Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Indian National Congress
Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Indian National Congress
Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Indian National Congress
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ ITA 145/2001
versus
AND
+ ITA 180/2001
versus
CORAM:
JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
JUDGMENT
% 23.03.2016
Dr.S.Muralidhar,J:
Introduction
1.1 More than four decades ago, while noting the distortion that large
contributions of money made to political parties and candidates could
bring about to the electoral process, the Supreme Court observed in
Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla, (1975) 3 SCC 646 (at p.
654) as under:
"The availability of disproportionately larger resources is also
likely to lend itself to misuse or abuse for securing to the political
party or individual possessed of such resources, undue advantage
over other political parties or individuals. Douglas points out in
his book called Ethics in Government at p. 72, “If one party ever
attains overwhelming superiority in money, newspaper support,
and (Government) patronage, it will be almost impossible, barring
an economic collapse, for it ever to be defeated”. This produces
anti-democratic effects in that a political party or individual
backed by the affluent and wealthy would be able to secure a
greater representation than a political party or individual who is
without any links with affluence or wealth. This would result in
serious discrimination between one political party or individual
and another on the basis of money power and that in its turn
would mean that “some voters are denied an ‘equal’ voice and
some candidates are denied an ‘equal chance’ ”.
1.2 The Supreme Court also noted that: "The small man’s chance is the
essence of Indian democracy and that would be stultified if large
contributions from rich and affluent individuals or groups are not
divorced from the electoral process."
1.3 Till the Supreme Court began actively examining the issue in a
public interest litigation (PIL) instituted in 1995 by 'Common Cause',
most of the registered political parties in this country, both at the
national and state levels, did not file income tax returns, despite it being
made mandatory under Section 139 (4B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
('Act'), introduced with effect from 1st April 1979. They also failed to
maintain proper accounts of their income and expenditure although this
was too mandatory for them to claim exemption from payment of
income tax under Section 13A of the Act.
1.4 The problem persisted despite the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the PIL by Common Cause. The Election Commission of India noted in
its 'Guidelines on Transparency and Accountability in Party Funds and
Election Expenditure' issued on 29th August 2014 that “concerns have
been expressed in various quarters that money power is disturbing the
level playing field and vitiating the purity of elections.”
1.5 This was echoed by the Law Commission of India (‘LCI’) in its
255th Report on 'Electoral Reforms' when it said:
"Money, often from illegitimate sources, results in “undisguised
bullying” when it is used (both authorised and unauthorised) to
buy muscle power, weapons, or to unduly influence voters
through liquor, cash, gifts. Currency notes come first in
containers, then in truckloads, moving to wholesale/small retail
forms, and finally to suitcases and in people’s pockets."
4. By this judgment, the Court holds that the INC was not entitled to
claim exemption from paying income tax for AY 1994-95 since it failed
to maintain properly audited accounts for the said AY, thereby not
fulfilling the mandatory condition for claiming such exemption under
the proviso to Section 13A of the Act.
Relevant facts
5. The facts relevant to the present appeals are that the Assessee INC is
a political party registered under the RP Act and satisfies the description
of a 'political party' for the purpose of Section 13A of the Act.
6. The Assessee was initially not filing its annual returns of income in
terms of Section 139 (4B) of the Act which was introduced by the
Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from 1 st April 1979.
This was simultaneous with the insertion of Section 13A of the Act.
7. In terms of Section 13A of the Act, income under the following heads
were exempt from tax as far as political parties were concerned:
(a) income from house property
(b) income from other sources
(c) capital gains
(d) any income by way of voluntary contribution received by a
political party.
a political party to submit a report under Section 29C (3) of the RP Act
for a financial year to the Election Commission of India , no exemption
under Section 13A would be available to it for such financial year.
10.2 The facts there were that the Income Tax Officer (‘ITO’) served a
notice under Section 148 of the Act on the GPCS for AYs 1960-61,
1961-62 and 1962-63 on the basis that it was a taxable entity having an
income of its own. The ITO proceeded to tax GPCS as an association of
persons. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the contention
of GPCS that it was only a unit of the INC and annulled the assessments
for the said three AYs.
10.3 After the ITAT dismissed the appeal of the Revenue, a reference
was made to the Gujarat High Court, which agreed with the ITAT that a
comparison of the constitution of the INC and the GPCS showed that
the GPCS was one of the constituents and committees of the INC and
did not have a separate existence.
(ii) The Income Tax authorities had been remiss in invoking the
statutory provisions against the defaulting political parties.
