Moeckli Chapter 19

19.
United Nations
International Human Rights Law (3rd

edn)
Edited by Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh
Sivakumaran, and David Harris
Publisher: Oxford University Press Print Publication Date: Dec 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198767237 Published online: Sep 2018
DOI: 10.1093/he/
9780198767237.001.0001
19. United Nations
Chapter: (p. 369) 19. United Nations
Author(s): Jane Connors
DOI: 10.1093/he/9780198767237.003.0019
Summary
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19. United Nations
According to its Charter, the promotion and protection of human

rights is one of the principal purposes of the United Nations (UN).
This chapter considers the work of the UN in the field of human
rights. Particular attention is given to the Human Rights Council and
the treaty bodies that consider progress in the implementation of UN
human rights treaties. The role of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is
briefly described, as is that of the General Assembly, Security Council,
Secretary-General, and International Court of Justice.
1 Introduction
Human rights have pervaded political discourse since 1945. The

massive affront to human dignity of the Second World War and the need
to prevent the recurrence of these horrors prompted the codification, at
the international level, of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus,
Article 1 UN Charter identifies ‘promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language or religion’ as one of the principal purposes of the
UN.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted on 10

December 1948, was the first step taken by the UN towards that
objective. In 1948 most governments recognized the UDHR, but insisted
that its provisions were not legally binding. Since then, human rights and
fundamental freedoms have been codified in hundreds of universal,
regional, and sub-regional, binding and non-binding, instruments. At the
level of the UN, this process is still in progress, but the main challenge is
implementation of existing standards at the national level. Another
challenge is to enhance the effectiveness and the visibility of the UN
mechanisms in the field of human rights.
This chapter introduces the work of the UN in the field of human rights. It
shows the progress that has been made, particularly since the adoption of
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA) by the World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993.1 This document reaffirms the
commitment of all states to fulfil their obligations to promote universal
respect for, observance, and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all in accordance with the UN Charter, human rights
instruments, and international (p. 370) law. It makes clear that all human
rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, and
although the significance of national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in
mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic, and
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
2 The Human Rights Council
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19. United Nations
The preamble to the UN Charter reaffirms ‘faith in fundamental human

rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal
rights of men and women’. Article 1 UN Charter identifies respect for
human rights as one of the purposes of the organization. To realize this
purpose, Article 55 provides that the UN shall promote universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, whilst Article 56
commits member states to take both joint and separate action in
cooperation with the UN to achieve these goals. The UN has established
bodies, known as ‘Charter-based’ bodies, to fulfil these functions. These
include the Commission on Human Rights and its replacement from 2006:
the Human Rights Council.
2.1 1946–2006: From the Commission on Human Rights to the

Human Rights Council
In 1946 the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the

principal organs of the UN, created the Commission on Human Rights.
For 60 years, the Commission, composed of 53 representatives of UN
member states, performed countless activities aimed at the protection
and promotion of human rights. It made important contributions to
human rights standard-setting, including drafting the UDHR, and other
human rights treaties. The Commission also developed UN institutional
capacity to promote and protect the full range of human rights. It
developed working methods and procedures, creating a Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to prepare thematic
studies, and provided a forum for human rights discourse in which it
allowed civil society to participate to an extent not known in other parts
of the UN system. Through the establishment and operation of its special
procedures system consisting of experts mandated to investigate
particular human rights issues or human rights violations in specific
countries, and a confidential mechanism for individuals to report
consistent patterns of gross and systematic violations of human rights in
a country, the Commission helped to improve the human rights situation
of many individuals in many countries.
Despite these achievements, the Commission became increasingly subject

to criticism, with particular attention focused on the politicization of its
work. In 2005, in a report on UN reform, former Secretary-General Kofi
Annan described the Commission to be:
undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism . . .

States have sought membership of the Commission not to
strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism
or to criticize others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed,
which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations
system as a whole.2
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19. United Nations
The Secretary-General’s critique set the stage for the replacement of the
Commission by a new body: the Human Rights Council. His call for
reform was underpinned by the (p. 371) assumption that the system
should move from ‘standard-setting’—that is, the negotiation of new
instruments—to implementation. The Secretary-General proposed the
creation of a smaller Human Rights Council, which would be a standing
body. Importantly, he suggested that the Human Rights Council should
function as a ‘chamber of peer review’ and that its principal task would
be the evaluation of the fulfilment by all states of all their human rights
obligations.3
Substantive negotiations on the establishment of the Human Rights

Council began in May 2005, and on 15 March 2006, the General
Assembly adopted Resolution 60/251 establishing the Human Rights
Council. The Resolution was adopted by 170 states voting in favour, four
against, and three abstentions. The Commission was abolished on 16 June
2006, and the first meeting of the Council was convened on 19 June 2006.
2.2 Composition, working methods, and mandate
The Human Rights Council is composed of 47 members. All UN member

states are eligible for membership, not only those with a good human
rights track record or that have ratified the majority of international
human rights instruments and cooperate with their respective
mechanisms. Members are elected in a secret ballot by a simple majority
vote of the members of the GA. When electing members, the ‘contribution
of candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights and their
voluntary pledges and commitments made thereto’ should be taken into
account.4 The vast majority of candidates submits written pledges and
commitments. These include promises of better cooperation with the UN
human rights treaty bodies, standing invitations to special procedures
mandate holders, ratification of international instruments, and promises
of action at the national level.5
All Council members must uphold the highest standards in the promotion
and protection of human rights, fully cooperate with the Council, and be
reviewed under the Council’s review mechanism during their
membership. There is no formal mechanism to hold members to account,
but a member that has committed gross and systematic violations of
human rights may be suspended by the General Assembly by a two-thirds
majority of its members present and voting. Despite calls from civil
society and others over the years that the General Assembly suspend
several members, including high-profile demands in 2016 in relation to
Burundi and Saudi Arabia,6 this procedure has been invoked once only.
This was in March 2011, when the General Assembly, acting on a
recommendation of the Human Rights Council, agreed by consensus to
suspend the membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.7 The suspension,
described by some delegations during the Assembly debate as
unprecedented and not to be used lightly, was reversed by the General
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Assembly in November 2011, on the recommendation of the Human

Rights Council.8
Council membership is broken down into regional groupings. The

(p. 372)
African and Asian groups are allocated 13 seats each. Eight seats are
reserved for the Latin American and Caribbean group, six for the Eastern
European group, and seven for the Western European and Others group.
Members serve for a period of three years and are not eligible for
immediate re-election after two consecutive terms. Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) may participate in the Human Rights Council as
observers if they have been granted consultative status with the
ECOSOC.9 Similarly, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) that are
fully compliant with the Paris Principles may participate in Council
meetings.10
The Human Rights Council meets regularly throughout the year,

convening at least three annual sessions. There must be at least ten
weeks of scheduled sessions to allow the Council to adopt a
comprehensive approach to human rights and respond effectively to
human rights situations as they develop. Special sessions, lasting one or
two days at a time, may also be scheduled at the request of a Council
member that has garnered the support of at least one-third of the
Council’s membership.
GA Resolution 60/251 establishes the Council as a subsidiary organ of the

General Assembly, and requires it to report to the Assembly annually. It
also spells out the Council’s principal duties. These include: promote
universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all; address and make recommendations on situations of
violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations;
promote effective coordination and mainstreaming of human rights in the
UN system; help prevent human rights violations through advisory
services, technical assistance and capacity-building in consultation and
with the consent of the states concerned; serve as a forum for dialogue on
thematic issues; make recommendations to the General Assembly on
developing new human rights standards; help prevent human rights
violations through dialogue and cooperation; respond promptly to human
rights emergencies; and support the work of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights and his/her office. The Council is to work in close
cooperation with governments, regional organizations, NHRIs, and NGOs.
In addition, the resolution stipulates that the Council shall undertake a
‘universal periodic review’ (UPR), based on objective and reliable
information, of the fulfilment by each state of its human rights obligations
and commitments in a way that ensures universality of coverage and
equal treatment. In fulfilling its mandate, the Council’s work should be
based on the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity, non-
selectivity, constructive international dialogue, and cooperation.
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2.3 Universal Periodic Review
The universal periodic review (UPR) mechanism was conceived as a form

of ‘peer review’ of UN member states’ action to fulfil their human rights
obligations, as well as a means of identifying areas in which help and
advice are required. The performance of states is measured against the
relevant standards in the UN Charter, the UDHR, the UN human rights
treaties to which the state is a party, and voluntary commitments and
pledges made by the state in the field of human rights.
GA Resolution 60/251 left the modalities of the UPR procedure for the
Council to work out. The Council’s ‘institution-building period’ began in
June 2006 and ended in June 2007. During this period, the Council
negotiated and agreed its rules, working methods, and tools, including
the way UPR is to be conducted. On 18 June 2007, the Human (p. 373)
Rights Council adopted Resolution 5/1.11 The framework of the UPR
mechanism and its processes are set out in the annex to this resolution,
and subsequent Council resolutions and decisions regarding the Council
and the UPR.12 States have now undergone two UPR cycles. The first
began in April 2008 and was completed in October 2011; the second
began in June 2012 and was completed in March 2017. The third cycle
commenced on 1 May 2017.
Each of the 193 UN member states is reviewed once every four-and-a-half

years. Forty-two states are reviewed per year during three annual two-
week sessions, with 14 states reviewed each session. The review is
conducted by a UPR Working Group, consisting of all members of the
Council, chaired by its President. Three Council members, each from a
different regional group and drawn by lot, known as the ‘troika’, facilitate
each review. Reviews are based on three documents, which address
implementation of recommendations accepted in previous cycles of the
UPR and the development of the human rights situation in the state under
review.13 These are:
(1) The National report is prepared by the state under review. This
report should not exceed 20 pages, and it should include
developments since the previous review, details of human rights
achievements, best practices, challenges and constraints in relation
to implementation of accepted recommendations from earlier
reviews, key priorities for the state, expectations in terms of
capacity-building, and requests, if any, for technical assistance. In
preparing their reports, states are encouraged to adopt a broad
consultative process with relevant stakeholders, such as local NGOs
and NHRIs.
(2) The Compilation of UN information gathers together relevant
recommendations, observations, and comments on the state made
since the last review by the UN treaty bodies, special procedures
mandate holders, as well as summaries of other relevant UN
documents. The report is produced by the Office of the High
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Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and should not exceed

ten pages.
(3) The Summary of stakeholders’ information is also prepared by
the OHCHR and should not be longer than ten pages. It compiles
additional ‘credible and reliable’ country information from relevant
stakeholders such as NGOs, NHRIs, academic sources, and regional
organizations. The contribution of NHRIs that are fully compliant
with the Paris Principles are summarized in a separate section of this
report. Stakeholders are encouraged to include information on
follow-up to the preceding review in their submissions.
The review itself consists of a three-and-a half hour interactive dialogue

between the state under review and the UPR Working Group. All Council
members and observers can participate in the dialogue, but interventions
are subject to strict time-limits. Advance questions may be transmitted by
members and observers at least ten working days before the review and
are relayed by the troika to the state. After the review, the troika submits
an ‘outcome report’, which is prepared with the assistance of the UPR
secretariat and the involvement of the state under review for adoption by
the UPR Working Group. The outcome report summarizes the dialogue,
recommendations made by the Working Group on how to improve human
rights protection within the state, the state’s responses to these
recommendations, including those that it accepts at this initial stage and
its voluntary commitments. The state under review has an opportunity to
react to any recommendations and may ‘accept’ or ‘note’, but not ‘reject’,
them. In practice, states have not always complied with this directive,
(p. 374) with many submitting responses such as ‘partially accepted’,
‘accepted in principle’, ‘already implemented’. The outcome report that is

adopted by the Working Group, accompanied by an addendum that
records the state’s position on all the recommendations, is submitted to
the next ordinary session of the Human Rights Council, where one hour is
allowed for its discussion. Twenty minutes is allotted to the state under
review to make a statement. If the NHRI of that state is fully compliant
with the Paris Principles, it is entitled to intervene immediately after the
state’s statement. Thereafter, all member states, observers, NGOs, and
other stakeholders may comment. At the end of this discussion a final
outcome report, containing the accepted and noted recommendations, is
adopted. This report serves as the basis for the state’s subsequent review.
In 2007, the Secretary-General characterized the UPR as a mechanism

with ‘great potential to promote and protect human rights in the darkest
corners of the world’.14 The first two cycles have been judged by most to
be extremely positive. All UN member states have participated,15 proving
it be truly universal. The majority fielded representatives of a very high
level and engaged in a constructive and open fashion. In preparation for
their reviews, many states created processes to allow for internal review
across governmental bodies and between government and civil society.
NHRIs, civil society organizations, UN entities, and development actors
engaged with the mechanism, as did individuals on the ground, with
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many watching the proceedings via webcast. In particular, civil society

organizations have used the UPR as a means to coordinate with one
another, including by formulating joint submissions in advance of the
review and following up on recommendations. They have also found the
mechanism to provide a non-confrontational and constructive framework
for state engagement which can lead to positive change on the ground.16
Over 56,000 recommendations were made over the first two cycles,
covering a broad range of human rights issues, with follow-up to these
providing a means to initiate or strengthen human rights dialogue and
cooperation at national, regional, and global levels.17 States have made
specific commitments in relation to human rights issues at various stages
of the review, while many have adopted the practice, encouraged by the
Council, of submitting voluntary mid-term reports on implementation of
recommendations.18
Experience of UPR shows that it is largely complementary to, and not in

competition with, the procedures of the UN treaty bodies (see Section 3).
During UPR sessions, states are frequently quizzed about their follow-up
to treaty body recommendations, and the final outcome documents
regularly contain concrete recommendations to this effect. Treaty bodies
often raise the commitments made by states parties under the UPR
process in their proceedings. Cooperation with treaty bodies, including
submission of reports, as well as ratifications of human rights treaties and
withdrawal of reservations to treaties, often increases before a review or
as a result of recommendations.
Nevertheless, UPR is not without its critics. Concerns have been

(p. 375)
expressed that some states avoid negative UPR assessments by ensuring

that friendly governments praise their human rights record and ignore
their shortcomings. Thus, the outcome of the review may not address
human rights violations that are occurring within the state. In addition,
the response of the state under review to recommendations may not be
clear. The proliferation of recommendations has also raised concern, as
has the fact that some may be repetitive. Some suggest that far fewer
recommendations address economic, social, and cultural rights than civil
and political rights, thereby undermining UPR’s objective of promoting
the universality, interdependence, indivisibility, and interrelatedness of all
human rights.19 Others raise the issue that some recommendations are so
vague as to be unimplementable. In December 2015, the incoming
Human Rights Council President expressed the view that the UPR
mechanism could be made more efficient and effective and called for a
collective effort towards that end. However, it is unlikely that there will
be any major changes to the UPR process.20
Follow-up to and implementation of UPR recommendations are indicators

of whether the mechanism meaningfully promotes and protects human
rights or whether it constitutes ‘ritualism’—that is, a non-substantive
cyclical exercise.21 One study reports positively that slightly over two-
thirds of the recommendations made during the first cycle had been
accepted by the state under review, with acceptance rates increasing over
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the cycle.22 An analysis of NGO mid-term assessments of implementation

of first-cycle recommendations by 165 states indicates that 48 per cent of
recommendations had generated action.23 Another study suggests that
the second cycle has seen the same level of acceptance of
recommendations as the first cycle, although the majority of these have
been couched in ‘soft’ language, rather than specific and measurable
terms.24
Implementation of recommendations is primarily for the state itself, but

states are encouraged to conduct broad consultations with all
stakeholders in this process. A voluntary fund exists to assist the least-
developed and small-island developing states implement UPR
recommendations.25 The OHCHR, other UN entities, regional
organizations, parliaments, and civil society actors, including NHRIs,
have invested significant energy into UPR follow-up.26
2.4 Responses to urgent situations
When responding to serious human rights situations, the Human Rights

