6TH RBUSNL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

IN THE MATTER OF:

M/S SINGH & SONS ................................................................................ APPELLANT

VERSUS
MR SAM MALHOTRA.......................................................... DEFENDANT

Criminal Appeal No. of 2023

(Under Article 226/227 of The Constitution of India)

As submitted to the Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble HIGH COURT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 .
S. TABLE
NO OF
.
CONTEN
TS

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

| ME MO RIAL O N BE HALF O F T H E APPELLANT

 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

S

1. @ At/at

2. & And/and

3. A.I.R. All India Reporter

4. All Allahabad

5. Anr. Another

6. Bom. Bombay

7. BomCr Bombay Cases Reporter

8. Cr.P.C. The Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973
9. Cri. LJ Criminal Law Journal

10. Ed. Edition

11. IPC The Indian Penal Code, 1860

12. Jhar. Jharkhand

13. No. Number

14. Ors. Others

15. P&H Punjab and Haryana

16. Pat. Patna

17. Pg. Page

18. r/w read with

19. SC Supreme Court

20. SCC Supreme Court Cases

| ME MO RIAL O N BE HALF O F T H E APPELLANT

 21. SCR Supreme Court Reporter

22. S. Section

23. Tri. Tripura

24. u/a under Article

25. u/s Under section

26. UK United Kingdom

27. UP Uttar Pradesh

28. UOI Union Of India

29. v. Versus

30. Vol. Volume

31. POCSO Protection of Children from

Sexual Offences Act, 2012

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

S. NO. CASES PG.

NO.

1. Mohori Bibee vs Dharmodas Ghose

2. Ritesh Agarwal vs SEBI

3. Johnson vs Pye

4. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Ajax Products Ltd.,

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 S. STATUTE
NO. S

1. Indian Contract Act, 1872

2. Indian Evidence Act

3. Information Technology Act, 2000

S. NO. ONLINE
DATABASE

1. All Indian Reporter

2. Live law

3. SCC Online

4. LexisNexis

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. of 2023

The Appellant has approached the Hon'ble High Court has Appellate Jurisdiction to hear the
instant matter under article 226/227 of the Constitution, which reads as under:-

226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including 1[writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for
any other purpose.]

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories.

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in
any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1),
without— (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the
plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an
application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such
application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party,
the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on
which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished,
whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the
expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so
disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry
of the said next day, stand vacated.]

[(4)] The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power
conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.

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227. [(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.]

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may— (a) call
for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating
the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and
accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.

(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and
officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that
any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be
inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the
previous approval of the Governor.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence
over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS
12th CHECKMATE NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

