OS Security Hardening Guide For SAP HANA SLES15 en

SUSE Best Practices
SAP
Operating System Security Hardening Guide

for SAP HANA for SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server 15 GA and SP1
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 GA and SP1
Soeren Schmidt, SAP Solution Architect (SUSE)

Markus Guertler, Senior Manager SAP Technology Team (SUSE)
Alexander Bergmann, Security Engineer (SUSE)
Operating System Security Hardening Guide for SAP HANA for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15
1 GA and SP1
Operating System Security Hardening Guide for SAP HANA for SUSE Linux
Enterprise Server 15 GA and SP1
Date: 2022-02-09
This document guides through various hardening methods for SUSE® Linux Enter-
prise Server for SAP Applications to run SAP HANA.
Disclaimer: Documents published as part of the SUSE Best Practices series have
been contributed voluntarily by SUSE employees and third parties. They are meant
to serve as examples of how particular actions can be performed. They have been
compiled with utmost attention to detail. However, this does not guarantee com-
plete accuracy. SUSE cannot verify that actions described in these documents do
what is claimed or whether actions described have unintended consequences. SUSE
LLC, its affiliates, the authors, and the translators may not be held liable for possi-
ble errors or the consequences thereof.
2 GA and SP1
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 SUSE Linux Enterprise security hardening settings for HANA 9
3 SAP HANA firewall 28
4 SUSE Remote Disk Encryption 34
5 Minimal operating system package selection 35
6 Security updates 37
7 Outlook 40
8 About the authors 40
9 Further information and references 40
10 Documentation updates 41
11 Legal notice 43
12 GNU Free Documentation License 44
3 GA and SP1
1 Introduction
IT security is an essential topic for any organization. Newspapers report frequently about new IT
security incidents such as hacked websites, successful Denial-of-Service attacks, or stolen user
data like passwords, bank account numbers and other sensitive data.
In addition to the publicly reported attacks, there are also a large number of incidents that are
not reported to the public. In particular, these cases are often related to espionage, where the
affected party has no interest to report an incident. Security experts agree that, for protecting
sensitive data, an organization must have a comprehensive security concept in place, taking all
eventualities into account that can potentially lead into security risks. This starts with proper
setup policies, like password and data protection policies for users and system administrators.
It continues with a protected IT environment using for example firewalls, VPNs, and SSL in
communication protocols. And it ends with hardened servers, intrusion detection systems, data
encrypting and automated security reporting. Additionally, many organizations perform security
audits on a regular basis to ensure a maximum of security in their IT environment.
Security
Policies
Network
Security
Security
Audits
Application
and Patch
OS Strategy
Security
FIGURE 1: ELEMENTS OF A CORPORATE IT SECURITY
4 GA and SP1
Comprehensive security concepts usually pay high attention to database systems, since databas-
es belong to the most critical components in any IT environment. Database systems that poten-
tially store sensitive data are by nature very popular targets for hackers and must therefore be
protected. SAP HANA systems typically store business related information and are considered as
being business critical. This is especially the case for ERP systems using SAP HANA. In addition,
many other SAP applications using SAP HANA, like BW systems, may store sensitive data.
1.1 Security for SAP HANA

SAP takes the security topic very seriously. For SAP HANA, there is a comprehensive SAP
HANA Security Guide (https://help.sap.com/doc/eec734dbb0fd1014a61590fcb5411390/2.0.05/en-
US/SAP_HANA_Security_Guide_en.pdf) available. This guide describes in detail how to protect
HANA from a database perspective. The guide also refers to security concepts for other connect-
ing layers that are separate from the SAP HANA system, for example the network and storage
layer. However, these topics are described only generically. There is no specific guidance on
how to apply these recommendations on the operating system level.
1.2 Security for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server

The security of the underlying operating system is at least as important as the security of the SAP
HANA database. Many hacker attacks target the operating system to gain access and sufficient
privileges to attack the running database application. SUSE Linux Enterprise Server is the rec-
ommended and supported operating system for SAP HANA. SUSE has a long-running history in
IT security for Linux operating systems. The company offers a comprehensive security package
for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server to protect systems from all kind of security incidents. This
package consists of the following components:
Security certifications
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 has been awarded many important security certifications,
such as the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) 140-2 validation, or the Com-
mon Criteria EAL4+ certificate. Currently we are in the process of achieving the same
for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15. For details visit https://www.suse.com/support/secu-
rity/certifications/ .
5 GA and SP1
Security updates and patches
SUSE constantly provides security updates and patches for their SUSE Linux Enterprise
operating systems and guarantees highest security standards during the entire product life
cycle.
Documentation
SUSE has published a Hardening Guide and a Security Guide that describe the security
concepts and features of SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15. These guides provide generic
security and hardening information valid for all workloads, not just for SAP HANA. For
more details visit:
https://documentation.suse.com/sles/15-SP2/html/SLES-all/book-hardening.html
https://documentation.suse.com/sles/15-SP2/html/SLES-all/book-security.html
Security patches
and updates Security Certifications
like FIPS, EAL4+, etc.
over the whole product lifecycle
AppArmor firewalld
for fine-grained security tuning Easy to administer OS firewall
Intrusion Detection OS Security Guide

using AIDE covering all security topics
Linux Audit System

CAPP-compliant auditing system
+ more
FIGURE 2: SECURITY COMPONENTS OF SUSE LINUX ENTERPRISE SERVER
6 GA and SP1
1.3 About this document
To further improve the security level specifically for SAP HANA, SUSE provides the document
at hand. It focuses on the security hardening of SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 running SAP
HANA databases to ll the gap between the Security Guide for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server,
the Hardening Guide for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, and the SAP HANA Security Guide.
The Hardening Guide for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server contains some of the recommendations
found here, but also additional recommendations. Most of the recommendations can be applied
to an SAP HANA installation after careful review and testing. SUSE collaborated with a large
pilot customer to identify all relevant security settings and to avoid problems in real world
scenarios. Also, SUSE and SAP are constantly cooperating in the SAP Linux Lab to provide the
best compatibility with SAP HANA.
Security Hardening Settings for HANA
SUSE Firewall for HANA
Remote Disk Encryption
Minimal OS Package Selection
Security Updates & Patches
FIGURE 3: THE FIVE MAIN TOPICS OF THE OS SECURITY HARDENING FOR HANA
7 GA and SP1
The guide at hand provides detailed descriptions on the following topics:
Security hardening settings for SAP HANA systems

The Linux operating system provides many tweaks and settings to further improve the
operating system security and the security for the hosted applications. To be able to t for
certain application workloads, the default settings are not tuned for maximum security.
This guide describes how to tune the operating system for maximum security when running
SAP HANA specifically. In addition, it describes possible impacts, for example on system
administration, and gives a prioritization of each setting.
Local firewall for SAP HANA

SUSE has developed a dedicated local firewall for SAP HANA systems to improve the net-
work security of SAP HANA. This is done by only selectively opening network ports on
external network interfaces that are really needed either by SAP HANA or other services.
All remaining network ports are closed. The firewall has a broad range of features and is
easy to configure. It is available as RPM package and can be downloaded from SUSE.
Remote Disk Encryption

Starting with SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 12 SP2, SUSE introduced
a new feature called Remote Disk Encryption. Classical Disk Encryption - available for
years – always required a passphrase being entered during boot. That prevented its use in
many setups because each boot needed a manual step. Remote Disk Encryption removes
this manual step as it allows the encryption keys to be stored safely on a remote key server
and to be automatically used during system boot.
Minimal package selection

