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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI

Criminal Revision Applications No. 186 and 189 of 2022

Applicants in Criminal Revision : through M/s. Jam Asif Mehmood

Application No.186/2022 & Gohar Mehmood, advocates

Applicants in Criminal Revision : through Mr. Riaz Akhtar Soomro

Application No.189/2022 advocate

Iqbal Hussain Channa, : through Mr. Sarfaraz Ali Metlo,

Respondent/Complainant in advocate
Both Revision Applications

State : through Mr. Gulfaraz Khattak,

Assistant Attorney General for
Pakistan

Dates of hearing : 14.02.2023

Date of Judgment : 09.03.2023

Date of Announcement : 16.03.2023

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD SALEEM JESSAR. J- By this single judgment, I propose to

dispose of above-noted two criminal revision applications as both the
applications arise out of the same order.

2. By means of instant Criminal Revision Applications the applicants have

assailed Order dated 06.07.2022 passed by learned VIth Additional Sessions
Judge, Karachi South in Private/Direct Complaint No. 872 of 2022, filed by
respondent Iqbal Hussain Channa s/o Ameer Bux Channa whereby the trial
Court has taken cognizance of the alleged offences and passed order for
issuance of bailable warrants against the applicants in respect of the offences
punishable under sections 449/500/501/34 PPC read with Section 502-A PPC.
In Criminal Revision Application No.189 of 2022 the applicants have also
assailed Order dated 25.03.2022 passed by learned XIIth Judicial Magistrate
Karachi South whereby he had sent the complaint / case to the Court of
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Sessions as, according to him, the alleged offences pertained to the jurisdiction
of Sessions Court.

3. Brief facts, relevant for the disposal of instant Criminal Revision

Applications, are that the respondent/complainant namely, Iqbal Hussain
Channa S/o Ameer Bux Channa filed private complaint, stating therein that
he is educated, well reputed businessman, respectable citizen of Pakistan, and
is philanthropist, actively works for social welfare and enjoys high respect in
family, friends, colleagues, peers and business community having wide social
circle. He is also administrator of Income Tax Co-operative Housing Society,
Sector 26-A, Gulzar-e-Hijri, KDA, Scheme-33, Karachi. According to him, the
accused/opponents No.1 to 4 shown in the direct compliant are residents of
the society, out of whom accused No. 1 to 3 falsely claim themselves to be the
General Secretary, President and Finance Secretary respectively of the said
society, who have prepared fake letter head of the society to deceit and cheat
public. He further stated that accused Nos.1 to 3 wrote letter to SHO, PS
Sachal claiming to be office bearers of the society, who got it verified from the
Office of Managing Director, Sindh Cooperative Housing Society, who
informed the SHO through letter dated 16.02.2022 that the
respondent/complainant is the Administrator of the said Society and that the
claim of accused No.1 to 3 to be the office bearers of the Society is false. He
further stated that accused No.4 is the wife of an officer of NAB who has
illegally encroached upon public road of the society by constructing a room
over it, while accused Nos.5 to 16 are mainstream media (news) television
channels, having viewership worldwide as mainstream media television
channels in various countries including UAE, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, Australia, and United States etc., whereas
accused Nos.17 to 30 are responsible for managing and running the accused
No.5 to 16 being their CEOs, COOs, Directors and / or owners, while accused
No.31 is the reporter of accused No.5, while accused No.32 is the reporter of
accused No.16, accused No.33 has criminal record who has undergone
imprisonment on account of his involvement in the case of thirteen murders of
the persons of Pak Land Cement Factory and neither he is resident of the
society, nor is the member thereof and despite that he participates and
arranges hirelings for the malicious protest. Complainant further alleged that
the accused in collusion with each other committed serious offences and
labelled the complainant as a land grabber, extortionist (Bhatakhor), gunda and

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hires armed gundas and is fake administrator of the Society and is involved in
corruption of millions of rupees, based on disparaging, conjectural,
misconceived, and false and incorrect informations against him causing
defamation to him without hearing counter version of the complainant in
disregard to responsible journalism as required by accused Nos.5 to 32. They
ruined the complainant, torn down his dignity, weakened his esteem and
social contribution and re-cognition of decades of continuous philanthropic
and social efforts without even bothering to conduct any investigation and to
seek a comment / counter version from the complainant although there was
no urgent need to air such heinous imputations against him. According to
him, certain delay if caused on account of verification of such allegations
before publishing the same, would not have caused any harm. Accused No.5
to 32 practiced forbidden „grey‟ journalism and acted in violation of second
part of code 22 (1) of the 2015 code, section 20 (f) of the 2002 Ordinance and, so
also the directions of the Superior Courts issued to the electronic media. His
grievance is that the accused persons have committed offences under Sections
449, 500, 501 & 34 read with Section 502-A of Chapter 21 of PPC. Therefore the
respondent/complainant namely Iqbal Hussain Channa S/o Ammer Bux
Channa filed instant Private/Direct Complaint.

4. After filing the complaint, the Court of learned XII-Judicial Magistrate,

Karachi South / Respondent No.2 in Cr. Revision Application No.189 of 2022,
sent the same to the Court of Sessions for trial vide his Order dated 25.3.2022
as, according to him, the alleged offences pertained to the jurisdiction of Court
of Sessions. On receiving the complaint, learned VIth Additional Sessions
Judge, Karachi South / Respondent No.1 got recorded the statement of
complainant Iqbal Hussain Channa and thereafter on 18.5.2022 sent the case to
the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate-XII for holding preliminary
inquiry/investigation. Accordingly, learned Judicial Magistrate- XII recorded
statements of two witnesses of the complainant namely, Arbab Ahmed Shar
and Tajuddin Buriro on 20.5.2022, then after hearing counsel for the
complainant, learned VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi South passed
the impugned order which has been impugned in the instant criminal revision
applications.

5. I have heard arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties

and have perused the material available on the record.

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6. Learned counsel for the applicants in criminal revision application

No.186 of 2022 submitted that Complaint under Section 200 Cr. P.C., (copy
whereof is available at page 49 of the file) was not competent before the
ordinary Court and while referring para 8 and 9 of said complaint, he
submitted that remedy for respondent No. 2 is provided under section 26 of
the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002, as according to him, sections 33 and 34 read
with section 37 of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002 bar the jurisdiction of Court,
therefore, in present case remedy was available to complainant to approach
the PEMRA Authorities through a complaint, which was required to be sent to
Council of Complaint. He, therefore, submitted that Court below has wrongly
assumed the jurisdiction; hence, impugned order dated 06.07.2022 (available
at page 37 of the file), suffers from legal infirmity and cannot be maintained;
hence, pray for quashment of the same. They further submitted that law cited
at the bar by the counsel for respondent No. 2 does not show the discussion
over the Sections 33, 34 and 37 of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002; hence, facts
and circumstances of those cases are different and distinguishable from
present case, therefore, are not applicable in this case. Learned counsel for the
applicants further submitted that the Court below has assumed wrong
jurisdiction, which requires proper revision, therefore, revisions filed by the
applicants are maintainable; hence, pray for grant of said revision applications
and setting aside of the impugned order, with dismissal of the complaint, filed
by respondent No. 2.