FACTUAL MATRIX
1. Sam Malhotra, a sixteen-year prodigy, was an astounding singer and extremely talented in
various kinds of music such as- Rap, Rock, Hip-Hop, Jazz and others and was also the recipient
of the “Sensational Voice of the Nation” award.
2. He wanted to develop his musical career by releasing fusion albums combining different genres
and by engaging himself on world music tours. So, he wanted a multi-purpose, ultra-modern
architectural marvel where he could have his recording studio and theatre - for live musical
performances and a roof top pool for hosting parties.
3. He misrepresented himself as a major in order to make the contract and put the task out to tender.
M/s. Singh & Sons was a leading building constructor and infrastructure provider, who offered to
do the entire work for Rs.10,00,000, which was an unrealistically low-price contract and it was
decided that the amount would be paid in installments in order of the completion of different
phases of the assigned work.
4. Sam accepted their offer and entered into a contract for construction of the multi-purpose
building and for providing all the amenities therein. According to the contract, the ground floor
was fixed for parking, the first floor was for the music theatre, the second floor was for the
recording studio and the last floor for the roof top pool.
5. M/s. Singh & Sons completed the construction of the ground floor and first floor and ran out of
money and materials for further construction and therefore, informed Sam that they could not
complete the construction unless further capital was made available to them. Sam had arranged a
poolside party to which he had invited top music directors, producers and other renowned
individuals in the music industry whom he believed would fund for his dream music albums and
music tours and was thereby desperate to have the construction of the roof top pool completed as
stipulated.
6. Mr. Sam Malhotra had thus, requested for the continuance of the construction work and further
requested to spend the remaining amount of Rs.7,00,000/- on the work out of their own funds and
assured them that the money would be paid to them as soon as his album is released. The roof top
pool was completed and the party was a success.
7. Sam entered into a contract with Veenaghaana Producers who agreed to fund for the fusion
albums and world tours and he told Mr. Singh, the Manager of M/s. Singh & Sons “Sir, you have
saved my career. Don’t worry about Rs.7,00,000/-.”
8. Having this as a promise, M/s. Singh & Sons started a new project. However, Sam’s new fusion
music album was a disastrous flop. Social media enthusiasts and meme pages massively trolled
him for his raucous and bizarre fusion music. He then found himself unable to pay the amount of
Rs.7,00,000/- to M/s. Singh & Sons. Mr. Singh (the petitioner) compelled Sam to render a music
9 | M E M O R I AL O N B E H AL F O F T H E A P P E L L A N T
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
12th CHECKMATE NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
performance in her daughter’s birthday party, in which she had invited various influential
personalities, in order to secure contracts regarding building, construction etc. and in return for
his perforamce, she agreed to release Sam from paying the debts of Rs.7,00,000/-
9. Sam agreed on this point and was ready for the music performance in the party as he also wanted
to get back his lost reputation and start his career afresh. However before the party, he suffered
from a severe sore throat due to over-repetition of rehearsals and could not perform in Ms.
Asha’s party on the advice of his doctor.
10. On Sam’s eighteenth birthday, both the parties, on grounds of humanity, decided to alter the
contract. Sam acknowledged the debt taken from M/s. Singh & Sons for rendering past services
and further both agreed on the same point that Sam would pay the debt through easy monthly
installments (EMIs) of Rs. 20,000/- per month till the repayment of the amount of Rs.7,00,000/-.
11. Sam, later on, felt that the work done by M/s. Singh & Sons was not performed as he had
specified. He further pointed out that the material used for constructing was substandard and not
satisfactory. He estimated that this would have cost them Rs.3,00,000/- only. He claimed that he
had paid the money already. Sam then decided to dispose off his property, without paying a
single dime to M/s. Singh & Sons .
12. When all this foul play came to the knowledge of M/s Singh & Sons, they tried to restrain him by
putting enormous pressure in order to recover their money amounting to a total sum of
Rs.7,00,000/- which they spent on the construction and amenities, but they could not recover the
same from Sam. As a last resort, they sent him a legal notice, stating that the money shall be
repaid within 15 days. However, Sam did not send any correspondence or reply to the said notice.
13. M/s. Singh & Sons finally decided to seek remedy from the Court of Law in this regard. The suit
was filed by M/s. Singh & Sons before the Civil Court of Chandigarh, on the ground that they
had constructed the building as per the terms of the contract and had taken all the diligent steps to
recover the loan made available to Sam Malhotra for Rs.7,00,000/- but now he refused to pay the
said amount and alleged fraud against him. They also prayed for injunction restraining Sam from
selling the property until the suit was disposed off. The Civil Court of Chandigarh heard the
matter and held that a minor’s contract is void ab initio and thus set Sam free from all his
liabilities towards M/s. Singh & Sons by upholding the judgment passed in Mohori Bibee v.
Dharmodas Ghose. The plea of restitution raised by the Plaintiff was rejected and injunction was
not granted. M/s. Singh & Sons, has thus, preferred an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana
High Court of Chandigarh.

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS
12th CHECKMATE NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES
12th CHECKMATE NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
13.

