Populism and The Quest For Political Power: The Pitfalls To Populist Electoral Success in Canada

ARTICLE
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-02683-5 OPEN
Populism and the quest for political power: the

pitfalls to populist electoral success in Canada
Sirvan Karimi 1✉
Recent electoral inroads by anti-establishment political parties in Europe and around the
world have led to the resurgence of the debate on populism. Within the burgeoning theo-
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retical and analytic interpretations of the surge of populism, competing arguments have been
deployed. Economic dislocation and the demographic shift within liberal democratic societies
have provided fertile ground for the rise of populism. However, the success of these populist
political parties, particularly the radical right populist parties, in utilizing prevailing societal
resentment is to a great extent conditional upon a perceived threat to national identity. While
the vestiges of political distrust and social and economic indignation can be found in
Canadian society, the absence of a historically ingrained strong sense of nationhood, con-
solidation of multiculturalism, the eclipse of class from national political discourse, and the
implausibility of resorting to Anti-Americanism as a mobilizing tactic has made it difficult for
both Canadian right and left-populist forces to replicate the success of their international
counterparts at the national level.
1 School of Public Policy and Administration, Faculty of LA&PS, York University, 133 McLaughlin College, Toronto, ON, Canada. ✉email: dalaho@yorku.ca
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2024)11:220 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-02683-5 1

ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-02683-5
T
Introduction
he politically astounding electoral breakthrough by radical comprehensive definition that conceptualizes populism as “a thin-
populist political parties in Europe and other parts of the centered ideology” that envisages society to be ultimately divided
world has reignited the debate on the polarizing propensity into two “homogenous and antagonistic groups, the pure people
of populist political parties and political actors. Polarization is not and the corrupt elite”, where politics should reflect the general will
a relic of extraterrestrial collision that can be dissected and ana- of the people (543). Wayland (2001), on the other hand, offers a
lyzed independently from the growing social, economic, and minimal definition that refers to populism as a political strategy
cultural cleavages within liberal democratic societies. Cultural and utilized by political leaders to mobilize unorganized and dis-
socio-economic chasms do not automatically lead to political gruntled segments of society. While Rovira Kaltwasser favors
polarization. Socio-economic cleavages by themselves are empty Mudde’s minimal definition, I believe combining these two mini-
slots and houses of cards. They only generate demands for radical mal definitions provides a more encompassing and comprehensive
populist parties and populist actors who in turn appeal to the definition of populism. In this paper, Populism is therefore, defined
people and embark on the electrifying political consciousness of as a divisive discourse intended to restore the general will of society
those cleavages, hence intensifying political polarization which is by pitting the people as the oppressed against the corrupt elite
perceived as a threat to liberal democratic societies. In this paper, (rhetoric adopted by both right and left-wing populist parties) and
it will be argued that despite the existence of political grievances racial minority groups (utilized by only right-wing populist par-
and socio-economic disgruntlement in Canadian society, the ties). This definition is also in line with the practical manifestations
absence of a historically ingrained sense of nationalism, the of the varieties of populism as reflected in the political ascendancy
consolidation of multiculturalism, constraints on class politics, of nativist-nationalistic populism and class-based populism as two
and the inefficacy of resorting to Anti-Americanism as a mobi- ideologically oriented variants of populism in liberal democratic
lizing tactic has precluded the electoral success of both the radical societies (Bugaric, 2019; Mudde, 2016).
left and right-wing populist political forces. Populism cannot be analyzed independently of the socio-
This paper is divided into four parts. Part one reflects on the economic environment that determines its momentum. It is,
debate on the concept of populism. Part two discusses the therefore, essential to elucidate the correlation between the dire
interplay of socio-economic conditions and populism. Part three socio-economic conditions and populist political figures who
deals with the historical evolution of populism in Canada. Part capitalize on those socio-economic cleavages to sharpen their
four discusses countervailing forces to the success of populism in assaults on the establishment or racial minority groups as the
Canada. Finally, in the conclusion the main themes and findings enemy of the people.
will be recapitulated.
Populism and socio-economic cleavages

