Australian National Defense Strategy 2024

NATIONAL
DEFENCE
STRATEGY
20
24
Defence acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia.
Defence recognises their continuing connection to traditional lands and waters and
would like to pay respect to their Elders both past and present.
Defence would also like to pay respect to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people who have contributed to the defence of Australia in times of peace and war.
© Commonwealth of Australia 2024
ISBN: 978-1-925890-86-0 (print)

ISBN: 978-1-925890-87-7 (online)
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968
(Cwth), no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission
from the Department of Defence.
Images on pages 54 and 61 courtesy of ASC Pty Ltd.

NATIONAL DEFENCE
STRATEGY
NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY
iv
Contents
Foreword................................................................................................... 5
Australia’s strategic environment.................................................................................. 5

A new approach to Australia’s defence......................................................................... 6
Capability priorities........................................................................................................ 7
People ........................................................................................................................... 7
Partnerships................................................................................................................... 8
Budget............................................................................................................................ 8
The path forward........................................................................................................... 9
Chapter 1: Strategic Environment............................................................ 11
Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.................................................................... 12

US engagement in the Indo-Pacific............................................................................. 13
Compounding security risks........................................................................................ 14
Technological advancement and disruption............................................................... 15
Chapter 2: National Defence.................................................................... 17
Defence’s contribution to National Defence............................................................... 19
Chapter 3: Defence Strategy.................................................................... 21
Deter actions against Australia’s interests................................................................... 23

Shape Australia’s strategic environment..................................................................... 23
Respond with credible military force.......................................................................... 24
The ADF’s five tasks...................................................................................................... 25
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Chapter 4: Defence Force Structure, Posture and Bases........................... 27
ADF structure............................................................................................................... 27
Six capability effects..................................................................................................... 28
ADF basing requirements............................................................................................ 29
Chapter 5: People.................................................................................... 33
Recruitment and retention.......................................................................................... 33

Future workforce requirements.................................................................................. 34
Culture......................................................................................................................... 35
Chapter 6: Capability Investment Priorities.............................................. 37
Priorities for the integrated, focused force................................................................. 38

AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine pathway............................................................ 42
Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance enterprise............................................... 43
Chapter 7: International Partnerships...................................................... 45
The US Alliance............................................................................................................ 46
Engagement with Indo-Pacific partners...................................................................... 47
Working with partners to support a global rules-based order................................... 50
International partner cooperation in Australia........................................................... 51
Chapter 8: Defence Industry and Acquisition Reform............................... 55
Capability acquisition reform....................................................................................... 55

Defence industry.......................................................................................................... 57
Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy........................................... 58
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Chapter 9: Defence Innovation, Science and Technology.......................... 63
Innovation, science and technology............................................................................ 63

Asymmetric advantage................................................................................................ 64
Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator............................................................... 64
AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities....................................................................... 65
Chapter 10: Resourcing............................................................................ 67
Investing in National Defence...................................................................................... 67

Reforming Defence’s funding model........................................................................... 69
Chapter 11: Reform Agenda..................................................................... 71
Defence reform agenda............................................................................................... 71

Biennial National Defence Strategy cycle.................................................................... 73
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Foreword
There is no greater responsibility for the Government than defending Australia. That is why
the Albanese Government is committed to deploying all elements of national power to
protect our security, interests and way of life.
This National Defence Strategy acknowledges that Australia’s security and prosperity are
inextricably linked. Australia’s future depends in large part upon protecting our economic
connection to the world, upholding the global rules-based order, maintaining a favourable
regional strategic balance and contributing to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.
The 2023 Defence Strategic Review recommended a biennial strategic update through a
National Defence Strategy. This should be done in combination with a biennial review of the
Integrated Investment Program. Accordingly, the 2024 National Defence Strategy is the first
iteration of the strategic update and should be read in conjunction with the 2024 Integrated
Investment Program.
Australia’s strategic environment

The Defence Strategic Review observed that Australia faced its most challenging strategic
environment since the Second World War. It also reaffirmed that Australia no longer
enjoys the benefit of a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict. Since then,
our strategic circumstances have continued to deteriorate, consistent with the trends the
Defence Strategic Review identified.
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Entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China is
a primary feature of our security environment. It is being accompanied by an unprecedented
conventional and non-conventional military build-up in our region, taking place without
strategic reassurance or transparency. The challenges to regional stability and prosperity
arising from this competition are being compounded by a range of other security risks,
including climate change, grey-zone activities and technological advancements.
Beyond the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine and
Iran’s support for Hamas and other proxies are examples of how revisionist states continue
to challenge the rules and norms that are so important to our interests and our own region’s
continued security, stability and prosperity.
While a major conflict is not inevitable, this new reality is making the pursuit of Australia’s
interests more challenging.
A new approach to Australia’s defence

Australia’s strategic environment demands a fundamentally new approach to the
defence of Australia and its interests. Accordingly, the Government has urgently assessed
the most consequential security risks we face and developed a comprehensive strategy to
address them.
This new approach is the foundational principle that underpins the National
Defence Strategy and is based on the concept of National Defence – a coordinated,
whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national
power to defend Australia and advance our interests. Just as important as strategy are the
tools available to effect that strategy. The National Defence Strategy must therefore be read
in parallel with the Integrated Investment Program, which sets out the specific defence
capabilities the Government will invest in.
These two documents build on the Defence Strategic Review, which concluded that the
Australian Defence Force (ADF) as it was then constituted and equipped was not fully fit for
purpose. It called for a fully integrated and more focused ADF characterised by enhanced
lethality and greater range, and for Defence policy and activities to be better coordinated
with Australia’s broader statecraft.
The National Defence Strategy sets out the Government’s strategic framework to guide the
significant and urgent changes required to transform Defence’s capability, force posture,
force structure, acquisition, recruitment and international engagement.
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The National Defence Strategy will see a Strategy of Denial become the cornerstone of
Defence planning. This approach aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any
potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional
security and prosperity and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance.
Together, the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program are designed
to ensure the ADF has the capacity to:
defend Australia and our immediate region;

deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia
through our northern approaches;
protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
Capability priorities
The adoption of National Defence means the ADF will shift from a balanced force capable of
responding to a range of contingencies, to an integrated, focused force designed to address
Australia’s most significant strategic risks. We have reset our defence capability priorities to
deliver this fundamental change. This reset has involved a complete rebuild of the Integrated
Investment Program to ensure it is a coherent, logical and affordable plan for defence
capability.
In rebuilding the Integrated Investment Program, the Government has made decisions
to prioritise and fund the acquisition of key capabilities to bolster Australia’s deterrence
capabilities. We have also made tough but necessary decisions to cancel, divest, delay
or re-scope projects or activities that are not critical to delivering the force our strategic
circumstances require. This reprioritisation has enabled us to accelerate new, immediate and
longer-term priority projects and capabilities.
People
People are Defence’s most important asset. As the ADF transitions to an integrated, focused
force, Defence’s workforce plans must change to effectively respond to the workforce crisis
it faces. It must recruit, retain and grow the highly specialised and skilled workforce required
to meet Defence’s capability needs and achieve the objectives of National Defence. Defence
must also continue to evolve its culture to underpin the significant reform required to deliver
the National Defence Strategy.
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The Government has introduced several key initiatives to improve recruitment and retention.
This includes the ADF Continuation Bonus, enhanced access to study opportunities,
expanded health benefits, and additional services and allowances for ADF members and
dependants. Defence is also widening eligibility criteria to enable more people to join the
ADF, among other important initiatives. These are important steps, but more work will be
needed to address Defence’s workforce crisis.
Partnerships
To respond effectively to the strategic environment we face, Australia must work even
more closely with our international partners to maintain regional peace and prosperity and
ensure a favourable regional strategic balance. These partnerships are also critical to protect
Australia’s economic connection to the world and support the global rules-based order.
Our Alliance with the US remains fundamental to Australia’s national security. We will continue
to deepen and expand our defence engagement with the US, including by pursuing greater
scientific, technological and industrial cooperation, as well as enhancing our cooperation under
force posture initiatives. Along with the United Kingdom (UK), our technology and capability
cooperation with the US under the auspices of AUKUS is essential to building the ADF’s capacity
to deliver impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response.
Australia will also invest in deepening our defence relationships with partners across Southeast
Asia and the Pacific, as well as in the Indian Ocean and North Asia regions. This includes
continuing to expand our partnerships with Japan and India. Australia will also continue to work
closely with like-minded partners outside the Indo-Pacific including key European nations.
Budget
Resourcing will underpin our ability to deliver the National Defence Strategy. To this end,
we are making a generational reinvestment in the ADF’s posture, capability and structure.
The Government has increased Defence funding to historic proportions which will see an
additional investment of $5.7 billion over the next four years to 2027-28 and $50.3 billion
over the next decade to 2033-34, above the previous trajectory over that period.
We have also improved the quality of spend through our commitment to a minimum viable
capability approach to acquisition and by reforming and streamlining processes to minimise
the burden of working with Defence.
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The path forward
This National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program provide a blueprint to
deliver an ambitious transformation of the ADF into an integrated, focused force that will be
positioned to safeguard Australia’s security and contribute to regional peace and prosperity
for decades to come.
The Government has committed to a biennial National Defence Strategy cycle to ensure
Defence policy, strategy, capability and planning keep pace with the rapidly evolving strategic
environment, respond to Australia’s national security priorities and provide clarity of process
and approach to defence industry.
The next National Defence Strategy will be delivered in 2026.
The Hon Richard Marles MP

Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Defence
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1
Chapter 1:
Strategic Environment
1.1 The Defence Strategic Review identified a new strategic reality for Australia. It observed
that, while conflict in the Indo-Pacific is not inevitable, Australia faces its most complex
and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.
1.2 Australia’s strategic environment has continued to deteriorate since the release of the
Defence Strategic Review, consistent with the trends it identified. The optimism at the
end of the Cold War has been replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched
and increasing strategic competition between the US and China. This competition is
being framed by an intense contest of narratives and values.
1.3 The competition is playing out in military and non-military ways, including
economic and diplomatic. It is accompanied by an unprecedented conventional and
non-conventional military build-up in our region, taking place without strategic
reassurance or transparency. The effects of this build-up are occurring closer to
Australia than previously. This build-up is also increasing the risk of military escalation or
miscalculation that could lead to a major conflict in the region.
1.4 At the same time, volatility is manifesting in conflict and crises in multiple regions,
including Europe and the Middle East. Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and immoral invasion
of Ukraine demonstrates the destructive reality of modern conflict when a nation
attempts to achieve its ambitions through force.
1.5 These dynamics are making the pursuit of Australia’s interests more challenging.
They also reaffirm the judgement, first set out in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and
confirmed in the Defence Strategic Review, that there is no longer a ten-year window of
strategic warning time for conflict.
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1.6 In this environment, Australia must work even more closely with the US, our closest ally
and principal strategic partner. We must also work with other key partners – notably
New Zealand, Japan, our partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific family, the Republic of
Korea, India as well as the UK and other European nations – that share our concerns and
are prepared to strengthen cooperation in support of shared interests.
1.7 These shared interests include maintaining regional peace and prosperity and ensuring
the regional strategic balance supports all countries being able to peacefully pursue
their objectives free from coercion. An unfavourable balance would increase the risk of
regional countries, including Australia, being coerced and losing their ability to pursue
their sovereign interests peacefully.
1.8 Maintaining a favourable regional strategic balance is as important for Australia’s

economy as it is for our security. As a middle-power maritime nation, Australia relies
on the free flow of goods, services and finance in the global market, and the rules and
norms that protect these activities. As such, Australia’s economic prosperity and security
remain intimately tied to developments in the international system and the maintenance
of global peace and stability.
Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific

1.9 Increasing strategic competition between the US and China is a primary feature of
Australia’s security environment and will likely have the greatest impact on the regional
strategic balance. While it has global implications, this competition is sharpest and most
consequential in the Indo-Pacific.
1.10 As China’s strategic and economic weight grows, Australia expects it will continue to seek
to play a more prominent role in the region. This will include leveraging all elements of
its power as it pursues its strategic objectives, including to change the current regional
balance in its favour.
1.11 However, China has employed coercive tactics in pursuit of its strategic objectives,
including forceful handling of territorial disputes and unsafe intercepts of vessels
and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace in accordance with
international law. Some of China’s initiatives in the Indo-Pacific also lack transparency
around their purpose and scope.
1.12 The risk of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is increasing, as well as at other
flashpoints, including disputes in the South and East China Seas and on the border with
India. There is increasing competition for access and influence across the Indian Ocean,
including efforts to secure dominance over sea lanes and strategic ports.
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1.13 That said, US-China dialogue, both at the leader-level and military-level, is useful in
preventing miscalculation and ensuring differences can be worked through in a way that
supports stability.
1.14 In the context of this competition, Australia and all countries in the Indo-Pacific have
a vital role and interest in maintaining a region where state sovereignty is protected,
international law is followed and nations can make decisions free from coercion.
1.15 Another feature of Australia’s strategic environment is increasing competition for

influence and access in the Pacific, including security cooperation. Leaders of the
Pacific have committed to a Pacific family-first approach to security, as outlined in the
2022 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Communique. It is in the region’s interest that
security challenges in the Pacific continue to be addressed through regional, Pacific-led
approaches. The strong and deep relationships within the Pacific, including with the
Pacific nations of Australia and New Zealand, provide a strong foundation on which to
uphold regional prosperity and resilience. Australia’s aim is to remain the partner of
choice for the Pacific family, including in security cooperation.
1.16 The Australian Government encourages all countries to be transparent about their
strategic intentions and to ensure their actions support regional security and stability.
US engagement in the Indo-Pacific

1.17 The US is deepening its engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners and allies, recognising
that collective approaches are crucial to maintaining the regional balance and enhancing
collective defence, military-industrial, economic and diplomatic capabilities.
1.18 Australia’s security will continue to be underpinned by the strength of our partnerships
with regional countries and our Alliance with the US. Australia-US security arrangements,
interoperability, intelligence sharing and industrial cooperation are critical to Australia’s
national security. The Australian Government is also pursuing greater defence and
technology cooperation with the US in the Alliance context and with the UK, including
through AUKUS.
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Compounding security risks

1.19 The challenges to regional stability and prosperity arising from strategic competition are
being compounded by a range of other risks including climate change, which is posing an
unprecedented challenge.
1.20 The effects of climate change are amplifying existing stressors across the region, such as
poverty, food security and cross-border migration and displacement. These effects may
also intensify transboundary tensions and have impacts on Australia’s national security.
The increasing frequency of climate events will place higher demands on the ADF for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations regionally and domestically,
placing greater stress on ADF capability, capacity and infrastructure. There remains
potential for state volatility which could require support from Australia or the
broader Pacific family.
1.21 Grey-zone activities have also expanded in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to conventional
military forces, some countries are employing para-military forces more frequently,
including China’s actions in the South China Sea. Threats posed by state and non-state
actors in the cyber domain are also multiplying.
1.22 North Korea has continued its destabilising behaviours, including its nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile programs, flouting UN Security Council resolutions and threatening
the Republic of Korea and the broader region.
1.23 Beyond the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s support for Hamas and
other proxies are examples of how revisionist states can undermine peace and stability.
Russia continues to prosecute the war in Ukraine, including through the use of lethal aid
supplied by Iran and North Korea. These countries are deepening cooperation with each
other and their behaviour is challenging the global rules-based order.
1.24 There remains potential for tension and miscommunication between India and Pakistan,
and between India and China – with the risk of nuclear weapons use or proliferation a
factor in each potential flashpoint. The threat of terrorism from politically and religiously
motivated extremist groups will endure, fuelled in part by ongoing violence and volatility
in the Middle East.
1.25 The state-based pursuit of weapons of mass destruction will likely grow as arms control
frameworks come under greater strain and strategic competition intensifies. Russia,
China and North Korea are building more diverse and sophisticated nuclear arsenals,
while Iran continues to breach its nuclear-related obligations. Australia’s best protection
against the increasing risk of nuclear escalation is US extended nuclear deterrence and
the pursuit of new avenues of arms control.
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Technological advancement and disruption
1.26 Technology has already overturned one of Australia’s long-standing advantages –
geography. Geography cannot protect Australia against new long-range missiles, space and
cyber-attacks, disinformation, supply chain disruptions and the erosion of global rules and
norms. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spurred inflation and exacerbated a global food and
fuel crisis, while also invoking the threat of nuclear weapons use which would have global
consequences.
1.27 Countries in the Indo-Pacific are investing in new and sophisticated weapons. These
weapons are frequently characterised by greater range and speed and are increasingly
difficult to counter. It is natural for countries to seek to modernise their armed forces and
keep pace with technology. However, it is vital for stability and to minimise tensions that
such modernisation is accompanied by transparency and strategic reassurance.
1.28 In line with its growing strategic and economic weight, China is improving its capabilities
in all areas of warfare at a pace and scale not seen in the world for nearly a century.
This is happening without transparency about its strategic purpose. Some of the
capabilities it is designing and deploying are highly advanced, including a growing
number of nuclear weapons, new missiles, more potent warships and nuclear-powered
and nuclear-armed submarines. Since the Defence Strategic Review, China has continued
fielding new strike missiles including hypersonic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles and
advanced long-range surface-to-air missiles.
1.29 Space and cyber capabilities play a significant role in safeguarding national security,
which means they are equally as important as the maritime, land and air domains that
they support and enable. Space is a critical enabler of military operations, supporting
communications, targeting and situational awareness. Malicious cyber operations will be
used by states to pursue their goals, including to support espionage and disinformation.
Malign actors – both state and non-state – are improving their cyber capabilities, increasing
the risk of disruptions to Australia’s critical systems, infrastructure and networks.
1.30 The greatest gains in military effectiveness in the coming decade will be generated by
better integrating existing and emerging technologies. Broader institutional innovations –
including boosting military-industrial capacity and military adaptation – will play a critical
role in this regard. Ukraine’s experience has demonstrated the high value of maintaining
military preparedness. This includes building a robust military-industrial base with secure
supply chains and developing the ability to effectively integrate emerging technologies.
1.31 The following chapter sets out how this new strategic reality requires a fundamentally
new approach to Australia’s defence – one that leverages and coordinates all arms of
national power to achieve an integrated approach to Australia’s national security.
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2
Chapter 2:
National Defence
2.1 As set out in the Defence Strategic Review, the current strategic environment has
diminished Australia’s historical and geographical advantages and demands a new
approach to defending Australia and its national interests. This new approach is based on
the concept of National Defence.
2.2 National Defence is a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach

to meet the strategic challenges Australia faces, including the threat of conflict and the
prospect of coercion. It is much broader than the previous military strategic concept
of Defence of Australia: it harnesses all arms of Australia’s national power to establish
a holistic, integrated and focused approach to protect our security and advance our
interests.
2.3 This concept draws on Australia’s innate strengths and unique contributions to
the region. These include our status as an influential middle power; our enduring
democratic values; our history of safeguarding international rules and contributing to
regional architectures; the strong foundations of our economy; and the strength of our
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
2.4 As a key element of National Defence, the Government is making a generational

reinvestment in the ADF’s posture, capability and structure. The Government is
determined to ensure that Australia becomes more capable, self-reliant and takes
greater responsibility for its own security.
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2.5 In addition to its investment in the ADF, National Defence works alongside broader
initiatives aimed at achieving:
Integrated statecraft – by taking a whole-of-government approach to advancing

shared economic and security interests, involving all tools of statecraft. This includes
by building regional trust and confidence, being transparent about Australia’s military
capabilities and strategic intent, ensuring a favourable regional strategic balance and
resisting all forms of coercion.
National resilience – by bolstering Australia’s ability to anticipate, prevent, absorb
and recover from natural and human-induced threats and hazards. Building
national resilience requires closer partnerships between the Commonwealth,
states, territories and industry. These partnerships will help address challenges that
require effective coordination between all levels of government, including threats
to sovereignty, social cohesion, critical infrastructure and transport security. These
partnerships will also enable more effective responses to foreign interference,
espionage, terrorism and violent extremism. National resilience includes ensuring
that civil society and civil infrastructure can support ADF requirements, including our
network of northern bases, roads, railways, ports and telecommunication networks.
National resilience also requires the Commonwealth to work with states and
territories to develop alternative capabilities for crisis response and recovery so that
the ADF is only used as a force of last resort.
Industry resilience – by developing and maintaining a stronger defence industrial
base with the domestic capability and capacity to support the ADF during crisis or
conflict. This includes developing the knowledge and skills of Australia’s domestic
workforce, investing in domestic research and development in technologies with
a clear pathway to acquisition, and maintaining a domestic footprint for local
manufacturing. Close industrial collaboration with key international partners will
reduce Australia’s vulnerability to coercion, diminish the impacts and utility of
coercion against Australia and our partners, and bolster the resilience of Australian
industry. It will also help strengthen these partnerships.
Supply chain resilience – by accelerating efforts between the Commonwealth,
states, territories and industry to secure Australia’s supply chains and strengthen
Australia’s capacity to recover from – and minimise the impact of – supply
disruptions. This includes diverse supply chains, protected suppliers, civil transport
capacity and secure lines of communication. These efforts will be bolstered by
initiatives to integrate supply chains with key international partners and the
establishment of a maritime strategic fleet.
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Innovation, science and technology – by ensuring Australia’s research and
innovation sector supports the most pressing defence and security priorities to
accelerate the delivery of next-generation capabilities to the ADF, including through
significant investments in the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA)
and under AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities.
A workforce and skills base – by achieving the generational uplift in capability
needed for National Defence, which requires a skilled, professional and diverse
workforce across all sectors of national security activity. Initiatives like the joint
Commonwealth and South Australian Government Defence Industry Workforce and
Skills Taskforce and the Commonwealth and Western Australia Nuclear Powered
Submarine Steering Group are essential tools to ensure a workforce with the
necessary skills is available to meet our security challenges. Our workplaces must
prioritise inclusion, wellbeing and safety.
A robust National Intelligence Community – by providing strategic
decision-making advantage, strategic warning, as well as direct support to
ADF operations and domestic security.
Defence’s contribution to National Defence