Council can convene for special sessions or hold urgent debates during
regular sessions. Since June 2006, the Council has held 26 special
sessions. This should be contrasted with the Commission on Human
Rights, which between May 1990, when ECOSOC authorized it to hold
such (p. 376) sessions,27 and its replacement by the Council in June 2006,
convened only five. Two of the Council’s special sessions have had a
thematic focus (the effects of the global economic crisis and the world
food crisis), one has focused on the attacks and abuses committed by
Boko Haram across the African continent, and the balance has addressed
urgent human rights situations in countries. Six have related to the
human rights situation in the Israeli Occupied Territory, one to Israeli
military operations, and five to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic.
The other sessions have concerned the human rights situation in Burundi,
the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur (Sudan), the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan. The Council has also convened
three urgent debates during its regular sessions: one in relation to Israel
and two on Syria.
The outcomes of special sessions or urgent debates have included the

creation of, or deployment of existing, expert fact-finding missions,28
which sometimes include the relevant Special Rapporteur;29 the creation
of independent international commissions of inquiry30 and requests for
existing commissions to commence special inquiries;31 the appointment of
an independent expert;32 requests for existing special procedures to
urgently investigate a particular situation;33 and requests for the High
Commissioner or OHCHR to report on the situation or issue.34
In response to less urgent situations within countries, the Council can

also create commissions of inquiry during its regular sessions,35
commissions on human rights,36 or mandate the High Commissioner to
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report on human rights concerns in individual countries,37 including in

relation to technical assistance and capacity building provided by
OHCHR.38 OHCHR investigations can also be established by the
Council.39 The Council is also able to create a special procedure to
address a country situation (see Section 2.5). However, resolutions
establishing such procedures, fact-finding missions, commissions of
inquiry and similar mechanisms,40 are unlikely to be adopted by
consensus unless the country concerned is willing to agree to the
mandate’s creation and expresses its willingness to cooperate with the
mechanism. When they are adopted without the state’s cooperation, the
mechanism is usually refused access to the state concerned. Where the
country expresses willingness to cooperate, the scope of the mandate will
be primarily technical assistance and capacity building.
Whether the Council will address a country situation depends on the

willingness of its membership. The operation of regional groups and
alliances assumes particular (p. 377) importance here and it should be
noted that, given the composition of the Council, the African and Asian
groups have an automatic majority in Council decision-making. There
have been charges that the Human Rights Council is selective and
politically biased. Some point to the existence of the standing Council
agenda item 7 on the human rights situation in Palestine and other
occupied Arab territories and the fact that developing states with difficult
human rights situations have largely escaped such scrutiny as evidence to
support their claims. It is worth noting that no special session, special
procedure, nor similar mechanism has been put forward regarding
Western states. Proposals to examine a particular country situation are
often opposed on the basis that ‘cooperative’ approaches to human rights
should be used—that is, approaches with which the state concerned
consents. Clearly, this is the preferred way forward, but workable only
where the state has a true desire to improve human rights enjoyment.
Some delegations also argue that UPR is the ideal mechanism to address
country situations, as it is based on state cooperation. However the fact
that it addresses individual states only periodically makes it unsuitable
for urgent and chronic human rights concerns.
2.5 Special procedures
The creation of the special procedures mechanisms was one of the major
achievements of the Commission on Human Rights. From the
establishment of the first special procedures mandate in 1980—the
Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances—to the end
of the Commission’s final session, the special procedures system evolved
remarkably.41 These mechanisms, consisting of independent experts who
work pro bono—either individually or as part of a five-member working
group—address country-specific situations or thematic issues that
concern all states. GA Resolution 60/251 mandated the Human Rights
Council to review and, where necessary, rationalize and improve all
mandates and mechanisms of the former Commission ‘in order to
maintain a system of special procedures’ within one year of its first
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session. Any decision to discontinue, merge, or streamline mandates must

be guided by the need to enhance human rights protection and
promotion.
Seven country-specific mandates have been discontinued since 2006,

although one was re-established in 2012,42 and a further six have been
created.43 Thirteen thematic mandates have been added. At the beginning
of August 2017, there were a total of 56 special procedures mandates: 12
on country situations;44 12 focusing on civil and political rights;45 ten in
the area of economic, social, and cultural rights;46 and 15 mandates that
focus on (p. 378) specific groups.47 The remaining mandates are: business
and human rights; the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on
the enjoyment of human rights; promotion of a democratic and equitable
international order; promotion of truth, justice, reparation and
guarantees of non-recurrence; right to development; human rights and
international solidarity; and the Working Group on African Descent.
Mandate holders are experts in their respective fields. They are selected
on the basis of technical criteria developed by the Human Rights
Council.48 A five-member Consultative Group, comprising ambassadors
from each of the five regional group who serve in their personal capacity,
conducts a selection process including an interview, and then proposes a
shortlist of experts for vacant mandates to the Council President. After
broad consultation among Council members, the President puts forward a
candidate for each vacancy for the Council’s approval, along with an
explanation if the proposal differs from that of the Consultative Group.
Throughout the process consideration is given to gender balance,
equitable geographic distribution, and representation of different legal
systems.
Each mandate holder serves in his or her personal capacity and

independently. They should not hold a decision-making position in
government or any other body that may result in a conflict of interest. He
or she must also respect the principle of non-accumulation of human
rights functions. Thematic mandate holders may serve up to two three-
year consecutive terms, and country mandate holders usually serve six
one-year consecutive terms; the maximum consecutive term for both
types of mandate holders in the same function is six years.49 While the
denomination of experts varies (‘Special Rapporteur’, ‘Independent
Expert’, or ‘member of working group’), their status is equal. They benefit
from such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are required for the
discharge of their duties.50
Since 1993, mandate holders have met annually for one week to discuss
themes of common interest and harmonization of working methods.
During these meetings they also interact with the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, the Bureau of the Human Rights Council, and others.
Their manual of operations was adopted and revised in the context of
such a meeting.51 A Coordination Committee of special procedures,
comprising six mandate holders, was established in 2005 to represent the
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system, including by making statements on its behalf. This Committee

meets regularly to discuss issues pertinent to the special procedures
system, including with states and civil society.
All mandate holders conduct country visits. Currently, 118 UN member

states and one observer state have extended ‘standing invitations’, and
so, in principle, any thematic special procedure may visit these states.
However, in all circumstances a visit must be agreed with the state
concerned, and some that have issued standing invitations have not
consented to a visit when requested. Where other states are concerned, a
specific invitation must be extended. Before the start of a visit, its terms
of reference are negotiated and agreed by the mandate holder and the
government. During visits, mandate holders meet with relevant
stakeholders and visit facilities relevant to their mandate. Before they
leave, they debrief (p. 379) the authorities and the media on their
(preliminary) findings and conclusions. A report on the visit, including
conclusions and recommendations, is subsequently transmitted to the
Human Rights Council, annexing any comments from the state. The
report is presented during the Council’s annual interactive debate on the
mandate. During 2016 mandate holders carried out 96 visits to 65 states
and territories.52
Most mandate holders examine complaints from individuals, human rights

defenders, or other interested persons regarding alleged human rights
violations that fall within the area(s) of their mandate. The OHCHR
channels these to the relevant mandate holders for action. ‘Letters of
allegation’ are addressed to governments requesting clarification of the
allegation. Where alleged violations are time-sensitive (imminent loss of
life, life-threatening situations, ongoing or imminent damage of a severe
nature) ‘urgent appeals’ are dispatched. Mandate holders also transmit
‘other letters’ that address non-state actors and thematic issues. In 2016,
mandate holders sent 526 communications to 119 states and 23 non-state
actors, with 455 being transmitted jointly by two or more mandates. A
report containing communications transmitted, and any replies received,
is submitted to each session of the Human Rights Council. Two special
procedures have developed sophisticated working practices and adopt
reasoned opinions in response to complaints. The Working Group on
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances receives reports of alleged
disappearance, which it seeks to clarify. Since its establishment in 1980,
it has transmitted over 55,000 cases to states, of which approximately
44,000 in respect of 91 states remain under active consideration.53 The
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopts opinions on complaints
regarding arbitrary arrest and detention. This Working Group was
established in 1991, and, to date, has adopted over 900 opinions.54
Some mandate holders develop authoritative opinions and standards, thus

contributing to the progressive development of international law. For
example, the special procedure on internally displaced persons
formulated Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement;55 the former
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and
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transnational corporations and other business enterprises developed

Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights;56 and the Independent
Expert on the effects of foreign debt prepared Guiding Principles on
Foreign Debt and Human Rights.57 Others adopt ‘deliberations’ or
general comments on specific themes.58 Thematic mandate holders often
research a specific theme, either at the request of the Human Rights
Council or on their own initiative, and whilst all present annual thematic
reports to the Council, the majority also do so to the General Assembly.
Similarly, country mandate holders report annually to the Council, and
many to the General Assembly. Questionnaires are often transmitted to
states, NGOs, and other stakeholders and meetings convened to elicit
comprehensive, up-to-date information. At the end of their tenure, some
mandate holders present a report which analyses the global human rights
situation as regards their mandate.59 They frequently organize, in
conjunction with the OHCHR, governments, and NGOs, seminars or
consultations which contribute to the analysis of human rights issues.
Some special rapporteurs submit amicus briefs to international, regional,
or national courts on issues related to their mandate.
Mandate holders also raise awareness of human rights concerns

(p. 380)
by releasing joint or individual press statements and engaging in regular

contact with the media, especially during country visits and Human
Rights Council or General Assembly sessions. Attendance at activities and
meetings organized by states, NGOs, or academic institutions is used to
raise awareness about their mandates, create and develop partnerships,
and learn about new developments. An increasing number of mandate
holders also follow up on communications and visits with further
communications, reports, visits, public statements, and consultations, in
order to accelerate implementation of their recommendations.60
The Human Rights Council adopted a Code of Conduct for Special

Procedures Mandate Holders in June 2007, which is designed to ‘enhance
the effectiveness of the system by defining the standards of ethical
behaviour and professional conduct that special procedures mandate-
holders … shall observe whilst discharging their mandates’.61 The Code
sets out general principles on the conduct, status, and prerogatives of
mandate holders, and regulations on sources of information,
communications, relations with states, and field visits. On occasion, states
have used the Code in statements during Council sessions or
correspondence with mandate holders, the Secretary-General, High
Commissioner, or the Council President to found allegations that
individual mandate holders have acted improperly, often with a view to
restricting their activities, and even to dismiss individual experts.62 In
June 2008 the Council adopted Presidential Statement 8/2, which
provides that the President will convey any information of persistent non-
compliance by a mandate holder with the Code, especially prior to the
mandate holder’s renewal, to the Council for consideration and action as
appropriate. A year later, the Council adopted Resolution 11/11, which
notes that it is incumbent on mandate holders to exercise their functions
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with full respect for, and strict observance of, their mandates set out in
the relevant Council resolutions and full compliance with the Code. It also
requests the OHCHR to assist special procedures mandate holders in this
regard.63
While the Code of Conduct was being negotiated, proposals were made
for a body to oversee its implementation, but these were unsuccessful.
Instead, in 2008, the special procedures’ Coordination Committee
adopted an ‘Internal Advisory Procedure’ (IAP) to review practices and
working methods. The IAP includes a mechanism, facilitated by the
Coordination Committee, to deal confidentially with issues that arise in
the practices and working methods of the mandate holders. In early 2010,
Philip Alston, then the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions, suggested the creation of a committee to deal with
complaints by governments and others of non-compliance with the Code
by mandate holders and governments in a way that would protect
mandate holders’ independence and integrity, yet hold them
accountable.64 This proposal was rejected by other mandate holders,
many states, and most civil society actors. Several states introduced this
idea in a somewhat different form during the review of the Council that
took place in 2011 (see Section 2.8) but it was not adopted. A similar idea,
and elements for a draft Human Rights Council resolution on the
implementation of the code of conduct, (p. 381) was put forward in 2015
by another mandate holder.65 This is unlikely to be the last time that such
a suggestion is made.
Reference to the Code of Conduct by states in their interactions with

special procedures is now less frequent. However, mandate holders still
face criticism, including in relation to funding of their activities through
non-UN sources that is alleged to affect their impartiality.66 Cooperation
by some states with special procedures remains weak. States’ conduct
towards mandate holders can also be inappropriate, leading one state,
France, to propose the introduction of a code of conduct for states
themselves. This proposal was not taken up.
Successive UN Secretaries-General have described the special

procedures as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Human Rights Council. One
commentator has labelled them ‘catalysts for human rights’, and argues
that they play a critical role in shaping international human rights norms,
shedding light on how states comply with these, as well as influencing
government behaviour for the benefit of millions of people.67 Mandate
holders have generated positive changes in many countries, and these
changes have been facilitated by their expertise, the quality of their
recommendations, and the openness of some states to cooperate.
However, the full potential of the special procedures remains untapped, in
particular in relation to their capacity to provide early warning of
potential human rights violations. The impact of their activities is
negatively affected by lack of state cooperation, inadequate resources,
and, as in the case of all human rights mechanisms, weak follow-up.
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2.6 Complaint procedure
The Council complaint procedure is based on the ‘1503 procedure’

created by ECOSOC in May 1970, which was implemented by the
Commission on Human Rights.68 This confidential procedure, the oldest
human rights complaint mechanism in the UN system, was concerned
with patterns of gross violations of human rights rather than individual
cases. Similarly, the Council complaint procedure is concerned with
identifying ‘consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of
all human rights and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any part of
the world and under any circumstances’.69
A complaint alleging a pattern of violation can be transmitted by a

person, or group, claiming to be the victims of violations of human rights,
or by any person or group of persons, including NGOs, who have direct
and reliable knowledge of the alleged violations. Complaints will be
considered inadmissible if they have manifestly political motivations or
are inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. All complaints must give a
factual description of the alleged violation and an indication of the rights
violated. The language used must not be abusive, although such a
complaint may be considered if it meets the other admissibility criteria
after deletion of the abusive elements. Complaints should not be based
solely on media reports. Domestic remedies should be exhausted before a
complaint is submitted, unless it appears that such remedies would be
ineffective or unreasonably prolonged, and situations being dealt with by
a special procedure or other UN or regional human rights complaints
mechanism will not be considered.
Complaints do not go directly to the Human Rights Council.

