An Assessment of Inter State Relation in India

with Special Reference To Inter State River

Water Disputes Act, 1956
A dissertation to be submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirement for the award of degree of
Master of Laws

In

Institute of Legal Studies

By

Abhinav Shukla
LLM (CAL)
Semester II
Roll No. 202310301030053

Under the Guidance

of

Dr. Mahendra Kumar

Associate Professor
Institute of Legal Studies

Lucknow-Deva Road, Uttar Pradesh

Session: 2023-24
 SHRI RAMSWAROOP
MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
(Established by UP State Govt. ACT 1 to 2012)
Lucknow-Deva Road, Uttar Pradesh-225003

Date: …………………..

TO WHOMSOEVER IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that Mr. Abhinav Shukla, LL.M., CAL has completed his dissertation, topic

“An Assessment of Inter State Relation in India with Special Reference to Inter State

River Water Disputes Act, 1956” under my supervision, for the award of degree of Master of

Laws at Shri Ramswaroop Memorial University. Dissertation supervisor will not be

responsible for any type of plagiarism, typological error or any factual legal infirmities.

He has completed all formalities as required under the ordinance and the dissertation is

forwarded for evaluation.

Dr. Mahendra Kumar

Associate Professor
Institute of Legal Studies
 SHRI RAMSWAROOP
MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
(Established by UP State Govt. ACT 1 to 2012)
Lucknow-Deva Road, Uttar Pradesh-225003

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the Dissertation entitled “An Assessment of Inter State Relation in

India with Special Reference to Inter State River Water Disputes Act, 1956” Submitted

by me in the fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of "Master of Laws" of

Shri Ramswaroop Memorial University, is a record of my own work carried under the

supervision of Dr. Mahendra Kumar, Institute of Legal Studies.

To the best of my knowledge this Dissertation has been submitted.

Abhinav Shukla
Semester: II
LL.M., CAL
Roll No.:202310301030053
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all those who have contributed to the
successful completion of this research endeavor.
First and foremost, I extend my heartfelt appreciation to my supervisor, [Supervisor's Name],
for their invaluable guidance, unwavering support, and insightful feedback throughout the
course of this study. Their expertise and encouragement have been instrumental in shaping
the direction and quality of this research.
I am deeply indebted to the scholars, jurists, and policymakers whose seminal works and
contributions have served as a beacon of knowledge and inspiration in navigating the intricate
landscape of inter-state relations and the legal framework surrounding water disputes in
India.
Furthermore, I extend my gratitude to the respondents and experts who generously shared
their time, insights, and experiences, enriching this study with diverse perspectives and real-
world insights.
I am also grateful to my peers and colleagues for their constructive criticism, stimulating
discussions, and moral support, which have greatly contributed to refining my understanding
and analysis of the subject matter.
Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the support of my family and friends whose
unwavering encouragement and understanding have been a constant source of motivation and
strength throughout this academic journey.
In conclusion, I recognize that this research would not have been possible without the
collective contributions and support of the aforementioned individuals and entities. While any
errors or shortcomings remain my own, I am immensely grateful for the guidance,
encouragement, and assistance received from all quarters.

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Abhinav Shukla

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter No. Title Page No.

Acknowledgement i

Table of contents ii

Chapter 1. Introduction 1-10

1. Background and Context

2. Significance of Inter-State Relations in India

3. Evolution of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act,

1956
4. Objectives and Scope of the Study

5. Research Questions and Hypotheses

6. Justification of the Study

7. Methodology

Chapter 2. Constitutional Framework of Inter-State

Relations 11-35
1. Distribution of Powers among States and the Centre
2. Federalism in India: A Historical Perspective
3. Role of the Constitution in Inter-State Relations
4. Key Constitutional Provisions related to Water
Distribution
5. Judicial Interpretations and Precedents
Chapter 3. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: An
Overview 36-60
1. Genesis and Historical Context
2. Objectives and Salient Features of the Act
3. Applicability and Jurisdiction
4. Case Studies of Major River Water Disputes
5. Critiques and Challenges
Chapter 4. Analysis of Adjudication Mechanisms under the 61-78
Act
1. Role of Tribunals in Resolving Disputes
 2. Challenges Faced by Tribunals
3. Comparative Study of Tribunal Decisions
4. Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Dispute
Resolution Mechanism
5. Legislative Amendments and Their Impact
Chapter 5. Conclusion and Suggestions 79-91
Summary of Findings
Implications for Inter-State Relations
Policy Implications and Reform Recommendations
Concluding Remarks
Suggestions
BIBLIOGRAPGHY 92-93
 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.

2. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the
deep. And the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.

3. And Gods said, let the water under the heaven be gathered together unto one place,
and let the dry lands appears: and it was so.

10. And God called the dry land earth; and the gathering together of the water called the
seas: and God saw that it was good.”1

The Kings of Sokia and the Kolia battled more than two thousand year ago over sharing of
the river Rohini’s waters2. Finally, the Buddha served as a peacemaker through mediating.
Water has always been regarded as res communes since the time of the Romans, which means
that it can never be owned and can only be used 3. In the line of common law principle water
law passed during the British regime based on the principle that flowing water is “negative
commodity not susceptible to ownership” 4. The rights that are attached with water is only
usufructuary right i.e. the right to use and take water5. The Hindu Kings often saw themselves
as trustees of the natural resources as part of their Dharma. But with the arrival of British in
India the notion of water displaced from common property to exercising of sovereign control
over the natural resources. Over a period of time numerous legislative initiative are taken to
shelter state sovereignty over water resources. This reform is being made in order to increase
economic interest by improving the irrigational system, which helped to promote agricultural
and make it one of the main sources of land revenue. Construction of irrigation systems and
their management were the government of British India's most distinctive tasks and

1
The First Book of Moses called Genesis- from the Holy Bible containing the old and New Testaments,
appointed to be read in churches, London, Cambridge University Press, 1909
2
Dodda Srinivasa Rao, “Inter-state Water Disputes in India: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions and
Settlement Machinery”. India”, 1998.
3
K.K Lahari, “Inter- State River Water Disputes Act- Genesis, Evolution And Analysis”.
4
Tony George Puthucherril, “Riparianism in India Water Jurisprudence, in Water and the Laws in India”,ed.2011
5
Supra 4

1
responsibilities. The Government of India Act 6, 1935 made irrigation was seen as a subject
that was primarily the provinces' competence, and the central government's involvement was
restricted to inter-state water conflicts.7 According to the Act, if a province files a complaint
against another, the governor general may appoint a commission to look into the situation and
submit a report.8 Based on the report the governor- general could pass final order9. The
Federal courts and any other Courts jurisdiction were restricted.
After the independence, the Constitution of India has adopted the federal arrangement which
elaborated the structure for the division of power between two tier governments 10. The Article
262(1) of the Constitution of India 11, 1950 allowed for the passage of legislation by the
parliament to settle disputes over the use, distribution, or management of water from or in any
interstate river or river valley. The Article 262(2) 12 barred the jurisdiction of Supreme Court
or any other court in respect of inter-state water disputes. However for more than six year
there was no legislation to dispense with inter-state water disputes. It was finally in 28th
August 1956 the Parliament legislated the Inter-State Water Disputes Act 13, 1956 under
article 262 of the constitution. The reason for enacting this legislation is provide to
mechanism for the settlement of water disputes which may arise among states. Under article
262 of the constitution empowered the parliament to enact legislation to enable for the
settlement of disputes regarding the usage, distribution, or management of any interstate
river's and river valley's waters and act further allow the parliament to establish tribunals for
adjudications of such disputes. Presently nine water disputes tribunal has been set up of out of
which four have attained the finality. The remaining five continue to simmer due the complex
center and state relation. The interplay between the Parliament, the Union and the Executive
is not effective for the adjudication of inter-states river dispute. This paper will discuss the
constitutional issue relating to water disputes and the existing legal framework. In the course
of discussion this paper will analyze complex cooperative federalism in respect of water and
it will further discuss on the proposition that consolidation of tribunal will solve and balance
the interstate water disputes.

6
Government of India Act,1935
7
Supra 6, Government of India Act,1935
8
Government of India Act,1935
9
Section 130-134,
10
K.K Lahari, “Inter- State River Water Disputes Act- Genesis, Evolution And Analysis”
11
Art.262 (1), the Constitution of India
12
Art.262 (2), the Constitution of India
13
“Inter- State water disputes Act,1956”

2
Significance of Inter State Relations in India
Inter-State relations in India pertain to the connections and engagements among the
constituent entities – states and union territories – as delineated by the Indian Constitution.
Part XI of the Constitution governs Administrative relations, while Part XIII regulates trade
and commerce. The interaction among Indian states is predominantly collaborative, with
concerted efforts aimed at implementing national policies and initiatives, as well as
addressing shared concerns. Nevertheless, friction may arise between states concerning
certain matters, including resource distribution and funding allocation.

Harmonious interstate relations hold significant importance for various reasons in India:

• National unity and integration: Maintaining harmonious interstate relations is crucial for
upholding national unity and ensuring the cohesive functioning of the country as a unified
entity.
• Economic development: Interstate cooperation is indispensable for the economic
advancement of the nation, facilitating the unhindered movement of goods, services, and
individuals across state borders.
• Upholding law and order: Interstate cooperation plays a pivotal role in preserving law and
order by enabling states to collaborate in combating crime and terrorism, thereby
safeguarding the welfare and security of citizens.
• Dispute resolution: It facilitates the resolution of disputes between states and mitigates the
escalation of conflicts, particularly significant within India's federal system where states
possess substantial autonomy.

There exist various Constitutional provisions concerning Inter-State relations in India:

• Article 261: Throughout the entirety of India's territory, full faith and credit must be
accorded to public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of both the Union and every state.
• Article 262: Parliament is empowered to enact laws for the resolution of any dispute or
complaint relating to the utilization, allocation, or governance of waters within or involving
any Inter-State river or river valley.
• Article 263: It facilitates the resolution of disputes and disagreements between states by
establishing an Inter-State Council.
• Articles 301 to 307: Part XIII of the constitution addresses trade, commerce, and
interactions within the Indian territory.

3
There are various methods to uphold harmonious relationships between states in India:
• Foster cooperation and dialogue: Promoting states to cooperate and engage in dialogue
with each other can aid in establishing trust and comprehension, facilitating conflict
resolution.
• Address developmental inequalities: Mitigating developmental gaps among states can
encourage inter-state collaboration and alleviate tensions.
• Strengthen federal institutions: Enhancing federal institutions like the Inter-State council
and Zonal councils can facilitate increased cooperation and coordination among states.
• Encourage economic integration: Stimulating economic integration among states through
initiatives like establishing free trade zones or developing common marketplaces can promote
inter-state cooperation and alleviate tensions.
• Cultivate cultural exchange: Encouraging cultural exchange among states can nurture
understanding, mutual respect, and contribute to national identity development.

Evolution of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956

Our Constitution broadly follows the framework of the Government of India Act, 1935. Prior
to its enactment, governmental power was largely centralized in the Secretary of State. Even
under the Government of India Act, 1919, significant irrigation projects couldn't proceed
without explicit approval from the Secretary of State. Disputes between provinces on this
matter were resolved by the Secretary of State, whose decisions were final. However, the
Government of India Act, 1919, did grant some autonomy to provinces, including control
over irrigation as a reserved subject.

Further autonomy was granted under Entry 19 of List 2 in the 7th Schedule of the
Government of India Act, 1935. This transfer of power allowed provincial governments to
legislate on matters concerning water, including supplies, irrigation, canals, drainage,
embankments, water storage, and water power. The executive authority of provinces was
made parallel to their legislative power, subject to certain restrictions. Provinces were thus
empowered to manage water supplies within their jurisdiction, albeit within the constraints
outlined in Sections 130 to 133 of the Act.

4
However, central oversight mechanisms were still in place. Sections 130 to 133 allowed the
Governor-General to address complaints between provinces regarding water supply
interference. A Commission could be appointed to investigate such matters, with the
Governor-General or His Majesty in Council issuing final orders if necessary. These orders
were binding on the provinces involved, unless challenged through a reference to His Majesty
in Council. These central safeguards ensured that no province could take actions detrimental
to the interests of another province or its inhabitants under the Government of India Acts,
1919 and 1935.

Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, British India was split into two independent
dominions, India and Pakistan, effective August 15, 1947. Section 2 delineated the territories
constituting these new dominions. Section 6 empowered the legislatures of each dominion to
enact laws, even those with extraterritorial reach. However, Section 8(2) mandated that the
governance of each dominion, its provinces, and other parts should align with the
Government of India Act, 1935, unless modified by the respective Constituent Assembly
under Section 8(1). Concurrently, Section 3(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order,
1947 applied the Government of India Act, 1935 to India from August 15, 1947, with
specified alterations and additions. In the absence of alternate provisions from the Constituent
Assembly, the Government of India Act, 1935 (as amended by the 1947 Order) remained in
force until the Indian Constitution took effect on January 26, 1950. Consequently, Sections
130 to 133 of the Government of India Act, 1935, with minor adjustments due to the
dominion formation, persisted until then.

As elaborated in the subsequent segment titled "Genesis – 1935-1949," the exclusion of

jurisdiction clause in Section 133 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was incorporated
into Article 262(2) of the Indian Constitution. Additionally, Article 262(1) mandated a
separate legislative framework for resolving water-related disputes, leading to the enactment
of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, almost six years post the Constitution's
commencement. This act mirrored the provisions of Sections 130 to 132 of the 1935 Act.

In a manner reminiscent of Entry 19 in List-2 of the 7th Schedule of the Act of 1935,
equivalent legislative authority was granted to States by Entry 17 in List-2 of the 7th
Schedule of the Constitution of India, albeit subject to the supremacy of the Center's powers
outlined in Entry 56 of List-1 of the Constitution of India. Hence, through Entry 56 of List-1,

5
the Central government retained paramount legislative authority. While Entry 17 of List-2 of
the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India granted legislative power to State Legislatures,
in line with their executive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution of India
[similar to Section 49(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935], it did not confer ownership
rights upon a State by deeming water coursing through its territory as its possession.

The inaugural authoritative declaration regarding the rights between States concerning
flowing waters or the rights of an interstate river was documented in the report of the Indus
Commission on July 13, 1942. This Commission was established by a notification on
September 11, 1941, from the Governor General Secretariat under Section 131 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, thus resembling a Tribunal under the Act of 1956. Tasked
with investigating the complaint from the Government of Sind regarding their stake in the
waters of the Indus River, the Commission commenced its duties on September 15, 1941. The
Commission was headed by the Honorable Mr. Justice B.N. Rau, a Judge of the Calcutta
High Court, appointed as Chairman, with Mr. P.F.B. Hickey, D.S.O., a retired Chief Engineer
from the Irrigation Branch of the United Provinces, and Mr. E.H. Chave, I.S.E., Chief
Engineer of Madras, serving as Members of the Commission.

Statement of Problem:

Although 75 per cent of the earth's surface is covered by water, only a minuscule proportion
of it is available for human needs as fresh water. These are found in lakes, streams and rivers.
The economic prosperity of a country depends upon its natural resources. Fresh water is one
of a country's most critical natural resources. The waters of a river can be exploited and made
to yield power in the form of electricity for irrigation and industrial use. Apart from this,
rivers were used for navigation, which is one of the cheapest modes of transport. Rivers are
also a source of aquatic life like fish which form an integral part of the ecological food chain.
With so little water available, disputes over fresh water are common. For the most part,
India's economy is based on agriculture, which largely depends on rainfall. Rainfall, however,
is very unevenly distributed in India and is solely dependent on the monsoons and
cataclysmic variation in the climatic condition in recent times. The number of rainy days in a
season has come down, and it is so erratic that there is heavy rain on some days and only
traces of it in the rest of the season. Unequal distribution of rainfall leads to drought in some
areas and floods in others. Irrigation, therefore, is a necessity. It can be achieved by

6
constructing dams across rivers with surplus water and diverting this surplus through canals
to areas with a deficiency. This country has fourteen major inter-State rivers flowing through
the basin of one or more of its constituting States. India also has forty-four medium rivers, of
which nine are inter-State. The river networks are reasonably spread over its entire territory
except in the northwest region of Rajasthan. There is a fundamental difference between the
snow-fed perennial river of northern India; and the river of central and southern India. The
major rivers in the country are inter-state in character. For example, the Indus River basin in
India includes Kashmir, Punjab, and parts of Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Rajasthan. The
Ganga and its tributaries run through Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh,
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal. The Mahanadi flows through Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, and parts of Bihar and Maharashtra. The Godavari basin includes the states
of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. The
Cauvery flows through Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The development of river water
resources for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation has been progressing steadily
since Independence. Many multi-purpose river valley schemes have been implemented on
inter-state rivers. Some river valley projects are the Bhakra Nangal, the Hirakud and the
Tungabhadra. These projects provide for irrigation, power and flood control. In many of these
projects, the states have cooperated by jointly developing the river concerned in an integrated
manner. They, therefore, derive the optimum benefits from a river. However, this cooperation
is only seen in some places. To solve this problem, various attempts were made; a first
attempt to resolve the problem was the Government of India Act 1935. Later, it found a place
in Indian Constitution under Article 262. In 1956 parliament passed the law Inter-State Water
Disputes Act. More than 67 years have passed since its establishment, and during that period,
nine inter-state water disputes have been referred to the tribunals. Presently, four out of the
nine attained finality and the rest five still struggle to attain finality.
Water disputes between states are becoming more volatile and animated as the per capita
availability of water has fallen drastically, and now India is included in the list of water stress
countries. This paper will provide an overview of the federal relations in water management
and the related legislative apparatus to resolve inter-State water disputes in India. Part I draw
the evolution and genesis of inter-state water dispute Act and constitutional mandate under
article 262 of the Constitution of India. Part II deals with Inter-State River Water Dispute
Act, 1956 which includes background, evolution, amendments and exhausted analysis of
various section of the Act. Part III deals with Tribunalization of water disputes under
InterState River Water Dispute Act which include the remedial solution for setting of a

7
permanent tribunal with appellate tribunal to decide water disputes. Part IV deal with nature
of water of water federalism.

Research Objectives:
1) This paper will discuss about the remedial solution of transferring subject water
from State list to Concurrent List so that central laws have override the state laws in case of
disputes between states
2) This paper will discuss about unification of tribunal i.e. the Union taking control
over all the inter-states water disputes tribunal and establishing a permanent tribunal, to
avoid legal disputes in water sharing.

Research Question:
1) Should water be transferred from the State List in the Constitution to the
Concurrent List for better management?
2) Should India persist with the tribunal system, which takes up water disputes on
and off, or replace it with a permanent Water Tribunal with an appellate tribunal?
3) To what extent has the constitutional framework, particularly Article 262 of the
Indian Constitution, effectively addressed and resolved inter-state river water disputes,
and what challenges persist in its implementation?
4) Should there be a reconsideration of the legislative placement of water-related
matters in the State List of the Constitution, or is the current distribution of powers
between the states and the center adequate for addressing inter-state river water disputes?
5) What is the effectiveness of the current tribunal system established under the Inter-
State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, in adjudicating disputes, and are there alternative
mechanisms that could provide more timely and efficient resolution?

Hypothesis:
1) Transferring water-related matters from the State List to the Concurrent List
would lead to a more effective and timely resolution of inter-state river water
disputes. This hypothesis aims to explore the impact of legislative jurisdiction on
the efficiency of resolving water disputes and whether a shift in constitutional
placement could enhance the dispute resolution process.

8
H0 (Null Hypothesis): Transferring water-related matters from the State List to the
Concurrent List would not lead to a more effective and timely resolution of inter-state river
water disputes. This hypothesis posits that the legislative jurisdiction, regardless of its
placement in the constitution, does not significantly influence the efficiency of resolving
water disputes between states.
H1 (Alternative Hypothesis): Transferring water-related matters from the State List to the
Concurrent List would lead to a more effective and timely resolution of inter-state river water
disputes. This hypothesis suggests that a shift in constitutional placement to the Concurrent
List could positively impact the dispute resolution process by enhancing coordination and
cooperation among states.