ISSUE I:

WHETHER THERE IS VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN M/S SINGH & SONS

AND MR SAM MALHOTRA?

ISSUE 2:
WHETHER THE JUDGEMENT PASSED IN MOHORI BIBEE VS
DHARMODAS GHOSE NEEDS RECONSIDERATION?

ISSUE 3:
WHETHER THE CIVIL COURT OF CHANDIGARH WAS CORRECT IN
REJECTING THE PLEA OF RESTITUTION?

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13 | M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F T H E A P P E L L A N T
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THERE IS A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN M/S SINGH & SONS AND
MR SAM MALHOTRA?

"You're not a victim for sharing your story. You are a survivor setting the world on fire with your truth.
And you never know who needs your light, your warmth, and raging courage."
-Alex Elle

1. That it is humbly contended that the contract entered between Mr Sam Malhotra [Hereinafter
referred to as Respondent] and M/s. Singh & Sons [Hereinafter referred to as Appellant] for the
construction of the Building for a Consideration of Rs. 10,00,000 is void ab-initio as the
Respondent was a minor at the time of the making of the contract.
2. That Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 states the essentials of a valid contract which
includes that all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent
to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly
declared to be void. The counsel humbly submits that essentials of a valid contract have not been
fulfilled in this case and therefore the contract between the appellant and the respondent is void
ab-initio.
3. That in the present case, the essential requisites of valid contract have not been fulfilled as parties
must be competent to make a contract and in the present case, the Respondent was a minor at the
time of entering into the contract. The counsel humbly submits that as per Section 11 of The
Indian Contract Act, 1872, every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority
according to the law to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind and is not
disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject. The counsel humbly submits that
as per Section 3 of The Indian Majority Act, 1875, the age of majority is 18 years and
therefore the contract entered between the appellant and the respondent is void ab-initio.
4. That in the case of Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose, the Privy Council held that any sought
of contract with a minor or infant is void/void ab- initio (void from beginning). Since minor was
incompetent to make such mortgage hence the contact such made or commenced shall also being void
and not valid in the eyes of law. The minor i.e. Dharmodas Ghose cannot be forced to give back the
amount of money that was advanced to him, because he was not bound by the promise that was
executed in a contract.

12. M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F T H E A P P E L L A N T
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

5. That the counsel humbly submits that the Appellent is relying on the fact that the Respondent
misrepresented himself as a major while entering into the contract. The counsel humbly submits that
reference may be sought to the judgement Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan vs Jai Kishori, the Privy Coucil
held that a deed executed by a minor is a nullity and incapable of founding a plea of estoppel. The
council held that even if a minor has entered into a contract by misrepresenting his age, he can at any
later stage plead “minority” and avoid the contract.
6. That in the case of Khan Gul vs. Lakha Singh, the defendant while still a minor, fraudulently
concealing his age, contracted to sell a plot of land to plaintiff and in return he received a
consideration of Rs. 17,500 and then refused to perform his part of the bargain. The plaintiff prayed
for recovery of possession or refund of consideration but there could be no question of specific
enforcement, the contract being void ab-initio.
7. That the reference may be sought to the case of Raj Rani vs. Prem Adib in which the plaintiff, a
minor, was allotted by the defendant, a film producer, a role in a film. The agreement was made with
her father. The defendant ultimately allotted that role to another artist and terminated the contract
with the plaintiff's father. Held, that neither the plaintiff not her father could sue on the promise. If it
was a contract with the plaintiff, she being the minor, it was a nullity. If it was a contract with her
father it was void for being without consideration.
8. That in the case of Johnson v. Pye, it was said that if by falsely representing a minor obtained load
from someone, he cannot be made to repay the loans in the form of damages for deceit. Hence, a
minor cannot be held liable for anything which would directly or indirectly enforce any agreement.
The Calcutta High court upheld the principle that a contract cannot be converted into a tort to sue a
minor.

