Moot Court Exercise - Jayasurya O Panicker 8116 LLB-III Div B

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

IN THE MATTER OF:

NILESH LAXMICHAND AND ANR …APPLICANTS

V.

SHANTABEN PURUSHOTTAM KAKAD, Through Lrs and …RESPONDENTS

Others

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................ .2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..................................................................................... … 4

STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................................................... 5

ISSUES RAISED........................................................................................................................ .6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................. .9
PRAYER.................................................................................................................................. ..10

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

&- And
AIR- ALL INDIA REPORTER
v.- Versus
AP- Andhra Pradesh
Bom- Bombay
CPC- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Lrs- Legal representative
Mad- Madras
Ors- Others
SC- Supreme Court
u/s- Under Section

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

1. Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908.

2. Indian Contracts Act, 1872.
3. Specific Relief Act,1963.
4. The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1947.
5. The Maharashtra rent Control Act, 1999
6. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882
7. The Indian Easements Act, 1882

CASES

● Vasant Dikkava and Chandrakant Kashinath Thakur and Ors. v. Narayan Lakhanna Shetty and Ors.
: AIR 1980 Bom 341.
● Gopalkrishna Govind v. Tukaram Narayan: AIR 1956 AP 33.
● Bhaskar Wamanrao Rithe v. Indira Iyer: LAWS(BOM)-2005-10-22
● Mowbrays Flats Owners Association v. C.A.M Riazuddin Mohammed : AIR (Mad) 2000-313
● S. Hardayal Singh v. Nirmala Devi : AIR 1984 Delhi 350
● D.V. Panse v. Laxminarayan Khar: LAWS (BOM)-2002-8-135
● Shri Ramanlal Kantilal Doshi v. Shri Hargovinddas Jagmohandas Gandhi: LAWS
(BOM)-2009-1-11
● Mohammed Kasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali, AIR (SC))-1998-0-3214
● Rajendraprasad Kedarprasad Tiwari v. Shankar Vithu Kuveskar: LAWS (BOM)-2002-4-62

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Applicant has filed this petition under Section 115 of THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 1908 Act reads as under:

(1) 115. Revision.—(1) The High Court, in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of
the value exceeding five lakhs rupees and the District Court, in any other cases, including a case
arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Code
of Civil Procedure ( Orissa Amendment) Act, 2010, may call for the record of any case which has
been decided by any Court subordinate to the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be,
and in which no appeal lies thereto, andThe Petitioner humbly submits that this Court has the
appropriate jurisdiction to hear the matter and adjudicate accordingly.

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,

the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:

Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation decided
by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section.

(2) The High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, shall not under this section, vary or reverse
any order, including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except
where the order, if it had been made in favor of the party applying for revision, would have finally
disposed of the suit or other proceedings.

(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such
suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court or District Court, as the case may be.

THE RESPONDENT RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE SAME.

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Chronological Order of Events and Claims

1. 1971- Defendant No.2 and original Landlord late Purshottamdas B. Kakad entered into
negotiations with respect to the subject-matter of the suit.
Notes:-
A. Defendant No.1 was about 5 years of age at the time (i.e Minor)
B. Plaintiff No.1 (Counsel’s Client) who was about 22 years of age at the time may not be having
knowledge and the purpose for which negotiations regarding the let-out premises were made.

2. 1973- Amendment of Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging rate Control Act, 1947 and insertion of
15A to the Act

3. Between 1988-90 & 1991-1993- Defendant 1 was carrying on his business of Book shop under
the name of Chetna Book Stores, M/s Chetna Book Stall and later on M/s Chetna Book Centre
(1988-1990 & 1991-1993).

4. Between 1993 to 2006- Other businesses like selling Readymade Garments and Fast Food
Centre were also going on in the premises.

5. July 2005- The defendant No.1 closed his business and since has not been using the suit
premises for the purpose for which the same was let out.

6. 10 October 2005 & 01 December 2005- Plaintiffs received two letters from defendants vide
Exh.24, intimating the original plaintiff that there is leakage in the suit premises causing nuisance
and due to which the suit premises has become unwholesome.

7. December 2005- Sub-Tenancy of the said property is shown as negotiated in favour of the
Defendant No. 2. (ref. Point-15 Appeal Order)

8. 2006- Chetna Book Store was Restarted

9. 2006- R.A.E Suit filed at Court of Small Causes at Bombay.