2.6 Defence plays a unique and vital role in National Defence as the only arm of the
Government that generates and employs military power.
2.7 The adoption of National Defence means the ADF will shift from a balanced force
designed to respond to a range of contingencies to an integrated, focused force
designed to address the nation’s most significant strategic risks. The capabilities required
to address these risks will also provide the ability to respond to a range of other
Government priorities and tasks.
2.8 The following chapter sets out the Government’s Defence Strategy, which directly
contributes to National Defence.
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3
Chapter 3:
Defence Strategy
3.1 Against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition, and in concert with Australia’s
other tools of statecraft, Australia’s Defence Strategy seeks to deter any actions that
could lead to conflict, military coercion or direct action against Australia or our interests.
3.2 To focus Defence planning on this objective, the Government has adopted a Strategy of
Denial. The Strategy of Denial aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any
potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional
security and prosperity, and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance.
3.3 Delivering the Strategy of Denial requires credible ADF capabilities that will complicate
the calculus of any potential adversary. The Government will achieve this by increasing
the range and lethality of the ADF, strengthening Australia’s national resilience and
focusing Defence’s international engagement efforts on enhancing interoperability and
collective deterrence.
3.4 The Strategy of Denial guides Defence’s contribution to National Defence and spans
five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber. It focuses on safeguarding Australia’s
interests in our primary area of military interest, the immediate region encompassing
the Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific. This region
includes our northern approaches.
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Strategy of Denial
Designed to deter a potential adversary from taking actions that would be
inimical to Australia’s interests and regional stability. The Strategy of Denial
involves working with the US and key partners to ensure no country attempts
to achieve its regional objectives through military action. By signalling a
credible ability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, this strategy also
seeks to deter attempts to coerce Australia through force. Both objectives
involve altering any potential adversary’s belief that it could achieve its
ambitions with military force at an acceptable cost.
3.5 The Strategy of Denial requires a re-weighting of the three prevailing strategic defence
objectives:
Shape Australia’s strategic environment;

Deter actions against Australia’s interests; and
Respond with credible military force, when required.
3.6 While previously these objectives had been given equal weight in Australia’s strategic
settings, deterrence is now Australia’s primary strategic defence objective. Accordingly,
Defence’s shaping activities and the signalling of Australia’s response capabilities must
more clearly support deterrence.
3.7 The Government’s defence strategy, capability plans and resources are now focused on:
responding to the threat of conflict and the prospect of coercion;

Australia’s primary area of military interest – while acknowledging that
developments in cyber, space, nuclear and long-range precision strike mean
Australia’s security interests are not bound by geography alone;
aligning efforts across Government to deliver National Defence; and
coordinating with the US and other key partners to contribute to the collective
security of the Indo-Pacific as a priority, while providing calibrated contributions
outside of Australia’s primary area of military interest as appropriate and necessary.
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Deter actions against Australia’s interests
3.8 Deterrence is the use of the military and other elements of national power to discourage
or restrain a potential adversary from taking unwanted actions. It involves having in
place measures and responses that change a potential adversary’s risk assessment and
therefore decision-making calculus.
3.9 To deter actions against Australia’s interests, Defence must work with other government
agencies, the US and other key partners to make a credible contribution to a favourable
regional strategic balance and be able to hold at risk forces likely to target Australian
interests. This includes by:
demonstrating our capability and resolve to respond to and withstand attacks on

Australian territory, including by conducting advanced military exercises with the
US and key regional partners;
protecting Australia’s critical sea lines of communication;
supporting the maintenance of the global rules-based order;
strengthening defence cooperation with our closest neighbours in Australia’s
primary area of military interest;
strengthening the individual and collective capabilities of Australia, the UK and
the US under AUKUS, including through enhanced trilateral defence capability and
technology sharing; and
signalling our high level of situational awareness in Australia’s primary area of
military interest.
Shape Australia’s strategic environment

3.10 Defence’s international engagement is an important part of Australia’s efforts to maintain
regional peace and prosperity, and to prevent conflict before it occurs. Defence must
focus its international engagement on maintaining regional stability in the Pacific,
Southeast Asia and the Northeast Indian Ocean. This includes:
deepening engagement between the ADF and its close partners in the region to
build trust and confidence;
developing security partnerships that demonstrate a collective resolve and
capability to withstand military coercion;
leveraging Australia’s strong diplomatic, intelligence and security relationships to
reinforce Australia’s reliability as a partner and commitment to transparency;
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developing strong defence industry links that support a favourable regional and
global strategic balance;
contributing to strategic stability mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict;
providing reassurance to regional partners through transparent statements of
strategic intent and capability;
working with partners to enhance Australia and the region’s resilience; and
contributing to a region that reinforces agreed rules and supports regional
architecture.
Respond with credible military force

3.11 Credible military capability underpins the Strategy of Denial. Defence must possess
sufficient capability to credibly hold at risk forces that could attempt to project power
against Australian territory and our northern approaches. This requirement has
implications for the ADF’s structure, posture and preparedness planning, including the
need for:
increasing lethality;
enhancing the ability to project and sustain deployed forces in Australia’s primary
area of military interest, and to operate with the US in support of shared security
objectives;
improving Defence’s ability to withstand attacks and continue operations;
maintaining awareness of regional military trends and strategic intent;
investing in the enabling capabilities that support the exercise of effective
command and control, including intelligence and warfighting networks;
adequate levels of recruitment and retention to achieve and sustain the required
Defence workforce;
appropriate levels of preparedness; and
maintaining the ability to support stability operations and provide humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief in the Indo-Pacific.
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The ADF’s five tasks
3.12 Australia’s interests remain global. In an interconnected world, events outside the
Indo-Pacific can directly affect our interests, including through supply chain disruption,
disinformation and attempts to reshape the multilateral system. As the conflict in Ukraine
shows, events in Europe can have implications for the Indo-Pacific.
3.13 Accordingly, the defence of Australia’s interests lies in the protection of our economic
connection to the world and the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
The ADF must maintain the capacity to:
Defend Australia and our immediate region;

Deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against
Australia through our northern approaches;
Protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
Contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
Contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
3.14 The Strategy of Denial and the ADF’s five tasks provide focus for Defence, including
for its force structure planning. The implications of this are set out in more detail in the
next chapter.
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4
Chapter 4:
Defence Force Structure,
Posture and Bases
ADF structure
4.1 The ADF is shifting from a balanced force capable of responding to a range of
contingencies, to an integrated, focused force designed to address the nation’s most
significant strategic risks. This force must be more capable of the impactful projection of
military power.
4.2 The ADF force structure must also be integrated across five domains – maritime,
land, air, space and cyber – with the capabilities that are vital to the ADF’s posture
and preparedness.
4.3 Through focused investment over the next decade, the Government will progressively
enhance the ADF’s ability to deter a potential adversary from projecting force against
Australia and, if required, sustain operations during a crisis or conflict.
ADF preparedness and national resilience
4.4 Preparedness and resilience are central to effective deterrence. The Government is
strengthening the ADF’s ability to withstand, endure and recover from disruption. This is
an important part of the broader approach to enhancing national resilience, emergency
management and crisis response and recovery capabilities set out in Chapter 2.
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Three epochs
4.5 The Government will evolve ADF force structure, posture and preparedness over three
critical time periods in order to achieve a more impactful force posture:
now until 2025 – the Enhanced Force-in-Being will focus on immediate

enhancements that can be made to the current force.
2026 to 2030 – the Objective Integrated Force will see the accelerated acquisition
of critical capabilities.
2031 and beyond – the Future Integrated Force will see the delivery of an ADF that
is fit for purpose across all domains and enablers.
4.6 The Government’s capability plans as set out in the Integrated Investment Program focus
on transforming the ADF in the medium to long-term by introducing next-generation
capabilities as soon as possible. A generational uplift in Defence’s capabilities will provide
a more credible ability to implement the Strategy of Denial.
Six capability effects

4.7 This transformation will focus on delivering the following six key capability effects.
Project force
4.8 The ADF will be optimised for impactful projection to deter any attempts to project
power against Australia. This includes ensuring the ADF has the ability to rapidly deploy
and employ forces in response to direct threats to our national security.
Hold a potential adversary’s forces at risk

4.9 The ADF requires the ability to hold at risk any potential adversary forces that could
target our interests during a conflict, complicating their cost and risk calculus.
Protect ADF forces and supporting critical infrastructure in Australia

4.10 Defence’s ability to protect its personnel, critical facilities and information in Australia
underpins its ability to defend Australia, project force and hold the forces of any potential
adversary at risk. The ability to withstand and recover from attack signals to any potential
adversary the extent of Australia’s resolve to defend itself.
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Sustain protracted combat operations
4.11 The ADF must be able to sustain protracted operations during a conflict, including in
circumstances involving disruptions to command and control networks, infrastructure,
logistics networks and communications systems. Defence’s ability to sustain protracted
operations despite these disruptions underpins the ability to credibly respond to threats.
Maintain persistent situational awareness in our primary area of

military interest
4.12 Defence, working with other government agencies, must be able to maintain persistent
situational awareness of our primary area of military interest. This includes an awareness
of the strategic intent and capability of any potential adversary in order to provide
warning time and decision-making space for the Government.
Achieve decision advantage

4.13 Defence must be able to exercise effective command and control during conflict. This
ability must be able to withstand disruption to enable the ADF to achieve its operational
objectives when and where needed. At the same time, Defence must also be able to
undermine a potential adversary’s ability to exercise its own effective command and
control in order to complicate its cost and risk calculus.
ADF basing requirements

Domestic force posture
4.14 Defence must posture to enable the impactful projection of military effects from
Australia, to project and sustain a deployed force and to drive efficient use of training
areas. Defence’s domestic force posture is to:
deliver a logistically networked and resilient set of bases, predominantly across the
north of Australia, to enhance force projection and improve Defence’s ability to
recover from an attack;
maintain a resilient network of southern basing infrastructure focused on force
generation, sustainment, health networks, and logistics nodes to sustain combat
operations and support the projection of Australian forces;
increase protection of bases and provide the ability to withstand disruption in crisis
or conflict;
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enable enhanced US and key partner training and cooperation on Australian

territory where these activities are in our national interest;
adopt climate adaptation strategies and energy resilience; and
adopt civil-military arrangements for infrastructure in the event of a crisis
or conflict.
4.15 Defence must focus force posture efforts and resourcing on bases most appropriate to
the strategic circumstances. Bases no longer meeting this criterion must be appropriately
divested. Effective management and rationalisation of the Defence estate is a complex
but essential undertaking.
4.16 The Defence Estate Audit report, commissioned as part of the Government’s response
to the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review, makes key recommendations
for reorienting the Defence estate to meet current and future security challenges.
The Government will finalise specific responses to the audit later in 2024. Defence estate
holdings will be reviewed as part of the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle to
ensure continued alignment with Defence priorities.
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5
Chapter 5:
People
5.1 People are Defence’s most important asset. Defence is focused on recruiting, retaining
and growing the highly specialised and skilled workforce required to meet Defence’s
capability needs.
5.2 As the ADF transforms from a balanced to an integrated, focused force, Defence’s
workforce plans must also change to effectively respond to the workforce crisis it
faces, noting the ADF is currently around 4,400 personnel under strength. This crisis is
impacting both ADF recruitment of new personnel and retention of existing, highly
skilled personnel.
5.3 Defence must address immediate workforce needs while also building a long-term
workforce pipeline. To achieve this, Defence is placing a strong focus on enhancing
the culture of the organisation and improving workforce wellbeing. Defence is also
prioritising programs to prevent suicide and is positioned to respond with urgency to the
Government’s accepted recommendations from the Royal Commission into Defence and
Veteran Suicide.
Recruitment and retention

5.4 Defence must fundamentally transform its recruitment and retention systems to achieve
its workforce priorities. Improved recruiting and retention efforts must focus on:
widening eligibility criteria to enable more people to join the ADF, including
developing options to recruit, where appropriate, non-Australian citizens;
streamlining the recruiting system to translate this wider pool of eligible applicants
into an increase in the number of ADF recruits;
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improving processes to enable faster recruiting so that skills gaps are met more
quickly; and
encouraging current personnel, who have built the skills and expertise the ADF
needs, to stay and serve longer through retention initiatives.
5.5 The highly competitive national labour market across all sectors and record low levels of
unemployment will continue to put pressure on Defence’s ability to attract and retain the
right people.
5.6 The Government has implemented targeted financial and non-financial initiatives to
increase the size of the ADF. This includes the ADF Continuation Bonus which provides
eligible individuals access to a $50,000 payment at the end of their initial service period.
Defence has also enhanced access to study opportunities and expanded the ADF Health
Benefits Program, providing additional services and increasing allowances to ADF
members and dependants.
5.7 The Government will also continue to prioritise targeted recruitment of Australian Public
Service (APS) personnel with skills and experience in STEM-related fields and project
management to support the delivery of the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated
Investment Program. The Government is also focused on upskilling and professionalising
the APS workforce to further reduce reliance on contracted staff and develop the APS
workforce agility required to meet future capability needs.
Future workforce requirements

5.8 Defence is focused on recruitment, retention and skilling initiatives to grow the
workforce and make Defence an even more attractive employer.
5.9 While the Defence workforce is becoming more representative of wider society, to
achieve a generational uplift in capabilities there must be diverse teams across a wider
range of Defence’s workforce segments. This involves greater representation of gender,
First Nations people, those from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and
people with a range of experiences to strengthen collaboration, problem solving and
decision making.
5.10 The 2020 Force Structure Plan outlined an ADF workforce requirement of around
69,000 personnel by 2030, based on force structure assumptions at the time. In 2022,
the former Government announced a plan to increase Defence’s total permanent
workforce, encompassing ADF and civilian personnel, to over 101,000 by 2040, with
the total number of permanent ADF personnel to increase to almost 80,000. This
announcement represented workforce growth of 18,500 over the growth outlined in the
2020 Force Structure Plan.
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5.11 Of the additional 18,500 workforce growth, 12,500 were funded and 6,000 were
unfunded. Between 2020-21 and 2022-23, ADF recruitment achieved approximately
80 percent of its target growth, equating to a shortfall of around 4,400 ADF personnel.
APS recruitment is currently on track with a workforce of around 17,500.
5.12 To enable effective and achievable workforce planning that reflects the force structure
requirements, Defence will develop a new comprehensive workforce plan in 2024 that
is aligned to the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program. This
will help meet the current and future needs of the ADF, APS and external workforce.
Culture
5.13 Culture is fundamental to achieving the Defence mission and implementing the National
Defence Strategy.
5.14 Defence’s culture must continue to evolve and strengthen to achieve the significant
reform required to deliver the National Defence Strategy. It must be values-based,
address current cultural challenges and promote a positive, inclusive and psychologically
safe workplace.
5.15 The Government acknowledges the importance of addressing cultural shortcomings,

including those highlighted in the 2020 Inspector-General of the ADF Afghanistan Inquiry
and those in the ongoing work of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.
While work is already underway to shape a positive and effective environment for Defence
people, enduring culture change requires deliberate and sustained effort through action
and continuous improvement. In addition to existing initiatives, the Government will
consider the findings of the final report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran
Suicide, which will further aid and inform strategies to improve Defence’s culture.
5.16 Defence will continue to drive reform to improve the mental health and wellbeing
support for its people, as well as for ADF families who play a vital role in supporting
ADF members and veterans. Trust is integral to supporting and strengthening the
mental health and wellbeing of the Defence workforce and delivering the National
Defence Strategy.
5.17 Families are critical to the retention and operational effectiveness of ADF personnel.
The Government recognises and values the pivotal role Defence families provide in
supporting the health and wellbeing of Defence’s people.
5.18 The Government is committed to supporting ADF members and their families by
providing timely access to the right support and information, at the right time, to enable
ADF personnel to be healthy, fit and able to perform their roles.
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6
Chapter 6:
Capability Investment
Priorities
6.1 To deliver an integrated, focused force and the capability effects set out in
Chapter 4, the Government has reset its defence capability acquisition plans.
This reset has involved a complete rebuild of the Integrated Investment Program to
ensure it is a coherent, logical and affordable plan for defence capability.
6.2 The integrated, focused force is designed using the minimum viable capabilities required
to ensure resources are maximised and military capabilities are brought into service as
quickly as possible. It includes deliberate choices to prioritise the introduction of
next-generation capabilities as soon as possible, such as the replacement of the Anzac
class with a new general purpose frigate. The Government will also ensure the ADF
maintains the ability to provide options for Australia to respond to crises in the short
term and will make targeted investments to increase the capabilities of the current force.
6.3 To enable the shift to an integrated, focused force, Defence is moving away from a
domain-centric approach to ADF force design. Force design will instead be focused on
capability development that addresses specific strategic and operational needs based on
realistic and prioritised scenarios. It also involves bringing minimum viable capabilities
into service as efficiently and effectively as possible. This will ensure capability
development is appropriately aligned with strategy and resources.
6.4 The Government has already commenced reshaping the ADF’s capabilities to enhance
Australia’s capacity to deter coercion and to increase the ADF’s capacity for impactful
projection. This includes the acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered
submarines, the transformation of the Army into one focused on littoral manoeuvre,
investments in long-range strike capabilities and the enhanced lethality of Navy’s surface
combatant fleet.
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6.5 The Government has significantly increased the level of investment in defence capability
over the next decade, as outlined in Chapter 10. In rebuilding the Integrated Investment
Program, the Government has also made tough but necessary decisions to cancel, divest,
delay or re-scope projects or activities that are not critical to delivering the force our
strategic circumstances require. This reprioritisation and additional funding has enabled
the Government to accelerate new immediate and longer-term priority projects that are
critical to delivering the force our strategic circumstances require.
Priorities for the integrated, focused force

6.6 The Integrated Investment Program advances the implementation of the Government’s
six immediate priorities announced in response to the Defence Strategic Review:
acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS

to improve our deterrence capabilities;
developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer-range and
manufacture munitions in Australia;
improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases;
initiatives to improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled Defence
workforce;
lifting Australia’s capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into
ADF capability, in close partnership with Australian industry; and
deepening Australia’s diplomatic and defence partnerships with key partners in the
Indo-Pacific.
6.7 Across the coming decade, investment in the integrated, focused force will be extended
to deliver increases in combat and enabling abilities in the following capability priorities:
undersea warfare to undertake a broad range of missions to project force, hold a

potential adversary force at risk and maintain persistent situational awareness;
targeting and long-range strike to provide a greater capacity, at longer ranges, to
deter any attempts to project power against Australia;
space and cyber capabilities that strengthen situational awareness, the ability to
project force and decision advantage;
amphibious capable combined-arms land system, enabled by Navy and Air Force
combat capabilities and supported by Navy’s amphibious capability, to optimise the
Army for littoral manoeuvre and control of strategic land positions, and to enable
the ADF to undertake rapid stabilisation and humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief operations;
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maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control operations that
provide Defence with the ability to deny the use of an area of the sea when needed
and provide the ADF with freedom of action;
expeditionary air operations to project force into Australia’s primary area of military
interest to deter attempts to project power against Australia or target Australian
interests, and maintain persistent situational awareness;
missile defence to protect critical Defence infrastructure, Defence facilities and the
ADF from long-range and high-speed missile capabilities;
theatre logistics to support the ADF’s ability to concentrate forces and sustain
protracted operations during a conflict;
theatre command and control that enables integrated ADF forces to plan and act
at speed in order to exercise effective command and control during a conflict and
remain resilient during disruptions to command and control networks;
a Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise to build stocks,
strengthen supply chains and support a domestic manufacturing capability; and
northern bases to ensure the ADF can project deployed forces and continue to
operate through disruption.
6.8 The integrated, focused force will deliver:
a. A Navy with enhanced maritime, air and land strike capability through:
the acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines,

providing a step change in Australia’s undersea warfare capability;
the development and introduction of uncrewed underwater and
surface vehicles to complement the Navy’s surface combatant fleet and
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines;
enhancing the lethality of Navy’s surface combatant fleet by integrating and
demonstrating the Tomahawk weapon system, the Naval Strike Missile and
the Standard Missile-6 long-range air defence missile, providing Navy with the
demonstrated ability to strike maritime, land and air targets at long-range;
enhancements to the undersea warfare capability of Navy’s surface combatant
fleet, including six new Hunter class frigates; and
enhancements to the broader lethality of the surface fleet through 11 new
general purpose frigates, six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels,
upgrades to the Hobart class destroyers and, with the Australian Border Force,
a combined 25 minor war vessels.
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b. An Army optimised for littoral manoeuvre with a long-range land and maritime
strike capability through:
the acquisition of a littoral manoeuvre capability, including domestically

produced medium and heavy landing craft, enhancing the ADF’s ability to
deploy and sustain land forces in Australia’s primary area of military interest;
the accelerated and expanded acquisition of land based long-range fires,
providing the ADF with a deployable strike capability with the range to protect
Australia’s northern approaches;
progressively introducing increments of Precision Strike Missiles to extend
the range and variety of targets that land based long-range fires are capable of
striking;
progressively increasing stockpiles of land based long-range fires
munitions; and
continued investment in the combined-arms land system, including infantry
fighting vehicles and combat reconnaissance vehicles, main battle tanks,
uncrewed tactical systems and a new attack helicopter, ensuring Army can
secure and control strategic land positions and provide protection for the ADF.
c. An Air Force that can deliver long-range intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance and an enhanced maritime, land and air strike capability through:
integration of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile with the P-8A, F/A-18F and
F-35A, and investigating integration of the Joint Strike Missile on the F-35A,
providing the ability to strike maritime targets at longer ranges;
integration of the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range
with the EA-18 and F-35A, allowing the ADF to target radar systems;
integration of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range on the
F/A-18F and F-35A, enhancing the ADF’s ability to strike land targets;
development of hypersonic air launched weapons for the F/A-18F;
replacement of the E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft
with a next-generation aircraft;
continued investment in uncrewed and autonomous systems, including
collaborative combat aircraft like the MQ-28A Ghost Bat, providing a potentially
asymmetric surveillance and strike capability; and
the acquisition of a modern Joint Air Battle Management System to integrate
the ADF’s air and missile defence capabilities.
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d. Space capabilities that enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
provide resilient communications and counter emerging space threats through:
continued investment in Australia’s first sovereign-controlled satellite

communications system, enhancing ADF communications in the Pacific and
Indian Ocean regions;
the Deep-space Advanced Radar Capability, which is a collaborative project with
the UK and US, providing greater situational awareness in space;
investment in geospatial intelligence capabilities; and
investment in space control capabilities, providing the Government with options
to assure Australia’s access to space.
e. Cyber capabilities that enable enhanced intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance, deliver resilient communications and provide computer network
defence and disrupt options through:
continued investment in the Australian Signals Directorate through REDSPICE,

significantly enhancing Australia’s cyber capabilities, providing more options to
defend Australian networks and supporting other ADF capabilities;
an uplift to Defence’s communications networks, providing greater network
efficiency, resilience and redundancy; and
enhancing defensive cyber capability through investment in workforce and
cyber mission systems.
f. The integrated, focused force will also be supported by:
a sovereign GWEO enterprise that can produce, maintain, repair, store and
overhaul select weapons;
an uplift in Defence’s logistics capability, including stocks of critical supplies, to
enable and support operations from the north of Australia during a crisis or
conflict;
enhanced targeting capabilities supported by intelligence and other capabilities;
special operations capabilities that integrate across domains and with other
government agencies;
a network of northern bases that is resilient and enhances Australia’s ability to
project force; and
a resilient theatre command and control network.
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AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine pathway

