G.R. No.

76562 April 22, 1991

ROGER B. PATRICIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, respondent.

Villareal, Villareal & Villareal for petitioner.

Roger B. Patricio for and in his own behalf.

NARVASA, J.:

Inspired no doubt by Proclamation No. 3, promulgated by the President of the

Philippines on March 15, 1986, shortly after the deposal of the former
government headed by the late Ferdinand Marcos, which inter alia directed
the taking of measures to improve the judiciary and remove therefrom those
deemed incompetent and otherwise undesirable, twenty (20) active law
practitioners in Capiz Province addressed a petition dated November 4, 1986
to the President, the Chief Justice, and the Minister of Justice, urging the
acceptance of the resignation or immediate removal of Hon. Enrique P.
Suplicio as presiding Judge of Brach 14 of the Regional Trial Court at Roxas
City. The petition contained the following relevant assertions:
1

1) that Judge Suplicio "was appointed during the reorganization of the courts in 1983
because of the patronage of his brother-in-law, then an assemblyman, and the regional
political kingpin, then an ambassador, and in spite of his meager exposure and experience in
the practice of law which his former employment with COMELEC could not provide;"

2) that "predictably, . . . in the performance of his functions as a judge, (he) has been
deficient and inadequate in legal knowledge, skill and application;"

3) that "as a graver fault, . . . (he) solicits, requires and receives valuable consideration in
matters affecting cases pending before him, and has interfered and shown unusual interest
in cases before other judges and investigating officers for unknown but suspicious reasons
and causes;"

4) that "the foregoing . . . (allegations) are based on the personal knowledge and experience
of some of . . . (the authors), on the information given . . . by . . . clients and other parties,
and on the general unsavory reputation of the Hon. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO in the
community;" and

5) that "said charges can be proved with documentary and testimonial evidence, and while
the various informants against the integrity of the Hon. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO are litigants in
his sala or are government officers and employees who might hesitate to restate formally
 their respective experiences because of their situation or station, still the seriousness and
flagrancy of the information given and the variety and number of the unrelated informants
thereof, place to a serious doubt His Honor's ability to meet or even approximate the
standard of proven integrity and honesty set out by the New Administration of its
judges . . . ."

Among those who signed the petition was Atty. Roger B. Patricio. On
November 11, 1986, he filed a common and consolidated Urgent Motion for
Inhibition in reference to seventeen (17) criminal and civil actions and special
proceedings pending in Judge Suplico's sala in which he was appearing as
counsel of record. Adverting to his being a signatory to said petition to
2

President Aquino, et al. dated November 4, 1986, copy of which he appended

to his motion, Atty. Patricio prayed that Judge Suplico inhibit himself "from
further trying . . . (his 17) cases," and that the same be reassigned by raffle to
other branches of the Trial Court. Patricio's submission was that the filing of
the petition of November 4, 1986 "will unavoidably generate or has generated
personal prejudice in the part of the Presiding Judge . . . against undersigned
counsel and/or his clients who are parties in the subject cases," and they
would thereby be deprived "of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-
free, disinterested and impartial tribunal . . . (citing Luque vs. Kayanan, 29
SCRA 178)."

By Order dated November 20, 1986, Judge Suplico ruled on the motion for
inhibition. In that order, the judge reproduced the petition to the President,
3

annexed to the motion. He also quoted from the record the testimony of a
witness in "Civil Case No. V-4653 entitled Catig versus Escevedo," in which,
according to him, he —
made rulings against his (Atty. Roger B. Patricio) objections and terminated his cross-
examination against his stand wherein Atty. Roger B. Patricio felt offended and embarrased
in the courtroom in the presence of his clients. So, the present petition come into being. (sic).

