Silverio v. CA Digest

G.R. No.
94284
April 8, 1991
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
PRINCIPLE:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel where treated under one
provision.1âwphi1 Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads; The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired. The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by
explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus: The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health (Article IV, Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them
differently, to wit; Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C.
Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying
reconsideration, be set aside.
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by
failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest had been issued. Those orders
and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at
his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within
the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party
in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused
holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
Petitioner contends that respondent, Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April
and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled
arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2)
finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other
than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
Petitioner takes the posture, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to
curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of
the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on
the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds
other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
HELD:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on
the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a
limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I,
First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the
ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party
(See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means, be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect
that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail, is to make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence, operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel, no
longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has
remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides,
the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. Uy
Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law,
Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]).
This has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and
Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at
scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the
conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of
a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance
before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
Therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on
erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want the Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a
Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and
cancelled because of Petitioner's non-appearance.

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G.R. No.

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,

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