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ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE JUDGEMENT PASSED IN MOHORI BIBEE VS DHARMODAS
GHOSE NEEDS RECONSIDERATION?

“Everything comes to us that belongs to us if we create a capacity to receive it” - Rabindranath Tagore

1. That the case of Mohori Bibee vs Dharmodas Ghose is a good precedent and the law enunciated
and principles formulated in the judgement pronounced by the privy council- form an absolute
basis in regard with the liability of the minor in enforceability of the contract.
2. That in the referred impugned judgement of Mohori Bibee vs Dharmodas Ghose, Dharmodas
Ghose (the respondent) was a minor and the sole owner of an immovable property. He went for
mortgage of his immovable property during his minority, in favour of the appellant Brahmo Dutt
and secured a mortgage deed for Rs. 20,000 at 12% interest rate per year. Dharmodas Ghose’s
mother sent a notification to Brahmo Dutt informing him about the minority of Dharmodas Ghose
on the date on which such mortgage deed was commenced. The representative of the defendant
had acted despite full knowledge about the incompetency of the plaintiff. It was held by the Privy
Council that (a) any sort of contract with a minor is void/void ab initio. (b) Since the minor was
incompetent to make such mortgage, hence the contract such made shall be void.
3. That it is humbly submitted on the behalf of the counsel for the defendant that Mr Sam Malhotra,
who is aged 16 years, is not competent to contract as per provisions of the Indian Contract Act,
1872. It is henceforth submitted that in order for an agreement to be a valid contract, provisions of
section 10 of the Indian contract act must be fulfilled, which lay down that for an agreement to be
a contract - (a)Parties Should be competent to contract. (b) There must be free consent of parties.
(c) There should be lawful consideration (d) there should be lawful object (e) The contract must
not be declared expressly void under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
4. That it is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Bench that for a contract to be valid, the parties to
contract must have a free consent, which has been defined u/s 13 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
to mean an agreement between two or more people upon the same thing in the same sense. It may
further be added that no binding contract can be formed if there is no consensus ad idem. Thus, it
may be stated before this Hon’ble Court that as a minor is not competent to give a valid consent,
hence, contract with Mr Sam Malhotra is void as it does not fulfil the conditions specified u/s 10
and 13 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
5. That it may humbly be stated that under Indian law, the Legal maxim which takes the dominance
is “Generalis Regula Generaliter Est Intelligenda” which basically means that a general rule is
to generally understood. It may be stated that a minor generally is not a competent party to enter
into a valid contract and is not someone who’s consent can be considered to be a valid consent,
thus, any contract with the minor is void-ab-initio.
6. That reference may be made to the judgement of Ritesh Aggarwal vs SEBI, in which it was held
by the Hon’ble Court that a contract must be entered into by a person who can make a promise or
 make an offer. Else, the contract will be void as an agreement which is not enforceable under the
law is void. Thus, minors cannot enter into a contract.
7. That reference further may be drawn to the observation of the court in the case of Latcharao vs.
Viswanadham, in which it was held by the Hon’ble Court that a minor is barred from being a part
of the formulation of the contract, and thus, any contract which is not related with the necessary
requirements for the existence of the minor is void-ab-initio.
8. That the age of majority has been specifically described under the Indian Majority Act, 1875,