The fewer operating system packages an SAP HANA system has installed, the less possible
security holes it should have. Following that principle, this guide describes which packages
are absolutely necessary and which packages can be safely discarded. As a positive side
effect, a minimized number of packages also reduces the number of updates and patches
that have to be applied to a system.
Security updates & patches

Open source software is frequently reviewed and tested for security vulnerabilities by open
source developers, security engineers from the open source community, security compa-
nies and, of course, by the hackers. When a vulnerability has been found and reported,
it is published in security advisories and usually gets xed very quickly. SUSE constantly
provides security updates and patches for all supported packages on SUSE Linux Enterprise
8 GA and SP1
Server. This chapter explains which update and patch strategies are the best. It also details
how to configure SUSE Linux Enterprise Server to frequently receive all relevant security
updates.
In short, this guide covers all important topics in detail that are relevant for the operating system
hardening of an SAP HANA system. Combining them with the other security features of SUSE
Linux Enterprise Server 15, like the security certifications and the constantly provided security
updates and patches, SAP HANA can run in a highly secure environment. This ensures that
the implementation meets the security standards and corporate security concepts required by
organizations of all sizes.
SAP HANA Security Guide

Application - Network and Communication Security - Authorization
- User and Role Management - Storage Security
- Authentication and Single Sign-On - etc.
OS Security Hardening Guide for HANA

Operating - OS Security Hardening Settings - Minimal OS Package Selection
- Local Firewall for HANA - Update & Patch Strategies
System - Remote Disk Encryption - etc.
FIGURE 4: SAP HANA AND OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY
2 SUSE Linux Enterprise security hardening settings

for HANA
2.1 Introduction to Linux security hardening

SUSE Linux Enterprise Server already provides a high level of security with the standard in-
stallation. However, the standard security settings are generic, because they have to t to all
possible Linux server workloads. Also, many security settings have impacts on the comfort of
9 GA and SP1
the system administration and possibly on the users of the system. Therefore, the SUSE Linux
Enterprise Server standard security settings provide a good tradeoff between compatibility with
all workloads, administrative comfort and a secure operating system environment.
SAP HANA is a very special workload with clearly defined requirements. For such a workload
it is possible to have a more restrictive security configuration compared to the standard config-
uration. The goal of this guide is to strengthen the security configuration without affecting the
compatibility with SAP HANA.
While security hardening results in higher security, it usually comes with the drawback of less
administrative comfort and system functionality. This is a fact that every system administrator
should be aware of. However, a system configured more restrictively can also provide a bet-
ter level of protection and a lower risk of successful attacks. In many cases, company security
policies, guidelines, or security audits force very high security standards which automatically
result in systems configured more restrictively. The Linux operating system has many tweaks
and settings that can improve the overall security of the operating system and its applications.
These settings can be summarized in the following categories:
Authentication settings
Define for example who is allowed to login, the exact password policy, etc.
System access settings

Define which users are allowed to access the system locally and remotely using different
login mechanisms (for example local logins via console TTY or remote logins via SSH)
Network settings
Define how certain layers of the network stack behave, for example the IP layer, or the
TCP/UDP layer
Service permissions
Define the permissions of certain system service, for example disabling 'at' jobs
File permissions
Define the le access rights of certain security-critical system les
Logging & reporting

Change the behavior of the system logging, syslog forwarding to a central syslog server,
automatic creation of reports (such as security reports) and forwarding of security-relevant
information via email
10 GA and SP1
2.2 Hardening settings for SAP HANA systems
Important
The measures in this chapter are described for the x86 architecture (AMD64/Intel 64),
but apply for the POWER architecture as well. Because of the differences in the hardware,
it might be necessary to adapt them accordingly (different device names, etc.)
Also, the graphical user interface is not covered. Running a GUI on a secure server should
be avoided.
The following hardening settings improve the security of SUSE Linux Enterprise Server systems
running an SAP HANA database. These settings are based on the recommendations of a security
audit, which was performed on a SUSE Linux Enterprise Server standard installation, running
an SAP HANA database.
Note
Read the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server Security Guide and the SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server Hardening Guide for additional measures (see https://documentation.suse.com/ )
(Choose "SUSE Linux Enterprise Server" instead of "SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP
Applications".
For each setting, the following details are provided:
Description: Details of the setting
Procedure: How to apply the setting
Impact: Possible impact for system administrators or users
Priority: High, Medium, Low
Based on the impact of a particular setting, a system administrator or a security engineer can
decide if the loss of administrative comfort is worth the gain in security.
The prioritization can be used to help decide which settings should be applied to meet security
requirements. High priority settings should be applied where possible, whereas low priority
settings can be treated as optional.
11 GA and SP1
Important
Disclaimer: We strongly recommend to execute all described hardening settings on a non-
productive (such as a DEV or QA) system rst. We also recommend to backup the system
before doing any changes. If btrfs/snapper is being used, creating a snapshot of the root
le system is advised. Furthermore, we recommend to test the functionality of SAP HANA
and all related applications and services after applying the settings. Since SAP HANA
installations, use cases, hardware and installed services are likely to be different from
the test audit, it cannot be guaranteed that all settings work correctly. It even cannot be
completely excluded that they potentially have a negative impact on the functionality
of the system.
If it is not possible to test the settings on a non-productive system, the changes should only be
made within a maintenance window. The maintenance window should provide enough time for
a proper system functionality test, or for restoring the system if necessary.
2.2.1 Installing SUSE security checker
Description
The SUSE security checker ( seccheck ) performs certain security checks, executed via cron
jobs, on a regular basis, and generates reports. These reports are usually forwarded via
email to root. More details about seccheck can be found in the le /usr/share/doc/
packages/seccheck/README or at https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles-15/single-
html/book_hardening/book_hardening.html#sec.sec_prot.general.seccheck .
Important
The password check is not done because the password-cracking software tool john
is not available on SUSE Linux Enterprise Server. The check would fail silently.
Procedure
Install package seccheck :
zypper in seccheck
12 GA and SP1
Impact
Daily and weekly reports via email to the root user.
Requires a properly setup email forwarding.
Priority
Medium
2.2.2 Configuring mail forwarding for root user
Description
To receive information about the security relevant changes and incidents, it is strongly
recommended to enable email forwarding for the user root to a dedicated email account
for the collection of system mails.
Procedure
1. Install 'Yast2-mail':
zypper in yast2-mail
2. Start the 'YaST' mail module:
yast mail
3. Choose 'Permanent' as connection type.
4. Enter the address of the internal mail gateway as outgoing mail server and configure
authentication if required.
5. Do NOT enable 'accept external SMTP connections'.
6. Enter the email address to forward the root emails (this is typically a dedicated system
mail collection account).
7. Save the settings.
8. Test the settings with:
mail root
subject: test
13 GA and SP1
test
.
9. Verify that the email has been delivered with the command mailq .
Impact
Requires an accessible SMTP server.
Requires somebody who regularly checks the mails of the 'root' user.
Priority
High
2.2.3 Forwarding syslog files to a central syslog server
Description
Log les should be forwarded from an SAP HANA node to a central syslog server. This
prevents syslog les from being manipulated by an attacker. In addition, it allows admin-
istrators to have a central view on the syslog les.
Procedure
This procedure explains a basic syslog forwarding setup. For a more sophisticated setup
consult the RSyslog manual at https://www.rsyslog.com/doc/master/index.html#manual .
On the target syslog server (running SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15)
1. Edit /etc/rsyslog.d/remote.conf
2. Uncomment the following lines in the 'UDP Syslog server' or 'TCP Syslog Server'
block of the configuration le and enter the IP address and port of the interface
rsyslogd shall listen:
TCP example
$ModLoad imtcp.so
$UDPServerAddress <ip>
$InputTCPServerRun <port>
UDP example
$ModLoad imudp.so
$UDPServerAddress <ip>
14 GA and SP1
$UDPServerRun <port>
3. Restart rsyslog :
systemctl restart rsyslog.service
On the SAP HANA node
1. Edit /etc/rsyslog.d/remote.conf
2. Uncomment the appropriate line (TCP or UDP) and replace 'remote-host' with
the address of the central log server:
TCP example
# Remote Logging using TCP for reliable delivery