7. Learned counsel for the applicants have further argued that

complainant/respondent No. 2 is involved in NAB Reference No.16/2019
(copy whereof is available at page 291 of Court file), besides the
complainant/respondent No. 2 had also filed Suit No.603/2022 against the
applicants before this Court (copy of the plaint is available page 385 of Court
file), wherein he has leveled almost same allegations as has been mentioned
under the complaint. Learned counsel have also referred to pages 205 and
onwards, which are news lines screen shots flashed by the news channels
against complainant/respondent No. 2, whereby the womenfolk as well as
persons of the society had held procession against complainant/respondent
No. 2 for forcibly encroachment on their respective houses. The counsel
further submitted that applicant or any of the news channels had not given
their personal opinion rather flashed the news covered by the correspondents
of the news channels, therefore, no offence in terms of Section 500 PPC had

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ever been committed by the applicants, which may warrant filing of complaint
against them.

8. Learned counsel for the applicants in criminal revision application

No.189 of 2022 submitted that while passing the impugned orders learned
Judicial Magistrate as well as learned Additional Sessions Judge did not
follow the procedure as prescribed in the criminal procedure code. He
referred to sections 190, 192, 193, 200 and 202 Cr.PC and submitted that the
Courts below have passed impugned orders in derogation of these sections.
He further submitted that the allegations leveled against the complainant
through media are, in fact true as such the same do not fall under the
definition of defamation. He further submitted that superior Courts have held
that in appropriate cases the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section
561-A Cr.PC can be invoked without first approaching the lower Court under
section 265-K Cr.PC. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon cases of (i) GHULAM ALI Versus JAVID and another (1989 P.Cr.L.J
507), (ii) MIAN MUNIR AHMAD Versus THE STATE (1985 SCMR 257), (iii)
MAHMOOD ABDULLAH Versus THE STATE (1987 P.Cr.L.J 33) & (iv) BABAR KHAN
and another Versus THE STATE (1997 P.Cr.L.J 1297).

9. Mr. Gulfaraz Khattak, learned Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan,

opposed Criminal Revision Applications and supported the impugned order
to the effect that Court of Sessions is the competent forum to entertain the
complaint under section 200 Cr. P.C., therefore, objection raised by the
applicants/accused does not vitiate the status of the Court below.

10. Mr. Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, learned counsel for respondent

No.2/complainant submitted that by virtue of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898,
direct complaint has to be maintained before the Court of Sessions in terms of
Section 200 Cr. P.C. and after completion of preliminary inquiry, the Court of
Sessions being ultimate Court of trial, was the competent forum to take
cognizance, which it did. He, therefore, submitted that revision applications
are not maintainable and impugned order does not suffer from any illegality
or infirmity, which may warrant interference by this Court. He has also
referred to cases of Ch. ZULFIQAR ALI CHEEMA V. FARHAN ARSHAD
MIR and others (PLD 2015 SC 134) as well as Haji SARDAR KHALID
SALEEM V. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and others (2006 SCMR 1192), and

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submitted that after admission of the complaint before the trial Court, the
remedy for the applicant was to file application under section 265-K, Cr. P.C.
instead they filed instant revision application directly before this Court, which
are not maintainable. He; therefore, submitted that by dismissing the revision
applications, case may be remanded to the trial Court with direction to record
evidence of the parties and decide fate of the cases, according to merits as well
as law. In support of his contentions, he places reliance upon the cases of
MUHAMMAD FAROOQ V. AHMED NAWAZ JAGIRANI and others (PLD
2016 SC 55) and SAEED GHANI V. Dr. SHAHID MASOOD and 3 others (2022
YLR [Sindh] Note 3).

11. In the first instance, I would like to deal with Cr. Revision Application
No.186 of 2022. Learned counsel for the applicants in this revision application
have mainly attacked the impugned order on the ground of maintainability of
private / direct complaint and lack of jurisdiction by the trial Court
/Additional Sessions Judge as, according to them, the trial Court had wrongly
assumed the jurisdiction as in instant case only concerned authorities of
PEMRA were competent to try the alleged offences. According to them, the
proper course for the complainant / respondent No.2 was to approach
PEMRA authorities and the trial Court/respondent No.1 has wrongly
exercised/assumed the jurisdiction as the jurisdiction is only vest with
PEMRA. Subject matter of the complaint fully falls under the provisions of
PEMRA Ordinance, 2001 and proper method and procedure is provided by
the Law for dealing said types of complaint and Councils of the complaints
were established Under section 26 of the PEMRA Ordinance to deal and
decide the subject matter of the complaints and barred the jurisdiction of
normal-cum-ordinary criminal court(s) through said special law PEMRA
Ordinance as per section 33 and 34 of PEMRA Ordinance.

12. It is a settled law that where maintainability of any legal proceedings

and/or jurisdiction of any Court is called in question, such legal point is to be
decided in first instance before discussing the merits of the case, therefore, I
would first deal with said legal point raised on behalf of the applicants /
accused. Before proceeding further, it would be advantageous to reproduce
hereunder relevant provisions of PEMRA Ordinance, 2002:

26. Council of Complaints.-1[(1) The Federal Government shall, by

notification in the Official Gazette, establish Councils of Complaints at

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Islamabad, the Provincial capitals and also at such other places as the
Federal Government may determine.
(2) Each Council shall receive and review complaints made by persons
or organizations from the general public against any aspects of
programmes broadcast or distributed by a station] established through
a licence issued by the Authority and render opinions on such
complaints.
(3) Each Council shall consist of a 1[Chairperson] and five members
being citizens of eminence from the general public at least two of
whom shall be women.
(3A) The Councils shall have the powers to summon a licensee against
whom a complaint has been made and call for his explanation
regarding any matter relating to its operation.]
(4) The Authority shall formulate rules for the functions and operation
of the Councils within two hundred days of the establishment of the
Authority.
(5) The 1[Councils] may recommend to the Authority appropriate
action of censure, fine against a broadcast or CTV station or licensee
for violation of the codes of programme content and advertisements as
approved by the Authority as may be prescribed.
27. Prohibition of broadcast media or distribution service operation.
The Authority shall by order in writing, giving reasons therefor,
prohibit any broadcast media or distribution service operator or owner
from,–
(a) broadcasting or re-broadcasting or distributing any programme or
advertisement if it is of the opinion that such particular programme or
advertisement is against the ideology of Pakistan or is likely to create
hatred among the people or is prejudicial to the maintenance of law
and order or is likely to disturb public peace and tranquility or
endangers national security or is pornographic, obscene or vulgar or
is offensive to the commonly accepted standards of decency; or
(b) engaging in any practice or act which amounts to abuse of media
power by way of harming the legitimate interests of another licensee
or willfully causing damage to any other person.
30. Power to vary conditions, suspend or revoke the licence.- (1) The
Authority may revoke or suspend the licence of a broadcast media or
distribution service by an order in writing on one or more of the
following grounds, namely:-
(b) the licensee has contravened any provision of this Ordinance or
rules or regulations made thereunder or an order passed under
section 27:
(c) the licensee has failed to comply with any condition of the licence;
and …………….
30A. Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the
Authority may, within thirty days of the receipt of such decision or
order, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that PEMRA shall make available a copy of its decision or
order of revocation of licence within twenty-four hours after decision
to the licensee for referring an appeal to the High Court.

33. Offences and penalties.-(1) Any broadcast media license or its

representative who violates or abets violation of any provision of this
ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which

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may extend to three years or with a fine may extend to ten million
rupees or with both.
(2) Any distribution service license or its representative who violates
or abets violation of any provision of the ordinance shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with a
fine which may extend to five million rupees or with both

(3) Where the violation, or abetment of the violation of any provision

of this Ordinance is made by a person who does not hold a licence,
such violation shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to four years, or with fine, or with both, in addition
to the confiscation of the equipment used in the commission of the act.