(p. 382)
Rather, they are pre-screened by the OHCHR and two Council working
groups: the Working Group on Communications (WGC) and the Working
Group on Situations (WGS). Both working groups are composed of five
members, each representing one of the five regional groups. WGC
members are designated by the Human Rights Advisory Committee (see
Section 2.7) from amongst its members, while the WGS is appointed by
the regional groups of the member states of the Council. Complaints are
pre-screened by the Chairperson of the WGC with the OHCHR. At this
point those communications that are manifestly ill-founded or anonymous
are dismissed. Those considered admissible are transmitted to the state
concerned for observations. Complaints and state replies are examined by
the WGC, which transmits cases it considers admissible, including its
recommendations on the case, to the WGS. The WGS may dismiss a case
or keep it under review until its subsequent session, requesting further
information from the state. The WGS also prepares a report for a closed
session of the Human Rights Council plenary, including recommendations
for action, usually in the form of a draft decision or resolution.
Proceedings in both working groups are confidential. They are conducted
on the basis of written materials alone, with neither governments nor
complainants appearing before them. Unlike the ‘1503 procedure’, both
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the author of the communication and the state are informed of the status
of the proceedings at key stages as well as the final outcome.
Although the value of the complaint procedure has been questioned, it is

often resorted to. The OHCHR receives between 11,000 and 15,000
communications annually. This is probably due to the fact that unlike the
treaty-based complaint procedures, which depend on the acceptance of
the state concerned (see Section 3.4), complaints can concern any
country. Increasing numbers of situations have been referred to the
Council by the WGS since 2011, and although most situations have been
discontinued,70 the impact of the complaint procedure should not be
underrated. It is well-placed to serve as an early warning mechanism. The
confidential nature of the procedure may also encourage states, most of
which respond to the communications submitted to them, to take
remedial action in order to avoid public scrutiny. In some cases the
Council has recommended the provision of technical assistance to states
subject to communications.71 Notably, in September 2012, the Council
decided to discontinue the review of complaints alleging widespread
violations of human rights in Eritrea under the complaints procedure in
order to consider the matter publicly in the context of the appointment of
a Special Rapporteur on human rights in Eritrea.72 The Council also
decided to transmit the documentation received under the complaint
procedure to the Special Rapporteur and invite her to investigate those
allegations and report back.
2.7 Human Rights Council Advisory Committee
The Human Rights Council Advisory Committee is set up to operate as a

‘think-tank’ for the Council.73 Consisting of 18 independent and impartial
experts, the Advisory Committee replaced the 26-member Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the
Commission on Human Rights. Committee members are elected by the
Human Rights Council by secret ballot from a list of candidates who fulfil
the requirements for nomination, which include high moral standing and
recognized competence and expertise in the field of (p. 383) human
rights.74 All members must be independent and impartial, so those who
hold decision-making positions in governments or any other entity that
might give rise to a conflict of interest are excluded. The geographic
distribution of experts is: African states: five; Asian states: five; Eastern
European states: two; Latin American and Caribbean states: three; and
Western European and other states: three. All UN member states may
propose and endorse candidates from their own region. They should
consult their NHRIs and civil society organizations in the process, and
include the names of those supporting their candidates. Members serve
for a period of three years and are eligible for consecutive re-election
once. They may not accumulate other human rights functions during their
tenure.
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The Advisory Committee convenes two annual sessions, for a maximum of

ten days per year. Additional sessions may be scheduled with the approval
of the Council. An annual report of the Committee’s activities is submitted
to the Council’s September session and an interactive dialogue with the
Committee’s Chairperson is conducted during this session.
The role of the Advisory Committee is to provide expertise to the Council

in the manner and form it requests, mainly through studies and research-
based advice. Unlike its predecessor, the Sub-Commission, the Advisory
Committee may not adopt resolutions or decisions, nor may it examine
and decide on specific country situations. Expertise may only be provided
to the Council on its request and under its guidance. However, the
Committee may make proposals to the Council for the incremental
enhancement of procedural efficiency, and research proposals within the
scope of the thematic work of the Human Rights Council. The Advisory
Committee’s activity is to be implementation-oriented and it is to engage
with states, NHRIs, NGOs, and other civil society stakeholders. Council
members and observers, UN specialized agencies, other
intergovernmental institutions, academics, and NGOs may participate in
the work of the Advisory Committee.75
The Advisory Committee’s studies are usually produced by drafting

groups of members drawn from regional groups, which seek comments
and advice from stakeholders through questionnaires. The output of the
drafting groups is discussed and revised in the Committee. Since its first
session in August 2008, the Advisory Committee has prepared a draft
declaration on human rights education and training,76 a draft set of
principles and guidelines for the elimination of discrimination against
persons affected by leprosy and their family members,77 a draft
declaration on the right to peace,78 and a draft declaration on the rights
of peasants and other people working in rural areas.79 It has addressed
subjects including missing persons, the protection of civilians in armed
conflicts, the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order,
human rights and international solidarity, aspects of the right to food, and
promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better
understanding of traditional values of humankind. The Committee has
worked at the Council’s request on the human rights of elderly people,
international cooperation on human rights, human rights and terrorist
hostage-taking, and promotion of the human rights of the urban poor. It
also works to mainstream a gender perspective and the human rights of
persons with disabilities into its work.
Despite these important contributions, the fact that the Advisory

Committee cannot initiate its own work or adopt resolutions or decisions
has circumscribed its capacity to (p. 384) provide the Council with
expertise. The Council’s ‘guidelines’ on the way its requests to the
Advisory Committee should be addressed are also prescriptive, thus
affecting the way this expertise can be provided. The Advisory Committee
now puts forward priority proposals for the consideration of the Council,
accompanied by detailed concept papers. It is important for the
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Committee to devise ways to strengthen its influence. These could include

working with other mechanisms and in different frameworks, and perhaps
convening panels or expert group meetings during its sessions.
Committee members have valuable expertise, and while some states
consider that the Committee’s work replicates that of other bodies or
goes beyond its mandate, the Council should explore ways to maximize its
potential.
2.8 Review and other discussions
GA Resolution 60/251 provided that the Human Rights Council would

review its work and functioning five years after its establishment and
report to the General Assembly. In turn, the General Assembly was to
review the status of the Council. The outcome of the five-year review of
the Council’s work and functioning was adopted on 25 March 2011.80 The
review focused on five issues: the UPR; the special procedures; the
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, and the Council’s complaint
procedure; the agenda and framework for the programme of work; and
methods of work and rules of procedure.
A myriad of proposals was put forward during review discussions, but few
changes were actually agreed. Many states expressed dissatisfaction with
the outcome, and the US disassociated itself from it. A group of influential
NGOs described the result as a ‘vital opportunity to strengthen the
Council’s work and functioning … squandered.’81 These reactions related
predominantly to the fact that proposals for a mechanism to improve the
Council’s responsiveness to emergency and chronic human rights
situations could not gain consensus.
Nonetheless, the outcome includes some important elements. For

example, the role of NHRIs that are fully compliant with the Paris
Principles in the UPR and with regard to special procedures was
strengthened. Procedures for the selection and appointment of special
procedures mandate holders were enhanced. States were urged to
cooperate with and assist special procedures by responding in a timely
manner to requests for information and visits. Technical measures to
streamline the work of the Council, including a voluntary yearly calendar
of resolutions, were encouraged. A task force on accessibility of persons
with disabilities to the Council and its mechanisms and the use of
information technology, including video-conferencing or video-messaging
to enhance participation of all stakeholders, was established.
Importantly, the outcome highlighted the issue of reprisals against

individuals and groups who cooperate, or have cooperated, with the UN
or its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. States
were urged to prevent and ensure adequate protection against such acts.
Since the adoption of the review document, cross-regional statements on
reprisals are now made by states during Council sessions and discussions
have been held on ways to prevent reprisals.82 During 2012, the President
of the Council raised allegations of reprisals in Council sessions and with
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relevant delegations. Her successors have been similarly vigilant. The

Coordination Committee of Special Procedures also have a framework for
dealing with intimidation and reprisals.83
Disappointment was also expressed at the result of the General

(p. 385)
Assembly’s review of the status of the Council. The Council remains a

subsidiary body of the General Assembly. However this is to be
reconsidered before 2026.84 Some states and many NGOs had hoped that
the General Assembly review would lead to an enhanced election process
for membership to the Council, perhaps by including a means by which
the pledges put forward by states presenting their candidatures would be
reviewed publicly. They had also hoped that ‘open slates’ for elections
might be required. However, none of these proposals was adopted.
Despite being labelled by several NGOs as ‘technical and bureaucratic’, a

number of changes was introduced that make a practical difference to the
work of the Council. The Council’s annual report now covers the period
from 1 October to 30 September, allowing the outcome of all of its
sessions in any one year to be considered by the General Assembly that
year. Its sessions are aligned to the calendar year, rather than starting in
June as before; and the President of the Council presents its annual
report to the Assembly’s plenary and Third Committee, with the latter
engaging in an interactive dialogue on the report. Importantly, the need
to provide adequate financing to fund unforeseen and extraordinary
expenses resulting from resolutions and decisions of the Council was
recognized. These had been met previously by the OHCHR diverting
funds from other activities.
While no formal review of the Council has taken place since 2011, many
initiatives directed at improving its efficiency, effectiveness, and working
culture and realizing its full potential have been proposed. In 2015 the
annual Glion Human Rights Dialogue85 was focused on improving the
relevance and strengthening the impact of the Human Rights Council as
it reached its tenth anniversary. Recent Council presidents have
prioritized efficiency and effectiveness, and many civil society
organizations have presented proposals aimed at strengthening
implementation and impact.86 Ideas will continue to be exchanged, but,
just as in the case of the review, it is likely that any adjustments to the
‘institution-building package’ will be very modest.
2.9 Conclusion
Early in its life, several observers and NGOs criticized, or even dismissed
outright, the activities of the Human Rights Council. They pointed to the
fact that numerous states with questionable human rights records were
members of the Council and that most of its special sessions unfairly
‘targeted’ Israel, whilst other serious country situations, such as that in
Zimbabwe, had not been scrutinized, let alone criticized. With the Council
now in its 11th year, these issues remain.87 Despite these concerns,
assessment of this increasingly active body’s performance is generally
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positive. Experience of the UPR mechanism has been extremely positive,

and the future of the special procedures system appears secure.
The Council has proved itself to be willing to address critical country

situations through special sessions, urgent debates, and other formats,
such as enhanced interactive debates and inter-sessional discussions.88
Indeed, in April 2011, it was the first UN (p. 386) intergovernmental body
to address the profound human rights concerns in Syria. Its attention to
this situation has been sustained: it has adopted strong resolutions,
created a Country Rapporteur, and a Commission of Inquiry. It has been
equally strong in relation to other countries, such as Burundi, Eritrea,
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Council has
continued to establish country-specific special procedures mandates. It
has also adopted resolutions to support countries, encouraging
accountability measures through technical assistance, as well as
facilitating cooperation and capacity-building.
The Council has made progress on thematic issues also. The UN’s first
resolution on human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity was
adopted by the Council in July 2011,89 and it created an Independent
Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity in 2016.90 Progress has been made on
women’s rights, the safety of journalists, human rights and climate
change, and the rights of persons with disabilities. In March 2011, the
Council adopted, by consensus, a ground-breaking resolution on freedom
of religion or belief, which dropped references to ‘defamation of religions’
and provides a comprehensive road map for coordinated national and
international efforts to ensure that freedom of religion or belief is not
undermined.91 It has been swift to adopt new human rights instruments,
such as the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, and
the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The Council has sought to achieve universal participation of states in its

deliberations through the Voluntary Trust Fund to support the
participation of Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing
States. However, the Council’s workload often results in three or four
three-hour meetings daily. This has significant resource implications. It
also compromises the capacity of delegations, especially those which are
small, to engage meaningfully with the work of the Council. Established
practices for the participation of NGOs in the work of the Council have
been maintained and the role of NHRIs strengthened. The Council has
also grappled with concerns relating to shrinking civil society space in
relation to its work and generally. Thousands of NGO representatives
participate at each session, whilst hundreds of side events are convened
by states and civil society. The Council’s presidency and bureau have
been assiduous in addressing reprisals against, and intimidation of, those
who collaborate with the Council or its mechanisms or seek to do so.
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Inevitably, differences of opinion exist among the members of the Council.

The challenge is to avoid polarization and divisiveness. During 2016,
strong divisions appeared in relation to the creation of a special
procedure mandate on protection against violence and discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Following difficult
substantive and procedural discussions, involving 11 amendments, the
relevant resolution was adopted with 23 members in favour, 18 against,
and 6 abstentions.92 Thereafter, the African Group member of the
Consultative Group recused himself from the process of preparing the
shortlist of candidates for the mandate.93 Following the mandate holder’s
appointment, the Russian Federation and the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (except Albania) made clear that they would not cooperate
with the special procedure. This series of events raised the issue of the
Council’s relationship with the General Assembly. A resolution was tabled
in the Third Committee of the General Assembly, on behalf of the African
Group, seeking to defer consideration of the resolution creating the
Independent Expert despite the fact that the mandate holder had (p. 387)
already taken up his functions. The initiative was defeated.94 The African
Group’s successive efforts to reintroduce its proposal and deny funding
for the mandate were also unsuccessful. At this stage, the mandate and
the activities of the mandate holder appear secure. However, the broader
issues of the General Assembly’s institutional relationship with the
Human Rights Council and its prerogative to review the Council’s work
remain.
In 2013, the General Assembly decided to defer consideration of a

Council resolution that called on the Secretary-General to nominate a
focal point on reprisals.95 To date, the General Assembly has not
considered the resolution and its status remains unclear. The possibility
that challenges to outcomes agreed by the Council being raised at the
General Assembly will not be removed unless the Council is established
as a principal body of the UN. To do so would contribute significantly to
the recognition of human rights as a pillar, along with development and
peace and security, of the UN.96 This will be considered in the next review
of the Council’s status.97
3 The treaty-based bodies
When the UDHR was adopted in December 1948, there was

broad agreement that the rights it enshrined should be spelled out in
treaties that would be binding on those states which ratified, acceded, or
succeeded to them. The year 1965 saw the adoption of the International
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) by the
General Assembly, while the ICCPR and the ICESCR were adopted in
1966. Since then, a further six ‘core’ UN human rights treaties have been
adopted, as have substantive and procedural protocols, most under the
auspices of the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights
Council. All UN member states have ratified at least one of the core
human rights treaties, and the majority has ratified over four. While it is
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often argued that no further human rights standard-setting activities are

required and that new instruments would duplicate rather than
complement those which exist, new instruments have been proposed on
topics such as the human rights of older persons,98 the regulation of
private military and security companies,99 and the activities of
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.100
Where the core human rights treaties are concerned, a body composed of
between 10 and 23 independent experts—a ‘human rights treaty body’—
examines the progress made by states parties in the implementation of
the treaty guarantees (see Table 19.1 for an overview of UN treaty
bodies). A 25-member treaty body also implements the mandates created
by the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. Treaty body
experts are elected at biennial meetings of states parties to the
instruments on the basis of their expertise in human rights.101 Although
they are nominated by states parties, experts are independent and not
subject to instruction from any state. Each expert works pro-bono and is
not an employee of the UN. The treaty bodies hold two or three regular
sessions of two to four weeks’ duration per year, in Geneva.
(p. 388)
Table 19.1 Overview of the UN treaty bodies
Instrument Treaty body Number

of states
parties
International Convention Committee on the 178

on the Elimination of Elimination of Racial
Racial Discrimination Discrimination (18
(ICERD) members)
International Covenant on Human Rights 169

