Object A4

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Object
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Stanford Encyclopedia It is standard practice to introduce the entries in a work of reference with a
definition of the topic. However, the concept of object—that concept of
of Philosophy object which is of fundamental interest within philosophy—is among the
most general concepts (or categories) which we possess. It seems very
doubtful that it can be defined in more general terms; the best that seems
possible is to trace relationships with other highly general concepts. Ernst
Tugendhat (1982, 21–23) compares what he calls “a concept of modern
philosophy, that of an object”, with the Aristotelian concept of being
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
(which is, as he puts it, a “term of art”). Tugendhat then proceeds to ask:
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Now what is meant by the word ‘object’? This word too, in the
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comprehensive sense in which it is used in philosophy, is a term of
Library of Congress Catalog Data art. In ordinary language we are inclined to call only material
ISSN: 1095-5054
objects… objects, and not e.g. events or numbers… What is meant
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- by ‘objects’ in philosophy has its basis in … what we mean by the
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP word ‘something’… There is a class of linguistic expressions
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized which are used to stand for an object; and here we can only say: to
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the stand for something. These are the expressions which can function
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, as the sentence-subject in so-called singular predicative statements
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . and which in logic have also been called singular terms…
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy In this entry, some of the various conceptions of object are documented
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The Metaphysics Research Lab and explored; and as with Tugendhat, their roles in logic, ontology and the
Center for the Study of Language and Information philosophy of language are examined. While the focus is chiefly on
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contemporary philosophical writings, the philosophies of the past (and
Object their continued influence) have an important role to play. Relationships
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Henry Laycock between the very highest-level concepts of logic and semantics, and the
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more concrete applications of these concepts in metaphysics and ontology,
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1
Object Henry Laycock
are among the topics for review. Tugendhat tells us that “The fundamental Natural-language uses of ‘object’ are (unsurprisingly) diverse. The modest
question of ontology is: what is being as being?”, and he reformulates this American College Dictionary, for example, contains some twelve entries
question as the question of “what it means to speak of an object”. Recent for the term, among which appear the following: “something that may be
work suggests that Tugendhat's reformulation of the ‘question of perceived by the senses, especially by sight or touch”, and again,
ontology’ may be, at any rate, contestable. “anything that may be presented to the mind: objects of thought.” The
former use seems closer to the vernacular—corresponding, roughly and
1. A formal sense of ‘object’ approximately, to the familiar everyday notion of body, or material object.
1.1 Statements in the literature But whatever its precise significance, the latter is plainly the more general
1.2 The pure concept and the thesis of its universal applicability use, and from a traditional logico-metaphysical standpoint, it is also the
1.3 A radically inclusive understanding of the core idea more fundamental of the two—perhaps the most fundamental of any. It
2. Some applied object-concepts will, accordingly, play the role of basic organizing concept for the
2.1 Objects and substances: a distinction following remarks. Some metaphysically significant qualifications or
2.2 Objects, substances and stuff applications of this basic concept, such as that of substance—applications
2.3 Abstract and concrete, universal and particular: preliminary which themselves embody or exemplify formal or logical categories—are
issues then considered briefly in the sequel.[1] What, then, is the content of this
2.4 Objects and attributes: Mill's contribution very general notion of an object, as in ‘object of thought’?
2.5 Non-attributive universals after Mill
2.6 Substances versus bundles: a note 1.1 Statements in the literature
3. Singularism and objecthood
3.1 The pure concept and the universal applicability thesis Russell, in a well-known passage, singles out just this notion in the
reviewed Principles of Mathematics:
3.2 The Russellian struggle with singularism
Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or
3.3 Frege, countability, and ‘mass nouns’ or non-count nouns
false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This,
3.4 ‘Stuff and things’: the ontic issue over objects
then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. (1937:
Bibliography
43)
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources And by way of elucidation of his notion of a ‘term’, Russell writes that:[2]
Related Entries
I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual and
entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one,
1. A formal sense of ‘object’ while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being,
i.e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2014 Edition 3

relation, a chimera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure in logical symbolism by variables. (1922: 4.1272)
to be a term (1937: 43)
Superficial differences of terminology notwithstanding, all these remarks,
Essentially cognate assertions are not uncommon in the literature. E. J. it seems fair to say, focus on one and the same underlying concept—a
Lowe, for instance, notes that concept which, in fact, is very widely recognized within philosophy. The
concept is at one and the same time both highly abstract (or as
‘Thing’, in its most general sense, is interchangeable with ‘entity’ Wittgenstein puts it, formal), and quite fundamental. It would seem to be
or ‘being’ and is applicable to any item whose existence is fundamental in the sense that any more narrowly defined, more
acknowledged by a system of ontology, whether that item be constrained conception of an object (e.g. “a thing that may be perceived by
particular, universal, abstract, or concrete. In this sense, not only the senses…”) must conform at least to the criteria for objecthood or
material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, objects in this extremely general, formal sense. And yet its widespread
and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be recognition or acknowledgement notwithstanding, there would seem to be
accounted ‘things’. (2005: 915) no generally agreed-upon unique or standard designation for the concept
in question—this at any rate seems clear from the already quoted
Or again, as Peter Strawson writes,
comments. In what follows, the concept is referred to as neutrally as
Anything whatever can be introduced into discussion by means of possible— employing the relatively common terminology of ‘objects’,
a singular, definitely identifying substantival expression…. albeit in the singular—as the pure concept, object (or PCO, for short).
Anything whatever can be identifyingly referred to; anything
Not only, however, does this concept have no truly standard designation:
whatever can appear as a logical subject, an ‘individual’. (1959:
more significantly, it is rarely subject to any sustained examination or
137, 227)
analysis. It seems entirely possible that the general feeling on this point is
And lastly, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes well summed up by Frege who, in response to the question of ‘what we
are here calling an object’, famously avers that he regards “a regular
the variable name ‘x’ is the proper sign of the pseudo-concept definition as impossible, since we have here something too simple to admit
object. Wherever the word ‘object’ (‘thing’, ‘entity’, etc.) is rightly of logical analysis” (1960: 32). And—given a sufficiently strict conception
used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the variable name. of ‘logical analysis’, at least—Frege's remark may well be unimpeachable.
For example in the proposition ‘there are two objects which…’ by But there are in fact several key semantical / categorial relationships
‘(∃;x, y)…’. Whenever it is used otherwise, i.e., as a proper between the PCO and cognate notions—relationships which promise to
concept word, there arise senseless pseudo-propositions. So one cast a degree of light upon the formal concept itself. Some at least of these
cannot, e.g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’ relationships have been recently examined by logicians and semanticists,
… The same holds of the words ‘Complex’, ‘Fact’, ‘Function’, and most notably, perhaps, by the late George Boolos. They are duly noted
‘Number’, etc. They all signify formal concepts and are presented in the sequel: briefly in Part 1, (1.3); but chiefly in Part 3.

1.2 The pure concept and the thesis of its universal applicability little if any difference; we may speak simply of a thesis of the universal
applicability of the pure concept—whether ‘for us’, or not, as the case may
Wittgenstein tells us that the PCO is a purely formal concept or ‘category’; be. And this thesis itself surely also deserves to be given a name. Here, it
and to say this is to say, among other things, that it has no more empirical is dubbed simply as the ‘universal applicability’ thesis, or UAT.
content than does any concept of logic or arithmetic, involving thereby
reference to no actual or possible kinds of things. Furthermore, qua formal Though the UAT is not a thesis whose precise character and basis can be
concept, the PCO figures typically as part of a broader set of elements—a said to be entirely clear, it appears standardly to be conceived as a kind of
set which includes the idea of the logical form of assertions or beliefs a priori or conceptual truth. Naturally enough; for if the PCO is no
quite generally. Indeed, it seems plain that the proposals quoted above empirical concept, the UAT is likewise no empirical thesis—in no respect
involve not only the articulation of a maximally general concept or akin to positing such things as quarks, bacteria or ghosts. It is not, in short,
category of object (entity, unit, thing, etc.), but also suggest a thesis a view concerning ‘what there is’ in anything akin to the ways in which
asserting its universal applicability. That is, claims are advanced to the biologists and physicists and just plain folk, are interested in what there is.
effect that the content of these various expressions, ‘entity’, ‘thing’, ‘unit’, Rather, as the remarks of Wittgenstein and Strawson in particular suggest,
and so forth, with their common, formal emphasis on oneness or unity, is it is an austerely semantic (or logico-semantic) thesis, concerning the
such as to be adequate to comprehend the sum-total of existence, to apply essential content of the categories involved in any reference or
to or to include whatever there may be. Or—limiting the thesis explicitly, predication.[3]
a la Kant, to the categories of (human) thought and talk—the formal
concept at issue, it is suggested, enters into virtually everything which The thesis can then be expressed in either of two ways—on the one hand,
may be thought or said. As Locke somewhat equivocally puts the point, as a thesis concerning the categories which general terms or predicates
embody or instantiate; or on the other hand, as a thesis on the semantics of
amongst all the ideas we have… there is none more simple, than reference itself. Couched à la Wittgenstein in terms of variables, the UAT
that of unity, or one… every idea in our understanding, every declares that all general natural-language sentences may be represented in
thought in our minds, brings this idea along with it… For number a formal system on the quantifier/variable model—that (with Quine) we
applies itself to… everything that either does exist or can be speak of nothing which cannot figure as the value of a variable;[4] or more
imagined (1924, 121–2). precisely, that if not restricted to first-order versions, the system of the
predicate calculus is ontologically complete. Barring the truth of
Whether as unrestricted doctrines concerning (Aristotelian) categories of nominalism, properties, properties of properties, and so forth, must be
being, or as restricted to the categories of thought, such views would allowed to count as objects too. But casting matters in this mode does not
seem, in fact, to be historically commonplace; they are reflected, for advance our understanding, either of the PCO or the UAT; for—as
instance, in Aquinas' remark, “Being and one are convertible terms”, as Wittgenstein's remarks themselves imply—it is the variable name ‘x’
again in that of Leibniz: “I do not conceive of any reality at all as without which is to be explicated by reference to the formal object-concept, rather
genuine unity”. In actual practise, the ambiguity or equivocation makes than vice-versa. At this level of abstraction, talk of variables and the like