Populism as a concept As a political backlash against the establishment, populism tends
As a popular and contested concept, populism has permeated to resurface during a specific era when dismal socio-economic
social science research and political and academic discourse. conditions question the legitimacy of the existing political order.
Depending on the context within which it is invoked, the concept Most of the early populist movements had been inspired by the
of populism has acquired a chameleon character. Within the demands of farmers and to some extent workers who had become
emerging exuberant literature on populism, there is no consensus victims of the emerging industrial economy in the nineteenth
on a single definition of the concept. Richard Hofstadter’s paper, century (Conway, 1978). The social, demographic, and economic
Everyone is Talking About Populism, but No One Can Define It, transformation accompanying industrialization triggered a
presented at a 1967 Conference at the London School of Eco- tumultuous surge of social discontent which was conducive to
nomics, still reflects the reality of the confusion associated with the facilitating the political coalition between farmers, workers, and
use of the term populism in explaining political phenomena urban intellectuals (Penner, 1977).
(Derbyshire, 2016; also, Deiwiks, 2009). As Noam Gidron and Bart While the economic deprivation of the 1930s was geared to
Bonikowski (2013) have pointed out, the challenge of defining generate an auspicious atmosphere for the appeal of populist slo-
populism lies in the use of the term by researchers from different gans, the spectacular economic prosperity accompanying World
fields to describe political movements, political parties, ideologies, War II was conducive to making populist slogans less attractive.
and political leaders across geographical, historical, and ideological Post-war social reconstruction which had been designed to inte-
contexts. In their comprehensive literature review of populism, grate the marginalized population through the deployment of
Gidron and Bonikowski (2013: pp. 7–13) identify three interrelated national resources to provide social welfare programs, left no
interpretations of populism: populism as a thin ideology with a latitude for extremists on both sides of the ideological spectrum to
binary vision of society that promises the restoration of the general threaten the foundations of liberal democracy (Mudde, 2015). The
will in society; populism as a rhetorical discourse that constructs institutionalization of demand management, which ensured high
politics as a struggle between the people and the corrupt estab- levels of employment and the expansion of welfare programs under
lishment; and populism as a political strategy employed mainly by unparalleled economic growth, not only bolstered the position of
an outsider or an unorthodox political leader striving to gain power the established political parties but also eclipsed both right and left
through anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages. By extremists’ criticisms of the political order from the terrain of
pitting the “people” against the “elite”, populism can become a political discourse. As one of the significant hallmarks of post-war
potent political force once it is blended with other ideological prosperity in Western societies, the welfare state provided moral
orientations such as nationalism, liberalism, and socialism. Since ground for the promotion of the ideas of social justice, solidarity,
their extensive review, numerous scholars have adopted a broad and universalism (Brodie, 1995). In fact, with the ascendancy of the
definition of populism that has made it formidable to grasp what it Keynesian paradigm, a period of diminished policy differentiation
really is. As Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (2018) has pointed out, and the greatest consensus between the governing social-demo-
“the best way to deal with the contested nature of the term cratic, liberal, and conservative parties began to prevail.
populism is to work with a minimal definition” (64). Among the The Keynesian-ushered post-war economic buoyancy was also
competing definitions, the best minimal definitions are presented accompanied by the gradual liberalization of the immigration
by Cas Mudde and Kurt Wayland. Mudde (2004) provides a policy in a significant number of liberal democracies such as the
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HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-02683-5 ARTICLE
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other Eur- unorthodox political parties and political figures with populist
opean countries. With the return of prosperity to Europe in the inclinations to enter the political scene as the self-declared
1960s, which led to the decline in levels of migration from Eur- defenders of the common people.
ope, countries such as the US, Canada, and Australia opened their The rise of neoliberalism and its distributional implications
doors to migrants from non-European countries (Akbari and compounded by the financial crisis of 2008 fostered an environ-
McDonald, 2018). Even West Germany, which had a restrictive ment for the prevalence of populist attitudes. However, the social
immigration policy in place, relaxed its immigration policy at this and economic ramifications of growing inequality and economic
time leading to the arrival of millions of migrants as guest insecurity did not necessarily determine populism’s political
workers, many of whom went on to gain permanent residency orientations. Growing societal tension as manifested in feelings of
(Hess and Green, 2016). Therefore, post-war economic prosperity economic vulnerability and socio-economic grievances generated
was conducive to cushioning and mitigating any serious domestic the demand for populist leaders. As Dani Rodrik (2018) has
backlashes to the gradual shift in the ethnic makeup of these pointed out, the salience of cleavages and narratives provided by
countries (Green, 1976). political leaders and political parties shaped the political manifes-
The economic crisis of the 1970s undermined the foundation tation of societal grievances. Based on this demand and supply
of post-war consensus and triggered waves of economic restruc- notion of the emergence of populism, several researchers have
turing across liberal democratic societies. The failure of Keynesian identified two ideologically driven political manifestations of
demand management to surmount the phenomenon of stagfla- populism (Rodrik, 2018; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017). Eur-
tion provided an auspicious atmosphere for the New Right to opean right-wing populist parties heavily capitalize on social,
launch a successful theoretical raid on the foundation of Key- ethnic, and cultural cleavages that have propelled these parties to
nesianism that had functioned as a springboard for generous and adopt a nativist and nationalist political orientation. By adopting
comprehensive social welfare programs (Brodie, 1995). With the an anti-immigration policy platform, right-wing and nationalist
ascendancy of neoliberalism, social welfare programs that were political parties such as Austria’s Freedom Party, Alternative for
installed as palliative measures to deflect the threat of radicalism, Germany, the Sweden Democrats, the Swiss People’s Party, the
came to be perceived by the dominant classes as impediments to Fidesz Party in Hungary, The League in Italy, the Independent
capital accumulation (Pierson, 2002). While Keynesian demand Party in the UK, Vox in Spain, and the People’s Party in Canada
management had provided a logical basis for the utilization of the have gained significant political momentum which is reflected in
capacities of market forces to combat socio-economic inequal- their recent electoral stature within their respective countries as
ities, the identification of it as an obstacle to economic growth well as the European Parliament (Riegert, 2019; Lisi et al., 2019).
dealt a major blow to Keynesianism. (Whitfield, 2001). On the other hand, left-wing populists such as Bernie Sanders and
The rising economic insecurity in the 1980s and 1990s was Elizabeth Warren in the United States, Syriza in Greece, and
exacerbated and intensified by the financial crisis of 2008 which Podemos in Spain mainly highlight economic deprivation and
triggered a global recession. The financial turmoil that erupted in growing income inequality as the basis for mobilizing economically
the US became a worldwide phenomenon that impacted all seg- deprived and marginalized people.
ments of the economy from the financial industry to the indus- Though authoritarian proclivity might be lurking beneath the
trial sector, to housing, and pension funds. In just the first policy platform of populist political parties and populist political
10 months of 2008, “private pensions in OECD countries figures, proclaiming to defend the interests of “the people” has
reported US$4 trillion losses in asset value” (Impavido and been the hallmark of policy declarations of populists from both
Tower, 2009: p. 1). Though the emerging levels of economic sides of the ideological spectrum. In other words, populist poli-
hardship varied from country to country, the pernicious social tical parties and populist political actors present themselves as the
and economic impacts of the crisis left an imprint across nations. vanguards of defending the people’s sovereignty to restore
To tackle and alleviate the severity of the economic crisis, gov- democracy. Both right and left-wing populists paint themselves as
ernments across Western liberal democratic societies had to ardent defenders of democracy though they have different con-
revive Keynesian stimuli to salvage financial institutions and ceptions of what it means. Radical right populists emphasize the
reduce the severity of the recession. However, almost all gov- direct participation of the people in political processes and the
ernments in liberal democratic societies gradually embarked on political decision-making process. Due to their nativist and
reactivating austerity measures which had severe impacts on nationalistic inclinations, radical right populists’ notion of the
ordinary people (Best, 2018). Polarization as reflected in eco- people excludes immigrants and minorities just as under the
nomic hardship, curtailing social welfare programs, and the Athenian practice of democracy certain groups such as women
feeling of vulnerability and uncertainty provided fertile ground and slaves had been excluded from political participation. On the
for populist propensity to flourish (Armingeon and Guthmann, other hand, radical leftist populists place heavy accentuation on
2014; Bugaric, 2019; Cordero and Simon, 2016; Mudde 2007; the notion of a classless society which can also be extrapolated
Punciman, 2018; Rooduijn, 2018). from an interpretation of classical democracy (Macpherson,
The economic crisis, the ensuing fear of vulnerability, and 1966). Thus, both radical right and left populists challenge liberal
economic deprivation have historically proven to have the potent democracy for different reasons. The entrenched pluralism and
potential to engender anti-immigrant attitudes among local minority rights protection under the aegis of liberal democracy
populations. In their cross-national studies of 22 countries (Kwak are despised by radical right populists and are perceived as threats
and Wallace, 2018) found a positive correlation between experi- to the maintenance of the general will of society. On the other
encing the economic crisis, the financial crash, loss of employ- hand, the juxtaposition of political equality and socio-economic
ment, and perceived immigrant threat. Similarly, in their inequality prevailing under liberal democracy is the source of
comprehensive study of the interplay of economic crisis and frustration for radical leftist populists who strive to advance an
populism, Algan et al., (2017: p. 309) found that “crisis-driven equal and classless society. It is based on these distinctions that
economic insecurity is a substantial determinant of populism and some authors have used the terms exclusionary and inclusionary
political distrust” (also Bogliacino and Virginia, 2016).1 The populism to characterize radical right and leftist populist political
general polarization as reflected in the decline of the public trust parties respectively (Bugaric, 2019; Mudde, 2007).
in the political system, political apathy, frustration, indignation, Despite their differences, both radical right and left-wing
and the fear of a bleak future provided a golden opportunity for populist political parties and political actors excoriate the existing