Civil and Political Rights Committee (18
(ICCPR) members)
First Optional Protocol to Human Rights 116

the ICCPR (ICCPR-OP1) Committee
Second Optional Protocol Human Rights 85

to the ICCPR on the Committee
Abolition of the Death
Penalty (ICCPR-OP2)
International Covenant on Committee on 165

Economic, Social and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
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Cultural Rights (18

members)
Optional Protocol to the Committee on 22

ICESCR (ICESCR-OP) Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
Convention against Torture Committee against 162

and Other Forms of Cruel, Torture (10 members)
Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment (UNCAT)
Optional Protocol to Subcommittee on 84

UNCAT (UNCAT-OP) Prevention of Torture
(25 members)
Convention on the Committee on the 189

Elimination of All Forms of Elimination of
Discrimination against Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) Women (23 members)
Optional Protocol to Committee on the 109

CEDAW (CEDAW-OP) Elimination of
Discrimination against
Women
Convention on the Rights Committee on the 196

of the Child (CRC) Rights of the Child (18
members)
Optional Protocol on Sale Committee on the 173

of Children, Child Rights of the Child
Prostitution and Child
Pornography
Optional Protocol on Committee on the 167

Children in Armed Conflict Rights of the Child
Optional Protocol to the Committee on the 35

Convention on the Rights Rights of the Child
of the Child on a
Communications
Procedure
International Convention Committee on the 51

on the Rights of Migrant Rights of Migrant
Workers (14 members)
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Workers and their Families

(ICRMW)
Convention on the Rights Committee on the 175

of Persons with Disabilities Rights of Persons with
(CRPD) Disabilities (18
members)
Optional Protocol to the Committee on the 91

CRPD (CRPD-OP) Rights of Persons with
Disabilities
International Convention Committee on Enforced 57

for the Protection of all Disappearances (10
Persons from Enforced members)
Disappearance (CPED)
(p. 389)
Each treaty body overseeing a core treaty is invested with various tools to
assist states parties’ implementation of their treaty obligations. These
include: consideration of state reports, the issuance of general comments,
the conduct of inquiries, and individual communication procedures.102
3.1 State reporting
States parties to each core UN human rights treaty undertake to report

regularly on their implementation of the treaty.103 Initial reports must
generally be submitted to the relevant treaty body within one year of the
treaty entering into force for the state concerned. Thereafter, periodic
reports104 are due in accordance with the provisions of the treaty or the
established practice of the treaty body concerned; periodicity varies from
two to five years.
All treaty bodies have issued detailed reporting guidelines on the form
and content of initial and periodic reports.105 In general, states are to
submit a ‘Treaty Specific Document’ setting out the legal, administrative,
and judicial measures taken to give effect to the treaty provisions and any
difficulties encountered in implementing the rights. States are also to
submit a ‘Common Core Document’ to all the treaty bodies to which they
report, which sets out the general domestic legal and constitutional
framework for the protection of human rights and information on
implementation of substantive treaty provisions which are common to all,
or several, treaties.106
State reports are prepared at the national level, usually under the
direction of a lead ministry or an inter-ministerial committee. As noted in
relation to UPR, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
encourages systematization of the preparation of reports through the
establishment of a national reporting and coordination mechanism to
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facilitate national consultations and follow-up.107 Preparation of the

report offers states parties the opportunity to undertake a comprehensive
review of measures they have taken to harmonize national laws and
policies with provisions of the relevant international human rights
instrument; monitor the progress made in the enjoyment of the rights in
the treaties; identify shortcomings and problems with the domestic
implementation; and evaluate future needs. Reporting guidelines urge
states to provide concrete examples of treaty implementation, and not
focus exclusively on the constitutional and legal framework.
Once submitted, the report is translated into the three working languages
of the committee concerned and scheduled for examination. There is
usually a delay in the consideration of the report as most treaty bodies
have many reports awaiting examination.108 Normally one or two sessions
prior to the session at which it will consider the state report, the treaty
(p. 390) body will adopt a ‘list of issues’ based on all available
information, including that provided by entities other than the state such
as NGOs and NHRIs, which is sent to the state party. In replying to this
list, the state party may update the information contained in its report or
provide additional information. In 2007, the Committee against Torture
adopted an optional reporting procedure, whereby if the state agrees, the
Committee prepares lists of issues prior to the submission of the state
report that are based on all available information, and the response,
together with the common core document, constitutes the state’s periodic
report. The General Assembly has encouraged the treaty bodies to offer
this ‘simplified reporting procedure’ to states parties.109 All treaty bodies
now invite states to use this approach with respect to periodic reports,
and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the
Committee against Torture offer this option to states with long overdue
initial reports.110
Consideration of reports takes place in public session, in the presence of

a delegation of the state party. To date, at least one state party has
appeared before a committee using video-conferencing facilities. Treaty
body members aim to engage the delegation in a constructive dialogue on
how the guarantees in the relevant instrument can be respected better.
After the public consideration, treaty bodies adopt ‘concluding
observations’. These identify progress in implementation since the last
report and remaining concerns. Each concern is matched by a specific
recommendation or practical advice designed to give the state
suggestions on further steps to improve implementation. There is a clear
correlation between the substance of the treaty body–state dialogue and
the substance and specificity of the recommendations in concluding
observations, which should be short, targeted, specific, pragmatic, and as
implementable as possible, so that the state party may follow-up.111
All the treaty bodies with the competence to review state reports require
information on implementation of previous recommendations in the next
periodic report, and most assess the progress made by the state party
against the concerns and recommendations they have identified. The
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Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture, the Committee

on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances have developed procedures for follow-up to their
concluding observations. These committees generally invite states to
report back within one or two years on all follow-up action. Most have
appointed a Special Rapporteur(s) or Coordinator(s) for follow-up who is/
are in regular contact with states parties. Where follow-up information is
deficient or not forthcoming despite reminders, this mechanism can
organize meetings with government representatives to survey possible
follow-up action and urge the state party to implement the committee’s
recommendations. Some of the treaty bodies that have developed follow-
up procedures grade states on progress made and most report on the
status of follow-up in a chapter of their annual reports to the General
Assembly and on their webpages.
An important feature of the reporting process is the contribution that

various stakeholders make. All treaty bodies have emphasized the
importance of cooperation with NGOs, whether national or international,
and the positive role NGOs can play at the domestic level in follow-up
activities. In addition, most treaty bodies have instituted formal (p. 391)
mechanisms for consultations with NGOs.112 NGOs often submit
‘alternative’, ‘parallel’, or ‘shadow’ reports to treaty bodies, which
analyse and often challenge the content of the state party’s report. Many
treaty body members rely on NGO information when preparing their
dialogue with the state party, or during the questioning of state
delegations. Treaty bodies also receive information from NHRIs, and
some have adopted guidelines for these institutions.113 Specialized
agencies and other entities of the UN system, including UN Country
Teams (UNCTs), also provide information.
Reporting to the treaty bodies can be a challenge for states parties,

particularly those that have ratified most or all of the core instruments.
Many states face a serious reporting backlog. The reports of some states
are more than a decade overdue, and some may have never submitted a
report.114 This has prompted the treaty bodies to coordinate and
streamline their procedures and discuss options for reform. States that
experience difficulties with the reporting procedures may solicit technical
assistance from the OHCHR, which has conducted many reporting
workshops for states often in partnership with other organizations and/or
NGOs.
Where states fail to submit reports despite repeated reminders, the

relevant treaty body may initiate a process, sometimes referred to as the
‘review procedure’, for consideration of the state’s implementation efforts
in the absence of a report. The state party is notified of the intention of
the treaty body to proceed with a review in the absence of a report.
Should the state party submit a report at this time, or indicate that one
will be submitted, the review procedure is suspended. Where no such
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response is received, the treaty body may formulate a list of issues and
questions for the state party and invite a state delegation to attend a
nominated session. Concluding observations are formulated on the basis
of the dialogue with the state party and other information. Although
states are actively encouraged to send a delegation, where no response is
received the review will proceed in the absence of the state party.
Examination of the state’s performance by the treaty body takes place in
public session on the basis of existing information from relevant
stakeholders and the concluding observations adopted are communicated
to the state concerned. The review procedure is used in exceptional cases
only, although since October 2010 the Human Rights Committee has
examined at least one state party per session in this way. In most cases,
notification by a committee that it intends to consider a state in the
absence of a report results in the state agreeing to present the overdue
report within an agreed deadline.
3.2 General comments
All treaty bodies, with the exception of the Sub-Committee for the
Prevention of Torture, issue ‘general comments’. In the case of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women these are
termed ‘general recommendations’. These documents are to be adopted
through a consultative and transparent process.115 The comments or
recommendations, which may (p. 392) be formulated jointly by one or
more committees,116 are adopted by consensus and provide authoritative
guidance on the general treaty obligations of states parties or set out how
the treaty body interprets the scope of the substantive provisions of their
treaty. Thus, they offer helpful interpretative guidance to states and other
stakeholders. General comments and recommendations frequently deal
with wider thematic or cross-cutting issues, such as the role of NHRIs,
the obligations of states during states of emergency, violence against
women, or gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination. While not
legally binding, these comments are often invoked by states and
complainants in reporting and complaints procedures, and, increasingly,
by international, regional, and national courts in their judgments.117
3.3 Inquiries
The Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of

Discrimination against Women, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child may initiate inquiries upon
receipt of reliable, well-founded indications of serious, grave, or
systematic violations of the respective conventions by a state party.
Inquiries may only be conducted in relation to states that have recognized
the competence of the relevant committee to conduct them. The inquiry
procedures are confidential and the cooperation of the state party is
required throughout. Once a state has consented to an inquiry, the
relevant committee may urgently designate one or several members to
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undertake a confidential inquiry and report back. Where this is warranted

and the state consents, this may include a visit to the state. The findings
of the members are examined by the whole committee and transmitted to
the state party with appropriate recommendations. Confidentiality is the
hallmark of the inquiry procedure, but findings are usually disclosed in
some form after dialogue with the state party at the end of each inquiry.
The Committee against Torture has conducted inquiries on Brazil, Egypt,
Lebanon, Mexico, Nepal, Peru, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the former
Yugoslavia; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women has conducted inquiries on Canada, Mexico, and the Philippines;
and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has
conducted an inquiry on the UK.
A similar inquiry procedure is created by Article 33 CPED, which allows

the Committee on Enforced Disappearance to request that one or more of
its members visit a state party where it receives reliable information
indicating a serious violation of the Convention. States parties do not
have to have recognized the competence of the Committee for it to
request a visit, although consultation with the state and agreement are
required before the visit, as is collaboration in respect of its modalities
and conduct. In addition to the inquiry procedure, the Committee has two
other innovative methods of dealing with urgent or severe violations of
the CPED. First, it may request urgent action that a disappeared person
be sought and found. By March 2017, 368 urgent actions had been
registered. Second, having sought information from the state concerned,
the Committee may bring (p. 393) well-founded indications that enforced
disappearance is being practised on a widespread or systematic basis by
a state party to the attention of the General Assembly through the
Secretary-General.118
The UNCAT-OP creates a novel preventative inquiry mechanism. It

establishes a system of complementary regular visits to places of
detention conducted by both independent international and national
bodies. UNCAT-OP’s two-pillar approach relies on an international body,
the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, and ‘national preventive
mechanisms’ (NPMs)—national bodies which must be established by each
state party within one year of entry into force of the UNCAT-OP for the
relevant state. NPMs should have unrestricted access to all places of
detention and all relevant information about the treatment and conditions
of detention of individuals deprived of liberty. In order to discharge its
mandate to advise states on national mechanisms and supervise their
work, the Subcommittee should have the same level of unrestricted
access as the NPMs. Since the beginning of its activities in 2007, the
Subcommittee has conducted over 50 visits, including regular visits to
states parties, follow-up visits, and visits to advise NPMs.
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3.4 Complaints procedures
The ability to claim that human rights have been violated is an important
part of the protection mechanisms of the UN human rights treaties. The
ICCPR-OP1, ICESCR-OP, UNCAT, ICERD, ICRMW, CPED, and CRC-OP3
provide for a state party to complain to the relevant treaty body that
another state party is not fulfilling its treaty obligations where both states
concerned have accepted this competence.119 These are known as inter-
state complaints mechanisms. To date there have been no inter-state
complaints to treaty bodies. Instead, attention has been focused on
mechanisms for individuals to complain that their rights under a
particular treaty have been violated by a state party.
All but one of the treaty bodies that support the core treaties implement
optional individual complaints procedures. These procedures allow
individuals to complain that a state party has violated its obligations
under the relevant treaty or substantive protocols to that treaty. As these
are optional mechanisms, states must accept the competence of the
relevant committee to receive individual complaints. Only the Committee
on Migrant Workers cannot yet receive such communications. The
ICRMW provides for such a procedure, but it has not been accepted by
the required number of states for the Committee to start receiving
communications.120
The procedure for the examination of individual complaints is generally

characterized as ‘quasi-judicial’. It is written and confidential; oral
hearings are rare. Complaints are pre-screened as to their compatibility
with the provisions of the relevant treaty and fulfilment of basic
admissibility requirements by the OHCHR. Complainants do not need to
be supported by legal representation, but this is advisable; however there
is no UN system of legal aid to help with this. Complaints may be brought
by third parties on behalf of individuals provided they have given their
written consent or are unable to do so.
A treaty body member designated as Special Rapporteur for New

Communications, or a Working Group, decides on the registration of
complaints and issues instructions on how to proceed with new cases.
Once formally registered, the complaint is normally transmitted to the
respondent state party for observations. Deadlines for observations vary,
but (p. 394) states generally have six months to submit observations on
both the admissibility and merits of a communication. As the treaty
bodies are careful to apply the principle of equality of arms, the state
party’s observations are sent to the complainant for comments. If a state
party fails to respond to a complaint, the relevant treaty body usually
bases its assessment of the situation on the facts as submitted by the
complainant, provided they are properly substantiated. A state party may
request that the treaty body examine the admissibility of the
communication separately from the merits should it believe that the
communication is inadmissible. The state must set out the reasons for its
view. In such circumstances the complainant is given the opportunity to
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respond to the claims of inadmissibility and it is then for the treaty body
to decide whether to consider the admissibility and merits of the
communication separately.
Treaty bodies may issue interim measures of protection in situations of

particular urgency, which require immediate action to prevent irreparable
harm to the complainant. These are often issued in death penalty, life-
threatening, and deportation or extradition cases.121 The vast majority of
states parties complies with such requests. The Human Rights Committee
and the Committee against Torture also issue requests for ‘provisional
measures of protection’. Such requests differ from interim measures as
they indicate explicitly that they may be reviewed, at the request of the
state, in light of information and comments received from it and further
comments, if any, from the complainant. Treaty bodies regard compliance
with interim measures requests as inherent in a state party’s treaty
obligations and any failure to comply with them a serious breach
thereof.122
Decisions on admissibility are adopted either at the level of the