2) The existing tribunal system, as outlined in the Inter-State River Water Disputes
Act, 1956, is equally effective in addressing inter-state river water disputes as
compared to a proposed permanent Water Tribunal with an appellate tribunal.
This hypothesis aims to assess the comparative effectiveness of the existing
tribunal system and a proposed permanent tribunal, considering factors such as
speed of resolution, consistency in decisions, and overall fairness.
H0 (Null Hypothesis): There is no significant difference in the effectiveness of the
existing tribunal system, as outlined in the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956,
and the proposed permanent Water Tribunal with an appellate tribunal, in addressing
inter-state river water disputes.
H1 (Alternative Hypothesis): The proposed permanent Water Tribunal with an appellate
tribunal is significantly more effective in addressing inter-state river water disputes
compared to the existing tribunal system outlined in the Inter-State River Water Disputes
Act, 1956.

Research Methodology:

This Paper has used doctrinal methodology to study the water laws and policy in the
international regime, followed by what prevails at the domestic level. The area is complex
because there is nothing like the water law or the water policy in the international sense of
the term or, for that matter, at the domestic level. Much of the water law discourse, as we
see, is essentially related to many other ecosystems, which either enclose a water body or

9
are alongside a water stream. The Supreme Court of India has recognized water as an
ancillary right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This water right is being
considered but has yet to be actualized, not even articulated in any policy or law in India.
The Paper discovered the position of Water Federalism in a unique two-tier system with
the constitutional and enabling provision for water management and inter-state water
dispute resolution. These sketches the analysis Inter-State Water Dispute Act under the
mandate of Article 262 of the constitution and draws a remedial solution of replacing an
ad hoc tribunal with a permanent one, including the subject water's expertise and an
appellate tribunal.

10
 CHAPTER 2
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS

Distribution of Powers among Centre and States

"The Indian Constitution is a federal Constitution in as much as it established what may
be called a dual polity which will consist of the Union at the Centre and the States at the
periphery each endowed with sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned to
them respectively by the Constitution.".- D.R. Ambedkar

The Constitution doesn't explicitly mention "federalism," but it implies a governance

structure that is predominantly federal. K.C. Wheare, a pioneer of modern federal theories,
defined federalism as "the method of dividing power so that general and regional
governments are each within a sphere co-ordinate and independent." He described the
Indian Constitution as quasi-federal, or a unique type of federation. In a federal nation, the
relationship between the Center and the States is crucial in understanding the dual nature
of power distribution. Both the Center and the States are deemed superior within their
respective realms. The Indian Constitution labels the nation as a "Union of States" and
dedicates a section to 'Union-State Relations,' delineating the distribution of executive,
legislative, and financial powers between them. Given the superiority of both the Center
and the States within their domains, they are expected to maintain a delicate balance and
harmony. Consequently, various clauses within India's constitution govern Center-State
Relations across different levels.

Types Of Centre State Relations:

Part XI of the Indian Constitution focuses on center-state relations, delineating both
legislative and administrative connections between the central government and the state
governments. This section lays down the framework for the distribution of powers and
responsibilities between the Center and the States, ensuring a balance of authority and
autonomy.

Within Part XII of the Constitution, provisions regarding financial relations between the
Center and the States are outlined. These laws govern the allocation of financial resources,
taxation powers, and fiscal responsibilities between the central government and the state

11
governments. This ensures a fair and equitable distribution of financial resources while
maintaining the fiscal stability of the nation.

In summary, Part XI and Part XII of the Indian Constitution play crucial roles in defining
and regulating the relationships between the Center and the States, encompassing
legislative, administrative, and financial aspects to ensure effective governance and
cooperation between the different levels of government.

Legislative Relations
Articles 245 to 255 focus on the legislative relationships between the Union and the states,
particularly concerning the Parliament and state legislatures. These articles examine the
extent of legislative authority held by both the Union and the states. Upon analysis, it
becomes evident that the Parliament possesses overriding authority over state legislatures.
These articles delineate various subjects for legislative action, the repercussions of
inconsistencies between state and national laws, the Parliament's residual powers, and
several other provisions. Additionally, Schedule VII delineates the Union List, State List,
and Concurrent List.

Administrative Relations
Articles 256 to 263 address administrative relations, particularly between the Central
Government and various state governments. Despite India's federal structure, it exhibits
unitary traits. Article 256 emphasizes that state governments must adhere to laws enacted
by Parliament and refrain from carrying out executive or administrative functions in
contravention of these laws. The Sarkaria Commission recommended cooperative
federalism to foster better relations between the Centre and the states. This
recommendation was deemed essential due to the frequent conflicts and lack of trust
among multiple parties operating at both federal and state levels, resulting in ineffective
governance.

Financial Relation
Part XII of the Constitution, encompassing Articles 264 to 293, elucidates the financial
relationship between the Central government and the states. Given India's federal
structure, it upholds the principle of power division concerning taxation, with the Central
government bearing the responsibility of fund allocation to the states. This document

12
comprehensively covers all pertinent provisions in this regard. Schedule VII delineates the
taxation authority of both the Center and the states, incorporating various regulations
pertaining to tax imposition and distribution by both entities, state grants, surcharges, and
related matters. An illustrative instance of this financial interplay between the center and
states is the Goods and Services Tax, a dual-structured tax system.

Centre State Relations In India

The Indian Constitution has a federal structure but tends to favor a unitary system.
Strengthening the federal setup is crucial to cater to the needs of people governed by state
administrations while maintaining the unity of India. Consequently, the relationship
between the central government and state governments, involving agreements on their
respective powers, functions, and responsibilities, has always been vital. However, the
current framework leans heavily towards centralization, with legislative, administrative,
and financial powers predominantly concentrated in the hands of the central government.
This leaves the states with numerous obligations but limited autonomy. Legislative
concerns include encroachments by the central government into subjects listed under state
jurisdiction and delays in obtaining approval for important bills passed by state
assemblies. In the financial realm, issues revolve around the increasing centralization of
powers by the central government in areas such as resource mobilization, allocation, and
other crucial aspects of economic decision-making like planning.

With the growing call for restructuring Centre-State relations, the Union Government
established the Sarkaria Commission in 1983. Despite taking approximately five years to
produce its report, the recommendations of this Commission fell short in resolving the
fundamental issues at hand, with only minor enhancements in the financial domain. These
included empowering municipalities to issue tax-free bonds, supporting Chief Ministers'
decisions on consignment tax, and slightly extending the timeframe for overdraft loans.
Regrettably, even these recommendations from the Sarkaria Commission remained
unimplemented by the Union Government for nearly two decades.

In response to evolving dynamics in the polity and economy since the Sarkaria
Commission's examination over two decades prior, the Government of India formed a
Commission on Centre-State Relations chaired by Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, former
Chief Justice of India, on April 27, 2007. This new commission scrutinized and evaluated

13
the current arrangements between the Union and States, along with judicial
pronouncements concerning powers, functions, and responsibilities across legislative,
administrative, gubernatorial, emergency, financial, economic, and social spheres,
including matters related to Panchayati Raj institutions and resource sharing such as inter-
state river water. The Commission delivered 273 recommendations in its seventh volume
report, submitted to the Government on March 30, 2010.

Administrative Relations Between Centre And State

Administrative relations play a crucial role in managing the interactions between the
Centre and the States. Articles 256 and 257, along with Articles 356 and 365, outline the
framework for these interactions. Articles 256 and 257 empower the Centre to provide
guidelines and directives to the States. Article 356, commonly known as President's Rule,
is invoked when a state struggles to form a stable government independently or through
coalition. President's Rule has been imposed in various states over 126 times. Conversely,
Article 365 grants the President authority to determine if a state fails to adhere to the
Constitution, thereby necessitating intervention. The term "any direction" in Article 365
encompasses directives issued under the Constitution's executive powers.

Article 365 acts as a preventive measure against hasty resort to extreme actions outlined in
Article 356 in case a State Government refuses to adhere to or enforce any Constitutional
directive issued by the Union. Consequently, the exceptional authority bestowed by
Article 365 is not only essential but should be exercised with great caution and solely in
severe circumstances. The Sarkaria Commission has validated the specific application of
Article 365. When a directive issued by the Union in the execution of its executive
authority under various Constitutional provisions such as Article 256, 257, and 339(2), or
during an emergency under Article 353, is disregarded by the State Government despite
sufficient warning and opportunity, and the President concludes under Article 365 that a
situation akin to Article 356 has emerged. If there is a significant public disorder posing a
threat to state security, it is the responsibility of the State Government to promptly inform
the Union Government about such disorder. Failure to do so may be viewed as obstructing
the exercise of the Union Government's executive authority, justifying the latter in issuing
appropriate directives under Article 257(1). If such directives issued by the Union
executive under Article 257(1) are not adhered to despite ample warning, the President
may then determine that a situation resembling that described in Article 356 has arisen.

14
Division of Administrative powers between the center and the states as per Centre-State

Administrative constitutional provisions:

Directives from the union to state governments:

In accordance with Article 256, the executive authority of the union extends to issuing
directives to the states for their compliance. The authority of the Union extends to the extent
of regulating a state in a manner deemed necessary for its objectives.

For instance, the union can issue directives to the state regarding the construction and upkeep
of communication infrastructure identified as nationally or militarily significant, along with
safeguarding railways within the state.

This is crucial for ensuring the enforcement of legislative laws across the nation. Failure to
comply with these directives may lead to a scenario where the Union can invoke Article 356,
enforcing the President's rule in the state and assuming control over its administration.

Delegation of union functions to the states:

Article 254 specifies that the President has the authority to assign certain functions
concerning matters under the jurisdiction of the central executive power to state governments,
either with conditions or without. Additionally, according to clause (2), Parliament has the
right to utilize state resources for implementing central laws and granting powers and
responsibilities to the states. Furthermore, a state can, upon the agreement of the central
government, delegate administrative tasks to the central authority.

All India Services:

Article 312 of the Constitution outlines the creation of "All-India services," which are
applicable to both the union and the states. States possess the power to suspend officers
belonging to these services. However, the appointment and disciplinary actions concerning
these officers can only be executed by the President of India.

Constitution of Joint Public Service Commission for Two or more State:

Apart from the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and the State Public Service
Commission, the Constitution allows for the establishment of a Joint Public Service

15
Commission. This commission can be formed when two or more states agree to do so by
passing resolutions in their respective legislatures, and the Parliament can enact laws to create
it. The structure of this commission is designed to foster cooperation between different levels
of government.

Additionally, the Constitution contains a provision where states can request assistance from
the UPSC in devising and executing joint recruitment plans for services requiring candidates
with specific qualifications.

Judicial System:
In our federal system, a notable characteristic is the presence of an integrated judicial system.
Despite having a federal structure with two tiers of government and shared powers, there is
no dual system for the administration of justice. This is evident from the existence of a single
integrated chain of courts responsible for administering both union and state laws, with the
Supreme Court positioned at the apex of the court hierarchy.

Inter-State Council:
India operates as a federation of states where the central government holds a significant role
while also relying on states for executing policies. The Constitution incorporates mechanisms
to foster collaboration between the central and state governments, ensuring that major
national policies are formulated through dialogue and consensus.

The establishment of the Inter-State Council exemplifies such a mechanism. Article 263 of
the Constitution authorizes the President to define the Council's functions. The Council's
responsibilities include investigating and providing advice on any conflicts arising between
states. Additionally, it facilitates discussions on matters of mutual interest.

Inter-State Water Disputes:

In India, there exists numerous inter-state rivers, and the management and progress
concerning them have been a matter of inter-state concern. These pertain to the utilization,
regulation, and allocation of waters from inter-state rivers for both irrigation and
hydroelectric power generation. Under the Indian Constitution, issues related to water within
a particular state are listed under the state's jurisdiction, while matters regarding inter-state
river waters fall under the union's jurisdiction.

16
To address the persistent issue of disputes over river water, the framers of the Constitution
granted exclusive authority to Parliament. Accordingly, Parliament is empowered to enact
laws for the resolution of any dispute or complaint concerning the usage, allocation, or
regulation of such waters. The Inter-State Water Disputes Act, passed by Parliament in 1956,
establishes tribunals tasked with adjudicating water disputes referred to them.

Centre State Conflicts In India

Federalism, a crucial element within our democratic system, draws its authority from Articles
245-263 of the Indian Constitution. As per these provisions, powers are clearly delineated
between the Centre and the States across legislative, administrative, and financial domains.

Moreover, the 7th Schedule of the Constitution divides into three lists: the Union List, the
State List, and the Concurrent List, detailing the legislative authority of the Parliament and
the State Assemblies.

The examination of Centre-State relations remains of enduring significance, given that the
governance at both levels operates with inevitable interconnection, rather than in isolated
silos.

Hence, despite these evident demarcations, the issue of disputes between the Centre and the
States persists.

Typically, such disputes arise when the Centre encroaches upon the States' jurisdiction by
enacting laws pertaining to subjects under the State list, or by legislating in a manner that
impacts the States' legal or constitutional prerogatives.

FEDERALISM IN INDIA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Decentralization was embraced during the time of the Mauryans and Harsha Empire in the
political ideology, whereas centralization became the official stance of the Delhi Sultanates,
the Mughal reign, and the British rule until 1861. The initial British presence in the country
dates back to 1579 with the arrival of a Jesuit Missionary, followed by merchants who
initially came for trade but eventually assumed governance. In 1765, authority was handed
over to the East India Company, gradually transitioning to the oversight of the British

17
Parliament. Under British rule, India was reunified under a robust central government,
despite being organized into various provinces, all ultimately under central authority.

1. CENTRALISATION PROCESS IN BRITISH ADMINISTRATION:

The consolidation of British administrative power in India traces its origins to 1773 with the
passing of the East India Company Act of 1772, commonly referred to as the Regulating Act
of 1773. This Act aimed to establish a centralized system of governance by bringing
previously independent provinces under the authority of the Bengal presidency. The leaders
of these presidencies were designated as Governors, while the head of the Bengal
Government held the title of Governor-General. The process of centralization, initiated in
1773 with the establishment of the Governor-General's office, reached its apex with the
Charter Act of 1833. Under this act, the Governor-General of Bengal was renamed as the
Governor-General of India, wielding authority over the entire British Indian administration.
All powers concerning supervision and control of civil and military administration, as well as
revenue matters, were consolidated under the Governor-General in council. Legislative
authority previously held by the Madras and Bombay presidencies was transferred to the
central government, which also gained supreme financial control. The presidencies of
Bombay and Madras were required to seek approval from the Governor-General in council
for any new appointments or financial disbursements. Thus, the Government of India became
the overarching authority in all matters, marking the completion of centralization under the
Act of 1833.

Another significant milestone in constitutional development was the Government of India

Act, 1858, which signaled the assumption of full responsibility for Indian governance by the
British Crown. The powers previously held by the Court of Directors and the Board of
Control were transferred to one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, representing
the Crown. This Secretary of State for India was supported by a council of fifteen members,
with the authority to override council decisions in case of disagreements. The Governor-
General in council became accountable to the Secretary of State for India and, consequently,
to the Crown. This Act marked the end of the era of the Company's rule in India, ushering in
a new phase under direct Crown rule. Alongside other changes, the Act facilitated the
complete transfer of Indian administration to the Crown, the designation of the Governor-
General of India as Viceroy, and the abolition of the 'dual government' arrangement.
However, the drawbacks of this highly centralized system, including disharmony,

18
inefficiency, and lack of accountability, became evident over time, leading to a shift towards
decentralization. As one scholar aptly summarizes, the post-1858 administration of the
British in India was characterized by a trend towards decentralization, marking a departure
from the highly centralized system that had prevailed until then. This trend towards
decentralization was initiated with the introduction of legislative councils in the provinces,
beginning with the provisions of the Indian Council Act of 1861.

2. THE INDIAN COUNCILS ACT, 1861 AND THE DECENTRALISATION

PROCESS:
Upon the British crown assuming direct responsibility for the Government of India
subsequent to the proclamation of 1857 and the enactment of the Government of India Act,
1857, a highly centralized governmental system was in operation. However, due to the vast
size of the territory and its diverse nature, complete centralized control without devolution of
authority became unfeasible. The process of decentralization commenced with the Indian
Councils Act of 1861, marking a significant moment in India's constitutional history under
British rule.

The Government of India Act, 1858, brought substantial changes to Indian administration by
abolishing the dual government, appointing a secretary of state, and forming an All India
council to aid in governance. Recognizing that alterations were necessary within the Indian
Government itself, events such as disputes between the supreme Government and the
Government of Madras, concerns over laws implemented in non-regulation Provinces
without legislative council approval, and the Legislative Council's demand for
correspondence between the secretary of State and the Government of India paved the way
for the Indian Councils Act, 1861.

Initiated by the Government of Lord Canning and introduced in the British parliament by Sir
Charles Wood, the Indian Councils Bill swiftly passed and received Royal assent on August
1, 1861, coming into effect the same year.

The Indian Councils Act, 1861, stands as a significant milestone in constitutional history for
two primary reasons. Firstly, it facilitated the inclusion of native voices in councils,
expanding both central and Provincial Legislatures with non-official members to better
understand native perspectives and address misunderstandings. Secondly, by reinstating

19
legislative powers to the Governments of Madras and Bombay and allowing for the
establishment of similar Legislative Councils in other provinces, the Act initiated a policy of
legislative devolution, paving the way for nearly complete internal autonomy for provinces in
1937.

Although the Act of 1861 initiated the representative system in India indirectly, it ensured
governmental responsiveness to public opinion without compromising supremacy and
authority. Consequently, it concluded the era of centralized legislation and laid the
groundwork for legislative decentralization in Indian constitutional history.

While not a deliberate move towards federalization, the Act of 1861 constituted a crucial step
in empowering provincial Governments in India, contributing significantly to the eventual
establishment of a federal polity. Its framework provided a blueprint for subsequent
governance in India until the end of British rule in 1947, with features like Legislative
Councils with non-official members and the portfolio system enduring to this day.

Further steps towards decentralization were taken with the Indian Councils Act, 1892, which
replaced the Act of 1861 with some modifications. This Act, influenced to some extent by the
demands of the Indian National Congress, introduced a significant non-official element into
the legislature, granting members the power to discuss budgets and ask questions. These
changes elevated the status of Provincial Legislatures and paved the way for their increased
powers and significance in the years that followed.

3. INDIAN COUNCILS ACT, 1909 AND DECENTRALISATION OF POWER:

The Indian populace expressed dissatisfaction with the reforms outlined in the Indian
Councils Act of 1882, which was subsequently amended from the Councils Act of 1861.
Even individuals who initially supported the Act of 1892 discovered its ineffectiveness in
practice. Political unrest escalated due to unfavorable developments both within India and
abroad.

The reforms initiated by Morley-Minto under the Indian Councils Act of 1909 were
embraced by the moderate faction dominating the Indian National Congress at that time.
Expressing gratitude to the Government for the proposed reforms in the 1909 Act,
Surendranath Banerjee stated during the Madras session of the Congress in 1908 that "the

20
reforms marked the pinnacle of the constitutional agitation." Gokhle remarked that the
Morley-Minto reforms provided Indians with an opportunity for responsible involvement in
administration. Muslims expressed satisfaction with the reforms as most of their demands had
been accommodated in the 1909 Act. These reforms also provided ample opportunities for
Indian politicians and officials to gain experience and training in governance and
administration techniques.

