PART II

Art. 809 (Gadong): Uy Coque v. Sioca (43 Phil 405)

Doctrine: The provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, that the attention clause of a will must state the number of pages in the will, and that the
witnesses signed in the presence of each other, are mandatory and non-compliance therewith
invalidates the will.
Facts:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar, admitting a will
to probate. The validity of the will is attacked on the ground that the testatrix was mentally
incapacitated at the time of its execution and on the further ground that it was not executed in the
form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645.
The transcript of testimony taken in the probate proceedings not appearing in the record, we
cannot review the findings of the court below as to the sanity of the testatrix. This leaves for our
consideration only the question as to whether the omission of certain formalities in the execution
of the will are fatal to its validity.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645 reads:
"No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by
the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by
him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets
or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and each other."
The formal defects of the will in question occur in its attestation clause which, in translation,
read as follows:
"We, the undersigned witnesses of this will, state that has been shown to us by the testatrix as her
last will and testament. And as she cannot sign her name, she asked that Mr. Filomeno Piczon
sign her name in the presence of each of us, and each of us, the witnesses, also signed in the
presence of the testatrix."
It will be noted that the attestation clause does not state the number of pages contained in the will
nor does it state that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other. Neither do these facts
appear in any other part of the will.
Issue:
(1) Whether the testatrix was mentally incapacitated at the time of executing the will.
(2) Whether the will complied with the requirements of the attestation clause.
Held:
The court did not review the findings of the lower court regarding the sanity of the
testatrix, so the only issue considered was the compliance of the will with the requirements of the
attestation clause.
The court ruled that the will was invalid due to the omission of certain formalities in its
execution. The provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, regarding the attestation clause of a will are mandatory. The attestation clause must state
the number of pages in the will and the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other. Failure
to comply with these requirements invalidates the will. Statutes prescribing the formalities for
the execution of wills are strictly construed. All the requirements must be observed, and courts
cannot supply the defective execution of a will. The purpose of the Legislature in prescribing
strict formalities for wills is to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the document.
In this case, the attestation cause of the will did not state the number of pages in the will and
did not state that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other. These defects rendered the
will null and void and it could not be admitted to probate.
The court mentioned a previous case, Abangan vs. Abangan, where a will with similar
defects was upheld as valid. However, the court distinguished that case by stating that the
intention of the legislator controls in statutory construction. The purpose of the amendments to
the law regarding wills was to require strict compliance with the formalities. Therefore, the court
could not enervate the amendment by too liberal a construction.
The court reversed the order of the lower court admitting the will to probate and declared the
will null and void.
Art. 809 (Tanaid): Quinto vs. Morata (G.R. No. 31732. February 19, 1930)

Estate of the deceased Gregorio Pueblo. CARMEN QUINTO, Applicant-Appellant, v. MARGARITA

MORATA, in substitution of Mateo Pueblo, deceased, contestant-appellee.

Guevara, Francisco & Recto, for Appellant.

Augusto de la Rosa and Angel Arigo, for Appellee.

FACTS: Carmen Quinto filed for probate on October 26, 1928, for a joint will she made with her
late husband, Gregorio Pueblo. The will stated that upon the surviving spouse's death, their
properties would pass to the heirs and legatees. However, Mateo Pueblo, Gregorio's brother,
opposed the application, arguing that the will's attestation clause didn't specify the number of
pages or the witnessing process. The court denied the petition because the attestation clause
didn't confirm the witnesses signed in the presence of both testators and each other. Carmen
appealed, claiming the court erred in denying probate. The attestation clause stated the testators
signed in the presence of the witnesses, but it didn't explicitly state the witnessing sequence or
the signing of each page.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in denying the probate.
RULING:NO, according to the Supreme Court; “Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be
given a strict interpretation. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405) this court, speaking
of the construction to be given to said section, said:

Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly
construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be executed in accordance with the
statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No
power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those
enumerated in the statutes." (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407.)”

Case No. 1 (Abdullah): Azuela vs. Castillo (GR NO. 122880, April 12, 2006)
FACTS:In this case, there are mentioned alleged fatal defects in the notarial will;
○ The attestation clause of the will does not state the number of pages used in the
will.
○ The instrumental witnesses did not sign the attestation clause.
○ The will does not contain a proper acknowledgment, but only a jurat
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) admitted the will to probate, considering the testimony of the
three witnesses to the will and the modern tendency to liberalize the interpretation of formal
requirements in the execution of wills that the defects in the will were not fatal.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's decision and dismissed the petition for probate,
emphasizing that the failure to state the number of pages in the attestation clause rendered the
will void and undeserving of probate.

ISSUE:Whether the defects in the notarial will, such as the failure to state the number of pages in
the attestation clause and the lack of signatures by the instrumental witnesses, are fatal and
render the will invalid.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling and denied the petition for
probate of the defective notarial will.The Supreme Court cited the Caneda Case:
"[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to
 probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself."
Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be
liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s presence should be
considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.

Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states
elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada.
However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements
under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will
itself as to the number of pages that comprise the will.