(4) Whosoever damages, removes, tampers with or commits theft of

any equipment of a broadcast media or distribution service station
licensed by the Authority, including transmitting or broadcasting
apparatus, receivers, boosters, converters, distributors, antennae,
wires, decoders, set-top boxes or multiplexers shall be guilty of an
offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or both.
33A. The Officers of Federal, Provincial and Local Government to
assist Authority.- The officers of Federal Government, Provincial
Governments and Local Governments including the Capital Territory
Police and the Provincial Police shall assist the Authority and its
officers in the discharge of their functions under the provisions of this
Ordinance and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder.
33B. Warrants for search.-(1) Where on information furnished by the
Authority, the Court has reason to believe that any unlicensed
broadcast media or distribution service is being owned, controlled or
operated or its equipment is being kept or concealed, it may issue a
search warrant and the person to whom search warrant is directed,
may enter the premises where such unlicensed broadcast media or
distribution service is being owned, controlled, operated or provided
or its equipment is being kept or concealed, or carry out search and
inspection thereof and seize all or any equipment therein.

(2) Any equipment of a broadcast media station seized under sub-

section (1) having no ostensible owner shall vest in the Authority.

34. Offences to be cognizable and compoundable. The offences under

this Ordinance shall be cognizable and compoundable.

35. Cognizance of offences etc.-(1) No court inferior to that of a

Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence punishable under this
Ordinance.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 32 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), it shall be lawful for any
Magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence authorized by this
Ordinance even if such sentence exceeds his powers unde0r the said
section 32.
36. Offences by companies.-(1) Where any offence under this
Ordinance has been committed by a person who at the time the
offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the
company itself shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be
liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
(2) Where the person guilty of an offence under this Ordinance, is a
company, corporation or firm, every director, partner and employee of

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the company, corporation or firm shall, unless he proves that offence

was committed without his knowledge, or consent, shall be guilty of
the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly.
37. Ordinance overrides other laws.-(1) The provisions of this
Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any contract,
agreement or any other instrument whatsoever:

Provided that –
(a) the national broadcasters, namely the Pakistan Broadcasting
Corporation shall continue to be regulated by the Pakistan
Broadcasting Corporation Act 1973 (XXXII of 1973) and the Pakistan
Television Corporation and Shalimar Recording and Broadcasting
Company Limited shall continue to be administered under the
provisions of the Companies Ordinance 1984 (XLVII of 1984); and

(b) other existing private broadcasters or CTV operators who had been
granted respective monopolies in multi-modal distribution system,
cable TV and in FM radio shall henceforth be regulated by this
Ordinance except in respects where specific exemptions are granted by
the Authority.

38. Indemnity. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie

against the Federal Government or any Provincial Government or
local authority or any other person exercising any power or
performing any function under this Ordinance or for anything which
is in good faith done or purporting or intended to be done under this
Ordinance or any rule made thereunder.

13. From perusal of the contents of Section 26 of PEMRA Ordinance, it

seems that the Council as mentioned in the section constituted under the
provisions of PEMRA Ordinance shall receive and review complaints made to
it by persons or organizations from the general public against any aspects of
programmes broadcast or distributed by a station established through a
licence issued by the Authority. Subsection (5) of said section provides that the
Council may recommend to the Authority appropriate action of censure, fine
against a broadcast or CTV station or licensee for violation of the codes of
programme, content and advertisements as prescribed and approved by the
Authority. Section 30 of the Ordinance provides that the Authority may
revoke or suspend the licence of a broadcast media or distribution service on,
interalia, the grounds; that the licensee has contravened any provision of the
Ordinance or rules or regulations made thereunder or an order passed under
section 27, that the licensee has failed to comply with any condition of the
licence. Section 30-A provides appeals against the order passed under Section
30.

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14. Subsection (1) to Section 33 provides that if any broadcast media

licensee or its representative violates or abets violation of any provision of
the Ordinance 2002, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years or with a fine may extend to ten million rupees or
with both. Subsection (2) of said section provides that if any distribution
service license or its representative violates or abets violation of any provision
of the ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one year or with a fine which may extend to five million rupees or
with both, whereas subsection (3) provides that if the violation, or abetment of
the violation of any provision of this Ordinance is made by a person who does
not hold a licence, such violation shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to four years, or with fine, or with both, in addition to
the confiscation of the equipment used in the commission of the act. Section
35(1) provides empowers a Magistrate of the first class to try an offence
punishable under the Ordinance, whereas subsection (2) thereof further
provides that notwithstanding anything contained in section 32 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), it shall be lawful for any Magistrate
of the first class to pass any sentence authorized by the Ordinance even if such
sentence exceeds his powers under Section 32 Cr. P.C.

15. Section 36 of the Ordinance, 2002 provides that if any offence under the
Ordinance has been committed by a person who was in charge of such
company or was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company,
he shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Subsection (2) of this Section provides if a company, corporation or firm, is
guilty of such offence, then every director, partner and employee of such
company, corporation or firm shall be guilty of such offence and shall be liable
to be proceeded against and punished accordingly, , unless he proves that
such offence was committed without his knowledge, or consent.

16. Section 37 of the Ordinance, 2002 provides that provisions of the

Ordinance, 2002 shall have overriding effect over any other law for the time
being in force, or any contract, agreement or any other instrument. Section 38
provides that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against
the Federal Government or any Provincial Government or local authority or
any other person exercising any power or performing any function under the
Ordinance, 2002 or for anything which has been done in good faith.

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17. From perusal of above said provisions of PEMRA Ordinance, 2002, it

seems that a full mechanism has been provided for the inquiry / investigation
and the proceedings in respect of any offence committed under said
Ordinance and the manner of conviction as well as quantum of sentence to be
awarded to any accused has also been prescribed, if found guilty of the
commission of such offence. Now the question arises as to whether the
allegations levelled by the accused / applicants, as claimed by the
complainant / respondent No.2 in Direct Compliant, fall within the ambit of
alleged offences / violations as detailed in the Ordinance, 2002 or not?
For this purpose, I would have to scrutinize the contents of the private
compliant. It seems that the complainant in para 9 of the complaint has stated
that the accused in collusion with each other committed serious offences and
labelled the complainant as a land grabber, extortionist (Bhatakhor), gunda and
hires armed gundas and is fake administrator of the Society and is involved in
corruption of millions of rupees, based on disparaging, conjectural,
misconceived, and false and incorrect informations against him causing
defamation to him without hearing counter version of the complainant in
disregard to responsible journalism as required by accused Nos.5 to 32. They
ruined the complainant, torn down his dignity, weakened his esteem and
social contribution and re-cognition of decades of continuous philanthropic
and social efforts without even bothering to conduct any investigation and to
seek a comment / counter version from the complainant although there was
no urgent need to air such heinous imputations against him. According to
him, certain delay if caused on account of verification of such allegations
before publishing the same, would not have caused any harm. Accused No.5
to 32 practiced forbidden „grey‟ journalism and acted in violation of second
part of code 22 (1) of the 2015 code, section 20 (f) of the 2002 Ordinance and, so
also the directions of the Superior Courts issued to the electronic media. His
grievance is that the accused have committed offences under Sections 449, 500,
501 & 34 read with Section 502-A of Chapter 21 of PPC. Therefore the
respondent/complainant namely Iqbal Hussain Channa S/o Ammer Bux
Channa filed instant Private/Direct Complaint.