Table 1 Major nationally oriented populist political parties.
Political party Ideological orientation Life span Political position and height of Outcomes
success
The Progressive Progressive populism 1920 to 1930 Center-left The Liberal Party absorbed some of its
Party of Canada The height of success was the 1921 members. Other members became
federal election when the party won part of fringe parties (such as the
fifty-eight seats in the House of United Farmers of Alberta, and the
Commons. United Farmers of Ontario). Some of
its radical members joined the CCF.
Social Credit Party Social credit social 1935 to 1990s Right-wing Currently, Parties and organizations
conservatism populism Provincial In the 1962 federal election, it won associated with Social Credit are fringe
branches thirty seats. It was successful in parties at the provincial level.
forming a government in certain
provinces such as Alberta and British
Columbia.
Cooperative Socialism social 1932 to 1961 Left-wing In 1961, the CCF was transformed into
Commonwealth democracy populism Provincial In 1943, a national poll found the CCF the New Democratic Party (NDP). It
Federation (CCF) branches to be the most popular party. For the has retained its presence in the
first time, its Saskatchewan provincial parliament but has never been able to
branch formed a government in 1943. form the national government. Its
provincial branches have been able to
form government in certain provinces.
Reform Party Free market 1987 to 2000 Right-wing In 2000, it changed its name to the
neoconservatism No Provincial The height of political success was in Canadian Alliance. In 2003, it merged
populism branches 1993 and 1997 when it gained Official with the Progressive Conservative
Opposition Status. Party of Canada and formed the
Conservative Party of Canada.
People’s Party Conservatism populism Since 2018 Right-wing, leaning towards the far right. Currently, has no seat in the
libertarianism No Provincial In the 2021 federal election, it gained Parliament.
branches 4.9% of the popular vote.
liberal democratic institutions. By capitalizing on the prevailing traced back to nineteenth century Canada which had been
wave of disgruntlement, indignation, and hopelessness, these inspired by American radical populists. The first populist
ideologically oriented extremist political parties and political movement in Canada emerged from an unsuccessful and short-
leaders have found a propitious environment to embark on lived alliance between farmers and workers who had been
challenging the existing political order. resentful of the industrial and commercial classes dominating
The perceived economic despair and accompanying hostility Canadian society. The movement was in fact a reaction to the
towards immigrants are two essential conditions that can func- policy measures of the First National Policy adopted by the
tion as a springboard for populist political parties, particularly MacDonald Conservatives in 1879 (Panizza, 2005). The explicitly
radical right populist political parties, to advance their political protectionist industrial policy was conducive to enhancing the
objectives. However, as can be demonstrated in the Canadian case position of the industrial and financial classes in the East. Poli-
below, certain intervening cultural and institutional forces can to ticized farmers and workers were under the impression that they
a great extent decelerate the populist momentum for both radical had received an insufficient return on their efforts. The main
right and left-populist political forces. objectives of the first farmer-labor populist movement were to
resist the domination of wealth, advance justice for all members
of society, and abolish the fraud and extortion of industrial
The historical trajectory of populism in Canada operations that had been permitted by law (Cook, 1984). It was
As was pointed out in the previous section of this paper, populism the prevailing conviction of the leading figures of farmers and
emerged, waned, and resurfaced during a specific era when dismal labor that an alliance between real productive forces committed
socio-economic conditions cast doubt on the legitimacy of the to economic freedom, cooperation, and democracy could, in the
existing political order. As a response to socio-economic dis- long run, eradicate the forces of privileges, unbridled competition,
locations and ensuing industrialization in the late eighteenth and and monopoly that constituted a menace to the interests of
early decades of the nineteenth century, populist movements farmers and workers (Cook, 1984).
gained momentum in Canada (Conway, 1978). In contrast to the Because of internal division and the return to economic
rise of populist-inspired political movements in Europe in the prosperity in the late nineteenth century, the first protest move-
nineteenth century which generally remained marginal, North ment gradually lost its political momentum (Cook, 1984). The
American populist movements in the nineteenth century were economic vicissitudes associated with industrialization had not
pervasive (Mudde, 2015). Most of these populist movements had only blurred the class lines between farmers and workers but had
been inspired by the demands of farmers and to some extent also facilitated the political coalition between farmers, workers,
workers who had become victims of the emerging industrial and urban intellectuals (Penner, 1977). The Progressive Party of
economy and the social transformation accompanying Farmers in Canada was the main emerging political machine of
industrialization. farmers and workers’ discontent and frustration directed at the
The origin and the rise of both right and left-wing populism established political order for failing to address the interests of
(for the summary of major right and left-wing populist political these marginalized layers within Canadian society. As the political
parties, see Table 1 at the end of this section) in Canada can be machine of rebellious farmers and farmworkers, the Progressive