does no more than reformulate the issues in symbolic mode, whereas the the present chapter we shall be concerned with the in the plural: the
UAT is primarily a thesis concerning the applicability of a certain formal inhabitants of London, the sons of rich men, and so on. In other
category to natural-language pre-philosophical thought or discourse. words, we shall be concerned with classes. (Russell 1919, 181)[5]
1.3 A radically inclusive understanding of the core idea What Russell appears to here propose is a view which, from a naive, extra-
philosophical standpoint, might well seem surprising, if not
As Strawson's remark in particular makes clear, the formal concept at counterintuitive. The view, evidently, is that grammatically plural
issue corresponds to the notion of a logical subject—a value of a reference too is to be understood as having a kind of collective albeit
Wittgensteinian ‘variable name’—where a ‘logical subject’ is itself semantically singular denotation—as corresponding to a special category
understood as the correlate of a semantically singular reference. The point of collective units.[6] In much the same vein, Frege sees semantically
is expressed not only in Strawson's comment but also, in one way or plural predication (that is, collective, or non-distributive predication)
another, in the remarks of Russell, Wittgenstein, and Locke. The key to precisely as a warrant for the posit of a matching ontic category of
the character of both the PCO and the UAT evidently rests in the notions collective units. In reference to the sentence ‘Siemens and Halske have
of unity and singularity— and thereby perhaps, more generally, in the built the first major telegraph network’, Frege asserts that “‘Siemens and
concepts of number and countability. The question of the bottom-line Halske’ designates a compound object about which a statement is being
constraints upon the PCO, if any, seems to be identical with the question made, and the word ‘and’ is used to help form the sign for this object”.
of constraints upon the abstract general notion of a unit, the notion of that (Frege 1914, 227–8). The nub of this suggestion, as it appears in the work
which is countable ‘as one’. There are, it will emerge, two incompatible of both Frege and Russell alike, is then that there exists some highly
modes of understanding this abstract notion; here, they are referred to as general and coherent formal concept of a unit, the scope of which extends
the ‘unrestricted’ and ‘restricted’ modes; and correspondingly, there are beyond that of reference which is, in any straightforward sense,
two versions of the UAT. Furthermore, recent arguments appear to suggest semantically singular. According to this view—and Russell and Frege are
that of the two conceptions of the PCO, the restricted mode is closer to the far from being alone on the matter—there is a coherent formal concept of
truth. Ironically, however, precisely those considerations which count in ‘unit’ available to us, ranging over modes of reference which are not, in
favour of the restricted mode may also be taken to suggest that at the end the semantically conventional sense, forms of singular reference at all, but
of the day—and for the very simplest of reasons—the UAT itself is false. which might well extend to include reference altogether generally and as
such.
Now on this key logico-semantic question, the question of constraints
upon the abstract general notion of a unit, the Russell / Frege tradition Given such an account, plainly, the thesis of the universal applicability of
leans towards a strikingly liberal, unrestricted or inclusive view. Thus in the object-concept, in its most comprehensive, all-inclusive form, follows
his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (IMP), having just examined as an immediate consequence. At the same time, however, the status of the
what he calls “the in the singular” in the well-know chapter 16 on apparently simple concept of a unit turns out to be less clear than it might
‘descriptions’, Russell writes that in initially have seemed. Many objects also come to count as one, as identical

with a single ‘many’—and the status of the PCO then appears somewhat 2. Some applied object-concepts
obscure. Objects are acknowledged, such as the ‘pure compound’ of
Siemens and Halske, which the plain, extra-philosophical individual seems 2.1 Objects and substances: a distinction
unlikely to recognize or readily embrace).[7] The very contrast between
one and many seems to have evaporated. At the same time, such a highly The most commonplace philosophical use of the term ‘object’ is not that
liberal generalization or reconstrual of the notion of a unit is not an which signifies the pure concept itself, but rather, that which is intended to
obviously satisfactory construal. The idea is not only contentious; most signify the more restricted concept of substance, understood (following
strikingly, it is one concerning which Russell himself, in the course of the Aristotle) as whatever is supposed to ‘exist independently’—however this
argument of The Principles of Mathematics (PoM), expresses serious phrase itself is to be understood.[10] Plainly, this is a far narrower notion
doubts.[8] And the reservations are not confined to to the PoM. In the IMP than that associated with the UAT in any form. And most typically
account itself, Russell qualifies his doctrine with the following proviso: (though by no means necessarily, given the varieties of Platonism), such
an ‘independent’ object is conceived of as a material object or body—that
The theory of classes is less complete than the theory of is, very roughly, as a substance in the full and traditional Aristotelian
descriptions, and there are reasons… for regarding the definition of sense. Sponsors of the Aristotelian concept tend to conceive of substances
classes that will be suggested as not finally satisfactory. Some as the central sub-category of material objects—that is, of objects
further subtlety appears to be required… The first thing is to consisting of matter—on account of their relatively high degree of
realize why classes cannot be regarded as part of the ultimate structure (‘form’). Furthermore, in drawing a contrast of this sort, between
furniture of the world. (1919, 182) the PCO as such, and a certain much less broad though historically and
philosophically crucial concept, we are in effect making a distinction
What lies behind this vague but cautionary remark appears to be closely between the pure concept in itself, and one of a number of restrictions on,
related to a set of issues already remarked, issues which are developed in or specifications or applications of, the core formal category— some of
the contemporary work of prominent logicians and semanticists. In an which find expression in natural languages, and some of which also loom
influential series of writings, Boolos in particular has shown how the large within philosophy. It is just these which constitute the subject-matter
traditional ‘class-reduction’ of essentially non-singular sentences to of the present intermediate Part. And among those which merit particular
singular form can and should be avoided; and Tom McKay has coined the consideration (other than the category of so-called ‘ordinary’ objects or
term ‘singularism’ to denote this exclusive preoccupation with singular Aristotelian substances) are the dual and putatively exhaustive categories
reference and distributive predication which is a hallmark of the standard of abstract and concrete objects, along with those of universals and
first-order predicate calculus. Particularly in view of its potential particulars. And in all these contexts, the pure concept in itself,
metaphysical ramifications, the matter would seem to deserve significantly embodying a entirely formal, logico-semantic category, cannot but
more attention than it has thus far received. It is further rehearsed, albeit in continue to occupy the foundational role as base concept, upon which any
a preliminary and tentative manner, in Part 3.[9] and every more specific concept cannot fail to be constructed.

The precise nature of the relationship between the narrow Aristotelian idea attributes, for instance—as objects. His observation, in effect, is that to
of a concrete organized object, and the absolutely general idea of an refer to some such thing as a virtue—kindness or generosity, say—as an
individual object or unit, has been examined and re-examined from the object or thing, seems to involve a certain inevitable reification
time of Aristotle's Categories up to the contemporary period; Strawson's (platonisation, substantialisation) of what is after all a (‘mere’) attribute. In
Individuals is itself one such major relatively recent work. And, to the consequence, he notes, a tendency emerges to seek some alternative term
extent that there is a received view on the matter, it is that this relationship (‘entity’, perhaps?) which might lighten the perceived ontic burden, or
is grounded in (if not identical with) the contrast between the general idea carry rather less obvious metaphysical weight. Thus Mill writes that
of an object of reference or subject of predication, and the particular
notion of a fundamental subject of predication. Aristotle's influential and we must take notice of an unfortunate ambiguity in all the concrete
powerful conception of such a fundamental subject is, of course, that of a names which correspond to the most general of all abstract terms,
subject which is incapable of also figuring as a predicate—or as he himself the word Existence. When we shall have occasion for a name
puts it, rather more precisely, it is that which is ‘neither said of nor present which shall be capable of denoting whatever exists… there is
in a subject’. In short, while the concept of an object in general hardly a word applicable to the purpose which is not also, and even
corresponds to that of a logical subject as such (abstract or concrete, the more familiarly, taken in a sense in which it denotes only
subject of any predication whatsoever), the concept of an object in the substances. But substances are not all that exists; attributes, if such
narrower sense corresponds to that of the basic or fundamental type of things are to be spoken of, must be said to exist… Yet when we
logical subject—the denotation of a fundamental (i.e., concrete) singular speak of an object, or of a thing, we are almost always supposed to
reference. It is then references of this latter type which are held, by the mean a substance. There seems a kind of contradiction in using
sponsors of accounts of this genre, to constitute the sole basis on which such an expression as that one Thing is merely an attribute of
references to other categories of objects—such things as classes, another thing… If, rejecting the word Thing, we endeavour to find
attributes, distances, weights, states of consciousness, and so forth, another of more general import, a word denoting all that exists….
whatever items could be Russellian ‘objects of thought’—may themselves no word might be presumed fitter … than Being … . But this word
be made. A thorough and complete review of the issue is to be found … is still more completely spoiled for the purpose … . Being is, by
elsewhere in the S.E.P. (see especially the main entries under ‘Substance’ custom, exactly synonymous with substance … Attributes are
and ‘Contintental Rationalism’). never called Beings … . In consequence of this perversion of the
word Being, philosophers … laid their hands upon the word Entity
There is however a certain terminological / conceptual thorn in the … . Yet if you call virtue an entity, you are … suspected of
philosophical flesh—an issue associated precisely with this use of the pure believing it to be a substance … . Every word which was originally
concept of an object, in relation to the notion of an Aristotelian substance intended to connote mere existence, seems, after a time, to enlarge
—which merits attention in the present context. The point is brilliantly its connotation to separate existence (Mill, 1900: 30–1).
observed by J. S. Mill in his Logic. There, Mill draws attention to an
implicature seemingly involved in speaking of all ‘non-substances’— In speaking of a “a kind of contradiction” here, Mill acknowledges a