The most significant achievement of the 1909 Indian Councils Act was the concession of the
principle of election to the Indian Legislative Council, a concept previously avoided by
British rulers. This scheme also paved the way for future changes in India's constitutional
history. However, as these reforms did not accommodate popular governance, they failed to
address the political issue, leading nationalist leaders to intensify their anti-British campaign
through the demand for "swaraj" or Self-Government.

4. GOVERNMIMT OF INDIA ACT, 1919 AND DEVOLUTION OF POWERS:

The concept of federalism in India was initially proposed in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report
of July 1918. This report envisioned a distant future where British India and the princely
states would form a federal union. It described India's eventual future as a "sisterhood of
states," governing themselves in local matters while having a federated appearance
externally. This report served as a foundation for future federations in India, leading to the
enactment of the Government of India Act in 1919.

The Government of India Act, 1919, approved by the British Parliament, became effective in
India on January 1, 1921, and remained in force for nearly sixteen years. This act was a
significant milestone in India's constitutional history, marking the beginning of responsible
government in the country. It brought about various notable changes in the administrative
structure of both the Indian and British governments. These changes included provincial
autonomy, the system of dyarchy, the introduction of a bicameral legislature at the center,
expansion of provincial legislatures, consolidation of separate electorates, empowerment of
governors and the Governor-General, division of subjects into two lists, and the establishment
of a Chamber of Princes.

21
The act also reformed the organization of the Indian council, created the position of High
Commissioner for India, and relaxed the control of the Secretary of State over Indian
administration from London.

One significant aspect introduced by the Act was "Dyarchy," which divided the executive
government in provinces into two distinct parts. One part, led by the Governor-in-Council,
handled reserved subjects and was accountable to the Government of India. The other part,
headed by the Governor and his Ministers, managed transferred subjects and was accountable
to the Provincial Legislature. The Governor played a crucial role in this system, jointly
overseeing the administration of reserved subjects with the council.

Each province's government was divided into two clearly demarcated parts, with the sphere
of each defined. In cases of uncertainty regarding whether a matter belonged to the reserved
or transferred department, the Governor's decision was final. However, the subject of
"Finance" remained common to both parts. The language used in the preamble of the
Government of India Act, 1919, indicated that the British rulers themselves were unsure
about the successful implementation of the reforms, viewing them more as an experiment
than the establishment of a well-defined constitution.

The Act of 1919 marked a significant shift in the responsiveness of the Government of India
to public opinion. Its actions began to align more closely with popular viewpoints, signaling
progress towards self-governance. Reforms implemented under this act were deemed crucial,
laying the foundation for Indian political advancement. Despite its imperfections, the
introduction of Dyarchy aimed to cultivate responsible self-government skills among Indians.
Although initially perceived as a failure and criticized as impractical, Dyarchy served as a
transitional mechanism during constitutional changes. However, it eventually fell out of
favor, with widespread calls for its abolition in favor of fully autonomous provincial
governments. The Non-cooperation Movement led by Mahatma Gandhi and the activism of
various political parties fueled this demand. The Simmon Commission, acknowledging the
impracticality of Dyarchy, recommended transitioning to fully responsible unitary
governments in each province. This recommendation was enacted through the Government of
India Act in 1935, marking a significant shift towards full-fledged federalism. Despite its
challenges, the reforms initiated by the Act of 1919 laid a solid foundation for constitutional
progress in India, setting the stage for further development.

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 5. MUSLIM LEAGUE AND FEDERAL DEMAND:
The Muslim community supported the federal concept out of concern for Hindu dominance.
On January 1, 1929, the All-India Muslim Conference endorsed a resolution advocating for
the establishment of a federal system with full state autonomy, where the center would only
wield powers explicitly granted, leaving residual authority to the 17 provinces.

In March of the same year, Jinnah presented his 'Fourteen Points' demands to the Muslim
League, which expanded upon Muslim requisites. The initial two points emphasized the need
for a federal structure with residual powers resting with the provinces, ensuring uniform
autonomy across all provinces. The Muslim community believed that only through a federal
arrangement could they effectively govern regions where Muslims constituted the majority.
Thus, the formation of an Indian Federation not only fulfilled Muslim aspirations for
governance in certain provinces but also safeguarded Muslim interests in others.
Consequently, the concept of federation strongly appealed to Muslim leaders as it addressed
the Hindu-Muslim issue in British India, akin to how it resolved the English-French problem
in Canada.

6. NEHRU COMMITTEE REPORT AND THE FEDERAL CONTEXT:

The explicit demand for a federal form of government was put forward by the Indian
National Congress during its Bombay Session in 1927. Motilal Nehru was appointed by the
Indian National Congress as a member of the All-Party Committee, where he served as its
head, earning it the moniker 'Nehru Committee'. This committee, which had the support of
almost 20 different political parties and groups in India, presented its report in 1928. The
report emphasized a centralized structure for British India, suggesting a devolution of powers
similar to the Government of India Act, 1919. It proposed that the central legislature be
granted the authority to enact laws pertaining to peace, order, and good governance for India,
except for matters designated to the provincial legislatures, which would have somewhat
lesser legislative power. Additionally, the committee envisioned the potential for a future
federation between British India and the Indian States, cautioning that in such a scenario, the
laws of the central government would directly apply to the people of the Indian States.
Nonetheless, the committee expressed hope that, based on gained experience, the Indian
States might choose to formally join the federation. The Nehru Report affirmed, "If the
Indian states are willing to join such a federation after understanding the full implications of
the federal idea, we will warmly welcome their decision." Thus, the Nehru Report did not

23
rule out federalism concerning the Indian states. It presented an admirable report that, for the
first time, recommended a federation as a constitutional solution to eradicate autocracy and
compartmentalism from Indian political life. Furthermore, it advocated for the complete
transfer of political power to Indian hands based on this federation. Notably, the hallmark of
the Nehru Report was its advocacy for a 'strong center'.

7. PRINCELY STATES AND THE FEDERAL AGREEMENT

The Indian states supported the notion of an All-India Federation due to their apprehension of
British dominance, which was progressively impinging on their independence. The statement
made by Lord Reading, the then Viceroy, who dispatched a letter to the Nizam of Hyderabad
on March 27, 1926, greatly perturbed the princes. In the letter, the Viceroy stressed that the
"supremacy of the British crown was absolute in India and the authority of the States was a
natural consequence of that supremacy." This prompted the rulers of Princely states to call for
an unbiased investigation into the entire relationship between them and the paramount power,
leading to the appointment of the Butler committee. Although the committee did not
explicitly define paramountcy, it asserted that "paramountcy must remain supreme," adapting
to the evolving needs of the time and the progress of the states. The disappointment of the
Princes with the Butler committee left them hopeful for an All-India Federation. Hence,
Indian Princes had their own motives to endorse the establishment of a Federation
encompassing all of India. In practice, paramountcy had been oppressively authoritarian and
arbitrary under British rule and their political Agents. The notion that "paramountcy was
supreme" was abhorred by all, yet they felt powerless to escape its grasp. The sovereignty of
the crown remained unchallenged everywhere. Consequently, every Indian Prince aspired for
complete freedom from external influence regarding the internal affairs of their state. They
believed that an All-India Federation would facilitate this, granting them autonomy within
their respective spheres of authority.

8. THE SIMON COMMISSION AND FEDERAL IDEA:

The Simon Commission Report, released in 1930, extended the discussion on federalism in
India, asserting that the ultimate structure of the Indian constitution "cannot be unitary; it
must be federal." Appointed by the British Government in 1927 under the chairmanship of
Sir John Simon, the commission aimed to review the effectiveness of reforms introduced by
the Government of India Act of 1919, as mandated by the Act itself. Published in 1930, the
commission acknowledged the failure of 'dyarchy' and recommended the establishment of

24
full responsible government in the Provinces. However, it did not favor the idea of
responsible government at the center. Nevertheless, the commission's recommendations were
significant in shaping the federal concept in the Indian context. It acknowledged the
challenges of governing a vast country like India under a unitary system and foresaw the need
for a federal structure to unite entities as diverse as British Indian Provinces and princely
States. This inclination towards federalism was shared not only by the British but also by
prominent Indian nationalists. Following the publication of the Joint Parliamentary
Committee's report in 1934, a bill was introduced in the British Parliament, receiving Royal
Assent on 2 August 1935, thus becoming the Government of India Act, 1935, which included
a proposal for an All-India Federation for the first time.

ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION IN INTER-STATE RELATIONS

Concerning interstate relations, the Constitution delineates the following provisions:

• Resolution mechanisms for interstate water disputes
• Establishment of interstate councils for coordination purposes
• Recognition and acceptance of public acts, records, and judicial proceedings across state
lines
• Ensuring freedom of interstate trade, commerce, and intercourse
• Moreover, the Parliament has instituted zonal councils to foster inter-state cooperation and
coordination.

Water Disputes Between States (Art. 262)

Water sharing stands out as a highly contentious matter within the Indian federal political
framework, often challenging the principle of cooperative federalism. Despite water being
under the jurisdiction of the State List, the Central Government holds the power to regulate
and develop inter-state rivers and their valleys.

Reasons For Rising River Disputes

Demographic factor– A demographic factor is a growing population in the river basin.

Agriculture patterns are changing as farmers shift to water-intensive crops like paddy and
sugarcane.

25
Climate and geographical factors – A 2011 study predicted that climate change could cause
a 50% reduction in the waters of the Cauvery sub-basins by 2080.
Uneven distribution of water resources, as well as increasing rainfall variability and drought
frequency.
Disputes arising from state bifurcation – When Telangana was formed in 2014, the
Godavari water and the Polavaram project became a source of contention.
Political factors– With the growing nexus between water and politics, regional political
forces have grown stronger and more assertive, transforming disputes into vote bank politics.

Article 262
Article 262 includes two provisions for resolving inter-state water disputes:
Firstly, Parliament is empowered to enact laws for adjudicating disputes or complaints
concerning the utilization, distribution, and management of interstate rivers and their valleys.
Secondly, Parliament may stipulate that no court, including the Supreme Court, shall have
jurisdiction over such disputes or complaints.

The River Boards Act of 1956: River boards are established for the regulation and
development of interstate rivers and their valleys. At the behest of the respective state
governments, the Central Government forms a river board to provide advisory support.

Inter-State Water Disputes Act (1956): The Central Government is permitted to establish
an ad hoc tribunal to settle disputes between two or more states concerning the waters of an
interstate river or river valley. The tribunal's verdict would be conclusive and obligatory.
Additionally, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall possess jurisdiction over
any water dispute referred to such a tribunal under this Act.

Constitutional Provisions To Solve Water Disputes

Schedule VII (Art. 246) State list (Entry 17)

Regulation & development of inter-State
Union List (Entry 56)
rivers and river valleys.

26
 Adjudication of disputes relating to waters
Article 262
of inter-State rivers or river valleys.
Establishment of an Inter-State Council to
Article 263 effect coordination between the states and
between the Centre and states.
Provides original jurisdiction to the
Article 131 Supreme Court to resolve disputes between
the Union and states and inter-State.
Empowers the Supreme Court to adjudicate
Article 136 on the earlier ruling by the other courts or
any other Tribunal that can be challenged.

TRIBUNAL ESTB. STATES INVOLVED

Krishna Water Disputes Maharashtra, Karnataka and
1969
Tribunal-I Andhra Pradesh
Maharashtra, Andhra
Godavari Water Disputes
1969 Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya
Tribunal
Pradesh and Odisha
Narmada Water Disputes Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya
1969
Tribunal Pradesh and Maharashtra
Ravi and Beas Water Punjab, Haryana and
1986
Disputes Tribunal Rajasthan
Cauvery Water Disputes Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil
1990
Tribunal Nadu and Puducherry
Krishna Water Disputes Maharashtra, Karnataka and
2004
Tribunal II Andhra Pradesh
Vansadhara Water Disputes
2010 Odisha and Andhra Pradesh
Tribunal
Mahadayi Water Disputes Goa, Karnataka, and
2010
Tribunal Maharashtra
Mahanadi Water Disputes
2018 Odisha and Chhattisgarh
Tribunal

27
Issues In Inter-State Water Disputes
Water Dispute Resolution Issues
Historically significant: The conflict regarding the sharing of Cauvery's water has a history
spanning over a century, originating between the princely state of Mysore (now Karnataka)
and the Madras Presidency (now Tamil Nadu).

Article 262 prohibits the Supreme Court or any other court from adjudicating interstate water
disputes. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court entertains petitions under its jurisdiction of Special
Leave Petition (Art. 136), leading to unresolved legal battles.

Mediating water disputes becomes challenging for the Central government, particularly
during periods of coalition politics and assertive regional political entities.

The failure of states to adhere to tribunal rulings poses a significant obstacle to resolving
disputes, even when a permanent tribunal is in place.

Problems with the current Interstate River Water Dispute Act of 1956:
Each interstate river water dispute necessitates the establishment of a distinct tribunal. The
prolonged delays in resolving these disputes are concerning. Tribunals like those for the
Cauvery and Ravi-Beas rivers have been operational for over 26 and 30 years, respectively,
without reaching a resolution. Furthermore, there is no specific provision for ensuring timely
adjudication, and delays often occur during the tribunal formation process. Additionally,
there exists no adequate mechanism for enforcing the decisions made by these tribunals. The
issue of finality is also problematic, as parties tend to swiftly appeal to the Supreme Court if
the tribunal rules against them. Only three out of the eight tribunals have issued awards that
have been accepted by all involved states. The control over water resources is considered a
sacred right that is fiercely protected, with compromise often viewed as politically damaging.
Notably, the Act fails to outline the guiding principles for tribunals when resolving water
disputes, leaving ambiguity in their decision-making process. Moreover, there are no age
limits specified for the chairperson and members of these tribunals.

28
Features Of The 2017 Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill
• The Central Government will establish a Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) prior to
referring any dispute to the tribunal. The objective of the DRC is to amicably resolve disputes
through negotiations within a year, with a possibility of extension by six months.

• Instead of maintaining multiple tribunals, a singular tribunal will be instituted.

• The tribunal is authorized to appoint Assessors to provide technical support. These

Assessors will be selected from experts within the Central Water Engineering Service,
holding the rank of Chief Engineer or higher.

• The tribunal is expected to resolve disputes within a timeframe of four and a half years.

• The decisions made by the Tribunal are conclusive and obligatory.

• A designated agency, appointed and authorized by the central government, will be

responsible for collecting and managing data for a national databank pertaining to each river
basin.

• The composition of the Tribunal will consist of one chairperson, one vice-chairperson, and
a maximum of six other members. The tenure of the chairperson is limited to five years or
until they reach the age of 70, whichever comes first. The term of office for the Vice
Chairperson and other tribunal members will conclude upon the resolution of the water
dispute.

2017 Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill Issues

Proposals are underway to establish Permanent Tribunal benches as required, raising
questions about the distinction between these and the current temporary benches.
The Supreme Court's assertion of its jurisdiction over appeals against water tribunals
established under the ISWDA has led to delays in judicial proceedings.
Ambiguities and uncertainties persist in the institutional mechanism for enforcing tribunal
decisions.

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India has witnessed numerous inter-state river water disputes, often stemming from
inadequate water resources for farmers. This research delves into India's constitutional and
statutory provisions for addressing such disputes. Complicating matters is the division of
water resources under the State List, while the Parliament holds authority to legislate on
inter-state rivers under the Union List. Additionally, the researcher examines the causes and
progress of ongoing and resolved river water disputes in India.

Constitutional and statutory provisions

The Constitution contains some provisions on water and related issues. Parliament has also
adopted Legislation to settle transboundary river water disputes. Some of these provisions
and legislation have been developed below.
A] Article 262 of the Indian Constitution
Article 262(1) stipulates that Parliament has the authority to create laws addressing disputes
or grievances regarding the utilization, allocation, or management of transboundary waters
within a river or river valley. According to Article 262(2), Parliament possesses the power to
enact legislation that could limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or any other court
concerning the disputes or appeals mentioned in Article 262(1).

In accordance with Rule 262(1), Parliament is empowered to pass a specific law, indicating
that the responsibility lies with Parliament to enact such legislation. Furthermore, Article
262(2) explicitly mentions that ‘Parliament may legislate…’. Under Article 13(3) of the
Constitution, the term “law” encompasses statutes, ordinances, enactments, regulations,
notifications, or any legally binding directives in India. The subject matter of such legislation
could pertain to disputes over transboundary rivers or river valleys.

Article 262(2) commences with the phrase “notwithstanding anything in this Constitution…”,
signaling that other constitutional provisions are overridden by Article 262(2). For instance,
Article 131, which grants the Supreme Court primary jurisdiction in disputes between states,
does not apply when examining Article 262(2). If Parliament intends to divest the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction over transboundary river water disputes, it must do so through the
mechanism outlined in Article 13(3), as it employs the term “law”.

30
Should Parliament fail to enact any legislation pursuant to Article 262(2), it may resort to the
Supreme Court or a higher court. The term “may” in this context implies that the enactment
of such legislation is contingent upon Parliament’s discretion.

B] Entry 17 of Schedule II (List of Countries) of Schedule 7

Entry 17 of Schedule II within Schedule 7 encompasses water sources, irrigation and canals,
drainage and oak, reservoir and hydropower. Regulations concerning water supply, irrigation,
or hydropower extend to transnational rivers, often the focal point of cross-border disputes.
Consequently, the government holds jurisdiction to enact laws pertaining to these matters,
contingent upon Article 56 of Schedule I.

In conjunction with Article 246(1) of the Constitution and List I (Union List), Entry 56
empowers Parliament to legislate on the regulation and development of rivers and valleys,
provided such regulations align with the public interest. Entry 17 explicitly affirms the
applicability of Entry 56's authority to governmental powers. Any legislation under Entry 17
that contradicts Parliament's enactments under Entry 56 of Schedule I would be overridden.
Article 246 of the Constitution further underscores this debate. It states, "Regardless of what
is in paragraphs 2 and 3," granting Parliament exclusive legislative authority over subjects
listed in List I. Conversely, it assigns jurisdiction over subjects listed in List II to the
government, with consideration for paragraphs 1 and 2.

Hence, although water resources fall under national jurisdiction, Parliament holds substantial
legislative authority in this domain, enough to supersede any legislation enacted by countries
conflicting with its parliamentary provisions.

C] Articles 131 and 136 of the Indian Constitution

Instances have arisen where nations have invoked Articles 131 and 136 of their respective
constitutions to address disputes concerning river basins that traverse borders. For instance, in
2001, Tamil Nadu lodged an initial grievance under Article 131, highlighting deficiencies in
the regulation of interim measures. Subsequently, in response to the Cauvery Water Dispute
Tribunal's ruling in 2007, the states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala sought special
permission under Article 136. Their petitions were accepted by the Supreme Court.

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D] Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956
The 1956 Water Disputes Law came into effect following Article 262 of the Constitution.
The central authority holds significant sway within this legal framework. Article 4(1)
empowers the establishment of a water court by the center, enabling challenges to water laws
based on county government jurisdiction.

As per Article 5(2), the Civil Service Tribunal must, within three years, submit a report to the
central government outlining the facts and decisions made. These court decisions are
officially published by the central government in the gazette. Once published, these decisions
hold the same weight as those of the Supreme Court.

Consequently, the central government possesses authority to enforce court orders through the
Commission. Additionally, it can issue judgments and dissolve tribunals, as outlined in
Section 11, which restricts the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts as per the
law.

While this law doesn't preclude the central government, it does intervene in various judicial
aspects. The arbitral tribunal is mandated to present its findings to the central government,
thus falling under its jurisdiction. In resolving disputes related to river water, the central
government supersedes the respective state governments and their subordinate courts.

E] River Boards Act, 1956

Despite the enactment of the Rivers Act in 1956, no river basin was established under its
provisions. Nonetheless, it's imperative to delve into this legislation to examine the Center's
involvement in inter-state river disputes as outlined in the Act.