Party began to challenge the traditional mode of politics that had restricting and subordinating the immigration policy to the exi-
mainly been geared to quench the interests of the financial and gencies of the Canadian economy (Reform Party, 1993; Reform
industrial classes in the East (Avakumuvic, 1978). Despite gen- Party, 1991; Reform Party, 1989).2
erating enormous wealth and prosperity, the emerging capitalist Obviously, the Reform Party was not successful in restructur-
social relations produced the paradox of plenty in the midst of ing the Canadian Federation along with its populist and ultra-
misery (Finkel, 2013). In order to reduce the financial pressures conservative ideological orientation. However, it was instrumental
on farmers, the political machine of populism in this era called for in forcing the governing Liberal government of Jean Chretien to
major reforms in banking, credit lending rules, and breaking crawl to the right of the center and adopt austerity policy mea-
down monopoly and freight rates (Conway, 1978). During its sures intended to reduce spending and allow for the balancing of
second phase in the early decades of twentieth-century Canada, the budget in the late 1990s. Though the Reform Party was
the populist movement made significant political breakthroughs successful in triggering a fundamental alteration in the landscape
that shocked status-quo political parties. The Progressive Party of of party politics as manifested in intensifying Canadians’ suspi-
Farmers was able to elect 64 MPs across the country in the federal cion of governments, the status-quo political parties, entrenched
election of 1921 and was catapulted to official opposition status in special interests, and the sociopolitical reality in Canada, that will
the House of Commons (Avakumuvic, 1978). However, these be discussed later in this paper, exerted pressures on the Reform
populist political movements were either absorbed by the estab- Party to gradually modify its original policy stance (Laycock,
lished political parties (most of the MPs from the Progressive 2021). In order to extend the frontier of its social basis of support
Party joined the Liberal Party) or metamorphosed into fringe beyond Western Canada and hence increase the levels of support
parties such as the Social Credit Party which gained momentum in the Eastern part of Canada, the Reform Party embarked on
in certain provinces (Lipset, 1971). While the adverse implica- transforming itself into the Canadian Alliance Party in 2000
tions of industrialization and the subsequent decline in the which finally merged with the Progressive Conservative Party of
standards of living during the great depression compelled certain Canada in 2003 to form the current Conservative Party of
organizations of farmers and workers to form a temporary alli- Canada. The transformation of the Reform Party and the eventual
ance as manifested in the rise of the Cooperative Commonwealth emergence of the Conservative Party of Canada led to impressive
Federation (CCF) as the political expression of social-democratic electoral success that enabled the Conservatives to form a
populism in 1932, such developments were unable to guarantee a national government in 2006. In its quest to expand its social
lasting coalition between these two strata. With the return of basis of support and hence capture political power at the national
economic prosperity, the class consciousness of the petite bour- level, the Conservative Party gradually moved towards the center
geoisie, particularly of populist farmers, began to shift away from of the ideological spectrum. In order to increase its share of votes
the revolutionary temptation during the economic slump. among ethnic groups in Canada, the Conservative Party gradually
Populist farmers could not tolerate the revolutionary languages of moderated its stance on immigration and multiculturalism
working-class organizations which in their view was a repudiation (Marwah et al., 2013). Consequently, unlike its predecessors, the
of their rugged individualism (Avakumovic, 1978). Conservative Party has not only discarded its rejection of mul-
The social, economic, and political vicissitudes in the 1980s ticulturalism but has also supported a relatively expansive mass
were conducive to providing fertile ground for the resurgence of immigration policy. By harnessing the political implications of
populism in Canada which came to leave its imprint on Canadian the Sponsorship Scandal that had been haunting the Liberal
politics for decades to come (Friesen, 2021). As the political government, the Conservative Party under Stephen Harper’s
manifestation of right-wing populism in Canada, the Reform leadership succeeded in forming a minority government in 2006.
Party entered the political scene in 1987 under the leadership of Contrary to the expectation of many conservatives, Harper was
Preston Manning and was successful in accomplishing a specta- inclined to run a deficit and resort to a greater level of state
cular electoral breakthrough in the 1993 Federal election. In 1997, intervention in economic activities such as bailing out the auto
the Reform Party formed the second-largest party caucus stand- sector in 2009. Furthermore, under the leadership of Andrew
ing in the House of Commons and succeeded in gaining the Scheer, the Conservative Party explicitly declared that it would
status of Her Majesty’s loyal opposition in the House of Com- not ban abortion or same-sex marriage. Such policy measures
mons. Certain social, political, and economic developments adopted by the Conservative Party were bound to alienate social
contributed to the rise of the Reform Party. The political turmoil conservatives and stir up resentment among ardent conservative
associated with two decades of failed constitutional negotiations proponents of neoliberalism who preached for greater fiscal dis-
intended to appease Quebec resharpened Western alienation. A cipline and a restricted level of state intervention in a market
significant number of Conservative voters became disillusioned economy (Livesey, 2020).
with the Progressive Conservative Party which had sedulously The Conservative Party of Canada’s gradual crawl towards the
striven to accommodate Quebec. A growing sense of economic center of the ideological spectrum generated a climate of dis-
vulnerability among Canadians in the 1980s was to a great extent appointment for radical figures within its ranks and files. The
conducive to making Canadian society less receptive to embra- resurgence of populist propensity within conservative circles was
cing more immigrants and refugees. These conditions provided manifested in the resignation of Maxime Bernier, a former
an auspicious opportunity for the Reform Party to seize the Cabinet member of the Conservative Party, who went on to form
moment and propagate its populist policy measures (Laycock, the People’s Party of Canada in 2018. In his political debates,
2021; Jakubowski, 2006). Bernier unequivocally adopted a populist overtone that echoes
By capitalizing on the prevailing sociopolitical environment of right-wing populists in Europe.
the 1980s and 1990s which was receptive to populist slogans, the As a right-wing populist party, the People’s Party appears to be
Reform Party explicitly called for several major radical political committed to reviving some of the policy measures that had been
reforms. These reforms ranged from calling for greater fiscal adopted by the Reform Party. The People’s Party has declared its
responsibility and lower taxes, to espousing direct democratic intention to eliminate multicultural funding, restrict immigration
measures such as referendum and citizen initiatives, to abolishing policy, and put more emphasis on skilled immigrants. It aims to
the Department of Multiculturalism as well as the concept of enact a Canada-First foreign policy, roll back all environmental
“hyphenated Canadianism” (though groups were permitted to protection commitments made by Canada, adhere to fiscal aus-
preserve their cultural heritage through their own resources), to terity, and safeguard freedom of expression by restricting the

Table 2 Summary of variables that have contributed to constraining populist electoral success at the national level.
Variables Description Its state within the Canadian Context Effects on populism
Nationalism/ Belief in common ancestry or Due to the historical conflict between Reduced opportunity for right-wing
National Identity ethnicity and holding a subjective Canada and Quebec and the populist parties to raise the flag of ethnic
feeling of belonging to a nation. institutionalization of multiculturalism, nationalism as a mobilization tactic.
Canada has a fractured nationalism which is
reflected in the fragmentation of national
identity.
Multiculturalism An established policy of Has acquired an iconic status and has Due to the significance of ethnic votes,
encouraging minority ethnocultural become part of Canadian identity. Political parties that wish to form a
groups to retain their customs and national government must eschew
traditions. resorting to divisive language. The
development of multiculturalism has also
closed off an avenue for political backlash
against immigration policy.
Class politics A situation in which ideologically The prolonged conflict between Canada and The latitude for ideologically oriented
oriented political parties appeal to a Quebec has provided legitimate ground for political parties, particularly the left-wing
specific socio-economic class. the exigency of maintaining national unity party, to wage class struggle as a
that has in turn been utilized by status-quo mobilization strategy is restricted.
parties, particularly the Liberal Party, to
circumvent class division, hence forcing both
right and left-wing parties to imitate a
classless image of Canada.
Anti-Americanism Historically ingrained sense of Due to the consolidation of continental For populist political parties, particularly
antipathy towards America that is economic integration, the decline in the the radical left-wing political party, anti-
fueled by the perceived fear of the appeal of economic nationalism, and Americanism as a mobilization strategy
American takeover of Canada. growing support for international trade, anti- has lost its appeal.
Americanism has been on the decline since
the 1990s.
definition of hate which it alleges is used to curtail freedom of older, less educated, working-class Canadians living mainly in the
expression. While it has declared its commitment to promoting western part of the country. The political sympathies of Canadian
democracy and democratic accountability, it has not been vocif- populists lie with the Conservative political forces (Graves and
erous in the adoption of the direct democratic measures that were Smith, 2020).
passionately advocated by the Reform Party. To broaden their It is yet to be seen which direction the Conservative Party of
electoral appeals, radical right populists in Canada have sub- Canada will take under the leadership of Pierre Poilievre who was
stituted their criticism of multiculturalism and immigration able to defeat Jean Charest, a moderate and centrist candidate.
policy with embracing neoliberal economic policy platforms Throughout his campaign for party leadership in 2022, Poilievre
(Budd, 2021). adopted populist language by emphasizing fighting for the “little
During the 2021 federal election campaign, The People’s Party people” and challenging “established elites” and “gatekeepers” in
capitalized on growing anti-vaccine sentiment and the wave of Ottawa. Despite his fury and combative populist stance that
dissatisfaction over the management of the COVID-19 pandemic. places heavy accentuation on fiscal prudence and small govern-
Even though it was shut out of the federal election and failed to ment, he has eschewed attacking immigration policy or capita-
capture a single seat in the House of Commons, it nonetheless lizing on racial and ethnic divides. As Eric Kaufmann, an expert
tripled its share of the popular vote. In the 2021 federal election, on populism, has pointed out, it is a natural proclivity of the
the People’s Party received 4.94 percent of the popular vote which populist movement to shift the rhetoric of opposition to the
was a major success as compared to its share of the total popular establishment beyond the economic realm to tricky cultural issues
vote in the 2019 federal election which stood at 1.6 percent. which is the hallmark of the People’s Party, but it’s not happened
Emboldened by the astonishing increase in the level of support with Poilievre (cited in Thomson, 2022, para 3).
for the People’s Party, Bernier asserted that his party would be Populism clearly has roots in Canadian society and Canadian
“the only real conservative option for this country” (Baum, 2021: politics. It is not a novel phenomenon. A rise, dwindling, and
para 6). resurgence have been the hallmarks of populism in Canada.
The electoral success of the People’s Party during the 2021 However, there are certain institutional, attitudinal, cultural, and
federal election has intensified the concern over the threat of economic variables that have the potential to function as bul-
right-wing populism in Canada. Some have interpreted the recent warks against radical populism from both sides of the ideological
electoral success of the People’s Party as a warning of the arrival divide.
of twenty-first-century populism in Canada (Hastings, 2021;
MacLellan, 2021). Given the gradual shift of the Conservative
Party of Canada toward the center of the ideological spectrum, it Countervailing forces to populism in Canada
is suggested that the People’s Party might succeed in expanding Prior to explaining variables that have contributed to the con-
its social basis of support in the future (Hastings, 2021). Such a tainment and restraining of populism at the national level in
prediction is predicated on the fact that there is a growing Canada (for a summary of these variables, see Table 2 at the end
populist attitude among Canadians. In their recent study, Frank of this section), it is essential to review and assess the impact of
Graves and Jeff Smith (2020) found that 34 percent of Canadians institutional variables on the fate of populism. Within the scope
hold a populist outlook. These Canadians happened to be mainly of the existing literature on the institutional explanation of