The judge then denied the motion for inhibition because —

1) it is "not verified, . . . not under oath, . . . not an original being only a machine copy, and
not supported by affidavits;"

2) four of the signatories are not known personally to him and "have never practiced law in . .
. (his) branch ever since;"

3) "the party-litigants has no interest and are not parties to the said motion and said inhibition
causes more delay in the termination of this case(sic);"

4) the motion, "together with the Annex A, alleges contemptuous words, which is not
supported by evidence and constitute a criminal contempt wherein the conduct of Atty. Roger
 B. Patricio is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or the Presiding Judge
acting judicially (sic);"

5) the motion was "pre-mature and constitute simple harrasment and direct contempt," there
being no "on-going investigation lodge in the proper forum (which should be "kept
confidential"), nor the undersigned presiding judge was given due process but adding insult
to injury, undersigned on November 12, 1986, at 8:00 o'clock A.M., heared a radio interview
over DYRO, where Atty. Roger B. Patricio spoke about this petition for the ouster of the
Presiding Judge citing the former case they filed against Judge Oscar Leviste, as a
precedent . . . (sic).

Observing that "said motion with the petition has already created great and
irreperable damaged (sic) on . . . (his) person," and citing precedents, the
Court made the following dispositions, to wit:

1) denying the motions for inhibition, summarily declaring them as a direct

contempt;

2) (d)eclaring Atty. Patricio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt

and sentence him (sic) to suffer both, fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) and imprisonment of three (3) months for each of the above-entitled
cases;"4

3) fixing the bail bond at P5,000.00 for each case; 5

4) (d)eclaring all said motions filed in the above-cases with the use of vicious,
intemperate, abrasive and disrespectful language as a criminal contempt and
(that) the same should be considered as stricken off from the records of the
respective cases;

5) recommending "that disbarment proceedings be filed against Atty. . . .

Patricio or any disciplenary (sic) action should be filed against him;"

6) directing the Deputy Sheriff to effect immediate service of the Order on

Atty. Patricio "at his law-office or residence in Roxas city;" and

7) requiring that copies of the order be furnished to the President of the IBP
Capiz Chapter and the Court Administrator.

Atty. Patricio lost no time in seeking invalidation of this Order of November 20,
1986. Towards this end, he filed with this Court on November 27, 1986, a
petition for "certiorari(with an urgent prayer for a restraining order/preliminary
injunction," praying for nullification of said Order of November 20, 1986 and
the inhibition of the Judge from trying all the seventeen (17) cases in which
petitioner Patricio had entered his appearance as counsel. On December 5,
1986, Patricio reiterated his plea for a temporary restraining order, expressing
his "well-grounded concern that, despite the timely filing of . . . (his) Petition, a
warrant for . . . (his) arrest . . . may, at nay time, be issued, if one has not
already been issued, considering respondent Judge's animosity . . .," and
considering further that the "bailbond of Eighty Five Thousand Pesos
(P85,000) as fixed by respondent Judge . . . (is "grossly exhorbitant and
excessive," being) even higher than that ordinarily fixed in cases of murder
and other grave offenses." The Court issued a temporary restraining order on
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December 8, 1986, enjoining enforcement of Judge Suplico's Order dated

November 20, 1986.

Another action against Judge Suplico, one of prohibition (with preliminary

injunction and/or restraining order), was also filed in this Court by Atty. Patricio
together with other signatories to the petition of November 4, 1986 — Attys.
Roberto A. Barrios, Rodriguez Dadivas, Aquilina B. Brotarlo, Victor Azagra,
Antonio Bisnar and Jose O. Alovera. In said action, docketed as G.R. No.
76600, the petitioners prayed that Judge Suplico be enjoined from further
taking judicial action, and be directed to inhibit himself, in all the cases where
they appear as counsel. By resolution dated December 8, 1986, the Court
issued the temporary restraining order prayed for and also directed
consolidation of G.R. No. 76600 and G.R. No. 76562.

Comments were submitted by Judge Suplico in both actions, on requirement

of the Court.

Thereafter the President of the Philippines accepted the resignation of Judge

Suplico, a fact which was communicated to the latter by the Court
Administrator on February 3, 1987.