# remote host is: name/ip:port, e.g. 192.168.0.1:514, port optional
*.* @@remote-host
UDP example
# Remote Logging using UDP

# remote host is: name/ip:port, e.g. 192.168.0.1:514, port optional
*.* @remote-host
3. Restart rsyslog :
systemctl restart rsyslog.service
4. Verify the proper function of the syslog forwarding using the command:
logger "hello world"
The log message “hello world” should now appear on the central syslog server.
Impact
Requires a central syslog server.
Priority
Medium
15 GA and SP1
2.2.4 Disabling ctrl-alt-del
Description
This prevents a reboot of a system via serial console and/or external keyboard.
Procedure
Create the following symlink:
ln -s /dev/null /etc/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.target
Impact
A system reboot cannot anymore be performed via a local keyboard or a remote

management session.
This can be irritating for system administrators, but it also helps to prevent accidental
reboots.
Priority
Medium
2.2.5 Implementing cron.allow

Description: The cron.allow le specifies a whitelist of users that are allowed to execute jobs
via the cron system. The le does not exist by default. This means every user (except those listed
in cron.deny ) can create cron jobs.
Procedure
Create an empty le /etc/cron.allow to prevent a user from creating cron jobs:
touch /etc/cron.allow
Info
Location of user crontabs: /var/spool/cron/tabs
Impact
SAP HANA users ('<sid>adm') and other users are not allowed anymore to create
their own cronjobs.
Priority
Low
16 GA and SP1
2.2.6 Implementing at.allow
Description
The at.allow le specifies a whitelist of users that are allowed to execute scheduled one-
time running jobs, so-called 'at' jobs, via the 'at' job execution system. This le does not
exist by default. This means that every user (except those listed in at.deny ) can create
'at' jobs.
Procedure
Create an empty le /etc/at.allow to prevent a user from creating 'at' jobs:
touch /etc/at.allow
Impact
The functionality of one-time 'at' jobs gets disabled.
Priority
Medium
2.2.7 Restricting sudo for general users
Description
The sudo command allows users to execute commands in the context of another user, typ-
ically the root user. The sudo configuration consists of a ruleset that defines the mappings
between commands to execute, their allowed source, and target users and groups. The
configuration is stored in the le /etc/sudoers . Like the command su , sudo asks for the
root password by default. However, unlike su , sudo remembers the password and allows
further commands to be executed as root without asking again for the password for ve
minutes. Therefore sudo should only be enabled for selected users, such as admin users.
Procedure
1. Edit the le /etc/sudoers , for example by executing visudo .
2. Comment out the line to:
#ALL ALL=(ALL) ALL # WARNING! Only use this together with 'Defaults targetpw'!
17 GA and SP1
3. Uncomment this line to:
%wheel ALL=(ALL) ALL
4. Add all system administrator users to the group wheel:
usermod -aG wheel <admin_user>
Important
The user added to the wheel group has to log out and log in again to get the
new group membership applied.
Tip
If sudo asks for the password of the target user instead of the user invoking sudo ,
uncomment (default) the line Defaults targetpw # ask for the password of the
target user i.e. root . For more details, read the man page of sudoers .
Impact
Prohibits sudo command functionality for all users, other than the ones that are
members of the group 'wheel'.
Note that the su command is still available for other users.
Priority
High
2.2.8 Adjusting default umask
Description
The command umask specifies the default XOR-masking for access rights for newly created
les. We recommend to change this value to 077. This will force newly created les and
directories to be not read/write/execute enabled for groups and other users.
Procedure
Edit the le /etc/login.defs and change the umask value:
UMASK 077
18 GA and SP1
Tip
The PAM module pam_umask.so (in /etc/pam.d/common-session ) applies the
umask setting made in /etc/login.defs . Refer to the respective man page for
alternatives.
Impact
Newly created les and directories are not read-, write- and executable by users other
than the creating user.
Remark
To take changes into effect, a logout and fresh login of all user sessions is required.
Priority
High
2.2.9 Modifying login definitions according to corporate security policies
Description
The le /etc/login.defs describes the login settings for users, such as password expi-
ration times, password aging, the number of allowed login retries, umask settings, etc.
It does not provide options to set the password policy. All changes apply only to newly
created accounts. To change existing accounts, use the passwd and chage commands.
Adjust the settings according to your corporate security policies.
Procedure
Edit the le /etc/login.defs and make changes according to your policies.
PASS_MAX_DAYS 90
PASS_MIN_DAYS 7
PASS_WARN_AGE 14
This example sets default password expiration values for all newly created users:
Password expires after 90 days
Warns 14 days before the password expires
Allows a user to change the password only every seven days
19 GA and SP1
The chage command prints information about the current password expiration state
for a particular user.
chage -l <user name>
Remark
It is also to possible to specify password expiration times and similar settings on a per-
user basis using the useradd command. More information about password aging can be
found in the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 Hardening Guide, section 2.26 Enabling
Password Aging.
Impact
Some login.defs settings, like the password expiration time, reject users to log in
after their passwords have expired.
These settings require system administrators to inform their users about the password
expiration times. Users are required to actively change their passwords from time
to time.
Priority
Medium
2.2.10 Setting up password failure counts for users
Description
Password failure counts prevent users from logging in after a defined number of failed
login attempts. SUSE Linux Enterprise Server provides this mechanism via the PAM sys-
tem. We do not recommend to use password failure counts, as they can be misused for
denial-of-service attacks of certain user accounts. If your corporate policy requires to set
up password failure counts for users, refer to the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 Security
and Hardening Guide, section 15.4.3 Locking user accounts after too many login failures.
20 GA and SP1
2.2.11 Setting up password strengthening for user accounts according to
corporate policies
Description
The default password policy for user accounts on a default SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
system is already quite strong. For example, a password cracking library is used to prevent
too simple and too short passwords. In some cases, it is required to configure the password
strengthening exactly according to a corporate password policy. This is possible by chang-
ing the PAM password authentication settings in the le /etc/pam.d/common-password .
Use the pam-config utility to modify the PAM password strengthening settings. The
changes are reflected in the le /etc/pam.d/common-password . Change the settings ac-
cording to your requirements.
pam-config --add \
--cracklib-retry=3 \
--cracklib-minlen=8 \
--cracklib-lcredit=-1 \
--cracklib-ucredit=-1 \
--cracklib-dcredit=-1 \
--cracklib-ocredit=0 \
--cracklib-difok=5
This example configures the password strengthening according to the following rules:
Ask user up to a maximum number of three times to enter a new valid password
Minimum of eight characters
At least one uppercase alpha character
At least one lowercase alpha character
At least one number
An unlimited amount of special characters, such as _, !, %