Committee plenary or by a working group. The Committees examine a
number of admissibility criteria.123 First, the complainant must show that
he or she is a ‘victim’ of a violation of provisions of the instrument he or
she invokes. The complainant must be personally affected by the
impugned state action. General claims by groups or an individual not
affected by the alleged violation (‘actio popularis’) are not permissible.
Second, the complaint must relate to events which occurred after the
entry into force of the complaint mechanism for the state party concerned
(admissibility ratione temporis), unless these produce effects after the
entry into force which constitute a violation of the relevant treaty.
Third, the complaint must relate to rights that are actually protected by
the instrument invoked by the complainant (admissibility ratione
materiae).
Fourth, the same matter must not have been examined by the treaty body
concerned or by another international investigation or settlement
procedure, such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, or the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, or be undergoing examination by such a procedure.
In regard to ICCPR-OP1 and CPED, only those cases that are being
examined by such a procedure at the same time as the communication to
the UN treaty body will be excluded. Most European states parties have
entered a reservation to the ICCPR-OP1 to the effect that once the
European Court of Human Rights has disposed of a complaint, it cannot
subsequently be considered by the Human Rights Committee.124
(p. 395) Fifth, the complainant must have exhausted all available
domestic remedies. This means that, in principle, the highest court of the
state party concerned must have considered and dismissed the case
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before a treaty body may consider it. The rule does not apply if the
pursuit of domestic remedies has been ‘unreasonably prolonged’. This is
an assessment that must be made on a case-by-case basis. Such remedies
must not only be available but also effective, thereby offering a
reasonable prospect of actual redress.
Complaints that do not fulfil these criteria will be declared inadmissible

and such decisions are final.125 Those complaints declared admissible are
referred to the state party for observations on the merits, if such
observations have not already been given. Once provided and the
complainant has been given a reasonable opportunity to comment on
these observations, or the deadline for submission has expired, the treaty
body will examine the merits of the case.
The CESCR-OP and CRC-OP3 provide that their respective committees

shall make available their good offices to the parties with a view to
reaching a friendly settlement of the matter of the communication. An
agreement on a friendly settlement terminates consideration of the
communication.
Treaty bodies generally adopt decisions on complaints—called ‘views’ or

‘opinions’—by consensus. The decisions include measures to be taken by
the state if a violation is found. Often those experts who do not share the
opinion of the majority append individual (dissenting or concurring)
opinions to the final decisions. This does not in any way undermine the
authority of the decision.
One, if not the principal, weakness of the treaty body complaints

procedures is that the final merits decisions are not strictly speaking
legally binding and thus cannot be enforced. However, in its General
Comment 33, the Human Rights Committee stated that although its views
are non-binding they ‘exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial
decision’.126 Furthermore, the Committee stated that its views are an
authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR by a body entrusted by states
parties to give such interpretations, and, as such, the principle of good
faith to treaty obligations requires that states cooperate with the
Committee and inform it of action taken to implement its views. In order
to strengthen the legal value of their decisions, the treaty bodies have
Special Rapporteurs mandated to consider state follow-up on views.
These Rapporteurs monitor how states parties respond to the
recommendations for a remedy and other measures to be taken following
the finding of a violation. It is normally expected that states will submit
follow-up information within a few months of a decision. The Special
Rapporteurs are in regular contact with states parties and the annual
reports of the treaty bodies to the General Assembly include a chapter in
which state party follow-up to views is detailed. All follow-up information
provided by the parties to a case is, in principle, public.127
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It is difficult to categorize state party follow-up. Many states parties pay

compensation to victims, even though some observe they do so not as a
matter of legal obligation but ex gratia. Others have released individuals
detained or imprisoned arbitrarily, or commuted death sentences. Others
either do not provide follow-up information or challenge the findings of
the treaty body concerned. ‘Enabling legislation’—that is, legislation that
makes decisions of treaty bodies enforceable at the national level—is
rare. However, the fact that all treaty bodies which decide complaints
have instituted and largely synchronized follow-up mechanisms has
improved the level of compliance with recommendations.
(p. 396)
Figure 19.1
Individual complaints procedures
For many years, the treaty bodies developed their jurisprudence under
the complaints procedures in what could be called ‘splendid isolation’
from that of regional human rights mechanisms or national tribunals. This
raised the spectre of conflicting interpretations of substantively very
similar, if not identical, provisions of international or regional human
rights instruments. One such example is the different treatment of the
‘death row phenomenon’ under the ICCPR and the European Convention
on Human Rights by the Human (p. 397) Rights Committee and the
European Court of Human Rights.128 More recently, comparative analyses
of jurisprudence prepared by the OHCHR have helped treaty bodies to
keep abreast of relevant developments in regional and national tribunals.
This has led to a welcome ‘cross-fertilization’ of human rights
jurisprudence. The treaty bodies now take into account the relevant
jurisprudence of regional courts and national tribunals when seized of
complex or novel legal issues. Conversely, the regional mechanisms (for
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example, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American

Court of Human Rights)129 and some national tribunals now regularly rely
on, or cite, treaty body jurisprudence. This contributes to the emergence
of substantively consistent and truly universal human rights
jurisprudence.
3.5 Treaty body coordination, harmonization, reform, and

strengthening
The treaty bodies have continuously sought to improve their effectiveness

by streamlining and harmonizing their working methods and practices.
Even so, differences remain in areas such as the treatment of NGO
information, the preparation of lists of issues, or the procedure for the
examination of reports. Many states parties complain of such procedural
differences and urge further harmonization.
The treaty body chairpersons assemble annually, usually in Geneva, to

discuss issues of common concern, working methods, common
approaches to thematic issues, and so on, with a view to enhancing the
effectiveness of the treaty body system as a whole. These meetings have
also been held in Brussels, Addis Ababa, New York, and Costa Rica in
order to bring the treaty bodies closer to the site of implementation and
strengthen links among international and regional mechanisms and
institutions and stakeholders.
Harmonization of the human rights treaty body system has been an issue
since the first meeting of chairpersons over 30 years ago. It has been the
subject of many UN reports, as well as academic commentary, and gained
greater prominence as the number of treaty bodies has grown and the
number of states party to the treaties has increased, leading to an over-
stretched system. In 2002, the UN Secretary-General identified
modernization of the UN treaty system as a crucial element in the UN
goal to promote and protect human rights. He called on the treaty bodies
to craft a more coordinated approach to their activities by standardizing
their reporting requirements and allowing states parties to produce a
single report summarizing their compliance with the full range of treaties
to which they are a party.130 The idea of a single report did not gain
favour with the treaty bodies and other stakeholders, but the treaty
bodies were amenable to standardizing their reporting requirements. In
2005, Louise Arbour, then the High Commissioner for Human Rights
made a far-reaching proposal for treaty body reform when she called for
discussions on proposals for a unified treaty system and the replacement
of the existing treaty bodies by a single, unified, standing treaty body.131
The OHCHR prepared a detailed concept paper, (p. 398) which was
discussed widely.132 A majority of stakeholders—many states parties,
most treaty bodies and experts, and numerous NGOs—was wary of the
proposal. Many pointed out that the establishment of such a body would
jeopardize and eventually undermine the specificity of the core human
rights instruments and their respective treaty bodies. Others considered
that the creation of a single body merging all treaty body activities was
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premature and politically unrealistic, but that some form of unification,

such as a single body for examination of complaints, might be feasible.
Successive High Commissioners have not pursued this proposal. In 2009,

the High Commissioner Navi Pillay launched a process of reflection on
ways to strengthen the treaty body system based on the premise that the
legal parameters of the treaties should not be altered. Around 20
consultations involving states, treaty body experts, UN entities, NHRIs,
academics, and civil society were organized by OHCHR. Whilst there was
broad support for this multi-stakeholder process, in 2011 some states
expressed the view that states must play the primary role in any
discussions relating to the treaty body system. As a result, in early 2012,
the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting its President to
launch an inter-governmental process on strengthening and enhancing
the effective functioning of the human rights treaty body system.133 In
June 2012, the High Commissioner published a report setting out her
vision for the future of the system.134 In July 2012, the intergovernmental
process was initiated, culminating in April 2014 with the adoption of
General Assembly Resolution 68/268 on strengthening and enhancing the
effective functioning of the human rights treaty body system.135
General Assembly Resolution 68/268 is long and detailed. It reaffirms the

independence of the treaty bodies and their members, whilst encouraging
the treaty bodies to align their methodology and harmonize their working
methods. However, in this process attention must be paid to the views of
states and no new obligations for states should be created. To this end,
the treaty bodies are encouraged to enhance the role of their
chairpersons in relation to procedural matters. Strengthened interaction
between states parties and the chairpersons during their annual meetings
is encouraged so that these meetings constitute a forum where all issues,
including those related to the independence and impartiality of treaty
bodies, can be raised constructively. Strategies for enhancing efficiency
are promoted. These include: combining overdue reports to eliminate the
backlog of outstanding reporting obligations; establishing word limits for
documents produced by states parties, other stakeholders, and the treaty
bodies themselves; and limiting treaty body working languages and
translation of summary records. In order to enhance accessibility and
visibility of the treaty bodies, they are encouraged to webcast their public
meetings and the Secretary-General is requested to make the system
accessible to persons with disabilities to ensure their full and effective
participation. To enable wider participation in the state reporting process,
the OHCHR is requested to facilitate via videoconferencing the
participation of members of its delegations not present in Geneva. States
are encouraged to provide voluntary funds to facilitate the engagement of
states parties, particularly those without representation in Geneva, with
the treaty body system. Recommendations are (p. 399) made to sustain
and strengthen the independence and impartiality of treaty body
members, and all acts of intimidation and reprisals against individuals
and groups contributing to the work of human rights treaty bodies are
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condemned. At the heart of the resolution, however, is the increased

meeting time allocated to the human rights treaty bodies, determined on
the basis of a formula based on their workload in 2014, to be reviewed
biennially. This is mirrored by a capacity-building programme, including
the deployment of dedicated officers in the OHCHR’s regional offices,
designed to support states parties to implement their treaty obligations.
Full implementation of General Assembly Resolution 68/268 began on 1

January 2015. The Secretary-General is to report on progress made to the
General Assembly on a biennial basis. The General Assembly will review
the state of the human rights treaty body system in 2020, including the
measures taken in line with Resolution 68/268 to ensure their
sustainability, and, if appropriate, to decide on further action to
strengthen and enhance the effective functioning of the system.
3.6 Conclusion
The activities of the human rights treaty bodies have developed greatly in
terms of scope and sophistication. The reporting procedures are being
increasingly harmonized to assist states parties with multiple reporting
obligations, whilst the quality, specificity, and usability of concluding
observations has gradually improved, making it possible for states parties
to follow-up on recommendations meaningfully. Follow-up procedures
have helped to keep those states parties that display little or no political
will to implement treaty body recommendations engaged. In terms of
individual complaints, the jurisprudence emanating from such procedures
has improved substantively and qualitatively over the years. A very
positive development has been the increasing ‘cross fertilization’ of
human rights jurisprudence. Follow-up to decisions of the treaty bodies
has also improved, with increasing numbers of states granting
appropriate remedies following a finding of a violation.
Despite these achievements, the treaty bodies must continue to respond

to the challenges they face. First, the state reporting procedures must be
harmonized further and simplified to prompt all states parties to meet
their reporting obligations and reduce the large number of overdue
reports. Second, the backlog of pending individual complaints that apply
to some treaty bodies must be reduced. While the quality of decisions has
improved, decision-making is slow and cumbersome. There is also scope
for distilling good practice in the jurisprudence of treaty bodies regarding
remedies.136 The non-binding nature of treaty body decisions remains a
concern. Although it is currently politically unrealistic to call for treaty
amendments that would make all final decisions under the treaty-based
complaints procedures legally binding and executable, follow-up
procedures that strengthen the domestic implementation of decisions
should be developed further. Finally, endeavours pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 68/268, and in line with High Commissioner Pillay’s
report, that aim to create holistic and harmonized functioning of the
treaty body system should continue. This is all the more necessary given
the likely adoption of new treaties and establishment of attendant
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mechanisms and the lack of appetite for rationalizing existing treaty

bodies.137
In the long term, harmonization of working methods and capacity-

building of states will not address the challenges posed by the existence
of nine human rights treaty bodies (p. 400) enjoying similar competence,
and another exercising a preventive function, whose treaties enjoy wide
acceptance. These challenges can be met only if appropriate and realistic
financial and human resources are allocated to the system or if it
undergoes profound structural change. It is to be hoped that innovative
proposals to secure the system’s future, which do not weaken its
protection for individuals, will emerge during the lead-up to the General
Assembly’s review of the system in 2020.
4 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for

Human Rights
From the adoption of the UDHR the international community sought to

establish a body within the UN that could support implementation of
human rights obligations by countries at the national level and effectively
deal with human rights violations. Suggestions for the creation of a UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights were advanced as early as 1947
and in the mid-1960s Costa Rica made a concrete proposal, but for
political reasons it was dropped.138
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights reactivated discussions

about the institution and mandate of a High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and called on the General Assembly to ‘begin, as a matter of
priority, consideration of the question of the establishment of a High
Commissioner for Human Rights’.139 The General Assembly reacted
swiftly, establishing a working group on the issue, and, on 20 December
1993, General Assembly Resolution 48/141, which created the post of
High Commissioner for Human Rights and set out its mandate, was
adopted without a vote. The High Commissioner is appointed by the
Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly, and serves for
a four year term, which is renewable once. The first UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso from Ecuador, took
office in April 1994. Since then there have been five High
Commissioners.140
The High Commissioner has the responsibility of promoting and

protecting the effective enjoyment by all of all human rights. In order to
carry out this mandate, he or she is to liaise with competent UN bodies
and issue recommendations on how to improve promotion and protection
of human rights, as well as rationalize and strengthen the UN human
rights machinery. The High Commissioner should also coordinate UN
education and public human rights information programmes. States
should be helped to realize their human rights obligations by providing
advisory, technical, and financial services, and engaging governments in
dialogue aimed at improving human rights protection. As well as
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enhancing international cooperation for the promotion of human rights,

the High Commissioner should play an active role in removing current
obstacles to the full realization of all human rights and in preventing the
continuation of human rights violations throughout the world. Finally, the
High Commissioner is to promote the realization of the right to
development. The High Commissioner reports annually to the Human
Rights Council and the General Assembly on his or her activities and
those of his or her office—the OHCHR.
The High Commissioner’s extensive mandate is fulfilled through the

OHCHR, which is a department of the UN Secretariat. The OHCHR has
developed greatly in terms of the (p. 401) scope of its activities, the
mandates it supports and services, and the human and financial resources
made available to it. The headquarters of the OHCHR are located in
Geneva, with an office in New York. In addition, the OHCHR has staff
based in around 70 countries as part of regional offices, country offices,
human rights components of UN peace operations, and UN country
teams.
The work of the OHCHR focuses on three broad areas: human rights
standard-setting, human rights monitoring, and supporting human rights
implementation at the country level. Within these three areas, it provides
expertise and substantive (research and analysis) and technical support
to the UN human rights bodies described earlier and contributes to the
monitoring of human rights situations and implementation of human
rights standards at the national level. More specifically at the national
level, the OHCHR provides technical expertise and capacity development
on the ground, including in relation to laws, policies, and institutions. It
also provides support to NHRIs, civil society, and individuals and groups
in their advocacy and efforts to claim their rights, including through
human rights education and information. The OHCHR responds to human
rights emergencies with rapid deployments, and provides guidance
regarding follow-up to UPR, treaty body, and special procedures mandate
holders’ recommendations. It administers 13 voluntary funds, many of
which support the victims of human rights abuses.141 The OHCHR also
supports the High Commissioner in his or her role as the global human
rights conscience and advocate. Since 2014, the OHCHR has pursued six
thematic priorities in its work, which reflect leading human rights
challenges. These are: strengthening human rights mechanisms;
enhancing equality and countering discrimination; combating impunity
and strengthening accountability and the rule of law; integrating human
rights in development and the economic sphere; widening the democratic
society space; and early warning and protection of human rights in
situations of conflict, violence, and insecurity.142
The 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development143 and the 2030