14. It is only thereafter that the INC filed income tax returns for AYs
1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96 together for the first time on 14th
February, 1996. The returns for the earlier AYs i.e., 1991-92 and 1992-
93, were filed later on, i.e. on 30th October, 1996. Each of the returns
was filed showing Nil income after claiming exemption under Section
13A of the Act.
15. On 25th September 1996, the AO while issuing notice under Sections
143(2) and 142(1) of the Act to the INC for AY 1994-95, asked for
specific details in terms of the annexure to the said notice. The INC was
asked to furnish:
(i) its consolidated accounts on an all-India basis by incorporating
all the accounts of the State Units;
(iii) the list of all donors, who had given voluntary contributions
in excess of Rs.10,000/- with their names and addresses.
16. The order sheets of the proceedings before the AO have been placed
on record. On 28th October 1996, the AO noted that there was no
compliance or any communication received from the INC. The same
position continued on 28th November, 1996 and 16th December, 1996.
The proceedings of 29th January 1994 read as under:
“There has been a continued non-compliance from the Party and
no details have been placed on record by the Party. In between
Shri C.P. Malhotra had appeared in connection with the filing of
I.T. Return was again reminded. In view of this, a specific show
cause is being issued for a final opportunity on the 14.02.1997. In
case of non-compliance, the Party has been informed that as ex-
parte assessment will be made.”
17. The proceedings of 14th February, 1997, again showed that there was
non-compliance and there was no communication received from the
INC. The proceedings of 25th March, 1997 read as under:
“Shri Rajesh Sharma, Chief Accountant of the Party attended and
filed a copy of A/c's of 14 State units. It is seen from the above.
(ii) The Party has not given the list of donors who
have given contributions in excess of Rs.10,000/-.
18. The proceedings recorded on 25th March 1997 showed that Mr.
Rajesh Sharma, Chief Accountant and Mr. C.P. Malhotra, Accountant,
attended the proceedings and produced the cash book and ledger of the
Central Office. The AO then noted as under:
“1. From the "Sale of coupons" A/c's there are deposits exceeding
Rs.10,000/- The AR have explained that the Treasurer of the
Party is in custody of the same & it is he who gets collection from
Sale thereof.
21. The AO proceeded to note that the INC had given a break-up of the
collection from sale of coupons in the denomination of Rs. 50, Rs. 100,
Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 amounting to Rs. 8,20,75,000. There was purse
money of Rs. 46,150 presented to the Congress President in the shape of
garlands and purse money of Rs. 26,280 presented to the Deputy Home
Minister. Rs. 2,22,01,000 was under the head ‘as per list attached (A)’.
This list (A) contained the break-up of the donors who had given
voluntary contributions in excess of Rs. 10,000. The AO noted that the
list was incomplete since it did not contain the complete address of such
donors as was required by Section 13A of the Act. The AO noted that
“despite repeated opportunities, the party failed to fulfil this statutory
requirement.”
22. Less than a week prior to the deadline for framing of the order, the
INC on 25th March 1997, furnished some of the details. The AO noted
that a ledger account of the donations reflecting those in excess of Rs.
10,000/- did not mention the complete address of the donors. The
Authorised Representative (AR) of the INC sought to explain that these
represented coupon sales but could not produce receipts or other
supporting documents or counterfoils of the said coupons for
verification of the claim.
23. The AO then turned to the three donations received from abroad and
noted that while the INC had placed on record its correspondence with
the bank, it expressed its inability to give further details. These three
donations were discussed by the AO in para 5.1 of the assessment order.
They were shown to be of the same date, i.e., 24 th December, 1993. The
first was a sum of Rs. 40 lakh from ‘Dominion Trading Company’. The
two others were of Rs.30 lakh each from ‘Decor Trading Company’.
The addresses of the above parties were not furnished. According to the
INC, the details were being obtained from the banks from which the
drafts had been received. The Treasurer of the INC addressed a letter on
14th November 1996 stating that addresses of the above contributors
were not available with the party and were being ascertained from their
bankers. However, till the time of framing of the assessment by the AO,
these details were not furnished.
26. Consequently, the AO concluded that the INC's claim under Section
13A of the Act could not be allowed and that the receipts would be
subject to tax. The AO noted the note in the Auditor’s report that since
all the Pradesh Committees had not supplied necessary details of their
primary and active members, and that no adjustment of membership fee
could be made in the books of accounts.
