairman of
COMELEC.

Ruling:
 Yes. Practice of law is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
instruments of all kinds, and giving of all legal advice to clients. However, on
dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla that the determitive factors to constitute practice of
law are: a) habituality; b) does it for compensation; c) application of knowledge such as
legal advice, preparation of legal instruments and counseling; and d) attorney-client
relationship.

3. Aguirre vs. Rana, BM 1036, June 10, 2003

Facts:
Respondent Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
Complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. That while not yet a lawyer, the
petitioner appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections, filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor, and represented
himself as counsel for George Bunan. All these happened even before respondent took
the lawyer’s oath.

Issue:
Whether engagement in practice of law prior oath taking may be admitted to the
Philippine Bar.

Ruling:
No, respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become
an attorney-at-law. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
There is still two essential requisites to be performed to become a full-fledge lawyer,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by Supreme Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys.

4. Catu vs. Rellosa, AC No. 5738, February 19, 2008

Facts:
A complaint was initiated from complainant Catu against Elizabeth and Antonio Pastor
regarding the building dispute in the Barangay where the parties reside. Respondent
Rallosa, as punong barangay, summoned the parties for amicable settlement but they
failed to arrive. Thereafter, complainant filed a complaint for ejectment against
Elizabeth and Pastor in the MTC of Manila. Respondent Rallosa entered his appearance
as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as
a lawyer and as a public officer.

Issue:
Whether punong barangay can engage in the private practice of their profession.
Ruling:
No, as a general rule under Section 7 of R.A. 6713. However, an exception from special
provision particularly Section 90 of R.A. 7160. Punong barangay was not one of the
enumerated elective officials that are prohibited to engage in practice of their
profession but respondent should have obtained the prior written permission of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as
counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do, hence, it is a breach of Rule 1.01
and Canon 7 of Code of Professional Responsibility.

5. PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 151809-12, April 12, 2005

Facts:
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and ordered its
liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group won the bid. Former SolGen Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision
of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. before Sandiganbayan, invoking Rule
6.03 of the CPR. Alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then SolGen and counsel to
Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al.

Issue:
Whether Mendoza violated th Rule 6.03 of CPR.

Ruling:
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General and later
as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in case before the Sandiganbayan.

6. Query of Atty. Karen Silvestre-Buffe, former COC of RT-C, AM No.

08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009

Facts:

The query rose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the RTC,
Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position. Thereafter, she engaged in the
private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases within the year
period of prohibition in Section 7 of R.A. 6713. Thereafter she posed questions related
to the provision that: "Why may an incumbent engage in private practice under (b)(2),
assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a
non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of
Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that
he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a position
of possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?".

Ruling:
The prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government
employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by
familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.

7. Maelotisea Garrido vs. Atty. Angel Garrido and Romana Valencia A.C. No. 6593
February 4, 2010

Facts:
Complainant Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondents Atty.
Garrido and Atty. Valencia before the IBP Committee on Discipline charging them
with gross immorality. Claiming that complainant and Atty Garrido were married on
June 23, 1962, had 6 children, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with
complainant notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage, and engaged in an
extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia. Respondent argued that they had not
committed any immoral act since they were married when Atty. Garrido was already a
widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar.

Issue:
Whether the conduct of respondent is ground for disbarment despite the offense
committed was before they were a member of the bar.

Ruling:
Yes. The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the
complaint is immaterial in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he
applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a
member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law.
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.

Part 2

1. IRRI v. NLRC

Facts:
Micosa was guilty of the crime of homicide. IRRI's HR Development Head, J.K.
Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction
in the case for homicide. Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal. Labor arbiter Villena
rendered judgment finding ternination of Micosa illegal. IRRI argued that The basic
premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, to them is a
crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the
Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations.

Issue:
1. Whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
dismissal of employment
2. Whether homicide involves moral turpitude.

Ruling:
As to whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
dismissal of employment. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes
wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Verily, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes. Moral turpitude has
been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to

determine. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree
of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances.

2. Dizon v. Lambino, Lambino v. Dizon A.C. No. 6968

Facts:
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of UP graduating student Dennis
Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council,
drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the
NBI. Atty. Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI,
together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP
Security Force on December 12, 1994.
As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into
his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the
Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon’s move, however, he not being
armed with a warrant for their arrest.

Issue:
1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to
the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:
R.1. Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she "acted within her official duties as she
safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance with the school’s substitute
parental authority" and "within the bounds of the law as the NBI agents had no warrants
of arrest."
R.2. By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty.
Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
xxxx
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.

EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines, however, he refuse to pay his membership dues to the IBP. Hence, the IBP
recommends to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys.

Issue:
Whether IBP can compell a practicing attorney to be a member of the IBP and pay
corresponding dues.

Ruling:
Yes. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. An integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. Lawyers, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee
for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar. A breach of it will be subjected
for discipline or disbarment.
The POL is not a vested right but a privilege clothed with public interest because
lawyer owes substantial duties to his client, to his brethren in professio, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State —
the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
A. C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

Facts:
Complainant Joselano Guevarra filed a complaint for Disbarment before IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty Jose Eala for grossly immoral
conduct. Complainant further stated that respondent mocked the institution of marriage,
and degrades the legal profession by having illicit affair with Irene (complainants wife).
Respondent argued that his relationship with Irene is not a scandalous circumstances,
because it was purely personal and low profile special relationship. The Commisioner
recommended that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule
7.03 Canon 7 of CPR. The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the
case for lack of merit. Hence the present petition.

Issue:
Whether a lawyer's illicit affair with a maried woman who is not his wife, tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct.