thought which might seem to echo Frege's, concerning the essentially (addressed further in Part 3). Removing a fly from a bowl of soup
‘unsaturated’ (dependent, non-substantial) character of concepts. There is inevitably involves removing some soup as well; but it seems
an omnipresent overshadowing of the pure, abstract concept of grammatically inappropriate to say that in such a case, there is another
objecthood, via its entirely legitimate association with the notion of thing which is removed, alongside the fly.
substantiality—an overshadowing associated with the semantic and
epistemic role played, in our overall talk of objects, by the ordinary And the question then arises, of exactly why such a remark seems
concrete objects or Aristotelian substances.[11] It is an overshadowing inappropriate. Given the duality in question, there is one particular answer
which might seem, in effect, to call the PCO into a kind of disrepute, by which may seem (and has in fact seemed) intuitively attractive: the soup
way of latent innuendo. which was removed does not intuitively count as a thing, precisely
because it does not count as an ‘ordinary’ thing or Aristotelian
But powerful though the association of objecthood and substantiality substance—because it is, in effect, entirely ‘form-indifferent’,
would seem to be, it provides sponsors of the PCO with no compelling structureless or seemingly mereological in its character. Or again (what
reason to call into question the austere sense of object within a purely comes to much the same thing), the spatio-temporal isolation of any such
formal discourse. They surely remain free to stipulate that for certain soup will be arbitrary or adventitious. The concept of soup evidently fails,
purposes, any such implicature of substantiality be simply detached—that unlike that of an individual substance, to carve nature at the joints; that, in
in logico-semantic contexts, ‘object’ (or other equivalent term) expresses essence, is why soup must be served in discrete bowls. And that, it may be
only the PCO, meaning nothing more than ‘something, anything, to which said, is surely why it seems grammatically inappropriate to call some soup
one may refer which may be counted as one’—whether it be an Australian a thing. However (so this answer continues) some soup really is, in terms
shiraz, a particular virtue, a number, the shape of a teardrop, or a hand of the more general pure object-concept, an individual object or thing; it is
grenade.[12]If, on the other hand, a principled contrast or distinction is just not an enformed or structured Aristotelian substance, just not an
called for between ‘property’ and ‘object’, then pace Mill, then this can ordinary thing. Rather, it is a so-called ‘quantity’, ‘parcel’, ‘portion’,
indeed be nothing other than a contrast between properties and those ‘sum’ or ‘mass’ of soup, belonging to a special category of extra-ordinary
objects deemed to be ‘basic’ or substantial objects—objects, that is, which mereological objects having just those properties described by Quine—
presuppose no other categories of items as conditions of their being or whereby ‘soup’ behaves like ‘water’, such that “any sum of parts which
instantiation. are water”, as he writes, “is water” (1960: 91).
2.2 Objects, substances and stuff However, exactly the opposite conclusion is no less possible. It is entirely
possible that this common response just puts the cart before the horse – no
This phenomenon—this fact of a pervasive duality of meanings for less possible that we are reluctant to call some soup a material thing,
‘object’—carries with it a significant potential for still other confusions or precisely because we are reluctant, for good but as yet unarticulated
conflations over potentially distinct high-level logico-semantic categories. semantic reasons, to call it a thing, an object, period. Does it seem
Consider the case of concrete non-count nouns or words for stuff intuitively wrong to speak of a ‘thing’ in this context, purely and simply in

virtue of our supposed attachment to the idea of an Aristotelian thing or strongly suggests a contrast between two general ontic categories. On the
substance? That cannot be said to be self-evident. It is noteworthy that the other hand, though, the adjective ‘abstract’ is closely cognate with the
various individuative terms which are used to plug the grammatical gap, noun ‘abstraction’, which might suggest ‘a product of the mind’, or
such terms as ‘parcel’, ‘portion’, and so forth, are being used as terms of perhaps even ‘unreal’ or ‘non-existent’— suggestions reinforced by the
art, technical terms which no longer play the kind of role they play in not uncommon, quasi-Aristotelian view that to be, for the case of concepts
natural-language contexts. Indeed if, as can be argued, the semantics of of this type, just is for the concepts to be instantiated. Alex Oliver in
non-count nouns like ‘soup’ are themelves irreducibly non-singular—and particular suggests that the dichotomy of concrete and abstract is simply
thereby not denoting single objects, individuals or things—then the ‘easy’ ‘too naive to be of theoretical use’—a suggestion supported by his
explanation of this phenomenon will need to be called into serious observation that there are ‘many different ways, themselves vague, to
question (and on this, see the comments of McKay in 3.4). Indeed the mark the distinction’. Consider in this connection the entry for ‘abstract
possibility cannot be discounted, that the UAT itself is called into question entity’ in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. The Dictionary offers
by the semantics of such nouns—an issue which is also rehearsed a not atypical definition, or partial definition, as “object lacking spatio-
provisionally in the sequel. temporal properties”. (Although this particular entry does not mention it, a
requirement of causal inertness is also sometimes added to accounts of the
2.3 Abstract and concrete, universal and particular: preliminary genre). The definition is, of course, no clearer than the concepts of space
issues and time themselves.[13] But the dictionary then proceeds to list as
examples “mathematical objects, such as numbers, sets and geometrical
Putting now relationships between the general concepts of object and
figures, propositions, properties and relations” (Jacquette, 1999: 3). And
individual substance to one side, there are two very general pairs of
given this, the basic character of such an account is bound to seem less
dichotomies which are plausibly seen as being directly subordinate to the
than fully perspicuous. Trivially, reference to geometrical figures, for
highest level concept or category of objects as such. The dichotomies in
example, includes reference to triangles, spheres and the like—objects
question—those of concrete and abstract, on the one hand, and of
which, even as Platonically ‘ideal’, are nonetheless defined in terms of
universal and particular, on the other—are commonly presented as being
spatial properties (shapes, areas, volumes and the like); and the question of
dichotomies of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories of
how to square this fact with a conception of such things as non-spatial
objects. Of the two, the dichotomy of concrete and abstract would seem to
(unless this means merely ‘non-existent’) is just not immediately
be especially contentious, and some potential worries concerning it are
obvious.[14] What is described as the abstract triangle, so the dictionary
highlighted before all else. Those worries seem however to be
entry continues,
circumventable, just in case the line of approach advocated in Mill's Logic,
elucidated in section 2.4 below, is given due regard. has only the properties common to all triangles, and none peculiar
to any particular triangles; it has no definite colour, size or specific
The dichotomy of concrete and abstract objects seems particularly
type, such as isosceles or scalene.
difficult. On the one hand, the use of the term ‘object’ in this context

Evidently, the remark directly echoes Locke, who speaks of the “abstract there are in fact those who are perfectly happy to consider sets of concrete
general idea” of a triangle which is “neither Oblique nor Rectangle, objects as themselves concrete.[15] Yet again, it is not at all unusual to
neither Equilateral, Equicrural nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at classify fictional characters, musical compositions and the like as abstract,
once”, (Essay IV.vii.9). Locke's conception of an abstract general idea—as even though these are indisputably historical creations of the human mind,
traditionally understood, as formed from concrete ideas by the removal of productions dated within human history, and so are hardly atemporal after
all distinguishing detail—is of course rejected by both Berkeley and the manner of Platonic ‘ideal’ objects. Another somewhat obscure, but
Hume. Indeed taken literally, the dictionary account of ‘the abstract again very different use of the term ‘abstract’, is that of David Lewis, who
triangle’ might seem to invite precisely Berkeley's acid criticism of speaks for instance of ‘the particular pain of a given person at a particular
Locke's abstract general ideas in the Principles—bluntly put, there can be time’ as an “abstract entity which… we might identify with a pair of a
no such object. (Such scepticism might perhaps invite the reply that qua universal and a single concrete particular instance thereof” (Lewis 1966).
ideal objects, such things as triangles and spheres are not conceived as On this conception, whatever it amounts to, abstract entities may be
spatio-temporally particularized or instantiated; and so, as ‘lacking directly experienced and have (at least phenomenal) spatio-temporal
concrete details’; but the reply can hardly be said to address the objection). location. However—and especially in light of the issues which are
One concept which evidently can pass muster in this context is that of (the rehearsed in 2.4 below—it is possible that ‘abstract’ in such cases is very
attribute of) triangularity, as against that of some elusive object which is misleading, and is really tantamount to ‘(particularized) attribute as
the (abstract) triangle—since the attribute itself, unlike any triangle, no opposed to substance’, or in other words, that it corresponds to the notion
matter how abstract, does not have vertices or sides. Nevertheless, it is of a spatio-temporally located trope.
clear from accounts such as that of Zalta (1983), that attributes are not the
only possible entities to play the relevant role. At the same time, it should In at least some of the cases of putative ‘abstract objects’, the key thought
be said, Zalta's own account introduces a class of abstract objects which, may just be that the items in question are either types or universals, rather
via the use of a concept of encoding, in contrast with that of than tokens or particulars, and are to be counted as abstract in some sense
exemplification, thereby presuppose the category of attributes. which is derivative from this. This conjecture—which seems to have a
degree of plausibility—is canvassed further in the sequel. But yet, the
In similar fashion, the dictionary classification of sets as abstract objects is abstract / concrete, universal / particular and type / token distinctions are
by no means atypical, yet the rationale for this too is by no means self- all prima facie different distinctions, and to thus conflate them can only be
evident. It is difficult to see why—on pain of begging the question— an invitation to further confusion.[16] Hence, if Oliver's remarks might
ordinary everyday objects which are naturally characterised as sets—chess seem unduly strong, the foregoing observations nevertheless give some
sets, bedroom sets, sets of tools, weights, cutlery, and so forth, should not degree of credence to his view. Such cautionary remarks are be construed
be included in the realm of bona fide sets (as naive set theories would not as canvassing rejection of any possible abstract / concrete dichotomy,
typically, in fact, suppose; and arguably, all appear to satisfy the axiom of but rather, with Oliver, as highlighting the desirability of greater focus on
extensionality). But possessing as they plainly do such properties as the coherent understanding of ‘abstract’, and perhaps also, thereby, on the
weight or mass is a sufficient condition of counting them as concrete; and better understanding of its rationale. It may be that progress in clarifying