6.9 Under AUKUS, a trilateral partnership with the UK and the US, Australia’s acquisition of
a fleet of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will enhance our ability to
deter aggression and contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific.
6.10 All three countries have committed to ensuring this initiative sets the highest standards
for safety, security and non-proliferation.
6.11 The Optimal Pathway for Australia to acquire conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered

submarines will be implemented as a conditions-based three-phase program,
consisting of:
Phase One: the US, as commenced in 2023, and the UK, commencing in 2026,
will make longer and more frequent nuclear-powered submarine visits to Australia.
These enhanced visits will lay the groundwork for Submarine Rotational
Force – West to begin operating from Western Australia as early as 2027, growing
to a mature state of up to four rotational US nuclear-powered submarines and one
rotational UK nuclear-powered submarine;
Phase Two: sale of three US Virginia class submarines to Australia, with the
potential to sell two more if needed, from the early 2030s; and
Phase Three: a trilateral joint delivery program building ‘SSN-AUKUS’ based on
a next-generation UK design integrating technologies from all three countries,
including cutting-edge US submarine technologies to be operated by Australia and
the UK, with the first delivery of an Australian-built submarine in the early 2040s.
6.12 Australia’s conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will be owned, operated,

maintained and regulated by Australia and under Australian command. They will be a
sovereign Australian capability, commanded by Royal Australian Navy officers under
the ADF’s chain of command. Decisions on their deployment, missions and operations
will be matters for the Australian Government, as with all of Australia’s sovereign
defence capabilities.
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Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance enterprise
6.13 The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted how vital the supply of munitions is to modern
armed forces, how quickly stockpiles can be depleted in conflict and the fragility of
supply chains for global weapons. The Government is pursuing a comprehensive
approach to build Defence’s GWEO stocks, strengthening supply chains and supporting a
domestic manufacturing capability. This will ensure Defence has access to the stocks of
ordnance it would need in a conflict. Further information on the Government’s plan for
GWEO will be in the forthcoming GWEO Enterprise Plan, which will be released later this
year.
6.14 Australia’s self-reliance will be enhanced through an ability to produce, maintain, repair
and overhaul select weapons. As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy,
the domestic manufacture of GWEO and munitions is one of Defence’s seven Sovereign
Defence Industrial Priorities. A resilient and secure GWEO supply chain will enhance the
ADF’s ability to sustain its strike capabilities in conflict.
6.15 Through the Integrated Investment Program, the Government is investing in:
the development of a sovereign ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul

select weapons;
the expertise Defence needs to strengthen Australia’s contribution to the industrial
base it shares with the US and other key partners;
the manufacture of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System missiles in Australia,
commencing in 2025, representing an important first step toward establishing
domestic missile manufacturing on a large scale; and
the construction and uplift of storage and distribution facilities to accommodate
Defence’s growing GWEO inventory.
6.16 Further information on the Government’s capability investments to achieve

the objectives of the National Defence Strategy are set out in the Integrated
Investment Program.
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7
Chapter 7:
International
Partnerships
7.1 Defence’s international engagement activities will be focused on achieving outcomes

that contribute to regional security and stability and strengthen deterrence against the
threat of military coercion or a major conflict.
7.2 The Government will continue to use diplomacy to reduce tensions and create pathways
for peace and stability. Regional defence engagement is a vital pillar of Australia’s
diplomacy. It aims to shape a region that is peaceful, stable and prosperous, that
operates by rules, standards and norms and in which countries exercise their own agency
to safeguard sovereignty. Importantly, it builds connections among defence forces and
forges people-to-people links that can be drawn upon during periods of tension.
7.3 Australia remains committed to transparency about Australia’s strategic intentions

and defence capabilities as a means to build strategic trust and understanding – and
demonstrate Australia’s value as a credible and reliable defence partner for the region.
Regional engagement is also important for developing a shared understanding of the
security environment.
7.4 Though focused on Australia’s primary area of military interest, Australia retains global
interests and global partners. The Government remains committed to supporting
activities outside of the Indo-Pacific when they are in Australia’s national interest to do
so, including non-combatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief.
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7.5 Strong global partnerships are also critical to protect Australia’s economic connection
to the world and support the global rules-based order. Investing in these partnerships
ensures the Government can respond to unexpected events that impact Australia’s
interests, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and conflict in the Middle East.
The US Alliance
7.6 Australia’s Alliance with the US is fundamental to our national security and the ADF’s
capacity to generate, sustain and project credible military capability. Australia and the
US share values and ideals, and our Alliance is underpinned by mutual respect for each
other’s sovereignty and national interests.
7.7 Australia and the US, and its other partners, are deepening defence engagement
to enhance and maintain the capability to make greater contributions to collective
deterrence, as well as to regional and global stability. Concurrently, the US is increasing
investments in infrastructure, capability and equipment to enhance its cooperation
with the ADF in Australia as part of mutually beneficial activities under the force
posture initiatives.
7.8 The Government will continue to strengthen its defence engagement with the US to:
ensure joint exercises and capability rotations with the US are focused on
enhancing collective deterrence and force posture cooperation;
acquire the technology and capability required to enhance deterrence, including
through increasing collaboration on defence innovation, science and technology;
drive interoperability and interchangeability in the development of the ADF’s force
structure and enable Australian access to US systems and capabilities, including
through technology transfer, information sharing, innovation, co-development,
co-production and co-sustainment programs;
leverage Australia’s strong partnership with Japan in its trilateral context, including
opportunities for Japan to participate in Australia-US force posture cooperation
activities, to enable interoperability and contribute to deterrence; and
progress enabling reforms to export controls, procurement policy and information
sharing to deliver a more integrated industrial base.
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Engagement with Indo-Pacific partners
7.9 Australia’s security and prosperity is inextricably linked to developments in the
Indo-Pacific. Australia continues to benefit from the economic dynamism of the region
and the defence of Australia lies in the collective security of the region.
7.10 The Government will continue to strengthen defence engagement with Indo-Pacific
partners, embracing bilateral, minilateral and multilateral opportunities to support
mutual interests, build trust, deepen cooperation and maintain peace, security and
prosperity in the region.
The Defence Cooperation Program and Pacific Maritime Security

Program
7.11 The Defence Cooperation Program remains the primary mechanism for Australia’s
practical defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
7.12 The Government will continue to deliver capability to enhance maritime security through
the Pacific Maritime Security Program (PMSP). Funding to the PMSP meets critical
sustainment and maintenance requirements that cannot be met by Pacific economies.
Pacific
7.13 The Pacific is vital to Australia’s security and prosperity. It sits astride Australia’s northern
and eastern lines of communication. The Government will continue to invest in security
relationships within the Pacific family, working together to achieve shared security
objectives, build partner capacity, enhance interoperability and address common
challenges, including upholding sovereignty, protecting resources and mitigating the
effects of climate change. Australia’s aim is to remain the partner of choice for the Pacific
family, including in security cooperation.
7.14 Defence engagement activities in the Pacific – both bilaterally and through regional
institutions – are intended to integrate forces to enhance regional capacity and
interoperability. They maximise Australia’s value as a security partner and enable
Pacific-led responses to Pacific security challenges, in accordance with the decision of all
Pacific leaders at the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting.
7.15 Australia will seek to enhance interoperability with New Zealand and – building on
our alliance and long history of close cooperation – jointly pursue security and stability
in our region. The Government will also enhance defence cooperation in the Pacific
with France.
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Southeast Asia
7.16 ASEAN member states and Timor-Leste are central to Australia’s national interests and
Australia has broad, deep and long-standing defence partnerships across the region.
Australia wants to see a regional order with ASEAN at its centre, providing an essential
stabilising influence.
7.17 The Government will continue to strengthen and leverage defence engagement with
Southeast Asian partners under the ASEAN framework and continue to invest in the
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in pursuit of a peaceful, stable and
prosperous region.
7.18 The FPDA is the only multilateral security arrangement of its kind focusing on Southeast
Asia and is Australia’s longest-standing regional security mechanism. It supports habits
of cooperation and practical interoperability between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Singapore and the UK and makes a valuable contribution to regional security and
economic prosperity.
7.19 Indonesia is an essential and enduring partner. Australia will continue to invest in our
bilateral defence partnership, including by deepening the complexity of our cooperation
and working together in support of regional security.
7.20 The Government will continue to strengthen defence cooperation with other Southeast
Asian partners, including Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. This cooperation will
support regional security, enhance interoperability and improve the ADF’s ability to work
in partnership to address common challenges such as climate change.
7.21 The Government will also sharpen its defence engagement with Southeast Asian
partners to focus on:
maturing defence training and exercises – including more advanced capability

cooperation – to strengthen our relationships, build robust and interlocking
networks of partners, increase interoperability and demonstrate collective
resolve; and
enhancing policy engagement and information sharing to inform regional
decision-making and build resilience to disinformation.
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North Asia
7.22 Japan is an indispensable partner for achieving regional peace and prosperity.
Our elevated Special Strategic Partnership is underpinned by a strong convergence
of values and interests and our growing interoperability, including in a trilateral context
with the US.
7.23 The Government will continue to strengthen strategic alignment and coordination
with Japan, including consultation on regional contingencies and increasing
collaboration on defence innovation, science and technology. Defence will also
enhance high-end interoperability with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, focused on
the scope, objectives and forms of our operational cooperation. Advancing our
cooperation on integrated air and missile defence, counterstrike, undersea warfare,
and increasing Japan’s participation in force posture initiatives in Australia are key
bilateral and trilateral priorities.
7.24 The Government will also elevate our defence relationship with the Republic of Korea,
pursuing targeted engagement opportunities that serve to advance our interests in
capability, defence industry, innovation, science and technology.
7.25 While Australia and China have different values and political systems, a stable and
constructive relationship is in the interest of both nations. The Government will remain
patient, calibrated and deliberate in its approach to China, cooperating where we can,
disagreeing where we must and engaging in Australia’s national interests.
7.26 The Government will also continue to raise, both privately and in public, issues that
matter to Australia, including destabilising, provocative or unsafe actions by the People’s
Liberation Army, China Coast Guard and maritime militia. Consistent with efforts to
pursue mechanisms to reduce tensions and the scope for miscalculation,
the Government is committed to pursuing a defence dialogue with China.
Indian Ocean region
7.27 India is a top-tier security partner for Australia. Through the Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership between Australia and India, the Government is continuing to prioritise
practical and tangible cooperation that directly contributes to Indo-Pacific stability.
7.28 Australia will continue to support India’s key role in the region by increasing the depth
and complexity of our defence cooperation. The Government will continue to seek
opportunities with India to drive practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, defence
industry cooperation and information sharing.
49
7.29 The Northeast Indian Ocean is central to Australia’s security and sea lines of
communication. In addition to our engagement with India, the Government’s defence
engagement in the Indian Ocean region will focus on:
regularising the ADF’s presence, including increasing deployments, training and

exercises with Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh; and
strengthening Australia’s defence cooperation with Indian Ocean region countries
through regional maritime domain awareness, growing defence industry
engagement and increasing education and training cooperation.
Working with partners to support a global rules-based

order
7.30 Australia’s bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defence arrangements are critical
components of the Government’s global engagement. That engagement includes
cooperation through the US Alliance and with NATO, capability and technology sharing
arrangements through AUKUS, and diplomatic partnerships such as the Quad.
7.31 The ADF will continue to integrate with the US and key partner defence forces –
particularly Japan, Indonesia, India, the Republic of Korea, the UK, France, Germany,
New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines – to coordinate our collective
strengths and minimise gaps in our global security engagement.
7.32 Australia’s defence engagement with like-minded partners outside the Indo-Pacific will
focus on the Indo-Pacific, shared global interests and advancing capability and defence
industry outcomes.
The Five Eyes partnership
7.33 The Five Eyes partnership – comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
the UK and the US – remains a vital element of Australia’s security settings. Australia’s
participation in the Five Eyes significantly enhances Australia’s situational awareness and
supports ADF operations. It is also vital for the development and acquisition of defence
capability, intelligence sharing and supporting our collective deterrence efforts.
50
The AUKUS partnership
7.34 AUKUS is a transformative technology-sharing partnership that will contribute to

strengthening the individual and collective capabilities of Australia, the UK and the US.
It builds on decades of close defence, capability and technology cooperation between
our countries.
7.35 Under AUKUS, leveraging cutting-edge technology to build asymmetric capabilities

will help maintain the collective capability edge of the AUKUS partners in the coming
decades. This includes harnessing the ingenuity of industry and academia across the
three nations and aligning enabling systems and processes.
7.36 Importantly, Australia, the UK and the US will progress Australia’s acquisition of
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines in a way that sets the highest
non-proliferation standard and maintains the integrity and strength of the
non-proliferation regime.
7.37 Defence’s nuclear-powered submarine acquisition will occur within the framework of
Australia’s safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency in a
manner fully consistent with AUKUS partners’ respective non-proliferation obligations
and commitments.
International partner cooperation in Australia

7.38 Force posture initiatives with the US, and our enhanced defence cooperation and
activities with key partners, build depth and trust in Australia’s relationships, support
collective deterrence and demonstrate Australia’s value as a reliable partner.
7.39 Australia will continue to enhance the size, scale and complexity of our engagement with
the US and other key partners in Australia, including Japan and Singapore.
7.40 Australia’s force posture cooperation with the US will continue to be a key pillar in
the Alliance. It supports Australia’s ability to deter and respond, provides credibility
and resilience to US force posture in the region, and supports broader collective
deterrence efforts.
7.41 Australia’s cooperation with international partners, including the US, is managed through
robust policy frameworks and principles that maintain and protect our sovereignty. These
frameworks govern the activities of foreign governments in, from or through Australia.
They also guide how we partner together to conduct activities and acquire capabilities in
line with Australia’s national interests.
51
7.42 The Government carefully manages all foreign defence force access, posture and training
on Australian territory by ensuring all such activities align with Australia’s national
interests and preserve Australia’s sovereign decision-making. These decisions are not
dictated by the interests of other nations – rather they are mutually agreed activities
in the interests of participating countries. These activities only occur at the invitation
of the Australian Government with full respect for our sovereignty, and domestic and
international laws. The fundamental principle underpinning these activities is the
long-standing policy of having no foreign bases on Australian sovereign territory.
52
53
8
Chapter 8:
Defence Industry and
Acquisition Reform
8.1 Delivering the right capabilities at the right time is central to this National Defence
Strategy. To achieve this, the Government is reforming the defence capability acquisition
system and the Government’s relationship with defence industry. This reform agenda is
articulated in greater detail in the Defence Industry Development Strategy.
Capability acquisition reform

8.2 The Government is committed to simplifying and accelerating Defence’s acquisition
processes to deliver capability more quickly in partnership with industry. This includes
embracing greater levels of risk both within Defence and across government agencies
involved in these processes.
8.3 The One Defence Capability System, which connects capability processes across Defence
to plan, acquire, deliver, sustain and dispose of capabilities, will be reformed to deliver
capability faster and in ways that are more responsive to changing priorities.
8.4 The Government is also reforming its approach to contracting with defence industry,
removing unnecessary and repetitive steps in the engagement, solicitation and selection
processes. More flexible contracting mechanisms will be developed to support agile
and developmental projects where technology is rapidly changing or where the ADF’s
requirements cannot be fully known.
8.5 As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, the Government will adopt a
more tailored approach to its procurement based on several criteria:
the availability of the desired or minimum viable capability solutions and the
potential sources;
55
the urgency of the capability need, and whether there is a clear justification for
Defence to prioritise speed of delivery over competition;
whether there is a clear strategic justification for Defence to intervene in
the market, either to establish or sustain strategically important industry
capability; and
the risks associated with the delivery of the capability.
Strategic partnerships
8.6 The Government is committed to establishing strategic partnerships with industry that
provide long-term opportunities on progressive capability development and innovation.
These partnerships provide greater certainty to industry on their long-term investment,
incentivise growth in the workforce and support small and medium businesses through
the expansion of supply chains.
8.7 As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, strategic partnerships will
initially be pursued to support:
land and joint maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade; and

test and evaluation, certification and systems assurance.
Minimum viable capability
8.8 The Government has adopted a minimum viable capability model to get new capabilities
into service faster. A minimum viable capability is a capability that can be introduced into
service successfully, sustained effectively and achieve the directed effect in the required
time. It is underpinned by minimum viable products, which achieve or enable the lowest
acceptable mission performance in the required time. This approach retains a focus on
value for money, but places greater emphasis on speed to acquisition.
8.9 Minimum viable capability supports innovation and developmental projects, allowing
Defence to embrace risk, support speed to capability and work with Australian industry
to undertake iterative upgrades, rather than waiting for a perfect solution.
56
Defence industry
8.10 A sovereign defence industrial base is vital for developing higher levels of military
preparedness and self-reliance. It also accelerates innovation and capability delivery.
8.11 A sovereign defence industrial base is not one characterised by complete self-reliance,
but is rather underpinned by industrial capability resident in Australia that, if necessary,
can effectively leverage international defence industry to deliver defence capabilities in
the timeframes required.
8.12 As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy, Australia’s defence industrial
base must be:
capable of delivering the capacity, size and scale to meet Defence’s needs as well
as the agility to rapidly scale;
resilient to disruptions beyond our control by strengthening our network of
supply chains;
competitive by providing the systems, technologies, materials, services and
products Defence needs to support its mission; and
innovative by maintaining a technological edge and developing the asymmetric
technologies needed by Defence.
8.13 Australia’s strategic circumstances require the targeted development of the sovereign
defence industrial base in areas of strategic priority. The Government will support
businesses to increase their scale and competitiveness to enable them to deliver
Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities.
8.14 The Government has identified seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities, as outlined
in the Defence Industry Development Strategy:
maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade of ADF aircraft;

continuous naval shipbuilding and sustainment;
sustainment and enhancement of the combined-arms land system;
domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions;
development and integration of autonomous systems;
integration and enhancement of battlespace awareness and management
systems; and
57
8.15 The Government will generate detailed industrial priorities as part of the biennial review
and update of the Defence Industry Development Strategy, which will occur in line with
the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle.
8.16 Targeted support will be delivered to Australian defence industry by tailoring

Government grants to grow industrial capabilities in areas of strategic priority. A single
Australian defence industry development grant will replace the Sovereign Industry
Capability Priority, Skilling Australia’s Defence Industry, Defence Global Competitiveness
and Capability Improvement grants. The new Defence Industry Development Grant will
simplify grant arrangements by giving Australian businesses a single access point.
8.17 The Government will also support Australian defence industry to pursue export
opportunities, including through an increased focus on government-to-government
sales. The Government will also work to integrate Australian companies into global
supply chains, including through co-design, co-development, co-production and
co-sustainment activities, as well as through the Global Supply Chain program.
This will bring scale, resilience and sustainability to Australia’s industrial base and
mitigate challenges that can result from companies having Australia’s Department of
Defence as their only customer.
Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise

Strategy
8.18 Naval shipbuilding and sustainment is a whole-of-nation endeavour critical to
our national security and sovereignty, requiring a significant uplift in Australia’s
shipbuilding workforce, industry and infrastructure to generate a modern and
capable naval capability. The Government is committed to supporting the growth of a
productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding and sustainment industrial enterprise,
including its underpinning supply chains and workforce. This is reflected in the most
significant investment in maritime capability in Australia’s history, which encompasses
building, sustaining and upgrading naval vessels and maritime capabilities, including
nuclear-powered submarines.
8.19 The dual objectives of the Government’s Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise
Strategy are to:
uplift the capacity, productivity and resilience of Australia’s shipbuilding and

sustainment industrial ecosystem, to provide national preparedness as a direct
input to the operations of the ADF; and
generate ongoing economic, export and employment opportunities for decades
to come.
58
8.20 Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy comprises the
following lines of effort:
optimising Australia’s existing naval shipbuilding and sustainment industrial base to

support continuous naval shipbuilding at two principal shipyards in South Australia
and Western Australia, accompanied by a national maritime sustainment network,
in conjunction with establishing a nuclear-powered submarine industrial base to
support the acquisition and sustainment of nuclear-powered submarines;
balanced investment over significant planning and delivery timeframes to support
the timely and cost-effective acquisition, upgrade and sustainment of minimum
viable maritime capability, whilst also providing a predictable pipeline of work and
consistent demand signal to industry to encourage investment;
developing strategic partnerships with industry to strengthen the industrial base
and to improve capability and participation of mid-tier supply chain companies;
managing workforce demand pressures through new and innovative approaches to
upskill and support over 8,500 direct jobs by 2030 in conventional shipbuilding and
sustainment as well as around 20,000 direct jobs over the next 30 years as part of
the nuclear-powered submarine pathway;
expanding infrastructure capability and capacity to support planned acquisition and
sustainment activities, while optimising productivity at the principal shipyards;
enhancing physical security measures at the principal shipyards and supporting
Australian industry partners to uplift security standards and compliance for defence
industry, their workforce and supporting supply chains; and
national and international partnering and collaboration, including with state and
territory governments, industry partners, academic and training institutions, and
international partners.
8.21 Realising the ambitions of Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise
Strategy will see a transformational uplift of Australia’s industrial and advanced
manufacturing capability, and enhanced national resilience and prosperity through:
a productive and resilient industry that can innovate and rapidly scale with
manageable risk to meet the needs of the ADF;
an appropriately skilled and experienced workforce, developed as an enduring
sovereign asset to deliver and operate maritime capability and generate broader
national security and economic effects;
a modern shipbuilding and sustainment infrastructure network, expanding
Australia’s industrial capacity and overall force flexibility; and
a risk-based approach to the security of acquisition and sustainment activities.
59
8.22 The implementation of Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise

Strategy will be detailed in an updated Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan to be
released later this year, which will be updated biennially in conjunction with the biennial
National Defence Strategy cycle and the Defence Industry Development Strategy.
8.23 The 2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan will set out the Government’s
approach to supporting the growth of a productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding
and sustainment industrial enterprise. It will be complemented by a Shipbuilding
Forecast for industry and the public to build confidence in Australia’s shipbuilding
industry. Future iterations of the forecast will be issued in line with the biennial National
Defence Strategy cycle.
60
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9
Chapter 9:
Defence Innovation,
Science and Technology
Innovation, science and technology

9.1 Investing in innovation, science and technology is fundamental to properly equipping and
preparing a modern fighting force in a technology-dominated world. The Government is
transforming Australia’s defence innovation, science and technology ecosystem through
significant investments in the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) and
AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities. These initiatives represent a step change in
Australia’s ability to enhance defence cooperation with partners, industry and academia
to rapidly develop and introduce technologically advanced military capabilities into
service.
9.2 Innovation should focus on emerging technologies with the potential to address the
strategic risks Australia faces. The Government will prioritise those areas of research
and development that align with the National Defence Strategy, and that will deliver
enhanced military capability at the earliest opportunity. The Government is also
exploring opportunities to rapidly adopt existing proven technologies at scale.
9.3 The Government’s ability to deliver advanced capabilities to the ADF is underpinned by
comprehensive partnerships with industry, academia and international partners, access
to specialised infrastructure and a highly skilled workforce.
9.4 The Government’s defence innovation, science and technology priorities are
hypersonics, directed energy, trusted autonomy, quantum technology, information
warfare and long-range fires.
63
Asymmetric advantage
9.5 Australia’s middle power status means we must seek military advantage in innovative
ways. Developing asymmetric advantage is one way to do this. It refers to military
capabilities that pit strength against weakness, at times in a non-traditional or
unconventional manner, and that disrupt a potential adversary’s decision calculus.
Countering, eliminating or enduring asymmetric advantage imposes disproportionate
costs, and in some cases there may be no effective response. Defence’s innovation,
science and technology plans and resources are aligned with this intent.
Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator

9.6 ASCA was established to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into defence
capability in close partnership with Australian industry and research organisations.
ASCA is a key element of Australia’s defence innovation, science and technology efforts
and will accelerate the delivery of minimum viable capabilities that can be put into
operational use rapidly.
9.7 ASCA comprises three programs: missions, innovation incubation and emerging and
disruptive technologies.
ASCA’s missions are focused on rapidly pulling through disruptive technologies

into capabilities that will meet Defence’s most pressing needs. Missions will
typically be time-bound to three years with clear performance targets to ensure a
‘fail fast’ approach is applied to technology that ceases to be viable or affordable or
to projects that are not delivering capability.
ASCA’s Innovation Incubation Program identifies and supports opportunities
to partner with Australian industry and universities to rapidly adapt, test
and acquire new or commercial technology for military purposes. Challenge
statements are used to elicit industry and university responses for short-term
funding on low-cost projects.
ASCA’s Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Program provides investment in
long-term research partnerships for the development of new technologies that
may improve existing capabilities or that help identify opportunities for the
development of asymmetric capabilities.
9.8 ASCA will also support the co-development of priority capabilities identified through
AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities, leveraging the respective strengths of each
country’s industrial base.
64
9.9 As the system and process matures, consideration may be given to broaden ASCA’s
remit to support other national security agencies and domestic partners to deliver
whole-of-government innovation outcomes.
AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities

9.10 AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities – is focused on harnessing joint research
and development of technologies with the UK and US to rapidly deliver asymmetric
capabilities for the three partners. The AUKUS partnership is focusing on key operational
problems common to Australia, the UK and the US and identifying areas where
collaboration will accelerate delivery.
9.11 The Government is pursuing a range of trilateral projects and incorporating emerging
technologies. Immediate priorities for this area of AUKUS collaboration are: advanced
cyber; artificial intelligence and autonomy; electronic warfare; hypersonics and
counter-hypersonics; quantum technologies; and undersea warfare. Together, these
projects will enhance AUKUS partners’ capabilities, collective security and deterrence.
9.12 The Government is also fostering an AUKUS partnership that deepens trilateral
cooperation, enhances information and technology sharing, and integrates our defence
industrial bases to further strengthen joint capability and increase resilience across the
three nations. These initiatives will enable a more seamless transition of technology into
military capability for the ADF. Key areas to enhance trilateral innovation and industrial
base collaboration include:
Technology transfer – the Government will continue to drive technology transfer

reform between AUKUS partners, including to enable co-design,
co-development and co-production of military capability. This includes developing
and implementing a trilateral export licence-free environment;
Alignment – the Government will pursue frameworks to integrate trilateral defence
innovation and procurement ecosystems to enable seamless military capability
development and delivery. This includes fostering collaboration across each
partner’s defence innovation organisations; and
Engagement – the Government will establish criteria, pathways and mechanisms
for industry and private equity firms to participate in AUKUS.
9.13 The Government will also explore trilateral delivery pathways for Australian
industry providers that demonstrate world-leading technology in the AUKUS Pillar II –
Advanced Capabilities areas of focus.
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10
Chapter 10:
Resourcing
10.1 To provide funding certainty for Defence, the Government is continuing the long-standing
policy of providing a ten-year funding model for Defence. This funding model will provide
Defence, including the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Submarine
Agency, with total funding of $765 billion to 2033-34.
Investing in National Defence

10.2 The Defence Strategic Review identified that the Defence budget was carrying significant
pressures, and that Defence funding should be increased to meet our strategic
circumstances. The Government is investing an additional $5.7 billion over the next
four years to 2027-28 and $50.3 billion over the next decade to 2033-34, above the
previous trajectory over that period. This investment will see the Defence budget grow
over the next ten years to $100.4 billion by 2033-34. The total funding of $765 billion
over the decade includes $330 billion in capability investment, compared to $270 billion
in capability investment for the decade to 2029-30 when the 2020 Defence Strategic
Update was released.
Table 1: Total Defence Funding Profile 2024-25 to 2033-34

(including the Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Submarine Agency)
2024-25 2025-26 2026-27 2027-28 2028-29 2029-30 2030-31 2031-32 2032-33 2033-34
$bn $bn $bn $bn $bn $bn $bn $bn $bn $bn
Defence
Funding
55.5 58.4 61.2 67.9 74.8 79.1 84.2 88.3 95.6 100.4
(including
ASD and ASA)
67
10.3 The Defence budget, not including funding for operations, comprises three major
categories of costs: acquisition of new capability; sustainment of capability; and the
critical Defence workforce. In addition, a fourth category is Defence’s operating budget,
which is relatively small.
10.4 Over the decade to 2033-34, the Government plans to increase annual investment in the
three major categories of costs, with:
the acquisition of new capability to grow from $17.6 billion to $42.1 billion;
sustainment of current and future capability to grow from $17.8 billion to
$29.1 billion; and
the Defence workforce to grow from $17.1 billion to $25.2 billion.
10.5 The breakdown of the categories of Defence funding, including the Australian Signals
Directorate and Australian Submarine Agency, is illustrated in the chart below.
Chart 1: Total Defence funding model by category 2024-25 to 2033-34

(including the Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Submarine Agency)
68
Reforming Defence’s funding model
10.6 The Government has reformed Defence’s funding model to ensure value for money and
to maximise accountability through reforms to over-programming levels, management of
unfunded contingency and greater assurance of the Defence budget and the Integrated
Investment Program.
10.7 The Government is also improving project assurance and control in the stages after a
project is approved. These reforms will ensure that projects achieve an appropriate
balance between the need for speed and flexibility in the development and approval
stages and the need for disciplined and focused project delivery once approved.
These reforms include:
creating an Independent Performance and Project Management Office;

establishing a new biannual Health of the Project Delivery System report to
the Government;
utilising, once established, a new Joint Statutory Committee on Defence to provide
greater parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of major projects; and
enforcing the need for regular independent reviews of projects.
69
11
Chapter 11:
Reform Agenda
Defence reform agenda

11.1 The Government’s Defence reform agenda is one of the most consequential in Australia.
Rising to the challenges of the current strategic environment will require unprecedented
effort and a culture of excellence.
11.2 Defence has adopted significant and ongoing strategic and enterprise reform aimed at
gaining and sustaining a competitive advantage in the current strategic environment.
Strategic Reform is the transformation of the core elements of Defence

that deliver effects to achieve the Strategy of Denial. Strategic reform
encompasses:
Strategy reform to ensure Defence is holistically working towards

agreed targets and all decisions are aligned to and informed by the
Strategy of Denial;
Force structure reform to ensure Defence is acquiring and maintaining a
structure comprised of the right mix of capabilities and workforce to deliver
the effects required for the Strategy of Denial; and
Force posture, preparedness and employment reform to ensure
Defence’s disposition, size, strength and readiness enables the
Strategy of Denial.
71
Enterprise reform is the transformation of Defence’s enabling elements that

drive performance, including:
Leadership and direction reform to drive commitment to excellence and
deliver clear, aligned direction across all levels;
Capability acquisition systems and procurement reform to urgently
acquire and integrate critical capabilities and better sustain the defence
industrial base;
Workforce systems reform to achieve a fully staffed, fully qualified and
security-cleared workforce to enable the force structure and posture to
deliver the Strategy of Denial;
Training and skilling reform to build a more agile, scalable and integrated
training system that delivers effects to enable the Strategy of Denial,
with the ability to quickly reskill, retrain and reallocate as strategic
circumstances evolve; and
Cultural reform to create a flexible and positive workplace that attracts and
retains a workforce that accepts and embraces organisational change.
11.3 The Government will continue to take a disciplined approach to Defence reform.
This includes transforming Defence’s enabling systems and frameworks so that they are
fit for purpose in the current environment.
Budget Process Operational Rules reform
11.4 The Government has agreed to reform the Budget Process Operational Rules to
streamline and accelerate processes related to the management of the Defence budget
and Integrated Investment Program to deliver capability faster and improve assurance
and governance mechanisms. These reforms will deliver processes with the speed and
agility necessitated by Australia’s strategic circumstances.
11.5 These reforms will provide greater flexibility for the Government to manage the
Integrated Investment Program, with the necessary assurance to the Government that
the financial risk introduced by a project will not exceed agreed funding levels.
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems reform
11.6 The Government is undertaking ICT systems reform to urgently deliver timely and
effective ICT outcomes to support the ADF. This includes the launch of the Defence
Digital Group, providing greater support to the enhancement and operation of the
Defence ICT environment. The Government has also prioritised upgrades to Defence’s
communications networks.
72
Legislative reform
11.7 The Government intends to progress legislative reform to address potential gaps in the
legal framework necessary to deliver capabilities and activities to support the ADF. This
includes ensuring that the domestic legal framework allows for the development, testing,
manufacturing, sustainment, security and export of defence capabilities, including those
in collaboration with Australia’s defence industry and international partners.
Guiding principles of transformation
11.8 Successful transformation of the Defence enterprise will be underpinned by the

application of three foundational principles:
Simplification to reduce the complexity in processes, structures and systems to

improve efficiency, reduce costs and enhance agility. This includes streamlining
workflows, eliminating redundant processes and creating a more straightforward
and agile enterprise environment;
Workforce optimisation to strategically align people and resources with business
objectives to enhance productivity, employee satisfaction and performance.
This includes the efficient utilisation of staff, development of skills and the
implementation of technologies to create a high-performing and adaptable
workforce; and
Digitisation to convert manual data, processes and operations into a digital format,
leveraging technologies to enhance efficiency, accessibility and innovation. This
involves the integration of digital tools, technologies and data-driven insights to
streamline workflows and improve decision-making.
Biennial National Defence Strategy cycle

11.9 The move to a biennial National Defence Strategy cycle provides a structured basis to
regularly evaluate and prioritise efforts to maintain a more lethal ADF that is capable of
credibly holding potential adversaries at risk – including as military forces modernise and
strategic challenges continue to evolve.
11.10 More broadly, the biennial cycle allows Government policy, strategy, planning and
reform efforts to keep pace with the rapidly evolving strategic environment, respond
to Australia’s national security priorities and provide clarity of process and approach to
defence industry.
11.11 The next National Defence Strategy will be delivered in 2026.
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CG_MAR012/24
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INTEGRATED
INVESTMENT
PROGRAM
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24
Defence acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia.
Defence recognises their continuing connection to traditional lands and waters and
would like to pay respect to their Elders both past and present.
Defence would also like to pay respect to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
who have contributed to the defence of Australia in times of peace and war.
© Commonwealth of Australia 2024

ISBN: 978-1-925890-88-4 (print)
ISBN: 978-1-925890-89-1 (online)
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968
(Cwth), no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission
from the Department of Defence.
Image on page 14 courtesy of ASC Pty Ltd.

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Contents
Chapter 1: Investing in the National Defence Strategy............................... 5
2024 National Defence Strategy.................................................................................... 5

Defence capability investment priorities....................................................................... 6
Funding the integrated, focused force.......................................................................... 9
2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy........................................................... 12
Building on the response to the Defence Strategic Review ....................................... 15
Reforms to capability acquisition................................................................................ 16
A highly skilled and integrated workforce................................................................... 17
Innovation, science and technology............................................................................ 18
Chapter 2: Undersea Warfare.................................................................. 23
Conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines................................................ 23

Infrastructure for conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines................... 24
Collins class submarines.............................................................................................. 27
Subsea warfare and uncrewed maritime systems...................................................... 27
Underwater range systems.......................................................................................... 29
Chapter 3: Maritime Capabilities for Sea Denial and Localised Sea Control
Operations.............................................................................................. 31
Enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet............................................................... 32

Hydrographic systems.................................................................................................. 35
Maritime mining.......................................................................................................... 35
Maritime support to regional partners....................................................................... 35
1
INTEGRATED INVESTMENT PROGRAM
Chapter 4: Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise ..................... 39
Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy........................................... 40

2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan ......................................................... 41
Chapter 5: Targeting and Long‑range Strike ............................................. 43
Defence targeting enterprise ...................................................................................... 43

Long‑range strike......................................................................................................... 44
Chapter 6: Space and Cyber..................................................................... 47
Enhanced space capabilities........................................................................................ 47

Enhanced cyber capabilities........................................................................................ 48
Electronic warfare........................................................................................................ 51
Chapter 7: Amphibious Capable Combined‑arms Land System................. 53
Littoral manoeuvre...................................................................................................... 54
Combined‑arms land system....................................................................................... 54
Battlefield aviation....................................................................................................... 58
Special operations capability....................................................................................... 58
Chapter 8: Expeditionary Air Operations.................................................. 61
Air mobility................................................................................................................... 61
Air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ...................................................... 62
Air combat capability................................................................................................... 62
Uncrewed air systems.................................................................................................. 63
Chapter 9: Missile Defence...................................................................... 67
A layered approach to integrated air and missile defence......................................... 68
2
Chapter 10: Theatre Logistics................................................................... 73
Additional logistics centres and capacity.................................................................... 74

Fuel holdings, storage and distribution capacity........................................................ 74
Improved health capability and protective measures................................................ 74
Chapter 11: Theatre Command and Control............................................. 77
Command and control................................................................................................. 79
Chapter 12: Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance............................ 81
Chapter 13: Northern Bases..................................................................... 85
Enhanced basing capacity for force projection........................................................... 85

Enhanced basing resilience......................................................................................... 86
Chapter 14: Enabling Capabilities............................................................ 89
Enterprise infrastructure ............................................................................................ 89

Enterprise data and information and communications technology .......................... 92
Appendix A: Budget Summary................................................................. 95
Notes on the Integrated Investment Program and the presentation of

financial information.................................................................................................... 96
3
1
INTEGRATED
INTEGRATED
INVESTMENT
Chapter 1:
INVESTMENT
Investing in the
PROGRAM
National Defence
PROGRAM
Strategy
2024 National Defence Strategy

1.1 The 2024 National Defence Strategy outlines a fundamentally new approach to the
defence of Australia. National Defence is a coordinated, whole-of-government and
whole-of-nation approach to meet the strategic challenges Australia faces, including
the threat of conflict and the prospect of coercion. It harnesses all arms of Australia’s
national power to establish a holistic, integrated and focused approach to protect our
security and advance our interests.
1.2 The adoption of National Defence means the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will
shift from a balanced force capable of responding to a range of contingencies, to an
integrated, focused force designed to address Australia’s most significant strategic risks.
This transformation is designed to maintain the capacity to achieve the ADF's five tasks:
defend Australia and our immediate region;

deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against
Australia through our northern approaches;
protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
contribute with partners to the collective security of the Indo‑Pacific; and
contribute with partners to the maintenance of the global rules‑based order.
5
1.3 The National Defence Strategy sets out the six capability effects Defence is required to
deliver in order to achieve these tasks:
project force;
hold a potential adversary’s forces at risk;
protect ADF forces and supporting critical infrastructure in Australia;
sustain protracted combat operations;
maintain persistent situational awareness in our primary area of military
interest; and
achieve decision advantage.
Defence capability investment priorities

1.4 The 2024 Integrated Investment Program sets out the specific capabilities the
Government will invest in to give effect to the National Defence Strategy. It provides a
generational uplift in Defence’s capabilities and shifts the ADF to an integrated, focused
force. The Government has reset its defence capability investment priorities to deliver
this fundamental change.
1.5 Defence’s capability investment priorities were reset through a rigorous prioritisation
process using realistic scenarios that evaluated the investments the ADF would require
to deliver the six capability effects set out in the National Defence Strategy. This reset has
involved a complete rebuild of the Integrated Investment Program to develop a coherent,
logical and affordable plan for defence capability.
1.6 In rebuilding the Integrated Investment Program, the Government has made decisions
to prioritise and fund the acquisition of key capabilities to bolster Australia’s deterrence
capabilities. The Government has also made tough but necessary decisions to cancel,
divest, delay or re‑scope projects or activities that are not critical to delivering the
force our strategic circumstances require. This reprioritisation and additional funding
have enabled the Government to accelerate new and more potent immediate and
longer‑term priority projects and capabilities.
1.7 To ensure our investment plans remain aligned with our strategic settings and take
account of advances in technology and developments in our strategic environment,
the Integrated Investment Program will be revised biennially, in line with the cycle for
updating the National Defence Strategy.
6
Capability investment priorities for the integrated, focused force
Undersea warfare
Maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control

operations
Targeting and long‑range strike
Space and cyber
Amphibious capable combined‑arms land system
Expeditionary air operations
Missile defence
Theatre logistics
Theatre command and control
Guided weapons and explosive ordnance
Enhanced and resilient northern bases
Note: In addition to these capability priorities, the Integrated Investment Program also outlines
investment in the enabling areas of enterprise infrastructure and enterprise data and information and
communications technology (ICT) that are needed to support, sustain and inform ADF operations. The
Integrated Investment Program also outlines the Government’s approach to naval shipbuilding, which
supports multiple capability priorities.
7
-
A
Funding the integrated, focused force
1.8 The Government is investing an additional $5.7 billion over the next four years to 2027‑28
and $50.3 billion over the next decade to 2033‑34, above the previous trajectory over
that period. This investment will see the Defence budget grow over the next ten years to
an estimated $100 billion by 2033‑34. The total funding of $765 billion over the decade
includes $330 billion in allocated funding for the capabilities set out in the Integrated
Investment Program. This funding has been allocated by the Government through the
2024‑25 Budget process.
1.9 In rebuilding the Integrated Investment Program, the Government has made the hard but
necessary decisions to cancel, divest, delay or re‑scope projects or activities that are not
critical to delivering the force our strategic circumstances require. This reprioritisation,
coupled with significant additional funding, has enabled the Government to accelerate
new immediate and longer‑term priority projects to deter any potential adversary from
taking actions that would lead to conflict or military coercion.
1.10 The integrated, focused force is designed using the minimum viable capabilities required
to ensure resources are maximised and military capabilities are brought into service
as quickly as possible. It includes deliberate choices to prioritise the introduction of
next‑generation capabilities as soon as possible, such as the replacement of the Anzac
class frigate with a new general purpose frigate. The Government will also ensure the ADF
maintains the ability to provide options for Australia to respond to crises in the short-term
and will make targeted investments to increase the capabilities of the current force.
1.11 Chart 1 shows the breakdown of investment across the capability priority areas, as well
as essential enabling areas and the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA).
Collectively, investment in these capability priorities will drive the shift from a balanced
force to an integrated, focused force more capable of the impactful projection of
military power.
9
Chart 1
Proportional investment for the decade 2024‑2034
by capability priority
Enterprise Advanced Strategic Undersea warfare

data and ICT Capabilities Accelerator 17%
3% 1% Maritime
capabilities for
Enterprise sea denial and
infrastructure localised sea
5% control operations
Enhanced and 16%

resilient northern
bases
4%
Targeting and
Guided weapons long‑range strike
and explosive
ordnance 8%
5%
Space and cyber
Theatre command
and control 8%
4%
Theatre logistics Amphibious capable
5% Expeditionary
combined‑arms land
system
Missile defence air operations
11%
5% 8%
Note: For Chart 1, individual investments have been solely attributed based on an assessment of the
capability priority to which they will contribute most. The percentages provided in Chart 1 should
not be seen as an upper limit to investment within any particular capability priority, as many projects
will contribute to multiple capability priorities. For example, maritime capabilities for sea denial
and localised sea control operations includes planned investments that also contribute to other
capability effects, such as missile defence and targeting and long‑range strike. Investments in the Naval
Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise have been included within the capability priorities it directly
supports, including undersea warfare and maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control.
10
1.12 Chart 2 shows a breakdown of investments across the five Defence domains of maritime,
land, air, space and cyber, in addition to Defence’s enterprise and enabling functions
for the next decade. Compared with the 2020 Force Structure Plan, the Integrated
Investment Program provides an increased level of investment in defence capability. It
includes investment across all domains in the capabilities needed to strengthen the ADF’s
ability to project force. It also lifts investment as a proportion of the overall total in key
maritime capabilities and enabling capabilities such as data, ICT systems, logistics, guided
weapons, explosive ordnance and infrastructure.
Chart 2
Proportional investment for the decade 2024‑2034 by domain
Enterprise and enabling Maritime