Agenda for Sustainable Development, which is based on the 2015
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),144 have manifold implications for
the work of the OHCHR. Development issues cut across much of the work
of the OHCHR, and it was keen to ensure that the SDGs were grounded in
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human rights principles and standards. The OHCHR provides expertise

and field support in the areas of the right to development, poverty and aid
policy issues, human rights indicators, human trafficking, anti-corruption
policies, globalization, and trade. The work programme of the OHCHR in
this area is largely defined by reference to decisions of the General
Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and the work and
recommendations of the latter’s Open-Ended Working Group on the Right
to Development. The OHCHR provides support to UN country teams and
human rights field presences in respect of the SDGs and works on
development policy and programming issues under the auspices of the
UN Development Group.
Much of the work of the OHCHR now takes place in the field and there
has been an identifiable shift of emphasis away from headquarters. The
importance of work in the field cannot be underestimated. For example,
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, which had been predicted by NGOs and
development agencies on the ground, highlighted the need for the
establishment of preventive mechanisms, of which human rights field
presences were seen (p. 402) as part and parcel. The first High
Commissioner made the creation of field presences a priority, and a field
office in Rwanda was set up in 1994. Since then the OHCHR has taken
numerous policy decisions designed to ‘operationalize’ its activities and
create and strengthen field presences—whether country-specific,
regional, or part of peacekeeping missions—throughout the world. By the
end of 2016 the OHCHR ran or supported 60 field presences.
The decision to create a field presence is taken in consultation with the

relevant government, taking into consideration the domestic human
rights situation, security and political considerations, human and financial
resources, administrative arrangements, and the scope of activities to be
undertaken (whether monitoring and/or technical cooperation activities).
The OHCHR country and stand-alone offices are established on the basis
of a standard agreement between OHCHR and the host government that
delineates the activities of the field presence: generally, human rights
observation, technical cooperation activities, and public reporting.
However, some field presences are restricted to technical cooperation
only. Regional offices and centres are also established on the basis of an
agreement with the host governments and in consultation with other
countries in the region, and these focus on cross-cutting regional human
rights concerns and assisting governments in their interaction with
human rights mechanisms. Several regional human rights centres, such
as those in Cambodia, Cameroon, and Doha, have been created by the
General Assembly, and their mandates are set out in their constituent
resolutions. Similarly, where there is a human rights component to a
Security Council peacekeeping, special political, or peace-building
mission, such as in Mali, Libya, and South Sudan, the mandate is
governed by the resolution creating the mission. Finally, human rights
advisers in UN country teams assist and support the integration of human
rights into programming activities, and seek to build the human rights
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19. United Nations
capacity of national stakeholders. Reports on the work of field presences

are regularly presented to the Human Rights Council for consideration
and possible action.
The variety and complexity of field presences have grown beyond

expectation since 1994. While some stand-alone field presences are tiny
and closely associated with the local UN country team, other field offices,
for example in Cambodia and Colombia, are staffed by numerous human
rights officers recruited both internationally and locally. Where larger
country offices are actively engaged in monitoring human rights
violations and regular reporting thereon, relations with the host state’s
authorities can become strained. Sometimes the re-negotiation with the
relevant government of the agreement for the field presence may become
a politically difficult exercise that requires the personal involvement of
the High Commissioner.
The 2005 World Summit recognized that human rights, peace and
security, and development were the pillars of the UN system, and
resolved to strengthen the OHCHR through the doubling of its regular
budget resources over five years.145 Yet only 3.5 per cent of the total UN
regular budget is allocated to OHCHR and much of its activities are
funded by voluntary contributions. On average, approximately 40 per cent
of OHCHR’s funding needs are covered by the UN regular budget. The
remaining funds are made up of voluntary funding from states and other
donors. In general, extra-budgetary resources support work not covered
by the regular budget, the majority of which is activities in the field.
Voluntary contributions also assist the financing of implementation of
mandates established by intergovernmental bodies, as frequently the
regular budget allocation for these is insufficient.146 The dependence on
voluntary contributions may be problematic because the OHCHR
consistently relies on the contributions of major donors to implement
(p. 403) essential activities and, thus, these will be affected in times of
economic downturn when there is a funding shortfall. Indeed, such

shortfalls have forced the OHCHR to cut posts and activities in the past,
and an appeal for funds has been launched annually since 2013.
Furthermore, although the High Commissioner strongly encourages
unearmarked financing, major donor countries may be tempted to peg
sizeable voluntary contributions to achieve some political leverage over
the content of programmes, or influence staffing policy. This is a
preoccupation voiced by some states, in particular non-donors.147
However, unless states are prepared to allocate the full resource
requirements needed to support the activities of the UN human rights
programme, the OHCHR will require voluntary contributions to fund its
essential work.
5 Human rights activities in other parts of the

UN
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In his first report on the renewal of the UN system published in 1997,

former Secretary-General Kofi Annan advocated for the integration of
human rights into the activities of other UN Departments and specialized
agencies.148 This is known as ‘mainstreaming’ human rights and much
progress has been made. General Assembly Resolution 60/251 tasks the
Human Rights Council with an important role in promoting the effective
coordination and mainstreaming of human rights within the UN system,
and it convenes an annual discussion with heads of UN entities on this
theme. Increased integration of human rights standards and principles,
including the right to development, into UN system policies relating to
development, humanitarian action, peace and security, and economic and
social issues is one of the OHCHR’s global expected accomplishments,
and much of the work of the OHCHR entails provision of guidance, policy
advice, and technical support to implement the mainstreaming
imperative. In addition, the OHCHR and other relevant UN entities have
agreed a policy on human rights in UN peace operations and political
missions that provides guidance on how human rights are to be
integrated into these activities.
In May 2008, the Secretary-General issued a policy decision reaffirming

the centrality of human rights in the development work of the UN. The
Human Rights Working Group of the UN Development Group (UNDG),
funded through a multi-donor trust fund, was established in response to
this.149 The Working Group is made up of 18 UN agencies, funds, and
programmes and is chaired by the OHCHR and a senior representative of
another UNDG entity. Its work focuses on three pillars: serving as the
primary forum to ensure policy coherence on human rights
mainstreaming; supporting the UNDG to make system-wide human rights
expertise available to national development actors; and supporting the
UN development system in respect of Human Rights up Front (Section
5.3).150
The OHCHR provides guidance, policy advice, and technical support in

respect of the mainstreaming of human rights. This has influenced the
approach of the main UN organs in the area of human rights, including
the General Assembly, Security Council (SC), Secretary-General, and
International Court of Justice (ICJ). These will be discussed below.
(p. 404) 5.1 General Assembly
The General Assembly, the UN’s principal deliberative organ composed of

all member states, is regularly seized of human rights issues. Article 13
UN Charter provides that the General Assembly ‘shall initiate studies and
make recommendations for the purpose of … assisting in the realization
of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion’. It is generally the Third Committee of
the General Assembly, responsible for social, humanitarian, and cultural
issues, which reviews human rights issues. The Third Committee receives
and discusses the Human Rights Council’s annual report (which is also
considered by the General Assembly plenary); reports from the Council’s
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19. United Nations
special procedures; the annual report of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights; annual reports of the treaty bodies; and reports on human
rights issues considered by the Secretary-General. This Committee also
negotiates and adopts resolutions on thematic human rights issues and
country situations, some of which overlap with those of the Human Rights
Council.151
The plenary General Assembly adopts human rights-related declarations

or resolutions, such as on the right to development,152 or on the outcome
of the Human Rights Council’s review of its work and functioning.153 It
formally adopts new instruments in the field of human rights that have
been adopted by the Council or other UN bodies. The General Assembly
also discusses and endorses the results and outcome documents of
international or world conferences dealing with human rights, such as the
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance, held in Durban in 2001, and the Durban Review
Conference, held in Geneva in 2009. Human rights instruments are also
elaborated in ad hoc working groups of the General Assembly, while
human rights considerations are also taken up during its High-level
Meetings, for example the 2005 World Summit, the 2012 High-level
Meeting on the Rule of Law, and the 2016 Summit for Refugees and
Migrants. The General Assembly is also able to create commissions of
inquiry and other mechanisms which, inter alia, address human rights
concerns,154 as may its special sessions and emergency special sessions.
In December 2016, in response to the absence of Security Council action
to ensure accountability for international crimes committed in Syria the
General Assembly used its powers to establish a mechanism to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the most
serious crimes under international law committed in that country since
March 2011.155
5.2 Security Council
The Security Council, the 15-member UN body with primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has
increasingly recognized the importance of the enjoyment of human rights
for the fulfilment of its mandate.156 However, although it has often
characterized massive human rights violations as threats to international
peace and its discussions and resolutions regarding situations (p. 405) in
countries or regions, such as Afghanistan, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Mali,
Myanmar, the Middle East, including the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
South Sudan, and Syria, frequently address human rights concerns, its
first debate on human rights and prevention of armed conflict did not
take place until 18 April 2017.157 The Security Council also addresses
several thematic issues with human rights dimensions. These include
women, peace and security,158 protection of civilians,159 children and
armed conflict,160 sexual violence in armed conflict,161 and trafficking in
persons in conflict situations.162 It has established a working group on
children and armed conflict, made up of its 15 members, which examines
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19. United Nations
reports of monitoring and reporting mechanisms in countries of concern,

makes recommendations, and monitors grave abuses of children that may
occur in an armed conflict.163 The Security Council has created
mechanisms which touch on human rights issues. Thus, Security Council
Resolution 1888 established a Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on sexual violence in conflict who is empowered to report
countries suspected to be responsible for such violence to the Security
Council.164 In addition, Security Council peacekeeping, or special political
and peace-building support missions, increasingly have human rights
promotion and protection as part of their mandates. In January 2016
there were 15 human rights components of such missions. The Security
Council also conducts missions to the field during which human rights
issues may be raised. Finally, it has responded to impunity for massive
human rights violations by establishing ad hoc international tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda165 and exercising its capacity to refer
situations to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in respect
of Darfur166 and Libya.167 Its failure to refer Syria has led some critics to
suggest that it fails to use this power consistently. The Security Council
may mandate the establishment of commissions of inquiry, and several of
these have required investigations into human rights violations.168
The High Commissioner for Human Rights and OHCHR senior staff
regularly engage in open debates with the Security Council on protection
of civilians and in formal meetings or informal consultations on country
situations. Under the ‘Arria formula’,169 which allows the Security Council
to meet informally with non-members of the Council outside the Security
Council Consultation Room, members of Human Rights Council
commissions of inquiry, special procedures, and human rights
components of peace operations have also provided human rights
briefings that inform the work of the Security Council or its subsidiary
bodies.170 There is more frequent reference in the Security Council to
(p. 406) Human Rights Council resolutions or its mechanisms, and vice
versa, and the same country situations are sometimes considered by

both.171 Some Human Rights Council resolutions have requested that its
reports be transmitted to the Security Council,172 while such reports have
sometimes been provided to it at the written request of particular
members.173
This increased integration of human rights in the Security Council’s work,

however, has tended to be ad hoc. In order to encourage a more
systematic approach, Switzerland launched an appeal on 13 June 2016 to
put human rights at the heart of conflict prevention. The appeal, which
has been endorsed by 90 states, calls on states to foster and enhance
communication and exchanges between the Human Rights Council and
the rest of the UN system, and in particular the Security Council.174
Perhaps this appeal will encourage the Security Council to accelerate its
efforts to mainstream human rights.
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19. United Nations
5.3 Secretary-General
The Secretary-General of the UN is the ‘chief administrative officer’ of

the organization and is appointed by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.175 The role of the Secretary-
General is rather loosely defined in the UN Charter, and each holder of
the post has defined their role in different ways. Most importantly, the
Secretary-General is to uphold the values and authority of the UN in all
his or her work.
The Secretary-General from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2016, Ban Ki

Moon, frequently recalled the 2005 Summit’s acknowledgment that peace
and security, development, and human rights are the pillars of the UN
system and are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. He reaffirmed the
central role of human rights in the work of the UN in his Five-year Action
Agenda in 2012 and in his final Human Rights Day message underlined
the fact that upholding human rights is in the interests of all, as it
advances well-being for every individual, stability for every society, and
harmony for our interconnected world.
Throughout his tenure, Secretary-General Ban regularly addressed the

Human Rights Council and took up a range of human rights concerns,
including discrimination and violence against women, reprisals against
human rights advocates, the death penalty, and discrimination and
violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity in this and other
fora.176 In addition, in 2011, he instituted a human rights due diligence
policy, which provides guidance to those UN entities that support non-UN
security forces. The policy sets out the measures UN entities must take to
exercise ‘due diligence’ to ensure that UN support is not provided to non-
UN security forces where there are substantial grounds for believing
there is a real risk that they may commit grave violations of international
humanitarian, human rights, or refugee law. The policy also sets out steps
to be taken where grave violations are committed by such forces.177 In
2012, a policy was adopted on human rights screening of UN
personnel.178
The Secretary-General also routinely focused on human rights violations

in country situations. For example, in 2010, with the agreement of the
President of Sri Lanka, he (p. 407) established a Panel of Experts to
advise him on the issue of accountability with regard to alleged violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final
stages of the conflict on Sri Lanka. A second Panel was established to
consider the response of the UN in this context, which reported to the
Secretary-General on 14 November 2012. This Panel highlighted the UN’s
‘systemic failure’ in Sri Lanka.179 In response, the Secretary-General
launched the Human Rights up Front (HRuF) initiative in 2013, and in
2014 issued an internal Human Rights up Front Action Plan, which
contains more than 60 actions directed at coordination of early warning
and crisis response, exchange of information among UN entities and
support for UN country teams.180 HRuF, described by Secretary-General
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19. United Nations
Ban as a major effort to achieve existing prevention mandates through

cultural and operational change and engagement with member states,181
calls for collective responsibility across the whole UN system to prevent
serious human rights violations, identifying risks of human rights
violations at an early stage, ensuring that the whole range of UN
mandates and mechanisms respond, and that senior officials on the
ground are supported and backed by UN Headquarters.182
The Secretary-General chairs the UN system Chief Executives Board for

Coordination, composed of the Executive Heads of all UN specialized
agencies, funds, and programmes as well as of the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, International Atomic Energy Agency, and
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Chief Executives Board
regularly discusses human rights issues, as do two of its subsidiary
bodies: the High-level Committee on Programmes and the UNDG.
The ‘good offices’ of the Secretary-General helped address and resolve

human rights violations affecting particular individuals or groups. These
are reserved for politically sensitive and high visibility cases. Secretary-
General Ban appointed special envoys or representatives for such cases,
and directed them to broker a solution or compromise. The Secretary-
General is also able to designate representatives to address particular
themes. For example, in 2016 he announced that Andrew Gilmour,
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, would lead UN system
efforts to stop intimidation of and reprisals against those cooperating
with the UN in the field of human rights.
The ninth Secretary-General, António Guterres, took office on 1 January