18. From perusal of Sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the Ordinance, 2002, it

seems that each Council established under the provisions of the Ordinance,
has been empowered to receive complaints made by persons or organizations

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from the general public against any aspects of programmes broadcast or

distributed by a station established through a license issued by the Authority
and render opinions on such complaints. Subsection (5) of said section further
empowers such Council to recommend to the Authority appropriate action of
censure and fine against a broadcast or CTV station or licensee for violation of
the codes of programme content and advertisements.

19. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 27, inter alia, speak about prohibition of
displaying any programme or advertisement which is against the ideology of
Pakistan or is likely to create hatred among the people or is prejudicial to the
maintenance of law and order or is likely to disturb public peace and
tranquility or endangers national security or is pornographic, obscene or
vulgar or is offensive to the commonly accepted standards of decency or
willfully causing damage to any other person.

20. Apart from above, Section 20 of the Ordinance is also relevant which
reads as under:
Section 20. Terms and Conditions of Licence. A person who is issued
a licence under this Ordinance shall---
(a) Ensure preservation of the sovereignty, security and integrity
of the Islamic republic of Pakistan.
(b) Ensure preservation of the national, cultural, social and
religious values and the principles of public policy as enshrined in the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
(c) Ensure that all programmes and advertisements do not contain
or encourage violence, terrorism, racial, ethnic or militancy, hatred,
pornography, obscenity, vulgarity or other material offensive to
commonly accepted standards or decency.

(d) Comply with rules made under this Ordinance;

(e) Broadcast if permissible under the terms of its licence

programmes in the public interest specified by the Federal
Government or the authority in the manner indicated by the
Government or as the case may be, the Authority, provided that the
duration of such mandatory programmes do not exceed ten per cent of
the total duration of broadcast or operation by a station in twenty-four
hours except if, by its own volition, a station chooses to broadcast such
content for a longer duration;

(f) Comply with the codes of programmes and advertisements

approved by the authority and appoint an in-house monitoring
committee, under intimation to the Authority, to ensure compliance of
the Code;
(g) Not broadcast or distribute any programme or advertisement
in violation of copyright or other property right;

(h) Obtain NOC from Authority before import of any transmitting

apparatus for broadcasting, distribution or teleporting operation.

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(i) Not sell, transfer or assign any of the rights conferred by the
licence without prior written permission of the Authority.
21. Even the complainant himself in para 9 of his complainant made
admission to the effect, “Accused No.5 to 32 practiced forbidden „grey‟
journalism and acted in violation of second part of code 22 (1) of the 2015
code, section 20 (f) of the 2002 Ordinance”.

22. From perusal of aforesaid provisions of Ordinance, 2002 coupled with

the admission of the complainant himself, as quoted above, it is obvious that
the grievances of the complainant, as raised in the Direct Complaint, are fully
covered under the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance. In such
circumstances, the bar, as contained in Sections 37 and 38 of the Ordinance,
would be applicable in instant case.

23. Needless to emphasize that PEMRA Ordinance 2002 being a special law
shall have overriding effect over all other laws for the time being in force
which also include Criminal Procedure Code and Pakistan Penal Code.
Therefore, the complainant should have resorted his remedy for redressal of
his grievances against the accused / applicants by invoking the provisions of
PEMRA, Ordnance. In this connection it would be advantageous to refer to
certain decisions pronounced by Superior Courts. In the case of Mir
SHAKEEL-UR-REHMAN and others Vs/ The STATE OF GILGIT-
BALTISTAN, reported in 2016 G B L R 280, which also relates to PEMRA, it
was held as under:

“We also hold that after promulgation of the Pakistan Electronic

Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, being a Special Law,
have exclusive jurisdiction and take cognizance of offences committed
by Media Channels in violation of PEMRA Laws and Rules thereto
i.e. in presence of penal provisions, PEMRA can suspend, cancel
licence, prosecute convict and award sentences of fines whosoever
violates the PEMRA Laws and Rules thereto. The PEMRA Ordinance,
2002 has an overriding effect upon other previous enacted special
laws.

24. In the case of Mohammad Iqbal Vs. Nasrullah reported in 2023 SCMR
273, Honourable Supreme Court held that wherever there is special and
general law applicable to a certain matter, the special law will prevail.

25. In the case of Syed MUSHAHID SHAH and others Vs. FEDERAL
INVESTMENT AGENCY and others, reported in 2017 S C M R 1218, while
dealing with this point, a Full Bench of Honourable Supreme held as under:

Criminal Revision Applications No. 186 and 189 of 2022

 14

“It is a settled canon of interpretation that where there is a conflict

between a special law and a general law, the former will prevail over
the latter. In Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman's case (supra) this Court
observed that "special statute overtakes the operation of general
statute".

26. Yet in another case of GULISTAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and another
Vs. SONERI BANK LTD. and another, reported in PLD 2018 SC 322, another
Full Bench of Honourable Supreme Court held as under:

“This view is incorrect because according to the principle of

harmonious interpretation the special law would take precedence over
the general law (generalia specialibus non derogant). The Ordinance is
a special law, and therefore its specific provisions will displace the
general law which shall be deemed to be inapplicable. Reference in
this regard may be made to the judgment reported as Neimat Ali
Goraya and 7 others v. Jaffar Abbas, Inspector/Sargeant Traffic
through S.P., Traffic, Lahore and others (1996 SCMR 826). This
position is also supported in Section 4 of the Ordinance which
provides that "the provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force". The reason behind this is logical
in that the legislature, having devoted attention to a special subject
and provided for all the peculiar circumstances that may arise in
respect thereof (the legislature is presumed to know the law when
enacting legislation), it cannot intend to derogate from such special
enactment by allowing the general law to override the special law,
unless it does so through express and specific mention of its intention
to that effect.”

27. In the case reported as Malik TARIQ AYUB and another Vs. Raja
ARSHAD MEHMOOD and another (2022 M L D 2037) [Islamabad], a Division
Bench of Islamabad High Court held as under:

“The ATA is a special law. It is a settled principle that provisions of

special law trump provisions of general law and the provisions of a
general law cannot be relied upon when the subject-matter is
specifically addressed by a special law. Section 21-D of the ATA
provides an independent scheme for consideration of bail of an
accused under the ATA and in view of settled principle of
interpretation of special law versus general law, provisions of Section
497 of Cr.P.C cannot be relied upon in the presence of Section 21-D of
the ATA. Notwithstanding the settled principle of interpretation, even
otherwise Section 21-D(1) of the ATA starts with non-obstante
language, which excludes provisions of Sections 496, 497 and 498 of
Cr.P.C while vesting in the ATC, the High Court and the Supreme
Court, the power and jurisdiction to grant or refuse bail to an accused
in a case triable by the ATC. Section 21-D(2) of the ATA is in pari
materia to Section 497(1) of Cr.P.C, whereby in order to release a
person accused of a non-bailable offence under the ATA, the court
must first form an opinion that there appear no reasonable grounds to

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believe that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death

or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for not less than ten years.
Formation of such opinion is a pre-requisite for grant of bail without
which no accused, triable by the learned ATC, can be afforded the
benefit of bail. Section 21-D(3) of the ATA then lists additional factors
that constitute a negative list in the presence of which bail is to be
denied, even in the event that the learned ATC comes to the tentative
conclusion that no reasonable grounds exist for believing that the
person is guilty of the offence charged with under the ATA. The ATC is
to deny bail under Section 21-D(3) if it concludes that the person, if
released on bail, would (a) fail to surrender to custody, (b) commit an
offence while he on bail, (c) interfere with witnesses or obstruct the
course of justice, or (d) fail to comply with conditions of release, if
any. If the learned ATC comes to the conclusion that there are no
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is guilty of the offence
charged with, and further none of the negative considerations listed in
Section 21-D(3) of the ATA are attracted, Section 21-D(4) of the ATA
then provides the list of considerations to be taken into account in
guiding the discretion of the learned ATC to release a person on bail.”