the tangle of issues here at stake calls for revaluation of this particular way abstract. A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing; an
of taking the abstract / concrete dichotomy. And in this connection, the abstract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing.
following section reviews a contrasting account of the dichotomy which Thus, John, the sea, this table, are names of things. White, also, is
may be found in Mill, and which appears in a distinctly more positive a name of a thing, or rather of things. Whiteness, again, is the
light. name of a quality or attribute of those things. Man is a name of
many things; humanity is a name of an attribute of those things.
2.4 Objects and attributes: Mill's contribution Old is a name of things; old age is a name of one of their attributes.
Arguably, the status of both the abstract / concrete and the universal / I have used the words concrete and abstract in the sense annexed to
particular dichotomies are best approached by first addressing the nature them by the schoolmen, who, notwithstanding the imperfections of
of the relationship between the two of them, within the framework of the their philosophy, were unrivalled in the construction of technical
concept of an object. And this, in fact, is the route which is here pursued. language, and whose definitions, in logic at least, though they
It is a fact of central significance that the concrete / abstract dichotomy has never went more than a little way into the subject, have seldom, I
at least two prominent but widely divergent interpretations. , On the one think, been altered but to be spoiled. A practice, however, has
hand, there is an ontic interpretation (such as that observed above); and grown up in more modern times, which, if not introduced by
there is a purely semantic or non-objectual interpretation, on the other. Locke, has gained currency chiefly from his example, of applying
the expression ‘abstract name’ to all names which are the result of
Construed as ontic, the concrete / abstract dichotomy is commonly taken
abstraction or generalization, and consequently to all general
to simply coincide with that of universal and particular. Hence, Quine
names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes. The
speaks of “the term ‘abstract’, or ‘universal’, and its opposite, ‘concrete’
metaphysicians of the Condillac school,--whose admiration of
or ‘particular’” (Quine, 1960: 233). And to thus construe the concrete /
Locke, passing over the profoundest speculations of that truly
abstract dichotomy is thereby, trivially, to ontologize it—to construe it
original genius, usually fastens with peculiar eagerness upon his
precisely as a contrast between concrete and abstract objects. Potentially,
weakest points,--have gone on imitating him in this abuse of
however, the basis is then laid for major confusions or distortions of the
language, until there is now some difficulty in restoring the word
relevant conceptual terrain. The issue is acutely remarked once again by
to its original signification. A more wanton alteration in the
Mill, in an undeservedly neglected passage from his Logic; and it is
meaning of a word is rarely to be met with; for the expression
precisely views of the Quinean genre which are the focus of Mill's
general name, the exact equivalent of which exists in all languages
complaint. Fixing primarily on the use of ‘abstract’, Mill begins by taking
I am acquainted with, was already available for the purpose to
the abstract / concrete dichotomy in a semantic sense, as concerning what
which abstract has been misappropriated, while the
he calls names. He writes:
misappropriation leaves that important class of words, the names
The second general division of names is into concrete and of attributes, without any compact distinctive appellation. The old
acceptation, however, has not gone so completely out of use, as to

deprive those who still adhere to it of all chance of being relevant attribute—that of triangularity, corresponding to the concrete
understood. By abstract, then, I shall always mean the opposite of adjective ‘triangular’—contrasts radically with triangles as such, which
concrete: by an abstract name, the name of an attribute; by a (even qua ideal) cannot but have have some distinctive spatial properties,
concrete name, the name of an object. (1900, 17-18) determinate kinds of shapes and so forth. The attribute of triangularity, on
the other hand, is given by a purely abstract definition or formula,
How, then, does the lesson of the Millian narrative bear on Quine's specifying what all such figures have in common, and is itself utterly
equation of the concrete / abstract and universal / particular dichotomies? incapable of independent instantation as such.[18] Consistently with these
On the Millian account, Quine's equation, due ultimately to Locke, remarks, furthermore, it is fair to say that commonly and perhaps even
involves a familiar albeit profoundly inappropriate categorization of the typically, what are referred to as abstract singular terms are construed
universal as such as ‘abstract’. In contemporary (and specifically Quinean) exclusively as the (putative) names of attributes.
terminology, the Millian narrative unfolds roughly, but intuitively, as
follows.[17] The spirit of the Millian approach is carried one step further in the cognate
group of doctrines constituted by conceptualism, nominalism and trope
Each concrete general term or predicate in adjectival form gives rise to a theory regarding attributes. With some degree of plausibility, it may be
corresponding nominal subject-expression, commonly described as an urged that abstract singular terms denote mere abstractions—that strictly
abstract singular term . Thus, ‘wise’ gives rise to ‘wisdom’, ‘dense’ to speaking, there is no such object as, say, refinement or viscosity as such,
‘density’, ‘happy’ to ‘happiness’, ‘viscous’ to ‘viscosity’, ‘red’ to as opposed to Peter's refinement, Paul's refinement, the viscosity of this or
‘redness’, and so on. Commonly and in fact typically, these abstract that particular substance, the triangularity of a certain piece of wood; and
singular terms are naturally construed as the putative names of attributes— so forth. On such an account, there is a (‘mere’) concept of refinement,
of one prominent sub-category, that is, of universals. And thus conceived abstracting away the idiosyncratic features of Peter's individual
as universals, attributes display two key, potentially complementary refinement, Paul's individual refinement, and so on. In Aristotelian terms,
features. First, they are traditionally and entirely plausibly treated as essentially this point is put by urging that the existence of such an attribute
abstractions, or as abstracted, in the quite specific and narrow sense of consists only in that of its ‘instances’. We may speak of the existence of
lacking independent (substantial) existence. And furthermore, in lacking refinement, only to the extent that we encounter the particular refinement
independent existence, they presuppose something else—something of Peter, Paul or Mary. And thus far, it may be said, the existence of
belonging to a distinct category, something which does have an attributes consists in that of tropes. Plainly, such an approach must yield a
independent existence and in which they need to be instantiated. very different account of the extension of the class of abstract objects from
a directly metaphysical approach.[19]
Here, there seems to be a significantly clearer and relatively well-defined
manner of drawing a distinction between the abstract and the concrete. 2.5 Non-attributive universals after Mill
From this standpoint, the vexed issue of geometrical figures appears in an
entirely different light. In the specific case of triangles themselves, the Among non-particulars objects, the emphatic focus on properties or

attributes, along with a corresponding neglect or downgrading of kinds, not with a general term in adjectival form, but with a concrete noun or
has a history going back to Hume—and before Hume, indeed, to Locke's substantive: there is gold in the hills, much as there are tigers in the
‘simple qualities’. It is the natural strategy of empiricism, still very much woods. The recent critical work on Crawford Elder on modal
alive and well, to place properties as the ultimate basis—epistemic and conventionalism, which addresses natural kinds for both individuals and
consequently ontic—for talk both of individual concrete objects or stuffs, contains helpful kindred insights on this issue (Elder, 2007).
substances and of general kinds or types.[20] But of course empiricism is Arguably, then, the ontologies of attributes and kinds diverge
not the only influential theory of knowledge (let alone as a standpoint for significantly, and the (‘non-particular’ or ‘second-order’) singular terms
ontology). And by the same token, attributes are not the only widely which purport to designate objects in these categories call for substantially
recognized sub-category of universals. distinctive semantic analyses.[21]
Though their status is no less contentious than that of attributes, both Viewed from a metaphysical standpoint, there is a venerable sense of the
species such as the tiger (Panthera tigris, ‘a large Asian carnivorous term ‘universal’ in which among universals are included just those objects
mammal’), and chemical substances such as gold (‘the yellow malleable which are capable of ‘multiple realization’ or instantiation. Many separate
ductile metallic element that occurs chiefly free or in a few minerals’) are things may, for example, be said to exemplify one and the same colour.
also eligible for membership. Kinds too, in short, whether kinds of things And the names of substances in the ordinary or chemist's sense (the names
or kinds of stuff, are also widely recognized as belonging to the category of metals, liquids, acids, gases, and so on) seem plainly to denote
of objects which count as universals. Yet neither the tiger, nor the element universals in this venerable sense. Thus the significance of the term
gold, can plausibly be said to be abstractions in the manner of attributes. ‘liquid’, for example, in its nominal use, is such that there is no natural-
Intuitively, the existence neither of gold nor of the tiger presupposes that language sense of the noun for which, if there is acetic acid in distinct
of something else in which these things ‘inhere’. And it seems fair to say containers, the liquid in one of the containers could be said to be a
that Aristotelians and essentialists tend to regard the category of kinds as a different liquid from the liquid in another.[22] The acetic acid in my glass
‘deeper’ category than that of attributes. cannot be said to be the same acetic acid as that in yours. However, the
liquid in my glass—that is, the type of stuff which the acetic acid in my
There appears to be an intuitive and plausible sense in which one might glass ‘exemplifies’, ‘embodies’, or ‘instantiates’—must be said to be
wish to say that such things as liquids and metals, elements and identical with that in yours. And in just this sense, the concept of a liquid
compounds, are concrete. Thus, gold may be (truly) said to be yellow, appears to be that of an immanent universal. In just this sense, it is a
heavy, malleable, dense, and so forth. And the names of liquids, metals, striking and undeniable feature of our ‘folk ontology’ that the very same
etc., are strikingly unlike abstract nouns. It seems then implausible to liquid (metal, organic compound, etc.) may be said to be present in any
categorize these subject-expressions as abstract singular terms, on a par number of places at the same time. Though the concept of a liquid just is
with ‘justice’, ‘mercy’ and ‘refinement’; they are most naturally described the concept of a distinctive kind or type, and so a universal in one good
as generic expressions, and are happily so-called by linguists. In semantic sense of the term, it is not obviously coherent to maintain that (although
terminology, the singular term denoting the metallic element is correlated, there may be vinegar here and there, and though vinegar is indeed liquid)