2017. When taking the oath of office, he paid tribute to Secretary-General
Ban for putting human rights at the heart of the UN’s work, and referred
to human rights, with sustainable development and peace, as pillars of
the UN. He emphasized that it was critical to establish human rights as a
fundamental value which should be defended above all, and that civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights should be enjoyed by all,
including minorities of all genders, without discrimination.183 It remains
to be seen how Secretary-General Guterres operationalizes these ideas,
but these comments and more recent statements suggest a real
commitment to human rights.
(p. 408) 5.4 International Court of Justice
The role of the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ
of the UN, is to settle legal disputes submitted to it by states and hand
down advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized UN
organs and specialized agencies. Individuals cannot bring cases to the
Court. Recent judgments and advisory opinions have drawn on the
provisions of the principal UN human rights instruments and
pronouncements of the UN human rights treaty bodies. Judgments or
advisory opinions may clarify the interpretation of provisions of
international human rights instruments, or spell out the legal obligations
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19. United Nations
of states under these instruments.184 Some human rights treaties provide

that inter-state disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
the treaty concerned may be referred to the ICJ, usually after certain
preconditions are fulfilled.185 One such dispute led the Court to spell out
the obligations of states parties to UNCAT to prosecute alleged
perpetrators of torture or extradite them to another country with
jurisdiction to prosecute.186 Furthermore, the ICJ has developed an
increasingly human rights sensitive jurisprudence.187 This may be
attributable, in part, to the fact that several of the ICJ’s judges, past or
present, were members of the human rights treaty bodies, special
procedures of the Commission on Human Rights, or its Sub-Commission,
or judges in regional human rights courts prior to their election to the
ICJ.188
6 Conclusion
The UN human rights protection system has grown in ways that

could hardly have been predicted at the time of the adoption of the
UDHR. It is now a multi-tiered and sophisticated system with numerous
international human rights instruments and monitoring mechanisms,
supported by a sizeable and increasingly operational OHCHR.
The growth of the UN human rights protection system has contributed to

an improvement in the human rights situation in many countries and
many thematic areas. So has the mainstreaming of human rights into
other UN programmes, notably UN development, peace, and security
activities. The UN’s human rights work is now highly visible, particularly
as a result of social media. This ensures dissemination of knowledge of
international human rights standards and mechanisms. National level
implementation of recommendations and decisions of treaty bodies,
special procedures, the UPR, and the Human Rights Council improves
steadily, even though there remains considerable room for the
improvement of existing follow-up mechanisms, coordination amongst
them, as well as identification of good practices.
Regardless of the budgetary constraints facing the UN and its

(p. 409)
human rights programme, demands for its support are unlikely to

decrease, particularly as the Human Rights Council steps up efforts to
address critical human rights issues, and other UN bodies, including the
Security Council, and development mechanisms mainstream human
rights into their work. Major challenges will be: ensuring genuine
dialogue on all issues in the Human Rights Council and avoiding
politicization of its work; resolving the division of labour between the
Human Rights Council and the General Assembly; exploiting the full
potential of the special procedures mandates; further harmonization of
the procedures of the treaty bodies and treaty body strengthening;
coordinated follow-up to, and encouraging implementation of, human
rights mechanisms’ recommendations; and the consolidation of the field
presences of the OHCHR, especially through the establishment of
regional and sub-regional offices in those parts of the world with
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19. United Nations
currently limited or no OHCHR presence. If all these challenges are

addressed and resolved, the UN human rights programme will fulfil its
role of assisting to secure the protection of human rights where it matters
most: at the national and grassroots levels.
Further reading
ALSTON,
‘Hobbling the Monitors: Should UN Human Rights Monitors be
Accountable?’ (2011) 52 Harvard ILJ 563.
and SCHABAS, New Challenges for the UN Human Rights

BASSIOUNI
Machinery (What Future for the UN Treaty Body System and Human
Rights Council Procedures?) (Intersentia, 2011).
EGAN,The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Law and Procedure

(Bloomsbury Professional, 2011).
FREEDMAN,
The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early
Assessment (Routledge, 2013).
FREEDMAN,Failing to Protect: The UN and Politicisation of Human Rights

(Hurst and Company, 2014).
GAERand BROECKER, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights: Conscience for the World (Martinus Nijhoff, 2014).
HOPGOOD, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press, 2013).
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

Special Issue, ‘The Role of the
Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council in the
Development and Promotion of International Human Rights
Norms’ (2011) 15 IJHR.
and ULFSTEIN, UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy

KELLER
(Cambridge University Press, 2012).
MAHONY and NASH, Influence on the Ground: Understanding and

Strengthening the protection impact of United Nations Human Rights
Field Presences (Fieldview Solutions, 2012).
ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA FRANCOPHONIE,

Practical Guide, Universal
Periodic Review (Organization Internationale de la Francophonie, 2013).
PICCONE,
Catalysts for Change, How the UN’s Independent Experts
Promote Human Rights (Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
POSNER, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press,

2014).
SIMMA,‘Mainstreaming Human Rights: The Contribution of the

International Court of Justice’ (2012) 3 Journal of International Dispute
Settlement 7.
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19. United Nations
WENAWESER and COCKAYNE, ‘Justice for Syria? The International, Impartial

and Independent Mechanism and the Emergence of the UN General
Assembly in the Realm of International Criminal Justice’ (2017) JICJ 1.
(p. 410) Useful websites

UPR-Info: <http://www.upr-info.org>
United Nations: <http://www.un.org>
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: <http://

www.ohchr.org>
Universal Human Rights Index: <http://

www.universalhumanrightsindex.org>
Universal Rights Group: <https//www.universal-rights.org>
International Court of Justice: <http://www.icj-cij.org>
Notes:
1
A/CONF.157/23 (25 June 1993).
2
In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights
for All, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005 (21 March 2005) para
182.
3
In Larger Freedom, Addendum 1, paras 6–8.
4
Civil society organizations often comment on candidate countries; eg,
Human Rights Watch protested against the Asian Group’s endorsement of
the candidature of the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011; and in 2016, 87
NGOs signed a letter requesting member states to consider carefully
whether the Russian Federation’s actions in Syria were compatible with
the principles and aims of the HR Council. The Syrian Arab Republic
withdrew its candidature and the Russian Federation was not elected.
5
These are available on the elections and appointments webpage of the
GA: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/71/meetings/elections/hrc>.
6
Joint NGO Letter, ‘Suspension of Burundi from Human Rights Council’,
26 October 2016, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/26/
joint-ngo-letter-suspension-burundi-human-rights-council>; Amnesty
International, Joint Public Statement, ‘Suspend Saudi Arabia from the UN
Human Rights Council’, 29 June 2016, AI Index: MDE 23/4345/2016.
7
GA Res 65/265 (1 March 2011).
8
GA Res 66/11 (18 November 2011).
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9ECOSOC Res 1996/31 (25 July 1996) sets out the principles to be
applied by the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs when considering whether
NGOs should be accorded consultative status.
10 See Chapter 24 for a discussion of NHRIs and the Paris Principles.
11 HR Council Res 5/1 (18 June 2007).
12See HR Council Dec 6/102 (27 September 2007); HR Council Res 16/2
(25 March 2011); HR Council Dec 17/119 (19 July 2011).
13 HR Council Dec 17/119.
14Secretary-General’s video message to the opening of the fourth Council

session (12 March 2007), available at: <http://www.un.org/webcast/
unhrc/archive.asp?go=004>.
15 Israel decided not to participate in its second review in early 2013,

leading the Council to adopt a decision on the non-cooperation of a state
under review (A/HRC/OM/71, 28 January 2013). In May 2013, the
President reported to the Council on the steps he had taken in this
context, and in October Israel participated in its review, albeit expressing
strong reservations.
16 Brown, ‘The Universal Periodic Review and Human Rights Progress: A

Case Study from Australia’ Human Rights Monitor (International Service
for Human Rights, June 2016) 23; UPR Info, ‘The Butterfly Effect:
Spreading Good Practices of UPR Information’ (2016).
17 UPR Info maintains a comprehensive database of UPR

recommendations and voluntary pledges, available at: <http://www.upr-
info.org/database/>.
18See: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/
UPRImplementation.aspx>.
19Saiz, ‘The UPR and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Skewed
Agenda?’ Human Rights Monitor (International Service for Human Rights,
June 2016) 12.
20Gujadhur and Limon, ‘Towards the Third Cycle of the UPR: Stick or
Twist? Lessons Learnt from the First Ten Years of the Universal Periodic
Review’ (2016), 42–47, available at: <http://www.universal-rights.org>.
21Charlesworth and Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal

Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP, 2014).
22UPR Info, ‘Universal Periodic Review: On the Road to

Implementation’ (2012).
23 UPR Info, ‘Beyond Promises: the Impact of UPR on the Ground’ (2014).
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24 McMahon and Johnson, Evolution Not Revolution: The First Two Cycles
of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review Mechanism
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016). See also Gujadhur and Limon (2016).
25 HR Council Res 6/17 (28 September 2007). This resolution also creates
a trust fund to assist states with their participation in the UPR.
26 eg, OHCHR, National Mechanisms for Reporting and Follow-up: A

Practical Guide to Effective State Engagement with International Human
Rights Mechanisms, HR/PUB/16/1 (2016); OHCHR, National Mechanisms
for Reporting and Follow-up: Study of State Engagement with
International Human Rights Mechanisms, HR/PUB/16/1/Add.1 (2016).
27 ECOSOC Res 1990/48 (25 May 1990).
28 eg, Israeli military attacks against the Occupied Gaza Strip (2009);
Israeli attacks against the humanitarian boat convoy (2010); Syria (2011);
Iraq (2014); Burundi (2015).
29 eg, situation in Occupied Palestinian Territories (2006).
30 eg, situation in Lebanon caused by Israeli military operations (2006);

Israeli military incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
northern Gaza and Beit Hanoun (2006); Darfur (2006); Syria (2011);
ensuring respect for international law in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem (2014).
31 eg, Aleppo, Syria (2016).
32 eg, Central African Republic (2014).
33 eg, Democratic Republic of Congo (2008).
34eg, Israeli military attacks in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2008);

Democratic Republic of Congo (2008); Côte d’Ivoire (2010); Boko Haram
(2015).
35eg, Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (2013); Eritrea (2014);

Burundi (2016).
36 eg, regarding South Sudan (2016).
37eg, promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka (2013);

Northern Mali (2013).
38 eg, Afghanistan (2013); Guinea (2013).
39 eg, Sri Lanka (2014); Libya (2015).
40These investigatory mechanisms may also be created by the Security

Council, the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. See: <libraryresources.unog.ch/
factfinding>.
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19. United Nations
41See, Nolan, Freedman, and Murphy (eds), The United Nations Special
Procedures System (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2016).
42The mandates on Belarus, Burundi, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of

the Congo, and Liberia were discontinued; the Belarus mandate was re-
established in 2012.
43 Mandates relating to Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire

(discontinued in June 2017), Eritrea, Iran, Mali, and Syria (who will only
take up his functions after the relevant Commission of Inquiry on that
country has finished its work).
44Belarus, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Democratic Peoples’

Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Iran, Mali, Myanmar, Occupied Palestinian
Territories, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria.
45Counter-terrorism, freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of

religion, human rights defenders, independence of judges and lawyers,
peaceful assembly and association, privacy, racism, summary executions,
torture, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the Working Group
on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances.
46Cultural rights, education, environment, extreme poverty, food, foreign

debt, hazardous substances, health, housing, and safe drinking water and
sanitation.
47The Working Group on discrimination against women in law and in

practice; enjoyment of human rights by persons with albinism; indigenous
peoples; internally displaced persons; elimination of discrimination
against persons affected by leprosy and their family members; migrants;
minorities; older persons; protection against violence and discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity; rights of persons with
disabilities; sale of children; slavery; trafficking; violence against women;
and the Working Group on Mercenaries.
48 See HR Council Res 5/1, Annex; HR Council Dec 6/102.
49 Presidential Statement of the Human Rights Council on terms of office

of special procedures mandate holders, A/HRC/8/PRST/2 (18 June 2008).
50Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Officials

other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission, ST/SGB/2002/9
(18 June 2002).
51Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights

Council (August 2008).
52Report on the twenty-third annual meeting held in June 2016, A/HRC/

34/34 (31 January 2017) Annex 1.
53Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary

Disappearances, A/HRC/33/51 (28 July 2016) para 5.
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19. United Nations
54See: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/
OpinionsadoptedbytheWGAD.aspx>.
55 E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 1998).
56 A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).
57 A/HRC/20/23 (10 April 2011).
58eg, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Deliberation No. 9, A/HRC/

22/44 (24 December 2012) 16–25.
59eg, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,

Review and assessment of the main issues addressed over six years of
mandate, A/70/263 (3 August 2015).
60 Report on the twenty-third annual meeting, Annex IX.
62See Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, ‘The Unfinished Business of a Special

Procedures System’ in Bassiouni and Shabas (eds), New Challenges for
the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty Body
System and the Human Rights Council Procedures (Intersentia, 2011)
439, 463–70.
64
His proposals are outlined in Alston, ‘Hobbling the Monitors: Should
UN Human Rights Monitors be Accountable?’ (2011) 52 Harvard ILJ 563.
65 Jazairy, ‘In Defence of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council:

An Alternative Narrative from the South’, Ibn Khaldun Research Paper No
3 (Geneva Centre for Human Rights Advancement and Global Dialogue,
2015).
66Connors, ‘Special Procedures: Independence and Impartiality’, in

Nolan, Freedman, and Murphy (2016), 52, 75–83.
67Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN’s Independent Experts

Promote Human Rights (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), viii.
68 ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVII) (27 May 1970).
69 HR Council Res 5/1, Annex, para 85.
70 For a list of situations referred to the Human Rights Council under the
complaint procedure between its creation and October 2014, see: <http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ComplaintProcedure/
SituationsConsideredUnderComplaintsProcedures.pdf>. No further cases
have been referred to the Council for action.
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19. United Nations
71eg, re Democratic Republic of the Congo, A/HRC/18/2 (18 November

2011) para 210; and Iraq, A/HRC/19/2 (16 August 2012) para 324; and A/
HRC/20/2 (3 August 2012) para 212.
72 HR Council Res 21/1 (27 September 2012).
73 HR Council Res 5/1, paras 65–84.
74 HR Council Dec 6/102.
75eg, the Advisory Committee has created a network of ‘Academic

Friends’ who work pro bono.
76A/HRC/AC/4/4 (10 February 2010). The Declaration was adopted by GA

Res 66/137 (19 December 2011).
77A/HRC/AC/5/2 (3 June 2010). The Guidelines were welcomed by the

General Assembly: GA Res 65/251 (21 December 2010).
78A/HRC/20/31 (16 April 2012), Annex. The HRC has since adopted the
Declaration on the Right to Peace, HR Council Res 32/28 (1 July 2016).
79 A/HRC/19/75 (24 February 2012), Annex.
80 HR Council Res 16/21 (25 March 2011).
81Joint NGO Statement on the review of the Council’s status by the

General Assembly, IOR 41/006/2011, available at: <https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior41/006/2011/en/>.
82 eg, A/HRC/22/34 (17 December 2012).
83See: <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/
Actsofintimidationandreprisal.aspx>.
84 GA Res 65/281 (17 June 2011).
85 See: <http://www.universal-rights.org/the-glion-human-rights-dialogue/
>.
86eg, Joint Civil Society Paper, Strengthening the Council at 10 (April