22% 38%
Cyber
7%
Space
3%
Air Land
14% 16%
Note: For Chart 2, investments have been attributed according to the domain in which projects are
managed and delivered, rather than according to the future capability priority to which they will
contribute most. The use of this narrower framework, underpinned by different assumptions relative to
Chart 1, results in some differences in attribution. For example, some planned investments attributed to
cyber in Chart 2 have been attributed to targeting in Chart 1. Not all investments in Chart 2 have been
attributed on an identical basis to the 2020 Force Structure Plan.
11
1.13 While these charts provide a useful basis for comparing planned investment, it is
important to note that the development of an integrated, focused force requires
sustained investment across multiple capability priorities and domains. This applies even
where a specific effect is delivered in only one domain or capability priority area. For
example, the development of effective and integrated targeting and long‑range strike
capabilities requires investment across all domains.
1.14 Integrated air and missile defence provides an example of how the integrated, focused
force will operate. Capabilities from all domains will integrate to detect, track, identify
and then respond to air and missile threats. This will include the use of early warning
aircraft, radar systems and other sensors operated by Navy, Army, Air Force and
intelligence agencies, to detect and track air and missile threats. Sensor data will be
compiled and analysed by an advanced joint air battle management system that will
be integrated with the Defence targeting enterprise, through a common data network.
The joint air battle management system will inform command judgements on how to
best respond to the threat. The ADF’s response to the threat might come from a surface
combatant operated by Navy, from an Air Force fighter aircraft or from a short‑range
ground based air‑defence system operated by a deployed Army unit.
2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy

1.15 The 2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy established the framework and
principles for an Australian defence industrial base that is:
capable of delivering the capacity, size and scale needed to meet Defence’s needs
with the agility to rapidly scale;
resilient to disruptions beyond our control, by strengthening our network of supply
chains;
competitive, by providing the systems, technologies, materials, services and
products Defence needs to support its mission; and
innovative, by maintaining a technological edge and developing the asymmetric
technologies needed by Defence.
1.16 The Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities (SDIPs) in the Defence Industry Development
Strategy are embedded in and have informed the design of the Integrated Investment
Program. By ensuring consistent and sustainable demand for the SDIPs, the Integrated
Investment Program will support industry’s ability to deliver on these priorities and
broader industry and workforce resilience in line with National Defence.
12
1.17 The Integrated Investment Program provides a holistic approach to supporting the seven
SDIPs, which are:
maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade of ADF aircraft;

continuous naval shipbuilding and sustainment;
sustainment and enhancement of the combined‑arms land system;
domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions;
development and integration of autonomous systems;
integration and enhancement of battlespace awareness and management
systems; and
1.18 The Government will support Australian defence industry to pursue export opportunities,
including through an increased focus on government‑to‑government sales. It will also
work to integrate Australian companies into global supply chains, including through the
Global Supply Chain program. This will help bring scale, resilience and sustainability to
Australia’s industrial base.
1.19 The Government will also help establish Australia as a strategic regional hub for key
capabilities. This includes participation in the development program for the Precision
Strike Missile, which will develop Australian industry while contributing to Australia’s
ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul guided weapons and explosive
ordnance (GWEO).
1.20 Defence will share its capability priorities with industry through enhanced Defence‑led
industry engagements. This will include more regular and direct classified briefings in
secure information environments with trusted industry partners.
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Building on the response to the Defence Strategic
Review
1.21 In line with the National Defence Strategy, the Integrated Investment Program will evolve
the ADF’s force structure over three critical time periods:
now until 2025 – the Enhanced Force‑in‑Being will focus on immediate

enhancements that can be made to the current force.
2026 to 2030 – the Objective Integrated Force will see the accelerated acquisition
of critical capabilities.
2031 and beyond – the Future Integrated Force will see the delivery of an ADF that
is fit for purpose across all domains and enablers.
1.22 The Integrated Investment Program extends funding across these three periods to deliver
the immediate priorities the Government identified in response to the 2023 Defence
Strategic Review:
acquisition of conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines through AUKUS

to improve our deterrence capabilities:
x $9 billion was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023‑24 to
2026‑27; the Integrated Investment Program provides $53‑$63 billion for
conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines over the decade from
2024‑25 to 2033‑34;
developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer range and
manufacture munitions in Australia:
x $4.1 billion was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023‑24 to 2026‑27; the
Integrated Investment Program provides $16‑$21 billion for GWEO, including
domestic manufacture of select weapons and components, and $28‑$35 billion
for targeting and long‑range strike over the decade from 2024‑25 to 2033‑34;
improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases:

x $3.8 billion was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023‑24 to 2026‑27;
the Integrated Investment Program provides $14‑$18 billion for northern bases
over the decade from 2024‑25 to 2033‑34; and
lifting our capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into ADF
capability in close partnership with Australian industry:
15
x $900 million was announced in May 2023 for the period 2023‑24 to 2026‑27;
the Integrated Investment Program provides up to $3.8 billion for ASCA over the
decade from 2024‑25 to 2033‑34.
1.23 The Government’s immediate priorities in response to the Defence Strategic Review
also included initiatives to deepen diplomatic and defence partnerships with key
partners in the Indo‑Pacific and improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled
Defence workforce. The Integrated Investment Program includes $510 million over
the decade to 2033-34 to strengthen maritime security with regional partners under
the Pacific Maritime Security Program, as part of a broader package of investment
in deepening diplomatic and defence partnerships in our region. While Defence's
workforce is not directly funded through the Integrated Investment Program, Defence is
continuing to progress initiatives to improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled
Defence workforce.
Reforms to capability acquisition

1.24 Defence requires a more efficient capability acquisition system better suited to our strategic
circumstances. Defence’s capability acquisition system will be transformed through:
a cultural shift empowering greater initiative to achieve agreed capability outcomes

with speed;
systems, processes and tools to improve the risk analysis that underpins
procurement decisions;
a more flexible procurement and contracting framework to improve speed to
delivery;
faster and more agile budgetary governance and processes;
improved project assurance and oversight activities, including greater visibility for
the Government on project performance; and
legislative reforms to strengthen the development, testing, manufacturing,
sustainment and security of defence capabilities.
1.25 The concept of minimum viable capability was integral in the development of the
Integrated Investment Program. Minimum viable capability refers to a capability that can
successfully achieve the lowest acceptable level of the directed effect in the required
time and be able to be acquired, introduced into service and sustained effectively.
1.26 At its core, minimum viable capability is about getting new capabilities into service faster.
This approach retains a focus on value for money, through processes that deliver greater
speed to capability acquisition. It supports innovation and developmental projects and
will allow Defence to embrace risk and work more closely with Australian industry on
iterative upgrades.
16
A highly skilled and integrated workforce
1.27 The Government’s investment in a highly skilled ADF and Defence civilian workforce
across the coming decade will be critical to the successful delivery and operation of
the capabilities set out in the Integrated Investment Program. Defence is focused on
recruitment, retention and skilling initiatives to grow the workforce and become an even
more attractive employer.
1.28 As the Government transitions the ADF to an integrated, focused force, Defence’s
workforce strategy must also change to effectively respond to the workforce crisis
it faces. This will involve addressing immediate workforce needs, while building the
long‑term workforce pipeline.
1.29 The 2020 Force Structure Plan outlined an ADF workforce requirement of around 69,000
personnel by 2030, based on force structure assumptions at the time. In 2022, the
former Government announced a plan to increase Defence’s total permanent workforce,
encompassing ADF and civilian personnel, to over 101,000 by 2040, with the total
number of permanent ADF personnel to increase to almost 80,000. This announcement
represented workforce growth of 18,500 over the growth outlined in the 2020 Force
Structure Plan.
1.30 Of the additional 18,500 positions, 12,500 were funded and 6,000 were unfunded.
Between 2020‑21 and 2022‑23, ADF recruitment has achieved approximately 80 percent
of its target growth, equating to a shortfall of over 4,400 ADF personnel. Australian Public
Service (APS) recruitment is currently on track with a workforce of around 17,500.
1.31 To enable effective and achievable workforce planning that reflects the force structure
requirements, Defence will develop a new comprehensive workforce plan for its ADF,
APS and external workforce that is aligned to the National Defence Strategy and the
Integrated Investment Program.
1.32 ADF reservists will continue to form an essential component of the Defence workforce,
representing thousands of personnel fully trained and ready to serve. Coming from all
walks of life, reservists will continue to contribute their unique combinations of skills,
knowledge and experience to Defence’s mission.
1.33 Workforce is at the heart of delivering the sovereign defence industrial base needed
for National Defence. The measures in the Defence Industry Development Strategy
to grow and train the defence industrial workforce require collaboration between the
Commonwealth and state and territory governments, in consultation with defence
industry, unions and education providers, to build Australia’s defence industry workforce
in priority areas.
17
Innovation, science and technology

National Defence Strategy priorities for defence innovation, science
and technology
Hypersonics
Long‑range Directed
fires energy
Information Trusted
warfare autonomy
Quantum
technology
1.34 Delivering on National Defence includes ensuring that Australia’s research and innovation
sector supports the most pressing defence and security priorities to accelerate the
delivery of next‑generation capabilities to the ADF.
1.35 The conflict following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated how military
forces can exploit the use of next‑generation technologies to achieve operational
outcomes and asymmetric advantage in non‑traditional and unconventional ways.
Asymmetric capabilities possess qualities that can circumvent a potential adversary’s
strengths, disrupt their decision calculus and impose disproportionate costs to endure,
counter or remove.
1.36 Given regional military modernisation and the rapid pace of technological change, the
Integrated Investment Program needs to ensure that Defence is positioned to take full
advantage of next‑generation technologies in ways that provide an asymmetric military
advantage and help deliver the Strategy of Denial.
18
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1.37 The focus on innovation, science and technology in the Integrated Investment Program
will drive new technology solutions, accelerate technology maturity and support
capability delivery. Defence innovation, science and technology will play a critical role in
maturing technology and bringing next‑generation technologies into defence capabilities
through spiral development and risk reduction.
The AUKUS technology partnership
In the face of an evolving security environment, the AUKUS partnership between

Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States presents a generational
opportunity to modernise and enhance longstanding partnerships and support
security and stability in the Indo‑Pacific and beyond.
Under AUKUS Pillar I, Australia is acquiring conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered

submarines that will enhance our ability to deter aggression and contribute to
stability in the Indo‑Pacific.
As a nation connected to the world through three oceans, submarines are an

essential capability for Australia. Relative to conventionally‑powered submarines,
nuclear‑powered submarines provide a superior deterrence capability. They are
harder to detect, have longer range and endurance, and provide a more versatile
platform for weapon systems and sensors. This enhanced capability is critical given
the complex and challenging strategic environment Australia faces.
AUKUS partners are collaborating to deliver this capability at the earliest possible
date and all three countries have committed to ensuring the initiative sets the
highest standards for safety, security and non‑proliferation.
Under AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities, AUKUS partners are pooling the
talents of our defence and innovation sectors to catalyse the delivery of advanced
capabilities, including the integration of our defence industrial bases, research
sectors and investor networks to accelerate trilateral capability development.
AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities is contributing to strengthening AUKUS

partners’ industrial bases by eliminating barriers to information sharing and to
technological and industrial cooperation.
1.38 Through the Integrated Investment Program, the Government is investing up

to $3.8 billion over the next decade in ASCA. ASCA will translate asymmetric
technologies into defence capability in close collaboration with defence industry,
including Australian primes, small and medium‑sized businesses and research
organisations. ASCA’s priorities will be driven by the National Defence Strategy and
AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities.
20
1.39 The Integrated Investment Program will enable Defence to invest in trilateral cooperation
on AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities, initially including:
undersea capabilities;
quantum technologies;
advanced cyber;
hypersonics and counter‑hypersonic capabilities;
electronic warfare; and
artificial intelligence and autonomy.
1.40 Investments in emerging technologies through the Integrated Investment

Program include:
highly advanced, extremely capable autonomous systems able to operate and

survive in contested warfighting environments, including the MQ‑28A Ghost Bat
collaborative combat aircraft and the Ghost Shark uncrewed underwater vehicle;
smaller, low‑cost and expendable robotic and autonomous systems that could be
deployed in larger groups across the maritime, land and air domains; and
the development of advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and early
warning sensors, including through continued development of CEA Technologies’
advanced radar capabilities and the Jindalee Operational Radar Network.
1.41 In line with advances in technology, the Integrated Investment Program includes
investment in a range of uncrewed and autonomous systems that can work together
and complement crewed systems on a range of missions that will support a Strategy
of Denial, hold potential adversary forces at risk and increase the potency of
our capabilities.
1.42 All weapons and weapon systems acquired by Defence will comply with Australia’s
domestic and international legal obligations and will be subject to legal reviews
prior to employment in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 of the
Geneva Conventions.
21
2
Chapter 2:
Undersea
Warfare
2.1 The modernisation of regional undersea surveillance and detection capabilities means
Australia needs more stealthy, survivable and lethal undersea capabilities that can
operate effectively at longer ranges. The Integrated Investment Program prioritises
investment in undersea warfare capabilities that will strengthen the ADF’s ability to
project force, hold potential adversary forces at risk and provide awareness of potential
threats to Australia’s security.
Conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines

2.2 A fleet of conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines will be central to
National Defence. They are harder to detect, have longer range and endurance, and
provide a more versatile platform for weapon systems and sensors, which will enable
us to hold a potential adversary's assets at risk at the greatest distance possible from
Australia’s shores.
2.3 Through the AUKUS partnership, Australia will acquire, operate and sustain a sovereign,
conventionally‑armed fleet of nuclear‑powered submarines equipped for intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance and undersea warfare and strike missions, consisting of:
three Virginia class submarines to be acquired from the United States, with an
option to seek approval for a subsequent acquisition of an additional two Virginia
class submarines if required. Australia’s Virginia class submarines will be sovereign
Australian submarines operated by the Royal Australian Navy. These submarines
will provide Australia with a conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarine
capability within the earliest possible timeframe, eliminating any capability gap
prior to the delivery of Australia’s first SSN‑AUKUS submarine. The first Virginia class
submarine is expected to be delivered in the early 2030s; and
23
trilaterally developed SSN‑AUKUS submarines to be constructed in South Australia.

SSN‑AUKUS will be based on the United Kingdom’s next‑generation design and will
incorporate advanced and interoperable technology from all three AUKUS nations,
including cutting‑edge United States submarine technologies. The first Australian
built SSN‑AUKUS is expected to be delivered in the early 2040s.
2.4 The transition to SSN‑AUKUS will be streamlined through commonality in systems

across the Virginia class and SSN‑AUKUS, which will enhance interoperability and
interchangeability of capability and workforce skillsets between AUKUS partners.
2.5 The acquisition of conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines represents the

largest single defence capability investment in Australian history and is an essential
investment given the strategic circumstances we face. The Government’s commitment
to conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines will require funding of
approximately 0.15 percent of Gross Domestic Product averaged out over the life of
the program, in line with 2023‑24 Budget projections. This is a transformative step that
will significantly contribute to Australia’s national security, regional stability and the
Australian economy.
2.6 The Government will invest $53‑$63 billion in this capability over the next decade
through the Integrated Investment Program, including submarines and supporting
infrastructure. In addition to this funding, the Government is resourcing the Australian
Submarine Agency, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator and other
government agencies.
2.7 The uplift in Australian industrial capability and capacity to support the acquisition
and sustainment of the conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarine fleet is
unprecedented and will be a whole‑of‑nation undertaking. There will be significant
opportunities across defence and related industries, innovation, science and technology
programs and Australia’s education and training institutions to meet the demands of the
nuclear‑powered submarine program.
Infrastructure for conventionally‑armed,

nuclear‑powered submarines
2.8 Australia’s SSN‑AUKUS conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines will be
manufactured in the Osborne naval shipyard in South Australia. Work to deliver these
submarines is already well under way, and key land acquisition and infrastructure
initiatives have already commenced, to ensure construction of Australia’s first
SSN‑AUKUS can begin before the end of this decade.
24
2.9 The Submarine Construction Yard created for the build of Australia's next-generation
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will make Osborne one of the most
advanced technological hubs in the world. In the next few years alone, it is estimated at
least $2 billion will be invested in South Australian infrastructure.
2.10 Investment in infrastructure works over the coming decade to support

conventionally-armed, nuclear‑powered submarines includes investment at
HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. HMAS Stirling has been undergoing a significant
program of works to support new Navy capabilities. Around $8 billion in additional
investment is planned in infrastructure in Western Australia out to the mid‑2030s to
support the transition to a sovereign Australian nuclear‑powered submarine operating
base. Investment in large vessel infrastructure in Henderson will be underpinned by the
requirements of the nuclear‑powered submarine program, as well as the future surface
fleet, and will be considered by Government based on forthcoming advice.
2.11 In September 2023, the Government approved an initial $1.5 billion investment to
deliver priority works required to enable a United Kingdom and United States submarine
rotational presence to commence from 2027 under Submarine Rotational Force – West
(SRF‑West). Subsequent works will be required to support the full SRF-West presence of
up to four United States Virginia class submarines and one Astute class submarine from
the United Kingdom.
2.12 The priority facilities required by 2027 to ensure safe and secure operation of
conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines include:
operational berths that meet the requirements for conventionally‑armed,

nuclear‑powered submarines on the existing submarine pier;
a shore power supply to berthed submarines;
intermediate maintenance facilities to support in‑water, routine SSN maintenance
activities;
regulated facilities for naval nuclear propulsion maintenance activities, including for
the management of operational low‑level radiological waste generated from those
activities;
emergency preparedness and response capabilities;
a submarine crew training centre; and
a physical security uplift for the base.
2.13 Subsequent maturation of these priority works to support the full SRF‑West capability
from 2030 will include:
25
additional staff working accommodation;

expanded training facilities for Navy crew;
expanded torpedo storage and maintenance facilities; and
additional logistic warehousing capacity.
2.14 The Government has agreed in‑principle that an east coast facility should be established
for Australia’s future submarine capability.
Australian industry opportunities in AUKUS Pillar I

There will be significant opportunities for Australian industry to be part of Australia’s
conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarine program.
These opportunities will extend from the delivery of the submarine construction
yard in Osborne in South Australia, infrastructure works at HMAS Stirling in Western
Australia, sustainment of Australia’s Virginia class submarines, to building and
supporting the operation of the SSN‑AUKUS submarines.
The Government will ensure opportunities for Australian businesses are developed
as a core priority to deliver Australia’s future submarine capability, including
integrating Australian businesses into the supply chains of our AUKUS partners.
This will see Australian businesses contribute to the maintenance of
conventionally‑armed United Kingdom and United States submarines and the
manufacture of components for their production lines.
A critical mechanism will be the Defence Industry Vendor Qualification Program,
which was initiated by AUKUS partners in January 2024 to streamline and accelerate
the qualification of suppliers into United States supply chains.
A second phase of United States qualification will commence in mid‑2024 targeting
machined parts, electrical components and medium valves, with a further three
phases planned for other major product families over the following 18 months.
Qualification of Australian suppliers will be completed against the major product
families critical to sustaining Virginia class submarines in time for SRF-West.
Once qualified, Australian companies will be well‑positioned to contribute to the
supply of the items and components that make up each submarine and therefore
contribute to a more resilient trilateral industrial base.
Over time, the program will be expanded to integrate Australian businesses into the
United Kingdom submarine supply chain.
26
Collins class submarines
2.15 The Government will invest $4‑$5 billion to ensure that the six Collins class submarines
will continue to provide a potent and credible capability to conduct operations to
safeguard Australia’s maritime approaches and sea lines of communication alongside the
ADF's surface fleet and airborne and land based capabilities. This will include:
the Collins life‑of‑type extension project;

upgrades to the Collins class sonar suite; and
ongoing sustainment of the Collins class, including cooperative capability assurance
programs with the United States.
2.16 Australia’s transition to conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines will be

underpinned by the ongoing availability of the Collins class submarine fleet. The
continued operation of the Collins class will maintain essential skills for Defence
and industry workforces and provide steps to build the future workforce for the
conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines.
Subsea warfare and uncrewed maritime systems

2.17 To complement crewed undersea warfare capabilities and Navy’s surface combatant
fleet, the Government will invest $5.2‑$7.2 billion in the development and acquisition
of subsea warfare capabilities and new autonomous and uncrewed maritime vehicles,
including through AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced Capabilities.
2.18 The development and acquisition of uncrewed surface vessels and uncrewed undersea
vehicles will take advantage of technological advancements in autonomous, robotic
and uncrewed systems. This will include investments in expendable, low‑cost systems
that can be produced at scale and deployed in larger groups on operational missions.
Navy’s uncrewed systems will be optimised for persistent, long‑range defence missions in
high‑risk environments including maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
27
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2.19 Planned investments include the development and acquisition of highly capable large
and extra‑large uncrewed and autonomous underwater vehicles to undertake stealthy
missions in high‑risk environments, alongside continued acquisition of Bluebottle
uncrewed surface vessels to undertake persistent maritime surveillance. The dedicated
undersea support vessel ADV Guidance will continue to provide support to undersea
surveillance systems trials, including the ability to deploy undersea crewed and uncrewed
vehicles, and robotic and autonomous systems. Enabling capabilities such as command
and control systems, robotic and autonomous systems and capabilities for the collection
and analysis of hydrographic data will be integrated into ADF operations.
Underwater range systems

2.20 To further safeguard Australia’s undersea capability, the Government will invest
$550‑$650 million to develop and acquire acoustic underwater range systems and
expanded undersea warfare facilities and infrastructure.
Table 1:
Investments in undersea warfare
Capability Element Approved Unapproved Total
Planned Planned Planned
Investment Investment Investment
(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Conventionally‑armed,
nuclear‑powered
$13bn $40bn ‑ $50bn $53bn ‑ $63bn
submarines and
infrastructure
Collins class submarines $1.0bn $3.0bn ‑ $4.0bn $4.0bn ‑ $5.0bn
Subsea warfare and $170m $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.2bn ‑ $7.2bn
uncrewed maritime systems
Underwater range systems $250m $300m ‑ $400m $550m ‑ $650m
Total $14bn $48bn ‑ $61bn $63bn ‑ $76bn
Note: A range of capabilities beyond those described in this section and listed in Table 1 contribute to
the ADF’s anti‑submarine warfare capability, including the P‑8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the
Hunter class frigates and intelligence, space and cyber capabilities.
29
3
Chapter 3:
Maritime Capabilities
for Sea Denial
and Localised Sea
Control Operations
3.1 To achieve the Strategy of Denial, Navy needs to be able to operate in the Indo‑Pacific.
As a maritime trading nation dependent on the security of our oceans, it is essential
for Navy to have sufficient modern capabilities suitable to operate in an increasingly
complex environment.
3.2 The Integrated Investment Program prioritises investment in maritime capabilities

that can hold potential adversary forces at risk in Australia’s northern approaches,
contributing to the security and stability of our region. This total investment of
$51‑$69 billion includes the acceleration of an expanded surface combatant fleet with
enhanced lethality and delivers continuous naval shipbuilding in both South Australia and
Western Australia.
31
Enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet

3.3 The Integrated Investment Program includes funding of $39‑$55 billion to deliver the
Government’s response to the review of Navy’s surface combatant fleet. This investment
will enhance the surface fleet’s strike, air‑defence and undersea warfare capabilities,
and bolster its ability to conduct presence operations. The enhanced lethality surface
combatant fleet will consist of:
three Hobart class air warfare destroyers upgraded to the Baseline 9 Aegis combat
system with enhanced strike and air‑defence capabilities;
six Hunter class anti‑submarine frigates of a single design that will boost Navy’s
undersea warfare, strike and air‑defence capabilities;
11 new general purpose frigates, constructed through an offshore then onshore
build strategy to accelerate delivery, to replace the Anzac class frigates. These
vessels will operate independently and in conjunction with the Hobart class air
warfare destroyers and Hunter class frigates to secure maritime trade routes and
northern approaches and escort military assets;
six Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels to be built in Western Australia to
increase Navy’s long‑range strike capacity and overall fleet lethality, to be delivered
in the 2030s. These systems can provide high endurance at a lower cost, and will
be optimised for operating in company with the rest of the surface combatant
fleet. These vessels will be provided with up to 32 vertical launching system cells
to increase long‑range strike capacity and overall fleet lethality. Large Optionally
Crewed Surface Vessels are currently being developed by the United States
Navy; and
six Arafura class offshore patrol vessels and 10 Evolved Cape class patrol boats as
part of Navy’s minor war vessel program. The Arafura class offshore patrol vessels
will perform a maritime patrol and response role for Navy. Of the 10 Evolved Cape
class vessels, the last of the eight fulfilling a maritime security role will be delivered
by the end of 2024 and the remaining two vessels, which will provide a navigation
and seamanship training capability, will be delivered by end of 2026.
3.4 Defence will decommission the two oldest Anzac class frigates as per their planned
service life. HMAS Anzac will be withdrawn from service in 2024, and HMAS Arunta will
be decommissioned in 2026, subject to an assessment of its condition. The remaining
six ships will remain operational, enabling Navy to maintain its fleet availability levels
while retaining workforce and industry skills. This will provide improved value for money
relative to previous plans, with the Government prioritising funding for the acceleration
of new general purpose frigates rather than an extended period of sustainment for the
oldest Anzac class frigates.
32
3.5 Supporting the growth in the number of major fleet vessels, the Fleet Air Arm will
expand its fleet of multi‑role helicopters to a total of 36 MH‑60R Romeo helicopters from
mid‑2025. These highly capable helicopters will provide airborne anti‑submarine warfare
capabilities and perform logistic roles in support of maritime operations.
3.6 The Government will also further enhance the lethality of the existing surface combatant
fleet through a range of additional projects, including:
upgrading existing Phalanx close‑in weapon systems to enhance anti‑ship missile

defence capabilities and provide the ability to engage targets including slow flying
aircraft, uncrewed aerial vehicles and surface vessels. Upgraded systems will be
deployed onto the Hobart class destroyers and HMAS Choules;
enhancing Nulka missile decoys that attract anti‑ship missiles away from their
targets through the provision of next‑generation Nulka rounds and a sovereign
support facility. This system is fitted to the Canberra class landing helicopter dock,
the Anzac class frigates and the Hobart class destroyers and will be fitted to the
Hunter class frigates;
acquiring the Tomahawk weapon system to allow Navy to hold targets at risk at
longer ranges, including for the Hobart class destroyers and, subject to a feasibility
assessment, Hunter class frigates;
replacing the Harpoon anti‑ship missile with the Naval Strike Missile on the Hobart
class destroyers and Anzac class frigates and fitting the Naval Strike Missile to the
Hunter class frigates; and
providing upgrades to the Aegis Baseline 9 combat system and Standard Missile‑2
(SM‑2) and Standard Missile‑6 (SM‑6) long‑range, air‑defence missiles for the
Hobart class destroyers and Hunter class frigates, providing the ability to counter
airborne threats, including ballistic missiles.
3.7 Essential logistics support and amphibious capabilities for the fleet will be maintained
through continued investment in the two Supply class replenishment oilers and
sustainment enhancements to the two Canberra class landing helicopter docks and
HMAS Choules. The Government is also investing in surface fleet support infrastructure,
including the redevelopment of the Garden Island Defence Precinct in Sydney, to ensure
these facilities can securely and efficiently berth, maintain and repair Navy vessels.
3.8 Consolidation of the Henderson precinct in Western Australia is currently under way,
as recommended by the Defence Strategic Review. Successful and timely consolidation
will enable eight new general purpose frigates to be built at the Henderson precinct and
will also enable a pathway to build six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels in
Western Australia.
33
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Hydrographic systems
3.9 Defence is partnering with the commercial hydrographic industry to undertake
maritime surveys of Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone and improve its understanding
of our maritime environment. From 2024, around $1 billion will be invested over the
decade through the HydroScheme Industry Partnership Program to collect, collate and
produce nautical charts and publications within the Australian Charting Area with the
Australian Hydrographic Office.
Maritime mining
3.10 To safeguard against the possibility of a contested maritime domain within Australian
waters, the Government will invest $640‑$670 million over the decade in capabilities to
help secure Australia’s regional maritime approaches and augment Defence’s ability to
protect littoral operations. This includes the acquisition of advanced, multi‑sensor sea
mines capable of being deployed from sub‑surface vessels, ships and aircraft.
Maritime support to regional partners

3.11 The Government will invest $510 million over the decade to support regional partners
under the Pacific Maritime Security Program. The Pacific Maritime Security Program
is a comprehensive package of capability, infrastructure, sustainment, training and
coordination designed to increase national and regional maritime security.
3.12 Deliveries of Pacific patrol boat replacements will continue as part of the Pacific
Maritime Security Program’s delivery of capability to enhance maritime security. The
Government is providing 22 Guardian class patrol boats to the region, with 19 vessels
delivered to date.
3.13 ADV Reliant will continue to perform its role providing support to Australia’s Pacific
partners and remains prepared for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations
when called upon.
35
Table 2:
Investments in maritime capabilities for sea denial
and localised sea control operations
(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Surface combatant fleet

Hobart class $1.5bn $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $6.5bn ‑ $8.5bn
Hunter class $2.3bn $20bn ‑ $30bn $22bn ‑ $32bn
General purpose frigates nil $7.0bn ‑ $10bn $7.0bn ‑ $10bn
Large Optionally Crewed
nil $400m ‑ $500m $400m ‑ $500m
Surface Vessels
Arafura class $2.2bn $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $3.2bn ‑ $3.7bn
Evolved Cape class $150m nil $150m
Anzac class $120m nil $120m
MH‑60R Romeo $1.7bn $700m ‑ $1.0bn $2.4bn ‑ $2.7bn
Surface combatant fleet support
Nulka missile decoys $110m $500m ‑ $700m $610m ‑ $810m
Surface fleet support systems $13m $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn
Supply class $12m nil $12m
Canberra class $2m $400m ‑ $500m $400m ‑ $500m
Surface fleet support
infrastructure
$160m $3.0bn ‑ $4.0bn $3.2bn ‑ $4.2bn
(including Garden Island
Defence Precinct)
Pacific support vessel $2m $150m ‑ $200m $150m ‑ $200m
Hydrographic systems $1.0bn nil $1.0bn
Maritime mining $620m $20m ‑ $50m $640m ‑ $670m
Maritime support to
$510m nil $510m
regional partners
Note: Planned investment for the Tomahawk weapon system, Naval Strike Missiles, Aegis Baseline 9
upgrade and SM-2/SM‑6 is included in Table 3, targeting and long‑range strike.
36
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4
Chapter 4:
Naval Shipbuilding
and Sustainment
Enterprise
4.1 Australia’s ability to build and sustain modern naval capabilities is critical to our national
security and sovereignty. The Integrated Investment Program will deliver a continuous
naval shipbuilding program through investment in naval shipbuilding and sustainment
activities at Osborne in South Australia and Henderson in Western Australia.
4.2 Naval shipbuilding and sustainment is a whole‑of‑nation endeavour, requiring a

significant uplift in Australia’s shipbuilding workforce, industry and infrastructure to
generate a modern naval capability. The Government is committed to supporting the
growth of a continuous, productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding and sustainment
industrial enterprise, including its underpinning supply chains and workforce, in line with
National Defence.
4.3 Over the decade, the Government is making an historic investment in building, sustaining
and upgrading naval vessels and maritime capabilities, including conventionally‑armed,
nuclear‑powered submarines. This includes $53‑$63 billion in conventionally‑armed,
nuclear‑powered submarines and facilities, $39‑$55 billion in Navy’s surface combatant
fleet and $12‑$17 billion in littoral manoeuvre vessels and facilities.
39
Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise

Strategy
4.4 The dual objectives of the Government’s Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise
Strategy are to:
uplift the capacity, productivity and resilience of Australia’s shipbuilding and

sustainment industrial ecosystem, to provide national preparedness as a direct
input to the operations of the ADF; and
generate ongoing economic, export and employment opportunities for decades to
come.
4.5 Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Enterprise Strategy comprises the
following lines of effort:
optimising Australia’s existing naval shipbuilding and sustainment industrial base to

support continuous naval shipbuilding at two principal shipyards in South Australia
and Western Australia, accompanied by a national maritime sustainment network,
in conjunction with establishing an industrial base to support the acquisition and
sustainment of conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines;
balanced investment over significant planning and delivery timeframes to support
the timely and cost‑effective acquisition, upgrade and sustainment of minimum
viable maritime capability, while also providing a predictable pipeline of work and
consistent demand signals to industry to encourage investment;
developing strategic partnerships with industry to strengthen the industrial base
and to improve the capability and participation of mid‑tier supply chain companies;
managing workforce demand pressures through new and innovative approaches to
upskill and support over 8,500 direct jobs by 2030 in conventional shipbuilding and
sustainment, as well as around 20,000 direct jobs over the next 30 years as part of
the nuclear‑powered submarine pathway;
expanding infrastructure capability and capacity to support planned acquisition and
sustainment activities, while optimising productivity at the principal shipyards;
enhancing physical security measures at the principal shipyards and supporting
Australian industry partners to uplift security standards and compliance for defence
industry, their workforce and supporting supply chains; and
national and international partnering and collaboration, including with state and
territory governments, industry partners, academic and training institutions, and
international partners.
40
2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan
4.6 The Government’s shipbuilding investment includes major changes to defence
shipbuilding that will result in a Navy equipped with a major surface combatant fleet
over twice as large as previously planned, including eleven new general purpose frigates,
six Hunter class frigates and six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels. It will also
result in an Army equipped with 18 landing craft medium and eight landing craft heavy.
4.7 South Australia will be the primary location for designing and building the Hunter class
frigates and upgrading the Hobart class destroyers, with construction of the Hunter
class frigate commencing at the Osborne shipyard in 2024. The Hunter class will be
immediately followed by construction of the replacement for Navy's Hobart class
destroyers. Australia’s SSN‑AUKUS conventionally‑armed, nuclear‑powered submarines
will also be built in the Osborne precinct.
4.8 Consolidation of the Henderson precinct in Western Australia is being achieved through
the delivery of landing craft medium and landing craft heavy. This consolidation will
set the conditions for eight new general purpose frigates to be built at Henderson and
provide a pathway to build six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels in Western
Australia in the 2030s.
4.9 Further detail on how these changes to Defence shipbuilding will be implemented will be
provided in an updated Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan to be released later this
year. The 2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan will set out the Government’s
approach to supporting the growth of a productive and resilient sovereign shipbuilding
and sustainment industrial enterprise. It will be complemented by a Shipbuilding Forecast
for industry and the public to build confidence in Australia’s shipbuilding industry. Future
iterations of the Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan and the Shipbuilding Forecast
will be issued in line with the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle.
41
5
Chapter 5:
Targeting and
Long‑range Strike
5.1 The Government will invest $28‑$35 billion to develop and enhance targeting and
long‑range strike capabilities across Defence. This includes acquiring advanced guided
weapons that can deliver potent effects at longer ranges, building weapons stockpiles
and developing and integrating targeting capabilities, including sensors and ICT systems,
to ensure these weapons can be used effectively. These capabilities will provide the
integrated, focused force with a greater capacity to hold at risk a potential adversary’s
forces that could target Australia’s interests during a conflict.
Defence targeting enterprise

5.2 An advanced and resilient network of sensors and communications and intelligence
systems will be brought together to form a Defence targeting enterprise. The Defence
targeting enterprise will provide Defence with the timely ability to detect, identify
and track targets more precisely and at longer ranges in highly contested operating
environments. The Defence targeting enterprise will be underpinned by a highly trained
workforce and will be interoperable with the capabilities of the United States and
other key partners.
43
Long‑range strike
5.3 The Integrated Investment Program includes investment in long‑range strike capabilities
for the Navy, Army and Air Force.
Navy
5.4 The Government will acquire the Tomahawk weapon system from the United States
to allow Navy's Hobart class destroyers, Hunter class frigates, subject to a feasibility
assessment, and, in the future, Virginia class submarines, to hold targets at risk
at longer ranges.
5.5 Next‑generation Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block II, SM‑2 and SM‑6 missiles capable of
being deployed in the Hobart class destroyers and Hunter class frigates will be acquired.
This will provide Navy with a greater capacity to target aircraft and missiles.
5.6 The integration of the Naval Strike Missile into Australia’s fleet of surface combatants
will continue. The Naval Strike Missile will provide an advanced capability against heavily
protected maritime and land targets.
Army
5.7 The acquisition of land based long‑range fires will be accelerated and expanded. Army’s
first long‑range fires regiment will be equipped with 42 High Mobility Artillery Rocket
Systems armed with Precision Strike Missile and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
munitions. This regiment will provide enhanced land and maritime strike and strengthen
Army’s ability to prevent an adversary’s forces from entering an operational area.
5.8 An additional long‑range fires regiment will further expand Army’s strike capabilities,
strengthening its ability to deliver persistent land based maritime strike.
5.9 The introduction of new land based radar systems and communications capabilities
will extend Army’s sensor and command and control networks. These capabilities will
provide an important contribution to the Defence targeting enterprise by improving the
integrated, focused force’s ability to detect and track approaching threats.
Air Force
5.10 The Long Range Anti‑Ship Missile capability will be acquired for integration into the
F/A‑18F Super Hornet, P‑8A Poseidon and F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Defence is
also investigating the integration of the Joint Strike Missile for the F‑35A.
44
5.11 The integration of the Joint Air‑to‑Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range capability
onto the F/A‑18F Super Hornet and F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter will enable Air Force to
defeat a more diverse set of land targets at longer ranges.
5.12 The integration of the Advanced Anti‑Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range onto
the EA‑18G Growler and the F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter will improve Air Force’s ability to
disrupt potential adversary surveillance and targeting capabilities.
5.13 The development of hypersonic air‑launched weapons for employment from the
F/A‑18F Super Hornet will provide the ability to engage targets at longer ranges with
high‑speed weapons.
5.14 Loitering precision munitions and their associated launch platforms and enabling
systems will support land and maritime targeting operations. These munitions will enable
the ADF to respond to threats more quickly without placing ADF people and systems
in harm’s way.
Table 3:
Investments in targeting and long‑range strike
(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Defence targeting enterprise $580m $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.6bn ‑ $7.6bn

Long‑range strike
Navy – sea based strike $5.3bn $7.0bn ‑ $10bn $12bn ‑ $15bn
Army – land based strike $1.9bn $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $3.9bn ‑ $4.9bn
Air Force –
$260m $3.0bn ‑ $4.0bn $3.3bn ‑ $4.3bn
air‑launched strike
Air Force – hypersonic
$1.5bn $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $2.5bn ‑ $3.0bn
weapons
Total $9.5bn $18bn ‑ $26bn $28bn ‑ $35bn
Note: Planned investments in new weapons for Navy, Army and Air Force to enhance their strike
capabilities are included in Table 3. Planned investments in Australia’s domestic GWEO enterprise
capabilities are included in GWEO investments at Table 10.
45
6
Chapter 6:
Space and Cyber
6.1 The Integrated Investment Program includes $27‑$36 billion in investments to enhance
space and cyber capabilities and improve their integration with other ADF capabilities.
This will improve the ADF’s understanding of the operating environment and its ability to
gain a decision advantage over potential adversaries and respond to threats effectively
and decisively.
Enhanced space capabilities

6.2 Space capabilities underpin the ADF’s warfighting effectiveness by providing
critical services, including communications, weather, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, and positioning, navigation and timing information.
6.3 The Government will invest $9‑$12 billion in enhanced space capabilities through
the Integrated Investment Program to provide resilient communications, surveillance
and reconnaissance, and improved space domain awareness and space control.
This will include:
the delivery of a sovereign‑controlled Australian Defence Satellite Communications

(SATCOM) system capability over the Indo‑Pacific. This system will include
communications satellites with ground stations and operations centres across
Australia and an integrated SATCOM management system;
47
the introduction of the Deep‑space Advanced Radar Capability, integrated with sites
in the United Kingdom and United States, to provide continuous detection, tracking
and identification of objects in deep space. The Deep‑space Advanced Radar
Capability will provide continuous global detection and observation of satellites
and other space objects and increase Defence’s ability to understand and monitor
threats to its space capabilities; and
measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to
interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help
ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support
its operations.
Enhanced cyber capabilities

6.4 Enhanced cyber capabilities are needed to protect the ADF’s warfighting networks as
well as understand and counter threats in the cyber domain that are increasing in scale
and complexity.
6.5 The Government will invest $15‑$20 billion in enhanced cyber domain capabilities to
develop both defensive and offensive options to impose costs on malicious cyber activity
in an increasingly contested cyber domain. These investments will provide greater
visibility of threats to critical infrastructure, increase the resilience of our infrastructure to
cyber attacks, provide new intelligence functions and enable offensive cyber operations.
6.6 Defence and the Australian Signals Directorate, alongside domestic and international
partners, will continue work to ensure Australian networks remain stable and secure.
The Australian Signals Directorate helps defend Australia from cyber threats by
comprehensively understanding the cyber threat, providing proactive advice and
assistance to improve the management of cyber risks and applying its offensive
capabilities offshore, including to support military operations.
48
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6.7 REDSPICE represents the largest ever investment in Australia’s signals intelligence and
cyber capability. The Government has prioritised REDSPICE funding in the Integrated
Investment Program to enhance Australia’s cyber capabilities, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance and deliver resilient communications and computer network
defence and disrupt options. REDSPICE will provide:
new offensive cyber capability to support the ADF;

enhanced strategic and operational intelligence;
new national cyber defence capabilities to defend Australia’s most critical systems
and infrastructure;
increased survivability and resilience of communications, classified networks and
the Australian Signals Directorate’s most critical functions;
enhanced space capability to support the ADF and resilient worldwide
communications; and
foundational capabilities such as data science, automation and machine learning to
deal with increasing volumes of data.
6.8 The Government is also investing in the delivery of an enhanced deployable defensive
cyber operations capability for the ADF and a comprehensive training program to
support the growth of the ADF cyber workforce.
6.9 The Integrated Investment Program also provides capabilities to enhance Defence’s
ability to understand, operate in and secure the cyber terrain in which cyber activities
occur. This includes:
improving the warfighting cyber capabilities of Defence’s networks and

strengthening their cyber interoperability with the United States and other key
partners;
developing joint warfighting networks and applications that will improve
communications access for ADF forces operating in challenging environments and
strengthen network security and resilience;
enhancing strategic communications systems;
developing alternative position, navigation and timing capabilities; and
modernising Defence’s cryptography to provide enduring communications security.
50
Electronic warfare
6.10 The Government is investing $2.7‑$3.7 billion in the development and integration of
electronic warfare capabilities that can protect the ADF’s electronic capabilities from
being interfered with, for instance through jamming and can enable the ADF to locate
and disrupt a potential adversary’s electronic signals. One of the ways in which the ADF’s
electronic warfare capabilities are being enhanced is through AUKUS Pillar II – Advanced
Capabilities, including through the AUKUS electronic warfare innovation challenge
launched in 2024.
Table 4:
Investments in space and cyber
(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Enhanced space capabilities

Satellite communications $150m $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.2bn ‑ $7.2bn
Space sensors $250m $3.0bn ‑ $4.0bn $3.3bn ‑ $4.3bn
Space control $190m $300m ‑ $400m $490m ‑ $590m
Enhanced cyber capabilities
Cyber capabilities $1.4bn $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $6.4bn ‑ $8.4bn
Cyber terrain $1.9bn $7.0bn ‑ $10bn $8.9bn ‑ $12bn
Electronic warfare $720m $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $2.7bn ‑ $3.7bn
51
7
Chapter 7:
Amphibious Capable
Combined‑arms
Land System
7.1 The Integrated Investment Program prioritises investments of $36‑$44 billion to enable
Army to rapidly transform in response to Australia’s changing strategic circumstances.
By 2026, Army’s divisions, commands and formations will have a new structure and
posture. This significant investment and restructure will ensure Army is ready to operate
in defence of Australia as part of an integrated, focused force.
7.2 Army will have the capability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, control key
strategic land positions, maintain persistent forward partnerships and protect and
sustain deployed forces within Australia’s primary area of military interest. Army’s
amphibious capable combined‑arms land system will be capable of assuring the security
of populations and controlling territory in the most challenging threat environments, in
cooperation with other ADF capabilities.
7.3 To perform these critical tasks, Army’s structure will include specialised combat and
support brigades, along with a new dedicated fires brigade and littoral manoeuvre group.
Army will consolidate its aviation capability to reduce the cost of aircraft ownership and
better generate capability. If required, these same forces will be able to undertake rapid
stabilisation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
53
Littoral manoeuvre
7.4 The Government will prioritise the acquisition of new littoral manoeuvre capabilities and
infrastructure through an investment of $7‑$10 billion in littoral manoeuvre vessels and
$5‑$7 billion in related facilities. These capabilities will strengthen the ADF’s capacity to
rapidly project force in a crisis or conflict and sustain ADF operations in the region.
7.5 Army will acquire and operate 18 landing craft medium and eight landing craft heavy,
which will be distributed across the three units based in South East Queensland,
northern Queensland and Darwin. The littoral manoeuvre vessels will be manufactured
in Australia and delivered between 2026 and 2037 to support continuous naval
shipbuilding and contribute to Australia’s national industrial base. Defence will also invest
in up to 15 amphibious capable support vehicles, which will be built in Australia.
Combined‑arms land system

