G.R. No.

L-20329 March 16, 1923 The clauses in said document describing the property intended to be thus mortgage are
expressed in the following words:

THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, petitioner,

Now, therefore, the mortgagor hereby conveys and transfer to the mortgage, by way of
vs.
mortgage, the following described personal property, situated in the City of Manila, and
JOAQUIN JARAMILLO, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, respondent. now in possession of the mortgagor, to wit:

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for petitioner. (1) All of the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor in and to the contract of lease
hereinabove referred to, and in and to the premises the subject of the said lease;
City Fiscal Revilla and Assistant City Fiscal Rodas for respondent.

(2) The building, property of the mortgagor, situated on the aforesaid leased premises.
STREET, J.:

After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the petitioner caused the
This cause is before us upon demurrer interposed by the respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, same to be presented to the respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City
register of deeds of the City of Manila, to an original petition of the Standard Oil Company of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel
of New York, seeking a peremptory mandamus to compel the respondent to record in the mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, the respondent was of the opinion that it
proper register a document purporting to be a chattel mortgage executed in the City of was not a chattel mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not
Manila by Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, in favor of the Standard Oil Company of New appear to be personal property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and
York. registration was refused on this ground only.

It appears from the petition that on November 27, 1922, Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, We are of the opinion that the position taken by the respondent is untenable; and it is his
was the lessee of a parcel of land situated in the City of Manila and owner of the house of duty to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on record. The duties of a register
strong materials built thereon, upon which date she executed a document in the form of a of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial
chattel mortgage, purporting to convey to the petitioner by way of mortgage both the character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or
leasehold interest in said lot and the building which stands thereon. quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is
sought as a chattel mortgage.
 be here added to the observations contained in said ruling. We accordingly quote
therefrom as follows:
The original provisions touching this matter are contained in section 15 of the Chattel
Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508), as amended by Act No. 2496; but these have been
transferred to section 198 of the Administrative Code, where they are now found. There is
It is unnecessary here to determine whether or not the property described in the
nothing in any of these provisions conferring upon the register of deeds any authority
document in question is real or personal; the discussion may be confined to the point as to
whatever in respect to the "qualification," as the term is used in Spanish law, of chattel
whether a register of deeds has authority to deny the registration of a document
mortgage. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial only. The efficacy of the
purporting to be a chattel mortgage and executed in the manner and form prescribed by
act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive
the Chattel Mortgage Law.
notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be
discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds
nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects nobody's rights
except as a specifies of notice. Then, after quoting section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508), his Honor
continued:

Articles 334 and 335 of the Civil Code supply no absolute criterion for discriminating
between real property and personal property for purpose of the application of the Chattel Based principally upon the provisions of section quoted the Attorney-General of the
Mortgage Law. Those articles state rules which, considered as a general doctrine, are law Philippine Islands, in an opinion dated August 11, 1909, held that a register of deeds has
in this jurisdiction; but it must not be forgotten that under given conditions property may no authority to pass upon the capacity of the parties to a chattel mortgage which is
have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. It is undeniable that the presented to him for record. A fortiori a register of deeds can have no authority to pass
parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature upon the character of the property sought to be encumbered by a chattel mortgage. Of
would be real property; and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real course, if the mortgaged property is real instead of personal the chattel mortgage would
property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal no doubt be held ineffective as against third parties, but this is a question to be
property. Other situations are constantly arising, and from time to time are presented to determined by the courts of justice and not by the register of deeds.
this court, in which the proper classification of one thing or another as real or personal
property may be said to be doubtful.
In Leung Yee vs. Frank L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson (37 Phil., 644), this court
held that where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real, property, the placing of the
The point submitted to us in this case was determined on September 8, 1914, in an document on record in the chattel mortgage register is a futile act; but that decision is not
administrative ruling promulgated by the Honorable James A. Ostrand, now a Justice of decisive of the question now before us, which has reference to the function of the register
this Court, but acting at that time in the capacity of Judge of the fourth branch of the Court of deeds in placing the document on record.
of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District, in the City of Manila; and little of value can
In the light of what has been said it becomes unnecessary for us to pass upon the point
whether the interests conveyed in the instrument now in question are real or personal;
and we declare it to be the duty of the register of deeds to accept the estimate placed
upon the document by the petitioner and to register it, upon payment of the proper fee.

The demurrer is overruled; and unless within the period of five days from the date of the
notification hereof, the respondent shall interpose a sufficient answer to the petition, the
writ of mandamus will be issued, as prayed, but without costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

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