As per Section 2 of the Act, the Center is tasked with overseeing the development and
management of interstate rivers and their valleys. Upon request from a state government, the
Center has the authority to institute a river council. Notably, the term "may" is employed
here, indicating that the formation of such councils is subject to the discretion of the central
government. The agency holds the prerogative to formulate, modify, or reject cross-border
river projects.

32
Under the law, the central government delegates powers to the council for executing its
duties. The phrase "as deemed necessary by the central government" is used, implying that
the funding allocated to the council hinges on the central government's discretion, with an
obligation to furnish an annual report to both the central government and relevant state
governments.

This underscores the council's accountability to the central government. The central
government possesses the authority to frame regulations to fulfill the objectives of the law.
Thus, it appears that dissolution of the council would be deemed necessary "if approved by
the central government".

While the primary stakeholders in these disputes are the respective state governments, the
manner in which conflicts are resolved involving the central government is significant. The
mechanisms instituted for arbitration of such disputes are answerable to the central
government and owe their existence to it. Hence, asserting that water and interstate water
disputes fall solely within the purview of state governments due to their inclusion in the State
List is erroneous. The central government plays an equally, if not more pivotal role in inter-
state river water disputes.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND PRECEDENTS

As per the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Territorial Rejuvenation,
eight courts have been instituted under the ISRWD Act to oversee river water management.
Moreover, 114 intergovernmental agreements have been finalized to address water disputes.
Certain longstanding and resolved conflicts pertaining to river basins are outlined below.

Cauvery Dispute

The Cauvery River originates in Karnataka, traverses through Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry,
and finally empties into the Bay of Bengal. Agriculture and livelihoods in both states heavily
rely on the waters of the Cauvery. Tamil Nadu contends that Karnataka should release water
during deficient years, whereas Karnataka argues that it cannot provide water to Tamil Nadu
when its own farmers are facing shortages.

33
Historically, negotiations between the Madras Presidency and the Principality of Mysore
concluded in 1974. From 1968 to 1990, 21 trilateral meetings involving ministers from
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Union Ministers for Irrigation were held. Despite the Indian
government's attempts to mediate between 1972 and 1976, no agreement was reached.

Responding to Tamil Nadu's appeal, the central government established the Cauvery Water
Dispute Tribunal in June 1990. In 1991, the tribunal issued an interim order directing
Karnataka to release a specified quantity of water to Tamil Nadu. Dissatisfied with this
temporary arrangement, Karnataka appealed to the Supreme Court.

In the case of Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal v. Respondent, the Supreme Court
deemed Karnataka's objections to be invalid. This decision led to protests in Karnataka,
resulting in five fatalities. In 1998, the central government formed a monitoring committee
under the Cauvery River Authority (CRA) and the ISRWD. The committee directed
Karnataka to release 9,000 cusecs of water to Tamil Nadu. While Tamil Nadu accepted this
directive, Karnataka refused to comply.

In 2007, the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal issued its final verdict, affirming the validity
of two agreements regarding water sharing between Madras and Mysore from 1892 to 1924.

The primary issues concerning Tamil Nadu were outlined as follows:

(i) Its insistence on the publication of the final arrangement in the Official Journal.
(ii) Its push for the establishment of a Cauvery Management Board, which was eventually
realized in 2013.

The climax of the case occurred in September 2016, when the Supreme Court mandated the
Karnataka government to release 15,000 water bodies to Tamil Nadu within the following 10
days. Karnataka complied with the court rulings amidst state-wide protests. Tragically, one
casualty and four injuries were reported due to clashes with law enforcement. Tamil
establishments bore the brunt of mass attacks, and violence paralyzed traffic on the
Bengaluru-Mysore highway.

Simultaneously, responding to the Attorney General's plea, the Supreme Court formed a
technical team to assess the ground realities of the Cauvery Basin. The team submitted its

34
report in October 2016, directing the Karnataka government to release 2000 cu-secs of water.
Legal proceedings on this matter are ongoing.

The Cauvery dispute has strained relations between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, aggravated
by the accompanying violence and disorder. The central government intervened as a mediator
in negotiations between the two states, establishing both an arbitration panel and a technical
team based on its perspective. Additionally, the Cauvery River Authority (CRA) supervised
the activities under the Prime Minister's purview. Thus, the central government assumed the
role of a negotiator in resolving the dispute between the two states.

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 CHAPTER 3
INTER STATE RIVER WATER DISPUTES ACT, 1956: AN OVERVIEW

GENESIS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Given that many rivers in India cross state boundaries, there have been ongoing conflicts over
how to fairly utilize them, including issues of control and allocation. The legal framework
addressing these matters dates back to the pre-independence era and encompasses various
statutes, alongside Articles 262, 263, and 131, which outline procedures for resolving
interstate disputes through Parliament. Both the central government and state governments
hold authority to legislate on matters concerning water distribution and irrigation. Key
legislations include the River Boards Act of 1956 and the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of
1956, which are discussed in detail in this paper, outlining their provisions for dispute
resolution, advisory mechanisms, negotiations, and more. Additionally, two organizations—
the National Water Development Agency and the Resources Development Council, chaired
by the Prime Minister—have been established to facilitate river water development. This
paper also examines the approach taken by the Supreme Court in interstate water disputes,
particularly notable in the Cauvery case, in determining state rights. Finally, it highlights
challenges faced by tribunals and suggests potential remedies such as empowering them with
contempt enforcement authority, addressing delays, and enacting comprehensive legislation.

History And Origin

Water, being a fundamental natural resource, essential for basic human needs and various
developmental activities in countries, is highly valuable. Consequently, the planning,
development, and management of this resource receive significant national attention. Many
of India's major rivers, along with their tributaries and sub-tributaries, flow across state
boundaries, leading to longstanding conflicts between different states over their usage,
control, and distribution.

The legislative history concerning water disputes dates back to the pre-independence era. In
the Government of India Act 1919, irrigation became a provincial matter, while matters
affecting provincial relations with other territories fell under the central legislature.
Subsequently, the Government of India Act 1935 focused on resolving river disputes between
provinces, with Sections 130-134 addressing water-related issues. This laid the groundwork

36
for Articles 239-242 in the draft Constitution of India. Dr. Ambedkar proposed an
amendment during the drafting process, emphasizing the need for a permanent institution to
handle disputes, especially with the expected rise in conflicts over water use for irrigation and
power generation in independent India. Consequently, Article 262 was incorporated into the
Constitution. The Constitution of India provides various mechanisms for resolving inter-state
disputes, including Articles 262, 263, and 131.

The legal framework governing states' rights regarding interstate rivers' waters under the
Constitution mirrors that of the Government of India Act 1935. For example, Entry 19 of List
2 in the 7th Schedule of the 1935 Act conferred legislative powers on states, akin to Entry 17
of List 2 in the Constitution of India. This article prohibits states from using interstate waters
in a manner prejudicial to other states' interests, affirming that ownership and territorial rights
over interstate water bodies are under the Union's control and utilized for public welfare.
Article 263 provides for the formation of an Inter-state Council by the President to settle
disputes, although this provision is seldom utilized. Article 131 offers an alternative
mechanism for resolving inter-state disputes, tracing its roots to Section 204 of the
Government of India Act 1935. It facilitates the resolution of disputes between states and
between the Union and states. However, the proviso of Article 131 excludes the Court's
jurisdiction concerning certain treaties. Article 131 can be invoked only if the dispute
involves a legal right extensively interpreted by the Supreme Court in various cases.

However, it is noteworthy that the Constitution itself lacks a mechanism for resolving water-
related disputes. It falls upon the Parliament to deliberate and take action regarding such
matters, as outlined in Entry 56 of List I of the Constitution. While states possess the
authority to legislate on matters concerning water supplies, irrigation, canals, drainage,
embankments, water storage, and waterpower under Entry 17 of List II, this authority is
subordinate to the legislative power of the Union.

It is contended that interstate river management and power sharing ought to be within the
purview of the states, with supremacy granted to them. However, given that several princely
states acceded to the Indian Union with certain levels of autonomy, particularly those with
agrarian economies, they were reluctant to relinquish regulatory control over water.
Consequently, the Constitution had to recognize this reality. States, functioning as quasi-
sovereign entities, cannot be treated akin to ordinary parties in property disputes. This likely

37
underpins the rationale behind Article 262, which empowers Parliament to enact separate
laws for adjudicating water disputes between states.

Constitutional Mechanism And Its Implementation

Various laws and statutes have been enacted by the parliament to tackle water disputes. One
such measure is the regulation of inter-state rivers, which resulted in the introduction of the
River Boards Act 1956. Additionally, entities like the Narmada Control Authority are
engaged in operational activities. The Union holds other powers related to water, such as
conducting impact assessments for large projects requiring environmental clearance. To gain
a deeper understanding of the constitutional framework governing inter-state water disputes,
it is essential to analyze two key legislations passed by parliament: The River Boards Act,
1956, and The Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956.

Inter-State Water Dispute Act, 1956

The roots of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 can be traced back to the
Government of India Act, 1935. It encompasses provisions akin to Sections 130 to 132 of the
1935 Act. Enacted in accordance with Article 262 of the Constitution, this legislation
established water Tribunals, reflecting the constitutional decision to assign water
management to state governments. Water was categorized under the state list when allocating
subjects between states, the union, or both.

This act defines water disputes and outlines the process for states to lodge complaints
regarding such disputes with the Central government. It also facilitates the resolution of
conflicts concerning Inter-State Rivers and River Valleys. Tribunals are established under
this act to arbitrate Inter-State water disputes when negotiation fails as determined by the
Central government. The Sarkaria Commission recommended the establishment of a Tribunal
within one year of a complaint by a State Government and the issuance of its decision within
five years.

Decisions made by these tribunals are deemed final and binding, with no avenue for appeal to
the Supreme Court. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts is explicitly
excluded in such matters. However, while the tribunal is empowered to make decisions, its
role does not extend to implementation.

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Moreover, the tribunal's mandate extends beyond adjudication to investigating matters of
public concern such as water pollution, flood control, river basin productivity sustainability,
climate change impacts, and more.

Although the Union government has established several water tribunals under the act,
including the Krishna Tribunal, the Narmada Tribunal, the Godavari Tribunal, the Cauvery
Tribunal, the Ravi, Beas Tribunal, etc., their operational efficiency is lacking due to delays at
various stages.

The establishment of these tribunals aligns with the constitutional principle that water is a
state subject, as they only function at the request of the concerned state. Additionally, their
binding decisions amalgamate judicial expertise and reputation.

Despite the clear guidelines provided by the act for resolving water disputes, the varied paths
taken to settle disputes indicate considerable discretion permitted by the law.

In 1956, the Parliament enacted the River Boards Act, utilizing its authority as per Entry 56
of List I. This enactment remains unique as it represents the sole instance where the
Parliament exercised its authority under Entry 56. The primary functions of the board
included ensuring the efficient use of inter-state water resources and overseeing various
irrigation, water supply, and hydroelectric power generation schemes. However, the board's
role is advisory, limited to providing advice and recommendations. Regrettably, the act has
become obsolete due to the failure to appoint River Boards[xii]. Consequently, its
effectiveness has been compromised, partly because Entry 56 grants extensive authority to
the Union, allowing it to encroach upon areas falling within the States' jurisdiction[xiii].
While separate legislation has established River Boards for specific purposes, such as
implementing mutually agreed sharing agreements between States (e.g., Upper Yamuna
River Board, Betwa River Board), they cannot be tasked with monitoring Tribunal awards'
operations and performance.

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National Water Policy, 1987

Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Water Resources, a board is established to oversee
water development and planning, ensuring their efficient use. Section 21 of this policy
addresses the equitable distribution of water among states, emphasizing a comprehensive and
participatory approach to manage water resources. Additionally, the board is tasked with
allocating water resources appropriately, preventing exploitation, and establishing a
standardized national information system.

Originally drafted in 1987, the national water policy was revised in 2012 to recognize water
bodies as 'economic goods.' In furtherance of river-water development, two additional bodies
have been established by the central government. The National Water Development Agency,
comprising State irrigation ministers, conducts surveys and studies for peninsular river
development as part of the national water plan. It aims to optimize the country's water
resources by utilizing surplus water from all rivers. The Water Resources Development
Council, chaired by the Prime Minister with state Chief Ministers as members, is another
entity formed to oversee water resource development initiatives.

Judicial Exposition

Over time, the Supreme Court has dealt with various inter-State river water disputes,
addressing issues such as the Tribunal's authority to handle interim allocations (e.g.,
Cauvery), non-compliance with Tribunal orders (e.g., Cauvery), environmental and
rehabilitation shortcomings (e.g., Narmada), and the constitutionality of State Legislature
Acts nullifying past water agreements (e.g., Punjab). In each instance brought before the
Supreme Court, the matter pertained not to water-sharing, already adjudicated or under
tribunal scrutiny, but to other legal or constitutional aspects.

Examining Supreme Court decisions on inter-state water disputes reveals a fundamental

tension between the concepts of "we the people" and the "sovereign socialist secular
democratic republic" of India. Understanding this tension is crucial before proposing
solutions to such conflicts. Inter-state water disputes fall into two categories: those
concerning states' rights and their extent within the Union, which can be resolved through

40
Supreme Court applications regarding constitutional rights, and those involving inter-state
rivers, which do not directly implicate constitutional rights.

The mechanism for resolving inter-state water disputes suffers from various inefficiencies. Its
primary challenge lies in the absence of an effective authority to enforce tribunal rulings.
While the tribunal can issue awards, it lacks enforcement powers or mechanisms for
contempt sanctions. In cases of state non-compliance, the central government can issue
directives and, as a last resort, invoke Article 356, but this is seen as extreme and temporary,
as subsequent governments may revert to non-compliance. The Cauvery water dispute
exemplifies the complexities of river water management in India, exacerbated by shortages,
increasing development projects, and unequal access to water sources among riparian states.

The Sarkaria Commission recommended elevating tribunal awards to the status of Supreme
Court decrees. The high number of appeals to the court underscores the government's failure
to effectively handle water-related disputes.

Water allocation issues involve complex technicalities, but delegating adjudicatory power to
tribunals undermines the authority of the Federal government. This approach could create
more obstacles than solutions. Additionally, tribunals lack enforcement power, unlike the
Supreme Court. Therefore, matters of public importance should be decided by the court.

Article 262's provisions appear insufficient. It would have been preferable to include a
mechanism in the Constitution itself rather than leaving it to Parliament. The Inter-State
Water Disputes Act took five years to pass after Article 262 was enacted in 1956. While
Article 262 grants the power to legislate, it doesn't mandate it, as no court can compel the
legislature to enact laws. However, laws made under Article 262 can be challenged.

Delays in tribunal establishment and award decisions are common. Referral to a tribunal
under the IWSDA depends on the Central Government's opinion that negotiation won't
suffice.

To address these loopholes, several recommendations are proposed. Firstly, establishing a

permanent tribunal for such disputes is necessary. The NCRWC suggests repealing the Inter-
State Water Disputes Act, 1956, and enacting a more comprehensive parliamentary

41
legislation. They argue against excluding such disputes from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
under Article 131, proposing that they fall within the Court's exclusive jurisdiction. This is
because parties often seek Supreme Court intervention, leading to dual forums' involvement.
Parliament should also effectively use its powers under Entry 56 List I by establishing river
boards, as outlined in the National Water Policy.

Alternatively, some scholars suggest limiting the Supreme Court to appellate jurisdiction. If
appeal to the Supreme Court is possible, states would likely not feel aggrieved, and as the
Court's decisions are respected and obeyed, implementation issues would diminish.

APPLICABILITY OF IRWD ACT, 1956

The Interstate River Water Disputes Act of 1956 (IRWD Act) is a legislation passed by the
Parliament of India under Article 262 of the Indian Constitution. It was enacted during the
reorganization of states based on linguistic lines to address potential conflicts over the use,
control, and distribution of water from interstate rivers or river valleys. Article 262 assigns a
role to the central government in resolving disputes over interstate rivers among the state or
regional governments. The Act has undergone amendments over time, with the most recent
one occurring in 2002.

The utilization and management of river waters fall under the jurisdiction of the states (as per
Entry 17 of the State List in Schedule 7 of the Indian Constitution). However, the central
government, with the approval of Parliament, can enact laws pertaining to the regulation and
development of interstate rivers and river valleys if those water resources directly fall under
its control and are deemed expedient in the public interest (Entry 56 of the Union List in
Schedule 7 of the Indian Constitution). Entities such as the Damodar Valley Corporation,
NHPC, and the River Boards Act of 1956, which are under the control of the central
government, are governed by Entry 56 of the Union List. When the central government seeks
to assume control over an interstate river project from the states in accordance with Entry 56
of the Union List, it must obtain approval from the legislative assemblies of the riparian states
before passing such legislation in Parliament, as outlined in Article 252 of the Constitution.
In cases where the public interest is at stake, the President may also establish an Interstate
Council under Article 263 to investigate and make recommendations on disputes that have
arisen between Indian states.

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The IRWD Act (section 2c2) affirms prior agreements, if any, between basin states regarding
the utilization of interstate river or river valley water. This legislation solely pertains to
Indian states and does not extend to union territories. Participation in tribunal adjudication is
restricted to the respective state governments, barring non-governmental entities.

Any international river water sharing treaty must undergo parliamentary ratification under
Article 253, after determining the allocation among Indian riparian states according to Article
262, ensuring constitutional validity or enforceability by the judiciary. India employs the
dualist theory for implementing international treaties and laws. Despite this, the Indian
government has entered agreements such as the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan and the
Ganga water sharing treaty with Bangladesh, without parliamentary ratification or consent
from affected riparian states as stipulated in Article 252.

The IRWD Act exclusively pertains to interstate rivers or river valleys. A dispute under this
act arises only when an action by one state impacts the interests of one or more other states.
For clarity, the application of the IRWD Act can be segmented into two distinct parts for
understanding its techno-legal implications.

Actions of a downstream state affecting the interest of an upstream state

In one specific scenario, the actions of a downstream state can impact the interests of an
upstream state. This occurs when the downstream state constructs a dam or barrage near its
border, causing the submersion of territory belonging to the upstream state, either temporarily
or permanently. Apart from this circumstance, no actions undertaken by a downstream state
have the potential to affect the interests of the upstream state, which relies on the water
resources for economic, ecological, and spiritual purposes. Here, the term 'interest' refers to
the importance, significance, or consequences associated with the potential loss of prevailing
water usage or purposes.

Actions of an upstream state affecting the interest of a downstream state

All actions taken by an upstream state to utilize, control, or distribute water from an interstate
river can impact downstream states in various ways. The examples below illustrate this,
though they are not exhaustive:

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 1. Utilizing river water for various purposes such as irrigation, drinking,
industrial applications, recreational activities, groundwater replenishment, and
enhancing rainwater utilization, among others, involves human intervention
aimed at converting water into vapor and releasing it into the atmosphere
through evapotranspiration or evaporation processes. This typically involves
the construction of water storage reservoirs followed by the utilization of
water for the aforementioned purposes.
2. Water quality can be affected by the use of water, leading to changes or
reductions in its quality. This occurs when dissolved salts accumulate in the
water remaining after usage. The level of dissolved salts increases through
consumption and the introduction of additional salts via human activities.
Additionally, human-induced alterations such as increased sedimentation or
turbidity from activities like mining and deforestation can further degrade
water quality. Transferring water from one river basin to another for use in
upstream regions can also impact the quality of water in downstream areas.
In general, the process involves transferring river water to regions facing water deficits after
establishing the necessary infrastructure for storage (such as water reservoirs) and
distribution networks (including canals, pipelines, and groundwater charging systems). These
activities fall under the category of river water distribution and control as per the IRWD Act.
However, such actions by an upstream state can lead to legal disputes with downstream
states, as they may impact the latter's existing interests in the following ways:

 Decrease in water availability: When an upstream state begins utilizing river water,
it typically obstructs lean season river flows initially by building low-cost barrages,
and later attempts to store peak floodwaters by constructing large reservoirs. This
alteration drastically changes the river's flow pattern, often reducing it to an
ephemeral or dry state for most of the year, except during floods. This modification
also affects the ecology of downstream rivers, impacting their vegetation and aquatic
life. Furthermore, the reduction in river water reaching the sea leads to erosion and
shrinkage of river deltas. Consequently, downstream states are deprived of consistent
access to river water for their needs, forcing them to store more floodwater to sustain
their current usage.