27. The AO had to make an estimate of the receipts since despite several
requests the Assessee was unable to furnish the details of the collections
made by the state units. Even the accounts of the 14 state units
submitted on 25th March 1997 had a number of deficiencies. The AO
accordingly observed:
29. As regards the expenditure towards salaries and other benefits to its
employees, postage and telegrams, travelling, rent and taxes, water and
31. Towards the end of the order, the AO observed “Charge interest.
Penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(b) and 271(1)(c) have been
separately initiated”.
33. The INC stated that the task of consolidating the accounts of the
party including all its state units was a herculean task “as the aforesaid
attempt was being made for the first time”. The INC had 26 Pradesh
Congress Committees, 6 territorial Congress Committees, 2 Regional
Committees, as also the account of All India Youth Congress, All India
Mahila Congress Committee, All India Congress Seva Dal, National
Students Union of India & Congress Parliamentary Party. It was claimed
that “the Assessee, under such a tremendous pressure could not
consolidate and also file the complete details pertaining to the voluntary
contributions, as was directed”.
35. The comments of the AO were then sought by the CIT (A) on the
application and the accompanying documents. Inter alia, the AO
pointed out that the specific instances in Explanation 1 to Section 153(3)
of the Act, as it stood at that time, did not apply to the INC and,
therefore, the INC could not be permitted to furnish the final accounts
after the limitation period had expired. The AO turned down the
allegation of the INC that it had not been given a sufficient opportunity
as ‘irresponsible’ since the Assessee had inspected the records for AY
1994-95 on 20th October 1997 and the notice dated 31st January 1997
asking it to furnish the accounts and other details was duly received in
the office of the INC on 31st January 1997 itself. It was further pointed
out by the AO that there was no case made out for entertaining any
additional evidence at this stage.
37. However, the CIT (A) found that the AO's decision as regards the
expenditure incurred by the INC for the AY in question was erroneous.
The expenses of the INC as a political party had to be viewed from the
perspective of it having to implement its policies, objectives and
manifesto and also to contest elections for which it needed a large
number of vehicles, millions of leaflets, posters, banners, flags,
loudspeakers etc. The employees’ expenses were allowed in full. It was
also held that depreciation to the extent of Rs. 1,15,46,998.17 also ought
to have been allowed. The balance claim of expenses then came to Rs.
39. The INC was aggrieved that the CIT(A) had granted relief of only
reducing the computable income by Rs. 9,27,48,793 (thereby computing
the total income at Rs. 25,12,68,081 (-) Rs.9,27,48,793). Further
according to the INC the CIT (A) ought to have considered the
additional evidence tendered and no prejudice would have been caused
to the Revenue if it had. It was, inter alia, pointed out that the estimate
of the receipts on account of membership fee, coupon sales and purse
money, etc. at Rs. 15 crores and the estimate of the total receipts at Rs.
26,33,57,966 were “without any basis or material on record and were
merely based on the subjective opinion of the AO”. It was further
pointed out that the CIT(A) had also ignored the assessment order
framed by the AO for AY 1995-96 where the assessment had been
completed on 31st March 1998 determining the income of the INC as
‘nil’.
40. It was urged by the INC that the non-consideration of the accounts
produced by the INC s additional evidence under Rule 46A of the Rules
amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice. It was further
submitted that unlike Section 145 of the Act, Section 13A of the Act did
not empower the AO to estimate income from voluntary contributions
and there was no material with the AO to make any such estimation. It
was submitted that voluntary contributions did not fall under any head
of income under Section 14 of the Act and was taxable only in terms of
Section 13A of the Act.
41. It was submitted by the INC that there was no time limit under
Section 13A of the Act for completing the audited accounts and,
therefore, the audited accounts, which were completed after the
assessment order for the AY 1994-95, should be considered after the
matters were remanded to the AO for a fresh consideration. Reliance
was placed on the CBDT’s Circular dated 19th October 2000. It was
submitted that there was no basis for the CIT (A) to restrict the
expenditure to 60% of the claim.
(i) Till the completion of the assessment order on 31 st March 1997, the
Assessee failed to file the audited accounts of all the state units and
produce the books of accounts. The auditing of the accounts of state
units was completed only thereafter.