there are nevertheless no liquids, and in particular there is no such liquid perceptible, underlies a bundle of perceptible qualities (Locke) and
as vinegar. Similarly, for what it is worth, it seems to be both meaningful could therefore be rejected (Hume). The conception that results
and true to say that there is a certain precious metal, such that one and the from this, that objects are spatio-temporally instantiated bundles of
same precious metal, namely gold, is mined in both Russia and South properties which could be referred to with the word ‘this’,
Africa.[23] persisted in British Empiricism until Russell. (1982, 425 n.4)
2.6 Substances versus bundles: a note It would seem to be chiefly this epistemologized conception of the
significance of the non-epistemic, or metaphysical substance-concept,
The use of the term ‘bundle’, in connection with the metaphysical which constitutes the motivating force behind the very introduction of the
constitution of objects, goes back at least to Hume's empiricist account of bundle theory.[24]
the self as a (mere) ‘bundle of perceptions’, each linked to others by
various contingent associations or ‘contiguities’. Neither a persisting For bundle theories of most varieties, concrete individual things are
substance, manifest or underlying, nor a containing ‘theatre’ of any sort is somehow ‘nothing but’ collections of universals—they are not, that is,
then required, so Hume maintains, to do justice to the phenomenal instantiations of universals in the sense of tropes; rather, they are
character of subjective continuity through time. However, the doctrine is immanent universals capable of being manifested (or ‘instantiated’) in
applicable (and has since been applied) to particular objects of all sorts, different places all at once. Although different versions of the bundle
mental and material alike. And again, in surveying the evolution of theory diverge on the issue of how particular objects are constituted out of
doctrine in the empiricist tradition through Locke and Bishop Berkeley to properties, all versions of theory would seem to agree that the fundamental
Hume, the bundle notion seems clearly to be motivated by the requirement ingredients of concrete objects are indeed properties; neither Lockean
that epistemically respectable concepts be explicated by reference to ‘substrata’ nor so-called ‘bare particulars’ figure in bundle stories. One of
actual and possible experiences. Arguably, then, the origins of the so- the more accessible accounts of the diverse bundle theories is that of
called ‘bundle theory’ of spatio-temporal objects lie in a contentious and James van Cleve (1985). Van Cleve suggests that there are three basic
epistemically driven metaphysics, whereby the very concept of an forms of bundle theory. In the first, an individual object is a set of
(Aristotelian) substance comes to appear problematic or ill-defined, a properties united by some relationship of ‘co-instantiation’, itself perhaps
condition which evidently persists for many to the present day. For Locke, defined in terms of spatio-temporal co-ordinates. Indeed such (‘impure’)
of course, our “idea of substance” is “the something, we know not what”, properties would seem to be a precondition for the possibility of more than
which we supposedly feel we must postulate, in order to bind together and one object's consisting of identical intrinsic attributes. On such an account,
(as he puts it) “support” the seemingly diverse causes of “our simple ideas it is difficult to see how an object could undergo any change of attributes;
of qualities”. As Tugendhat observes, but some sponsors of the theory might find this consequence acceptable
nevertheless —so much he worse, it may be said with Hume, for
In the early modern period the Aristotelian insight was no longer ‘ordinary’ persisting objects. In the second version, van Cleve suggests, an
understood; substance appeared as a substrate that, itself not object may be identified with a temporal sequence of sets of attributes,

thereby circumventing the potential difficulty regarding change. In this object-concept and its scope. The concept, it will be recalled, is glossed by
case, however, the properties which constitute an object at any stage Strawson (as also, representatively, by Tugendhat) as the correlate of “a
become essential to its identity; and a third version circumvents this singular, definitely identifying substantival expression”. But now the fact
objection by construing references to individual things as, in effect, is that, when put in just these terms of ‘singular substantival expressions’,
‘logical constructions’ out of references to properties, somewhat along the there appears to be the very simplest and most obvious objection to the
lines of the linguistic phenomenalism once advocated by A. J. Ayer. John claim—an objection echoing Russell's rejoinder to the Leibniz maxim that
Hawthorne and Ted Sider have however recently proposed a considerably “Whatever is, is one”. Russell's response is simply that “Whatever are, are
less restricted conception of what bundle theory is about, according to many”.
which they propose for certain purposes to
Thus take, for example, the many fish presently in Georgian Bay. On the
understand the bundle theory more neutrally, as saying that the one hand, it would seem counterintuitive (if not simply question-begging)
fundamental facts about qualities involve only universals, and to insist that they cannot be included under ‘anything whatever’. And on
make no reference to particulars. This leaves open whether the other hand, it is plain that they are ‘introduced into discussion’ by way
particulars are to be eliminated from ontology or constructed out of of a plural substantival expression, e.g. by the definite description ‘the fish
universals, perhaps as sets or fusions of properties and relations. in Georgian Bay’, or by a demonstrative such as ‘those fish’. In any
(2002, 54) natural-language sense of ‘singular’, these phrases do not introduce
something into discussion by means of ‘a singular, definitely identifying
But, as they rightly go on to acknowledge in this same passage, Bundle substantival expression’, simply because the referring expressions in such
theory is “a somewhat misleading name for the position we will be cases are not singular but plural. The fish in Georgian Bay, it might be
exploring, as our bundle theorist need not put forth bundles as entities”. said, are manifestly many things and not just one. And this fact, taken at
face value, is surely consistent with a certain ‘naive’ but entirely harmless
understanding of the PCO—an understanding whereby this concept too
may have both singular and plural representations or forms.
3. Singularism and objecthood
Nevertheless, the view that non-singular constructions—and particularly
3.1 The pure concept and the universal applicability thesis
those involving collective predication—are best conceived as semantically
reviewed
singular, denoting such collective entities as classes, sums, or sets, is
We may return now to the understanding of the fundamental object- strikingly commonplace. Ironically, as noted earlier, just such a thesis
concept which served to introduce the organizing topic of this piece. And occurs in Russell's Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, where
here, Strawson's thesis noted in Part 1—whereby the claim is made that Russell speaks—albeit with manifestly serious reservations—of plural
anything whatever can figure as an ‘individual’ or ‘logical subject’— definite descriptions as designating classes.[25] Max Black would likewise
provides a suitable point for addressing the fundamental question of the seem to endorse the principle, in maintaining that we may build

the idealised set talk of mathematicians upon the rough but designating a set or collection of objects, and so—either in reality, or
serviceable uses in ordinary language of plural referring perhaps just pragmatically or instrumentally treatable as such—as
expressions… to get the abstract notion of a set as… several things semantically singular. In this way, the issue of directly addressing
referred to at once. (1971, 633-4) collective predication is in effect circumvented—albeit at the cost of ontic
proliferation, the introduction of a further ontic category for the values of
And E. J. Lowe declares that he “treats a plural noun phrase like ‘the the (singular) variables, in the form of distinctive collective entities.[28]
planets’ as denoting a set… construed… as being, quite simply, a number McKay's terminology of ‘singularism’ is introduced to designate just this
of things” (1995: 522–3). On this type of approach, neither the concept of essentially reductive view; and thanks to the work of Boolos, along with
the many, nor the use of plural expressions, calls for modification to the that of McKay and others, it has become clear that sentences which are
doctrine that whatever is, is one. The many also count as one; what a irreducibly plural may be represented in an ontically less contentious
plural referring expression designates is indeed just one—one set or light.[29]
equally one class. On such accounts, syntactically plural reference is
semantically singular; there is a sense of ‘singular’ in which ‘singular’ and Boolos—perhaps the most influential author advocating such an approach
‘reference’ are simply co-extensive, and ‘object’ is correlative with —has drawn attention to a variety of syntactically simple sentences, e.g.
both.[26] ‘The rocks rained down’, which (chiefly on account of the non-distributive
character of the predicates) are both essentially plural, and can be
At the same time, of course, sentences containing plural nouns are often understood and formally represented without any singularist reduction. It
quite straightforwardly reducible to sentences which are is in that connection that he plausibly remarks
(straightforwardly) singular: ‘Russell and Frege were logicians’, ‘My dogs
are poodles’, and the like, can readily be cast as sentences concerning only it would appear hopeless to try to say anything more about the
single individuals—sentences which, if formalised, contain only singular meaning of a sentence of the form ‘The Ks M’ other than that it
variables, quantifiers, predicates and constants. And in such cases, it is means that there are some things such that they are the Ks and they
difficult to see any good reason for introducing talk of sets. On the other M. (1998, 168)
hand, it sometimes happens that plural sentences are not reducible to
singular form. It is self-evident, for example, that in virtue of its collective Indeed, Boolos urges us to
predication, the sentence
Abandon the idea that the use of plural forms must be understood
Some dogs have surrounded a fox. to commit one to the existence of sets (‘classes’, etc.)… Entities
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity… It is not as though
cannot, while retaining the collective predication, be transformed into there were two sorts of things in the world, individuals and
singular sentences about each of a number of individual dogs.[27] And it is collections… There are, rather, two different ways of referring to
in just such cases that the standard strategy has been to treat a sentence as the same ‘things’. (1984, 442)