2016) available at: <http://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/
hrc10_joint_paper_final.pdf>.
87See Piccone, ‘Ten Years Later: The Status of the UN Human Rights
Council’, Testimony prepared for the Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission of the US Congress (17 May 2016), 2–3, available at: <https:/
/www.brookings.edu/testimonies/ten-years-later-the-status-of-the-u-n-
human-rights-council/>.
88Piccone and McMillen, ‘Country-Specific Scrutiny at the United

Nations Human Rights Council: More than Meets the Eye’ (May 2016),
available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/country-specific-
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19. United Nations
scrutiny-at-the-united-nations-human-rights-council-more-than-meets-the-
eye/>.
89 HR Council Res 17/19 (14 July 2011).
91 HR Council Res 17/13 (24 March 2011).
93 Letter of Ambassador HE Mr Amr Ramadan (29 July 2016).
94 Report of the Third Committee, A/71/479 (5 December 2016).
95 HR Council Res 24/24 (27 September 2013).
96See Rucker, ‘Repositioning the Human Rights Council as a principal

organ of the UN’, Human Rights Monitor, 58–59.
97 GA Res 65/281, para 3.
98 GA Res 65/182 (21 December 2010).
99 HR Council Res 15/26 (7 October 2010).
101The exception is the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights, established by ECOSOC Res 1985/17 (28 May 1985), whose
members are elected by ECOSOC member states. Unlike other treaty
bodies, membership is subject to strict regional distribution. The General
Assembly has recommended that consideration be given to replacing this
procedure with elections by states parties to the ICESCR, while
preserving the requirements set out by ECOSOC: GA Res 68/268 (21 April
2014), para 11.
102 GA Res 68/268.
103See OHCHR Report on the working methods of the human rights

treaty bodies relating to the state party reporting process, HRI/ICM/
2011/4 (23 May 2011).
104CPED, Art 29 only requires a report on implementation two years after

the entry into force for the state concerned. However, the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities may request further information on
implementation.
105 These can be found on the webpages of each treaty body at: <http://
www.ohchr.org>. See Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content
of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human
Rights Treaties, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 (3 June 2009).
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19. United Nations
106States are encouraged to review their common core documents as

appropriate: GA Res 68/268, para 3; Report of the Chairs of the human
rights treaty bodies on their twenty-eight meeting, A/71/270 (2 August
2016) para 91.
107 eg, OHCHR, National Mechanisms for Reporting and Follow-up: A

Practical Guide to Effective State Engagement with International Human
Rights Mechanisms, HR/PUB/16/1 (2016); OHCHR, National Mechanisms
for Reporting and Follow-up: Study of State Engagement with
International Human Rights Mechanisms, HR/PUB/16/1/Add.1 (2016).
108 See Status of the Human Rights Treaty Body System, A/71/118 (18
July 2016) paras 29–35 and Annex VIII, for an indication of the backlog of
reports awaiting review on 31 December 2015.
109 GA Res 68/268, para 1.
110Status of Human Rights Treaty Body System, Annex XIV. The

advantages of the simplified reporting procedure are outlined in:
Simplified Reporting Procedure, HRI/MC/2014/4 (14 April 2014).
111See GA Res 68/268, para 6. See also Report of the Chairs of the
human rights treaty bodies on their twenty-sixth meeting, A/69/285 (11
August 2014) Annex II.
112
See Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme: A
Handbook for Civil Society (2008), available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/AboutUs/Pages/CivilSociety.aspx>.
113 See ‘Engagement of NHRIs with the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies:
An Overview of Procedures and Practices’ (May 2016), available at: <http
://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/AnnualMeeting/Pages/
MeetingChairpersons.aspx>
114 See Status of Human Rights Treaty Body System, Annex II for
information on reporting compliance. See also: Timely, late and non-
reporting by States parties to the human rights treaty bodies, HRI/MC/
2016/2 (22 March 2016).
115Report of the Chairs of the human rights treaty bodies on their twenty-
seventh meeting, A/70/302 (7 August 2015) para 91.
116eg, Joint General Recommendation 31 of the Committee on the

Elimination of Discrimination against Women/General Comment 18 of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices, CEDAW/C/GC/
31-CRC/C/GC/18 (14 November 2014).
117eg, Advisory Opinion relating to the Administrative Tribunal of the

International Labour Organization on a complaint filed against the
International Fund for Agricultural Development [2012] ICJ Rep 10; Case
Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic
Republic of Congo) [2010] ICJ Rep 639; Secretary of Security v Sakthevel
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19. United Nations
Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal);

Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 (Supreme Court of India).
118 CPED, Arts 30 and 34.
119ICCPR, Art 41; ICESCR-OP, Art 10; UNCAT, Art 21; ICERD, Arts 12–13,
ICRMW, Art 76; CPED, Art 32; CRC-OP3, Art 12.
12010 acceptances are required before this procedure can start

functioning; see ICRMW, Art 77(8).
121 HRC, Rules of Procedure, Rule 92; CAT, Rules of Procedure, Rule
108(1); CERD, Rules of Procedure, Rule 94(3). Explicit powers to request
interim measures are included in the CEDAW-OP, CRPD-OP, CPED,
ICESCR-OP, and CRC-OP3.
122eg, Piandiong v The Philippines, CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 (19 October

2000) para 5.2.
123These admissibility criteria are set out in the ICCPR-OP1; CERD, Art
14; UNCAT, Art 22; CEDAW-OP; CPRD-OP; CPED, Art 31; CRC-OP3, Art 7;
ICESCR-OP, Art.3.
124See Phuong, ‘The Relationship Between the European Court of Human

Rights and the Human Rights Committee: Has the “Same Matter” Already
Been “Examined”?’ (2007) 7 HRLR 385.
125 ICESCR-OP provides that the CESCR may decline to consider a

communication if it does not reveal that the alleged victim has suffered a
‘clear disadvantage’, unless the Committee considers that the
communication raises a serious issue of general importance.
126 HRC, General Comment 33, CCPR/C/GC/33 (5 November 2008) para

11.
127 Follow-up to Decisions, HRI/ICM/2009/7 (11 November 2009) para 5.
128 Compare Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 and Barrett and Sutcliffe
v Jamaica, CCPR/C/44/D/270 and 271/1998 (30 March 1992).
129eg González (Claudia) et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v Mexico, IACtHR Series C

No 205 (16 November 2009); Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28.
130Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change,

A/57/387 (9 September 2002) paras 52–4.
131Plan of Action submitted by the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Annex to ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005/Add.3
(26 May 2006).
132Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified

Standing Treaty Body, HRI/MC/2006/CRP.1 (14 March 2006).
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19. United Nations
133GA Res 66/254 (23 February 2012). The resolution was introduced by
Russia and adopted with 85 states voting in favour, none against, and 66
abstaining.
134 UN Reform: Measures and Proposals, A/66/960 (26 June 2012).
135GA Res 68/268. See Broecker and O’Flaherty, ‘The Outcome of the
General Assembly’s Treaty Body Strengthening Process: An Important
Milestone on a Longer Journey’, Universal Rights Group Policy Brief (June
2014).
136 See A/71/270, paras 35–37.
137 eg, pursuant to CPED, Art 27, a Conference of States parties was
convened on 19 December 2016 to consider whether to transfer the
Committee on Enforced Disappearances’ functions to another treaty body.
It decided to continue the Committee’s operation.
138Clapham, ‘Creating the High Commissioner for Human Rights: The

Outside Story’ (1994) 5 EJIL 556.
139 VDPA, para 18.
140Mary Robinson (Ireland); Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil); Louise

Arbour (Canada); Navanethem Pillay (South Africa); Zeid Ra’ad al
Hussein (Jordan). Bertrand G. Ramcharan (Guyana) was Acting High
Commissioner from August 2003 to June 2004.
141eg the UN Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture and the UN
Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery.
142OHCHR Management Plan, 2014–2017—Working for your rights,

available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2014_2017/
omp_web_version/index.html>.
143 GA Res 41/128 (4 December 1986).
144GA Res 70/1 (25 September 2015). The SDGs supersede the
Millennium Development Goals.
145 GA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) para 124.
146OHCHR Report 2016, 77–82, available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/

english/OHCHRreport2016/>.
147JIU/REP/2014/7 (2014). The Secretary-General’s response to the

report is contained in A/70/68/Add.1.
148 Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, A/51/950 (14
July 1997) paras 78 and 79.
149 See <http://hrbaportal.org/human-rights-mainstreaming-mechanism>.
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19. United Nations
150See: UNDG-Human-Rights-Working-Group-TORs-5Dec2014.pdf,
available at: <https://undg.org/>.
151Universal Rights Group, ‘The Human Rights Council as a Subsidiary

Organ: Evaluating its relationships with the General Assembly and UN
Security Council’ (2016), 5–6.
152 GA Res 41/128 (4 December 1986).
153 GA Res 65/281 (17 June 2011).
154 GA Res 65/281.
155GA Res 71/248 (21 December 2016); Implementation of the resolution

establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the
Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian
Arab Republic since March 2011, A/71/755 (19 January 2017).
156Security Council Report, Human Rights and the Security Council—An

Evolving Role (January 2016).
157This was convened by the US presidency: S/PV.7926; The Non-Aligned

Movement transmitted a communique to the presidency expressing its
concern that the debate represented an attempt by the SC to expand its
mandate beyond areas which do not pose a threat to international peace
and security: S/2017/335, Annex.
158SC Res 1325 (31 October 2000); SC Res 2122 (18 October 2013); SC
Res 2242 (13 October 2015).
159SC Res 1265 (17 September 1999); SC Res 1674 (28 April 2006); SC
Res 1894 (11 November 2009).
160 S/PRST/1998/18 (29 June 1998).
161SC Res 1820 (19 June 2008), SC Res 1888 (30 September 2009); SC
Res 1889 (5 October 2009); SC Res 1960 (16 December 2010); SC Res
2106 (24 June 2013); SC Res 2272 (11 March 2016).
162 SC Res 2331 (20 December 2016).
163 SC Res 1612 (26 July 2005); SC Res 1882 (4 August 2009).
164 SC Res 1888.
165This Tribunal closed on 31 December 2015; its residual tasks are

undertaken by the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals
established by SC Res 1966 (22 December 2010).
166 SC Res 1593 (31 March 2005).
167 SC Res 1970 (26 February 2011). See Chapter 26.
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19. United Nations
168Cote d’Ivoire, S/PRST/2004/17 (25 May 2004); Darfur, SC Res 1564

(18 September 2004); Central African Republic, SC Res 2013 (5
December 2013).
169Named after former Permanent Representative to the UN of Venezuela

and Security Council President, Diego Arria.
170Breen, ‘Revitalizing the United Nations Human Rights Special

Procedures Mechanisms as a Means of Achieving and Maintaining
International Peace and Security’ (2008) 12 Max Planck YB of UN Law
177.
171Universal Rights Group, ‘The Human Rights Council as a Subsidiary

Organ: evaluating its relationships with the UN General Assembly and the
UN Security Council’ (2016), 9–10.
172 eg HRC Res 28/20 (27 March 2015); HRC Res 30/10 (1 October 2015),
in relation to the Commission of Inquiry on Syria.
173 Security Council Report, 6.
174 See: <https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-

releases.msg-id-62152.html>.
175 UN Charter, Art 97.
176Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Remarks to the Human Rights

Council,’ 10 September 2012, available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/
news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1643>.
177 A/67/775-S/2013/110, Annex.
178UN Policy Committee Decision 2012/18, available at: <http://

hdl.handle.net/11176/387395>.
179Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Statement on the Internal Review

Panel Report on Sri Lanka’, 14 November 2012, available at: <https://
www.un.org/sg/en/content/ban-ki-moon/human-rights-front-initiative>.
180 UNDG, ‘Rights up Front, detailed Action Plan’, January 2014, available
at: <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Detailed-Plan-of-
Action-Rights-up-Front>.
181 Letter dated 24 December 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed

to the President of the General Assembly, A/70/656 (6 January 2016).
Other documents can be found at: <http://un.org/sg/en/content/ban-ki-
moon/human-rights-up-front-initiative>.
182 See Kurtz, ‘With Courage and Coherence, the Human Rights up Front
Initiative of the United Nations’, Global Public Policy Paper (July 2015).
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19. United Nations
183‘Secretary-General-designate António Guterres’ remarks to the

General Assembly on taking the oath of office’ (12 December 2016),
available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-12-12/
secretary-general-designate-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-oath-office-
speech>.
184eg Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 136; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo. See
Ghandhi, ‘Human Rights and the International Court of Justice: The
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case’ (2011) 11 HRLR 527.
185 eg ICERD, Art 22; CEDAW, Art 29; CAT, Art 30; CMW, Art 29; CED, Art
42.
186Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite

(Belgium v Senegal) [2012] ICJ Rep.
187 ILA International Human Rights Law Committee Interim Report,

‘International Human Rights and the International Court of
Justice’ (2014), available at: <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/
index.cfm/cid/1027>; Rodley, ‘The International Court of Justice and
Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ in Adenas and Bjorge (eds), Farewell to
Fragmentation (CUP, 2015) 87.
188eg Judge Al-Khasawneh, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Judge Thomas

Buergenthal, Judge Bruno Simma, Judge Peter Kooijmans, and Judge
Antônio Cançade Trindade.
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19.

International Human Rights Law (3rd

Publisher: Oxford University Press Print Publication Date: Dec 2017

19. United Nations

Chapter: (p. 369) 19. United Nations

Author(s): Jane Connors

According to its Charter, the promotion and protection of human

Human rights have pervaded political discourse since 1945. The

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted on 10

2 The Human Rights Council

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Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 27 March 2020

The preamble to the UN Charter reaffirms ‘faith in fundamental human

2.1 1946–2006: From the Commission on Human Rights to the

In 1946 the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the

Despite these achievements, the Commission became increasingly subject

undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism . . .

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Substantive negotiations on the establishment of the Human Rights

2.2 Composition, working methods, and mandate

The Human Rights Council is composed of 47 members. All UN member

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Assembly in November 2011, on the recommendation of the Human

Council membership is broken down into regional groupings. The

The Human Rights Council meets regularly throughout the year,

GA Resolution 60/251 establishes the Council as a subsidiary organ of the

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2.3 Universal Periodic Review

The universal periodic review (UPR) mechanism was conceived as a form

Each of the 193 UN member states is reviewed once every four-and-a-half

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Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and should not exceed

The review itself consists of a three-and-a half hour interactive dialogue

‘accepted in principle’, ‘already implemented’. The outcome report that is

In 2007, the Secretary-General characterized the UPR as a mechanism

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many watching the proceedings via webcast. In particular, civil society

Experience of UPR shows that it is largely complementary to, and not in

Nevertheless, UPR is not without its critics. Concerns have been

expressed that some states avoid negative UPR assessments by ensuring

Follow-up to and implementation of UPR recommendations are indicators

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the cycle.22 An analysis of NGO mid-term assessments of implementation

Implementation of recommendations is primarily for the state itself, but

2.4 Responses to urgent situations

When responding to serious human rights situations, the Human Rights

The outcomes of special sessions or urgent debates have included the

In response to less urgent situations within countries, the Council can

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report on human rights concerns in individual countries,37 including in

Whether the Council will address a country situation depends on the