44
  Deterioration in water quality: Utilizing 75% of the available river water increases
the concentration of dissolved salts fourfold, affecting the water's quality. This
alteration in water quality, including changes in alkalinity and salinity, adversely
affects the growth of crops traditionally cultivated in downstream areas. Additionally,
aquatic flora and fauna face threats to survival or diminished growth due to increased
salinity and alkalinity. Basin closure, where the river is blocked from reaching the sea
for most of the year, also affects the ecology and fisheries of surrounding areas.
Moreover, there's a risk of seawater intrusion into river estuaries and deltas,
contaminating groundwater.

The utilization, control, or distribution of river water by an upstream state inevitably disrupts
the existing usage patterns and purposes in downstream states by altering the natural flow of
river water in terms of quantity, quality, and timing. Furthermore, dam failures in upstream
areas can lead to flash floods or subsequent dam failures downstream, resulting in significant
property damage and loss of life. The IRWD Act (section 3) emphasizes that the mere
anticipation of actions by a riparian state, which could affect the interests of other riparian
states, is sufficient to warrant interstate water disputes. However, activities such as peak flood
control measures, limited to impounding floodwaters in reservoirs without significantly
impacting water quality, and hydropower generation from runoff within its territory, do not
necessarily interfere with downstream states' interests.

Salient features of the Act

The Bill comprises 13 Sections outlining the key aspects of The Inter-State River Water
Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019 as follows:

Tribunal: A Tribunal named the Inter-State River Water Disputes Tribunal will be established
by the Central Government to adjudicate water disputes. This Tribunal may have multiple
benches. All existing Tribunals will be dissolved, and ongoing water disputes before these
Tribunals will be transferred to the new Tribunal. (Section 3(4))

Disputes Resolution Committee: According to the Bill, when a State raises a request
regarding any water dispute, the Central Government will establish a Disputes Resolution
Committee (DRC) to seek an amicable resolution. The DRC will endeavor to resolve the
water dispute through negotiations within one year, with a possible extension of six months.

45
Following negotiations, the DRC will submit a report to the Central Government containing
details of: (i) the positions of each participating State during negotiations; (ii) the Committee
members' perspectives on these positions; and (iii) all pertinent facts, information, and data
related to the dispute. If a water dispute remains unsettled after negotiations, the Central
Government will refer it to the Tribunal for adjudication within three months of receiving the
DRC's report. (Section 3(4A)) The DRC will consist of a Chairperson and experts with a
minimum of 15 years of relevant experience, appointed by the Central Government.
Additionally, each participating State will nominate a representative (at the Joint Secretary
level) to serve on the Committee.

Composition of the Tribunal: The Tribunal will be composed of a Chairperson, a Vice-

Chairperson, along with no more than three judicial members and three expert members.
Their appointments will be made by the Central Government following the recommendation
of a Selection Committee. (Section 4B) The Selection Committee will be comprised of the
Prime Minister or an appointed Minister as the Chairperson; the Chief Justice of India or a
Supreme Court judge appointed by him as a Member; the Minister overseeing the Law and
Justice Ministry as a Member; and the Minister in charge of the Ministry of Jal Shakti as a
Member. (Section 4B (2))

Amendment of Section 5: Upon receiving a referral regarding any water dispute from the
Central Government, the Chairperson will designate said dispute to a Tribunal Bench for
resolution. The Tribunal Bench will examine the assigned water dispute and submit a detailed
report to the Central Government, outlining its findings on various aspects such as yield,
water usage efficiency, and other relevant factors as specified. It will also deliver its decision
on the dispute within a timeframe of two years. In cases where the report cannot be furnished
within this period due to unavoidable circumstances, the Central Government reserves the
right to extend the deadline by up to one additional year.

Tribunal Decision: The decision rendered by the Tribunal Bench will be conclusive and
obligatory for all involved parties, possessing the same legal weight as an order or decree
issued by the Supreme Court.

Data Repository: To facilitate the maintenance of a comprehensive national-level data bank

and information system for each river basin, the Central Government will appoint or

46
authorize an agency. This agency will be responsible for collecting and managing data
pertaining to water resources, land, agriculture, and related matters, in accordance with
prescribed guidelines. Additionally, the agency is empowered to request and verify any data,
records, or pertinent information provided by State Governments..

Tabular presentation of differences made by the Bill to the existing Act

Inter-State Water Dispute Act Inter-State Water Dispute

1956 (Amendment) Bill, 2019

Under Section (4)Act, when any request is By substitution of new section under3(4),the
received from the State Government in Bill provide for a single standing
respect of any waterdispute, a separate Tribunal(with multiple Benches)instead of
Tribunal has to be established for each multiple Tribunals. All existing Tribunals
interState river water disputes. shall stand dissolved and the water disputes
pending adjudication before such existing
Tribunals shall stand transferred to the new
Tribunal Constituted under the Bill.

There is no provision in the Act for the By Substitution of Section 3(4(A)),the Bill
constitution of Dispute Resolution proposes to introduce a mechanism to resolve
Committee. the water dispute amicably by negotiations
through a Disputes Resolution
Committee, to be established by the Central
Government consisting of experts from
relevant fields, before such dispute is referred
to the Tribunal
Under section (5)Act, the tribunal should Amendment of Section5 of the Act, the bill
forward its report to the Central Government prescribes the total time period for
with in a period of 5 years, which may be adjudication of a water dispute by the
extended by the Central Government, for Tribunal has been fixed at a maximum of four
such further period as it considers necessary. and halfyears.

47
 Under Section(6) of the Act, The Central
Government shall publish the decision of the
Under Section (6) of the bill proposethat the
Tribunal in the Official Gazette and the
decision of the Bench of theTribunal shall be
decision shall be final and binding on the
final and binding on the States concerned.
parties to the dispute and shall be Given
effect to by them.

Article 246 of the Constitution addresses the legislative domain of both Parliament and the
State Legislatures. This allocation of legislative authority between the Central and State
governments encompasses three distinct categories:
• The Union List (List – I)
• The State List (List – II)
• The Concurrent List (List – III)

The subject of "water" falls within Entry 17 of List – II, which pertains to matters under the
jurisdiction of the States. However, Entry 17 is contingent upon the provisions outlined in
Entry 56 of List – I, which is under the purview of the Union. The specific provisions
pertaining to this arrangement are as follows:

List - I (Union List)

"56. Regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to the extent that such
regulation and development, under the control of the Union, is deemed expedient in the
public interest by Parliament."

List - II (State List)

"17. Water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water
storage, and water power, subject to the conditions specified in Entry 56 of List - I."

48
Article 262 of the Constitution deals with adjudication of water disputes. The
provisions in this regard are:
Article 262 (1)
Article 262 (2) states that Parliament has the authority to establish a legal framework for
resolving disputes or complaints regarding the utilization, distribution, or regulation of water
in inter-State rivers or river valleys. Additionally, Parliament is empowered to enact laws that
exclude the jurisdiction of both the Supreme Court and any other court concerning such
disputes or complaints. The Indian Parliament has enacted four laws in accordance with these
constitutional provisions. These laws include three acts falling under Entry 56 of List I: the
"River Boards Act 1956," the "Betwa River Board Act 1976," and the "Brahmaputra Board
Act 1980." The fourth law, the "Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956," is enacted
under Article 262.

MAJOR INTER-STATE RIVER DISPUTES

The Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 addresses conflicts regarding inter-state river
water. Should the Central Government perceive that a state government's appeal regarding
any water dispute remains unresolved through negotiations, a Water Disputes Tribunal is
established to investigate the matter.

List of major Inter-State Water disputes

According to the information shared by the government in the Lok Sabha, a list of inter-state
water disputes is given below.
S.No. Name of States Date of Present Status
Tribunal Concerned Constitution
1 Godavari Maharastra, April,1969 Award given on July,1980
Water Andhra
Disputes Pradesh,
Tribunal Karnataka,
Madhya
Pradesh &
Odisha

49
2 Krishna Maharastra, April,1969 Award given on May,1976
Water Andhra
Disputes Pradesh,
Tribunal-1 Karnataka
3 Narmada Rajasthan, October,1969 Award given on
Water Madhya December,1979
Disputes Pradesh,
Tribunal Gujarat and
Maharashtra
4 Ravi & Beas Punjab, April,1986 Report and decision given in
Water Haryana & April, 1987.
Tribunal Rajasthan Clarification/explanation
sought from the
Tribunal by the party states.
Also, a presidential reference in
the matter is before Supreme
Court and as such the

matter is sub-judice.
5 Cauvery Kerala, June,1990 Report and decision given on 5-2-2007. A
Water Karnataka, special leave petition (SLP) field by party
Disputes Tamilnadu and states in Hon‟ble Supreme Court, as such
Tribunal Puduchery the matter is sub-judice.

50
6 Krishna Karnataka, April,2004 Report and decision given on 30-12-2010.
Water Telangana, However, as per Supreme Court order
Disputes Andhra dated 16.9.2011, till further order, decision
Tribunal-II Pradesh and taken by the Tribunal on reference filed by
Maharashtra states and central government shall not be
published in the official Gazette. As such,
matter is sub-judice. Term of the tribunal
has been extended for a further period of
two years w.e.f. 1st August,2014 to address
the terms of reference as contained in
section 89 of Andhra Pradesh
reorganization Act,2014. The term of
KWDT-II has further extended for period
of one year. w.e.f. 1st August,2016. The
matter is under adjudication in the
Tribunal. The government of Telangana
filed a SLP 33623-26 of 2014 and WP(C)
545 of 2015 in the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in the matter. The matter is sub-judice.
7 Vansadhara Andhra February,2010 Report and decision not given by the
Water Pradesh & tribunal. State of Odisha has filed an SLP
Disputes Odisha in Supreme Court against the appointment
Tribunal of one of the members of the tribunal. The
SLP in the matter filed by the state of
Odisha in the Supreme Court is pending.
The matter is sub-judice. Besides,
Vansadhara water disputes tribunal in its
order dated 17.12.2013 has directed to
constitute a 3-member protem supervisory

51
 flow management and regulation
committee on river Vansadhara to
implement its order. State government of
Odisha has filed special leave to appeal
(Civil) No.3392 of 2014 with regard to the
Vansadhara water disputes tribunal
judgement dated 17.12.2013. the matter is
sub-judice.
8 Mahadayi Goa, Karnataka November,2010 Report and Decision not given by the
Water & Maharashtra Tribunal.
Disputes
Tribunal

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, RIVER DEVELOPMENT

& GANGA REJUVENATION LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 3053
ANSWERED ON 03.08.2017

Most rivers of India are plagued with interstate disputes

Virtually every significant river in the nation is a shared interstate resource, spanning across
two or more states. Post-independence, the surge in population, driven by factors like
agricultural expansion, urbanization, and industrial growth, has led to numerous interstate
conflicts over the distribution of river waters.

Following the interstate river water is worth mentioning the controversy.

 • Dispute over Cauvery river water involving Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala.
 • Krishna river water conflict among Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh.
 • Tungabhadra river water dispute between Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.
 • Controversy over the waters of Aliyar and Bhivani rivers between Tamil Nadu and
Kerala.
 • Godavari river water dispute involving Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Karnataka.

52
  • Narmada river water dispute among Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and
Rajasthan.
 • The Mahi River dispute among Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh.
 • Controversy surrounding Ravi and Beas River waters among Punjab, Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jammu and Kashmir, and Delhi.
 • Dispute over the Satluj-Yamuna linkage involving Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan.
 • Yamuna River water dispute among Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Delhi.
 • Karmanasa River water dispute between Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.
 • The Barak River water conflict between Assam and Manipur.

Case study on Godavari River

Introduction:

The Godavari river is flanked by the Mahadeo Hills of the Satpura Range to the north, the
Western Ghats to the west, and the Eastern Ghats of the Dandakaranya region of Odisha,
Chattisgarh, and Andhra to the east. Geographically, the basin's interior traverses
Maharashtra's plateau. It encompasses the Vidarbha Plain and the forested Wainganga valley,
rich in natural vegetation covering the rugged terrain. Originating at an elevation of 1067
meters in the Brahmagiri Hills of the Western Ghats in Nashik District, Maharashtra, the
Godavari, also known as Dakshin Vahini Ganga, flows over 1465 kilometers southeastward
to meet the Bay of Bengal at Narasapuram in West Godavari district, Andhra Pradesh.
Similar to many Indian rivers, Godavari's source is sanctified by a Shiva Temple,
Trimbakeshwar, one of the 12 Jyotirlingas, most of which are near rivers. It holds elaborate
myths and hymns in its honor. The river has a tributary, Gautami, near its origin in
Maharashtra, and another distributary called Gautami where it meets the sea in Andhra
Pradesh. As the longest river in Peninsular India, it flows through three states: Maharashtra,
Telangana, and Andhra Pradesh, with its basin extending to Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka,
parts of Chattisgarh, and Odisha. Passing through three agroclimatic zones and six
agroecological zones, it supports a diverse range of biodiversity and communities, with over
sixty million people residing in the basin. Important cities like Nashik, Nagpur, Wardha,
Nanded, and Chandrapur in Maharashtra, and Bhadrachalam, Nizamabad, Mancherial, and
Ramagundam in Telangana, as well as Rajahmundry and Narsapur in Andhra Pradesh, and

53
Seoni and Balaghat in Madhya Pradesh, lie within its basin. The river is regarded no less than
a sister to the Ganga. Nashik holds significant religious importance not only as the birthplace
of Dakshin Vahini Ganga but also due to its association with the Ramayana, believed to be
the place where Lord Ram resided during his Vanavasa. Throughout the river's course, places
like Tapovan offer glimpses of this ancient story cherished to this day. On the banks of the
Godavari in Nashik stands the KalaRam Mandir, where in 1930, Babasaheb Ambedkar
initiated the KalaRam Mandir Entry Satyagraha, challenging the temple's restriction for the
depressed classes. Indeed, Godavari has been witness to many significant events right from
its source.

Basin Overview:

The principal hydrological planning units are the major river basins. Recognized as a
functional hydrological unit for water resource management, the basin entails evaluating
individual water resource development projects within the overarching basin strategy. India's
second-largest river basin is the Godavari, encompassing approximately 9.5 percent of the
nation's total land area. This includes Maharashtra (48 percent), Telangana (18.8 percent),
Andhra Pradesh (4.5 percent), Chattisgarh (12 percent), Odisha (5.7 percent), along with
smaller portions of Madhya Pradesh (7.8 percent), Karnataka (1.4 percent), and the
Puducherry Union (0.01 percent) (refer to Table 1). The basin's geographic location is
illustrated in Figure 1. The basin is divided into two sections: complete drainage, flowing
into the Bay of Bengal, and rivers that flow into the Bay of Bengal, typically characterized by
canal drainage at their exits.

The Godavari Basin spans a total area of 312,812.0 km², with dimensions of 302,065.10 km²
and a maximum width and length of 995 km and 583 km, respectively. Positioned between
73°24" and 83°4 in longitude and 16°19' to 22°34' in latitude, the basin lies on the Deccan
Plateau. It is bordered by the Satmala Hills to the north, the Ajanta and Mahadeo Hills to the
northwest, the Western Ghats to the west, the Eastern Ghats to the south, and the black hat to
the east and southeast. The heart of the basin lies within the Maharashtra plateau, situated
300-600 meters east of its center. The Eastern Ghats, predominantly comprising the basin's
eastern half, extend along the peninsula's eastern border.

54
The Godavari River, the largest on the peninsula, and its primary tributaries feed into the Bay
of Bengal, constituting the fundamental component of the water system. Originating at an
elevation of 1,067 meters in the Western Ghats near the Triambak Hills in the Nasik district
of Maharashtra, the Godavari River flows on the right bank of Darna, Prava, and Manjra,
with Kadwa, Purna, Kadam, Pranhita, and Indravati on the left bank. The southwest monsoon
season contributes significantly to precipitation in the Godavari basin. As it approaches the
sea, the Godavari Delta consists of a wide array of alluvial rivers.

S.No. Feature Description

1 Basin Extent 73o24‟ to 83o4 E 16o19‟ to 22o34‟ N
2 Area (Sq.km) 312812.00 (CWC Reported)
Maharshtra-48.7% Andhra Pradesh-23.7% Madhya
3 States in the basin Pradesh-7.8% Odisha-5.7% Karnataka-1.4% Chhattisgarh-
12.4% Puducherry-0.01%
4 Districts(Census 2011) 55
Parliamentary
5 55
Constituencies (2009)
Mean Annual Rainfall
6 1093.21
(mm)
Mean Maximum
7 33.04
Temperature (oC)
Mean Minimum
8 20.63
Temperature (oC)
Total Population ( As per
9 60489310
Census 2001)
Number of villages (As
10 43492
per Census 2001)
11 Highest Elevation (m) 1664
Avg. Annual Water
12 110.540
Potential (BCM)
Utilizable Surface Water
13 76.30
(BCM)
14 Number of Sub Basins 8

55
15 Number of Watersheds 466
Number of water Dams (921) Barrages (28) Weir (18) Anicuts (1) Lifts
16
resources structures (62) Power House (16)
17 Highest Dam Bandardhara Dam-82.35 m
18 Longest Dam Sriramsagar(SRSP) Pochampad dam-15.6 km
19 Highest Barrage Kolar barrage-15.5 m
20 Longest Barrage Kolar barrage-1.195 km
Number of Irrigation
21 Major-70 Medium-216 ERM-6
projects
22 Number of HE projects 14
Number of Ground water
23 1875
observation wells
Number of
24 88
HydroObservation Sites
Number of Flood
25 18
Forecasting Sites
26 Water tourism sites 53

The Godavari basin has been divided into 12 sub-basins by Godavari Water Disputes
Tribunal (GWDT) viz. (1) Upper Godavari (from the source toits confluence with the Manjra
(2) Pravara, (3) Purna, (4) Manjra, (5) MiddleGodavari (from its confluence with Manjra to
confluence with Pranhita), (6)Maner, (7) Penganga, (8) Wardha, (9) Pranhita, (10) Lower
Godavari (from its confluence with Pranhita up to the sea),(11)Indravati and(12)Sabari.

The physical extent of varioussub basins of Godavari basin is indicated in Table

Table 1: Physical extent of various sub-basins of Godavari basin

Index Subbasin Extent

56
G-1 UpperGod Includes the catchment from source of Godavari to itsconfluence
avari with the Manjra. Excludes the catchment areas of the Pravara, the
Purna and the Manjra but includes that of all other tributaries
which fall into the Godavari in this reach.

G-2 Pravara Includes the entire catchment of Pravara from the source to its
confluence with the Godavari including Areas of Mula and other
tributaries of the Pravara.
G-3 Purna Includes the entire catchment of the Purna (from

Source to its confluence with the Godavari) including all its

tributaries.
G-4 Manjra Includes the entire catchment of Manjra from its source to its
confluence with the Godavari including catchment areas of Tima,
Karanja, Haldi, Lendi, ManerAnd other tributaries.

G-5 MiddleGod Comprises the catchment of the Godavari from its confluence
avari with Manjra to its confluence with Pranhita. Includes all its
tributaries in this reach, except the Maner and the Pranhita.

G-6 Maner Includes the entire catchment of Maner from its source

To its confluence with the Godavari, including all its tributaries.