Boolos thus maintains that “neither the use of plurals nor the employment of objects—that we may speak of objects in the plural as well as in the
of second order logic commits us to the existence of extra items beyond singular, and that plural talk of objects is talk of the very same category of
those to which we are already committed.” items as is talk of objects in the singular. Most properly and plausibly—
less ‘liberally’—conceived, the UAT involves no requirement that
Semantically, the plural is not the singular writ large, and rather than philosophically respectable reference be always somehow singular.
taking the reductive route called for by the singularist canon of standard Formally, there is need for no such single object as the object of a plural
logic, the predicate calculus can itself be expanded to deal with such reference, no such unit as ‘the many’. On the approach of Boolos and
essentially plural sentences, qua plural.[30] What is called for here is those who follow him in rejecting ‘singularism’, a restricted conception of
nothing more than a further semantical category of variables (as opposed, the PCO is simply a more plausible conception. Recognition of plural
that is, to values). By way of the deployment of plural variables, each one sentences as an additional and distinct semantic category requires no extra
of which can takes any number of objects (or in other words, some ontic category. From this standpoint, the unrestricted, singularist approach
objects) as its values, such a logic can be expanded to provide a plausible —in effect, a species of monism—involves ontologising what is in fact a
and intuitive semantics for the irreducibly plural sentences. We are then in merely semantic contrast. In direct opposition to singularism, then,
a position to admit irreducibly collective expressions without any Boolosian-style pluralism may then be said to be the view that the abstract
correspondingly collective objects; semantically distinctive types of general concept of an object or a unit corresponds only to reference which
symbolism are deployed which are lacking in distinctive ontological is semantically singular, and cannot also absorb or cover plural reference,
commitment.[31]We have, in short, an expanded semantics without a which is straightforardly non-singular. On this view, while there is a
corresponding expansion of ontology. As McKay puts it, significant semantical distinction here, the content of the maxim that
‘Whatever is, is one’ is simply not contradicted by that of the maxim that
plural and singular ultimately rely on the same ontology… If we
‘Whatever are, are many’. Ontologically, these two maxims are precisely
take the singular as basic, adding plurals will add no new things to
on a par, and there is no good reason to privilege the singular.
the ontology… the semantics of plural language does not
automatically require sets or mereological sums. (2008, 302)[32] 3.2 The Russellian struggle with singularism
The view involves no denial of the utility of the concept of a set or class; it
This formal break from singuralism, while by no means universally
insists only that the proper introduction of set-theoretical concepts calls for
accepted, is clearly anticipated or foreshadowed in the early work of
resources and motivation which go beyond the semantics of plural
Russell. Among other things, The Principles of Mathematics contains a
reference.
hesitant defense of pluralism, against the unrestricted singularist / monistic
In conclusion, the fundamental spirit of the UAT in no sense demands the thesis—a defense which, though incompletely developed, seems of
endorsement of an unrestricted conception of the PCO, or of singularism. sufficient importance to briefly here rehearse. Russell focusses on what
Rather, it involves affirming simply that our talk is indeed talk exclusively are prima facie essentially plural sentences such as

(a) Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smith's suitors. propositions have not one subject, but many subjects (69, fn.).”
Conceiving the notion of ‘the many’ as some one to be just plain
He notes that “it is Brown and Jones who are two, and this is not true of incoherent, Russell heroically attempts to give theoretical articulation to
either separately.” Now on this basis, it seems not obviously implausible some formal notion of the absolute diversity of the many. He attempts to
to conclude that ‘two’ is true of both collectively—that ‘Brown and Jones’, promote the idea—akin, in fact, to the clearer and more developed views
in short, denotes a unified collective subject for the collective predication of Boolos and McKay—that there is simply no such object as ‘the
(or in other words, a set or class). And yet, Russell insists that many’—no such thing as the logical subject of a semantically plural
sentence, the possibly collective nature of the predication notwithstanding.
it is Brown and Jones who are two… nevertheless it is not the
There can, Russell is obviously inclined to think, be no single subject for a
whole composed of Brown and Jones which is two, for this is only
collective (and in this case, a specifically numerical) predication; “there is
one (57).
not a single term at all which is the collection of the many terms…” (514).
Russell's point would seem to be that, supposing Brown and Jones to And in this sober judgment, he is supported among others by Peter Geach,
constitute a set, the fact remains that it is the members of the set who are for whom the idea of a class as many “is radically incoherent” (1972:
two—the predication of ‘are two’ attaches to the members, rather than to 225). The pluralistic version of the UAT is then, because restricted, both
any set itself. And he insists, furthermore, that a class semantically richer, and by the very same token ontologically more
economical, than its monistic / singularist version. Nevertheless, it must be
in one sense at least, is distinct from the whole composed of its said, the singularist version dies hard. Furthermore, the work of Russell,
terms, for the latter is only and essentially one, while the former, Boolos and McKay certainly suggests that pluralism is also the more
where it has many terms, is… the very kind of object of which plausible account.
many is to be asserted… (69).
But, as an account of the basic logico-semantic categories of reference,
It is here that Russell introduces his notorious if suggestive terminology of just how plausible, at the end of the day, is this account? There are some
‘the class as many’, insisting that there must be “an ultimate distinction well-known comments in the work of Frege, which have a bearing on this
between a class as many and a class as one… the many are only many, and question concerning the predicative formulation of the UAT. And
are not also one”. Or as he also writes, in ironically, this very simple step, of the recognition and acknowledgement
of semantically plural sentences, leads in a direction which threatens to
such a proposition as ‘A and B are two’, there is no logical subject:
undermine the UAT in its most plausible, because restricted, version. It
the assertion is not about A, nor about B, nor about the whole
does so, by opening up the semantic space of non-singularity, as a space
composed of both, but strictly and only about A and B (77).
which is not obviously occupied by plural sentences alone.
Again, and with something of an air of paradox, he insists that a “plurality
3.3 Frege, countability, and ‘mass nouns’ or non-count nouns
of terms is not the logical subject when a number is asserted of it; such

As a thesis concerning the meaning of general terms, the UAT may be does not address the issue of such substantival terms as ‘blood’ and ‘gold’
expressed as the requirement that all substantival predicate-expressions themselves. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire status of the PCO
(concepts, kinds) satisfy the object-concept, whether in its singular or and the UAT can seem to be called into question by the (closely related)
plural forms—that, in effect, they are always constrained by an integral so-called “problem of mass terms”, as Davidson (1967) puts it. Thus mass
numerical constituent. And it is perfectly clear that, for example, the nouns (or better, non-count nouns—a more inclusive and also more
singular substantives ‘rabbit’, ‘tree’ and ‘planet’ do satisfy the object- precisely defined category), no more appear to satisfy a singularist version
concept; for insofar as such (a singular occurrence of) a general term as of the UAT than do plural nouns. Indeed many non-count nouns just are,
‘rabbit’, ‘tree’ or ‘planet’ is true of anything, it is true, in virtue of its in a certain limited sense, semantically plural—‘clothing’ is roughly
meaning, of just one item at a time. equivalent to ‘clothes’, ‘traffic’ to ‘moving vehicles’, ‘furniture’ to ‘pieces
of furniture’; and so on.
Now the qualification ‘substantival predicate-expressions’ above is
suggested by an issue famously remarked by Frege, who writes that However, there are many such nouns which are not thus semantically
plural, and corresponding quantified sentences which therefore cannot in
Only a concept which isolates what falls under it in a definite any circumstances be singularised—e.g. ‘All water contains impurities’ as
manner, and which does not permit any arbitrary division into against ‘All apples contain pesticides’ or ‘All cattle have tails’. These then
parts, can be a unit relative to a finite number… Not all concepts are sentences for which the UAT may, even in its most liberal form, be
posses this quality. We can, for example, divide up something difficult to sustain. At any rate, if one accepts some version of semantic
falling under the concept ‘red’ into parts in a variety of ways, pluralism akin to the positions of Boolos and McKay, whereby plural
without the parts thereby ceasing to fall under the same concept references are sometimes irreducibly plural, then there is no obvious
‘red’. (1984, 66) reason to stop at just this point – no obvious reason, that is, to limit non-
singularity to plural forms exclusively; and the semantics of non-count
In somewhat more recent (Quinean) terms, Frege's point could be put by
reference may well emerge as neither singular nor plural, or as designating
saying that while terms like ‘rabbit’ and ‘planet’ are terms of ‘divided
neither one nor many things.[33]
reference’, or come with built-in principles for counting that to which they
are applied, adjectival terms like ‘red’ do not. To say that something or
3.4 ‘Stuff and things’: the ontic issue over objects
other (e.g. blood) is red, does not directly involve its being countable as
one, in the way that to say that something is a planet, or (equally) is round, In ontic terms, the issue may be dramatized by posing the question of just
plainly does. Further argument would clearly be required, to establish that what it is for a material—a kind of stuff or substance, some such stuff as
concepts such as ‘red’ must, indirectly, satisfy the object-concept, though snow or beer, iron, gold, or water—to exist. The standard, traditional
what that argument would be is hardly obvious. answer is, of course, that the existence of these various kinds of stuff
consists precisely in that of particular instances—in the case of the
This is by no means, however, the end of the matter, precisely because it
metallic element gold, of this gold here and that gold there; in the case of