7.6 The Government will continue to invest in an upgraded amphibious capable
combined‑arms land system that will be better able to identify threats, protect ADF units,
move quickly and respond decisively within our region. This will involve developing land
capabilities that can be deployed by the ADF's strategic lift assets such as the Air Force’s
C‑17A Globemaster III and C130J Hercules, Army’s new littoral manoeuvre vessels and
Navy’s Canberra class vessels.
7.7 Investment in the enhanced combined‑arms land system includes:
the modernisation of, and operational enhancements for, Defence’s protected

mobility fleet, including the Hawkei protected mobility vehicle – light, the
Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle – medium and protected medium and heavy
trucks;
the replacement of the main battle tank fleet with 75 M1A2 Abrams main
battle tanks to provide significant increases in lethality, mobility, protection and
communications. The new main battle tanks, which are to be delivered between
2024 and 2028, will provide unmatched firepower and protection, enabling land
forces to operate in high‑threat environments. Main battle tanks will be able to
operate with other elements of the combined‑arms land system to meet the most
demanding land challenges in our region;
the acquisition of 129 Redback infantry fighting vehicles capable of providing
highly protected close‑combat capabilities. These vehicles will be manufactured in
Australia from 2026 for delivery between 2027 and 2029. The Redback will provide
Army with an improved ability to operate in hostile environments and strike targets
more effectively;
54
the continued delivery of 211 Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles to meet
Army’s land combat reconnaissance requirements. Domestic production of these
vehicles is ongoing. The Boxer is replacing and enhancing the mounted combat
reconnaissance and counter‑reconnaissance capabilities previously provided by the
Australian light armoured vehicle;
the acquisition of 30 AS9 Huntsman self‑propelled howitzers and 15 AS10 armoured
ammunition resupply vehicles that will provide indirect fire support in close
cooperation with other combat forces. These capabilities will be complemented by
upgrades to the artillery digital terminal control system and the acquisition of new
ammunition types. These systems are being manufactured in Australia and the first
system will enter service this year;
the acquisition of an enlarged and enhanced fleet of bridging, breaching, engineer
support and combat engineering vehicles, including 29 armoured breaching
vehicles and 17 joint assault bridges; and
further investment in low‑cost and expendable small uncrewed aerial systems
for the amphibious capable land force that can undertake a range of operational
roles, including intelligence and surveillance, while improving force protection.
From 2025, the Shadow 200 tactical uncrewed aerial system will be replaced with
the Integrator, which will provide greater performance in payload, endurance,
deployability, connectivity and interoperability.
7.8 Army will continue to explore the utility of uncrewed ground vehicles, including
integrating uncrewed systems into combat missions and support roles, in order to
enhance operational effectiveness and reduce risks to personnel. The Government will
also invest in deployable counter‑small uncrewed aerial systems capabilities.
7.9 The Government will also continue to invest in world‑leading protection and lethality
for ADF personnel through ongoing acquisition and sustainment of advanced small
arms, direct fire support weapons, night‑fighting equipment, combat equipment,
simulation systems for training and other technologies to maintain a decisive edge on
the battlefield.
7.10 Advanced sensors, effectors and exploitation capabilities will also be acquired in order to
enhance the ADF’s ability to understand, detect, evade and neutralise explosive threats.
7.11 Investment in the Army Reserve will deliver enhanced domestic security and response
capabilities, which will strengthen its ability to provide security for northern bases and
critical infrastructure and help it prepare for potential future contingencies.
55
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Battlefield aviation
7.12 Battlefield aviation provides land forces with enhanced situational awareness,
logistic support and the ability to manoeuvre quickly and attack adversary forces.
The Government will invest $9‑$10 billion to recapitalise Army’s battlefield aviation
capabilities. This will include:
acquisition of 40 UH‑60M Black Hawk and supporting systems to rapidly replace

Army’s fleet of MRH‑90 Taipan multi‑role helicopters. The UH‑60M Black Hawks
commenced delivery under an accelerated acquisition process in 2023. Continued
investment in this fleet will provide a proven combat and logistic capability
with the ability to rapidly deploy on a wide variety of missions including land,
amphibious and littoral combat, special operations and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief;
replacement of the current fleet of Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters with
29 AH‑64E Apache attack helicopters. Entering service from 2026, the Apache will
deliver advanced sensing and communication capabilities, command and control
functions and crewed and uncrewed teaming capabilities. It will provide air support
to land forces, close‑combat attack, reconnaissance and escort duties and will
complement the introduction of uncrewed systems and loitering munitions. The
Apache will be an integral part of the combined‑arms land system and an essential
capability to support integrated, focused force operations in our region; and
continued investment in the expanded fleet of 14 CH‑47F Chinook helicopters as
Defence’s battlefield cargo helicopter capability. Expanding the fleet of Defence’s
largest helicopter will strengthen Army’s airlift capability and increase its ability to
support operations.
Special operations capability

7.13 Defence’s special operations forces are a vital component for Australia’s national security
and the ADF’s integrated, focused force. The Government will invest $1.6‑$2.1 billion
to modernise the special operations capability so it can continue to conduct a suite
of specialist military activities across all domains including reconnaissance, targeting,
strike, technical operations and enhanced engagement with allies and partners.
Special operations forces will also continue to provide support to state and territory
counter‑terrorism response.
58
Table 5:
Investments in amphibious capable combined‑arms
land system
(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Littoral manoeuvre
Littoral manoeuvre vessels $35m $7.0bn ‑ $10bn $7.0bn ‑ $10bn
Combined‑arms land system
Hawkei protected mobility
$63m nil $63m
vehicle – light
Bushmaster protected
$210m $1.5bn ‑ $2.0bn $1.7bn ‑ $2.2bn
mobility vehicle – medium
M1A2 Abrams main battle tank $1.5bn $50m ‑ $75m $1.6bn
Redback infantry fighting vehicle $6.4bn $200m ‑ $300m $6.6bn ‑ $6.7bn
Boxer combat
$2.3bn nil $2.3bn
reconnaissance vehicle
Land mobility vehicles $160m nil $160m
Combat vehicle systems nil $100m ‑ $150m $100m ‑ $150m
Huntsman self‑propelled
$580m $15m ‑ $20m $580m ‑ $600m
howitzer
Artillery ammunition and control $34m $500m ‑ $700m $530m ‑ $730m
Combat engineering $130m $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $1.1bn ‑ $1.6bn
Uncrewed tactical systems $190m $500m ‑ $700m $690m ‑ $890m
Individual combat equipment $240m $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $2.2bn ‑ $3.2bn
Counter explosive hazards $180m $700m ‑ $1.0bn $880m ‑ $1.2bn
Reserves recapitalisation nil $200m ‑ $300m $200m ‑ $300m
Battlefield aviation
UH‑60M Black Hawk $3.0bn $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $4.0bn ‑ $4.5bn
AH‑64E Apache $4.3bn $100m ‑ $150m $4.4bn ‑ $4.5bn
CH‑47F Chinook $170m $400m ‑ $500m $570m ‑ $670m
Special operations capability $620m $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $1.6bn ‑ $2.1bn
Note: Planned investment in facilities for the amphibious capable combined‑arms land system is
captured in northern bases and enterprise infrastructure.
59
8
Chapter 8:
Expeditionary
Air Operations
8.1 Modernisation of air power capabilities across the region has resulted in a need for
more survivable and potent air domain capabilities that can operate at longer ranges.
The Integrated Investment Program includes investment of $28‑$33 billion in capabilities
that will enable Air Force to undertake expeditionary air operations to project force into
our primary area of military interest. These capabilities will provide aerial surveillance
of our maritime approaches, hold at risk, at extended ranges, potential adversary forces
that could target our interests during a conflict and deter attempts to project power
against Australia.
Air mobility
8.2 The Government will invest an estimated $11 billion to ensure Air Force has an air
mobility capability equipped to enable and sustain rapid deployments of Australian
personnel and equipment into our region, including to harsh and hazardous
environments impacted by conflict or humanitarian disasters. This will include existing
and new capabilities, alongside approved upgrade programs to:
replace Defence’s current fleet of 12 Hercules aircraft with a new and expanded
fleet of 20 C‑130J Hercules medium air mobility aircraft, of which the first aircraft is
expected to be introduced into service in 2027‑28;
ensure the C‑17A Globemaster III and KC‑30A multi‑role tanker transport aircraft
can continue to support the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment through
the 2030s, under the air mobility capability assurance program;
increase the capacity of Air Force's pilot, aircrew and mission controller training to a
level that supports the increased need for qualified air‑warfare personnel; and
61
enhance Defence’s network of northern air bases to provide a more resilient and
sustainable platform for force projection. This will allow Defence to maintain a
higher tempo of activities and continue operations despite disruption.
Air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

8.3 The ADF operates specialised capabilities to undertake surveillance of Australia’s vast
maritime environment and detect, deter and respond to potential adversary capabilities,
including submarines. Investment of an estimated $4 billion will enhance the ADF’s
air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and maritime patrol and response
capabilities, through:
sustainment and upgrades to Australia’s fleet of 14 P‑8A Poseidon maritime patrol

aircraft to enhance anti‑submarine warfare, maritime strike and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Upgrades to the P‑8A fleet will ensure
continued interoperability with the United States and other key partners and
strengthen Defence's ability to secure and protect Australia’s maritime interests;
the acquisition of a fourth MQ‑4C Triton remotely piloted aircraft system. The
first MQ‑4C is due to be delivered to Australia in 2024. With its extended range
and endurance, the MQ‑4C fleet provides the ADF with the ability to undertake
maritime surveillance at greatly extended ranges; and
the delivery of a fleet of MC‑55A Peregrine aircraft to provide an airborne
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare capability. The
capability will be a critical enabler for advanced ADF capabilities and will provide
important intelligence information to support ADF missions.
Air combat capability

8.4 Investment of $10‑$12 billion will upgrade Australia’s fleet of combat aircraft to mitigate
advanced threats and maintain interoperability with partners and allies across the
region. Investments in priority capability enhancements to these aircraft will increase
their lethality and survivability against air, land and maritime threats at extended ranges,
operating alongside electronic warfare systems. Key air combat capabilities include the:
F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter, which will continue to be Australia’s most capable and
survivable aircraft for conducting air‑to‑air combat missions against advanced threat
aircraft and air‑surface missions against well‑shielded targets. Continued investment
in the F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter fleet will provide incremental improvements to the
aircraft’s capabilities, including through the integration of long‑range strike munitions
such as the Long Range Anti‑Ship Missile and potentially the Joint Strike Missile;
62
F/A‑18F Super Hornet, which has a range of advanced capabilities that complement
the F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter, including a large and diverse weapons capacity.
Together, these two air combat aircraft will provide the integrated, focused force
with multiple credible and valuable strike and missile defence options; and
EA‑18G Growler aircraft, which will continue to support ADF ground, sea and air
operations through its capability to detect, analyse, identify, disrupt, deter and
destroy radar and communications systems.
8.5 The F/A‑18F Super Hornet and EA‑18G Growler will be provided with lethality and
survivability upgrades, while maintaining their interoperability with the United States
and other key partners. Defence is looking to extend the operational life of both these
capabilities to 2040.
Uncrewed air systems

8.6 The Government will invest $4.3‑$5.3 billion in the development and acquisition of
uncrewed aerial systems for Air Force to augment its crewed capabilities on a range of
missions. Initial areas of focus include autonomous collaborative capabilities able to
perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and combat roles including:
the MQ‑28A Ghost Bat. The Government is continuing to invest in this collaborative
combat aircraft and has approved its next stage of development, which will see the
delivery of three Block 2 aircraft with enhanced design and improved capabilities.
This investment will progress the development of the unique Australian technology
that allows MQ‑28A aircraft to work with each other and with crewed aircraft
as one team to achieve their mission. It will also enable further development
of the MQ‑28A’s mission payloads, integrated combat system and autonomous
systems; and
other developmental uncrewed aerial systems. In line with the Defence Industry
Development Strategy, the Government is exploring opportunities to further
enhance the integration of uncrewed aerial systems into the ADF’s force structure.
Co‑development of uncrewed aerial systems with Australian industry will provide
Defence with a range of effective, expendable and economical capability options
into the future.
63
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Table 6:
Investments in expeditionary air operations

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Air mobility
C‑130J Hercules $7.5bn $700m ‑ $1.0bn $8.2bn ‑ $8.5bn
Air mobility $540m $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $1.5bn ‑ $2.0bn
Air training and
$210m $700m ‑ $1.0bn $910m ‑ $1.2bn
support systems
Air intelligence, surveillance
$2.9bn $700m ‑ $1.0bn $3.6bn ‑ $3.9bn
and reconnaissance
Air combat capability
F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter $2.3bn $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $4.3bn ‑ $5.3bn
EA‑18G Growler $2.3bn $1.5bn ‑ $2.0bn $3.8bn ‑ $4.3bn
Air‑to‑air weapons $500m $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $1.5bn ‑ $2.0bn
Uncrewed air systems $280m $4.0bn ‑ $5.0bn $4.3bn ‑ $5.3bn
65
9
Chapter 9:
Missile Defence
9.1 Military modernisation has enabled more countries to project combat power across
greater ranges within our region through advanced long‑range and high‑speed missile
capabilities. In this context, our integrated, focused force needs capabilities that can
defend against, and reduce the effectiveness of, air and missile attacks.
9.2 The Integrated Investment Program includes an extensive investment in integrated

air and missile defence (IAMD), spread across the capability priorities outlined in the
National Defence Strategy. This includes investment in advanced active IAMD defence
capabilities that can defeat key air and missile threats in flight, including missile launchers
and munitions. It also includes investment in sensors, command and control systems and
communications capabilities and critical IAMD supporting systems. The Government is
also investing in passive IAMD capabilities that can degrade the effectiveness of an air
and missile attack, which are an essential part of any IAMD framework.
9.3 The Government is establishing the underpinning architecture for our IAMD system
through the development of the joint air battle management system, which will link
together sensors and active missile systems, both planned and into the future.
9.4 This architecture will connect the active missile defence systems that will be acquired
through the Integrated Investment Program and provide the foundation for further
systems to be integrated over time. The acquisition of new active missile defence
systems will be considered as technology matures, including in the context of the
2026 National Defence Strategy, taking into account developments in the technology
used by the United States and other key partners.
67
A layered approach to integrated air and missile defence

9.5 The Government is investing in a layered IAMD capability that can efficiently and effectively
sense and respond to air and missile threats. This will include integrated sensors, command
and control systems and active and passive missile defence capabilities operating across
a common network. Planned investment in a layered approach to IAMD is spread across
multiple elements of the integrated, focused force.
9.6 Key IAMD command and control and sensor capabilities include:
the development of an advanced joint air battle management system, which will
provide the underpinning architecture for the ADF to effectively track and engage air
and missile targets;
investment in advanced sensors including upgrades to the Jindalee Operational Radar
Network, continued investment in CEA Technologies’ advanced radar technologies and
investment in space based sensors and geospatial intelligence capabilities, to detect
and locate air and missile threats; and
maintaining the effectiveness of the E‑7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control
(AEW&C) fleet ahead of its scheduled replacement with a next‑generation capability to
maintain battlespace awareness and coordinate command and control.
9.7 IAMD sensor capabilities will be integrated with the Defence targeting enterprise across a
common network and be interoperable with the United States and key partners.
9.8 Key active missile defence response capabilities include:
the acquisition and integration of the Aegis Baseline 9 combat system onto the Hobart
class destroyers and introduction of Hunter class frigates fitted with Aegis Baseline 9.
The Aegis combat system will provide the ability to counter airborne threats, including
ballistic missiles, through the integration of SM‑2 and SM‑6 missiles;
the acquisition of the enhanced ground‑based National Advanced Surface to Air Missile
System in service with NATO countries, which will have the ability to intercept fixed and
rotary‑wing aircraft, cruise missiles and uncrewed aerial systems;
F‑35A Joint Strike Fighter and F/A‑18F Super Hornet aircraft fleets, currently in
service, with the capability to detect airborne threats and employ air‑to‑air missiles to
intercept and destroy fixed and rotary‑wing aircraft, cruise missiles and uncrewed aerial
systems; and
the development of counter‑small uncrewed aerial systems in response to the
proliferation of uncrewed aerial systems and loitering munitions.
68
X
9.9 Key passive missile defence capabilities will include measures to enhance Australia’s
network of northern bases – to ensure they can continue to operate through
disruption – and improve logistics preparedness and responsiveness. This will increase
Defence’s ability to withstand and respond to a hostile action while degrading the
effectiveness of air and missile threats.
9.10 This layered approach to IAMD also includes strengthening Defence’s reserve of
munitions and providing the ability to scale up the production of munitions through the
GWEO enterprise.
70
Table 7:
Investments in missile defence

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Command and control and sensor capabilities

Joint air battle
$690m $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.7bn ‑ $7.7bn
management system
E‑7A Wedgetail
$84m $500m ‑ $700m $580m ‑ $780m
AEW&C aircraft
AEW&C replacement nil $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn
Jindalee Operational
$660m $300m ‑ $400m $960m ‑ $1.1bn
Radar Network
Active missile defence
(excluding planned
$370m $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $1.4bn ‑ $1.9bn
investment captured under
other capability priorities)
Note: The Government’s investment in missile defence is spread across multiple elements of the
integrated, focused force with many planned investments in missile defence captured elsewhere.
For instance, planned maritime missile defence investments are captured in Tables 2 and 3. Planned
air‑to‑air combat investments are included in Table 6. Other relevant investments are included in
Table 9. Planned investment in passive missile defence measures is included in Tables 8 and 11.
71
10
Chapter 10:
Theatre Logistics
10.1 An enhanced theatre logistics system that can effectively facilitate the flow of people,
capabilities and key supplies to bases and forward operating locations will underpin
the ADF’s posture, preparedness and ability to deter threats and project force.
The integration of this system with civil society and civil infrastructure will also be
strengthened, as a key element of national resilience and National Defence.
10.2 The Government is investing in a joint theatre logistics system that will enable the ADF to
rapidly concentrate forces, sustain protracted operations during a conflict and scale up
when needed, even when logistics networks and communications systems are disrupted.
To develop the joint theatre logistics system, the Integrated Investment Program includes
investments of $15‑$21 billion in:
logistics command, control, communications, computers, data and intelligence;

supply;
distribution;
maintenance;
engineering;
infrastructure support; and
health and personnel support services.
73
Additional logistics centres and capacity

10.3 The Government will invest $11‑$15 billion to further develop and enhance additional
logistics centres and supporting capabilities to support and sustain the integrated,
focused force. This includes the establishment of additional logistics centres and capacity
in central and northern Australia to enhance Defence’s ability to rapidly move forces and
supplies where they are needed. This investment will also ensure that stocks of critical
supplies, resilient storage and warehousing facilities and distribution networks are readily
available. Greater integration with Australian industry will ensure Defence can draw on
additional capacity to meet demand during a crisis or conflict.
Fuel holdings, storage and distribution capacity

10.4 Fuel security is an integral component of National Defence. Defence is reliant on access
to the right fuel in sufficient quantities, at the right time and in the right location, to
effectively respond to threats to Australia’s national security. Defence will continue to
work with industry, the Commonwealth and state and territory governments as part of
a national approach to improving the resilience of its fuel supply. This national approach
will help ensure Defence retains a sovereign capability that can support the integrated,
focused force on operations.
10.5 The Government is investing $3.7‑$4.8 billion in improvements to develop and enhance
fuel holdings and storage and distribution capabilities. Defence’s current deployable
bulk fuel distribution capability will be replaced and modernised with new vehicles and
systems that will provide timely and reliable transport, storage and distribution of fuel.
Improved health capability and protective measures

10.6 The Government will invest around $1 billion in further developing and enhancing health
capabilities and protective measures to provide the ADF with the health support it needs
to sustain forces engaged in operations. This includes:
continuing the transformation of the ADF’s deployable health system to provide

a cutting‑edge deployable military healthcare capability, including the delivery
of clinical and operational medical training and shelters and other deployable
infrastructure;
developing a new health knowledge management system for garrisons, ships
and deployed environments. The system will enable a longitudinal health record
for serving members and the veteran community that will connect Defence with
Commonwealth agencies to improve health readiness and enhance the delivery of
health services;
74
providing a scalable and flexible chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) defence capability that will enhance the protection of ADF personnel against
exposure to CBRN substances and toxic industrial materials across land, maritime
and air domains; and
continuing the acquisition of a suite of dedicated, modern and purpose‑built rescue
and firefighting vehicles to replace the existing fleet of aviation fire vehicles and
enable emergency response to airfield incidents and bushfire suppression.
Table 8:
Investments in theatre logistics

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Additional logistics centres

$100m $10bn ‑ $15bn $10bn ‑ $15bn
and capacity
Fuel holdings, storage and distribution capacity
Improved fuel resilience $330m $3.0bn ‑ $4.0bn $3.3bn ‑ $4.3bn
Bulk fuel distribution $160m $200m ‑ $300m $360m ‑ $460m
Improved health capability and protective measures
Deployable health capability $220m $300m ‑ $400m $520m ‑ $620m
CBRN defence $8m $400m ‑ $500m $410m ‑ $510m
Rescue and firefighting
$67m $20m ‑ $50m $87m ‑ $120m
vehicles
Total $890m $14bn ‑ $20bn $15bn ‑ $21bn
Note: Additional logistics centres and capacity includes capabilities such as logistics vehicles, systems,
storage and warehousing, deployable basing infrastructure and enhancements to support services for
deployed forces, such as provision of clean water and power generation.
75
11
Chapter 11:
Theatre Command
and Control
11.1 ADF commanders need to be able to quickly develop a comprehensive appreciation

of key threats and opportunities on operations so they can make fast and effective
decisions. The ADF also needs the ability to undermine a potential adversary’s ability to
exercise effective command and control in order to complicate its risk calculus. The ability
to exercise effective command and control in complex and rapidly evolving operational
situations is underpinned by ICT networks and systems that can rapidly collect, sift and
integrate a diverse range of information from different sources.
11.2 The Integrated Investment Program includes investments of $11‑$15 billion in capabilities
to enable ADF decision‑makers to assess complex situations, plan effectively and act
quickly on operations. This includes investments in enhancing and modernising Defence’s
joint, sea, land and air warfighting command and control systems and intelligence
capabilities. Robust intelligence capabilities are central to National Defence as they
directly support ADF operations and provide strategic decision‑making advantage.
77
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Command and control
11.3 The Government is modernising the ADF’s command and control systems to
improve their integration, resilience and responsiveness. These investments will also
better synchronise command and control across all ADF domains and strengthen
interoperability with the United States and other key partners. Key investments include:
enhancement of the theatre land command and control architecture to support

improved planning and decision making and provide new communications and
geospatial data capabilities. This will also strengthen cyber security, resilience and
interoperability;
continued replacement of Defence’s existing air traffic management and theatre
air control systems. This will enhance the ability to manage aircraft movements
in an agile, efficient manner, including in complex and disrupted operating
environments; and
the acquisition of a secure suite of ICT systems, applications and supporting
infrastructure for Navy to support critical national command and control and
interoperability and continued rollout of communications links for sharing data
across deployed maritime units.
Table 9:
Investments in theatre command and control