(ii) Even if there was no time limit for completion of the accounts and
audit, they had to be completed within a reasonable time. Non-
completion of accounts and their audit even within two years from the
end of the relevant financial year (‘FY’) cannot be condoned and the
Assessee cannot be given the benefit of a reasonable cause to enable the
additional evidence to be tendered under Rule 46A of the Rules. In
terms of Rules 46A(1)(b) and 45A(1)(c), there was no sufficient cause
which prevented the Assessee from producing the requisite evidence
before the AO. The CIT (A), therefore, was justified in declining to
admit the additional evidence.
(iv) The Assessee did not fulfil the conditions (a), (b) and (c) under the
proviso to Section 13A of the Act and, therefore, the AO was justified in
not allowing exemption therein.
shown in central office account at Rs. 11,33,57,696 and from all the
state and other units at Rs. 3,82,97,972 + Rs. 1,81,17,534.” Further in
case the AO had information about any specific receipt not disclosed in
the accounts “he can take appropriate actions under the law”.
(vii) There was a close nexus between the voluntary contributions and
expenditure on political activity of a political party. This was because
the expenditure on political activity is incurred from the voluntary
contributions and the position of a political party was akin to the
carrying out of the aims and objectives of a Trust.
(viii) But for Section 13A of the Act, voluntary contributions would not
be taxable income since it did not fall under any of the heads of the
income under Section 14 of the Act. It would not come under the head
‘income from other sources’. The expenditure incurred by a political
party on its political activities was allowable as a deduction since such
expenditure was incurred to carry out its aims and objects for which the
voluntary contributions were also received. The aims and objects of
political party fell within the scope of the expression “any other object
of general public utility” appearing in the definition of ‘charitable
purposes’ under Section 2(15) of the Act.
(ix) The contention of the Assessee that exemption under Section 13A
of the Act can be granted even if the prescribed conditions are fulfilled
at the appellate stage was rejected. The Assessee did not deserve the
grant of exempton at the appellate stage. At the same time, the Assessee
did not deserve its assessment to be set aside so that the AO could grant
exemption under Section 13A of the Act.
(x) In view of the overall excess of expenditure over income and the
decision of the Supreme Court in Ranchi Club Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax (2001) 247 ITR 209 (SC), the interest charged under
Section 234A and 234B of the Act was required to be deleted.
(xii) The impugned order of the CIT (A) on the allowability of the
expenditure was set aside and the matter was restored to the AO with the
direction to decide it de novo. The expenditure could be allowed subject
to the condition that “there exists a nexus between the expenditure and
voluntary contributions, and the expenditure was incurred to attain the
aims and objects of the party”.
(xiii) Accordingly, the Assessee’s appeal was partly allowed and the
Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.
Orders on remand
44. Initially when these appeals were heard on 3rd January 2002, certain
questions of law were framed by the Court both in the Revenue’s appeal
as well as in the Assessee’s appeal. Meanwhile, in terms of the
45. On 12th November 2014 the Court framed a further question of law
in addition to those already framed by its order dated 3rd January 2002.
On 8th December 2015 in light of the submissions made by both learned
counsel for the Revenue as well as learned Senior counsel for the
Assessee, one further question of law was framed for consideration by
the Court in the Revenue's appeal, i.e., ITA No. 145 of 2001.
3. Whether, the ITAT was right in holding that the Assessee had
failed to fulfil the three conditions envisaged under Clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of Section 13A of the Act?
50. Before proceeding to interpret Section 13A, certain other terms and
expressions used in the provisions of the Act require to be noticed. The
expression ‘voluntary contributions’ has been defined under Section
2(24)(iia) of the Act as under:
“voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly
or partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an
institution established wholly or partly for such
purposes or by an association or institution referred to in
clause (21) or clause (23), or by a fund or trust or
institution referred to in sub clause (iv) or sub- clause (v)
of clause (23C) of section 10.
51. It is significant that the above definition does not include ‘voluntary
contributions received by a political party’. However, does that mean
that voluntary contributions received by a political party, which finds
mention as an exempted category of income under Section 13A of the
Act, is not otherwise ‘income’?
Provided that—
53. This was simultaneous with the insertion of Section 139(4B) of the
Act which reads as under:
“139 (4B). The chief executive officer (whether such
chief executive officer is known as Secretary or by any
other designation) of every political party shall, if the
total income in respect of which the political party is
assessable (the total income for this purpose being
computed under this Act without giving effect to the
provisions of Section 13A exceeds the maximum amount
which is not chargeable to income-tax, furnish a return of
such income of the previous year in the prescribed form
and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth
such other particulars as may be prescribed and all the
provisions of this Act, shall, so far as may be, apply as if
it were a return required to be furnished under sub-
section (1).
the these provisions appears to be that, after 1st April 1979, it was
incumbent on every registered political party to furnish a return of
income, if the total assessable of such political party exceeded the
maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax. In determining
the total income, the computation has to take place under the Act
“without giving effect to the provisions of Section 13A”.