G-7 Penganga Includes entire catchment of Penganga from its source To

its confluence with Wardha with all its tributaries.
G-8 Wardha Comprises the catchment of river Wardha from its source to its
confluence with Wainganga with all its tributaries but excluding
the catchment of Penganga
G-9 Pranhita Comprises the catchment of Wainganga from its source to its
confluence with Wardha and the Pranhita up to its confluence
with Godavari. Includes all the tributaries of Wainganga and
Pranhita except Penganga and Wardha. The Wainganga after its
confluence with Wardha is called Pranhita.

57
 G-10 LowerGod Consists of the lower part of Godavari from its confluence with
avari Pranahita up to the sea. Includes direct catchment of the Godavari
in this reach with all its Tributaries except the Indravati and the
Sabari.
G-11 Indravati Includes all the areas drained by Indravati and its tributaries from
its source to its confluence with the Godavari.
Sabari Includes entire catchment of Sabari river from its

source to its confluence with the Godavari including its tributary

Sileru.

Source:GodavariWaterDisputesTribunal(GWDT)Award

State wise breakup of catchment

The Upper Godavari, Pravara, and Purna sub-basins are entirely within Maharashtra. The
Manjra sub-basin's drainage area comes from Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Telangana. Most
of the middle Godavari sub-basin lies in Telangana. Manjra sub-basin is entirely in
Telangana, while Penganga sub-basin's drainage area is from Maharashtra and Telangana.
Wardha and Pranhita sub-basins are contributed to by Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. A
portion of Chhattisgarh falls into the Pranhita sub-basin. Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, and
Chhattisgarh contribute to the Lower Godavari sub-basin. Indravati sub-basin's catchment
area is partly in Chhattisgarh and partly in Odisha. Sabari sub-basin lies within the territories
of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha. Table 1 indicates the state-wise breakdown of
the entire Godavari basin's catchment area, while Table 2 presents the distribution of sub-
basin by state.

Table 2 State-wise break up of catchment area of Godavari basin.

Sl. State Catchment area %of the basin

(Sq.km) area
No.

1. Maharashtra 152199 48.7

2. Karnataka 4406 1.4

58
 3. MadhyaPradesh 31821 10.2

4. Chhattisgarh 33434 10.7

5. Telangana 57829 18.4

6. AndhraPradesh 15372 4.9

7. Odisha 17752 5.7

Total 312813 100.00

Source: WaterbalancestudiesofNWDA

State wide lift Irrigation and barrages on Godavari River

Water resources projects in the basin include Irrigation projects, Hydro Electric projects and
Extension, Renovation and Modernization projects. Nearly 286 major / medium irrigation
projects are there in the river basin. Sriram Sagar Stage I (Pochampad), Ghopewara Upsa
Sinchai Yojana, Jayakwadi (Pathan) Project, Godavari Delta, Sripad Sagar (Yellampalli),
Pench Project, Jayakwadi (Manjal Gaon) Project, Potteru (Central), Purna Project, and
Godavari Upper Canal are some of the major commands in the basin. The number of the
water resources projects is listed in table.

Number of water resource projects

Sl. No. Type of Projects Number of Projects

1 Major Irrigation Projects 70

2 Medium Projects Irrigation 216

3 ERM Projects 6

4 Hydro-Electric Projects 15

Major and medium irrigation projects

59
 The dependable yield for the basin is utilized under number of major, medium and
minor irrigation projects of the basin. Irrigation is being carried out in the area under
these projects viz., dams, barrages, diversion structures and other lift irrigation
systems.
 Prior to independence only a few irrigation projects were constructed in Godavari
basin.
 Important among these are Godavari delta system (with Dowlaiswaram weir as head
works).
 After independence, under various five-year plans a large number of multi-purpose
and irrigation projects have been taken up.

60
 CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF ADJUDICATION MECHANISMS UNDER THE ACT

Methods of Adjudication for Resolving Inter-State Water Disputes in India. Utilizing judicial
and quasi-judicial approaches, commonly referred to as "adjudicatory methods," proves
significant when negotiation and alternative non-adjudicatory methods fail to yield results.
These methods typically manifest in three forms: arbitration, tribunal decisions, or court
rulings. At the domestic level, adjudicatory methods may be established through agreements,
constitutional provisions, or statutory regulations. For instance, while the U.S. Constitution
grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over Inter-State Water Disputes, the Indian
Constitution delegates such authority to tribunals under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of
1956. Conversely, the River Boards Act of 1956 outlines statutory arbitration as a means to
settle interstate river water disputes. Apart from statutory arbitration, conventional arbitration
may be employed through agreements within federations or treaties between states in
accordance with international law. For example, the 1924 agreement between Mysore and
Madras regarding the Cauvery waters stipulated arbitration as the dispute resolution method.
Adjudication stands as a crucial means for resolving Inter-State Water Disputes, yet the
effectiveness of adjudicatory methods remains a subject of debate. Arbitration offers the
advantage of allowing each party to nominate representatives to the adjudicatory body, but
initiating arbitration may prove challenging amidst contentious circumstances. Additionally,
the process of appointing arbitrators often entails delays, and achieving consensus among
them may be arduous, potentially hindering decision implementation due to entrenched party
perspectives.

Given careful consideration to all aspects of the matter, adjudication through a tribunal might
be preferable to arbitration, provided a method for appointing impartial members to the
adjudicatory body can be established. A tribunal composed of unbiased members is more
likely to offer an objective perspective on the matter compared to a body comprising
nominees of the involved parties. In the context of adjudication via a tribunal or a court, the
former is favored. The primary rationale for preferring adjudication through a court is its
impartiality towards the issues at hand. However, if impartiality can be ensured through
tribunal adjudication, there is little to distinguish between the two in this regard. Assuming
that tribunal adjudication can indeed guarantee impartiality, it should be favored over courts
for resolving interstate water disputes. Tribunals present several advantages over courts,

61
including prompt case resolution, informality, relaxation of technical rules of evidence,
freedom from precedent, flexibility, and specialization. Water disputes entail complex
economic, geographical, topographical, and technical considerations. Deliberating on these
factors and hearing arguments may require lengthy continuous sessions. Given other judicial
responsibilities, a court may not be able to allocate the necessary time for such proceedings.
Occasionally, there arises a necessity for immediate assessments, which favors the
establishment of a tribunal. Tribunals offer the advantage of blending legal expertise with
other relevant skills, thus enhancing flexibility. However, the convenience of readily
available forums for conflict resolution, inherent in courts, is a notable advantage. Unlike
tribunals, which must be formed anew for each interstate water dispute, courts provide a
consistent venue for resolution. Moreover, when expert knowledge is not integral to legal
proceedings, the choice between tribunal and court becomes less significant. Thus, tribunals
lose a major advantage in such scenarios. Considering these relative strengths and
weaknesses, it's pertinent to analyze their practical application in interstate water disputes in
India. Despite attempts, arbitration has not proven successful or operative in India, as
evidenced by historical agreements and statutory provisions. Similarly, the judicial method
lacks encouragement, both constitutionally and statutorily, in India.

Article 262 emphasizes an "adjudicatory method" in clause (i). However, the subsequent
clause displays a reluctance towards the judicial method, allowing Parliament the freedom to
enact laws excluding court adjudication. Consequently, the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of
1956 established tribunals as the exclusive adjudicatory mechanism for resolving inter-state
water disputes in India. Despite the constitutional and statutory non-recognition of the
judicial method, the judicial role in water dispute resolution in India has not been
marginalized. There have been instances where parties involved sought court intervention in
areas of grey interpretation concerning tribunal awards. Additionally, in cases of tribunal
award implementation and violation, parties have had no recourse but to seek judicial
intervention, as seen in the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal's interim award case. It is now
imperative to assess the performance of various tribunals established under the Inter-State
Water Disputes Act of 1956 to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the tribunal
system in resolving inter-state water disputes in India. The Union Government has thus far
established five tribunals under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956: the Ravi-Beas
Waters Tribunal, the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, the Godavari Water Disputes
Tribunal, the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal, and the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal.

62
Among these, the Ravi-Beas Tribunal, initially established by ordinance, was later brought
under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956. Three of these tribunals have issued their
final awards. The Ravi-Beas Tribunal provided its final conclusion under section 5(2) of the
Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 in 1978, pending the announcement of the final report
under section 5(3) of the same Act. Similarly, the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal has
submitted only an interim report thus far. These tribunals unquestionably serve as the sole
adjudicatory mechanism for settling inter-state water disputes as envisioned in the Inter-State
Water Disputes Act of 1956.

The combined findings of all the tribunals can be succinctly presented as follows:

I. All tribunals have unanimously agreed that a river should be regarded as a unified physical
entity. This includes its tributaries, even if they lie entirely within one state, for the purposes
of water resource allocation.

II. It is affirmed that a tributary within a single drainage basin does not constitute a separate
unit for water distribution. The entirety of the basin must be considered as one unit for this
purpose. The Eradi Tribunal applied this principle in 1987 during the resolution of Ravi-Beas
Waters Disputes among Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan.

III. Nearly all tribunals have asserted that once a state is allocated a specific portion of water
from a drainage basin or river system, it has the freedom to utilize it as it sees fit.

IV. As a fundamental principle, all tribunals have acknowledged that diverting water for use
outside the basin is permissible.

V. The principle of "optimum utilization" of water resources has been embraced by almost all
tribunals as the ultimate goal in water allocation and utilization.

VI. The tribunals have emphasized the importance of avoiding unnecessary waste in the
utilization of waters within the concerned basin or river system.

vii. Certain tribunals have placed importance on preventing pollution of the relevant water
resources.

63
viii. With due consideration to the principle of 'community of interest,' some tribunals have
suggested the approach of 'cooperative development' of the relevant water resources by the
disputing states.

ix. Tribunals have established the principle that the utilization of water by any individual or
entity of any kind within a state's territory is considered as usage by that state.

x. Another significant principle endorsed by these tribunals is that in an Interstate Water

Dispute, the concerned states represent all their inhabitants.

xi. Tribunals have also maintained the position that if there is central legislation (by the
parliament), such legislation binds all states, and the tribunal lacks authority to override
paramount central legislation. However, tribunal decisions supersede any conflicting state
legislation and executive actions.

xii. Almost all tribunals have acknowledged the usefulness and importance of agreements
and have promoted dispute resolution through agreements. Nonetheless, some tribunals have
established the principle that 'water shares allocated by certain agreements, which were not
part of the current dispute's terms of reference, remain unaffected.' However, if the
examination of water allocation based on a prior agreement becomes the terms of reference
for a tribunal, its award may override the earlier agreement (Eradi Tribunal).

(xiii) The tribunals have consistently shown reluctance to apply decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court to Indian circumstances, arguing that the Indian and U.S. federations differ in
nature and origin. The constituent units of the Indian federation do not possess the same
constitutional status or degree of autonomy as those in the United States of America.

(xiv) Some tribunals have embraced the principle that unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties or directed by the relevant tribunals, if a state is unable to utilize a portion of its
allocated water in any given year due to the non-development or damage of its projects, or
for any other reason whatsoever, that state will not have the right to claim the unused water in
subsequent years (The Krishna and Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal).

64
(xv) Furthermore, some tribunals have also endorsed the idea that the failure of a state to
utilize any portion of its allocated water in a particular year shall not result in the forfeiture or
abandonment of its water share in subsequent years, even if another state may have utilized
such water during the same period, unless otherwise agreed upon by the involved parties or
directed by the respective tribunals.

(xvi) All tribunals have outrightly rejected the Riparian rights doctrine and the application of
a state's proprietary rights theory.

(xvii) Starting from the Indus Commission before Independence, all tribunals have invoked
and applied the principle of equitable apportionment or equitable utilization.

(xviii) Most tribunals involved in the resolution of interstate water disputes have stressed that
the concept of 'equitable' apportionment/utilization cannot be precisely formulated to fit all
circumstances and occasions. Therefore, the standard of 'equitable apportionment/utilization'
necessitates the adaptation of the formula to the specific requirements of each situation to
ensure that the allocation of water is rational, just, fair, and reasonable in the truest sense of
the terms.

(xix) It has been observed that typically, the awards of various tribunals only provide a
description of the various beneficial uses of water, without intending to establish norms for
determining the order of priority for such uses.

(xx) The tribunals have in their awards, shown the tendency of protecting acquired water
rights or existing water rights.

(xx i) Tribunals have allowed the use of !:,Tfatmdwater in their awards, but this hasn't been
considered as utilizing water from the river.

(xx ii) Concerning the cost of dispute settlement operations, all major tribunals, as per section
9(3) of the Inter-state Water Disputes Act, 1956, have decreed that "each state will bear their
own costs for appearing before the Tribunal," and "the Tribunal's expenses shall be shared
equally among the states."

65
(xx iii) Regarding the cost-benefit analysis of projects addressed in the respective Tribunal
orders, the prevailing practice indicates that Tribunals generally focus on allocating water
shares among states, leaving them free to utilize their shares as they see fit. Nonetheless,
certain shortcomings in Tribunal performance should not be disregarded during discussions.

a)From the proceedings in the three cases where final awards were issued by the tribunals, it's
evident that the entire process took an unreasonably long time. Even now, two tribunals that
are operational haven't yet issued their awards despite commencing their work a long time
ago.
b)Tribunals have demonstrated inconsistency in executing awards. Some have made only
half-hearted attempts, while others have remained completely silent on the matter. The
Nannada Control Authority, established by the Nannada Waters Disputes Tribunal, originally
had limited responsibilities concerning cost allocation and the rehabilitation of affected
individuals. Later, its mandate expanded to include environmental monitoring, but it does not
resemble a Narmada Basin Authority. Similarly, although the Krishna Water Disputes
Tribunal proposed the creation of the Krishna River Authority, this never materialized. Even
with the 1980 amendment to the Inter-state Water Disputes Act of 1956, tribunals still lack
the authority to independently devise schemes for award implementation. This deficiency
became evident during the controversy surrounding the implementation of the Cauvery Water
Disputes Tribunal's interim award. Interestingly, instead of utilizing existing legislation such
as the River Boards Act of 1956 for implementation, both tribunals and parliament have
advocated for amending the Inter-state Water Disputes Act of 1956.

(c) All previous Tribunals, guided by a mechanical approach and erroneously assuming that
water conflicts are solely inter-state affairs, have overlooked the role of people as significant
stakeholders in such disputes. This state-centric approach of the tribunals has sparked
controversy due to fundamental assumptions underlying their awards. Recent research
highlights that the highly sensitive conflict over Cauvery water between Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu transcends the state level. Understanding the Cauvery Dispute requires recognition of
various water conflicts throughout the Cauvery basin. Additionally, the assumption by
tribunals that larger dams signify development, upon which many water disputes are
adjudicated, is no longer universally accepted. A debate is ongoing regarding technology-
driven development versus people-centered development, as evidenced by the controversy
surrounding the construction of the SSP project and calls for a review of the Narmada Water

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Disputes Tribunal's award. Furthermore, the performance of tribunals in settling water
disputes in India has not met expectations. Final awards in three disputes were primarily the
result of prior agreements between concerned states. Additionally, tribunals cannot claim
exclusive ingenuity regarding substantial principles; for instance, they borrowed the
"equitable apportionment" principle from a U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Kansas vs
Colorado case. In light of these discussions, several conclusions can be drawn regarding the
efficacy of tribunals as a method for settling interstate water disputes in India.

(I) Primarily, Tribunals must deliver final judgments promptly. Expedient resolution of inter-
state water disputes by the tribunal might face obstacles such as data unavailability or delayed
submission by state governments. However, in such instances, the tribunal can proceed to
issue its decision based on the available data, exercising best judgment.

(II) Tribunals should heed public demands when issuing final awards, recognizing that water
conflicts extend beyond state parties. Over time, successive governments have eroded
people's control over community resources and traditional local management systems. In this
regard, guiding tribunals with the public trust theory, which views natural resources as
common property and entrusts the state with the duty to protect them as trustees of the
people, would be beneficial.

(III) Tribunals should include provisions or mechanisms for ongoing evaluation in their
awards.

(IV) Many tribunal reports rely on assumptions outdated by present realities, rendering them
static documents reflecting conditions from decades ago. Therefore, immediate review of
such reports is imperative to adapt to changing circumstances.

(V) Resolving federal issues, including inter-state water disputes, requires consideration
beyond the viewpoints of central and state governments. With the establishment of
Panchayats as a third tier in the federal structure, their involvement is crucial. Tribunals
should ensure participation of Panchayats and other bodies in decision-making processes to
enhance the acceptance of their awards. Additionally, exploring avenues for participation by
non-governmental organizations and grassroots groups is essential, as their grievances and
demands sometimes escalate into interstate water conflicts.

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B. Alternative Dispute Settlement Methods for Resolution of the Inter-State Water
Disputes in India /

The adjudicatory model for resolving inter-state water disputes primarily relies on the
"Winner take it-all Principles," neglecting the consensual approach. However, inter-state river
water disputes inherently defy resolution solely through determining winners and losers.
Hence, a combined approach integrating adjudication with conflict resolution methods
emphasizing compromise, consensus, and cooperation is deemed appropriate. This blend is
particularly advantageous in the Indian context, aligning with cultural norms that prioritize
consensus. Rather than solely relying on state-imposed common law adjudication, utilizing
alternative dispute resolution methods such as negotiation, conciliation, good offices, and
mediation can yield superior outcomes. These methods, alongside water policy,
administration, and law, collectively form water institutions that can effectively resolve water
disputes without adjudication. To assess the effectiveness of these approaches in India, a
detailed examination of various non-adjudicatory methods employed to resolve inter-state
water disputes is warranted.

(1) Negotiation

Negotiation serves as a method for settling water disputes, either directly between involved
parties or in conjunction with third-party intervention such as good offices or mediation, each
varying in their degree of involvement. Good offices simply bring parties together without
actively participating in negotiations, while mediation involves a more active role from the
mediator, directing negotiations toward a peaceful resolution, though suggestions made are
not binding. However, both methods have limited scope for thorough investigation into facts
or laws related to interstate water disputes. To address this limitation, a more specialized
technique called conciliation has been employed. In conciliation, impartial bodies or advisory
committees make non-binding reports with settlement proposals, aiming to facilitate
resolution. While mediation and conciliation are often used interchangeably, they differ in
their approach. Mediation involves informal proposals based on party-supplied information,
whereas conciliation entails a group hearing both sides, investigating facts, and issuing
formal but non-binding proposals for consideration as a solution. Negotiation, whether direct
or third-party facilitated, remains the preferred method for resolving interstate water disputes,
focusing on accommodating both parties' interests equitably and fostering voluntary

68
agreement, leading to faithful implementation of negotiated settlements. This approach
contrasts with adjudicatory methods, which may not suit the complex nature of interstate
river water disputes, requiring delicate balancing of various socio-economic, technical, and
geographical factors unique to each dispute.

Furthermore, the obligatory nature of judicial proceedings diminishes their effectiveness. The
decision of the adjudicator cannot fully satisfy all parties involved. Due to its numerous
benefits, negotiation has been recognized as a powerful and effective method for resolving
both international and interstate river water disputes. To be precise, bilateral negotiations
among nation-states have become an indispensable means, as discussed in the previous
chapter. A multitude of treaties directly addressing water disputes, which are concluded
through negotiation, further support this assertion. Primarily due to this, the Helsinki Rules in
Article 30 prioritize negotiation as the primary method for settling international river water
disputes. In addition to these advantages, negotiated agreements also establish various
commissions and committees to oversee and enforce the treaties. Examples include the
International Boundary and Waters Commission under the 1944 treaty between Mexico and
the United States, the Permanent Joint Technical Committee under the Nile Water Agreement
of 1959 between Sudan and the United Arab Republic, the Mahakali River Commission
under the 1996 treaty between India and Nepal, and the Joint Committee under the 1996
Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on water sharing of the Ganga at Farakka between India and
Bangladesh. These are just a few instances of joint commissions established to administer
agreements or treaties between nation-states.