populism, there are two main lines of argument. First, with however, as Bo Rothstein (1998: p. 306) has pointed out “homo
respect to the rise of Euroscepticism which is being molded into a politics cannot be considered as structural -cum- institutional
bitter populism in some European countries, it is argued that the dope”. Without taking into consideration the intervening vari-
formation of some form of European federalism is the most ables such as nationalism, multiculturalism, regional peculiarity,
effective response to contain the tide of Euroscepticism (Heine, and electoral mobilization strategies, it would be a formidable
2014). According to this line of thought, a federal Europe can task to deploy an argument that the electoral system such as the
utilize redistribution as a mechanism to alleviate growing socio- Single-Member Plurality System can by itself deprive populist
economic inequalities in member countries so that the ability of parties of electoral ascendancy.
populist parties to capitalize on social and economic resettlement As has already been mentioned, the current electoral system in
as a ground to mobilize disgruntled Europeans will be under- Canada has not prevented populist electoral successes at the
mined (Eagleton, 2017). Reflecting on the rise of populism in the provincial level. Also, as was pointed out earlier, when the poli-
United States, John McGinnis (2018) has suggested that in order tical basis of support for a populist political party is concentrated
to contain populism, American federalism which has become in a particular region or certain regions, the FPTP model cannot
heavily centralized, must return to its classical version where most prevent a populist political party from becoming a major player
of the residual powers were reserved for the states. However, this in Canadian politics. This was the case with the Reform Party
line of reasoning ignores the fact that while in a heavily decen- which although it did not capture the bridle of the national
tralized federal system, there is less chance for populism at the government, was instrumental in amplifying the voice of the right
national level, populism can still gain ground at the sub-national and the demand for austerity. It was in fact during the presence of
level as is the case in certain Canadian provinces such as Alberta the Reform Party in Parliament that the governing Liberal Party
and Quebec (Young, 2022). crawled to the right side of the ideological spectrum and adopted
The second line of institutional argumentation is the assertion the most draconian neoliberal policy measures as manifested in
that the form of the electoral method has a significant impact on downsizing the public sector, curtailing social programs, and
the electoral prospects for populist parties. It is argued that the slashing federal transfers to provinces (Johnson, 2006: pp. 90–94,
proportional representation (PR) system has the potential to not see also Prince, 1998–1999). Finally, it would be a tall order for
only increase the share of the popular vote but also increase the institutionalists to reject a hypothetical argument that in the case
electoral coalition of populist parties (Becher et al., 2022). of a strong sense of nationalism as the basis for electoral mobi-
Accordingly, the PR system is advantageous to fringe parties such lization, the absence of multiculturalism, and the prevalence of
as populist parties on two interrelated grounds. First, under the regional harmony, a populist political party will not be able to
PR system, supporters of populist parties confidently cast their form a national government even under the current electoral
votes for the party of their choice and are no longer engaged in system.
strategic voting (Downes et al., 2018).3 Second, the percentage of Thus, institutional structures cannot be analyzed indepen-
popular votes acquired by parties is automatically translated into dently of other variables such as nationalism, multiculturalism,
the percentage of seats in parliament. In other words, contrary to and electoral mobilization strategies which have decisive impacts
the situation under the Single-Member Plurality system or the on electoral outcomes. Populism and nationalism are neither
First-Past-The-Post system (FPTP) where there is no direct separate nor equivalent. Though they can be analytically distinct,
relation between the percentage of votes and the percentage of they hinge on “shared foundations of an us-them boundary”
seats, votes cast under the PR system are not wasted. While there (Singh, 2021: p. 285). Nationalism is defined as a discourse
is no empirical evidence to substantiate the assertion that the PR revolving around the nation as a sovereign community that exists
system fosters extremism (Carter, 2004), it is undeniable that PR within a demarcated space and is constructed around member-
is advantageous to fringe parties. For example, the People’s Party non-member opposition. Populism, on the other hand, is a dis-
of Canada which gained 4.95 percent of the popular vote in the course structured on the antagonism between people as an
2021 federal election in Canada without gaining a single seat, oppressed group, and the powerful elite with populists fighting
would have been able to capture 16 seats if the election had been for the people (De Cleen, 2017). Despite being analytically dis-
conducted under the PR system. It is asserted by some analysts tinct, populism and nationalism have been combined in populist
that the FPTP electoral system forces political parties to moderate politics.
their ideological orientation and become pragmatic (Marwah Within the existing literature on the interplay of populism and
et al., 2013). However, this assertion needs to be qualified. First, nationalism, it has almost become a common assumption that
the FPTP electoral method cannot prevent populist forces from nationalism and populism are complementary (Bonikowski,
gaining power at the provincial level. Second, the FPTP electoral 2017). The correlation between populism and nationalism is not
method may not negatively affect unorthodox political parties straight. Therefore, their interplay requires further clarification.
even at the national level if their social basis of support is con- Maximilian Filsinger et al. (2021) distinguish between two com-
centrated in particular regions. Such is the case with the Reform peting conceptions of nationhood and national identity that have
Party of Canada which despite its anti-immigration and anti- permeated literature on nationalism. Ethnic national identity is
multicultural stance, was able to emerge as a major political force built on a strong emphasis on the place of birth, blood, and
in the 1993 federal election and established itself as the main ancestry. Civic national identity is built on the adherence of
opposition party in 1997. However, due to its aspiration to cap- individuals to national political institutions, its democratic sys-
ture national power, the Conservative Party of Canada had to tem, and shared rights-based values. Populism and nationalism
move beyond its Western basis and moderate its stance in order are thus to a great extent highly but imperfectly correlated in the
to capture ethnic votes in the Eastern part of Canada, particularly speeches of leaders (Jenne et al., 2021: p. 70). As Filsinger et al.
in Toronto and Montreal where there is a huge concentration of (2021) have pointed out, the ethnic conception of nationhood is
ethnic groups. intimately tied to radical right populism whereas there is a weak
Thus, institutional variables such as the electoral system cannot relation between civic national identity and populism which is
by themselves explain the failure of populist forces in Canada. mitigated by socio-economic factors.
The electoral method is just a mechanism that is influenced by Thus, the existence of a strong sense of nationalism and the
the configuration of other non-institutional variables. Institu- articulation of threats to national identity is indispensable to the
tional settings might be crucial in shaping political games, successful campaign of radical right populists to mobilize