28. In a recent decision given by Islamabad High Court in the case of

MOHAMMAD RAFIQUE AND ANOTHER Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL,
FEDERAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, ISLAMABAD AND ANOTHER,
reported in 2023 P.Cr.L.J. 38 [Islamabad], while discussing this point
elaborately, held as under:

“14. It is also settled law that any enactment having overriding

clause, like section 39 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, shows
its special character of being special law and excludes the general law.
In other words, the special provision overrides the general provision
and the special enactment prevails over general enactment, even, the
special law dealing with specific matter provides special procedure,
therefore, special procedure in such matter would be followed that the
same has not been provided under the general law, as such, recourse to
general law is permissible when special law is silent on particular
point, except where the provision of general law is inconsistent with
the provision of special law. It is also settled that special law is to be
applied to a particular case on the basis of special jurisdiction
envisaged in that particular law and provisions of general law stand
displaced as held in 1996 SCMR 826 (Neimat Ali Goraya v. Jaffar
Abbas). Furthermore, while taking analogy from cases reported as
PLD 2002 Karachi 83 (Messrs Noorani Traders, Karachi v. Pakistan
Civil Aviation Authority), 2010 SCMR 27 (Ismaeel v. The State), PLD
2010 Lahore 498 (The State v. Fazeelat Bibi), 1993 CLC 2009 Karachi
(National Bank of Pakistan v. Emirates Bank International Ltd.) and
2014 CLD 582 Lahore (Saeed Ullah Paracha v. Habib Bank Ltd.), it has
been observed that special law prevails over the general law and all
the specialized kinds of offences, like predicate offences, and the
special procedure dealing with Anti-Money Laundering is not
provided in the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 or in any other law
disclosing specific character of AMLA, 2010, as such, there is no
second opinion that it is a special statute providing special legislative
intent to deal with specialized crime and when such kind of special
laws have been promulgated the legislature has to provide an
overriding clause in order to protect its character to prevail over any

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other law, legislation, rules and administrative instructions. The piece

of legislation having overriding effect has to be interpreted in the light
of phraseology and language used by the legislature. The Courts while
interpreting laws relating to specialized economic activities and
complexities of recent times do not admit of solution through any
doctrinaire or straitjacket formula as held in PLD 2007 SC 133
(Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq). The plain
language of section 39 of AMLA, 2010 provides an overriding effect
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law and this special
Act is in addition to the Anti-Narcotics Force Act, 1997, Control of
Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, National
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and any other law relating to
predicate offences. Section 39 of the Act clearly establishes the
legislative intent that this special law has precedence on all other
specialized crimes referred in other laws, therefore, the argument
advanced by learned counsel for petitioner that the AMLA, 2010 is not
a special law, rather same has to be applied.”

29. In view of this legal position, the trial Court was not competent to take
cognizance in the matter and issue bailable warrants to the extent of accused
persons who are related to Media, as in such a case PEMRA was the only
competent authority to take cognizance of the offences, if any, it being a
special law would prevail upon general law. In this view of the matter and
keeping in view the principle laid down by Superior Courts including
Honorable Supreme Court in various cases, the case law relied upon by
learned counsel for complainant / Respondent No.2 viz. SAEED GHANI V.
Dr. SHAHID MASOOD and 3 others (2022 YLR [Sindh] Note 3) would not
be attracted to the facts of instant case.

30. Now, I advert to Cr. Revision Application No.189 of 2022. It may be

noted that the applicants in this revision application are private persons and
have no connection with Media. The learned counsel, appearing for the
applicants has attacked the impugned order mainly on the ground that
procedure as contemplated in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, for
entertaining and disposal of Direct / Private Complaint has not been adopted
and followed by learned Magistrate, Respondent No.2, who had sent the
complaint to the Court of Sessions as well as by learned Additional Sessions
Judge / Respondent No.2, who has passed the impugned order dated
06.7.2022. Learned counsel has quoted various provisions of Criminal
Procedure Code in the memo of Revision Application in order to emphasize
that such relevant provisions of the Code were not followed in letter and spirit
by Respondents No.1 and 2. Before discussing the relevant provisions of law,
it would be advantageous to reproduce the same hereunder:

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 17

“190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates: (1) All Magistrates of

the First Class, or any other Magistrate specially empowered by the
Provincial Government on the recommendation of the High Court,
may take cognizance of any offence- (a) upon receiving a complaint of
facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a report in writing of
such facts made by any police officer; (c) upon information received
from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own
knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed which
he may try or send to the Court of Session for trial and]
(2) A Magistrate taking cognizance under sub-section (1) of an offence
triable exclusively by a Court of Session shall, without recording any
evidence, send the case to the Court of Session for trial.
192. Transfer of cases by Magistrate [Omitted by the Ordinance.
XXXVII of 2001, dt. 13.8.2001.]
193. Cognizance of offences by Courts of Session: (1) Except as
otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the
time being in force no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any
offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the (1) case has been
sent to it under Section 190, sub-section [(2)]. (2) Additional Sessions
Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges shall try such cases only as the
Provincial Government by general or special order may direct them to
try or as the Sessions Judge of the division by general or special order
may make over-to them for trial.

200. Examination of complainant: A Magistrate taking, cognizance of

an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant upon
oath, and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing
and shall be signed by the complainant, and also by the Magistrate :
Provided as follows: (a) when the complaint is made in writing,
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require a Magistrate to
examine the complainant before transferring the case under Section
192 [or sending it to the Court of Sessions]; (aa) when the complaint Is
made in writing nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require
the examination of a complainant in any case in which the complaint
has been made by a Court or by a public servant acting or -purporting
to act in the discharge of his official duties; (b) [Omitted A.O.,
1949,Sch.]; (c) when the case has been transferred under Section 192-
and the Magistrate so transferring it has already examined the
complainant, the Magistrate to whom it is so transferred shall not be
bound to re-examine the complainant. Words added by Law Reforms
Ordinance. XII of 1972
201. Procedure by Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of
the case: (1) If the complaint has been made in/writing to a
Magistrate-who is not competent to take cognizance of the case, he
shall return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court with an
endorsement to that effect. (2) If the complaint has not been made in
writing, such Magistrate shall direct the complainant to the proper
Court.
202. Postponement of issue of process : (1) Any Court, on receipt of a
complaint of an offence of which it is authorised to take cognizance; or
which has been sent to it under Section 190, sub-section (3), or referred
to it under Section 191 or-Section 192, may, if it thinks fit, for reasons
to be recorded, postpone the issue of process for compelling the
attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into
the case itself or direct any inquiry or investigation to be made by [any
Justice of the Peace or by] a police officer or by such other person as it

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 18

thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of file
complaint:
Provided that save, where the complaint has been made by a Court, no
such direction shall be made unless the complainant has been
examined on oath under the provisions of Section 200.