A new password must differ by at least ve characters from the old password. More
information on password strengthening options can be found in the man page man
pam_cracklib .
21 GA and SP1
Impact
The passwords for system users have to be set according to the defined policies.
The root user is allowed to overrule the password policy.
When setting password expiration times, users can not login anymore after their
passwords have expired.
Priority
Medium
2.2.12 Configuring user remote login restriction
Description
Use the le access.conf to control remote access to the system for the root and any other
user accounts. The configured accounts are restricted to log in from a certain IP subnet
via SSH.
Procedure
1. Edit the le /etc/pam.d/sshd and append:
auth required pam_access.so
See man access.conf for configuration details.
2. Edit le /etc/security/access.conf (see man access.conf for configuration

details):
+ : <sid>adm : <network/netmask>
+ : sapadm : <network/netmask>
+ : <admin user> : <network/netmask>
- : ALL : ALL
Warning
Do not use the pam-config utility here. It only supports pam_access as glob-
al module. The configuration above is not suitable to be used globally for all
services and can cause a denial of access for the entire system!
22 GA and SP1
Impact
Only whitelisted users coming from the specified IP subnet are allowed to log in via
SSH.
Remote root login is prohibited.
Priority
Medium
2.2.13 Setting up password for rescue mode
Description
The root password is needed in rescue mode (rescue.target) to access the system. On SUSE
Linux Enterprise Server versions, no change has to be made.
2.2.14 Adjusting sysctl variables to Improve network security
Note
This section only covers settings for IPv4. There a similar IPv6 parameters available if
required.
Description
sysctl (system control) variables change certain kernel parameters that influence the
behavior of different parts of the operating system, such as the Linux network stack. These
kernel parameters can be looked up in the proc filesystem, in /proc/sys/ . Many kernel
parameters can directly be changed by echo’ing a value into a parameter le. However,
these changes are not persisted and are lost after a system reboot. Therefore we recommend
to make all changes in the sysctl configuration le.
Procedure
Create a configuration le ( man 5 sysctl.d for details) in /etc/sysctl.d/ and set the
following variables:
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
23 GA and SP1
This setting enables the reverse path filter in strict mode. The setting ensures that the an-
swers to incoming IP packets are always sent out via the interface the packet also has been
received. If the system would direct the answer packet to a different outgoing interface
according to the routing table, this packet would be discarded. The setting prevents certain
kind of IP spoofing attacks, such as those used for DDoS attacks.
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
This setting disables the acceptance of packets with the SRR option set in the IPv4 packet
header. Packets that use “Source Routing” are rejected. This prevents IP packet redirection
such as a redirection to a host behind a firewall that is not directly reachable.
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
The TCP SYN Cookie Protection is enabled by default. A 'SYN Attack' is a denial of service
attack that consumes all the resources on a machine. Any server that is connected to a
network is potentially subject to such an attack.
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
ICMP echo requests (ping) can be sent to a broadcast address to scan a network for existing
hosts / IPs or to perform a ICMP ood within a network segment. This setting ignores icmp
echo packets, sent to a broadcast address.
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
This setting avoids filling up log les with unnecessary error messages coming from invalid
responses to broadcast frames. See RFC 1122 'Requirements for Internal Hosts - Commu-
nication Layers' for more information.
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as default gateways) has
few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
This disables the acceptance of ICMP redirect messages. These messages are usually sent
by gateways to inform a host about a better route to an outside network. These redirects
can be misused, for example for man-in-the-middle attacks.
24 GA and SP1
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 4096
The TCP SYN backlog defines the number of SYN packets that are queued for further
processing. When the queue limit is exceeded, all new incoming syn-packets are dropped.
This improves the protection against TCP SYN ood attacks.
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
IP forwarding is the IP routing functionality of a Linux system. SAP HANA systems should
never act as routers. Therefore IP forwarding is disabled.
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
IP redirects should only be sent by routers / gateways. As SAP HANA systems do not act
as gateways, redirects are disabled.
Impact
This changes the behavior of the IP network stack, which might cause some network
problems or performance issues with certain network setups and devices (such as
firewalls) in some rare cases.
Priority
High
2.2.15 Changing home directory permissions from 755 to 700
Description
By default, home directories of users are accessible (read, execute) by all other users on the
system. As this is a potential information leak, home directories should only be accessible
by their owners. SAP HANA system users ('<sid>adm') have their home directories in the
directories /usr/sap/<sid>/home/ . As this directory structure is located in the domain
of SAP, we do not describe any changes here.
Procedure
The following commands will set the permissions to 700 (directory only accessible
for the user) for all home directories in /home :
chmod 755 /home
25 GA and SP1
for a in /home/*; do echo "Changing rights for directory $a"; chmod 700 ”$a”;
done
Impact
System users are not allowed anymore to access other users home directories.
An exception is made to '<sid>adm' users with their home directories in /usr/sap/

<sid>/home .
Priority
Medium
2.2.16 Modifying permissions on certain system files
Description
Many system les are group- or world-readable by default. For those les that carry sen-
sitive information, this can be a security risk. Changing the le permissions of these les
to more restrictive values increases the security. SUSE provides the tool chkstat to check
and set le permissions of certain les that are defined in one of the following configura-
tion les:
permissions.local
permissions.easy
permissions.paranoid
permissions.secure
The permissions.local le is dedicated for user-defined le permissions.
Procedure
For SAP HANA systems we recommend to use the permissions.easy pattern plus some
additional le permissions that will be stored in the permissions.local pattern.
First, set the permissions in the correct order in /etc/sysconfig/security :
...
PERMISSION_SECURITY="easy local"
...
Next, add the following permission settings to the le /etc/permissions.local :
26 GA and SP1
# HANA Security Hardening
#
/etc/at.allow root:root 0400
/etc/bash.bashrc root:root 0444
/etc/csh.cshrc root:root 0444
/etc/csh.login root:root 0444
/etc/shadow root:shadow 0440
/etc/rsyslog.conf root:root 0400
/etc/crontab root:root 0400
/etc/cron.d root:root 0700
/etc/cron.hourly root:root 0700
/etc/cron.daily root:root 0700
/etc/cron.weekly root:root 0700
/etc/cron.monthly root:root 0700
/etc/login.defs root:root 0400
/etc/security/access.conf root:root 0400
/etc/sysctl.conf root:root 0400
/etc/X11/xdm/Xservers root:root 0444
/root root:root 0700
/root/.cshrc root:root 0400
/var/log/boot.log root:root 0640
/var/log/sa root:root 0770
#
# Changing permissions of utmp files would cause the commands
# w, who and last not to work anymore for non-root users
#
# Uncomment these lines, if you are really sure about that
/var/run/utmp root:utmp 0600
/var/log/wtmp root:utmp 0600
Now apply the permissions:
chkstat --system --set
Impact
Some system administration tasks that require access to les mentioned above and
that are usually performed as normal system user have to be performed as root user.
Priority
Medium
27 GA and SP1
3 SAP HANA firewall
3.1 SAP HANA network communication
Note
The SAP HANA firewall currently only includes rules for IPv4.
The section "Network Security" of the SAP HANA Security Guide (https://help.sap.com ) rec-
ommends that different components of the SAP HANA database should operate in different net-
work zones. Also, the network communication should be restrictively filtered to follow a mini-
mal communication approach.
In practice, this results in segmenting the network communication of certain SAP HANA compo-
nents into multiple dedicated IP networks (ISO/OSI Layer 3). The SAP HANA system is connect-
ed with exactly one interface to each IP network. Typically, these interfaces are logical bonding
interfaces that include two or more physical interfaces for redundancy. The physical interfaces
are connected to separated Ethernet network segments (ISO/OSI Layer 2).
User network
Firewall Admin network