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10. November 2007- New registration certificate under Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.

11. February 2013- Learned Trial Judge Passed a decree in favour of the Defendants.

12. Between April-June 2013- Appeal filed by Plaintiff (original suit) i.e the Counsel’s client against
the order passed by the Learned Trial Judge which was registered by the Appellate Court.

13. October 2017- The Appellate Court quashed and set aside the decree passed by the Learned
Trial Judge and passes a decree that Defendants deliver quiet and peaceful possession of the suit
premises.

14. The Counsel is therefore appearing on behalf of the Original plaintiff Smt. Shantaben Purshottam
Kakad (deceased) who in turn is represented by her legal representative Mr. Anil Purshottam
Kakad and Others.

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 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE I

WHETHER The invocation of the Jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 115 of CPC is valid or not ?

ISSUE II

WHETHER The decree passed by the Learned Appellate Bench is valid and justifiable?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Argument by Counsel shall be on the grounds that all rights claimed by the Appellants
starting from claims as Majority of defendant at the time of lease agreement up until the rights
claimed as a result of protection provided by statutory acts specifically Bombay Rents, Hotels
and Lodging rate Control Act, 1947 have all been categorically disputed in the following way.

1. Majority and Validity of Contract by reference to Section 11 of Indian Contracts Act,

1872 read with Sections 11 r/w sections 64, 65 and 68 of the said act, thereby also
successfully being able to prove that it was Defendant No.1 who is the original lessee and
not Defendant No. 2 as claimed by the Appellants.

2. As to Protection of rights as Tenants and Subtenants claimed by the Appellants as a

result of statute on the ground that the agreement was made prior to 1.2.1973 also doesn’t
stand ground as the defendants/appellants have failed to provide any evidence as to an
agreement starting from 1971 as claimed by them. All rent receipts deposed as well as other
evidence including Shop & Establishments Certificates are not in any way conclusive to
prove that claim.

3. As to Defendants/Appellants claim as to right to Revision as per Section 115 of CPC also

find no ground as appellants are unable to prove their claim as to findings recorded by
Appellate Court are perverse. And that merely on the basis of initial order passed by the
learned Trial Judge and on that instance an alternative view if possible.

4. As to grounds of Nuisance, unlawful subletting and non-use of premises for the purposes for
which the property was leased under sections 16 (1)(c), 16(1)(e) and 16(1)(n) respectively
of The Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 have been successfully proved by the
respondents when asked to prove when in the position as appellants at the appellate
proceeding.

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 A. Age of Majority and Validity of Contract

If We consider that the rent receipts were issued in the name of defendant No. 1, it suggests that
defendant No. 2 had taken tenancy in the name of defendant No. 1 for his benefit. Secondly, after
attaining the majority, defendant No. 1 has not rescinded the contract. No material is produced by
the defendants on record to indicate that defendant No. 1 at any time had rescinded the contract.

With that in mind, defendant No. 1 was minor at that time and, therefore, the contract was voidable
at his option. Section 64 of the Contract Act, amongst others, lays down that the person rescinding
a voidable contract has to restore the benefits received thereunder from any other party to such
contract. Section 65 lays down that when a contract becomes void, any person who has received
any advantage under such an agreement or contract is bound to restore it. Section 68 lays down
that if a person incapable of entering into a contract is supplied by another person with necessaries
suited to his condition in life, the person who has furnished such supplies is entitled to be reimbursed
from the property of such incapable person. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals
with cancellation of instrument. Section 33 thereof lays down that on adjudging the cancellation of
an instrument, the Court may require the party to whom such relief is granted, to restore, so far as
any benefit which he may have received from other party and to make any compensation to him
which justice may require. Thus defendant No. 1 has neither rescinded nor restored the benefits by
restoring the possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs. Rather defendant No. 1 has continued
with the contract on attaining majority.

If we refer to the case:-

● Gopalkrishna Govind v. Tukaram Narayan: AIR 1956 AP 33.

○ If a contract is within the competence of the guardian and it is for the benefit of the minor it
is specifically enforceable.

B. Hold, Control, Rights over the Lease Property

Since there is no evidence of any agreement between parties the presence of such an agreement and
thereby hold and control can only be presumed by the conduct of the parties as well as some material
evidence such as rent receipts, Shop & Establishment Certificates etc.