(2) A -Court of Session may, instead of directing an investigation

under the provisions of sub-section (1), direct the investigation to be
made by any Magistrate subordinate to it for the purpose of
ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint.
(3) If any inquiry or investigation under this section is made by a
person not being a Magistrate [or Justice of the Peace] or a police
officer, such person shall exercise all the powers conferred by this
Code on an officer-in-charge of a police station, except that he shall not
have power to arrest without warrant.
(4) Any Court inquiring into a case under this section may, if it thinks
fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath].

203. Dismissal of complaints: [The Court], before whom a complaint

is made or to whom it has been transferred, 2s[or sent] may dismiss
the complaint, if, after considering the Statement on oath (if any) of the
complainant and the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any)
under Section 202 there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for
proceeding. In such cases he shall briefly record his reasons for so
doing. Words subs. by Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

204. Issue of process: (1) If in the opinion of a Court] taking

cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground of proceeding, and
the case appears to be one in which, according to the fourth column of
the Second Schedule, a summons should issue in the first instance, it
shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused. If the case
appears to be one in which, according to that column, a warrant
should issue in the first instance, it may issue a warrant, or, if it thinks
fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a
certain time before such Court or if it has no jurisdiction itself some
other Court having jurisdiction.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of
Section 90.
(3) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or
other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are
paid, and if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Court
may dismiss the complaint.”

31. On a bare perusal of the contents of Section 200 Cr. P.C. it seems that
when a complaint has been filed before a Magistrate he, while taking,
cognizance of the offence alleged in the complaint, shall forthwith examine the
complainant upon oath, and the substance of the examination shall be reduced
to writing and shall be signed by the complainant, and also by the Magistrate.
However, the proviso to said section, provides that when the complaint has
been made in writing, then it would not be necessary for a Magistrate to
examine the complainant on oath before transferring the case under Section
192 or if the offences are triable by the Court of Sessions before sending the

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case to the Court of Sessions. Subsection (2) to Section190 Cr. P.C. provides
that while sending the case to the Court of Sessions for trial, the offence being
exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate shall send the case
as aforesaid without recording any evidence. Subsection (2) of Section 200 Cr.
P.C. empowers the Sessions Court to get the preliminary enquiry /
investigation conducted by any Magistrate subordinate to it for the purpose
of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. Subsection (4) to
Section 200 Cr. P.C. bestows powers upon any Court / Magistrate, holding a
preliminary inquiry / investigation into the case, to record evidence of
witnesses on oath. After holding preliminary enquiry / investigation
recording evidence of the witnesses, if deemed fit, such Magistrate shall send
back his report to the concerned Court of Sessions. Section 203 Cr.P.C.
provides that after considering the Statement on oath of the complainant and
also keeping in view the result of the investigation or preliminary inquiry, if
conducted under Section 202 Cr. P.C., if concerned Court is of the opinion that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding with the case, then after recording
brief reasons, it may dismiss the complaint. Section 204 Cr. P.C. provides that
if concerned Court is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding with the matter, it may issue a summons or warrant, as the
circumstances of the case may require, for getting attendance of the accused.

32. Now examining instant case in the light of abovesaid provisions of

Criminal Procedure Code, it seems that the complainant had filed the
complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. against the accused / applicants for
allegedly committing offences under Sections 449, 500/501/34 read with
Section 502-A PPC in the Court of XII-Judicial Magistrate, Karachi South,
respondent No.2 herein, copy whereof is available at page 57 of the Court File.
The said complaint was sent by learned Judicial Magistrate to the Court of
Sessions for trial vide his Order dated 25.3.2022 as, according to him, the
alleged offences pertained to the jurisdiction of Court of Sessions. The
relevant portion from the said order is reproduced as under:

“Therefore, keeping in view above section and memo of direct

compliant along with relevant documents, I am of the view that
offence pertains to the Jurisdiction of Hon‟ble Sessions Court,
therefore, same be sent up to the hon‟ble District and Sessions Court.”

33. On receiving the complaint, learned VIth Additional Sessions Judge,

Karachi South, respondent No.1 herein, got recorded statement of the

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 20

complainant namely, Iqbal Hussain Channa, on 18.5.2022, as required under

Section 200 Cr.P.C. copy available at page 49 of the Court file. Thereafter,
respondent No.1 sent the case to respondent No.2 for holding preliminary
inquiry/investigation as provided under Subsection (2A) to Section 202
Cr.P.C. Accordingly, as provided under subsection (4) to Section 202 Cr. P.C.
respondent No.2 got recorded statements of two witnesses of the complainant
namely, Arbab Ahmed Shar and Tajuddin Buriro on 20.5.2022, copies
available at pages 53 and 55 respectively of the Court file. Ultimately, after
hearing counsel for the complainant, learned Additional Sessions Judge / trial
Court passed the impugned order. The concluding para of the impugned
order is reproduced hereunder:

“The question of defamation at the hands of accused could only be

adjudged at the stage of trial and not otherwise. Accordingly, the
complaint is registered and cognizance is taken against the accused
No.1 to 4 and 17 to 33. Let the attendance of accused No.1 to 4 and 17
to 33 be secured by furnishing the surety in the sum of Rs.50,000/- each
and execution of P.R Bond in the like amount. Let such process be
issued through S.H.O concerned for compliance”

34. Learned counsel for the applicants has not been able to point out as to
how and in what manner, respondents No.1 and 2 have passed the impugned
orders in contravention of the legal procedure as prescribed under the Code of
Criminal Procedure. As detailed above, it is apparent that the Courts below
have adopted the procedure as laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code,
1898, and I have not been able to find any derogation or contravention thereof.

35. Learned counsel, while emphasizing on Section 193 Cr. P.C., contended
that a Court of Sessions is, at all, not competent to take cognizance of any
offence as a Court of original jurisdiction, therefore, learned Additional
Sessions Judge seriously erred in taking cognizance in the matter and issuing
warrants against the accused persons, therefore, the impugned order is liable
to be set aside on this ground. It seems that learned counsel, while making this
submission, has not gone through the provisions of relevant law. It seems that
the cognizance was not directly taken by learned Additional Sessions Judge.
In fact, as stated above, the complaint was filed by the complainant in the
Court of Judicial Magistrate who sent the same to the Court of Sessions, the
offence falling within the jurisdiction of Court of Sessions. It was thereafter
that learned Additional Sessions Judge, got recorded statement of the
complainant and then sent the matter to Judicial Magistrate for holding

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preliminary enquiry and after receiving the report of the preliminary inquiry
and considering the contents of the statement of the complainant as well as his
two witnesses, he passed the impugned order. In this view of the matter, the
impugned order does not seem to be suffering from any illegality or material
irregularity.

36. It may be observed that by insertion of section 502-A through the

Defamation (Amendment Act IX) of 2004 in the P.P.C. the offence of
defamation under section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code has been made to be
triable by the Court of Sessions. Section 502-A PPC reads as under:

"502-A. Trial of offences under this chapter.---Notwithstanding

anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of
1898), the Court of Session shall have the jurisdiction to try an offence
under this Chapter and decide it within a period of ninety days."

37. Even the complainant in caption of the complaint has also mentioned
section 502-A PPC. In view of above legal position, the contention of learned
counsel for applicants has no force.