Case No. 2 (Amerila): In the Matter of Petition for the probate of the will of Enrique S.
Lopez vs. Lopez (G.R. No. 189984)
Facts: Enrique S. Lopez died on June 21, 1999, leaving behind his wife and four children. Before
his death, he executed a will on August 10, 1996, designating his son Richard as the executor and
administrator. Richard filed a petition for the probate of the will. One of the respondents,
Marybeth, opposed the petition, claiming that the will was not executed and attested as required
by law and that it was procured through undue influence. The attesting witnesses and the notary
public who notarized the will testified that it was executed in accordance with the law. The
opposing party presented a witness who claimed that the notary public was not authorized to
notarize the will in 1996.
Issue: Whether the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez should be probated.
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the probate of the will. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, which disallowed the probate of the will due to a
discrepancy in the number of pages. The attestation clause stated that the will consisted of 7
pages, including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment were written. However,
the will actually consisted of 8 pages, including the acknowledgment portion. The Court held
that the attestation clause must state the accurate number of pages used in the will to prevent any
interpolation or omission of pages. The Court also ruled that the statement in the
acknowledgment portion of the will cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The Court cited
Article 809 of the Civil Code, which allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the
attestation clause, but Richard failed to comply with this requirement. Therefore, the Court
upheld the disallowance of the will.
Ratio: The Court based its decision on Article 805 of the Civil Code, which requires the
attestation clause to state the number of pages used in the will. The purpose of this requirement is
to prevent any tampering or alteration of the will. The Court also cited Article 809, which allows
for substantial compliance with defects in the form of the attestation clause, but Richard failed to
meet this requirement. The Court emphasized that the total number of pages and whether all
required signatures were present must substantially appear in the attestation clause to ensure the
integrity of the probate proceedings. Therefore, the Court affirmed the disallowance of the will.
Case No. 5 (Ardina): Labrador vs CA (184 SCRA 170)
FACTS: The deceased, Melecio Labrador, left behind him a parcel of land which was partitioned
among his nine heirs through a holographic will. Sagrado, one of his heirs, filed a petition for the
probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. However, Jesus and
Gaudencio, also heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the
will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law alleging therein that before
Melecio’s death, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in
favor of Jesus and Gaudencio the parcel of land.
The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null and void the Deed
of Sale. Jesu and Gaudencio appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the
trial court. It denied the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated.
The aggrieved party, therefore, filed a petition to the Supreme Court alleging among others that
the CA erred in not allowing the probate proceeding withstanding the fact that in the first
paragraph of the second page of the alleged holographic will, which was written in Ilocano, the
testator made mention a date – “month of March, 17th, 1968.
ISSUE: Whether the holographic will is dated
HELD: Yes. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the
succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that “this being in the month of March 17th day, in
the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the
one who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father.” This clearly shows
that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will. These
requirements are present in the subject will. Hence, the probate proceeding should be allowed.

Case No. 6: Gan vs. Yap (G.R. No. L-12190; August 30, 1958)

FACTS:A petition for probate of a holographic will of Yap was filed but the will itself was not
presented. The proponent tried to establish its contents and due execution by statements in
open court of four witnesses of the proponents.

Issue: W/N lost holographic will can be probated.

Held:No. The execution and contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
by the bare testimony of the witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. Unlike
holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed.
The difference lies on the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guaranteed of authenticity is
the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing instrumental witnesses.
The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will
is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

Case No. 7 (Bejec): Rodelas vs, Aranza (G.R. No. L-58509; December 7, 1982)

FACTS: Petitioner Marcela Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal to
approve the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and to be appointed as the executor. The
petition was opposed by Amparo Aranza, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias, and
Ephraim Bonilla. The opposition was based on several grounds, including the failure of the
petitioner to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator, the alleged copy of
the will not containing a disposition of property after death, and the absence of a holographic
will itself. The probate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the alleged photostatic
copy of the will cannot stand in lieu of the lost original. The original will could not be located,
suggesting that the testator had discarded it before his death.
ISSUE: Can a holographic will that was lost or cannot be found be proved by means of a
photostatic copy?
RULING: The Supreme Court set aside the lower court's order of dismissal and allowed the
photostatic copy of the holographic will to be admitted as evidence for the probate proceedings.
The court held that a photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted as evidence if the authenticity of the deceased's handwriting can be determined by the
probate court. A comparison can be made between the photostatic copy and the standard writings
of the testator to establish authenticity. The court relied on the case of Gan v. Yap, which stated
that a lost or destroyed holographic will may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy, or
even a mimeographed or carbon copy, if it can exhibit and test the authenticity of the deceased's
handwriting before the probate court.
Case No. 8 (Bernido): Codoy vs. Calugay (G.R. No. 123486; August 12, 1999)

The contested holographic will of Matilde Se o Vda. De Ramonal is brought to court, with the
Supreme Court ultimately ruling that the will cannot be probated due to inconsistencies in the
handwriting and the lack of three witnesses required by law.