ISO/OSI Layer 3 - IP
SAP HANA System SAP HANA System SAP HANA System SAP HANA System
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4
Distributed systems network
Firewall Backup network

ISO/OSI Layer 3 - IP
FIGURE 5: EXAMPLE OF A SAP HANA NETWORK DIAGRAM WITH EXTERNAL FIREWALLS
28 GA and SP1
All SAP HANA networks should be either isolated (this means distributed system networks),
or if they require communication from other networks (this means user communication), they
should be behind an external firewall. This external firewall should only allow traffic for a SAP
HANA network that is required for the communication with the SAP HANA services that are
listening on this network.
In some cases an external firewall cannot be provided, or certain networks are shared between
many servers but not just SAP HANA database systems. In these case, a local running firewall
can take over some of the functionalities of an external firewall.
3.2 Local firewall for SAP HANA

The security of an SAP HANA database can be further improved by configuring a locally running
firewall. This firewall should only allow network communication on ports where HANA services
or other required system services are listening. Communication to all other ports should be
dropped and optionally be logged. This complies with the “minimal communication approach”
suggested in the SAP HANA Security Guide.
SUSE developed a dedicated local firewall for SAP HANA, based on Linux iptables . This fire-
wall takes all requirements from typical SAP HANA systems into account.
The firewall provides the following features:
Predefined SAP HANA services definitions (according to the SAP HANA Master Guide)
Protection of multiple SAP HANA instances running on one server
Interface / service mappings for an unlimited number of interfaces
Possibility to directly use service definitions from /etc/services
Option to restrict access to services to certain source networks
Simulating option that prints the iptables commands to the console instead of executing
them (What if…)
29 GA and SP1
SAP HANA System
Node 1
isolated
User network
Interface bond0
HANA components
Admin Network
Interface bond1
- Database
- HANA XS
- Host Agent Distributed System Network
- Lifecycle Mgr. Interface bond2
- etc.
Backup network
Interface bondk
Distributed System Network
Backup Network
Admin Network
User Network
SAP HANA System
Node 2
User network
Interface bond0
HANA components
Admin Network1
Interface bond1
- Database
- HANA XS
- Host Agent Distributed System Network
- Lifecycle Mgr. Interface bond2
- etc.
Backup network
Interface bondk3
FIGURE 6: EXAMPLE OF A SAP HANA FIREWALL NETWORK DIAGRAM
Not every scenario requires having a dedicated local firewall on the SAP HANA servers. For
example, if all SAP HANA networks are behind a properly configured external firewall, a local
firewall is not necessarily required.
However, in some cases it helps to improve the network security. It can even improve network
debugging capabilities (→ logging of dropped packets). The most common cases for running a
local firewall are:
when an external firewall is not available to protect non-isolated SAP HANA networks
from other networks (e.g. user network).
when an external firewall can not be configured restrictively enough to only allow network
communication for particular SAP HANA ports for certain SAP HANA networks.
30 GA and SP1
when an external firewall provides not enough security zones.
when a protected network contains many different servers, such as non-SAP servers, in
the same network.
There are several other reasons why a local firewall could make sense. For example, a local
firewall prevents unwanted services or daemons listening TCP or UDP ports and receiving con-
nections. That is because all not specifically allowed network ports are blocked by default. Al-
so, unauthorized network traffic received on blocked ports can be logged. This allows to easily
identify unwanted connection attempts. Last but not least, a local firewall can be a set require-
ment by corporate security policies or security audits.
SAP HANA System

HDB00
Network Interface bond0

(User Network)
0-21 ports blocked X
SSH server 22 (ssh) ports open
23 - 4999 ports blocked X
5000-5013 (HANA Studio) ports open
HANA components
5014-4299 ports blocked X Incoming connections
- Database
4300 (http client access) ports open
- HANA XS
- Host Agent 4300-30014 ports blocked X
- Lifecycle Mgr.
- etc. 30015,30016 (DB Access) ports open
30017 - 65535 ports blocked X
syslog
Logging of dropped
packets
FIGURE 7: EXAMPLE OF A SAP HANA FIREWALL NETWORK TRAFFIC FLOW (PORTS ARE EXEMPLARY)
3.3 Installation
The SAP HANA firewall is available from the repositories for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for
SAP Applications 15 and extends firewalld by adding rulesets.
31 GA and SP1
zypper install HANA-Firewall
The package installs the following les:
/usr/sbin/hana-firewall Firewall executable. A usage description can

be printed with the command: /usr/sbin/
hana-firewall --help
/etc/hana-firewall/ Main configuration le
/etc/sysconfig/hana-firewall Directory for HANA services and user de-

fined services
/usr/share/man/man8/hana-firewal- Man page for the HANA firewall

l.8.gz
3.4 Configuration
With SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15, firewalld replaces SUSE Firewall2, and HANA-Firewall
is now an integral part. To get familiar with firewalld , refer to the SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server 15 Security Guide, section 18.4 firewalld (https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles-15/
singlehtml/book_security/book_security.html#sec.security.firewall.firewalld) .
Important
Before setting up the SAP HANA firewall, you rst need to configure firewalld for all
non-SAP related services like SSH.
To configure the SAP HANA firewall, follow the respective instructions detailed
in the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications Guide, section Config-
uring HANA-Firewall (https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles-for-sap-15/singlehtml/book_s4s/
book_s4s.html#sec.s4s.configure.firewall-hana) .
Tip
It is recommended to use the YaST HANA-Firewall module. There is no simple way to
do this on the command line.
32 GA and SP1
3.5 Services
3.5.1 Service definitions
A service is a named definition of TCP or UDP ports used by a specific network service. Common
services are defined in /etc/services . For an easier configuration of the firewall, additional
services are provided by the package, or can even be created manually. The HANA Firewall
service definitions are stored in the directory /etc/hana-firewall/ . Each le defines one
service and allows to define a list of ports or port ranges for TCP and UDP.
3.5.2 Predefined services
The 'SAP HANA Administrators Guide' and the 'SAP HANA Security Guide' describe all services
and the required TCP/UDP ports that SAP HANA uses. These services can also be found in the
tabular overview "TCP/IP Ports of All SAP Products" at https://help.sap.com/viewer/ports . Most
of these services are available as predefined services in the HANA firewall:
TABLE 1: LIST OF SHIPPED SAP HANA SERVICE DEFINITIONS (HANA-FIREWALL 1.1.5)
Service Name Description
HANA cockpit More information may be found in the SAP

knowledge base article 2389709.
HANA database client access Provide access to system database and all
tenant databases.
HANA data provisioning Event streaming via SQLDBC (ODBC/JDBC)

protocol.
HANA HTTP client access Allow web browser access to HANA.
HANA distributed systems Internal network communication for mul-

ti-host (distributed) installation.
HANA system replication Internal network communication for system

replication for both single and multi contain-
er setup.
33 GA and SP1
Service Name Description
HANA studio lifecycle manager Allow connection to HANA lifecycle manager

via host agent.
Software provisioning manager The port 4237 will allow web browsers to ac-
cess software provisioning web UI remotely.
HANA special support The ports should be used in rare technical

support scenarios. See HANA administration
guide for more details.
3.5.3 User-defined services