38. It appears that learned counsel for the applicants in paras 10 to 16 of the
grounds of the revision application has narrated defamatory allegations
leveled against the complainant by the accused persons as mentioned in the
impugned order passed by respondent No.1 vide clause (a) to (g) at page 41 to
43 of the Court file. As regards allegation contained in clause (a), it has been
stated that material is available with proposed accused No.4 namely, Ms
.Fouzia Khan, regarding opening of wine shop beside her house against which
she had raised objection. As regards allegation contained in clause (b), it is
averred that material is available with certain week and poor members of the
Society, who could not unearth the truth about complainant‟s malpractices
due to fear that they might have been implicated in false and bogus cases by
the complainant. As regards the allegation contained in clause (c), it has been
mentioned that the material relied upon by members of the society reflects
that they had filed applications / complaints at PS against the complainant,
but the concerned SHO never entertained any such complaint against the
complainant. As regards the allegation contained in clauses (d) and (e), it has
been stated that material relied upon by the society members reflects that
whenever they had raised objections on illegal occupation by the complainant,
they were victimized at the hands of complainant. As regards the allegations

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 22

contained in clauses (f) and (g), it has been asserted that members of the
society as well as the applicants had to face various illegal and bogus
litigations / cases since inception of the society at the hands of the
complainant in order to refrain them from seeking justice and knocking the
door of the Court of law.

39. From perusal of above grounds taken on behalf of the applicants for
setting aside the impugned order whereby bailable warrants have been issued
against the applicants for securing their attendance before the trial Court, it is
apparent that all these facts, which have been admitted by the applicants
themselves, do require the recording of evidence and without recording
evidence of the parties such facts cannot, at all, be adjudicated upon in a
proper and judicious manner and this is exactly what the learned trial Court
has observed in the impugned order dated 06.07.2022 i.e. “The question of
defamation at the hands of accused could only adjudged at the stage of trial
and not otherwise”. In this connection reference may be made to the case of
Daim Ali Khan Versus Mushtaque Ali alias Farooq and 4 others reported
in 2017 Y L R 1456 wherein it was held as under:-

“12. There are two different aspects of present controversy i.e.

firstly, the question of sale of suit house through sale agreement
without mutation of title/Foti Khata in favour of the legal heirs of
deceased Moula Bux Khoso, and the matter relating to the sale
agreement in question could only be dealt with by the Civil Court; and
second, the question of illegal dispossession is absolutely different
from the civil liabilities, and learned trial Court was bound to
ascertain as to whether the allegations levelled by the applicant
constituted an offence under Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, or
otherwise. Trial Court, in circumstance, had failed to exercise the
jurisdiction vested in it in appropriate manner and committed
material illegality and gross irregularity, while dismissing the
complaint without recording the evidence of the parties and affording
them opportunity to produce their documents during the trial.”

40. The stand taken by the applicants, as stated above, was that the facts
reported / displayed in the media by accused persons were substantially
true and that the same were published / displayed in public interest, as
such no case of criminal defamation can be made out against the applicants
/ accused. In this connection, suffice it to say that it is yet to be determined
at the trial stage after recording of evidence etc. as to whether the alleged
defamatory news contained true or untrue facts and before undertaking
such exercise, it would be premature to adjudge determination of such fact.
Needless to emphasize that while dealing with a private complaint at the

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 23

initial stage, the Court has only to see as to whether a prima facie case has
been made out by the complainant for issuing further process in the matter
or not and at that stage a detailed inquiry is not warranted.

41. In the case of Noor Muhammad v. The State and others reported in
PLD 2007 SC 9, Honourable Supreme Court held as under:

"The Court cannot overstretch the proceedings as to convert the

preliminary inquiry or the averments made in the complaint to a
stage of full-fledged trial of the case. It is quite an initial stage
whereafter the accused is having the opportunity, apart from
showing his innocence in the case at the final stage, to have a
recourse of an intermediary remedy by moving the Court showing
the complaint to be false and frivolous one and requesting the
Court for his acquittal under section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. prior
to further proceeding in the case to be taken. Mere summoning of an
accused by the Court to answer the charges levelled against him
does not tantamount to any infringement of any right of a person
but rather an opportunity afforded to him to explain his position.
During the investigation of a FIR case, where the police is
empowered to arrest without warrant i.e., in cognizable case, such
a process, i.e., arrest etc. is resorted to by the police, even in a case
where the person accused of the charge pleads innocence before the
police and he succeeds in his efforts to some extent and the police
agrees with him, yet before any recommendation by the police for
his discharge, an insistence is made of his surrender before the
authorities/court. The possibility of accusation turning out to be
false or frivolous at the trial should not overbear the Court from
issuing the process if the material available, prima facie discloses
the case against the accused. At this stage a protracted inquiry or
full-dressed rehearsal of trial is not required."

42. Even otherwise, it seems that in instant case only process has been
issued to the applicants for their appearance in the Court and at the trial
stage they would be afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing to disprove
the allegations levelled by complainant/respondent No.3 in the direct
complaint. Besides, other remedies admissible under the law would also be
available to them for initiating appropriate proceedings against the
complainant and also for awarding compensation to them, if ultimately it is
found and concluded that the complaint was frivolous and vexatious and
had been filed with ulterior motives only to victimize the applicants.
In case of Noor Muhammad v. The State and others (PLD 2007 SC 9),
Honourable Supreme Court held as under:

"Moreover, section 250, Cr.P.C. also provides sufficient safeguard

to an accused against a false and frivolous accusation by the
complainant, which envisages that the court while acquitting an

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 24

accused at the trial stage, holding that the charge brought against
him, was false, frivolous or vexatious has sufficient power to
award adequate compensation."

43. In the case in hand the applicants have prima facie by-passed the
ordinary legal course available to them provided under the Criminal
Procedure Code and since there has been placed no exceptional
circumstances to justify departure from normal course, hence in absence
thereof inherent jurisdiction vested under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. cannot be
exercised which otherwise would amount to interrupt and divert the
ordinary Code of Criminal procedure; however, the applicants can agitate
the same plea before the trial Court. As far as revisional powers vested
under Section 435 Read with Section 439, Cr.P.C. are concerned, I find no
jurisdictional error or material illegality and irregularity in the impugned
order which may warrant interference of this Court. It is settled law that
Revisional jurisdiction cannot be used for interrupting or subverting the
normal criminal proceedings unless an order under reference is found
tainted with miscarriage of justice, same cannot be interfered with.

44. In case of Muhammdd Farooq v. Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani and others

reported in PLD 2016 Supreme Court 55, it was held by apex Court as
under:-

"To take cognizance of an offence in complaint case, burden of

proof in preliminary enquiry for the issuance of process and or
summons as the case may be is much lighter on the complainant
and he is required to establish prima facie case, whereas, the burden
of proof placed on the prosecution during regular trial is much
stringent and the prosecution is required to establish and prove the
case beyond reasonable doubt."

45. Since the trial Court after completion of codal formalities has
brought the complaint on record. After registering the case, trial Court took
cognizance of the same and has issued bailable warrants against the
applicants. The applicants without approaching the trial Court by availing
remedy available under the law under Section 265-K Cr. P.C., have directly
approached to this Court for quashment of the proceedings which is not
permissible. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of
Director General, Anti-Corruption Establishment, Lahore, and others v.
Muhammad Akram Khan and others reported in PLD 2013 SC 401, wherein
it has been held as under:

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"2. ... The law is quite settled by now that after taking of cognizance
of a case by a trial court the F.I.R. registered in that case cannot be
quashed and the fate of the case and of the accused persons challaned
therein is to be determined by the trial court itself. It goes without
saying that if after taking of cognizance of a case by the trial court an
accused person deems himself to be innocent and falsely implicated
and he wishes to avoid the rigours of a trial then the law has provided
him a remedy under sections 249-A/265-K, Cr.P.C. to seek his
premature acquittal if the charge against him is groundless or there is
no probability of his conviction.