Facts:The case involves the contested holographic will of Matilde SeñoVda. De Ramonal.The
respondents, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo, and Eufemia Patigas, filed a petition for
probate of the holographic will with the Regional Trial Court.The petitioners, Eugenia
RamonalCodoy and Manuel Ramonal, filed an opposition, claiming that the will was a forgery
and illegible.Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence.
Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
The trial court granted the petitioners' demurrer to evidence, and the respondents
appealed.Respondents filed a notice of appeal and in support thereof, they reiterated the
testimony of their witnesses, namely: Augusto Neri, Generosa Senon, Matilde Binanay, Fiscal
Rodolfo Waga, Mrs. Teresita Vedad, and Evangeline Calugay.The Court of Appeals citing the
case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, held that even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code in requiring the production of three witnesses is
merely permissive. Thus, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will
and allowed the will to probate.Hence, the instant petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive.
2. Whether or not the holographic will of the deceased Matilde SeñoVda. de
Ramonal is authentic.
Held:
1. Article 811 of the civil code is mandatory.
The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at
least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of
the testator. The Supreme Court is convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the
Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. The SC has ruled that
"shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea
of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is
mandatory.
2. Respondents failed to establish the authenticity of the holographic will.
In the case at bar, the goal is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be
prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ
means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the present petition is
to determine the true intent of the deceased.

It will be noted that not all the witnesses were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In
the case of Augusto Neri, he merely identified the record of the Special Proceedings before the
lower court. Generosa E. Senon was not even able produce the voter’s affidavit to identify the
signature of the deceased as it was no longer available. Evangeline Calugay never declared that
she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document. Even the former lawyer of the deceased,
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga, expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay,
she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of
the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. A visual
examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different. There were uneven
strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will and the signatures in several documents such as
the application letter for pasture permit, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are
continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in
support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde
Señovda. de Ramonal.

Case No. 11 (Cadungog): Vda De Perez vs. Tolete (232 SCRA 722)
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Bulacan, respondent.
Facts: Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, who with their children, Jocelyn,
18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
They (Cunanan spouse) executed separate wills that contained similar provisions and pertained
to conjugal property, to wit: Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his
wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever
situated". In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children
and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife, Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan, as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
substitute executor.

Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan also executed her own last will and testament containing the same
provisions as that of the will of her husband.

When the entire Cunanan family perished to death when they were trapped by fire that gutted
their home, the separate wills of Cunanan couple were admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court
of the County of Onondaga, New York.

However, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, petitioner herein, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills
ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York, invoking further to be appointed as the special
administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple.

Perez argued that she was the sole heir of her daughter and that the Cunanan heirs had no legal or
proprietary interests in the estate. She presented evidence to prove the due execution of the wills
in accordance with New York laws.
Issue: Can the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses be probated jointly?

Ruling:Yes. The separate wills of the Cunanan spouses can be probated jointly. The court ruled
that practical considerations dictate the joint probate of the separate wills since they contain
essentially the same provisions and pertain to conjugal property.

While the petitioner has submitted evidence of the due execution of the wills and their admission
to probate in New York, she has failed to present evidence on the foreign laws governing the
probate proceedings. The court emphasizes that proof of foreign laws is necessary as the
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

Case No. 12: IN RE WILL OF JOSEFA ZALAMEA Y ABELLA V. ANTONIO ABELLA

ET AL. (GR No. 17857, 1922-06-12
Facts:
On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was residing in the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last will and testament with an
attached inventory of her properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in the... presence of three witnesses,
who signed with her all the pages of said documents.
The testatrix died on the 6th of January, 1921, and, as the record shows, the executor appointed
in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on the 19th of January
of... the same year an application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters
of administration in his favor.
To said application an opposition was presented by Antonio Abella... alleging that the supposed
will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provisions of the law,... it
was not paged... correlatively in letters,... nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it
signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other.
Trial having been held,... a quo overruled the opposition of the contestants, and ordered the
probate of the will,... the contestants have appealed, and in their brief they assign three errors,
which, in their opinion, justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from.
The first error assigned by the appellants as committed by the court... said to be the will of the
deceased Josefa Zalamea, was executed with all the solemnities required by the law.
The arguments advanced by appellants' counsel in support of the first assignment of error tend to
impeach the credibility of the witnesses for the proponent, especially that of Eugenio Zalamea.
We have made a careful examination of the evidence... but have not found anything... that would
justify us in disturbing the finding of the court a quo.
The attesting witnesses... clearly testify that together with the other witness to the will, Pedro de
Jesus, they did sign each and every page of the will and of the... inventory in the presence of
each other and of the testatrix, as the latter did likewise sign all the pages of the will and of the
inventory in their presence.
The appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will was not signed by the testatrix, nor by
the witnesses on the day of the execution of the will,... their contention on the testimony of
Aurelio Palileo, who says... that on one occasion Gonzalo Abaya told him that one of the pages
of the will had not been signed by the witnesses... on the day of its execution.
Palileo's testimony is entirely contradicted by Gonzalo Abaya... in the direct, but in the
rebuttal,... evidence as well.Palileo's testimony cannot prevail over that of the attesting
witnesses,... The appellants impeach the credibility of Eugenio Zalamea, for having made a
sworn declaration... justice of the peace of SantaCruz, Laguna,... before the trial of this case,...
Zalamea's testimony in connection with the dismissal of a criminal case against a... nephew of
his, in whose success he was interested,... infer from this fact the partiality of his testimony.
The allegation is of little importance to impeach the credibility of the witness Zalamea,... because
his testimony is corroborated... sufficient for us to conclude that the first assignment of error
made by the appellants is groundless.
Do not think this question properly to have been raised at the trial, but in the memorandum
submitted by the attorney for the appellants to the trial court, he contended that the will could not
be admitted to probate because one of the witnesses to the... will was not produced... that the
voluntary non-production of this witness raises a presumption against the pretension of the
proponent.
Issues: The court below erred in admitting the will to probate notwithstanding the omission of
the proponent to produce one of the attesting witnesses.
Ruling:The trial court found that the evidence introduced by the proponent, consisting of the
testimony of the two attesting witnesses and the... other witness who was present at the
execution, and had charge of the preparation of the will and the inventory, Exhibits A and A-1,
was sufficient.
The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the probate of the inventory,
Exhibit A-1, despite the fact that this exhibit has no attestation clause in it, and its paging is made
in Arabic numerals and not in letters.
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, we find that
the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires
this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any... other attestation clause at
the end of the inventory
It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the
law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation of the... pages and serves
to prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision,... We see no reason why
the same rule should not be applied where the paging is in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters,
as in the inventory in question. So that, adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of
Abangan vs. Abangan, and followed in Aldaba vs. Roque,... with regard to the appreciation of
the solemnities of a will, we find that the judgment appealed from should be, as is hereby,
affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Case No. 13 (Corpuz, Jezreel): Maloto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76464
February 29, 1988
Facts:Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, (1)AldinaMaloto-
Casiano (2)Constancio, Maloto, (3)Panfilo Maloto and (4)Felino Maloto. Believing that
the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs
commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. However,
while the case was still in progress the parties - Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino -
executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement
provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The
Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for
approval which the court did approved.