If assumed that tenancy was created in 1971 (at that time defendant No. 1 Nilesh was minor) and hence

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negotiation, for creation of tenancy were held by defendant No. 2. From inception, defendant No. 2 is
in exclusive possession without any interruption. The rent is being paid by defendant No. 2. In the
absence of an agreement in writing, the conduct of the parties shows that the tenancy of suit
premises was created in favour of defendant No. 2. That is what was concluded by the Trial Judge.

If it is assumed that defendant No. 1 is the tenant, the defense claims that in spite of that defendant
No. 2 is occupying the suit premises prior to 1.2.1973 and as such is a protected sub-tenant or a
protected licensee. (Refer Section 15A of MRCA)

But on perusal of

1. The rent receipts which are issued in the name of defendant No. 1 Nilesh (Exhibit -22) for
the months of August and September, 2005 (PW-1 Anil deposed that he had personally
instructed the Manager to sign the rent receipt and he identified the signature). The Appellate
Court also considered the rent receipts dated 1.12.1975, 1.12.1986, 1.3.1989 and
1.12.2000 at Exhibit-40 collectively produced by the defendants. These rent receipts were
issued in the name of defendant No. 1.
2. With respect to Defendant’s claim that, defendant No. 2 is in possession of the suit premises
prior to 1.2.1973, no documentary evidence is produced on record. ANd since they relied upon
the Shop Act Licence dated 19.2.1991 where name of defendant No. 2 is shown as
employer. Said license does not establish possession of defendant No. 2 prior to 1.2.1973. It
has come on record that in the suit premises sale of snacks, juice, cold-drinks and ice-cream
was carried on and to that effect Shop Act Licence was issued on 9.9.2005. During appeal
DW-1 Laxmichand admitted that the fast- food center was continued for 2-3 months. In other
words, the fast-food center was continued upto December, 2005. The suit is instituted on
19.10.2006. The application for renewal of licence was made on 9.1.2007 and the new
registration certificate was issued on 30.11.2007. Thus this Shop Act Licence also does not
establish the case of defendant No. 2 that he is in possession of the suit premises prior to
1.2.1973. In view thereof, defendant No. 2 cannot claim to be a protected sub-tenant or
protected licensee.
3. Additionally at the outset it needs to be noted that the defendant no. 1 has not

denied the tenancy. Hence, there is no question of induction of the defendant no. 2
since inception. As a result thereof when no written permission or admission during,

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 no question of regarding the same as permitted by plaintiffs.
4. Defendants had also submitted in the form of two letters dtd. 30/10/2005 and
01/12/2005 from the defendants vide Exh.24 ­by the defendant no. 2. The fact that
the defendant no 2 has written the letter implies that he has the absolute control
over the suit premises. The letters makes it crystal clear that the defendant no. 2 has
not left any stone unturned in admitting that it is he who is in possession of the suit
premises.
5. Hence it can be established that Defendant No. 2 was in De Facto Possession of
property but in all sense only Defendant No. 1 can claim a De Jure right of
possession.

C. Unlawful Subletting [Section 16 (1) (e) MRCA, 1999]

By keeping in mind the above points especially points 3 & 4 i.e non denial of tenancy by
defendant No. 1 and Letters sent by Defendant No. 2 to original plaintiff, adverse possession of
property and unlawful sub-letting can be established.

● Vasant Dikkava and Chandrakant Kashinath Thakur and Ors. v. Narayan Lakhanna Shetty
and Ors. : AIR 1980 Bom 341.

In this case a broad differentiation was drawn between Contractual and Statutory Tenants.

After noting several authorities and the provisions of the Act, the Full Bench came to the
conclusion that the contractual tenants could be divided into two categories:

A a tenant who, under the tenancy agreement was specifically entitled to sublease his interest
(for short, "category 'A' tenant")

B a tenant who under the tenancy agreement was not so specifically entitled to sublease or
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whose tenancy agreement was silent about it (for short, "category 'B' tenant").

In our case the defendants are neither able to claim contractual tenancy nor are the able to claim
statutory tenancy, hence the said subletting shall come under the purview of Section 15A of
Bombay Rents Act (Read)

The only point to decide on sub­lettting is, whether the landlord has consented for
the same. The answer is “No”.

