Bamberg - 2014 - Identity and Narration
Bamberg - 2014 - Identity and Narration
Bamberg - 2014 - Identity and Narration
Michael Bamberg
1 Definition
2 Explication
Self and identity are traditionally bound up with what is taken to be the
essence of the individual person which continues over time and space in
Although self, like “I” and “me,” are highly specific morphological
items of the English lexicon, they are commonly assumed to refer uni-
versally to corresponding concepts in other languages—an assumption
that has been contested, however. A closer look reveals that these con-
cepts most often have a history of their own that varies in illuminating
ways (cf. Heelas & Lock eds. 1981; Triandis 1989). Modern notions of
self and individuality (cf. Elias [1987] 1991; Gergen 1991) are taken to
be closely intertwined with the emergence of local communities, nation
states, new forms of knowledge and reflection (“rationalization”), feel-
ing, and perception—all in conjunction with increasing interiorization
and psychologization.
In this process of becoming individualized, self-narration (autobiog-
raphy, life-writing, autofiction) springs to the fore as the basic practice-
ground for marking the self off from “I” as speaker/agent and “me” as
character/actor (cf. the narratological distinctions between “narrating
self” and “narrated self” and between narrator and protagonist). Acts of
thematizing and displacing the self as character in past time and space
become the basis for other self-related actions such as self-disclosure,
self-reflection and self-criticism, potentially leading to self-control,
self-constraint, and self-discipline. What further comes to light in this
process is an increasing differentiation between (and integration of) “I”
and “me” (James [1890] 1989), and simultaneously between “I-we-us”
and “them-other” (Elias [1987] 1991). Thus, self, apparently, is the
product of an “I” that manages three processes of differentiation and
integration: (a) it can posit a “me” (as distinct from “I”); (b) it can posit
and balance this “I-me” distinction with “we”; and (c) it can differenti-
ate this “we” as “us” from “them” as “other.” This process of differenti-
ation must be taken into account when talking about “self” as different
from “other” and viewing self “in relation to self” (as in self-reflection
and self-control). Self, as differentiated from other by developing the
ability to account for itself (as agent or as undergoer), to self-reflect,
and to self-augment, can now begin to look for something like temporal
continuity, unity, and coherence, i.e. identity across a life (cf. Ricœur
[1990] 1992).
The link between life and narration and the exploration of lives (includ-
ing selves and identity) through the exploration of narratives have tradi-
tions going back to Freud ([1900] 1913), Allport (1937), and Murray
(1938). However, this close connection between life and narrative is
said to require a particular retrospectiveness that values “life as reflect-
ed” and discredits “life as lived.” Sartwell (2000) has questioned (a)
whether life really has the purpose and meaningfulness that narrative
theorists metaphorically attempt to attribute to it and (b) whether narra-
tives themselves have the kind of coherence (Toolan → Coherence)
and telic quality that narrative theorists often assume. The problem
Sartwell sees in this kind of approach is that the lived moment, the way
it is “sensed” and experienced, is said to gain its life-worthy quality
only in light of its surrounding moments. Rather than empowering the
subject with meaning in life, Sartwell argues, narrative, conceived this
way, drains and blocks him or her from finding pleasure and joy in the
here-and-now. The subject is overpowered by narrative as a normaliz-
ing machine.
Another difficulty resulting from the close linkage between life, nar-
ration, and identity consists in what Lejeune ([1975] 1989) termed “the
autobiographical pact.” According to Lejeune, what counts as autobiog-
raphy is somewhat blurry, since it is based on a “pact” between author
and reader that is not directly traceable down into the textual qualities.
Thus, while a life story can employ the first-person pronoun to feign
the identity of author, narrator, and character, use of the third-person
pronoun may serve to camouflage this identity (cf. narrative unreliabil-
ity; Shen → Unreliability). Autobiographical fiction thrives on the
blurring of these boundaries. Of interest here are “the perennial theoret-
ical questions of authenticity and reference” (Porter 2008: 25) leading
up to the larger issue of the connection between referentiality and narra-
tion (cf. Genette’s 1990 distinction between fictional narrative and fac-
tual narrative).
While most research on biography has been quite aware of the situ-
ated and locally occasioned nature of people’s accounts (often in insti-
tutional settings) and the problems this poses for claims with regard to
the speaker/narrator’s sense of self or identity, a number of researchers
have launched a large-scale critique of the biographic turn as reducing
language to its referential and ideational functions and thereby overex-
tending (and simplifying) narration as the root metaphor for the person,
(sense of) self, and identity. At the core of these voices is the call for a
much “needed antidote to the longstanding tradition of ‘big stories’
which, be they in the form of life stories or of stories of landmark
events, have monopolized the inquiry into tellers’ representations of
past events and themselves in light of these events” (Georgakopoulou
2007: 147; cf. Strawson 2004).
when practiced over and over again, has the potential to result in a
sense of constancy and sameness, i.e. big stories that can be elicited
under certain conditions.
5 Bibliography