46. It is a settled principal that where two courts have coextensive or

concurrent jurisdiction, the Court of the lower grade is to be approached in
the first instance. In instant case although alternate remedy in shape of
application for quashment under section 265-K Cr.PC was available to the
applicants, however, instead of availing such remedy they have directly
invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 561-A Cr.PC
which is not warranted by law. In this connection reference may be made to
the case of MUHAMMAD FAROOQ V. AHMED NAWAZ JAGIRANI and
others reported in PLD 2016 SC 55 wherein, while dealing with this legal
point Honorable Supreme Court held as under:-

“10. We have heard the arguments of learned ASCs for the parties as
well as the learned Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh, and perused
the record. The orders passed either under Section 203, Cr.PC whereby
the direct complaint is dismissed or under Section 204, Cr.PC whereby
the Court has taken cognizance of an offence complained of and has
issued warrants or summons for causing the accused to be brought or
produced before the Court are judicial orders. Where taking
cognizance of the offence after hearing the accused persons and the
Prosecutor, the Court considers that the charge is groundless or that
there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any charge, it
may record acquittal under section 249-A Cr.P.C and or Section 265-K
Cr.P.C as the case may be. The Sessions Judge and or the High Court
under Sections 435 and 439 Cr.P.C may exercise Revisional power to
examine the legality or propriety of any order passed and or examine
the regularity of any proceedings of the Court subordinate to it.
Exercise of jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C by the High Court
is akin to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973; exercise of such
jurisdiction is not to be exercised in routine and or as a matter of
course merely because such jurisdiction is available and or could be
exercised. Exercise of inherent jurisdiction is dependent on non
availability of alternate and efficacious remedy and or existence of
some extraordinary circumstances warranting exercise of such
jurisdiction by-passing such alternate remedy by the High Court.
Another rule of propriety, that has evolved by precedent law must not

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lose sight is that where two Courts have coextensive or concurrent

jurisdiction, than the propriety demands that jurisdiction of Court of
the lower grade is to be invoked in the first instance.
11. The remedy under Section 561-A, Cr.PC is not an alternate and or
substitute for an express remedy as provided under the law in terms of
Sections 435 to 439, Cr.P.C. and or Sections 249-A or 265-K, Cr.PC, as
the case may be. One cannot be allowed to bypass and or circumvent
the ordinary remedy in normal course of the event……….

13. Even if the contention of Mr. Shahadat Awan, learned ASC for the
respondents is taken, on its face value that inherent jurisdiction under
Section 561-A, Cr.PC is coextensive with power under Section 249-A,
Cr.PC and or under Section 265-K, Cr.PC as the case may be, therefore,
no exception to the exercise of such jurisdiction by the High Court in
the instant case could be taken, the contention is preposterous. As
observed above, it is not the question of taking any exception to the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the High Court. It is matter of
regulating the exercise of inherent jurisdiction available with the High
Court. It is now well entrenched legal position that where a power is
coextensive with two or more Courts, in ordinary circumstances,
propriety demands that the litigant must first seek remedy in the
Court of the lowest jurisdiction. Mr. Shahadat Awan does not dispute
that learned trial Court was seized of jurisdiction under Section 249-
A, Cr.PC. No special and or extraordinary circumstances were either
pleaded or considered by the learned Judge in Chambers in the High
Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction Section 561-A, Cr.PC.

14. The learned Judge in Chambers in the High Court proceeded on a

wrong assumption that the complainant has not brought on record
sufficient material to show that the allotment was part and parcel of
his land. It was not the case of the appellant that part and parcel of
his plot has been allotted, but his case was that it was a green belt, a
public amenity abutting his plot, which was converted into
commercial plot and was allotted. It has also come on record that it
was only on the complaint of the appellant such conversion and or
allotment of the green belt was cancelled on the same date, which fact
is mentioned in the inquiry report that "after having made complaint
by Muhammad Farooque, the same allotment was
withdrawn/cancelled by the site". To take cognizance of an offence in
complaint case, burden of proof in preliminary enquiry for the
issuance of process and or summons as the case may be is much lighter
on the complainant and he is required to establish prima facie case,
whereas, the burden of proof placed on the prosecution during regular
trial is much stringent and the prosecution is required to establish and
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt (see Noor Muhammad v. State
(PLD 2007 Supreme Court 9 at page 14).”

47. Earlier in the case reported as Maqbool Rehman v. State (2002 SCMR
1076), learned Apex Court had held as under:

"Normally, High Court does not exercise inherent jurisdiction unless

there is gross miscarriage of Justice and interference by the High Court
seems to be necessary to prevent abuse of process of court or to secure

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 27

the ends of justice. Jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C is neither

alternative nor, additional in its nature and is to be rarely invoked
only to secure the ends of justice so as to seek redress of grievance for
which no other procedure is available and that the provisions should
not be used to obstruct or direct the ordinary course of Criminal
Procedure. This kind of jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and
designed to do substantial justice. It is neither akin to appellate nor
the Revisional Jurisdiction."

48. In the case of Bashir Ahmed v. Zafar-ul-Islam reported in PLD 2004

Supreme Court 298, Honorable Supreme Court after elaborately discussing
the said legal point highlighted guidelines for exercising the inherent powers
to the following effect:

"(i) The said provision should never be understood to provide an

additional or an alternate remedy nor could the same be used to
override the express provisions of law;
(ii) the said powers can ordinarily be exercised only where no
provision exists in the Code to cater for a situation or where the Code
offers no remedy for the redress of a grievance;
(iii) inherent powers can be invoked to make a departure from the
normal course prescribed by law only and only in exceptional cases of
extraordinary nature and reasons must be offered to justify such a
deviation; and
(iv) in the matter of quashing criminal proceeding, the trial must
ordinarily be permitted to take its regular course envisaged by law
and the provision of section 561-A, Cr.PC should be invoked only in
exceptional cases for reasons to be recorded."

49. In view of above legal position the applicants in Cr. Revisions

Application No.189 of 2022 , if felt aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
proceedings initiated by the trial Court and were of the view that the same
deserved to be quashed, they must have approached the trial Court in first
instance by moving application under section 265-K Cr.PC. However, instead
of availing said alternate remedy, they have directly invoked inherent
jurisdiction of this Court under section 561-A Cr.PC.

50. The upshot of the above discussion is as under:-

i. Criminal Revision Application No.186 of 2022 is allowed,

consequently, the impugned order dated 06.07.2022 passed by
learned VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi South in
Private/Direct Complaint No. 872 of 2022 is set aside to the
extent of accused No.5 to 32 as arrayed in the private complaint.
However, the complainant/respondent would be at liberty to

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 28

approach the concerned PEMRA Authorities for redressal of his

grievances as mentioned in the private/direct complaint.
ii. Criminal Revision Application No.189 of 2022 is hereby
dismissed, consequently, the impugned order dated
25.03.2022 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-XII, Karachi
South and impugned order dated 06.07.2022 passed by learned
VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi South in Private/Direct
Complaint No. 872 of 2022 are maintained to the extent of
accused No. 1 to 4 and 33 as arrayed in the private complaint.

Office to place a signed copy of judgment in connected file.

Karachi
Dated. 9th March, 2023. JUDGE

Criminal Revision Applications No. 186 and 189 of 2022