the compound water, of the water in my glass and the water in yours; and 2008, 316-7)
likewise, for any other kind of stuff.[34] Quite generally, so this answer
goes, the existence of metals, liquids, elements, compounds and the like, The implication is that non-count nouns cannot denote or correspond to
consists in that of discrete objects, entities or units of a special type, not individual ‘quantities’ or ‘parcels’ of stuff; since there is supposedly no
uncommonly characterized as ‘quantities’ or ‘parcels’ of stuff or more to the concept of such an object than the idea of what such a noun
matter.[35] denotes—on the crucial proviso that the mode of designation is singular,
or that what is denoted is some kind of unit. The upshot, as he concludes,
Nonetheless, as McKay for one has noted, there would seem to be an is that in the case of words like ‘water’,
obvious semantic problem with this view; related sceptical discussion may
also be found in the recent work of Elder (2008, section 2). Words for we should not expect a successful reduction to singular reference
stuff or ‘mass nouns’ clearly belong to the semantic category of non-count and singular predication, something that the application of
nouns—as contrasted with the category of words for things, or count traditional first-order logic would require… when we say that
nouns, words like ‘planet’, ‘dog’ and ‘tree’. Count nouns are themselves water surrounds our island… our discourse is not singular
semantically either singular or plural; as semantical sub-categories, discourse (about an individual) and is not plural discourse (about
singularity and plurality virtually exhaust the category of count nouns. It some individuals); we have no single individual or any identified
appears then to follow that non-count nouns can be neither singular nor individuals that we refer to when we use ‘water’… (2008, 310-11)
plural—a point which would seem indeed to be as fundamental as any,
And at this point, the ontic question seems to be a pressing one. If we do
and from which two subsidiary points follow directly.
not refer to any “single individual or any identified individuals” when we
It follows in the first place that non-count nouns share with plural nouns use ‘water’, to what, then, do we refer? Just this is the force of McKay's
the distinction of being semantically non-singular. And, since it is a question when he asks ‘what the subject of fundamental non-count noun
feature of the meaning of ‘semantically singular’ that semantically predication is’—the question
singular nouns denote or correspond to single units, semantically non-
of what satisfies ‘x is water’, especially if we understand quantifier
singular nouns, whether plural or non-count, must somehow not denote or
phrases on anything like a standard model… We must either
correspond to single units. As McKay succinctly observes, while non-
understand what values x can take, or provide some other analysis
count nouns are indeed on a par with plural nouns in respect of their non-
of quantifier phrases… (emphasis mine). (2008, 305)
singularity,
His answer is that we must
plural discourse has natural semantic units that are the same as
those of singular discourse, but stuff discourse has no natural be talking about some stuff, not a thing or some things, and in that
semantic units, and reference and predication seem to proceed on a way, mass reference and predication are ontologically more
different model than that of an individual and a property. (McKay significant than plural reference and predication. We seem to be in

new territory ontologically, not just grammatically. (2008, 311) route to resolution of this problem is far from being obvious. Assume,
however, a successful resolution of such difficulties, along with the
Given that ‘the many’ and ‘the much’ are equally non-singular, then corresponding availability of a suitable algorithm. Still, the necessary
whereas ‘the many’ are merely many ones, ‘the much’, qua neither one departures from the sheer elegance of standard forms of predicate
nor many, can be nothing other than – the much. The idea so clearly calculus, with all the significant associated complexities, might seem to
advanced by Tugendhat, that there is just one exhaustive and maximally count against opting for any such departure in the first place, and instead
general ontic category, that of objects, individuals or things—a category perhaps adopting some species of reductionism. Evidently, such a strategy
which excludes absolutely nothing which may be spoken of, and is in that might recommend itself forcefully on grounds of sheer convenience; but
sense empty—is directly challenged by the thought that there are two, an option for convenience is one thing, and objective resolution of the
mutually exclusive top-level ontic categories or concepts. In much the way formal difficulties quite another.[36]
that ‘an individual or object of some kind’ naturally serves as an indefinite
generic expression for the ontic category of any possible kind of Bibliography
individual or object, so in McKay's view, ‘some stuff of some kind’ is
appropriate to serve as an indefinite expression for this ‘novel’ ontic Black, M., 1971, “The elusiveness of sets,” The Review of Metaphysics,
category of (any kind of) stuff. 24: 614–636
Boolos, G., 1984, “To be is to be the value of a variable (or to be some
But now to take this route in cases unlike that of ‘clothing’, where ‘the
values of some variables),” Journal of Philosophy, 81: 430–449.
much’ is not a stand-in for ‘the many’—to acknowledge ‘the much’ as an
–––, 1998, Logic, Logic and Logic, R. Jeffrey (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.:
ontic category, even though it is agreed that we are not here dealing with a
Harvard University Press.
‘unit’—might appear to risk embracing paradox. As McKay quite frankly
Cartwright, H., 1970, “Quantities”, The Philosophical Review, 79: 25–42.
acknowledges,
–––, 1993, “On Plural Reference and Elementary Set Theory”, Synthese,
if we are not to reduce mass talk to thing talk by introducing a 96: 210–254.
realm of entities, then it seems that we must somehow provide for Casati, R., 2004, “Is the Object Concept Formal?”, Dialectica, 58 (3):
talk about non-entities. (2008, 316) 383–394.
Chappell, V. C., 1971, “Stuff and Things”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Yet is there not a prima facie logical absurdity in the notion of a range of Society 71: 61–76.
non-units, ‘each’ of which is just some stuff? If there is something, of Davidson, D., 1967, “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese, 17: 304–23.
which there can be several distinct occurrences, then in the minimalist Elder, C., 2008, “Against Universal Mereological Composition”,
sense of ‘entities’ (as meaning items each of which is countable as one), Dialectica, 62 (4): 433–454.
these ‘somethings’ can hardly fail to count as distinct entities. To say that –––, 2007, “Realism and the problem of Infimae Species”, American
there can be no ranges of non-entities seems like an outright truism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (2): 111–127.

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Blackwell, 1959. Philosophy, 92 (10): 509–524.
–––, 1891, “Function and Concept” by P. Geach in Translations from the –––, 2005, “Things”, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd Edition,
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(eds. and trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, second edition, 1960. McKay, T., 2006, Plural Predication, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Geach, P., 1972, Logic Matters, Oxford: Blackwell. –––, 2008, “Critical Notice” of Words without Objects, Canadian Journal
Hacker, P., 1979, “Substance: The Constitution of Reality”, in P. French, of Philosophy, 38 (2): 301–323
T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy Mill, J. S., 1900, A System of Logic, London: Longmans, Green.
(Volume 4), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 239–61. Oliver, A., 1994, “Are subclasses parts of classes?” Analysis, 54 (4): 215–
Hawthorne, J. and Sider, T., 2002, “Locations”, Philosophical Topics, 30: 223.
53–75. –––, 2005, “Abstract entities”, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd
Honderich, T., 1995, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oxford University Press. Quine, W.V., 1982, “Boolean algebra.”, in Methods of Logic (Chapter 20),
Jacquette, D., 1999, “Abstract objects”, in The Cambridge Encyclopedia Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. –––, 1969, “Speaking of Objects,” reprinted in Ontological Relativity,
Kamp, H., and Reyle, U., 1993, From Discourse to Logic, Dordrecht; New York: Columbia University Press.
Boston: Kluwer Academic. –––, 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Koslicki, K., 2003, “The Crooked Path from Vagueness to Four- Russell, B., 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge
Dimensionalism” in Philosophical Studies, 114: 107-34. University Press; reprinted, London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1937.
Laycock, H., 2006a, Words without Objects, Oxford: Oxford University –––, 1919, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London: G. Allen &
Press. Unwin.
–––, 2006b, “Variables, Generality and Existence”, in Paolo Valore (ed.), Sommers, F., 1963, Types and Ontology, The Philosophical Review, 72:
Topics on General and Formal Ontology, Milano: Polimetrica, 27– 327–363.
52. Strawson, P. F., 1959, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics,
–––, 2005, “Mass nouns, Count nouns and Non-count nouns: London: Methuen.
Philosophical Aspects”, Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Thomasson, A. L., 2007, Ordinary Objects: Oxford University Press.
2nd Edition, Oxford: Elsevier. Thompson, M., 1965, “Abstract Entities and Universals”, Mind (New
Lewis, D., 1966, “An argument for the identity theory”, The Journal of Series), 74 (295): 365–381
Philosophy, 63 (2): 17–25. Tugendhat, E., 1982, Traditional and analytical philosophy: Lectures on
Locke, J., 1924, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Pringle- the philosophy of language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pattison (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wetzel, L., 2009, Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects, Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press. tokens

Wittgenstein, L., 1921, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D.F. Pears and
B.F. McGuinness (trans.), London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1961 Notes to Object
Yi, Byeong-Uk, 1999, “Is Two a Property?” Journal of Philosophy, 96(4):
163–90. 1. There is, then, some inevitable overlap in topic here with entries in the
van Cleve, J., 1985, “Three versions of the bundle theory”, Philosophical S.E.P. whose topics are just the particular sub-categories of object, for
Studies, 47: 95–107 instance, the categories of substance and of abstract object. There is
Zalta, E. N., 1983, Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic however no inevitable overlap of content; here, such categories are briefly
Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, Kluwer. spoken to qua applications or sub-categories of the formal category, rather
than as topics in their independent right.
Academic Tools
2. The notorious Platonism embodied in Russell's remark may for present
purposes be ignored.
How to cite this entry.
Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP 3. And on this account, it might be given either an Aristotelian or a
Society. Kantian category-twist.
Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology
Project (InPhO). 4. Or perhaps we should speak, with Boolos—to allow for more recent
developments—of the values of a variable.
Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links
to its database. 5. The response is to be found in Chapter Seventeen, following his well
known re-presentation in that book of the Theory of Descriptions.
Other Internet Resources Whether the doctrine concerns the significance of plural reference
altogether generally, or perhaps only in the context of semantically
‘Aquinas on One and Many’, by Gyula Klima (Fordham University)
irreducible plural sentences, is an issue which is not here pursued.
A Selection of Papers on Ontology, maintained by Raul Corazzon
The Buffalo Ontology Site, maintained by Barry Smith 6. In a similar vein, Helen Cartwright declares that whether one or many,
‘Identical cats are one—one cat or one set of cats’ (Cartwright 1970).
Related Entries
7. Such a ‘pure compound’ is presumably to be distinguished from a
Aristotle | Aristotle, General Topics: categories | continuity and couple, in the sense in which, were Siemens and Halske to be married or
infinitesimals | mereology | nominalism: in metaphysics | plural involved in some other intimate relationship, they would conventionally
quantification | properties | substance | temporal parts | tropes | types and come to constitute a single couple.