Three years later Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel
discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),"
and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have
found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials
inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.

Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina
and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of
Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement
they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties.

Subsequently, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees
named in the will, filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings in
the intestate proceedings of Adriana and for the allowance of the will.Trial court denied
their motion. The petitioner came to SC by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court. SC dismissed that petition and advised
to file a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will. By that petitioner file a
separate proceeding for probate of the will.

Significantly, during the investigation the appellate court found out that the will was
allegedly revoked by the househelp of Adriana in the act of burning the will with
instructions of the testatrix, as witnessed by Guadalupe MalotoVda. de Coral and
Eldadio. The CA stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the
will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana

Ruling:SC approved the allowance of Adriana Maloto's last will and testament.

Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:

(1) By implication of law; or

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in
case of wills: or
 (3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the
intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled,
or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the
testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in
accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of
its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established
according to the Rules of Court.

The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandion the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
that the document destroyed must be the will itself.

"Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of
a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is
paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the
burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And
then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were
one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove
(presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were
burned.

Case No. 14 (Corpus, Jim): Molo vs Molo (GR L-2538 September 21, 1951)

Facts: Mariano Molo died in 1941 and he left two wills, the 1918 will and the 1939 will. The
1939 will contains a clause which expressly revokes the 1918 will. In 1941, Juana (wife) filed a
petition for probate of the 1939 will but was opposed, this was set aside by the court for failure to
execute in accordance with the law. In 1944, Juana filed another petition for probate of the 1918
will and this was opposed because (among other contentions) the will has subsequently been
revoked by the 1939 will. It was contended here that the testator after executing the 1939 will
with full knowledge of its revocatory clause, testator deliberately destroyed the original of the
1918 will arguing that the 1918 will submitted was only a duplicate of the original.

Issue: Is the revocatory clause of the disallowed 1939 will valid and effective as to nullify the
1918 will? - No

Held: (1) No evidence on deliberate destruction. – There is no evidence which may directly
indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed original of 1918 will because if his knowledge if
the revocatory clause of the 1939 will. The only evidence was the original was in possession of
testator until execution of second will and the original was not found. (2) Doctrine of dependent
relative revocation. – The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the
revocation depends, is equivalent to the nonfulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the
place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will. In the case at bar, even if arguing
that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will in view of the 1939 will, it will not have the
effect of defeat the 1918 will because the 1939 will was not valid was set aside.

Case No. 15 (Cortes): Guevara vs. Guevara (74 Phil 479)

Facts:Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests to his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the second marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter
Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he
adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the
acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of
a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the
assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that
the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

Issue:Whether or not the procedure adopted by Rosario was legal?

Ruling: No. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by
the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.Under Section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to
Rule 76, of the Rules of Court, If the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees
desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court
for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that the legatees other than the present litigants had
received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the
provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the
court for probate.

Case No. 16: Caniza vs. CA (G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997)

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO

EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.

FACTS:
1. Ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza, was declared incompetent by judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece,
Amparo A. Evangelista.
2. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included
cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian
of her person and estate.
3. Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. Her guardian
Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to eject
the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was later amended to
identify the incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista.
4. The amended Complaint alleged that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in
question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already
had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could
be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through
her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they
had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the
possession of the house in question, they were enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent, because, while they were saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the
incompetent was losing much money as her house could not be rented by others."
5. Defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family,
and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she
"bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
6. Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC in Cañiza's favor, the Estradas being ordered to
vacate the premises and pay Cañiza. 7. On appeal, the decision was reversed by the Quezon City
RTC. RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved
is accionpubliciana, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court."
8. Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for
Cañiza was indeed an accionpubliciana in the RTC, not an accioninterdictal in the MetroTC,
since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by
tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by
what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until
it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the
property, it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to
remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's
supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to
drive the defendants out."
9. Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs, the aforementioned guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively substituted for her.