economically vulnerable and politically disillusioned people justice, and freedom could provide the focus for Canadian
within a given society against elites, immigrants, and visible nationalism which would, in turn, bind Canadians to the Cana-
minorities (Bonikowski, 2017). The presence of ethnically dian state (Whitaker, 1992; McRoberts, 1991). Trudeau assumed
inspired national sentiment that can be channeled into resent- that by basing the sovereignty of the people on a set of values
ment towards those who are perceived to be outsiders, is an common to all, the Charter would function as a nostrum to foster
effective weapon in the arsenal of radical right populist politicians Canadian national identity and hence strengthen Canadian unity
and political parties. As can be demonstrated, the Canadian (Russell, 1983). Thus, multiculturalism and the Charter were
conception of nationhood is complicated, ambiguous, and weak. assumed to reinforce civic identity as opposed to ethnically based
As a frustrated Hugh MacLennan pointed out a long time ago, national identity. However, the civic base of national identity
whether or not Canada has acquired its own unique identity, has promoted by mainstream Canadian politicians and political
become an “everlasting, frustrating, humiliating question” for institutions is not shared by Quebec nationalists and Indigenous
Canadians (Cited in Baker, 1973: p. 57). Canadian mainstream peoples who have different and competing images of Canada
politicians have historically striven to reinforce a conception of (Kymlicka, 1998). Despite its enchanting attractiveness as an
nationhood that is based on civic values and norms. Pierre Elliot emblem of cultural recognition, multiculturalism has been envi-
Trudeau, the “gladiator” of Canadian politics whose political saged by both Quebec nationalists and Indigenous peoples as a
philosophy has greatly shaped Canadian political culture, believed deliberate endeavor by Trudeau to relegate them to the status of
that Canadian nationalism should not be based on the national visible minorities in Canada. Neither Quebec nor the Indigenous
and ethnic characteristics of either English or French Canadians. peoples have identified themselves as members of ethnic mino-
Instead, he argued that Canadian nationalism should be con- rities (Cairns, 2001). As collective entities, both Quebec nation-
structed on neutral civic principles and values (Trudeau, 1968). alists and Indigenous peoples have rebuffed the paradigm of
Former Prime Minister, Jean Chretien described Canada as a multiculturalism as an ethnonational reflection of Canadian
post-national, bilingual, and multicultural society where diversity society (Abu-Laban, 1994). Quebec nationalists have in fact
has become “a source of comparative advantage and a source of construed multiculturalism as a surreptitious endeavor by Canada
continuing creativity and innovation” (cited in Mobley et al., to neutralize and eclipse Quebec’s binary vision of Canada from
2012, p. 307). In his recent interview published in the New York the terrain of political discourse (McRoberts, 1991: pp. 27–8).
Times, which sparked a major controversy in Canada, the current A recent survey by the Environics Institute for Research (2019)
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau characterized Canada as the first shows that there is no single source of Canadian national identity
“post-national” state and asserted that “there is no core identity, and there is no consensus on a shared set of values that can bind
no mainstream in Canada” (Lawson, 2018). Canadians together. Furthermore, in addition to the fragmenta-
Due to the absence of or weak national identity in Canada, tion of Canadian identity along race, ethnicity, religion, and lan-
both Canadian radical right and left populists have encountered guage, more Canadians identify themselves with their region or
formidable difficulty in advancing their political goals and province than with the national state. Given the rapid alteration in
objectives by adopting a radical populist platform. The historical the ethnic makeup of Canadian society, it is clear why radical
legacy of Canadian dualism as reflected in the continuation of the right-wing populist political parties have eschewed launching
French and English cultural divide, and the gradual shift in the direct political assaults on ethnic minorities and multiculturalism
ethnic make-up of Canada which culminated in cementing and have instead limited their criticisms to the official provisions
multiculturalism as one of its defining features, have to a great of funds allocated to the promotion of multiculturalism. It would
extent contributed to the lack of or weak formation of Canadian be a formidable task and a miracle for any radical right-wing
national identity (Belshaw, 2020). The competing national visions populist political party in Canada to capture national power
of English-speaking Canadians envisioning Canada as an unhy- without receiving a substantial level of support from the first and
phenated nation, and French-speaking Canadians viewing second-generation immigrants who constitute almost 40% of the
Canada as a compact of two nations, gradually came to be Canadian population as of 2011 (Warnica, 2019).
superseded by “a national pluralism in which multiculturalism The entrenchment of Canadian multiculturalism that has
became “a dominating value” (Belshaw, 2020: 12.6). acquired an iconic status provides an explanation for the lack of
Pierre Elliot Trudeau was instrumental in the shift from Cana- significant backlash against immigration policy despite socio-
dian dualism to multiculturalism. Before his arrival on the political economic cleavages within the country. Contrary to the most
scene and his subsequent ascendancy to the pinnacle of power as industrialized liberal democratic countries that have encountered a
Prime Minister in 1968, Trudeau had already developed his phi- major backlash against immigration, Canada, despite welcoming a
losophical and political ideas of check and balance, and the high level of immigrants each year, has not faced any such major
superiority of individual rights over collectivity as the basis for his backlash. As has already been pointed out, there is strong and
vision of the Canadian nation (Trudeau, 1968; see also Whitaker, enduring cross-party support for an expansive immigration policy.
1992: pp. 132–159). Under the flag of fighting for a united, rights- Since mainstream political parties must compete for racial minority
based, bilingual, and multicultural Canada, Trudeau embarked on votes, there is no incentive for the established political parties to
a course of action that was not intended to accommodate Quebec raise the flag of anti-immigration. Furthermore, Canadian multi-
nationalists but rather to decelerate the momentum for Quebec culturalism, which has entrenched itself as one of the defining
nationalism, hence diminishing the bargaining power of Quebec features of Canadian political culture, has to a great extent closed
within the Canadian federation. His vision of Canada was further off an avenue for a significant backlash against immigration policy.
advanced through the entrenchment of the Charter in the Con- As sociologist Jeffrey Reitz (2014) has meticulously asserted
stitution Act of 1982. It was Trudeau’s unwavering conviction that “Popular support for multiculturalism as a symbol creates a posi-
the diffusion and protection of the French language within Canada, tive political environment for the development of Canada’s
which is guaranteed in section 23 of the Charter, would be bound expansionist immigration policy and helps immigrants integrate
to generate a condition within which “Quebec cannot say it alone into the economy and society” (108). According to a 2018 survey
stood for French” heritage (Cited in McRoberts, 1991: p. 153). by the polling company Ipsos which asked Canadians to rank
The entrenchment of the Charter in the Constitution Act of Canadian symbols and values, most surveyed Canadians placed
1982 was based on the assumption that the provision of a set of multiculturalism “right next to the national anthem—and just
subjectively inspiring common values such as equality, equity, behind their flag” (Thompson, 2018: para 2).4