On May 25, 1987 this Court promulgated a Resolution (a) declaring that the
acceptance of Judge Suplico's resignation had rendered moot the question,
raised in both G.R. No. 76562 and G.R. No. 76600, as to whether or not he
should be enjoined from acting in the cases therein specified, and thus left as
the sole issue, the validity of the Order of contempt dated November 20, 1986,
set up in G.R. No. 76562; and (b) resolving, in view thereof;
. . . (1) to FORTHWITH LIFT the temporary restraining orders issued on December 8, 1985
in G.R. No. 76562 and G.R. No. 76600; (2) to DISMISS G.R. No. 76600 for having become
moot and academic, without pronouncement as to costs; (3) to NOTE Judge Suplico's
appearance in his own behalf; and (4) to REQUIRE the parties to submit, if they so desire,
memoranda containing additional arguments as regards the Order of contempt of November
20, 1986, within twenty (20) days from notice.
All courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt, this being essential
to their right of self-preservation. Under the Rules of Court, contempt is
classified into direct, and indirect or constructive. Direct contempt is
"misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect towards the
court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required so to do." Where the act of contumacy is not committed in facie
7

curiae, or "in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or

8

interrupt the proceedings before the same," i.e., perpetrated outside of the
sitting of the court, it is considered indirect, or constructive, contempt, and
may include "(m)isbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions," "(d)isobedience of or resistance to
a lawful writ, transactions," "(d)isobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a
court or judge," (a)ny abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt," or "any improper
conduct tending, directly, or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice," etc.
9

Several distinctions exist between these two categories of contempt. The first
is as regards the nature of the proceeding to be taken against the contemner.
In the case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemner may be
punished only "(a)fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel;" on the other hand, a
10

person may be "summarily adjudged" in direct contempt, at the very moment

11

or on the very occasion of the perpetration of the act of contumely.

A second distinction lies in the penalty that the Court may impose. For direct
contempt, the court may impose a "fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or
a judge thereof, or . . . a fine not exceeding ten pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court." On the other hand,
12

the person found guilty of indirect contempt " against a superior court or
judge . . . may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisoned not
more than six (6) months, or both," or if guilty of constructive contempt
"committed against an inferior court or judge, . . . may be fined not exceeding
one hundred pesos or imprisoned not more than one (1) month, or both, and
(in either case) if the contempt consists in the violation of an injunction, . . .
may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such
violation."13
A third distinction is in respect of the availability of the remedy of appeal. The
judgments of superior courts on direct comtempt are not
appealable; but their judgments in constructive or indirect contempt "may be
14

reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court . . .; (however)

execution of the judgment or order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed
by the person in contempt, in an amount fixed by the . . . (Regional Trial
Court), conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him, he will abide by
and perform the judgment or order." 15

One other distinction is as regards the Court where proceedings may be

initiated. Direct contempt is always proceeded against in the same superior
court where committed. A special civil action of indirect contempt involving an
inferior court, however, may be instituted either in that court or in the Regional
Court of the province or city in which the inferior court is sitting.
16

Consideration of these legal propositions vis a vis Judge Suplico's Order of

November 20, 1986 should at once disclose quite apparent errors in the order.

It seems clear, in the first place, that Judge Suplico had acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when he imposed on Atty. Patricio, for having allegedly
committed direct contempt, the penalty of a "fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) and imprisonment of three (3) months for each of the (17) above-
entitled case;" and "fixing the bail bond at P5,000.00 for each case." The
17

penalty is clearly in excess of that for direct contempt fixed in Section 1, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, which is "not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both. "In the second places, His
Honor's act of fixing bail quite clearly runs afoul of the legal provision that the
"(j)udgment of superior courts on direct contempt shall not be appealable."

Moreover, what Judge Suplico pronounced as constituting direct contempt —

Atty. Patricio's Urgent Motion for Inhibition of November 11, 1986 — was
without doubt but one, single act. That the motion sought the judge's inhibition
in seventeen (17) actions and proceedings pending in his sala did not operate
to convert or transform that single motion into seventeen (17) separate
applications for disqualification. There was, to repeat, really one, single act of
direct contempt, if direct contempt it was indeed, not seventeen separate
contumacious acts meriting seventeen (17) distinct penalties.