ISSUE: Assuming desahucio (unlawful detainer) to be proper, whether Evangelista, as Cañiza's

legal guardian had authority to bring said action?
RULING: YES, a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may
be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can
be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance,
is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the
estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full
authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in
which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her
properties" By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to
attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her
person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession
of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized
principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her
incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession
thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be
needful for this purpose.
In bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to
"the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4,
Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. — A
guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income
and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that
purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do
so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.

Case No. 17 (Dagmil): Dorotheo vs. CA (320 SCRA 12)

Facts:Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. After Alejandro's death, petitioner,
who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the
probate of the latter's will and testament. The probate court admitted the will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion to Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period granted.
The dismissal become final and executory and a corresponding entry of judgment was
forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals. The lower court, to implement the final and
executory order, issued a writ of execution. Judge Zain B. Angas set aside the Order directing
the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory",
hence, not final in character. Private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals
which nullified the assailed Orders of Judge Zain. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner
contended that in issuing the assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no
jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case.

Issue:May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect?

Ruling:No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit
erroneous, is binding on the whole world.

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:

 whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
 compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
 the testamentary capacity of the testator; and
 the due execution of the last will and testament.

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly
prohibited by law from making a will.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was
validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had
already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such
determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no
longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final
and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies
provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its
belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed
and is satisfied with the decision or order.

Case No. 18 (Dalumpines): Mercado vs. Santos (66 Phil 215)

Facts:Petitioner Atilano G. Mercado filed a petition for the probate of his deceased wife's will in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.The probate court admitted the will to probate without
any opposition. Five intervenors filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of
jurisdiction of the court to probate the will.The motion was denied by the probate court and
affirmed on appeal. During the probate proceedings, one of the intervenors filed a complaint
against the petitioner for forgery of the will. The complaint was dismissed at the complainant's
request, but two more complaints for the same offense were filed and dismissed. The provincial
fiscal then filed an information against the petitioner, leading to his fourth arrest. The case was
dismissed after investigation, but the provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation. The petitioner
was arrested again and the case was ordered to trial. The petitioner filed a demurrer, which was
overruled.
He then filed a motion to dismiss the case, claiming that the will had already been
probated and the order of probate is conclusive as to its authenticity and due execution. The
motion was denied, leading the petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari, prompting the petitioner to file a
petition for review with the Supreme Court. The petitioner argued that the probate of the will is a
bar to his criminal prosecution for forgery and that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial.
Issue:Whether or not the probate of a will prevents criminal prosecution for forgery?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and validity. The court cited provisions of section 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of
Civil Procedurethat establish the conclusiveness of the probate of a will. Sec. 306 provides, as
regarding the effect of judgments in case of a judgment/order in respect to the probate of a will,
such judgment/order is conclusive upon the the will. While, Sec. 333 establishes an
incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by the Code to be conclusive.
Further, Sec. 625 provides that with regards to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a
probate will, the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive
as to its due execution. The law creates a conclusive presumption as to the due execution of the
will after it is admitted into probate.
The court also noted that the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the judgment of
the court is binding upon everyone, even the State. The court further held that criminal action
will not lie against the forger of a will that has been duly admitted to probate.
The court cited conflicting authorities on this issue but ultimately chose the rule most
consistent with Philippine statutory law and the stability of property rights. The court
emphasized that there is an adequate remedy available to parties who may be adversely affected
by the probate of a forged will.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner.

Case No. 22: Gallanosa vs. Arcangel (G.R. No. L-29300)

Facts:The petitioners are the legal heirs of Pedro Gallanosa.They filed an action for the recovery
of 61 parcels of land that were adjudicated under the probated will of Florentino Hitosis.The
action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata, as the legal heirs did not appeal from the
decree of probate or the order of partition and distribution.15 years later, they filed another
action for the "annulment" of the will and the recovery of the same 61 parcels of land.The
respondent judge initially dismissed the action, but later granted the plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration and set aside the dismissal order.

Issue:Whether the private respondents have a cause of action for the "annulment" of the will and
the recovery of the 61 parcels of land.

Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

Ratio:The lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal
and ignoring the decrees of probate and distribution, as well as the order of dismissal in the
previous civil case.The principle of res judicata applies, which means that the final decrees and
orders in the probate proceeding and the previous civil case are conclusive and binding upon the
parties.Judgments should become final at some definite date fixed by law in order to put an end
to controversies.The probate of a will is mandatory and our procedural law does not sanction an
action for the "annulment" of a will.The private respondents' action is barred by res judicata and
prescription.The order of dismissal is affirmed.

Case No. 23 (Gandor): Ortega v. Valmonte (GR. 157451, December 16, 2005)

Facts: In 1980, Placido came back to Philippines and lived in a house and lot which he owned in
common with his sister Ciriaco Valmonte and titled in their names.
Two years after his arrival from US, Placido, at the age of 80 married Josefina who was then 28
years old, in a ceremony on February 5, 1982. Placido executed a last will and testament in
English of two pages dated in 1983 and is in favor of his wife Josefina.
The probate was opposed, among other grounds, but the petitioner does not dispute the due
observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances
surrounding it are indicatives of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent,
who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three
attesting witnesses deceiving Placido to sign it.
Petitioner contends that is was “highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young age to
almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who was thrice her age and who happen to
be a Fil-American pensionado” thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the
probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly defies human reason, logic and common experience
for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and
testament.