Similarly, when it comes to disputes regarding national or inter-state rivers, negotiations and
agreements have historically been regarded as the most effective approach. In the United
States of America, the constitution offers two options for resolving inter-state water disputes:
adjudication through the Supreme Court or reaching a settlement via compact or agreement,
without favoring one over the other. However, the American experience highlights the
challenges associated with adjudicating inter-state water disputes in court, such as significant
delays. Consequently, numerous interstate compacts have been established to address the
equitable distribution of waters in interstate rivers. It's worth noting that not all water
compacts solely focus on water distribution; some are aimed at the integrated development of
river basins. Similarly, in Australia, federal practice over the last fifty years indicates that
differences among states regarding inter-state rivers have been effectively resolved through

69
interstate compacts between the states and the Commonwealth. Despite the constitutional
provision of two alternative settlement modes without preference, negotiation emerges as the
most suitable and commonly utilized method for resolving any river water dispute, whether
national or international.

Moreover, during the discussion, it becomes apparent that negotiation is officially

acknowledged in the constitutions of both the U.S.A. and Australia, deeply ingrained in the
federal practices of these nations. To delve into a similar discourse within the Indian context,
it is pertinent to examine the constitutional provisions. In India, the constitution remains
silent regarding inter-state agreements. Article 262 of the constitution designates Interstate
Water Disputes as more than just a typical federal dispute. It identifies such disputes as a
'special class' where both legal and non-legal facets are present. Interestingly, the constitution
intentionally empowers Parliament to exclude the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in resolving
such disputes. While this aspect aligns with the constitution, it is peculiar that the
Constitution, under the same article, solely mandates adjudication by tribunal, disregarding
other methods like negotiation and conciliation, which could be more apt for resolving
disputes encompassing legal and non-legal dimensions such as inter-state river water
disputes. Consequently, in India, the utilization of non-adjudicatory dispute resolution
methods lacks constitutional recognition, with no room for alternative methods either
preceding the quasi-judicial tribunal adoption or following its failure. However, the
resolution of any federal issue globally cannot be confined solely within constitutional
frameworks and adjudicatory methods. Inter-state water disputes may find resolution through
statutory, non-statutory bodies, and administrative machineries. A prime example is the Inter-
state Water Dispute Act of 1956 enacted by the Indian Parliament, which prioritizes
negotiation as the primary means for settling inter-state river water disputes.

Moreover, the definition of a water dispute according to the Act encompasses, among other
things, disagreements regarding the interpretation of agreements concerning the usage,
allocation, or management of interstate river waters, or the execution of such agreements. It is
worth noting that despite the absence of an explicit provision in the constitution allowing
states to engage in negotiations with other states, the Inter-state Water Disputes Act of 1956,
enacted under Article 262 of the constitution, places significant emphasis on negotiation,
surpassing the scope of Article 262, which solely addresses adjudicative methods. In addition
to the Inter-state Water Disputes Act of 1956, another statute, namely the States Recognition

70
Act of 1956, under Section 108(1), envisions the potential for interstate agreements
concerning water. However, a major flaw of these two statutes is the absence of any
provisions within the Acts detailing the procedure or forms for entering into such agreements.
Furthermore, the Inter-state Water Disputes Act of 1956 primarily concerns itself with the
resolution and adjudication of disputes. The Act becomes applicable when a dispute is
justiciable, and any matter or dispute lacking a prejudicial effect, although negotiable, cannot
be the subject of adjudication under the ISWD Act of 1956.

To address statutory deficiencies and facilitate negotiation, another complementary law was
enacted in 1956, as mentioned earlier. This law is the River Boards Act of 1956. Although
not rooted in Article 262 of the constitution and not directly focused on dispute resolution
through negotiation, the River Boards Act, 1956, can supplement the Interstate Water
Disputes Act effectively. The operational framework of the river boards, as outlined in the
Act, can foster an atmosphere conducive to negotiated agreements between states. Even if the
boards fail to achieve consensus among the states, their impartial reports on technical matters,
produced after thorough examination and cooperation, can significantly influence public
opinion, which is crucial for political settlements. In addition to the primary provisions of the
Act, the updated regulations also advocate for dispute resolution through negotiation before
resorting to arbitration under the Chief Justice of India. However, the Central Government
has yet to utilize its authority under the River Boards Act, and no River Board has been
established to date. Consequently, the potential of River Boards for dispute resolution
through negotiation remains untapped. Historical usage patterns indicate that negotiation, as a
method, has been largely procrastinated and has lacked any specific timeframe.

In the case of the Cauvery Waters Dispute, negotiations spanning from 1968 to 1990 proved
ineffective. However, this prolonged process does not negate the fact that the allocation of
water from most of India's interstate rivers has primarily been achieved through agreements
and negotiations between the involved states. Even in the three disputes where tribunals have
issued final awards thus far, these outcomes largely stem from prior negotiated agreements
among the concerned states. Interstate agreements are currently in force regarding the
Subernarekha, Mahi, Damodar, and Barakar systems. Additionally, agreements exist within
the Ganga basin concerning the Betwa, Sone, and partially, the Chambal rivers. This reality
suggests that a combination of adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory methods would be the most
effective approach to resolving interstate water disputes in India. These methods are not

71
mutually exclusive but rather complementary to each other. However, historically, the central
government has oscillated between favoring negotiated settlements and adjudication. For
example, despite the establishment of the Narmada Tribunal in 1969, further negotiations
were suggested by Ms. Indira Gandhi, leading to a delay in the adjudication process without
fruitful results. Eventually, the tribunal issued its award in 1979. Hence, there is no singular
method; both negotiation and adjudication processes are necessary. Ideally, reaching an
amicable settlement through negotiation would be preferable, but if negotiation fails,
resorting to adjudication under the Interstate Water Disputes Act, 1956, would be prudent.
Within the current constitutional and legal framework, states can pursue negotiation or
conciliation with the assistance of mediators chosen by themselves or appointed by the Prime
Minister. Any resulting agreement could then be adopted as the tribunal's award. This
approach has been employed in the past, and unresolved issues following mediation could be
left to the tribunal for adjudication. Even if conciliation is not entirely successful, it facilitates
dialogue between parties, making it easier for the tribunal to reach a final decision.

(ii) National Water Policy And National Water Grid

To address interstate river water disputes in India effectively and consistently, both legal
avenues and alternative non-adjudicatory methods have been deemed necessary at the
administrative level of the Central Government. One such proposal that has been under
consideration is the establishment of a National Water Grid. This concept was initially put
forth during the 1970s through two proposed schemes: the National Water Grid by Dr. K.L.
Rao and the Garland Anal Project by Captain Dastur. However, both plans were deemed
unfeasible for implementation due to cost and other factors, leading to their abandonment by
the Central Government. This highlighted the necessity of a comprehensive National Water
Policy for the sustainable management of water resources and the resolution of interstate
disputes. Recognizing the limitations of adjudication alone, the Central Government
established the National Water Resource Council in 1983, tasking it with formulating such a
policy. Subsequently, a draft National Water Policy was adopted at the Council's inaugural
meeting on September 9th, 1987, chaired by the Prime Minister. This meeting also led to the
decision to develop guidelines under the National Water Policy, which outlined fundamental
principles for water management.

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(I) Water is a scarce and valuable national asset, intended for strategic planning,
development, and preservation, in an integrated and environmentally responsible manner,
considering the requirements of the respective state.

(II) The entire river basin should be viewed as a unified entity for distributing water from
interstate rivers or river valleys. However, in the case of extensive basins like the Indus,
Ganga-Brahmaputra, and Meghna, sections of the basin may also be considered.

(III) Both surface and groundwater resources should be maximally utilized, with
consideration given to groundwater availability when allocating river water.

(IV) Water-deficient regions should receive water transfers from other areas, including
transfers between river basins, while accounting for the needs of those areas or basins.

(V) Project planning for water resource development should prioritize multiple benefits,
incorporating an integrated and interdisciplinary approach that addresses human and
ecological concerns, as well as the needs of marginalized communities.

(VI) Planning units should be hydrological, such as drainage basins or sub-basins, with
dedicated organizations established for the planned development and management of river
basins.

(VII) When allocating water, priority should generally be given to drinking water, followed
by irrigation, hydroelectric power, industrial, and other uses, in that order.

(VIII) Groundwater potential should be periodically reassessed and its exploitation regulated
based on recharge possibilities and considerations of social fairness.

(IX) Conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater should be promoted from the outset
of project planning.

(X) Water use policies should be closely integrated with land use policies, and water
distribution should be equitable, ensuring social justice.

73
(XI) Enhancing the efficiency of water utilization across various sectors and fostering
conservation awareness through educational initiatives, regulations, and both incentives and
disincentives is imperative.

(XII) Water tariffs should be structured to incentivize prudent water consumption, covering
maintenance and operational costs as well as a portion of fixed expenses for hydraulic
projects.

(XIII) There should be a gradual integration of farmers into the management of irrigation
systems.

(XIV) Prioritizing the needs of drought-prone regions in water resources development

planning is essential. Implementing measures such as soil moisture conservation, water
harvesting techniques, exploiting groundwater potential, and facilitating surface water
transfer can reduce vulnerability. Additionally, promoting less water-intensive activities like
pasture management and forestry in these regions is advisable.

(XV) Establishing a national information system on water resources, equipped with a

network of data banks and databases, to strengthen existing central and state-level agencies is
crucial.

(XVI) Intensifying training and research endeavors as integral components of water resources
development programs is necessary.

The initial version of the national water policy was ratified by the NWRC in 1987, which
mandated the formulation of guidelines for a National Water policy. However, subsequent
council meetings, including the latest one on February 6, 1996, failed to make significant
progress. During the latest session, the draft proposal was neither extensively deliberated
upon nor subjected to a vote due to disagreements among states, which arose during the
earlier National Water Board discussions. Typically, after the council convenes, the National
Water Board, chaired by the secretary with the participation of chief secretaries from all
states, strives to achieve a consensus on the guidelines. However, states like Madhya Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra objected to the draft guidelines, citing
the unique characteristics of each basin and the existing coverage of many interstate rivers by

74
tribunal awards. Conversely, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and West
Bengal argued against including groundwater as part of basin water for the purposes of water
allocation.

Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Haryana, and Punjab expressed dissent towards the proposal
suggesting that the claim of nonbasin states for water allocation should be contingent upon
the agreement of all co-basin states. Haryana additionally advocated for ensuring that the
hydro power benefits of joint projects are accessible to all basin states. This highlighted a
lack of consideration for national interests. Andhra Pradesh raised concerns regarding the
proposal to involve the central government in the water allocation process. The objections
from the Planning Commission were even more significant. Refusing to endorse the draft
guidelines, the commission pointed out several constitutional weaknesses regarding their
enforceability. It noted that the provisions of the national water policy only pertain to the
transfer of water from other areas, including inter-basin transfers, without addressing the
allocation of inter-state river waters among basin states. The Commission suggested that
basing the guidelines on common principles adopted by various tribunals, rather than the
Helsinki rules, would be more appropriate and realistic, leveraging indigenous wisdom
accumulated over time. It questioned the necessity of developing such guidelines,
highlighting that water allocations for most inter-state rivers have already been settled
through tribunals or agreements. In the peninsular region, formal water allocations are absent
only for the Mahanadi and the Tapti rivers. The Cauvery water disputes are under tribunal
consideration. Interstate agreements govern the Subernarekha, Damodar, Barakar, and Mahi
rivers, while agreements also exist for the Betwa, Sone, and partially for the Chambal rivers
within the Ganga Basin.

The Yamuna's location is well-established. The Commission reiterated that full allocation of
water remains to be done for major inter-state rivers like the Ganga and the Brahmaputra,
which have international basins and therefore fall outside the scope of the guidelines. Given
this, the Planning Commission questioned whether such policy guidelines would be widely
applicable at this stage, except for a few river basins, and whether national guidelines would
be worthwhile in such cases. Tamil Nadu also argued against framing executive guidelines at
this time, fearing interference with ongoing adjudicatory processes before the Tribunal and
the Supreme Court, especially in the case of the Cauvery dispute. Conversely, the Karnataka

75
Government has long advocated for the framing of National Water Policy guidelines to
achieve an objective and satisfactory solution to the sharing of river waters.

The discussion thus reveals inconsistency among state governments regarding the framing of
national water policy guidelines. States facing water shortages tend to support the idea of
transferring water from surplus to deficit areas. Some states have even proposed declaring all
major rivers as national assets. However, states from which transfers could occur often assert
proprietary rights over the rivers, deny any surplus, and express concerns about the erosion of
state rights and the expansion of the Central Government's authority. These differing opinions
highlight that almost all disputing states in India aim to share rivers without a clear policy
framework.

The establishment of legal policies centered around fair allocation or fair usage is crucial in
achieving an impartial and satisfactory resolution to the distribution of river waters. In India,
the lack of written regulations on fair allocation has posed a significant challenge in
effectively adjudicating or settling interstate water disputes, particularly in cases of fully
allocated river basins like the Cauvery river. Here, water is typically fully allocated to the
lower basin state with flat terrain, leading to disputes arising from the irrigation needs of the
basin state with mountainous and undulating terrain. The Indus Commission, established
prior to Independence to resolve disputes between Punjab and Sind provinces, has affirmed
that the principles of fair allocation govern water disputes in India. Similarly, the Krishna and
Narmada Tribunals have supported this notion when resolving disputes in semi-allocated
river basins with surplus water beyond committed utilization, focusing on disputes over
claiming surplus water. However, these unwritten principles of fair allocation lack clarity
regarding the relationship between longstanding water users with prescriptive rights acquired
through prior appropriation and new or proposed users. In contrast, the rules outlined in the
1997 U.N. convention seem to effectively balance the interests of old users, typically
represented by lower basin states, and new users, represented by upper basin states.
Therefore, the call for the development of guidelines for a National Water Policy holds merit.
Without such a legal policy framework, achieving a meaningful resolution to disputes like the
Cauvery issue or similar conflicts will remain elusive.

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 (III) Water Administratzon

It has been previously noted in the study that relying solely on legislature and judiciary to
resolve water disputes is insufficient for any country. A comprehensive water administration,
guided by a sound national water policy, is crucial for resolving such disputes. While India
cannot claim significant progress in this regard, recent efforts have been made to utilize
constitutional mechanisms such as the inter-state council for exchanging views towards
administrative solutions for inter-state water disputes. Various bodies, agencies, and boards
have been established either by statutory direction or through parliamentary resolution,
central cabinet decision, or executive orders. Among these bodies, statutory bodies like the
Zonal Councils established under the State Reorganization Act, 1956, have occasionally
addressed inter-state water disputes in their discussions, aiming to alleviate tensions.
Additionally, bodies such as the Bhakra Management Board, Beas Construction Board, and
Betwa River Board, established by acts like the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966, and the
Betwa River Board Act, 1976, respectively, serve as administrative mechanisms for resolving
specific water disputes outlined in these statutes. In addition to statutory bodies, several non-
statutory bodies also play a significant role, and their collective activities influence the
administrative resolution of inter-state river water disputes in India. Some notable bodies
include the Central Water Commission (1945), National Water Resource Council (1983),
Central Board of Irrigation and Power (1927), National Water Development Agency (1982),
and Control Boards for Inter-state River Projects (established in various years by government
resolutions). To gain deeper insights into this matter, a detailed analysis of the functioning of
these bodies appears warranted.

Central Water Commission (CWC)

Since its establishment in 1945, the Central Water Commission has made significant strides
in advancing and advocating measures for the management, preservation, and utilization of
water resources to foster the development of irrigation and hydropower generation, as well as
flood control and protection initiatives. The commission is overseen by a chairman who also
serves as the ex-officio secretary to the Government of India. It conducts its operations
through four wings: the Design and Research wing, the Planning and Progress wing, the
Water Planning Wing, and the River Management Wing. Notably, the River Management
Wing offers technical guidance to states on matters such as river morphology, flood

77
protection, and drainage, thereby facilitating the resolution of interstate water disputes
through administrative channels.

National Water Resource Council (NWRC)

The National Water Resource Council (NWRC) was established through a resolution by the
Central Government, following the lead of the National Development Council 446. Its
composition mirrors that of the latter, with the Prime Minister serving as Chairman and
various Central Ministers, along with all Chief Ministers of states and lieutenant governors of
Union Territories, acting as members. Additionally, a National Water Board was formed,
chaired by a secretary, with chief secretaries from all states as members. The key functions of
the council, as outlined in the Government Resolution, include drafting policy guidelines for
industrial water management and pricing, developing irrigation management policies, and
devising plans for the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater in irrigation projects.
These designated responsibilities illustrate its potential to serve as a platform for fostering
cooperation between the Centre and states in resolving interstate water disputes within India.

Central Board of Irrigation and Power

The Central Board of Irrigation and Power operates as the primary national entity for
coordinating research endeavors within the realms of irrigation, flood control, and power,
along with disseminating resultant findings. Its membership includes Chief Engineers
overseeing irrigation and power departments. The Board consistently collects feedback
pertaining to challenges encountered in the design, construction, maintenance, and
management of irrigation and power projects, necessitating research, data analysis, and the
development of feasible solutions. Additionally, it serves as a pivotal platform for engineers
and scientists nationwide to convene and deliberate on pertinent issues. Dissemination of
technical knowledge via publications stands out as a significant responsibility of the Board.
Moreover, it fulfills roles as the Indian National Committee for several international bodies,
including the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), International Commission
on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), International Association for Hydraulic Research (IAHR),
and International Water Resources Association (IWRA).

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 CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

TESTING OF HYPOTHESIS

1) Transferring water-related matters from the State List to the Concurrent

List would lead to a more effective and timely resolution of inter-state river water
disputes. This hypothesis aims to explore the impact of legislative jurisdiction on
the efficiency of resolving water disputes and whether a shift in constitutional
placement could enhance the dispute resolution process.
H0 (Null Hypothesis): Transferring water-related matters from the State List to the
Concurrent List would not lead to a more effective and timely resolution of inter-state river
water disputes. This hypothesis posits that the legislative jurisdiction, regardless of its
placement in the constitution, does not significantly influence the efficiency of resolving
water disputes between states.

Hypothesis Rejected

H1 (Alternative Hypothesis): Transferring water-related matters from the State List to the
Concurrent List would lead to a more effective and timely resolution of inter-state river water
disputes. This hypothesis suggests that a shift in constitutional placement to the Concurrent
List could positively impact the dispute resolution process by enhancing coordination and
cooperation among states.

Hypothesis Accepted

2) The existing tribunal system, as outlined in the Inter-State River Water Disputes
Act, 1956, is equally effective in addressing inter-state river water disputes as
compared to a proposed permanent Water Tribunal with an appellate tribunal.
This hypothesis aims to assess the comparative effectiveness of the existing
tribunal system and a proposed permanent tribunal, considering factors such as
speed of resolution, consistency in decisions, and overall fairness.

79
H0 (Null Hypothesis): There is no significant difference in the effectiveness of the
existing tribunal system, as outlined in the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956,
and the proposed permanent Water Tribunal with an appellate tribunal, in addressing
inter-state river water disputes.

Hypothesis Rejected

H1 (Alternative Hypothesis): The proposed permanent Water Tribunal with an appellate

tribunal is significantly more effective in addressing inter-state river water disputes
compared to the existing tribunal system outlined in the Inter-State River Water Disputes
Act, 1956.