which under section 3 states that a person is deemed to have attained the age of majority when he
completes the age of 18 years. This, the counsel on behalf of the defendant most humbly submits
before this Hon’blue Court that Mr. Sam Malhotra is below 18 years and this, being a minor and
thus, incompetent to contract under the Indian Contract Act.
9. That furthermore, the counsel submits to the acquaintance of the court that seeking reference to
the judgement of Leslie vs. Sheill, in which the minor misrepresented himself to be a major and
obtained 2 loans from the plaintiffs, it was held that the money could not be recovered back by the
plaintiffs.
10. Furthermore, reference may be made before the Hon’ble Court to the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
laid down under section 28 of the Sale of Goods Act, which expressly means ‘Let the buyer
beware’. Thus, in the following case, M/s Singh & sons, has availed the services from Mr. Sam
Aggarwal and therefore, he must have exercised reasonable care and precaution before entering
into a contract and thus, Mr. Sam Malhotra cannot be made liable for the negligence of not
exercising reasonable precaution committed on behalf of M/s Singh and sone.
11. That it may be humbly submitted that our country follows the adversarial system of adjudication,
and according to section 82 and 83 of the Indian Penal Code, a minor is given either absolute or
partial immunity and is exempted from criminal liability accordingly, being considered as doli
incapex or doli capex. Thus, it may be added that a person who is a minor is considered unworthy
of thinking as to the consequences of the act. Thereby, it is submitted that in the instant case, the
matter involves case of a civil nature and thus, it is submitted that if in criminal cases, immunity
can be granted and liability can be condoned, then it certainly can be condoned in civil cases.
12. That further reference may also be made to the recent judgements of Sri Veeranna vs. Sri
Basanagouda; Shri Jagdish Prasad vs. X; Indresh Patel vs. Minor Suryansh Patel, in which
the judgement laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Mohiri Bibi vs. Dharmodas Ghose
was reiterated and it was held that minor cannot be made liable for any offence committed by him,
even in cases where the minor has misrepresented his age and asserted himself to be a major.
13. That sections 64 and 65 of the Indian Contract Act relate with the restoration of any undue benefit
received under voidable and void contracts respectively and the Privy Council in the case of
Mohiri Bibi vs. Dharmodas Ghose highlighted that in case the parties to contract are incompetent
to contract, then the provisions of restoration of benefit will not apply as the contract is void ab
initio. Thus, it may humbly be contended that in the instant case, Mr. Sam Malhotra is a minor
and thus, even if any undue influence has been effected upon him, Sections 64 and 65 will not
 apply upon him. Furthermore, it was also held the doctrine of estoppel laid down under sections
115 of the Indian Evidence Act would not apply on cases related to a minor.
14. That it may further be submitted that no undue advantage has been made by the minor Mr. Sam
Malhotra as it has been observed that the material used by M/s Singh & Sons was of low standard
and would not have cost more than Rs. 3 lakhs and the outstanding amount of Rs. 7 lakhs cannot
be made to be attributable to M/s Singh & Sons as no service in regard to the same has been
availed by Mr. Sam Malhotra and there is nothing left to be paid.
15. Furthermore, reference may also be made to the judgment of Raghava Chariar vs. Srinivasa, in
which it was held that a minor is allowed to enforce only those contracts under which some
benefit can be derived by him and under which he is required to bear no obligation. It is further
submitted that any contract which can go against the minor and cause undue liability upon him
cannot be enforced in the court.