Issue: Whether or not the will of Placido was executed with fraud.

Held: We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by
which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the documents which he executes, or it may relate to
some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.
 In this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was
ever presented. It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established
by the fact that he instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole
beneficiary and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken “the
cudgets of taking care of the testator in his twilight years”.
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a “grand conspiracy” in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to
receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favouring it
and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be
affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.

Case No. 25 (Guinid): Pecson vs. Coronel (G.R. No. L-20374; October 11, 1923)

FACTS: The Court of First Instance probated the will of Dolores Coronel who named as her
sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of her niece, in consideration of the good services which
the latter has rendered. The relatives of Dolores by consanguinity questioned the genuineness of
the will on the following grounds: (a) that the proof does not show that it contains the last will of
Dolores, and (b) that the attestation clause is not in accordance with the provisions of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645. They argue that it was improbable
and exceptional that Dolores should dispose of her estate without considering her blood relatives.
Extraneous illegal influence must have been exerted against her as there is no sufficient motive
for such exclusion inasmuch as until her death, she maintained very cordial relations with the
aforesaid relatives. It appears, however, that Dolores suspects some of her nephews as having
been accomplices in a robbery of which she had been a victim.

ISSUE: Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her estate.

RULING: YES. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889.

ARTICLE 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any
part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in
favor of any persons qualified to acquire it. In the case at bar, the Court finds nothing strange in
the preterition made by Dolores of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson
as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not
seem the most usual and customary, still, this would not be null per se contrary to what the
respondents’ claim.
It must be noted, every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and he may
bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty.
If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property
is not affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is
unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as
eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, the
unreasonableness or injustice of a will may be considered on the question of testamentary
capacity. The testamentary capacity of Dolores is not disputed in this case. The preference given
to Lorenzo Pecson is not purely arbitrary. The proof adduced, although contradicted, shows by a
preponderance of evidence that services had been rendered to Dolores Coronel.

Case No. 26 (Hernandez): Austria vs. Reyes (G.R. No. L-23079. Feb 27, 1970)

FACTS: The case involves a dispute over the validity of the adoption of heirs in a will. The
petitioners opposed the probate of the will, claiming that the respondents were not legally
adopted by the testatrix. The lower court, however, allowed the probate of the will and
appointed one of the respondents as executor. The petitioners filed a petition in intervention for
partition, alleging that they were the nearest kin of the testatrix and that the respondents were
not legally adopted. The lower court granted the petitioners' intervention but limited it to
properties not disposed of in the will. The petitioners sought to challenge the authenticity of the
adoption papers presented by the respondents, but the lower court refused to hear the matter.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the orders restricting their
intervention to properties not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.

ISSUE: WON the institution of heirs in the will can be annulled based on the falsity of the cause
for the institution, specifically the alleged invalidity of the adoption of the respondents.

HELD: The institution of heirs in the will cannot be annulled based on the alleged invalidity of
the adoption of the respondents. The court also stated that the legality of the adoption can only
be challenged in a separate action.

The court ruled that before the institution of heirs may be annulled, three requisites must concur:
(1) the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will, (2) the cause must be shown to
be false, and (3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
In this case, the decedent's will did not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause forthe
institution of heirs. The institution cannot be annulled based on guesswork or uncertain
implications. Even if the decedent believed she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her
estate to the respondents as their legitime, the institution of heirs must stand. The decedent's
disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely favored the respondents, shows her
intention to give them more than what she thought the law required.

Case No. 28 (Julian-Torralba): Lajom vs. Leuterio (107 SCRA 651)

FACTS: Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial proceedings of his testate estate
were instituted in the Court of First Instance. An agreement of partition and distribution was
executed by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of
Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, whereby the properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were
divided among themselves. Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying, among other things, that he
be declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly recognized and acknowledged in
accordance with the laws in force prior to the Civil Code, thereby being a co-heir of Jose P.
Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola; that the agreement of partition and distribution executed in
1935 by these three legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a victim of preterition.

HELD: It is alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the institution of
heirs made by the deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077
was thereby converted into an intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate. This
contention is clearly untenable. There might have been merit therein if we were dealing with a
special proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in
consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the
settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased.
But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court having
jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which
admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.

Case NO. 29: Morales vs. Olondriz (G.R. No. 198994)

Facts:Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003, leaving behind his widow, Ana Maria
Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O.
Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria
Bautista Olondriz.The decedent's widow and children filed a petition for the partition of the
decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator, believing that the decedent died
intestate.Iris Morales filed a separate petition alleging that the decedent left a will dated July 23,
1991, which omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the
decedent.Morales moved to suspend the intestate proceedings to give way to the probate
proceedings, but the respondent heirs opposed her motion.The RTC consolidated the two cases
and ordered an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of preterition.Morales failed to appear
during the hearing, and the RTC suspended the intestate proceedings and set the case for
probate.The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion and
reinstated Alfonso, Jr. as the administrator of the estate, ordering the case to proceed intestate.