Hypothesis Accepted

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

The study suggests engaging stakeholders (including the public, government, NGOs, courts,
and tribunals) to address interstate river water disputes. This involvement offers a promising
avenue for resolving such disputes amicably. Resolving water conflicts effectively
necessitates expertise in environmental and natural resource economics. This includes
assessing the value of water resources and associated infrastructure, calculating economic
damages from water pollution and habitat loss, conducting cost-benefit analyses, designing
markets, implementing water conservation policies, and addressing water-related challenges
linked to climate change. However, mechanisms for settling Indian water disputes are unclear
and lack transparency. The study analytically differentiates between situations conducive to
cooperation and those characterized by pure conflict, where initial rights allocation is
contested. In the latter scenario, pursuing negotiated solutions might prove fruitless, with
arbitration or adjudication being more efficient alternatives. Nonetheless, India's process is
sluggish, and genuinely binding arbitration mechanisms are absent. Furthermore, intertwining
interstate water disputes with broader center-state conflicts and political issues exacerbates
the challenges.

The study notes that improving the design of mechanisms for negotiating inter-state water
disputes can lessen impacts. Potential measures include establishing a national water

80
commission free from daily political influences, adopting a federated structure integrating
river basin authorities and water user associations, and setting specific timeframes for
negotiation and adjudication. The study develops a framework considering collective action,
sustainability, and the capability approach in resolving water disputes. It briefly discusses
how identity may impede cooperation or the formation of universal principles. The
framework is then applied to a case study of the Godavari river dispute in India. Central to
river water disputes are issues of justice and fairness, influenced by factors such as citizens'
perceptions of their rights to river water, their ability to organize collective claims based on
location, economic activities, and identity, and their capacity to influence state decisions. The
framework also highlights the importance of state policies aligning with the voices and
collective interests of different groups, as well as how riparian states acknowledge and
address each other's claims. It suggests that the capability approach offers a broader
perspective than collective action alone in resolving water disputes. India has experienced
numerous river water-sharing disputes in its history.

Disputes between states located upstream and those downstream stem from conflicting water
usage needs, often seeking resolution through Water Tribunal awards or court litigation.
Addressing water-sharing conflicts should prioritize water conservation across sectors and
sustained stakeholder dialogue. Establishing a permanent forum for discussion is imperative.
Resolving such disputes shouldn't solely rely on governments; all stakeholders must engage
for effective resolution. Karnataka recently faced protests over the Mahadayi river water-
sharing dispute with Goa, rooted in conflicting water usage claims since the 1980s. Karnataka
asserts its need for 7.56 tmc ft. of Mahadayi River water, while Goa argues for the
preservation of its population's water dependency and the river's ecosystem. Karnataka
proposes diverting surplus Mahadayi water to address its drinking, irrigation, agriculture, and
power generation needs. Water-sharing disputes, like the Cauvery river dispute between
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu or the Sutlej-Yamuna Canal Link (SLY) dispute between Punjab
and Haryana, are not uncommon in India and often await resolution in apex courts.

Is legal recourse sufficient for resolving water-sharing disputes? Absolutely not. This is due
to the spatial disparities in water availability and the inadequacy of existing water resources
to meet growing demands. By 2050, India is projected to be classified as a 'water scarce'
nation based on per capita annual water availability. The combination of surface water from
rivers, lakes, and groundwater won't suffice for the escalating needs in agriculture, industry,
and households. Water-sharing disputes are not only highly politicized but also emotionally

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charged. Often, the root causes are neglected in favor of superficial issues. Take the Cauvery
water dispute, for instance, where the declining river yield and groundwater depletion are
overlooked. Additionally, the cultivation of water-intensive crops exacerbates the situation
in Tamil Nadu.

Relying solely on legal remedies won't address the fundamental issues behind these
disputes. So, what are the solutions to tackle the growing water-sharing conflicts? Firstly,
strategies must focus on water conservation across various sectors. This includes
minimizing leaks in piped water systems to reduce non-revenue water and repurposing
wastewater through recycling. Industries should enhance water efficiency by adopting zero
discharge practices, while agriculture can benefit from technologies like micro-irrigation.
Despite a significant increase in micro-irrigation coverage in recent years, there's still ample
room for expansion. Secondly, measures must be taken to halt groundwater depletion by
replenishing aquifers. Over the past three decades, India has witnessed a 13% decline in
water tables, with some states facing severe overdrafts. Punjab, for instance, has over 100
blocks experiencing unsustainable groundwater development. Without intervention, water
quality will deteriorate, jeopardizing access to safe water.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTER-STATE RELATIONS

Inter-State Relations within India involve the dynamic interplays and linkages among its
various federal entities, comprising states and union territories. Understanding this concept
necessitates a closer examination of the Indian Constitution. Part XI of the Constitution
addresses Administrative Relations, while Part XIII delves into Trade and Commerce.

In a collaborative spirit, Indian states cooperate to implement national policies and initiatives
and collectively address issues of mutual importance. Nevertheless, it's crucial to
acknowledge the potential for tensions, particularly concerning contentious issues such as
resource distribution and funding allocation.

Inter-State Relations in India encompass the cooperative endeavors of states and union
territories in executing national policies while navigating occasional disagreements, notably
concerning resource allocation and funding distribution.

Inter-State Relations in India: Constitutional Framework and the Impact of the Sarkaria
Commission

Inter-State Relations operate within the framework outlined in Article 263 of the Indian
Constitution, established by the Sarkaria Commission in 1990. Its primary aim is to promote

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cooperation and coordination among various states and between the central and state
governments, essential for the effective operation of India's federal system.

This cooperative framework extends beyond interactions solely between the central and state
governments; it also encompasses interactions among the states themselves. As a result, Inter-
State Councils have been instituted to:

 Ensure State Coordination: The Inter-State Council ensures that states

coordinate and collaborate effectively on national matters of significance.
 Promote Understanding and Recognition: It also plays a crucial role in
promoting understanding and recognition of public acts, records, and court
proceedings among states, simplifying administrative processes.
 Settle Disputes through Discussion: Furthermore, the council acts as a
platform for states to engage in constructive discussions and settle disputes amicably,
fostering harmony within the federal structure.

The Inter-State Council, established under Article 263 of the Indian Constitution and
influenced by the Sarkaria Commission, holds significant importance in fostering
collaborative ties between the central government and state governments, as well as among
the states, which is vital for the effective functioning of India’s federal system.

Fundamentals of Inter-State Relations in India

The interaction among state governments in India is shaped by the country's federal
governance structure. This dynamic can be described through three primary elements:
cooperation, collaboration, and competition.

 Cooperation: State governments frequently come together to address common

interests and challenges. They collaborate on issues such as fair distribution of river
water, joint infrastructure projects, and regional economic progress. To facilitate this
cooperation, the Indian Constitution includes provisions for establishing Inter-State
councils, which promote coordination and solidarity among states.

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  Collaboration: State governments also engage in collaboration, not only among
themselves but also with the central government, especially on matters of national
importance. This collaboration extends to areas like disaster management, internal
security, and international relations. The National Development Council plays a vital
role as a platform for such collaborative endeavors.

 Competition: There is a competitive aspect in the relationships among state

governments in India. States compete with each other for various resources and
opportunities, including attracting investments, creating jobs, and improving
infrastructure within their respective jurisdictions. This competition extends beyond
economic factors; states also seek to surpass each other in social indicators such as
literacy rates, healthcare services, and poverty alleviation efforts.

Constitutional Provisions Governing Inter-State Relations in India

In India, various constitutional provisions address Inter-State relations, playing a vital role in
fostering cooperation and resolving disputes among states. Let's delve into these
constitutional articles:

Article 261 underscores the significance of acknowledging and honoring public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings not only of the Union (central government) but also of each state
throughout India's entire territory. It aims to establish a consistent legal framework
nationwide.

Article 262 grants Parliament the authority to pass laws for resolving disputes or grievances
concerning the utilization, distribution, or control of water resources in Inter-State rivers or
river valleys. This provision helps mitigate conflicts over crucial water sources shared by
multiple states.

Article 263 establishes the Inter-State Council, a mechanism aimed at facilitating the
resolution of disputes and differences among states. This council plays a pivotal role in
fostering collaboration and coordination among states.

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Articles 301 to 307, found in Part XIII of the Indian Constitution, comprehensively address
trade, commerce, and the movement of people within the Indian territory. These articles
delineate the principles and regulations governing trade and commerce between states,
ensuring the unhindered flow of goods and services across state borders.

How did the Sarkaria Commission influence Inter-State Relations in India?

The Sarkaria Commission, operational from 1983 to 1988, played a pivotal role in proposing
the formation of a permanent Inter-State Council in India, in accordance with Article 263 of
the Indian Constitution. To differentiate this council from other entities outlined in Article
263, the Commission suggested labeling it an “intergovernmental council.”

The primary duties assigned to this council encompass:

 Conflict Resolution: Facilitating dialogue and discussions among states or between

the central government and states regarding matters of mutual concern. This facilitates
the peaceful resolution of issues and grievances through negotiation.

 Recommendations: Offering suggestions aimed at improving the coordination of

actions and policies on specific subjects, thereby fostering greater collaboration
between the central government and states.

Composition of the Council

The Inter-State Council, formed in 1990 under the administration of the Janata Dal
Government under V.P. Singh, includes the subsequent members:
(i) Prime Minister, who concurrently acts as the Chairman of the Council.
(ii) Chief Ministers of all states within the Union.
(iii) Chief Ministers of Union Territories with legislative assemblies.
(iv) Administrators of Union Territories lacking legislative assemblies.
(v) Governors of states under the rule of the President.

Duties of the Council

This council acts as an advisory entity, concentrating on matters concerning Center-state,
Center-Union Territories, and inter-state relationships. Its key roles consist of:

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  Facilitating Discussions: Engaging in constructive dialogues regarding areas of
shared concern and ensuring prompt resolutions through communication.
 Recommendations: Offering guidance and suggestions to the government on topics
that incite conflicts or disagreements among various tiers of governance.
 Common Interest Affairs: Examining matters of mutual interest proposed by the
Chairman, thereby fostering improved governance and collaboration among diverse
levels of government.

Importance of Inter-State Relations for India’s Unity and Development

In India, nurturing harmonious relationships among states is of utmost importance for several
compelling reasons:

 National Unity and Integration: These relationships serve as the cornerstone of

national unity, ensuring the cohesive functioning of the country as a singular entity.
They unite the diverse states, fostering a sense of solidarity among the populace.

 Economic Development: Inter-State collaboration forms the foundation of economic

advancement. It facilitates the smooth flow of goods, services, and people across state
borders, driving economic growth and prosperity. This cooperation is integral to
India's economic progress.

 Maintenance of Law and Order: Effective cooperation among states is crucial for
maintaining law and order. It enables states to work together in combating crime,
terrorism, and other security threats. This collective effort guarantees the safety and
security of the population.

 Dispute Resolution: In India's federal system, where states enjoy significant

autonomy, harmonious Inter-State relations are key to resolving disputes amicably.
They act as a barrier against conflicts escalating into larger confrontations.

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POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS

The discourse presented in this article highlights the outdated nature of current constitutional
provisions and practices regarding inter-state water regulation, management, and governance.
There is a pressing need for their revision to adapt to changing circumstances. The central
government's passive stance on this matter is apparent, as it appears to intentionally avoid
intervening in inter-state water disputes. It is imperative for the central government to
abandon its politically correct approach and proactively engage in resolving these disputes
swiftly and systematically, acknowledging its responsibility as a sovereign state. The analysis
presented herein suggests that Parliament should update its understanding of water resources
based on new scientific insights and realign governance powers accordingly. Treating one
aspect of freshwater resources in isolation, disregarding its inevitable transboundary impact
on other components and the ecology, goes against general and customary principles of
international environmental and watercourses law. Hence, the provisions of Schedule Seven
of the Constitution and Article 262 of the Indian Constitution need revision in light of the
arguments presented. We advocate for clarifying the term "water resource" and its scope
within the Indian constitutional framework, encompassing both surface and groundwater.
However, we do not propose transferring the water resource entry to the concurrent list of
Schedule Seven. Regarding inter-state water dispute adjudication, tribunals should prioritize
diplomatic or political means, including hydro-diplomacy and negotiation, for preliminary
resolution. This approach aims to foster broader dialogue among stakeholders from each state
involved.

This approach appears to be the most rational. Using diplomacy as a political tool aligns with
the constitutional philosophy, which rightly aims to separate governance from judicial
intervention. To enhance the tribunal's resolution of inter-state water disputes, it's crucial to
clarify its jurisdiction explicitly, stating that it can address the allocation of freshwater among
provincial states, not just river water. Additionally, it should have the authority to address
water governance comprehensively, rather than limiting itself to technical projects and river
water distribution, as has been the case. Furthermore, a clear mandate allowing appeals to the
Supreme Court of India for matters of rights-based discourse or broader issues of equity and
social justice is desirable. This would necessitate amendments to both the Constitution and
the Tribunals Act. Furthermore, revisiting Article 262 and Entry 56 of the union list would

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impact the tribunal's jurisdictional scope and existence, as these provisions collectively form
the authority for its creation.

Improving the tribunal partially resolves the issue unless an overarching legal framework is
established to harmonize existing laws and policies. This umbrella legislation would align
resource governance activities with advanced watercourses and environmental laws. It would
serve as the legal and legislative guide for authorities, limiting their actions according to
defined legal principles and curbing political misuse. Together with the proposed changes,
this could reduce politicization of resources. However, given the dire forecasts of future
water crises, timely information and knowledge to address these issues are increasingly
crucial. Thus, efficient governance of available resources is imperative, and improving how
we manage water, the most precious resource, would be a significant step forward.

CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, the study underscores the intricate dynamics of Inter-State Relations in India,
emphasizing the paramount importance of cooperation, collaboration, and healthy
competition among the diverse federal units. Through the constitutional framework
established by the Sarkaria Commission, mechanisms such as the Inter-State Council have
been instituted to foster dialogue, resolve disputes, and promote unity among states and union
territories.

The analysis illuminates the critical role of Inter-State Relations in facilitating India's unity,
driving economic development, maintaining law and order, and effectively resolving
disputes. However, the study also identifies significant shortcomings in the existing
constitutional provisions, particularly in addressing inter-state water disputes. This
underscores the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to align governance practices with
evolving scientific and legal understanding.

Recommendations:

 Constitutional Revision: The study advocates for a thorough revision of

constitutional provisions related to water resources (Articles 261, 262, and Schedule
Seven) to reflect contemporary scientific knowledge and ensure the effective

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 governance of these vital resources. This revision should aim to clarify and strengthen
the roles and responsibilities of both the central government and state governments in
managing inter-state water disputes.

 Enhanced Tribunal Jurisdiction: Empowering tribunals to address broader issues of

water governance beyond mere distribution and utilization would significantly
improve the adjudication process for inter-state water disputes. Additionally,
providing a clear mandate for appeals to the Supreme Court would enhance
transparency and fairness in the resolution of such disputes.

 Umbrella Legislation: Introducing comprehensive legislation governing water

resources management would harmonize existing laws and policies, ensuring
consistency and reducing the potential for politicization. This legislation should
incorporate principles of sustainability, equity, and participatory governance to guide
decision-making at all levels.

 Knowledge and Information Sharing: Emphasizing the importance of timely

information and knowledge sharing among stakeholders is crucial for addressing
future water crises and enhancing the efficient governance of water resources.
Investing in research, monitoring, and data-sharing mechanisms would enable
informed decision-making and proactive management of water resources.

By implementing these recommendations, India can strengthen its Inter-State Relations

framework, fostering greater cooperation, resolving disputes more effectively, and promoting
sustainable development across the nation. This proactive approach will not only enhance the
resilience of India's federal system but also contribute to the overall well-being of its citizens
and the protection of its natural resources for generations to come.

SUGGESTIONS:
 Public Awareness Campaigns: Launching public awareness campaigns about the
importance of Inter-State Relations and the need for cooperation among states can
help foster a sense of unity and shared responsibility among citizens. These

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 campaigns can highlight the benefits of collaboration in areas such as economic
development, infrastructure, and disaster management.

 Capacity Building: Investing in capacity-building initiatives for government

officials, particularly at the state and local levels, can enhance their understanding of
Inter-State Relations and equip them with the necessary skills to engage in effective
dialogue and negotiation. This could include training programs, workshops, and
knowledge-sharing platforms focused on inter-state cooperation and conflict
resolution.

 Strengthening Inter-State Institutions: Enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of

existing institutions such as the Inter-State Council and tribunals responsible for
adjudicating inter-state disputes is essential. This could involve providing them with
adequate resources, expertise, and authority to perform their functions more
efficiently. Additionally, ensuring transparency and accountability in the functioning
of these institutions can bolster trust among stakeholders.

 Promoting Regional Cooperation: Encouraging regional cooperation initiatives

among neighboring states can help address common challenges and foster mutual
understanding. Platforms for regional dialogue and collaboration on issues such as
water management, environmental conservation, and economic development can
promote shared interests and peaceful coexistence.

 Inclusive Decision-Making Processes: Promoting inclusive decision-making

processes that involve all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations,
academia, and marginalized communities, can ensure that diverse perspectives are
considered in policy formulation and implementation. This can help build consensus
and ownership of inter-state initiatives, leading to more sustainable outcomes.

 Investing in Conflict Prevention and Resolution: Proactive investment in conflict

prevention mechanisms, such as early warning systems and mediation processes, can
help prevent inter-state disputes from escalating into larger conflicts. Building trust

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 and communication channels among states through regular dialogue and confidence-
building measures is crucial for maintaining peace and stability in the region.

 Harnessing Technology: Leveraging technology and data-driven approaches can

enhance the efficiency and transparency of Inter-State Relations. Developing digital
platforms for information sharing, monitoring, and collaboration can facilitate real-
time communication and decision-making among states, leading to more effective
governance outcomes.

By implementing these suggestions, India can strengthen its Inter-State Relations framework,
promote sustainable development, and foster peace and cooperation among its diverse federal
units. These proactive measures can contribute to building a stronger, more resilient nation
that effectively addresses shared challenges and maximizes opportunities for collective
growth and prosperity.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) PRIMARY DOCUMENTS

Statutes
India

3) The Indian Constitution, 1950.

4) The Government of India Act, 1858
5) The Government of India Act, 1915
6) The Government of India Act, 1919
7) The Government of India Act, 1935
8) Indian Independence Act, 1947
9) The River Boards Act, 1956
10) The Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956
11) The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948.
12) The Betwa River Boards Act, 1976
13) The States Reorganisation Act, 1956
14) The Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
15) The Inter-State Water Disputes Rules, 1959
16) The Inter-State Water Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1968
17) The Inter-State Water Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1980
18) The Inter-State Water Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1986
19) The Inter-State Commission Act, 1912

(B) SECONDARY DOCUMENTS

Books

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 1) Abbas, B.M., The Ganges Water Dispute. University Press Ltd, Dhaka, 1982.
2) Banerjee, A.C., Indian Constitutional Documents Vol. III. A Mukherjee,
Calcutta, 1961
3) Herber, Rivers in International Law, Stevens & Sons, London, 1959.
4) Biswas, A K. (ed), Water Resources, Tata McGraw-Hill, New Delhi, 1998.

JOURNALS

1) Amirthavachani, Tamil Weekly, Trichinopoly, 28th July 1990.

2) Civil Services Chronicle, April 2007.
3) Hindustan Times, 7th March 2003.
4) India Today, 21st March 1991.
5) India Today, 31st December 1991.
6) India Vision 2020 for the People of India by the People of India.
7) Inter-State River Water Disputes, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 1976.

NEWSPAPERS

1) The Hindu, 8th May 2007.

2) The Hindu (Editorial), 5th September 2002.
3) The New Indian Express, 14th November 1991.
4) The New Indian Express, 13th January 2004.
5) The New Indian Express, 21st January 2004.

WEB ADDRESS

1) http://www.rediff.com/news/cauvery.htm
2) River Systems of Karnataka – Salient Features – Internet.
3) www.justanswer.com/law Wikipedia, Cauvery River Water Dispute
Sponsored Links.

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