In the light of the same, In the case of

● Shri Ramanlal Kantilal Doshi v. Shri Hargovinddas Jagmohandas Gandhi: LAWS

(BOM)-2009-1-11
It is
held in para 3 that,

“ADMITTEDLY, there is no material to show that the plaintiff/landlord has given consent
or permission to defendant No.1 to sub­let the premises at any point of time.”
As a
result of that the same is without the consent of the landlord and is unlawful. At the cost
of repetition, it would be proper to recall that it is the case of the defendant No.2 that for
spiritual reason and astrology purpose, the premises was taken in the name of the
defendant No.1 Nilesh Laxmichand. Even the rent receipts Exh.40 colly., dtd. 01/12/1975,
01/12/1986, 01/03/1989 and 01/12/2000 produced by the defendants support the same.
Now, the aspect is that of user by defendant No.2 when receipt is in the name of
defendant No.1.

While
in,
Mohammed Kasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali, AIR (SC))-1998-0-3214

It is held in para 3 that

“It is well settled that parting with possession meant giving possession to persons other
than those to whom possession had been given by the lease and the parting with
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possession must have been by the tenant; user by other person is not parting with
possession so long as the tenant retains the legal possession himself, or in other words
there must be vesting of possession by the tenant in another person by divesting himself
not only of physical possession but also of the right to possession”

In the light of the same if it is argued that if the defendant no. 1 has parted with
possession then it is nothing but sub­letting.

D.
Non-User
1. As regards the non-­user of the suit premises, it was deposed by PW­1 that
from the beginning, the defendant No.1 was carrying on his business of
Book Shop in the name of Chetna Book Stores in the suit premises. If we
compare this evidence with claim by Defendant No.2, it is deposed in Court,
that the suit premises was acquired on tenancy basis and its use was started
for business purpose i.e. selling of books under the name and style of M/s.
Chetna Book Stall initially but later on changed to M/s. Chetna Book Centre.
Let us reserve the aspect of deciding upon the name of firm being Chetna
Book Store, M/s. Chetna Book Stall or M/s. Chetna Book Centre, it can be
said that the initial user of the suit premises was for selling of stationary.

2. Defendant No.2 Laxmichand Dedia (DW­1) also deposed that having run the
said business of Chetna Book Store for quite number of years and as he
was not able to get good business and sufficient earning, he chose to do
other business. Accordingly, he started the business of Readymade
garments for some time but also did not succeed. Thereafter, he started
business under the name and style of M/s. Shree Krishna Food Corner.
However, the BMC declined to issue such licence for certain reasons.
Therefore, the said business was stopped. Subsequently, again the business
of selling books in the name and style of Chetna Book Centre was started
from the suit premises. The Bombay Shops and Establishment Licence
bearing registration No.FN/I/1208 in the name of Chetna Book Stall showing
the defendant No.2 Laxmichand Velji Dedhia as employer points out to the
fact that the said business was carried out from 1988­1990, 1991 to 1993.
The most important aspect which is highlighted on behalf of the defendant is
that the said licence No. 18607 is restricted to that period. After the said

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 period of 1991 to 1993, the subsequent licence is at Exh.42 bearing licence
registration No. FN­1/011700. The same is for the period 2006 to 2007. Thus,
it emerges that the business of Chetna Book Store continued from 1988­90,
1991 to 1993. Subsequently, there was a break and the business Chetna
Book Store was started from 2006 to 2007. As regards the missing year from
1993 to 2006 as emerges from the evidence of the DW­1 himself, other
business like selling of Readymade garments and Fast Food Centre were
going on at the suit premises. In the light of the same, can it be believed that
the defendant had sufficient cause for not using the suit premises six months
prior to the institution of the suit. Admittedly, the date of institution of the suit
is 19/10/2006. The defendants have come out with a case that the firm by
name M/s. Chetna Book Centre is being carried out since 2006­07 on the
basis of new registration certificate issued on 30/11/2007. The suit is
instituted on 19/10/2006. It is clear from the aforesaid documents that there
is a gap of 13 months in between the institution of the suit and registration of
the new firm. At this stage again the estoppal due to pleadings in of
defendants will come into play. Thus, the fact of non-user is squarely
established.