Issue:Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the case to proceed
intestate despite the existence of the will.

Ruling:The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) and dismissed the
petition.The CA had dismissed Morales' petition for certiorari, stating that the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire
inheritance into intestate succession.The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning and
concluded that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion.The decedent's will omitted
Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee, and his preterition annulled the institution of
heirs.The will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void.The Supreme
Court also stated that the probate court has the jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will when exceptional circumstances warrant it.In this case, the annulment of the will due to
preterition resulted in total intestacy, making separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic
validity of its provisions unnecessary.The Supreme Court also clarified that the previous order
setting the case for probate was merely interlocutory and could be modified or rescinded at any
time before final judgment.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court's decision was based on the principle that preterition, which is the complete
and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator's inheritance without the heir's express
disinheritance, annuls the institution of heirs in the will.The court emphasized that the probate
court has the jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when exceptional
circumstances warrant it.In this case, the annulment of the will due to preterition resulted in total
intestacy, making separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity unnecessary.The court
clarified that an interlocutory order, such as the one setting the case for probate, does not result
in res judicata and can be modified or rescinded before final judgment.

Case No. 30 (Montebon):Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72706, Oct 27,
1987)

Facts:The widow and legally adopted daughter of the deceased filed a motion to dismiss the
probate of the will of deceased Nemesio Acain, arguing that the petitioner, brother of the
deceased, had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings, that he was merely a universal heir,
and that they had been preterited.

Issue: Whether or not the widow and adopted daughter have been preterited.

Ruling: The widow has not been preterited, but the adopted daughter has been preterited,
resulting in the nullification of the will. The court affirms the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court to dismiss the petition.

Case No. 31 (Montevirgen): Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449)

FACTS: The case of Nuguid v. Nuguid involves the probate of a will and the issue of preterition.
Preterition refers to the omission of forced heirs in a will. The deceased, Rosario Nuguid, passed
away without any descendants but left her parents as forced heirs. However, her will completely
omits their names, resulting in preterition. The court's area of inquiry in a probate proceeding is
usually limited to the extrinsic validity of the will. In this case, the parties focused on the
intrinsic validity of the will, questioning whether it should be considered null and void due to
preterition. The court decided to address this issue directly to avoid further litigation and waste
of time and resources.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will is null and void due to preterition.

RULING: The holographic will is null and void due to preterition. The court determined that the
will indeed suffered from preterition. Preterition refers to the omission of forced heirs in the will,
either by not mentioning them or not instituting them as heirs or expressly disinheriting them.

In this case, the will completely omitted the testatrix's parents as forced heirs, resulting in
preterition. The court emphasized that preterition annuls the institution of heir and throws open
the entire inheritance to intestate succession.

Case No. 32: NERI v. AKUTIN (GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943; 74 PHIL 185)

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of
the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was
contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion
of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over
which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of
money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there
disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the
ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his
second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul
the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

Case No. 33 (Nunez): De Perez vs. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 31703)

Legal Principle/Doctrine: Requisites of Fideicommissary Substitution

FACTS:Carmen Perez is in possession of P21,428.58 deposited by La Urbana as the final

payment ofAna Alcantara against Andres Garchitorena. Mariano, son of Andres, sought
attachment on saidamount after obtaining judgment worth P7,872.23 against Joaquin Alcantara,
husbandof Carmen. Carmen contends that said amount belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of
Ana. Thelower court ruled that the money belongs to Carmen’s children as fideicommissary
heirs of Ana.

ISSUE:Whether or not the money was the property of Carmen’s children as fideicommissary
heirs.

HELD:The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the ninth,
tenth,and eleventh. Fideicommissary substitution has four requisites: a first heir called
primarilyto the enjoyment of the estate; an obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and
transmitto a third person the whole or a part of the estate; a second heir; and, the
fideicommissarius beentitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit
from the latter and notfrom the fiduciary. The clause merely provides for enjoyment and not
disposal. This is anindication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution. Third,
clear andoutstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution is the provision that the whole
estateshall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, meaning the heiress shall preserve the
wholeestate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.
Lastly,clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a
provision istherein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause
anticipatesthe case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving
and enjoyingthe inheritance.
In this instance, all the requisites of fideicommissary substitution are present. A first heir
primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress,
called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will. An obligation clearly
imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.
Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass
unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to
dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate,
said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for
the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. Lastly, a second heir – such are
the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X
and in clause XI.
Therefore, the money belongs to Carmen’s children as fideicommissary heirs.

Case No. 34: Crisologo vs. Singson (G.R. No. L-13876)

Facts:The case involves a dispute over the ownership of a residential lot in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
The plaintiffs, Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo, filed an action for partition
against Dr. Manuel Singson.They claimed that they owned one half pro-indiviso of the property
based on the provisions of the last will of Doña Leona Singson, the original owner.The will was
duly probated in Special Proceeding No. 453 and the project of partition was approved by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.The plaintiffs made demands for the partition of the
property, but the defendant refused to comply, leading to the filing of the lawsuit.

Issue:Whether the testamentary disposition in the last will of Doña Leona Singson provided for a
sustitucion vulgar (simple substitution) or a sustitucionfideicomisaria (fiduciary substitution).