57. The Income Tax Circular No. 245 dated 11th August 1978 also
explained the purport of the above provisions. It was clarified in para 4
of the said circular that the exemption under Section 13A of the Act
would not be available unless a political party fulfils the following
conditions:
(i) it keeps and maintains such books of accounts and other
documents that would enable the income tax officer to properly
deduce its income therefrom.
58. It requires to be noticed at this stage that Section 13-A of the Act has
undergone further changes in 2003 and as at present it reads as under:
Provided that—
(a) such political party keeps and maintains such books of account
and other documents as would enable the Assessing Officer to
properly deduce its income therefrom;
59. Thus the basic requirement under Section 13 A of the Act for a
registered political party to be able to claim exemption from income tax
remains the same. To strengthen the provision, the second proviso was
added to make it mandatory for a political party to submit a report to
the Election Commission of India under Section 29C (3) of the RP Act
if it wanted to seek exemption in terms of Section 13A of the Act.
63. Mr Aggarwal pointed out that under Section 14 of the Act, there
were various heads of income provided but there was no head of income
sale of coupons and purse money and donations and other such receipts
constitute voluntary contributions under Section 13A of the Act.
Referring to Section 29B of the RP Act and Section 293A of the
Companies Act 1956, he submitted that a wider meaning has to be given
to the expression ‘voluntary contributions’. After 11th September 2003,
the date on which Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act,
2003 came to force, a political party had to maintain records of each
voluntary contribution in excess of Rs. 20,000 in substitution of Rs.
10,000.
73. It is, therefore, clear that an income has to necessarily arise from a
receipt of money but all receipts do not qualify as ‘income’. What is
clear is that income does not include fixed capital or realising of fixed
capital by turning it to some other form of capital or money. It has to be
a periodical monetary receipt not in the nature of windfall. It has to be
earned with some sort of regularity from definite sources.
74. That takes us to Section 14 of the Act which specifies the heads of
income. Five distinct heads of income that are identified are:
(i) Salaries (Section 14 clause A)
(ii) Income from house property (Section 14 clause C)
(iii) Profits and gains of business or profession (Section 14 clause D)
(iv) Capital gains (Section 14 clause E), and
(v) Income from other sources (Section 14 clause F)
75. When the above heads of income are compared with the heads of
exempt income under Section 13A of the Act, as far as a political party
is concerned, three of the above heads are exempt from tax. These are
income from house property, income from other sources and capital
gains (the latter having been inserted by Finance Act, 2003 with
retrospective effect from 1st April 1979). Apart from the above three,
there is also mentioned ‘any income by way of voluntary contributions
received by a political party’ from any person.
77. Although the above argument appears attractive at the first blush, on
Wallace & Co. AIR 1932 PC 138, in the context of the Income Tax Act,
1922, held that Section 4(3)(v) of that Act was only clarificatory and
“must be due to the over anxiety of the draftsman to make this clear
beyond possibility of doubt”. Applying that analogy it has to be held
that the mere fact that income by way of voluntary contributions in the
hands of Trusts and other entities (other than the political party) is
deemed to be income under Section 2 (24) (iia) of the Act, will not mean
that it is not income as far as the political party is concerned.
82. The submission that there has to be in the first place a source of
income and in relation to it there has to be income from ‘other sources’
does not hold good in the present context since admittedly the INC has
also income from house property, which is reflected in its returns. That
apart, Section 56 (1) of the Act makes it clear that even if there was no
income under clauses A to E of Section 14 of the Act, there could be
income from other sources under clause F of Section 14 of the Act.
having to be some ‘material return’ for the donor may not be apposite in
the context of donations made to a political party. Such donation could
be a result of the donor endorsing the ideology or the manifesto of a
political party. It may be simply be an act of participation in a
democracy. An elector may believe that a plurality of political parties is
good for democracy. She may want to make donations to one or more
political parties while reserving to herself the right of deciding which
political party to support at the time of election. There could be multiple
reasons for donations.