To create a new service, run:
hana-firewall define-new-hana-service
Follow the instructions on the screen. After the service has been created, you have to generate
the XML les:
hana-firewall generate-firewalld-services
Now the service should appear in the YaST HANA Firewall module and can be assigned.
Testing and activation ~~~~~~~~ After the firewall has been configured, it should carefully
be tested. After that, make sure that the firewall is started on system boot automatically:
systemctl enable firewalld.service
Warning
Ensure there is no other non-SUSE firewall enabled that might start automatically.
4 SUSE Remote Disk Encryption

All data processed by SAP HANA can contain sensitive information that need to be protected.
Depending on the version the data volume, redoing log les or database backups can be en-
crypted by the SAP HANA itself. For details consult the SAP HANA Security Guide at https://
help.sap.com .
34 GA and SP1
If the internal encryption of SAP HANA should not or cannot be used, you can encrypt directo-
ries containing sensitive data via Remote Disk Encrypting available in SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server for SAP Applications. When using the internal encryption, the various encryption keys
are stored on disk in the SSFS which is located by default in <home-of-sidadm>/.hdb/<host-
identity>/SSFS_HDB.DAT . The SSFS itself is encrypted with the SSFS master key, normally
located in $DIR_GLOBAL/hdb/security/ssfs/, which is protected only by le permissions. To
protect this key or the SSFS Remote Disk Encrypting can help to reach higher security. It will
not store any key of SAP HANA directly, but can encrypt the part of the le system where the
keys are located.
SUSE Remote Disk Encryption uses block devices as an encrypted container for arbitrary direc-
tories. It allows to store the encryption keys safely on a remote key server. To mount the device,
the host contacts the key server on a TLS secured connection to retrieve the necessary keys au-
tomatically to unlock the data. Clearly the key server should be a dedicated, security-hardened,
and protected system, since anyone with access to this system can retrieve the keys and decrypt
the data.
The setup of client and server is described in more detail in the SUSE Linux Enterprise Serv-
er for SAP Applications guide, section 10 Encrypting Directories Using cryptctl at https://
www.suse.com/documentation/sles-for-sap-15/ .
5 Minimal operating system package selection
5.1 Background
A typical Linux installation has many les that are potentially security-relevant. This is espe-
cially true for binary les and executables. Also, every running service might potentially be vul-
nerable to a local or remote attack. Therefore it is recommended to have as less les (binaries,
executables, configuration les) as possible installed and as few services as possible running.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server provides an RPM package for each logical component, like a Linux
application, a service or a library. An RPM package groups all les, including executables, other
binaries, configuration les and documentation les, that belong to this particular component.
The most common packages are grouped by use cases as 'Installation Patterns'. These patterns
can be selected during the operating system installation or later via YaST to easily get an instal-
lation that ts the requirements of a particular use case, for example for an SAP server with
development tools.
35 GA and SP1
Reducing the number of installed RPM packages to a minimum lowers the amount of potential-
ly vulnerable les on the system. This significantly improves the overall security of a system.
Furthermore, a low number of installed packages reduces the number of required (security) up-
dates and patches that have to be applied to the system on a regular basis. SAP HANA is a very
complex application, shipped in different versions, and having many additional components,
which makes it hard to choose the minimal list of packages.
5.2 Required installation patterns and packages

The required software for SAP HANA is described in 'SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15.x for SAP
Applications Configuration Guide for SAP HANA' attached to SAP note '1944799 - SAP HANA
Guidelines for SLES Operating System Installation' and lists the necessary patterns.
The recommendation is to install the system with the role "Minimal" (pattern "Base System").
Then add the patterns "Enhanced Base System" (which pulls in the patterns "AppArmor", "Soft-
ware Management" and "YaST System Administration") and "SAP Application Server Base". The
pattern "X Window System" should be installed only if needed. This results in a total amount of
746 packages, or 941 package if "X Window System" has been installed.
For SSL support, the SAPCRYPTOLIB (SAP package) and the SAR archiver tool should be installed
in addition.
In some rare cases, the support might ask for the installation of additional packages. Therefore,
we generally recommend to have SUSE Linux Enterprise Server update repositories configured
on your HANA system to be able to quickly install new packages.
FIGURE 8: COMPARISON OF THE AMOUNT OF INSTALLED PACKAGES BETWEEN CERTAIN PACKAGE SELECTIONS
36 GA and SP1
6 Security updates
6.1 Security updates for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15

No different from commercial software, open source software is tested by hackers and securi-
ty experts for vulnerabilities. Also, it can contain programming errors. These facts may result
in security risks. As soon as newly found security vulnerabilities are reported, for example on
security mailing-lists or by security advisories, the affected code usually gets xed quickly –
sometimes even within hours. This is usually done either by the authors of the affected applica-
tion, by security experts in the community, or by the Linux distributors.
For SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, the resulting security patches are quickly incorporated into the
corresponding software package and published as security updates through our update channels.
As soon as they are available there, they can be downloaded by all SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
customers, and should be applied immediately.
6.2 SUSE Linux Enterprise Server update channels

To receive security updates (and other updated packages) on SAP HANA systems, the SUSE
update channels must be configured properly. Usually SAP HANA systems do not have direct
access to the Internet. This requires an update proxy between the corporate network and the
Internet. Thus SUSE provides the Subscription Management Tool (SMT) or Repository Mirroring
Tool (RMT), or SUSE Manager.
To verify that your HANA system has been configured properly to receive updates, check if it
has been registered to the SUSE update channels:
zypper lr
This command lists the available software repositories of a SUSE Linux Enterprise Server in-
stance. The output should show the update channels for all enabled modules of the particular
Service Pack.
There are many ways to install new patches and also to selectively install just the security
updates. The most common way to install only security updates is to execute the following
commands:
zypper ref # Refreshes the update sources