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Warfighting networks and

$560m $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $2.6bn ‑ $3.6bn
strategic communications
Decision advantage and
$270m $1.0bn ‑ $1.5bn $1.3bn ‑ $1.8bn
intelligence
Land command systems $150m $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.2bn ‑ $7.2bn
Air command systems $5m $500m ‑ $700m $510m ‑ $710m
Air traffic management and
$370m $400m ‑ $500m $770m ‑ $870m
control capability
Maritime command systems $610m $200m ‑ $300m $810m ‑ $910m
Total $2bn $9.1bn ‑ $13bn $11bn ‑ $15bn
79
12
Chapter 12:
Guided Weapons and
Explosive Ordnance
12.1 The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted how vital the supply of munitions is to modern
armed forces, how quickly stockpiles can be depleted in conflict and the fragility of
supply chains for global weapons. The Government is pursuing a comprehensive
approach to building Defence’s GWEO stocks, strengthening supply chains and
supporting the establishment of a domestic manufacturing capability, in line with
National Defence.
12.2 Australia’s self-reliance will be enhanced through an ability to produce, maintain, repair
and overhaul select weapons. As outlined in the Defence Industry Development Strategy,
the domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions is one
of Defence’s seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities. A resilient and secure GWEO
supply chain will enhance the ADF’s ability to sustain its strike capabilities in conflict.
12.3 The Government’s investments in GWEO will complement the targeting and long‑range
strike investments also included in the Integrated Investment Program. They will deliver
a domestic manufacturing capability that supports national resilience and ensures
Australia has the GWEO stocks it would need in a time of conflict.
12.4 The Government will invest $16‑$21 billion in Australia’s GWEO enterprise over the next
decade. This investment prioritises the development of a sovereign ability to produce,
maintain, repair and overhaul selected weapons. It also includes the acquisition of a
sufficient stock of weapons and munitions to help ensure sustained operations in a
time of conflict and the expansion of storage and distribution facilities to accommodate
Defence’s growing GWEO inventory.
81
12.5 Australia’s contribution to the international munitions industrial base it shares with
the United States and other key partners is being strengthened. The GWEO enterprise
will establish Australian access to the technical data, processes and training needed to
develop our own guided weapons manufacturing capability and integrate Australian
businesses into global guided weapons supply chains.
12.6 The initial focus for Australia’s domestic GWEO manufacturing capability will be the
domestic assembly of imported components and materials. The number of munitions
components made in Australia will increase over time. The manufacturing of an initial
batch of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions in Australia in 2025 will
represent an important first step toward establishing domestic missile manufacturing on
a large scale.
12.7 Over time, as domestic capability and capacity grows, the focus will shift to the
manufacture of higher complexity weapons and components. In the immediate term,
the Government will also seek opportunities for Australian engagement in development
programs for weapons such as future increments of the Precision Strike Missile. This will
ensure Australian industry is prepared to take advantage of future co‑production and
co‑sustainment opportunities.
12.8 Defence is working with industry to develop detailed costed plans for the domestic
manufacture of GWEO. The Government will release the GWEO Enterprise Plan
later in 2024.
12.9 Undertaking essential sustainment activities for critical guided weapons domestically
will also improve Australia’s security and resilience. Using the Mark 48 torpedo as an
exemplar, the Government will work with the United States and other key partners to
explore opportunities for weapons system co‑sustainment activities.
Table 10:
Investments in GWEO

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
GWEO enterprise $820m $15bn ‑ $20bn $16bn ‑ $21bn

Total $820m $15bn ‑ $20bn $16bn ‑ $21bn
82
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Chapter 13:
Northern Bases
13.1 The Integrated Investment Program includes investments of $14‑$18 billion to ensure
Defence has a logistically connected and resilient set of bases, ports and barracks across
Australia’s north. This is pivotal to enhance force projection and improve Defence’s
resilience and ability to sustain operations through a crisis or conflict.
Enhanced basing capacity for force projection

13.2 Ongoing investment in a range of projects and activities across northern Australia will
enhance the ADF’s ability to project force. These investments include:
the development of Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield infrastructure to enable

improved support to maritime surveillance operations by P‑8A Poseidon aircraft;
the development of the Defence estate across Darwin and Townsville to address
force posture requirements and enhance the integrated, focused force’s ability to
undertake operations from northern Australia;
upgrades to the RAAF Base Learmonth airfield to enable KC‑30A multi-role tanker
transport aircraft operations, including additional runway capacity, in‑ground
refuelling and climate resilience measures;
the redevelopment of the Larrakeyah Defence Precinct in Darwin, including facilities
upgrades and new berthing capabilities to accommodate major surface combatants
and submarines at HMAS Coonawarra;
upgraded range facilities and associated infrastructure at Robertson Barracks
Close Training Area and at the Kangaroo Flats, Mount Bundey and Bradshaw Field
Training Areas;
85
the delivery of airfield improvements at RAAF Base Tindal to enable enhanced air
refuelling operations by KC‑30A multi-role tanker transport aircraft;
infrastructure enhancements to Defence sites in Far North Queensland; and
new facilities in northern Australia and South East Queensland to house and
support Army's littoral manoeuvre capabilities and enable logistics vessels to be
loaded and unloaded.
Enhanced basing resilience

13.3 The Government is also investing in projects to enhance resilience across northern
Australia and strengthen Defence’s ability to sustain operations, with a particular focus
on air base remediation activities. This will include:
major maintenance to airfield pavements, lighting and drainage at RAAF Base

Darwin and Mount Bundey Airfield;
the redevelopment of RAAF Base Townsville including facilities enhancements,
capacity improvements and upgrades to engineering services;
airfield works at RAAF Bases Curtin and Learmonth; and
sustainment, maintenance and enhancements to airfield pavements and supporting
infrastructure at prioritised airfield sites.
86
Table 11:
Investments in northern bases

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Enhanced basing capacity for force projection and enhanced basing resilience
Northern operational
$430m $7.0bn ‑ $10bn $7.4bn ‑ $10bn
base infrastructure
Northern air base
$2.6bn $3.0bn ‑ $4.0bn $5.6bn ‑ $6.6bn
infrastructure
Northern logistics network nil $400m ‑ $500m $400m ‑ $500m
Northern training area
$330m $20m ‑ $50m $350m ‑ $380m
enhancements
87
14
Chapter 14:
Enabling
Capabilities
Enterprise infrastructure
14.1 The Defence Strategic Review found there was a need for a network of well‑established
bases and facilities in the south‑east of Australia to provide a level of depth to ADF basing
and the national support base. The Integrated Investment Program includes investments
of $17‑$22 billion in infrastructure across key defence facilities. This includes significant
upgrades to training institutions in southern Australia that will help support workforce
growth, meet training needs and provide living‑in accommodation. These investments
also include funding for national programs to maintain and upgrade Defence's airfields
and maritime infrastructure.
14.2 Enterprise infrastructure investments strengthen Defence’s ability to withstand

disruption in crisis or conflict, adopt climate adaption strategies and improve energy
resilience. Defence will accelerate its transition to clean energy, as directed by the
Government’s response to the Defence Strategic Review, with a plan to be presented to
the Government by 2025. Defence is also developing a net‑zero strategy to guide action
in response to climate change.
14.3 The Defence Estate Audit report, commissioned as part of the Government’s response
to the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review, makes key recommendations
for re‑orienting the Defence estate to meet current and future security challenges. The
Government will finalise specific responses to the audit later in 2024. Defence estate
holdings will be reviewed as part of the biennial National Defence Strategy cycle to
ensure continued alignment with Defence priorities.
89
Training and workforce growth infrastructure

14.4 Defence and Defence Housing Australia are working together to meet future demand
for ADF housing with a particular focus on locations that support the priorities of the
National Defence Strategy.
14.5 As the size of the Defence workforce grows, Defence will need investments across
the entire estate. The Integrated Investment Program includes investments to meet
Defence's future training facilities and office accommodation needs. Key ADF training
establishments in Australia’s south will receive upgrades to base infrastructure to support
planned workforce growth.
14.6 For example, the Riverina Redevelopment Program will deliver three discrete projects to
provide base infrastructure upgrades and meet training and accommodation needs at
each site. These are:
Blamey Barracks Kapooka Redevelopment for Army recruit training;

RAAF Base Wagga Redevelopment for Air Force recruit and initial employment
training; and
Albury Wodonga Military Area Redevelopment for Defence logistics initial
employment training and career continuation training.
14.7 The Australian Defence Force Academy living‑in accommodation project will support
the recruitment, retention and wellbeing of trainee officers through the provision of
essential living‑in accommodation at Defence’s largest and only tri‑service military
training academy. It will replace and expand existing facilities to provide contemporary,
safe and suitable accommodation with room for future workforce growth.
14.8 The Young Endeavour will be replaced with a new ship that will be operated by
Navy and used to provide youth development and sail training through the Young
Endeavour Youth Scheme.
Base infrastructure
14.9 Continued investment in Defence’s bases, which provide a home for Navy, Army and
Air Force units, will ensure the ADF can generate operational capability. Planned
investment includes enhancements to HMAS Stirling, Gallipoli Barracks, Holsworthy
Barracks and HMAS Harman. Continued investment in air bases will also ensure the
Air Force can train with and maintain its complex fleet of aircraft. This will include
significant investment in the Edinburgh Defence Precinct and RAAF Bases Amberley,
Pearce and Richmond.
90
Science and technology infrastructure
14.10 Defence’s science and technology infrastructure will be enhanced through investment
in critical digital, technical and estate capabilities needed to support National Defence
priorities. This will include the delivery and refresh of high-performance computing
capabilities, specialised experimental facilities and digital infrastructure systems to
capture, analyse and share research.
National capital works

14.11 National capital works include upgrades to sites supporting command, control and
communications functions and investment in initiatives to address environmental
management and energy security.
Table 12:
Investments in enterprise infrastructure

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Training and workforce growth infrastructure

Training infrastructure $2.5bn $700m ‑ $1.0bn $3.2bn ‑ $3.5bn
Workforce growth
$37m $4.0bn ‑ $5.0bn $4.0bn ‑ $5.0bn
infrastructure
Base infrastructure $860m $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.9bn ‑ $7.9bn
Science and technology
$160m $1.5bn ‑ $2.0bn $1.7bn ‑ $2.2bn
infrastructure
National capital works $340m $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $2.3bn ‑ $3.3bn
91
Enterprise data and information and communications

technology
14.12 The ability to acquire, move and use data is a foundational enabler for the ADF’s
warfighting capability. High quality, secure data is critical to decision advantage,
preparedness, operations, enterprise services and advanced targeting capabilities.
The Government’s investments in enterprise data and ICT will strengthen security and
resilience and improve the ability to share data efficiently and at scale. The integration of
automated processes, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, will enable a
greater volume of data to be processed, exploited and disseminated faster.
14.13 The Government is investing in projects that will strengthen Defence’s ability to manage
its data as a strategic asset by:
uplifting the network of ICT capabilities across Defence, and the people and systems
that support it;
enhancing interoperability and connectivity with allies and partners to support
communications, situational awareness and targeting;
ensuring military capabilities are more interconnected; and
ensuring the integrated, focused force is supported by secure networks.
14.14 Through the Integrated Investment Program, the Government will invest $8.5‑$11 billion
in data and ICT at the enterprise level through the:
delivery of modern, secure and survivable networks and applications capable of

fulfilling current and future corporate, intelligence and warfighting needs. This
includes an uplift of Defence’s single information environment to strengthen
network security and agility and deliver next‑generation Defence networks;
delivery of the OneDefence Data Program, which will improve the storage,
management, acquisition and discovery of data. This will also provide advanced
data analytics and strategic decision support to enhance business functions and
warfighting capabilities; and
establishment of a consolidated enterprise resource planning and management
system across Defence. This will simplify and integrate core business functions
and standardise information processes including logistics, maintenance, human
resources and finance to improve the efficiency, agility and speed of Defence’s
business operations.
92
Table 13:
Investments in enterprise data and ICT

(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
Enterprise networks $790m $5.0bn ‑ $7.0bn $5.8bn ‑ $7.8bn

Enterprise systems $660m $2.0bn ‑ $3.0bn $2.7bn ‑ $3.7bn
Total $1.5bn $7.0bn ‑ $10bn $8.5bn ‑ $11bn
93
Appendix A
Appendix A:
Budget Summary
Table 14:
Integrated Investment Program planned investment summary
(2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34) (2024‑25 to 2033‑34)
ASCA $3.1bn $500m ‑ $700m $3.6bn ‑ $3.8bn

Undersea warfare $14bn $48bn ‑ $61bn $63bn ‑ $76bn
Maritime capabilities for
sea denial and localised sea $10bn $40bn ‑ $58bn $51bn ‑ $69bn
control operations
Targeting and long‑range
$9.5bn $18bn ‑ $26bn $28bn ‑ $35bn
strike
Space and cyber $4.5bn $22bn ‑ $31bn $27bn ‑ $36bn
Amphibious capable
$20bn $16bn ‑ $23bn $36bn ‑ $44bn
combined‑arms land system
Expeditionary air operations $17bn $12bn ‑ $16bn $28bn ‑ $33bn
Missile defence $1.8bn $12bn ‑ $17bn $14bn ‑ $18bn
Theatre logistics $890m $14bn ‑ $20bn $15bn ‑ $21bn
Theatre command and
$2.0bn $9.1bn ‑ $13bn $11bn ‑ $15bn
control
GWEO $820m $15bn ‑ $20bn $16bn ‑ $21bn
Northern bases $3.4bn $10bn ‑ $15bn $14bn ‑ $18bn
Enterprise infrastructure $3.9bn $13bn ‑ $18bn $17bn ‑ $22bn
Enterprise data and ICT $1.5bn $7.0bn ‑ $10bn $8.5bn ‑ $11bn
Grand Total $92bn $240bn ‑ $330bn $330bn ‑ $420bn
95
Notes on the Integrated Investment Program and the presentation of

financial information
[1] Purpose of the public Integrated Investment Program. The public Integrated Investment Program
has been developed in order to:
provide the Australian public with transparency of the Government’s plans to develop defence
capabilities over the coming decade, in line with the National Defence Strategy; and
provide defence industry with information on Defence’s capability goals and requirements to
support industry planning.
[2] Development of the Integrated Investment Program. The public Integrated Investment Program
provides information to support the goals outlined above while protecting national security and
taking account of commercial sensitivities. To facilitate this approach, a reporting structure was
established to enable aggregation of all planned defence capability investments within thematic
categories and subcategories that are aligned with the capability priorities identified in the
National Defence Strategy. The thematic groupings presented in the public Integrated Investment
Program correlate with a full list of Defence's capability projects, that is held at a classified level, to
provide transparency and ensure accuracy. The methodology adopted also involved a consistent
approach to the presentation of financial confidence intervals or ‘range bands’ to present funding
provisions for projects that have not been approved by the Government. The methodology used
established a coherent reporting framework to enable the release of an appropriate level of
detail on Defence's capability plans and associated financial information. The public Integrated
Investment Program will be updated biennially in line with the National Defence Strategy.
[3] Planned capability investment tables and charts. The tables included in the public Integrated
Investment Program encapsulate planned investment over the period from 2024‑25 to 2033‑34.
The figures:
are in 2023‑24 Mid‑Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook out‑turned price and exchange basis;
describe the planned investment (not precise cost estimates) for approved and unapproved
acquisition funding and associated unapproved sustainment funding for defence capabilities;
do not include expenditure prior to 2024‑25 on existing projects, nor long‑term expenditure
beyond 2033‑34;
are based on investment plans for individual projects, including a reasonable level of
over‑programming at the total program level to assist with budget management by helping to
mitigate the impact of unforeseen project delays;
do not include project contingency;
below $100 million have been rounded to the closest $1 million;
between $100 million and $1 billion have been rounded to the closest $10 million;
between $1 billion and $10 billion have been rounded to the closest $0.1 billion;
between $10 billion and $100 billion have been rounded to the closest $1 billion;
above $100 billion have been rounded to the closest $10 billion;
listed as totals may not precisely add to the figures in the column above; and
are based on a point‑in‑time and will be regularly adjusted in line with Defence's capability
development, acquisition and approval processes.
[4] Approved planned investment. Figures for approved planned investment include previous
96
investment decisions where budget and scope authority for future expenditure has been decided.
These approximate figures reflect the unexpended portion of approved funding from 2024‑25.
They include approved acquisition funding only and not sustainment funding. Approved planned
investment includes some infrastructure projects that have not yet received Parliamentary Works
Committee approval. Approved planned investment also includes particular approved funds that
have been transferred from Defence to the Australian Signals Directorate.
[5] Unapproved planned investment. Figures for unapproved planned investment include planned
investment that has not received final approval. These figures include both unapproved acquisition
funding and unapproved sustainment funding. Figures have been presented within range bands
taking into account that funding approvals have not yet been provided and the need to preserve
commercial sensitivities.
[6] Total planned investment. Total planned investment is the sum of approved planned investment
plus unapproved planned investment. This entails approved and unapproved acquisition funding
as well as unapproved sustainment funding. Approved sustainment funding has not been included.
Defence's published annual reports and portfolio budget statements provide information on
Defence's Top 30 sustainment products, incorporating approved sustainment funding.
[7] Allocated funding. The Government has allocated funding of $330 billion to Defence capability
investment over the decade to 2033‑34 through the 2024‑25 budget process. This amount of
funding available for capability investment does not include over‑programming.
97
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NATIONAL

© Commonwealth of Australia 2024

ISBN: 978-1-925890-86-0 (print)

Images on pages 54 and 61 courtesy of ASC Pty Ltd.

Australia’s strategic environment.................................................................................. 5

Chapter 1: Strategic Environment............................................................ 11

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.................................................................... 12

Chapter 2: National Defence.................................................................... 17

Defence’s contribution to National Defence............................................................... 19

Chapter 3: Defence Strategy.................................................................... 21

Deter actions against Australia’s interests................................................................... 23

Chapter 4: Defence Force Structure, Posture and Bases........................... 27

Recruitment and retention.......................................................................................... 33

Chapter 6: Capability Investment Priorities.............................................. 37

Priorities for the integrated, focused force................................................................. 38

Chapter 7: International Partnerships...................................................... 45

Chapter 8: Defence Industry and Acquisition Reform............................... 55

Capability acquisition reform....................................................................................... 55

Innovation, science and technology............................................................................ 63

Chapter 10: Resourcing............................................................................ 67

Investing in National Defence...................................................................................... 67

Chapter 11: Reform Agenda..................................................................... 71

Defence reform agenda............................................................................................... 71

Australia’s strategic environment

A new approach to Australia’s defence

 defend Australia and our immediate region;

The next National Defence Strategy will be delivered in 2026.

The Hon Richard Marles MP

1.8 Maintaining a favourable regional strategic balance is as important for Australia’s

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific

1.15 Another feature of Australia’s strategic environment is increasing competition for

US engagement in the Indo-Pacific

Compounding security risks

2.2 National Defence is a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach

2.4 As a key element of National Defence, the Government is making a generational

 Integrated statecraft – by taking a whole-of-government approach to advancing

Defence’s contribution to National Defence

 Shape Australia’s strategic environment;

 responding to the threat of conflict and the prospect of coercion;

 demonstrating our capability and resolve to respond to and withstand attacks on

Shape Australia’s strategic environment

Respond with credible military force

 Defend Australia and our immediate region;

ADF preparedness and national resilience

 now until 2025 – the Enhanced Force-in-Being will focus on immediate

Six capability effects

Hold a potential adversary’s forces at risk

Protect ADF forces and supporting critical infrastructure in Australia

Maintain persistent situational awareness in our primary area of

Achieve decision advantage

ADF basing requirements

 enable enhanced US and key partner training and cooperation on Australian

Recruitment and retention

Future workforce requirements

5.15 The Government acknowledges the importance of addressing cultural shortcomings,

Priorities for the integrated, focused force

 acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS

 undersea warfare to undertake a broad range of missions to project force, hold a

6.8 The integrated, focused force will deliver:

 the acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines,

defend Australia and our immediate region;

Integrated statecraft – by taking a whole-of-government approach to advancing

Shape Australia’s strategic environment;

responding to the threat of conflict and the prospect of coercion;

demonstrating our capability and resolve to respond to and withstand attacks on

Defend Australia and our immediate region;

now until 2025 – the Enhanced Force-in-Being will focus on immediate

enable enhanced US and key partner training and cooperation on Australian

acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS

undersea warfare to undertake a broad range of missions to project force, hold a

the acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines,

the acquisition of a littoral manoeuvre capability, including domestically

continued investment in Australia’s first sovereign-controlled satellite

continued investment in the Australian Signals Directorate through REDSPICE,

the development of a sovereign ability to produce, maintain, repair and overhaul

maturing defence training and exercises – including more advanced capability

regularising the ADF’s presence, including increasing deployments, training and

land and joint maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade; and

maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade of ADF aircraft;

uplift the capacity, productivity and resilience of Australia’s shipbuilding and

optimising Australia’s existing naval shipbuilding and sustainment industrial base to

ASCA’s missions are focused on rapidly pulling through disruptive technologies

Technology transfer – the Government will continue to drive technology transfer

creating an Independent Performance and Project Management Office;

Strategy reform to ensure Defence is holistically working towards

Simplification to reduce the complexity in processes, structures and systems to