Furthermore, the existence of a fractured nationalism, weak Canadian sovereignty. Undoubtedly, Diefenbaker’s nationalistic
national identity, and a greater level of identification with pro- orientation on foreign policy had adversely impacted Canada’s
vinces and regions rather than the national state also explains relationship with the United States. It is no wonder that Die-
why populist political parties might be successful in finding a fenbaker’s electoral defeat in the 1963 federal election was
niche political market at the sub-national level which is receptive interpreted by the then-American ambassador to Canada, Walton
to their populist ideas (Potter, 2019). It was due to the populist Butterworth, as a swing to greater stability and cooperation in
orientation of current Premier Doug Ford who hinged his Canada-US relations. In his assessment of the 1963 federal elec-
populist commitment to reassert the interests of people and clip tion, Ambassador Butterworth predicted that Canada would “be
the wings of special interests associated with the political estab- more stable, responsible, sophisticated and generally cooperative
lishment on a neoliberal-driven policy platform that allowed the than any time since 1958” (Cited in McKercher, 2011, p. 1043).
Ontario Provincial Progressive Conservative Party to gain poli- One may assume that the anti-American ingredient of Cana-
tical power in 2018 (Budd, 2020). dian nationalism could be harnessed by populist political parties,
Despite the complexity and ambiguity of Canadian national particularly radical left populism, as a rallying cry to mobilize
identity, anti-Americanism is also inscribed into the soul of the Canadian voters. It was in fact during the early decades of the
Canadian national psyche. As William Baker (1970) has pointed second part of the twentieth century that the penetration of
out, as a recurring theme in Canadian history, anti-Americanism American branch plants into the Canadian economy was utilized
“…is one of the solid legs on which the elusive animal, the by left nationalists to put pressure on the government of Pierre
Canadian identity, stands” (426). Its roots can be traced back to Elliot Trudeau to take certain policy measures such as the
the events before the commencement of the Canadian Con- entertainment with the Third Option and the adoption of the
federation in 1867. With the American Revolution against the Foreign Direct Investment Review (FIRA) agency to reduce
British Monarchy, the arrival of the United Loyalists in British American ownership of leading sectors of the Canadian economy
North American colonies who were fleeing the American Revo- (Marsden, 1997; Blocker, 2021).5 Resorting to this anti-American
lution, and the subsequent threat of American expansionism in strategy to challenge the domination of the Canadian economy by
the early decades of the nineteenth century, anti-Americanism American branch plants in the 1950s to mid-1970s was an
became a part of the Canadian psyche (Baker, 1973). Long before effective political mobilization tactic utilized by the radical leftist
the rise of the Canadian federation, both French and English supporters of the Waffle movement who had been guided by
Canada, despite their historical differences and animosity, were economic nationalism (Blocker, 2021).6
adamant in distinguishing themselves from Americans Due to the maturation of the continental economic integration,
(Woodfinden, 2019; Underhill, 1960). Due to the perceived the historically ingrained anti-Americanism that was prevalent
American threat to Canada’s existence, Canadian survival has during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century had
been often perceived as surviving the American threat of significantly disappeared by the 1990s (Granatstein, 1996).
expansionism (Cullen et al., 1978). It is due to the continuation of According to Granatstein, the anti-Americanism which reached
the rehearsal of this historical memory that “a salient dimension its peak during the 1988 general election fought on the free trade
of Canadian nationalism is indistinguishable from anti-Amer- agreement with the United States, was the “last gasp” of the anti-
icanism” (Cullen et al., 1978: p. 105). The inclination of Cana- Americanism ingredient of Canadian political culture. The gra-
dians to identify themselves as being different from Americans is dual eclipse of anti-Americanism from the terrain of Canadian
an overriding theme in major comparative studies of political political culture was mainly due to the gradual consolidation of
culture in Canada and the United States (Stewart, 1994). During continental economic integration and the weakening position of
the late nineteenth and a major part of the twentieth centuries, economic nationalism which had been fueled by the fear of the
Canadian politicians of different political and ideological brands American takeover of the Canadian economy.7 Therefore, anti-
occasionally utilized the anti-American aspect of Canadian poli- Americanism purports to be no longer a viable and efficacious
tical culture to attract voters (Fulford, 2001). option for radical leftist populists in Canada. If the volume of
With a few notable exceptions, right-wing populism in Canada foreign direct investment (FDI) is used as a benchmark to mea-
has historically eschewed raising the anti-American flag as a sure the level of economic dependency, then it would be a futile
mobilization tactic. As the leader of the Progressive Conservative and implausible electoral strategy to invoke the dependency
Party, John Diefenbaker who was the Prime Minister of Canada theory to paint Canada as a satellite of the American Empire.
from 1957 to 1963, had adopted a nationalistic populist stance Since the 1980s and early 1990s, Canada has become a net out-
which was manifested in his antipathy for bilingualism, multi- ward investor and Canadian businesses have begun to tighten
culturalism, and special treatment of Quebec (Story and their grip over leading sectors of the Canadian economy. Cana-
Sheppard, 1998). With respect to his foreign policy, his refusal to dian businesses have begun to extend the scope of capital accu-
join the Organization of American States (OAS), his retention of mulation beyond national boundaries and Canada has emerged as
Canada’s relation with Cuba after the Cuban Revolution, his an “imperial state” in its own right (McNally, 2017). Even during
stance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and his reluctance to arm the COVID-19 pandemic which brought about major disruptions
American Bomarc missiles with nuclear warheads on Canadian in economic activities across the globe, Canadian direct invest-
soil, were interpreted by some analysts as a reflection of his anti- ment abroad surpassed foreign direct investment in Canada and
American proclivity (Glazov, 2002; Newman, 1963; Nicholson, the principal destination of Canadian investment abroad remains
1968). On the other hand, Jason Zorbas (2012) has argued that to be the United States (Statistic Canada, 2021a, 2021b). As of
Diefenbaker’s foreign policy, and particularly Canada’s relation 2020, “the amount of U.S. FDI [in Canada] totaled USD 422
with the United States, was mainly shaped by his nationalism Billion, a 5 percent increase from the previous year, Canada’s FDI
which aspired to retain Canadian autonomy. Diefenbaker’s stock in the United States totaled USD 570 Billion, a 15 percent
nationalism reflected Red Tory’s nationalistic quest to preserve increase from the previous year” (U.S. Department of State,
Canada’s autonomy in the face of the overwhelming propensity of 2022).
the United States to turn Canada into a satellite of the American Given the decline of American ownership of the leading sectors
Empire (Staring, 2010; Grant, 1965). As Zorbas has pointed out, of the Canadian economy, the corresponding increase in outward
Diefenbaker’s Red Tory’s nationalism should not be construed as investment levels by Canadian businesses, and the growing
anti-Americanism but rather as an endeavor to preserve backlash against economic protectionism which is reflected in the

