Demand To Dismiss Coram Non Judice
Demand To Dismiss Coram Non Judice
Demand To Dismiss Coram Non Judice
2 Your address
[City, ST ZIP Code]
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[Court name]
11 [Defendant's Name] ,
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Defendant
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DEMAND TO DISMISS CORAM NON JUDICE WRIT OF
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1 TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF AN INJURY IN FACT CAUSED BY THE
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UNDERSIGNED [YOUR NAME]
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UNDERSIGNED VOLUNTARILY PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCEEDINGS
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FOR ALLEGED NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT OR CLAIM THAT
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RESPONDENT.
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1 DISCRETION AND MUST DISMISS PETITION IMMEDIATELY. LUJAN,
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SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE et al. 504
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DEMAND TO DISMISS ON THE BASIS THE PRESIDING
18 person not a judge" — meaning, in effect, that the proceeding in question was not a
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judicial proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could
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therefore not yield a judgment” Burnham v. Superior Court 495 U.S. 604 (1990)
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1 DETERMINATIONS IN MATTERS OF LAW AND EQUITY AND WITHOUT
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AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO PRESIDE OVER A TRIAL BY JURY
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A NON-JUDICIAL PERSON LACKS JURISDICTION TO
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13 ORDER.
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1 IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE UNDERSIGNED THAT THE
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ADJUDICATOR IS FORBIDDEN FROM PRACTICING LAW FROM THE
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4 BENCH.
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JURISDICTION.
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1 28 USC SECTION 2072(b) “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge
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or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of
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28 USC SECTION 2072(b) STATES THAT THIS COURT
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CANNOT CREATE OR ENFORCE RULES WHICH MAY OR SHALL
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IN U.S. SUPREME COURT MATTER LUJAN, SECRETARY OF
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18 THE INTERIOR v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE et al. 504 U.S. 555 (1992) THE
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SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE
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1 THERE S THE LIKLIHOOD THE COURT CAN PROPERLY REDRESS AND
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REMEDY THE MATTER BASED UPON THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT.
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INJURY IN FACT CAUSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED [YOUR NAME]
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PROVING CLAIM THAT RESPONDENT OWES DEBT FOR CHILD
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BEFORE THIS COURT ACTS, IT MUST PRESENT PROOF OF
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DEBT FOR SUPPORT.
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1 WITHOUT PROOF OF EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY
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CLAIMANT OF AN INJURY IN FACT CAUSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED
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FACTS BEFORE THE COURT.
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“The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is
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void traces back to the English Year Books, see Bowser v. Collins, Y. B. Mich. 22
22 Edw. IV, f. 30, pl. 11, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482), and was made settled law
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1 by Lord Coke in Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke Rep. 68b, 77a, 77 Eng. Rep.
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1027, 1041 (K. B. 1612). Traditionally that proposition was embodied in the
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4 phrase coram non judice, "before a person not a judge" — meaning, in effect, that
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the proceeding in question was not a judicial proceeding because lawful judicial
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authority was not present, and could therefore not yield a judgment. American
8 courts invalidated, or denied recognition to, judgments that violated this common-
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law principle long before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. See, e. g.,
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“Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
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1 must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest
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which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
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4 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972);[1]
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and (b) "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical,' " Whitmore, supra,
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at 155(quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983)). Second, there
8 must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—
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the injury has to be "fairly. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
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11 and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before
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the court." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 561*561 Rights Organization, 426 U. S.
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26, 41-42 (1976). Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative,"
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15 that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id., at 38, 43.” LUJAN,
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SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE et al. 504
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1 A MONEY JUDGMENT ISSUED BY A NON-JUDICIAL PERSON
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IS WITHOUT THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS A MONEY JUDGMENT
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THE 14TH AMENDMENT PROTECTS AGAINST STATE
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DUE PROCESS CLAUSE UNDER 14TH AMENDMENT
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1 A NON-JUDICIAL PERSON PRESIDING OVER A TITLE IV-D
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SUPPORT MATTER IS NOT AN IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATOR BECAUSE
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Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to
8 subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a
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direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
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11 him in his case.”- TUMEY v OHIO 273 U.S. 510 (1927) Supreme Court of United
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States.
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THEREFORE, THE NON-JUDICIAL PERSON CANNOT BE AN
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AMENDMENT BECAUSE THE NON-JUDICIAL PERSON BENEFITS EVERY
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TIME A SUPPORT ORDER IS RENDERED AND PAID THROUGH A TITLE
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1 A NON-JUDICIAL PERSON CORAM NON JUDICE IS
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WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO PRESIDE OVER A TRIAL BY JURY FOR
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PREJUDICE.
13 LETTER ABBREVIATION
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THE COURT’S JURISDICTION TO DISMISS THIS DEMAND TO
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VACATE MUST BE CLARIFIED BY EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTION
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1 WITHOUT PROOF OF EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE
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PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER, A DISMISSAL OF THIS DEMAND IS VOID FOR
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1 _____________________________
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[YOUR NAME]
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19 Your Nmae
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