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The 'Not Expected' but 'Expected' Opening Speech of the African Union
Commission

Article · April 2024

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 The ‘Not Expected’ but ‘Expected’ Opening Speech of the African Union Commission
Chairperson

Assefa Leake Gebru1

On March 11, 2024, the meeting of the representatives of the Federal government of Ethiopia and
Tigray for strategic reflection on the implementation of the Pretoria agreement was opened with a
statement by the African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat.
Considering the Constitutive Act of the AU and its commitment to silencing guns, the statement
fell short of fulfilling the principles of the Constitutive Act and its best practices over the last two
decades. It was not what we should expect of a senior civil servant and embodiment of the
continental organization. However, noting that the AUC and its Chairperson appeared to be under
the full influence of the Prosperity Party and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, his partisan speech
was not unexpected.

Moussa Faki began his statement by acknowledging that it is a year and a half since the signing of
the Pretoria Agreement and well into the period of its implementation. He said: ‘…to date, and
thanks to our collective action, the process has already achieved steady and commendable progress
in the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)’.

Evaluating the implementation of the agreement as ‘steady and commendable’ is unfounded, to

say the least. The reason for the AUC to convene the meeting and call the eminent members of the
Panel who mediated the agreement was precisely the failure to implement the critical pillars of the
agreement. Issues including the plight of rape survivors; the repatriation of IDPs and refugees, the
demobilization and re-integration of Tigray Defense Force (TDF)combatants; the restoration of
constitutional order; and re-establishing the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and Tigray are among
the key pillars. These fundamental issues remain unresolved, and in many cases not addressed.
Applauding the implementation as ‘steady and commendable’ or praising the Pretoria Agreement
as an ‘African solution' becomes, to put it politely, misleading.

The Chairperson's identification of the mechanisms monitoring the implementation of the

agreement as a collaborative process between ‘the High-Level Panel, the Joint Committee, and

1
Assefa Leake Gebru is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Mekelle University. Email:
visitassie@yahoo.com, or assefa.leake@mu.edu.et

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Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission' is a misrepresentation as the AU has not been
able to track progress on the implementation of the COHA.

The Panel along with the parties and observers has only met once since the signing of the Nairobi
Modalities of Implementation just a few weeks after the Pretoria Agreement was finalized. And
despite the deployment of monitoring and verification, its officers have been complaining that they
have been denied access to parts of the Western, Southern, Eastern, and Central zones of Tigray
occupied by non-Ethiopian National Defense Force and foreign forces. Furthermore, neither the
monitoring and verification mechanism, the panel, nor the AU Chairperson has ever presented a
report on the implementation of the agreement to any of the official sessions of the AU Peace and
Security Council. With these realities, the claim of efficient and coordinated monitoring and
verification is a clear misrepresentation.

The statement of the Chairperson then details the key achievements thus far: ‘Some of the key
achievements since the signing of the agreement include the immediate cessation of hostilities, the
handover of heavy and medium weapons, the resumption of essential services, and the reopening
of schools and economic activities in most parts of the Tigray region.’

Again, this claim is inaccurate as it fails to recognize that Tigrians in occupied territories are still
facing crimes of ethnic cleansing and a range of other human rights abuses. It also fails to recognize
over a million IDPs who still live-in makeshift camps unable to send their children to school or
resume their lives, not to mention the over 60,000 refugees who have fled the hostilities. Failing
to recognize and prioritize the removal of non-ENDF and foreign forces from the administrative
territories of Tigray and prompting the return of IDPs to their homes epitomizes the critical failure
to take the necessary action vital for a truly inclusive and sustainable peace process that will lay a
foundation for genuine reconciliation, justice, and stability in the region.

The Chairperson, without providing any detail to his claim, indicates that Ethiopia has made
progress towards transitional justice with the support of the AUC. The Chairperson’s assertion
lacks substantiation. We know that despite some initial ‘consultative meetings’ on this issue there
is neither a transitional justice policy adopted by the government nor a mechanism to implement
it inclusive of Tigray, the signatory to the agreement. The Ministry of Justice’s organized
‘consultative meetings’ were an artifice, involving only handpicked members and supporters of
the Prosperity Party, while omitting crucial Tigrian stakeholders. This exclusion may aim to

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prevent contradictory stances, but it dismisses Tigray’s unique perspective and genuine
opportunities for reconciliation. As a result, the outcome is rejected by the Interim Regional
Administration of Tigray, leading to dominant narratives of mutual accusations and incriminations
in the media, and raising fears of a recurrence of conflict.