Thus in the case of:

● Bhaskar Wamanrao Rithe v. Indira Iyer: LAWS(BOM)-2005-10-22

It is held in para 4 that,

“Thus, it has been held that it was not necessary for the landlord to establish that the
premises were not in use at all. It was held that it was enough if he proved that the tenant
was not using the premises for which they were let out for continuous period of six
months and the defense that premises were being used by third person or for the
purpose other than the one for which it was let out would not detract from concept of
non­-user.”

E. Nuisance and Annoyance

Now, so far as the aspect of causing of nuisance is concerned, the PW­1 Anil deposed in
his evidence that the food stall or Restaurant was started in the suit premises. But as the
premises was not suitable for food stall/Restaurant and there is no proper lay out or
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ventilation for cooking, there was lot of pollution and smell and smoke due to which his
mother who lives upstairs was affected. Not just that, but even he was affected whenever
he visited her. Accordingly, he made complaint to the person running the said food stall
i.e. Raja and the said business was closed down.

As is noted earlier, it was admitted specifically by the Defendant No.2 Laxmichand that
no such food stall was being carried out. Similarly, he has deposed in his
examination­in­chief itself that the business under the name and style of M/s. Shree
Krishna Food Corner was being run from the suit premises. It is also admitted that the
BMC Health Department declined to issue licence for the business. It is pertinent to note
that the suit premises was let out to carry on book shop or Stationary Mart. Instead of
that the same has been converted into Food Corner. The business of Book Stall and
Food Corner are diametrically opposite to each other. The former is carrying out during
day and the later goes till late hours of night. As a result of that, it can safely be said that
the said starting of food corner in all probabilities might have resulted in causing nuisance
and annoyance to the occupants of the suit building.

On this very aspect of granting of license to conduct business of Restaurant, reliance is

placed by plaintiffs upon the judgment in case of

Mowbrays Flats Owner's Association Vs. C.A.M.Riazuddin Alias Riazuddin

Mohammed,AIR (Mad) 2000­313.

By placing reliance upon the earlier Judgment in S. Hardayal Singh Vs. Nirmala Devi,
AIR 1984 Delhi 350, it is held,

“If the activity is without a licence, it is per se unlawful and, therefore, any disturbance
which can be described as intolerable .....”

If
contented whether nuisance to just one person or only the owner is justified to establish
nuisance and annoyance

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We can rely upon the Judgement in the case of

D.V. Panse Vs. Laxminarayan Khar, LAWS(BOM)­2002­8­135.

“That aspect to my mind, will be a pure question of fact. Moreover, this submission clearly
overlooks the clinching evidence on record. Further, both the trial court and the Appellate
court on analysing the materials on record have found that there is clear evidence on
record that the conduct of the tenants amounted to causing nuisance and annoyance to
the landlords.”

Based on the above points the decision of the Appellate Court in passing a decree in
favour of the Counsel’s client in this case the respondents under sections 16(1)(c),
16(1)(e) & 16(1)(n) is appropriate.

F. Joint Family (Only if raised by Applicants)

on
this very specific aspect, the reliance was placed by plaintiffs upon the judgment in case
of Rajendraprasad Kedarprasad Tiwari Vs. Shankar Vithu Kuveskar,
LAWS(BOM)­2002­4­62, it is held in para 3 that,

“We now come to the second challenge namely that the acquisition was by the
joint family. In the first instance, the tenant is petitioner. The rent receipts are in the
name of the petitioner. Mere fact that along with the tenant some others including his
relatives may be staying, cannot convert the tenancy from the name of the petitioner
into a joint family.” Thus, merely because the father was paying rent on behalf of minor
son, it cannot be said that the acquisition was for joint family.

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G. Jurisdiction

The defendants are not in a position to demonstrate that the findings recorded by the Appellate Court are
perverse, being based upon no evidence or that they are contrary to the evidence on record. The
defendants are also not in a position to demonstrate that no reasonable person would have arrived at the
conclusions other than arrived by the Appellate Court. Merely because on the basis of evidence on
record another view is possible, that itself is no ground for invocation of powers under Section 115 of
CPC Hence, invocation of Section 115 of CPC does not stand ground in this case

17
 PRAYER

Therefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is humbly prayed before this Hon’ble High Court that it may be pleased to hold, adjudge
and declare that:

1. The current application made for Revision u/s 115 of CPC, lacks any relevance and that it
shall be dismissed outrightly.
2. The Order passed by the Learned Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes of
Bombay shall be duly observed and adhered to and thereby possession shall be handed
over peacefully to its rightful owners.
3. It must also be noted by the Honourable Court that the matter has been lingering on and
stuck within the four walls of the court house for over a decade, to the extent that the
original plaintiff to the case has deceased during its pendency and subsequent appeals,
hence it’s furthermore prayed that the honorable court delivers justice without further
delays

AND/OR

Pass any other Order, Direction or Relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of Justice,
Fairness, Equity, and Good Conscience.