zypper patch -g security # Install security patches only
37 GA and SP1
6.3 Update and patch strategies
In many cases, organizations have corporate polices in place that describe requirements regard-
ing updates and patches for their Linux servers.
The following overview describes some of the most common update and patch strategies, and
their advantages and disadvantages.
6.3.1 Installing all new updates and patches on a regular basis
Description
This strategy promotes the installation of new updates and patches for example once a day
or once per week, either manually by a system administrator or using automatic update
tools like YOU (YaST Online Update) or SUSE Manager. Since SUSE does not implement
any new features between Service Packs, the installation of updates and patches (including
security updates) is usually uncritical for a system. However, in some rare cases, updates
might cause problems and can compromise the stability of a system.
Advantages
The System is always up-to-date and latest security updates are applied quickly. This makes
a system very secure.
Disadvantages
In some rare cases, updates and patches might cause problems. Also, some updates (for
example kernel updates) require a reboot.
Recommendation
This is a good strategy for all non-productive HANA systems, but not for systems that are
in production.
6.3.2 Installing all new updates and patches during maintenance windows
Description
This strategy is very similar to the last one, but it ensures that a SAP HANA system is out
of production or tagged with a limited availability during the update cycle. This is a very
commonly used strategy for systems running large databases.
Advantages
Problematic updates will not put a productive SAP HANA system into danger.
38 GA and SP1
Disadvantages
Since maintenance windows usually have longer time frames in between (for example once
a month), systems might not be up-to-date from a security perspective.
Recommendation
This is only a good strategy if important security updates are installed outside of the usual
maintenance windows.
6.3.3 Selectively installing new updates and patches
Description
A selective installation of patches and updates, for example of security updates only, fur-
ther reduces the probability of installing problematic updates. This strategy is frequently
combined with updating systems on a regular basis. The selective installation of packages
can be performed using zypper, YaST or SUSE Manager.
Advantages
The system is mostly up-to-date with (almost) all security patches installed.
Disadvantages
Selecting packages has to be done manually and creates recurring effort, if one of the filters
provided by zypper (for example cve number, category, severity) cannot be used.
Recommendation
This is probably the best update strategy, but also the most complicated one.
Tip
An important issue with updates in most cases is the reboot and the involved downtime.
Some kernel updates are shipped as live patches and do not require a reboot anymore.
More details can be found in the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 Administration Guide,
section 8 Live Kernel Patching with KLP.
6.3.4 Not updating
Description
A system is not registered to the SUSE update channels and no updates are applied.
39 GA and SP1
Advantages: This has only disadvantages.
Disadvantages
Constantly increasing number of known security vulnerabilities make the system an ideal
target for hacker attacks.
Recommendation
We strongly recommend to subscribe to the SUSE update channels and to install at least
security-updates on a regular basis.
Which update strategy ts best for the SAP HANA systems in an organization heavily depends on
the corporate updating & patching policies / guidelines. It also depends on the requirements of
a particular SAP HANA system. For important SAP HANA systems, a more conservative update
strategy should be chosen. For test systems, updates might even be applied automatically, for
example by using YOU (YaST Online Update), on a regular basis.
7 Outlook
Even though this guide already covers most security hardening topics, we are planning to pro-
vide further improvements. Also, later versions of SAP HANA might have changed, or new re-
quirements regarding the hardening settings, the firewall or the minimal package selection might
apply in future. It is planned to incorporate these new requirements as soon as they occur.
We recommend to check for updated versions of this document from time to time at the SUSE
documentation pages at https://documentation.suse.com .
8 About the authors

This document has been developed by Markus Guertler (Architect & Technical Manager, SAP
Linux Lab), Soeren Schmidt (Solutions Architect, SAP Linux Lab) and Alexander Bergmann (Soft-
ware Security Engineer, SUSE Maintenance & Security team).
9 Further information and references

The following table provides an overview of sources for further information regarding the dis-
cussed topics in this guide.
40 GA and SP1
SUSE Security Portal http://www.suse.com/security
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server Security Guide https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles-15/

singlehtml/book_hardening/book_harden-
ing.html
SAP HANA Security Guide http://help.sap.com/hana/SAP_HANA_Securi-

ty_Guide_en.pdf
SAP HANA Master Guide http://help.sap.com/hana/SAP_HANA_Mas-

ter_Guide_en.pdf
SAP HANA Guidelines for SLES Operating SAP note 1944799

System Installation
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15: Installation SAP note 2578899

Note
If you have any questions, comments or feedback on this document, do not hesitate to contact
us under the email address saphana@suse.de (mailto:saphana@suse.de) .
10 Documentation updates
This chapter lists content changes for this document since its rst release.
v1.3
Changed title to reflect, that for 15 SP2 and later a changed guide is available.
v1.2
41 GA and SP1
Removed the following chapters (content was moved to the official Hardening Guide for
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server):
"Allow root login only via the rst local console (tty1)"
"Prohibit login as root via ssh"
"2.2.11 Set default inactive time to 1"
Added comment about x86/Power and GUI on top of "SUSE Linux Enterprise Security
Hardening Settings for HANA"
v1.1
Removed obsolete comment about SAP Note 1944799 in "Further Information & Refer-
ences"
Reworked "Set default inactive time to 1 day"
Added comment about x86/Power and GUI on top of "SUSE Linux Enterprise Security
Hardening Settings for HANA"
Added missing SAP Note 1944799
42 GA and SP1
11 Legal notice
Copyright © 2006–2024 SUSE LLC and contributors. All rights reserved.
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the
GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or (at your option) version 1.3; with the Invariant
Section being this copyright notice and license. A copy of the license version 1.2 is included in
the section entitled "GNU Free Documentation License".
SUSE, the SUSE logo and YaST are registered trademarks of SUSE LLC in the United States and
other countries. For SUSE trademarks, see https://www.suse.com/company/legal/ .
Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. All other names or trademarks mentioned in
this document may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners.
Documents published as part of the SUSE Best Practices series have been contributed voluntarily
by SUSE employees and third parties. They are meant to serve as examples of how particular
actions can be performed. They have been compiled with utmost attention to detail. However,
this does not guarantee complete accuracy. SUSE cannot verify that actions described in these
documents do what is claimed or whether actions described have unintended consequences.
SUSE LLC, its affiliates, the authors, and the translators may not be held liable for possible errors
or the consequences thereof.
Below we draw your attention to the license under which the articles are published.
43 GA and SP1
12 GNU Free Documentation License
Copyright © 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston,
MA 02110-1301 USA. Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
license document, but changing it is not allowed.
0. PREAMBLE
The purpose of this License is to make a manual, textbook, or other functional and useful docu-
ment "free" in the sense of freedom: to assure everyone the effective freedom to copy and redis-
tribute it, with or without modifying it, either commercially or noncommercially. Secondarily,
this License preserves for the author and publisher a way to get credit for their work, while not
being considered responsible for modifications made by others.
This License is a kind of "copyleft", which means that derivative works of the document must
themselves be free in the same sense. It complements the GNU General Public License, which
is a copyleft license designed for free software.
We have designed this License in order to use it for manuals for free software, because free
software needs free documentation: a free program should come with manuals providing the
same freedoms that the software does. But this License is not limited to software manuals; it
can be used for any textual work, regardless of subject matter or whether it is published as a
printed book. We recommend this License principally for works whose purpose is instruction
or reference.
1. APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS

