15-Non-White Voters

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Why non-white voters are abandoning the Democratic Party

Ten years ago, as the Republican Party smarted from its second defeat by Barack Obama, a
committee of grandees released an “autopsy” analysing what went wrong. One particular
worry was the party’s inability to attract non-white voters who were—and still are—in a
demographic upswing. The report’s assessment was unsparing and self-flagellating: the voters
who described the party as “scary, narrow-minded and out of touch” and labelled it as full of
“stuffy old men” had a point.
The Republican Party’s problems winning over Hispanics meant that candidates ought to
quash their nativist talk and “champion comprehensive immigration reform”, the report
suggested. The party did not take its own advice. Its next nominee was, of course, Donald
Trump, who said that Mexico was intentionally sending “criminals, drug dealers, rapists” to
America and pledged to build a wall. His message has not moderated. In October Mr Trump
accused illegal immigrants of “poisoning the blood of our country”.
But the party realignment has not played out as experts expected. Working-class and non-
white voters, once steadfast Democratic supporters, are shifting to the Republican Party in
droves. Between 2018 and 2022, Republican margins among the white working class, already
large, grew by seven percentage points. Among the non-white working class, the swing was
more than double that.
Meanwhile, in those four years non-whites’ support for Democrats has flagged significantly—
by six points among African-Americans, by 11 points among Hispanics and by 19 points
among Asians. Greater backing among college-educated whites, who are repelled by Mr
Trump’s inflammatory outbursts about race, gender and immigrants, is the main way the
Democratic Party has stayed competitive.
Race was once the most important dividing line in American politics; now it is education. A
great inversion is under way: Democrats, once the party of workers, are attracting the poor
and the professional elite; Republicans, once the party of the country club, are appealing to
the racially diverse working and middle class. How did this happen?
Two new books offer answers. “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?” is an effort by John
Judis and Ruy Teixeira, left-leaning observers who are a celebrity duo in political-science
circles. Their influential book from 2002, “The Emerging Democratic Majority”, argued that
growing numbers of non-whites and Democrats’ rising strength among city-dwellers and
those with university degrees set the stage for an enduring majority. (…) “We were dead
wrong about the Democrats’ ability to hold on to the working-class whites”, they write.
The defection has now spread to working-class voters of all colours. Mr Judis and Mr Teixeira
blame “the cultural insularity and arrogance” of the Democratic Party, which began during
Mrs Clinton’s presidential campaign. In their view, zealots of transgenderism, critical-race
theory, climate eschatology and lack of immigration enforcement seized control of a party that
was previously centred on the everyman.
Mr Judis and Mr Teixeira are old-school organised-labour Democrats, with little patience for
the newfangled progressives who speak in the language of the faculty lounge. With the
exception of abortion, the Democrats are simply out of touch with most Americans on cultural
matters. The authors’ critique is of “a combination of neoliberal economics and social
liberalism that has alienated working-class voters”. In this story, the demise of unions and rise
of free trade sowed the seeds of voters’ discontent with Democrats. The gentrification of the
party’s shadow institutions, including mainstream media outlets, meant that a strange ideology
that gave primacy to oppression supplanted old-fashioned class consciousness. The working-
class revolt commenced soon after.
(…) Economic explanations of voting behaviour look increasingly inadequate at a time when
culture wars predominate. (Why else would working-class voters turn towards the party of tax
cuts for the wealthy, while the rich and the near-rich are shifting to the party that champions
progressive taxation?) President Joe Biden believes in massive doses of industrial policy, rules
to boost goods made in America and support for organised labour. And yet he does not seem
to have altered the ongoing realignment. The authors think this is because of his
unpopular cultural stances, such as endorsing “gender-affirming care” for trans children and
teenagers.
(…) Although African-Americans remain more steadfast Democrats than their Hispanic and
Asian counterparts, the Republican Party could make inroads with them. Already, 21% of
young black men vote for Republicans, though black women remain almost unanimously in
favour of Democrats. (No one is quite sure what explains this gender divide.)
Because voters are stubborn creatures, few things cause big shifts in public opinion. The
uproar over civil rights in the 1960s was one catalyst for realignment, pushing black voters to
the Democratic Party and white southern Democrats towards the Republican Party. The
advent of populism now appears to be another realignment rather than a mere transient shock
that will go away after Mr Trump wins or loses in 2024. (In Europe a similar political sorting
along educational lines is taking place, too.)
Whether the movement of the working classes, white and not white, towards the Republicans
persists could determine who wins the presidency in 2024. Some are optimistic for Mr Biden,
pointing to the continued drift of the educated towards the Democratic Party. But for every
American adult who graduated from college, there are two who did not. It is not an ideal trade
for Democrats, who are learning that demography is not destiny. ■
https://www.economist.com/culture/2023/11/17/why-non-white-voters-are-abandoning-the-
democratic-party

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