Moussa Faki points to the US $1 million contribution the AU pledged to provide for disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and congratulates Ethiopia for being the first to benefit
from the AU’s Peace Fund organized for similar purposes. In the meantime, there are no clear
provisions related to Post-conflict Reconstruction, and Development (PCRD). Normally, one
would have expected a commitment to a Joint Assessment Mission by international aid donors.
The Agreement only mentions limited aspects of PCRD in its section on humanitarian issues. The
brief mention also provides little formal role for the UN and other international partners, despite
the fact that the bill for the destruction of Tigray amounts to an estimated US $26 billion (according
to the recent assessment by the federal government). Despite this, neither the AUC nor its Panel
have attempted to call a donor conference that could make an overall evaluation of the extent of
the damage and the need for reconstruction. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed wants to gloss over the
damage and the reconstruction needs of Tigray by putting the needs within a broader Ethiopian
agenda of reconstruction and development. The chairperson’s $1 million donation is pitifully small
and serves to minimize Tigray’s needs.

Moussa Faki emphasizes the significance of political dialogue, transitional justice, and DDR as
critical issues requiring attention. While his call is commendable, he overlooks some crucial
matters such as the repatriation of IDPs and refugees, as well as the restoration of Tigray’s
administrative territory. Neglecting these issues could hinder the success of addressing other
important matters outlined by the commissioner. Particularly, the restoration of occupied territories
is essential as a prerequisite for effectively tackling other vital issues.

The Chairperson urges the parties to demonstrate leadership, collaboration, and compromise,
emphasizing the need for dedication and transparency in achieving peace in the Tigray region.
However, the plea for continued leadership faces significant challenges due to compliance issues.
Effective leadership in enforcing peace agreements necessitates empathy, effective
communication, building trust, and a commitment to fostering lasting peace through constructive
dialogue, elements that are predominantly absent in the implementation of the Pretoria agreement.

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 For example, DDR has not been completed within the agreed timeframe, and there is a lack of
open political dialogue between the parties. Major peace agendas like transitional justice are not
being pursued mutually, leading to distrust and mutual accusations. Notwithstanding the TPLF’s
leadership crises, the federal government, which holds a position of influence, could have made a
significant contribution to the peace effort. However, it appears to lack political commitment.
Given these challenges, the Chairperson's call appears unrealistic.

Finally, Moussa Faki emphasized the AU's ongoing commitment to fully support an Ethiopian-led
process. However, the AU has faced criticism for perceived bias, notably in its endorsement of
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's portrayal of the conflict in Tigray as a law enforcement operation,
potentially neglecting its duty under the 'Responsibility to Protect' principle. The delayed peace
efforts in Tigray, prompted by international condemnation due to extensive devastation, have
heavily relied on support from influential entities like the EU and the UN. Despite this external
support, the AU's leadership has been criticized for a lack of robust follow-up actions and strategic
direction during the implementation phase.

The power dynamics and historical trends within the AU have highlighted a significant imbalance,
showing a strong bias towards federal government control in the Ethiopian peace process instead
of fostering a collaborative approach with Tigray. The implementation of the agreement has
notably strayed from its intended spirit, driven by Abiy Ahmed's strategic agenda to delay or
invalidate its provisions. This shift poses a serious threat to the authorities in Tigray, leaving them
unable to address even the most basic humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
or facilitate their return to normalcy.

In conclusion, the Chairperson’s statement unveils gaps, inconsistencies, and partisan biases that
pose obstacles to the successful execution of the Agreement. Without addressing fundamental
issues like the restoration of Ethiopia's territorial integrity, the reinstatement of constitutional order,
and the repatriation of IDPs and refugees, the prospects of achieving enduring peace in Tigray
appear distant.

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