This License applies to any manual or other work, in any medium, that contains a notice placed
by the copyright holder saying it can be distributed under the terms of this License. Such a
notice grants a world-wide, royalty-free license, unlimited in duration, to use that work under
the conditions stated herein. The "Document", below, refers to any such manual or work. Any
member of the public is a licensee, and is addressed as "you". You accept the license if you copy,
modify or distribute the work in a way requiring permission under copyright law.
A "Modified Version" of the Document means any work containing the Document or a portion
of it, either copied verbatim, or with modifications and/or translated into another language.
44 GA and SP1
A "Secondary Section" is a named appendix or a front-matter section of the Document that deals
exclusively with the relationship of the publishers or authors of the Document to the Document’s
overall subject (or to related matters) and contains nothing that could fall directly within that
overall subject. (Thus, if the Document is in part a textbook of mathematics, a Secondary Section
may not explain any mathematics.) The relationship could be a matter of historical connection
with the subject or with related matters, or of legal, commercial, philosophical, ethical or po-
litical position regarding them.
The "Invariant Sections" are certain Secondary Sections whose titles are designated, as being
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45 GA and SP1
A section "Entitled XYZ" means a named subunit of the Document whose title either is precisely
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other respects.
46 GA and SP1
If the required texts for either cover are too voluminous to t legibly, you should put the rst
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If you publish or distribute Opaque copies of the Document numbering more than 100, you must
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release you from this requirement.
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D. Preserve all the copyright notices of the Document.
47 GA and SP1
E. Add an appropriate copyright notice for your modifications adjacent to the other copyright
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given in the Document’s license notice.
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L. Preserve all the Invariant Sections of the Document, unaltered in their text and in their
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N. Do not retitle any existing section to be Entitled "Endorsements" or to conflict in title with
any Invariant Section.
O. Preserve any Warranty Disclaimers.
48 GA and SP1
If the Modified Version includes new front-matter sections or appendices that qualify as Se-
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designate some or all of these sections as invariant. To do this, add their titles to the list of
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any other section titles.
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text has been approved by an organization as the authoritative definition of a standard.
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from the previous publisher that added the old one.
The author(s) and publisher(s) of the Document do not by this License give permission to use
their names for publicity for or to assert or imply endorsement of any Modified Version.
5. COMBINING DOCUMENTS
You may combine the Document with other documents released under this License, under the
terms defined in section 4 above for modified versions, provided that you include in the combi-
nation all of the Invariant Sections of all of the original documents, unmodified, and list them
all as Invariant Sections of your combined work in its license notice, and that you preserve all
their Warranty Disclaimers.
The combined work need only contain one copy of this License, and multiple identical Invariant
Sections may be replaced with a single copy. If there are multiple Invariant Sections with the
same name but different contents, make the title of each such section unique by adding at the
end of it, in parentheses, the name of the original author or publisher of that section if known,
or else a unique number. Make the same adjustment to the section titles in the list of Invariant
Sections in the license notice of the combined work.
49 GA and SP1
In the combination, you must combine any sections Entitled "History" in the various original
documents, forming one section Entitled "History"; likewise combine any sections Entitled "Ac-
knowledgements", and any sections Entitled "Dedications". You must delete all sections Entitled
"Endorsements".
6. COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS
You may make a collection consisting of the Document and other documents released under
this License, and replace the individual copies of this License in the various documents with a
single copy that is included in the collection, provided that you follow the rules of this License
for verbatim copying of each of the documents in all other respects.
You may extract a single document from such a collection, and distribute it individually under
this License, provided you insert a copy of this License into the extracted document, and follow
this License in all other respects regarding verbatim copying of that document.
7. AGGREGATION WITH INDEPENDENT WORKS

A compilation of the Document or its derivatives with other separate and independent docu-
ments or works, in or on a volume of a storage or distribution medium, is called an "aggregate"
if the copyright resulting from the compilation is not used to limit the legal rights of the com-
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an aggregate, this License does not apply to the other works in the aggregate which are not
themselves derivative works of the Document.
If the Cover Text requirement of section 3 is applicable to these copies of the Document, then if
the Document is less than one half of the entire aggregate, the Document’s Cover Texts may be
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of covers if the Document is in electronic form. Otherwise they must appear on printed covers
that bracket the whole aggregate.
8. TRANSLATION
Translation is considered a kind of modification, so you may distribute translations of the Doc-
ument under the terms of section 4. Replacing Invariant Sections with translations requires spe-
cial permission from their copyright holders, but you may include translations of some or all
50 GA and SP1
Invariant Sections in addition to the original versions of these Invariant Sections. You may in-
clude a translation of this License, and all the license notices in the Document, and any War-
ranty Disclaimers, provided that you also include the original English version of this License
and the original versions of those notices and disclaimers. In case of a disagreement between
the translation and the original version of this License or a notice or disclaimer, the original
version will prevail.
If a section in the Document is Entitled "Acknowledgements", "Dedications", or "History", the
requirement (section 4) to Preserve its Title (section 1) will typically require changing the actual
title.
9. TERMINATION
You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Document except as expressly provided
for under this License. Any other attempt to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Document
is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License. However, parties who
have received copies, or rights, from you under this License will not have their licenses termi-
nated so long as such parties remain in full compliance.
10. FUTURE REVISIONS OF THIS LICENSE

The Free Software Foundation may publish new, revised versions of the GNU Free Documenta-
tion License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit to the present version,
but may differ in detail to address new problems or concerns. See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ .
Each version of the License is given a distinguishing version number. If the Document specifies
that a particular numbered version of this License "or any later version" applies to it, you have
the option of following the terms and conditions either of that specified version or of any later
version that has been published (not as a draft) by the Free Software Foundation. If the Document
does not specify a version number of this License, you may choose any version ever published
(not as a draft) by the Free Software Foundation.
ADDENDUM: How to use this License for your documents

Copyright (c) YEAR YOUR NAME.
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2
51 GA and SP1
or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation;
with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts.
A copy of the license is included in the section entitled “GNU
Free Documentation License”.
If you have Invariant Sections, Front-Cover Texts and Back-Cover Texts, replace the “ with…
Texts.” line with this:
with the Invariant Sections being LIST THEIR TITLES, with the
Front-Cover Texts being LIST, and with the Back-Cover Texts being LIST.
If you have Invariant Sections without Cover Texts, or some other combination of the three,
merge those two alternatives to suit the situation.
If your document contains nontrivial examples of program code, we recommend releasing these
examples in parallel under your choice of free software license, such as the GNU General Public
License, to permit their use in free software.
52 GA and SP1

OS Security Hardening Guide For SAP HANA SLES15 en

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SUSE Best Practices

Operating System Security Hardening Guide

SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 GA and SP1

Soeren Schmidt, SAP Solution Architect (SUSE)

2 SUSE Linux Enterprise security hardening settings for HANA 9

3 SAP HANA ﬁrewall 28

4 SUSE Remote Disk Encryption 34

5 Minimal operating system package selection 35

8 About the authors 40

9 Further information and references 40

12 GNU Free Documentation License 44

FIGURE 1: ELEMENTS OF A CORPORATE IT SECURITY

1.1 Security for SAP HANA

1.2 Security for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server

Intrusion Detection OS Security Guide

Linux Audit System

FIGURE 2: SECURITY COMPONENTS OF SUSE LINUX ENTERPRISE SERVER

Security Hardening Settings for HANA

SUSE Firewall for HANA

Remote Disk Encryption

Minimal OS Package Selection

Security Updates & Patches

Security hardening settings for SAP HANA systems

Local firewall for SAP HANA

Remote Disk Encryption

Minimal package selection

Security updates & patches

SAP HANA Security Guide

OS Security Hardening Guide for HANA

FIGURE 4: SAP HANA AND OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY

2 SUSE Linux Enterprise security hardening settings

2.1 Introduction to Linux security hardening

System access settings

Logging & reporting

For each setting, the following details are provided:

Description: Details of the setting

Procedure: How to apply the setting

Impact: Possible impact for system administrators or users

Priority: High, Medium, Low

2.2.1 Installing SUSE security checker

Daily and weekly reports via email to the root user.

Requires a properly setup email forwarding.

2.2.2 Conﬁguring mail forwarding for root user

2. Start the 'YaST' mail module:

3. Choose 'Permanent' as connection type.

5. Do NOT enable 'accept external SMTP connections'.

7. Save the settings.

8. Test the settings with:

Requires an accessible SMTP server.

2.2.3 Forwarding syslog ﬁles to a central syslog server

systemctl restart rsyslog.service

On the SAP HANA node

# Remote Logging using TCP for reliable delivery

# Remote Logging using UDP

systemctl restart rsyslog.service

logger "hello world"

Requires a central syslog server.

A system reboot cannot anymore be performed via a local keyboard or a remote

2.2.5 Implementing cron.allow