Again, the bond fixed by Judge Suplico in the aggregate sum of P85,000.00
— i.e., P5,000.00 for each of the 17 cases being handled by Atty. Patricio —
is also unreasonable and excessive in the premises (apart from being
completely out of place sine, as above pointed out, judgments of direct
contempt of superior courts are not appealable). The impression given is that
the power to punish for contempt was exercised by His Honor in a manner
inconsistent with prevailing policy and doctrine, i.e., that it be wielded on the
preservative, rather than on the vindictive, principle; to correct, rather than to
18

retaliate for conduct deemed offensive. 19

The foregoing exposition and conclusions do not, of course, dispose of the

essential question before the Court, which is whether or not Atty. Patricio's
urgent motion for inhibition dated November 8, 1986, taken together with the
petition addressed to the President of the Philippines for the judge's removal
from the office, was in truth correctly categorized as an act of direct
20

contempt.

There is nothing in the language of the urgent motion for inhibition itself which
may be accounted disrespectful or offensive. This is made clear by Judge
1âwphi1

Suplico himself in his Order of November 20, 1986. It is the petition annexed
to said motion for inhibition and made the overt basis thereof, which must be
examined and analyzed to determine if direct contempt was committed
against respondent Judge Suplico.

The petition itself, addressed to President, Chief Justice and Minister of

Justice (urging, in line with the reorganization of the judiciary, acceptance of
the resignation or immediate removal of Judge Suplico) is a privileged
communication within the meaning of Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code. The petition was written by twenty (20) active law practitioners in Capiz
21

Province in fulfillment of what they evidently considered their social, civic and
legal duty to rid the courts of undesirable magistrates, and assist in the
restoration of the people's faith in the judiciary and the Rule of Law. It was
addressed exclusively to the officials who were the appropriate and competent
parties to act thereon. The petition was not attended by any publicity
whatsoever. Absent any evidence of malice or other improper motive on the
part of the authors, the petition is prima facie not actionable upon the theory
either that it is libelous or contumacious. Indeed, given the particular
circumstances and conditions of the case, the petition in question may be
regarded — as a similar one was so considered by this Court some fifty years
ago — as merely an exercise of a consititutional right to petition government
22

for redress of a legitimate grievance.

When it became clear that Judge Suplico had somehow learned of the petition
for his elimination from the judiciary, it became inevitable for the lawyers who
had drawn it up, and who had cases pending in the judge's sala, to seek the
latter's inhibition since it might not unreasonably be expected that, as Atty.
Patricio has expressed it, the petition "will unavoidably generate or has
generated personal prejudice in the part of the Presiding Judge . . . against
undersigned counsel and/or his clients who are parties in the subject cases;"
hence, the Judge "should inhibit himself . . . in the name and interest of justice
and fairness and to avoid violation of the party litigant's constitutional right to
due process" and ensure that they be accorded "the cold neutrality of an
independent, wholly-free, disinterested and impartial tribunal . . ." It was
unavoidable, too, for a copy of the petition to be attached to the motion for
inhibition, since it was the very reason for the inhibition prayed for. The
petition was attached to the motion not to defame or debase, or shame or
humiliate the judge, or defy or denigrate the authority of the court, but simply
to demonstrate the basis for the movant's apprehension that the judge might
become or have become so affected by the petition for his ouster as to lose
that "cold neutrality" demanded of his office in dealing with the authors and
their clients.

Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant

belligerence, a virtual defiance of the court. No such attitude is discernible in
23

the statements of the motion for inhibition or the petition thereto annexed.
What the authors essentially do in their petition thereto annexed. What the
authors essentially do in their petition is (1) to declare their endorsement of
"the policy and thrust of the New Administration to reform and improve its
judiciary by requiring that judges be persons of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence, . . . whose appointment or stay as such shall be
without regard to his political clout or that of his relatives and patrons," and (2)
to specify the reasons why they believe that Judge ship and should thus be
removed as judge. The statement of those reasons, in the very nature of
things, entailed an enumeration of the judge's perceived shortcomings,
defects and involving some denigration of his qualities and traits. Withal, there
was no unnecessary debasement or abuse of the Judge's person. The
references to him were all strictly relevant to the fundamental thesis: the need
for his removal from his position in line with the Government's policy to reform
and improve the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is issued ANNULLING AND

SETTING ASIDE the Order issued by respondent Enrique P. Suplico on
November 20, 1986, then acting as Presiding Judge of Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court (6th Judicial Region) at Roxas City. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.