8. That is, his agonized discussion of what he there calls ‘the class as to the kind, and only derivatively to the instances. The issue is pursued in
many’ seems to end up by calling the whole idea into question. section 2.3.
9. Recent work has witnessed the coining of the term ‘singularism’ to 15. It is here that set theory merges into mereology. See Cartwright 1993.
characterise this semantic standpoint; the issue figures in more detail in At the same time, their being human products—artifacts and so
Part 3. functionally, rather than physically defined—might well be taken to be a
significant element in their sethood.
10. The recent and fairly commonplace revival of scepticism regarding so-
called ‘ordinary’ objects is not among the issues for this entry. 16. It cannot, for instance, be taken to be self-evident that the status of
items as types or universals renders them causally inert. Arguably, and
11. This is a point which both Quine and Strawson, in their different ways, depending on the case in point, the structure (‘form’, ‘design’) of a
have stressed. concrete object can play a central role in its causal powers. Whether the
item in question is an aircraft wing, a microchip, or a piece of code in
12. The matter is perhaps further complicated by the nature of the concept
machine language—in which syntactic structure, digitalized to a sequence
of substance itself. For insofar as substance is conceived – along with both
of numerals, is all that matters—structure seems key; and structures are
Aristotle and the rationalist tradition – as that which ‘exists
themselves pre-eminently objects of mathematics, hence the intimacy of
independently’, Platonists in particular may wish to treat numbers not
the relationship of math to physics, and of physics to engineering in turn.
merely as abstract objects, but also as substances – and so, as objects in
The objection that such structures must here be understood as tokens or
that full-blooded, substantial sense of the term perhaps more commonly
tropes, rather than as types or full-blown Platonic qualities, seems
reserved for concrete entities alone. On the other hand, Fregean concepts,
relatively weak. By their own characterization, trope-theorists tend to
understood as being essentially ‘incomplete’, cannot qualify for
classify tropes themselves as abstract or ‘perfect’ particulars.
substancehood, and therefore not for objecthood in any such restricted
Furthermore, as Armstrong and others have argued, causal relationships
sense.
involve laws, which themselves involve reference to universals, general
13. The point is hardly frivolous; in light of developments in both properties and the like.
cosmology and quantum mechanics, it can no longer be said to be obvious
17. For the parallel prototypical account, see Quine 1960, ch. 3.
that either space-time, space, or time correspond to unitary, well-
demarcated ontic categories. 18. Thus when Dale Jacquette speaks darkly of the abstract triangle—said
to have only properties common to all triangles, and none peculiar to any
14. In a similar vein, in his ‘The metaphysics of abstract objects’, E. J.
particular triangle—no determinate size or shape—it might seem that what
Lowe speaks of universals as abstract entities; yet he remarks that pieces
he has in mind can be no triangle at all, but instead a purely abstract
of gold ‘are soluble in aqua regia’ only in virtue of being instances of the
attribute. Zalta's (1983) account of abstract objects would provide
kind, gold. Yet this would seem to attribute a physical property primarily

Jacquette with a more sophisticated option here, although what seems the plural: the inhabitants of London, the sons of rich men, and so on. In
clear is that, once again, the appropriate abstract object could not possibly other words, we shall be concerned with classes’.
be a triangle. And, of course, Berkeley's characterization of Locke's
‘abstract general idea’ of a triangle in very similar terms was intended as 26. A note of caution is in order at this point, however. The boundary
no elucidation but rather a reductio of Locke's idea. But recent discussion between monistic doctrines and Boolosian pluralism—for which some
indicates that whether Berkeley has fairly interpreted Locke's account or plural sentences are represented as irreducibly plural or multiple—is far
not is very much an open question from sharp. For lacking any determinate principle of unity, the idea of
‘class’ as merely ‘several objects’, or Lowe's ‘a number of things’,
19. It would seem, e.g., that Shakespeare's character by the name of becomes no more than the idea of ‘many’—in short, Russell's
‘Hamlet’ cannot be treated on anything like the lines of an attribute questionably intelligible notion of ‘the class as many’.
corresponding to a so-called abstract singular term (an attribute of what?).
27. An anonymous reader has suggested that there are other options to
20. ‘Consequently ontic’, since it is a characteristic feature of empiricist consider, noting that ‘in a Davidsonian framework, we might consider the
methodology to epistemologize ontological categories. Though this is not reduction to: (∃e) (e is a surrounding & Agent(e) = dog1 & Patient(e) =
the place to do it, the ongoing influence of empiricism in both fox1) & (∃e) (e is a surrounding & Agent(e) = dog2 & Patient(e) = fox1)
epistemology and metaphysics is readily documented. & … Or we might go with plural quantification over the events, while still
keeping all the substance talk in the singular: (∃Es) (Each e among the Es
21. This issue is evidently related to the contentious question of so-called is a surrounding, each e among the Es has one and the same fox as its
‘mass nouns’ or words for stuff, to be considered briefly in the sequel. patient, and for each e among the Es, (∃x) (x is a dog and the agent of e)).
This requires there to be a plurality of surrounding events, and requires
22. The point is explored in Laycock 2006, Ch. 5, sections 6 & 7.
that an individual dog can be the agent of a given surrounding event. The
23. In this lies one motivation for the reductionist treatment of his so- latter is not so problematic, in that “being a surrounding” can be an
called ‘mass terms’ in Quine 1960, ch. 3. extrinsic property of the event in question. Just as a single soccer player
can be the agent of an event that satisfies the extrinsic description
24. Scepticism regarding the traditional (non-epistemic) concept of “winning the World Cup for Spain”, so a single dog can be the agent of an
substance has, of course, by no means disappeared, and is often vigorously event that satisfies the extrinsic description “being a surrounding”.’ The
promoted, in association with the recent popularity of mereological styles former suggestion would appear to involve reference to the individual
of ontology, chiefly on grounds of vagueness. The issue is not considered dogs involved, a fact which is not revealed in the original remark. As to
in this work. However, for incisive discussion of the issue focussing on the naturalness (and metaphysics) of such paraphrases, in light of the form
recent work by Ted Sider, see Koslicki 2003. of the natural language sentence at issue, the reader is left to judge.
25. ‘In the present chapter’, he writes, ‘we shall be concerned with the in 28. These are objects referred to variously, and potentially with different

connotations, as ‘sets’, ‘classes’, ‘pluralities’, ‘sums’, ‘collections’, and considered further in the sequel. It is also addressed in the entry for plural-
‘plural objects’. quantification, where it is suggested that “There may be something ad hoc
about the idea that some sorts of semantic value give rise to ontological
29. See Boolos (1998) and McKay (2006). In the Fregean reductive style commitments while other sorts don't. On the other hand, it may count in
of treatment we have the pursuit of what McKay has called a singularist favor of the alternative view that it does better justice to many people's
strategy. strongly felt intuition that plural locutions are ontologically innocent.” But
an anti-singularist reponse here might involve nothing more than
30. The precise nature of the relationship between the Boolos strategy, and
insistence upon a general and principled distinction between semantical
the non-singular Russellian approach, to be considered in the sequel, is not
and ontic issues.
entirely clear.
33. This issue in particular is considered in Laycock 2006a, in which the
31. At the same time, the ontic significance of such symbolism—or lack of
overall status of non-singular sentences is examined at some length.
it—needs to be explicitly stipulated, since there exists a spontaneous and
naive tendency, within reflective or philosophical thought, to take any 34. See particularly the work of Vere Chappell (1971) and Peter Hacker
distinctive types of symbolism precisely as an index of a correspondingly (1979) for explicit statements of this view. The view itself however is
distinctive types of object (or as Russell puts it, to fail to distinguish advocated by most of those who have written on the topic, including
between grammatical and logical subjects). Cartwright; for—as is noted in this work—once the view is couched in
formal terms, it is evidently difficult to see what possible alternative there
32. As Boolos sensibly remarks, it is ‘haywire to think that when you have
could be.
some Cheerios, you are eating a set—what you're doing is eating THE
CHEERIOS … it doesn't follow just from the fact that there are some 35. The idea of such a posit differs from that of an organized individual
Cheerios in the bowl that, as some who theorise about the semantics of substance in just one key respect—it is the idea of a kind of object which
plurals would have it, there is also a set of them all’. The classical example is entirely form-indifferent—an object which might occur in any state of
of this approach is the treatment by Boolos of the so-called Geach-Kaplan scatter or of aggregation whatsoever. And for this very reason, it is
sentence, ‘Some critics admire only one another’. And it is worth supposed, such things will be typically more durable than discrete
remarking here that Russell, contrary to Frege, struggled with the idea of individual substances— outliving those structured objects which they
collective predication as a logically distinctive phenomenon which did not might sometimes constitute. Vere Chappell speaks of the bronze of which
involve collective units, because it could not be understood as involving the Discobolus was made as persisting through being transformed into
single logical subjects. In effect, and very much in keeping with his swords and shields; Helen Cartwright takes as an example
incipient distinction between logical and grammatical subjects, Russell
struggled against the ontologization of semantical non-singularity. The The gold of which my ring is made is the same gold as the gold of
issue is of sufficiently general relevance to our overall concerns that it is which Aunt Suzie's ring was made.

Object
And asserts its equivalence to
The quantity of gold of which my ring is made = the quantity of

gold of which Aunt Suzie's ring was made.
36. Nevertheless, the standard reductionist answer has one basic merit: it
is, in a word, internally coherent. And not only is it, in a certain sense,
coherent, but it constitutes, in effect, an attempt to rationalise an otherwise
seemingly absurd state of affairs. And yet, in virtue of the possibility of
seemingly limitless distinct references to matter (or ‘drawings of
boundaries’), the rationalisation involves embracing the daunting excesses
of a mereology with a ‘principle of unrestricted composition’. To embrace
the mereology of matter-instances is to simply bite the bullet—to brave or
brazen it out by insisting that there really are utterly vast (and indeed, in
the absence of so-called ‘simples’, countless) numbers of arbitrary
objects, the theory of which is not a physical or causal theory in any
recognizable sense, but is akin to a branch of algebra or pure geometry.
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