Ruling:
Yes, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent's illicit
affair with a married woman, is a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
behavior renders him unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which
his license confers upon him. As to Eala's argument that his relationship with Irene was
a low profile and not having a scandalous manner, is a negative pregnant, he is thus far
admitting that they have illicit affair with complainant's wife. Joselano Eala then is
disbarred.

ROSA YAP-PARAS petitioner, v. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.

A.C. No. 4947 June 7, 2007

Facts:
A previous disbarment case filed by petitioner Yap-Paras against Atty. Justo Paras and
was found guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath. The Court
resolved to suspend Atty. Paras from the POL for 1 year. After that, motion for
contempt and/or disbarment was filed again by the petitioner alleging Atty. Paras
violated the suspension order earlier by the court with his continued POL (he filed a
pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension)

Issue:
Whether Atty. Paras violated the Court's suspension order.

Ruling:
The court found no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty.
Paras violated the Court's suspension order. The Court noticed the records of
administrative cases between them which reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity
between Atty. Paras and petitioner's counsels. Therefore, the Court reminded the
parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-movant's counsels, that Lawyers should
treat each other with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility. They should avoid further
squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. It is well to
stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract
from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court.
The Court denied the motion for disbarment.
 ATTY. ROSARIO DE LA ROSA, complainant vs. COURT OF APPEALS
JUSTICES JOSE L. SABIO, JR., PERLITA TRIA-TIRONA, OSWALDO
AGCAOILI, MARIA DEL CASTILLO, MeTC JUDGE EUGENIO
MENDINUETO, ATTYS. GILBERT REYES, DEOGRACIAS FELLONE and
ANTONIO HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
A.M. No. CA-03-35, July 24, 2003

Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Pasig dismissed the complaint for estafa against 5 accused on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The complainant in the dismissed case wrote to
the SOJ to compel the prosecutor to file criminal information of which the prosecutor
complied. A estafa case then was filed against 5 accused, 2 (Pantaleon and Campos)
were dismissed due to lack of probable cause while the proceedings of other 3 accused,
namely Ferdinand Santos, Robert John Sobrepeña, and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr, were
suspended by respondent Judge Mendinueto, thus pending the outcome. The CA,
composed of respondent Justices issued a TRO directing the trial court and the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City to refrain from conducting any further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 59354 until further orders.

Aggrieved, the complainant alleged that respondent Justices deliberately delayed the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 59354 by issuing the TRO without basis.
Complainant further charged that respondent Judge was likewise guilty of deliberately
delaying Criminal Case No. 59354, when he refused to commence proceedings despite
the lapse of the Temporary Restraining Order. Complainant also charged respondent
lawyers, for having masterminded the scheme to frustrate the prosecution of the case
against their three clients through the petition for review filed before the Court of
Appeals. The complainant referred to his pleadings that the three respondent lawyers as
"brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen" or "sages".

Issue:
Whether the claim of complainant against respondents were substantiate.

Ruling:
Justice Quimbo submitted his report with the recommendation that the administrative
case against all the respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.

Justice Quimbo further stressed that - as officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to
conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other. Though a
lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. Obviously, complainant’s use of
sarcasm in calling the three respondent lawyers "brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen"
and "sages" fell short of this mandate. There should always be civility among members
of the legal profession.

ANTERO J. POBRE, complainant vs. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR, respondent.

A.C. No. 7399 Aug 25, 2009

Facts:
Complainant Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the statements of Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor. To Pobre, the
statements reflected as total disrespect and demean the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates. Subsequently, respondent Santiago explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity.

Issue:
Whether the statement of of the Lady Senator is covered by constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity.

Ruling:
Yes, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court. However, the Court wishes to express its deep concern about
the language Senator Santiago used in her speech and its effect on the administration of
justice. Lady senator has crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct.
It should be noted that - no lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to
the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the
lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of CPR.
It must be noted that even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to used as a
vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates,
nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant, vs.

ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005

Facts:
Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and VP of IBP-NV Chap. On May 5, 2003,
respondent asked complainant Galasinao, a clerk of court, if the record of a CC 784 had
already been remanded to the court of origin. The respondent was not even a counsel of
record of the said case. Complainant replied that the record had not been transmitted. In
reaction to this the respondent throw insulting statements at complainant. Complainant
filed a case because she was embarrassed by the respondent, as it happened in her office
of which she was the head if her staff. Respondent replied to the complaint but instead
of commenting or denying on the charges against him, he just gave a lengthy narration
of the prefaratory facts of the case and the incident on May 5 2003. Respondent
personally asked for complainants' forgiveness to which she accepted. Nonetheless, the
investigationg recommended that respondent be reprimanded.

Issue:
Whether respondent had the right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Ruling:
Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties
to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. Through his
acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784,
respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of
that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith. Respondent was fined in
the amnt of P10,000.

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant, vs.

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
Adm. Case No. 6290 July 14, 2004

Facts:
Complainant Cambaliza, a former employee in the law office of respondent Atty.
Tenorio, charged the respondent for deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice.
Complainant failed to substantiate the charges on deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the
respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, Felicisimo Tenorio,
Jr., who is not a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant later withdrew in
pursuing the case but the IBP found charges on malpractice or other gross misconduct
was substantiated by the complainant.

Issue:
Whether respondent Atty. Tenorio violated CPR.

Ruling:
Yes. The respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by her
husband, in a violation of Rule 9.01 of the CPR.
Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. Such acts
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one.
His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of
the legal profession. Atty. Tenorio was suspended from the POL for 6 months.