85. The known tests for determining what could be said to be 'income'
for the purposes of the Act are, therefore, inadequate for determining
whether the voluntary contribution to a political party is ‘income’ in its
hands. It definitely forms the corpus from which expenses are incurred
by the political party. It is a regular source of income. It may or may not
be a windfall depending on the size of the donation.
91. Mr. Aggarwal makes an earnest plea that for the purposes of Section
13A of the Act, there is, in fact, no time limit specified for furnishing
the audited accounts. It is submitted that unlike certain other provisions
of the Explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 288 of the Act, are filed
that the AO may reasonably deduce the taxable income of the political
party therefrom. In other words, the requirement of maintaining the
audited accounts and furnishing those accounts in terms of the proviso
to Section 13A of the Act is not merely directory.
96. Given the above legal position regarding the mandatory requirement
of Section 13A of the Act, the CIT (A) was justified, and so was the
ITAT, in declining the application of the INC under Rule 46A seeking
permission to place on record the consolidated accounts at the appellate
stage.
97. The mere fact that the INC may have units in each of the states in
the country, which makes the task of consolidating the accounts a
tedious one, does not absolve it from the mandatory statutory
requirement of filing consolidated accounts of the central office and the
state units. A company can have branches all over the country and may
be required to file consolidated accounts of all those branches. There
can be no excuse for such company not doing so for any given AY.
Without there being audited accounts, none of the figures mentioned by
an Assessee in the returns can be verified. Where the accounts of an
Assessee fail to inspire confidence and merit rejection, or where there is
no full and true disclosure by the Assessee, a combination of Sections
143 and 144 of the Act would come into play and the AO would have to
deploy the best judgment assessment. Therefore, in the present case,
merely because the INC had several state units and other associated
bodies, whose individual accounts had to be tallied and finalised, was
not a sufficient cause for it not to comply with the requirements of the
proviso to Section 13A of the Act by the time of completion of the
assessment.
98. The Court, therefore, holds that the INC failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause in terms of Rule 46A(1)(b) and 46A(1)(c) of the Rules.
The decision of the CIT(A) as affirmed by the ITAT, is upheld.
end of the relevant FY. The consolidated accounts were tendered before
the CIT (A) only on 4th November 1997. This was certainly an
unacceptable and inordinate delay. Given the context of Section 13A of
the Act, such delay could not possibly have been condoned.
100. In any event, The audited 'consolidated' accounts filed before the
CIT (A) also do not satisfy the mandatory legal requirement. The Court
pointed out to Mr Aggarwal during the course of hearing various
discrepancies and shortcomings therein. The auditor’s report is not in
the format that one expects a duly qualified CA to adopt. When it was
plain to the CA that the receipts of the state units and the items of
expenditure incurred by them units were not supported by documents, a
qualified report ought to have been furnished. On the other hand, the
Court finds that a standard format report has been adopted. The
auditor’s report dated 1st July 1997 for the AY 1994-95 reads as under:
“The President
Indian National Congress
New Delhi.
102. It is not understood how despite the above note, the auditor can
simply certify that the balance sheet and the statement of income and
expenditure as on 31st March 1994 are in agreement with the books of
accounts, vouchers, receipts, books etc. "produced before us". In the
facts of the present case, when admittedly the complete figure of the
receipts and expenditure of all the state units was not available, it should
not have been possible for an auditor to make that kind of a statement.
The purpose of whole exercise of audit undertaken by a CA, is to
examine if the accounts maintained by an Assessee give a true and fair
view of its financial affairs. Significantly, the above report does not use
the expression ‘true and fair view’ at all. There is also a difference
between an Auditor saying that the accounts are in accordance with the
Assessee's books of accounts and the Auditor saying that they are in
accordance with the books of accounts "produced before us". If an
Assessee has failed to maintain or produce all the books of accounts,
receipts, vouchers etc., in accordance with the mandatory legal
103. It is also disconcerting to note that the same auditor has issued
identical certificates for other AYs for which simultaneously accounts
have been finalised. This kind of an auditor’s report, to say the least,
leaves much to be desired. It does not comport with the degree of
seriousness with which a duly qualified auditor is expected to discharge
his statutory obligations. An auditor is discharging both the professional
and a statutory duty. He is licensed under the expectation that he will
faithfully discharge the above obligations. In the present case, the Court
is constrained to note that the auditor’s report submitted before the CIT
(A) on 4th November 1997 is woefully short of the requirement of the
law.