For this Act of Kindness, the Petitioner as in Duty Bound, shall forever Pray.

Date: 24 September 2018.

Place: Mumbai, India.

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 Miscellaneous

Sections Referred

Indian Contracts Act, 1872

11. Who are competent to contract.—Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority
according to the law to which he is subject , and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting by
any law to which he is subject.

64. Consequences of rescission of voidable contract.—When a person at whose option a contract is

voidable rescinds it, the other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained in which he is

promisor. The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he have received any benefit thereunder from

another party to such contract, restore such benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received.

65. Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes
void.—When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received
any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it to the person
from whom he received it.

68. Claim for necessaries supplied to person incapable of contracting, or on his account.—If a person,
incapable of entering into a contract, or any one whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied by another person
with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who has furnished such supplies is entitled to be
reimbursed from the property of such incapable person

19
Specific Relief Act, 1963

31. When cancellation may be ordered.—(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable,
and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may
sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be
delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also
send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall
note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.

33. Power to require benefit to be restored or compensation to be made when instrument is cancelled or is
successfully resisted as being void or voidable.—(1) On adjudging the cancellation of an instrument, the court
may require the party to whom such relief is granted, to restore, so far as may be any benefit which he may have
received from the other party and to make any compensation to him which justice may require.

(2) Where a defendant successfully resists any suit on the ground—

(a) that the instrument sought to be enforced against him in the suit is voidable, the court may if the defendant has
received any benefit under the instrument from the other party, require him to restore, so far as may be, such benefit
to that party or to make compensation for it;

(b) that the agreement sought to be enforced against him in the suit is void by reason of his not having been
competent to contract under section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), the court may, if the defendant
has received any benefit under the agreement from the other party, require him to restore, so far as may be, such
benefit to that party, to the extent to which he or his estate has benefited thereby.

20
The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1947.

14. Where the interest of a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, any sub-tenant to whom
the premises or any part thereof have been lawfully sub-let 86[before the commencement of the Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959] shall, subject to the
provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions as
he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued.

15. [(1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, [but subject to anycontract to the contrary,] it
shall not be lawful after the coming into operation of this Act for any tenant to sub-let the whole or any
part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein:

99[Provided that the 100[State] Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, permit in any area
the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases and to such extent as may be
specified in the notification.]101[

(2) The bar against sub-letting, assigning or transferring premises contained in sub-section (1) shall be
deemed not to have had any effect before the commenement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging
House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, in any area in which this Act was in operation before
such commencement; and accordingly, notwithstanding, anything contained in any contract or in the
judgement, decree or order of a Court any such sub-lease, assignment or transfer in favour of such persons
as have entered into possession despite the bar as sub-lessees, assignees or transferees, and have continued
in possession at the commencement of the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to be valid and effectual.]

15A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, it shall not be lawful after the commencement of the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act, 1963
for any tenant to give premises or any part thereof on licence for monetary consideration without the
previous permission of the landlord.

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The Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999

16. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of section 25, a landlord shall be
entitled to recover possession of any premises if the court is satisfied—

(c) that the tenant, his agent, servant, persons inducted by tenant or claiming under the tenant or, any person residing
with the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighbouring
occupier, or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral or illegal
purposes or that the tenant has in respect of the premises been convicted of an offence of contravention of any of the
provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 394 or of section 394A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation
Act or of sub-section 394 or of section 376 or of section 376A of the *Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations
Act, 1949, or of section 229 of the **City of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 ; or of section 280 or of
section 281 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 ; or

(e) that the tenant has—

(i) on or after the 1st day of February 1973, in the areas to

which the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 applied; or

(ii) on or after the commencement of this Act, in the Vidarbha and Marathwada areas of the State,

unlawfully sub-let or given on licence the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other
manner his interest therein ; or

(n) that the premises have not been used, without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a
continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit.

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