Ruling:The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.The court held that the last will of Doña Leona Singson established a sustitucion
vulgar.The court found that the testamentary clause did not expressly provide for a
sustitucionfideicomisaria and did not impose a clear obligation on the first heir to preserve and
transmit theproperty to a second heir.Therefore, the plaintiffs, as co-owners pro-indiviso, were
entitled to partition the property.
Ratio:The court based its decision on the relevant provisions of the Civil Code in force at the
time of the testatrix's death.The court cited Article 774, which allows the testator to designate
substitutes in case the named heirs do not accept or are unable to accept the inheritance.The court
also referred to Article 785, which provides for the validity of fideicommissarysubstitutions, but
requires that they do not go beyond the second degree and are made in favor of persons living at
the time of the testator's death.The court emphasized that for a sustitucionfideicomisaria to exist,
there must be a clear obligation imposed on the first heir to preserve and transmit the property to
a second heir.In this case, the court found that the testamentary clause did not meet the
requirements for a sustitucionfideicomisaria and therefore established a sustitucion vulgar.As a
result, the plaintiffs were entitled to partition the property.

Case No. 36 (Osorno): Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vano (8 Phil 119)

FACTS:Genova Rosales of Cebu executed a will on October 26, 1903. The third clause is in part
as follows:

“3. Of the third part of the estate, which is at my free disposal, I bequeath to the Chinaman
Chiong Joc-Soy, the sum of 50,000 pesos, Mexican currency, of which amount 20,000 pesos are
for the aforesaid Chiong Joc-Soy, and the balance of 30,000 pesos for the expenses of interment
etc. of my late husband Don Nicasio Veloso, …”

On the February 6, 1905, the petitioner, Chiong Joc-Soy, the legatee named in the will, filed a
petition in the said proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, Genoveva
Rosales, asking that the administrator be directed to pay him the 50,000 pesos mentioned in the
will. The court granted the petition and ordered the administrator to pay the petitioner his share.

The administrator and the heirs have appealed and said that the lower court was in error in
ordering the payment of the 30,000 pesos without requiring the petitioner to give a bond
conditioned that he would dispose of the money as indicated in the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the legacy contains a condition and the Court should require bond from
Chiong that he would dispose of the money as indicated in the will?

RULING: No. The legacy does not contain a condition and the Court should not require bond
from Chiong that he would dispose of the money as indicated in the will

Article 797 of the Old Civil Code (now Art. 882) provides that: The statement of the object of the
designation or of the legacy or the application to be given to what has been left by the testator,
or the charge imposed by the same, shall not be considered as a condition, unless it appears that
such was his will.

What has been left in this manner may be immediately claimed and is transmissible to the heirs
who give security for the fulfillment of the orders of the testator and the repayment of what they
may have received, with its fruits and interest, should they fail to comply with this obligation.
The Court thinks under all the circumstances of the case that the testratrix did not intend to
impose upon the legatee any condition in making the gift of 30,000 pesos.

It is true, as claimed by the heirs, that it is very evident that she intended the 20,000 pesos to be
the absolute property of the petitioner and that as to the 30,000 pesos she had a different
intention, but this does not resolve the question presented. That she wished and desired the
petitioner to expend the 30,000 pesos as indicated in the will is apparent, but the question is, did
she intent to make her gift conditional, or did she rely upon her confidence in the petitioner that
he would carry out her suggestion without the necessity of imposing a condition upon him? It
appears that the husband of the testratrix was a Chinaman; that she was a Filipina, and that the
legatee was Chinaman. The manner in which persons of Chinese descent spend money to
perpetuate the memory of a deceased person of their race does not appear, nor the amount that
they are accustomed so to expend, nor the time during which it may be expended. All these
circumstances were doubtless known to the testratrix and we believe that knowing them she
intentionally selected a person of Chinese birth to carry out her purposes in this regard. We hold,
therefore, that they legacy is not conditional.

Moreover, a fair construction of the second paragraph of article 797 (of the old civil code)
indicates that the heirs of the legatee are the only ones who are required to give security, and that
such security is not required of the legatee himself.

Case No. 37 (Palmones): Rabadilla vs. CA (G.R. No. 113725; June 29, 2000)

FACTS: Testatrix Aleja Belleza left a Last Will and Testament instituting Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as
a devisee of Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. Appended to it was a Codicil stating that Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation to deliver 100 Piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza in December every year. Incase that Dr. Jorge Rabadilla dies, his heir to
whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 shall continue the obligation stated in the Codicil.

It is also stated that, buyer, lessee and mortgagee shall have the same obligation in case
the subject lot is either sold, leased or mortgaged by the heir. Failure to comply to the
obligation to give 100 piculs of sugar every year will allow Maria Marlina to seize the lot and
turn it over to the Testatrix Descendants.

Petitioner mortgaged the lot to Philippine National Bank and Republic Planter
Bank. Mortgagees failed to comply to the obligation imposed by the Testatrix.

ISSUE: Is the Codicil of the Testatrix a Modal Institution?

RULING: Yes, the institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known
in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution,
the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property
left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
In the case at hand Testatrix owns Lot. No 1392 which he has given to the Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, father of the petitioner where the heir is obliged to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza which satisfies the requisites of a modal institution.