104. Mr. Aggarwal tried to suggest that a format was prescribed by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’) for accounts to be
tendered by political parties only recently, i.e. in February 2012. He also
referred to the instructions recently issued regarding the filing of income
tax returns by political parties.
106. The covering note of the President ICAI acknowledges that "the
present system of accounting and financial reporting followed by
political parties in India does not adequately meet the accountability
concerns of the stakeholders." The 'Illustrative format of Auditor's
report' appended to the note requires the auditors to state inter alia that:
''In our opinion and to the best of our information and
according to the explanations given to us, the said
accounts give a true and fair view in conformity with the
accounting principles generally accepted in India''
107. The above guidance note of the ICAI can be said to clarify the legal
requirement regarding the standard of reporting that is expected of an
auditor discharging both a professional and a statutory responsibility. It
does not mean, as was suggested by Mr Aggarwal, that prior thereto
there was no such requirement of a auditor's report to satisfy the
statutory mandate of Section 13A of the Act.
108. Since no attempt has been made by the INC to place before the
AO, or even before the CIT (A), acceptable audited accounts, from
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which the AO could deduce the taxable income of the assessee, the
Court has no hesitation to hold that the mandatory requirement of the
proviso to Section 13A of the Act was not fulfilled by the Assessee.
Such a failure could not have been condoned either by the CIT (A) or
the AO.
on notice that all orders passed on remand are subject to the outcome of
the appeal filed by the Revenue in this Court.
with Section 13A of the Act, thereby defeating the very purpose of the
said provisions as was foreseen by the Supreme Court in Common
Cause v. Union of India (supra). In the circumstances, the rule of
consistency cannot be applied to condone the violation of the law by the
INC.
115. In this context it was submitted by learned counsel for the Revenue
that although the AO did not mention Section 144 of the Act, it was
permissible for him to have made such an estimation of income. It is
further stated that estimation is possible even under Section 143(3) of
the Act. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Seth Gunmukh Singh
v CIT [1944] 12 ITR 393 (Lahore) and Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills v
CIT [1954] 26 ITR 775 (SC). It was submitted that this kind of a defect
is curable under Section 292B of the Act. It was submitted that in the
facts of the case since the INC failed to comply with the terms of notice
under Section 142(1) of the Act, it was open to the AO to make a best
116. As has already been noted, the INC failed to comply with the
requirements of the proviso to Section 13A of the Act and was therefore
not eligible to claim exemption from payment of income tax. The INC
failed to produce the authentic and audited consolidated accounts of its
central office and state units which could be said to represent the true
and fair view of its financial affairs. It is also true that by the time the
assessment was completed, the INC could produce only the accounts of
its central office and 14 state units. The question that arises is whether,
in such circumstances, an AO could have resorted to best judgment
assessment?
118. The types of elections held would also have a bearing on the
income of the party. For e.g., elections to the Parliament would require a
different level of activity when compared to elections to a state
Legislative Assembly or to a local body. Also the profile of the
contributors may determine the size and frequency of the contribution.
For instance, just a few corporate entities could make a very sizeable
donation to a political party compared to a political party which has a
large number of individual donors. Therefore, there are too many
imponderables that make the task of estimating, with a degree of
certainty, the income of a political party extremely difficult. This kind of
an exercise would require collating a vast amount of data which as of
now does not exist in the public domain particularly with political
parties resisting attempts at bringing them within the ambit of the Right
to Information Act, 2005. Although accounts have to be furnished by
candidates to the Election Commission of India, that per se cannot form
a reliable source of estimation of the voluntary contributions that may be
made to a political party.
121. The question that then arises is whether the ITAT ought to have
remanded the matter to the AO for re-computing the INC's taxable
income for the Ay 1994-95? Here the Court would like to recapitulate
that we are dealing with AY 1994-95 and the current year is 2016. What
was unable to produced in these 22 years cannot suddenly be produced
by the INC even if the matter is sent back to the AO at this stage. It
would be a futile exercise particularly since even the so-called audited
accounts of the INC, submitted on 4th November 1997 at the stage of
the appeal before the CIT (A), are not reliable. The AO would be
unable, in the circumstances, to determine the possible extent of
voluntary contributions received by the state units.
124. The legal position is that no deduction can be allowed with respect
to the expenditure incurred by the political party for any purpose
whatsoever if it fails to comply with the basic requirements of Section
13A of the Act.
126. Consequently, the Court disagrees with the decision of the CIT (A)
restricting the expenditure of the Assessee to 60% of the amount
claimed and order of the CIT (A) and the ITAT to that extent are set
aside.