14 |
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE CIVIL COURT OF CHANDIGARH WAS CORRECT IN
REJECTING THE PLEA OF OF RESTITUTION?

1. That it is humbly submitted that the Civil Court of Chandigarh was correct in rejecting the plea of
restitution and the law was upheld. In the case of Ritesh Aggarwal v. SEBI it was held by the
hon’ble court that, “a contract must be entered into by a person who can make a promise or make
an offer. Else, the contract will be void as an agreement which is not enforceable under law is
void. Thus, minors cannot enter into a contract.
2. That it is humbly contended that Section 65 of the Indian contract act 1872 deals with the
doctrine of restitution and it relates to the obligation of the person who has received some
advantage under void agreement or contract. This aspect of Doctrine of Restitution is expressly
mentioned in Section 41 of the original Specific Relief Act of 1877. However Section 65 is
applicable only when an agreement was valid when it was entered into and became void only at
a future date This above-mentioned principle was observed in Leslie (R) Ltd V Sheil.
According to the facts of this case, a minor succeeded in deceiving some money lenders by
misrepresenting their age and were successful in obtaining a sum of 4000 euros from them.
Their attempt to recover the amount and subsequent damages failed due to the principle
explained above.
3. That it is humbly submitted that if the agreement was entered into between a major person being
the plaintiff and the minor defendant in this case then doctrine of restitution will not be applied,
as was held in the case of Mohiri Bibi v/s Dharmodass Ghosh. In the present case the
defendant Mr. Sam Malhotra, aged 16 years at the time of the contract was a minor. According
to Section 11 of The Indian Contract act 1872, a person needs to be a major at the time of the
contract for it to be valid or else it will be void ab initio.
4. That it is further brought to contention that Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, lays
down the law of estoppel but the Indian Contract Act makes it clear that a minor is incompetent
to contract thus a minor cannot incur liability under any contract and the rule of evidence cannot
be invoked to defeat this section. the rule of estoppel does not apply in the present case. Even if
a minor i.e in the present case Mr. Sam Malhotra incorrectly represents himself as a major as
well as takes a loan or enters into a contract, he could plead that he is a minor. The rule of
estoppel does not apply to a minor. He could plead his minority in his defence.
5. That it is humbly submitted that a person cannot ratify an agreement made by him during
minority once he attains majority. Ratification deals back to the date of making of the contract.
Once a contract which was then void cannot be made valid due to subsequent ratification. In the
case of Suraj Narayan v. SukhuAheer decided by the Allahabad High Court, the court stated
A minor borrowed a sum of money, placed a simple bond on it and, after reaching the majority,
placed a second bond on the original loan plus interest. He argued that the claim to the second
bond was not sustainable. As the bond was without consideration and did not come under
Section 25(2) of the Indian Contract Act.
6. That it is further humbly contended that under the Indian Law, Generalis Regula Generaliter
Est Intelligenda, means a general rule is to be generally understood, as minor is not a
competent party to enter into a valid contract/agreement and to give a valid consent, as contract
with minor is void-ab-initio. According to section 65 of Indian Contract Act, 1872, It clearly
states that the agreement is discovered to be void i.e. the agreement was valid earlier but at the
time of enforceability it can not be enforced by law. Every contract means an agreement
enforceable by law, which means firstly there should be an agreement which is enforceable by
 law. But in the instant case the agreement was not discovered void but was void-ab-initial i.e
void from the very beginning.
7. That it is further submitted that in the case of T.R. Appaswami Aiyangar vs Narayanaswami
Aiyar And Ors. on 28 March, 1930 by the Bombay High Court, it was said that even if a minor
fraudulently misrepresents his/her age and induces another person to enter into a contract with
them, then in defence the minor is not stopped from setting up a defence of minority.
8. That it is contended that according to Section 68 of the Contract Act, “If a person incapable of
entering into a contract or a person legally bound to support the contract is provided by another
person with the necessaries that are suited to his or her life, the person who provided the
supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such an incapable person.” The word
“necessaries” is not specified in the Act, but an illustrative definition of the sense of the term is
provided by Alderson B in his judgment in Chapple v Cooper, Things necessary are those
without which a person cannot properly exist. First of all, food, clothes, accommodation, and the
like. In the present case the defendant Mr. Sam Malhotra has not been provided with any
necessaries and hence is not liable to reimburse any amount to the Appellant M/s Singh and
sons.
 PRAYER

Wherefore, may it please the Hon’ble High Court, in the light of facts and circumstances of the case,
issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities citied, the Respondent prays that this Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to Adjudge, rule upon, and determine the following:

1. That the contract between Mr Sam Malhotra and M/S Singh & Sons in invalid and void ab-initio.
2. That the judgement passed in Mohiri Bibee vs Dharmodas Ghose does not need reconsideration.
3. That the Civil Court of Chandigarh was correct in rejecting the plea of restitution.

AND

Pass any other order it may deem fit in the interest of Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience.

All of which is respectfully prayed and humbly submitted.