soaring support for globalization and international trade among Due to the seismic shift in the ethnic makeup of Canadian
Canadians, resorting to an anti-Americanpolitical strategy to rally society and the concentration of ethnic votes in certain metro-
Canadians behind a radical policy platform by leftist populist politan centers such as Toronto, Montreal, and British Columbia,
forces is no longer a viable and efficacious option.8 no political party can ignore the reality of being attentive to new
One might argue that left-wing populist forces in Canada can, Canadians if it aims to knock on the doors of political power at
like their counterparts in other countries, champion progressive the national level. This emerging reality of Canadian society
social and economic measures to rally socially and economically explains why the Conservative Party of Canada unlike its pre-
marginalized layers within Canadian society. However, the decessors has tacitly eschewed launching direct attacks on mul-
latitude for the left to emphasize class politics is constrained. ticulturalism and immigration policy. The existence of a fractured
The inveterate conflict between Quebec and Canada and the nationalism as manifested in the fragmentation of national
ongoing regional discontent have thus given legitimacy to the identity, has reduced the ability of populist parties to play the
exigency of maintaining national unity which has, in turn, card of nationalism to rally Canadians against the threat of out-
provided an auspicious momentum for the status-quo political siders. Furthermore, the consolidation and institutionalization of
parties, particularly the Liberal Party, to evade class cleavages multiculturalism has closed off an avenue for a significant back-
and accentuate the imperatives of maintaining national unity lash against immigration policy.
and placating regional imbalances (Bickerton, 2007). Through Due to the historical permeation of Canadian national discourse
adopting brokerage politics as a means of electoral mobilization with the exigency of maintaining national unity and regional
which has continued to remain the dominant mode of party accommodation, and the perpetuation of a classless image of
politics in Canada, the Liberal Party has historically been able to Canada by the Liberal Party, the latitude for class politics by right
coerce both the right and left parties to mitigate their class and left-wing political forces is constrained. Finally, the anti-
appeals and hence adopt a classless image of Canada (Horowitz, American ingredient of Canadian political culture that in the past
1968; Carty, 1988). Furthermore, leftist political forces have fueled Canadian nationalism as a mobilizing tool by radical poli-
historically been outflanked by the ideological maneuverability tical forces, is no longer an effective strategy that could be utilized
of the Liberal Party which has adopted and implemented all by populist forces, particularly left-wing populism, to generate
those socially progressive policy measures advocated by the political support. Conditions such as the high level of US owner-
Canadian left (Finkel, 2013).9 As Allen Mills has aptly pointed ship of the leading sectors of the Canadian economy which in the
out, the CCF-NDP has historically faced formidable difficulty in early second part of the twentieth century facilitated the ability of
distinguishing itself from the Liberal Party when the latter “is on radical leftist political forces to harness the anti-American element
its best behavior” (Mills, 1991:259). of Canadian political culture to mobilize Canadians to advance
their political objectives have lost their appeal. The gradual con-
tinental economic integration, the decline in US ownership of
Conclusion Canadian industry, the ability of Canadian capital to expand its
As has been argued throughout this paper, the rise of populism international scale of operation, and growing public support for
has historically been correlated with socio-economic downturns international trade have all diminished the appeal of economic
and ensuing perceived economic vulnerability. Populism reso- nationalism that was in the past utilized by radical leftist political
nates in an environment of intense socio-economic grievance forces as an anti-American mobilization tactic.
which is receptive to divisive populist slogans. Under a climate of
economic deprivation and social marginalization, socially and
economically deprived individuals develop a predilection to Data availability
search for the blame for their socio-economic misfortunes. Data sharing is not applicable to this research as no data were
Growing income inequality perceived economic vulnerability, the generated or analyzed.
cultural backlash against immigrants, and the accompanying
diminution of public trust in existing political institutions tend to
Received: 20 December 2021; Accepted: 18 January 2024;
provide fertile ground conducive to generating a magnetic field
for populist appeals. The failure of mainstream political parties to
surmount the social and economic implications of neoliberal
policies has also intensified the populist surge.
Like other Western countries, signs of social and economic
indignation, a relatively low level of cultural backlash against Notes
immigration policy, and political distrust can also be traced in 1 Thomas Kurer (2020) has argued that the disadvantages of employment
transformation for semiskilled workers and ensuing changes in the social hierarchy,
Canadian society. Furthermore, there is a growing populist out- not impoverishment, generate support for right-wing populist political parties. Kurer’s
look among less educated and older Canadians whose political argument seems to be plausible. However, it should be noted that changes in social
sympathies mainly lie with conservative political forces. While status are corollaries of economic transformation which cannot be analyzed
populist forces have been able to make political inroads at the independently from overall economic transformation and economic crisis that
sub-national level, they have not been successful at the national engender economic insecurity and economic deprivation.
level. The failure of populist forces to make a significant electoral 2 As a well-known populist premier of Alberta from 1935 to 1943, William Eberhart
introduced the direct democratic measure of recall but scrapped the principle when his
breakthrough at the national level lies in the interaction of own constituents decided to recall him (Wiseman, 1995: p. 227).
institutional, cultural, and attitudinal variables that have the 3 Strategic voting refers to a voting situation where the voter is under the impression
potential to hamper the success of populism at the national level. that their preferred party has no chance of winning the seat, and they therefore, vote
The absence of a historically ingrained strong sense of nation- for another party that has the chance of defeating the party that they dislike most.
hood, the political maturity of multiculturalism, the eclipse of 4 The consolidation of multiculturalism as a bulwark against anti-immigration backlash
class from the terrain of national political discourse, and the does not mean that there are no conflictual non-economic variables such as religious
and cultural values that can provide a demand for populist parties and populist
decline in the appeal of anti-Americanism have made it a for- political figures. The ongoing cross-Canada protests against the controversial sex
midable task for both the radical right and left-populist forces to education curriculum that are spearheaded by religious and conservative parents
replicate the success of their international counterparts at the provide strong ammunition for populist forces. However, neither right-wing nor left-
national level. wing populist forces can harness this movement to advance their objectives. The

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Populism and the quest for political power: the

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Populism and socio-economic cleavages

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Table 1 Major nationally oriented populist political parties.

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Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints

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