Interest
128. While deleting the interest under Section 234A and 234B of the
Act, the ITAT relied on the judgment of the Patna High Court in Ranchi
Club v. CIT (1996) 217 ITR 72 (Pat) against which an SLP was
dismissed by a one line order in CIT v Ranchi Club, [2001] 247 ITR
209. However, recently in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bhagat
Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. [2015] 279 CTR 185 (SC), the decision in
Ranchi Club Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) has been
overruled. The consequent legal position is that notwithstanding that the
AO may not have separately dealt with the issue of interest in the
assessment order, interest can nevertheless be charged on the tax amount
due under Section 234A and 234B of the Act. Consequently, the
decision of the ITAT on this aspect is set aside.
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Summary of conclusions
129. It is necessary at this stage for the Court to summarise its
conclusions:
(i) For understanding and interpreting Section 13A of the Act, it would
serve no purpose to compare it with Section 11 of the Act which applies
to Trusts.
(ii) Section 13A of the Act is not a computation section. Income by way
of voluntary contributions would be excluded only subject to fulfilment
of the conditions stipulated under Section 13A of the Act.
(iii) It could never have been the legislative intention that voluntary
contributions received by a political party that does not satisfy the
requirement of Section 13A of the Act - viz., maintaining books of
accounts, keeping a record of voluntary contributions in excess of
Rs.10,000 (now enhanced to Rs. 20,000) and getting the accounts
audited - would be exempt from tax. In such event, the income of a
political party by way of voluntary contributions would be included in
the taxable income. Voluntary contributions are not capital receipts.
(xi) The final audited accounts tendered at the appellate stage contained
various discrepancies and shortcomings. The auditor’s report submitted
before the CIT (A) on 4th November 1997 is woefully short of the
requirement of the law.
(xii) Since the INC failed to place before the AO, or even before the CIT
(A), acceptable audited accounts, from which the AO could deduce the
taxable income of the assessee, the mandatory requirement of the
proviso to Section 13A of the Act was not fulfilled by the INC.
(xiii) With the Revenue having preferred an appeal before this Court
against the impugned order of the ITAT, all further proceedings
consequent upon the remand to the AO were subject to the outcome of
under Sections 234A and 234B of the Act, even if the same was not
separately dealt with in the assessment order. The decision of the ITAT
on this aspect is set aside.
Question No.1 is answered by holding that the Assessee INC was not
entitled to any exemption in respect of the disclosed income by way of
voluntary contributions i.e., Rs.25,12,68,081-Rs.15,00,00,000 (the latter
amount being the estimate by the AO which has been set aside by this
Court).
Question No.3 is answered by holding that the ITAT was not justified
in holding that the objects of a political party fall within the scope of the
expression any other object of general public utility appearing in Section
2(15) of the Act.
before the CIT (A) could not be accepted as evidence since they were
not audited till the assessment was framed and, therefore, the INC was
not entitled to exemption under Section 13A of the Act.
132. The impugned order dated 9th April 2001 of the ITAT in ITA Nos.
4181/Del/98 and 5100/Del/98 for AY 1994-95 and the corresponding
order dated 31st March 1997 of the AO and the order dated 8th July
1998 of the CIT (A) shall stand modified in terms of this judgment. It is
clarified that the inasmuch as this Court has set aside the impugned
order of the ITAT to the extent it has remanded the proceedings to the
AO, the orders passed on remand by the AO, the CIT (A) and the ITAT
do not survive.
133. The appeals of the INC and the Revenue are disposed of in the
above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.
Postscript
134. This case demonstrates the need for a slew of legislative measures
that need to be put in place for an effective check on the influence of
money on the electoral process. Recently in Ashok Shankarrao Chavan
v. Madhavrao Kinhalkar (2014)7 SCC 99 the Supreme Court observed:
“48. It is common knowledge as is widely published in the Press
and Media that nowadays in public elections payment of cash to
the electorate is rampant and the Election Commission finds it
extremely difficult to control such a menace. There is no
truthfulness in the attitude and actions of the contesting
candidates in sticking to the requirement of law, in particular to
Section 77 and there is every attempt being made to violate the
restrictions imposed in the matter of incurring election expenses
with a view to woo the electorate concerned and thereby, gaining
their votes in their favour by corrupt means viz by purchasing the
votes..."
S. MURALIDHAR, J
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
MARCH 23, 2016
Rk/b’nesh/dn