R. Wallace
R. Wallace
R. Wallace
99-112
Plato’s defense speech for Socrates splendidly deploys Plato’s genius while
raising many controversies1. Of course I have just now raised a major one: was
Defense (I shall not call it Apology) composed by Plato or by Socrates? I shall
return to this question which proves central to my thesis, while noting here
some arguments for Platonic authorship and for significant independence
from what Socrates said in court. Thus, this text was transmitted as a work
of Plato; stylometric analysis confirms his authorship2; Xenophon and others
wrote quite different speeches, something possibly unlikely if Plato’s text
was known to be close to Socrates’. Despite Defense’s various strategies to
suggest otherwise (notably, mentioning or claiming Plato’s presence in court: 34
a, 38 b), no other speech in Plato (or any other ancient writer, including
Thucydides) reproduces what speakers said. Plato was a creative genius,
not a stenographer. Xenophon (Defense, 1-2) notes that the arrogant tone
(ÌÂÁ·ÏËÁÔÚ›·) of Socrates’ courtroom speech suggested that he wanted to be
convicted (ibid., 3-9), something we probably would not call typical of Plato’s
Defense, with its insistent piety and many flourishes directed to a democratic
audience, as we shall see. It has also been suggested that so many versions of
Socrates’ defense speech were composed precisely because as Plato’s Crito
says (Cr., 45 e; cf. Gorg., 486 a-b), Socrates’ own speech was so inadequate,
again something we would not say of Plato’s Defense. Xenophon himself refers
to other versions (Defense, 1), whether or not in Socrates’ voice, and we know
1. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Academy of Athens in April 2012.
Many thanks to E. Moutsopoulos, Anna Tatsi, and Doukas Kapantaïs for their warm
hospitality on that occasion, and to Maria Protopapas-Marneli and Chloe Balla for
organizing the event. I am grateful to Gabriel Danzig, Lowell Edmunds, Robin Waterfield,
and my Northwestern Philosophy colleagues Richard Kraut and Kenneth Seeskin for
comments on this text, and to Robin Waterfield for sending me a copy of his fine book Why
Socrates Died, New York, W. W. Norton, 2009 (on Plato’s defense speech see especially pp. 8-
19). I have also profited from the first chapter of G. Danzig’s, Apologizing for Socrates,
Lanham, Md., Lexington Books, 2009 (cf. earlier TAPA, 133, 2003, pp. 281-321), a fresh take
on Plato’s speech not incompatible with the approach developed here, and well worth
reading.
2. See L. BRANDWOOD, Stylometry and chronology, in R. KRAUT (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Plato, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1992, pp. 90-120.
100 R. WALLACE
6. J. BURNET, n. 4, pp. 64-67 and passim; E. DE STRYCKER and S. R. SLINGS, n. 5, pp. 21-
25, proposing a somewhat different structure; and M. C. STOKES, Plato: Apology,Warminster,
Aris and Phillips, 1997.
7. Plato repeats this number in Socrates’ imaginary dialogue with the laws in Cr., 52 e.
8. According to DIOG. LAERT., 2, 44, some thought Socrates died at 60.
102 R. WALLACE
9. Socrates and Legal Obligation, Minneapolis, Minneapolis U.P., 1980, p. 6. Cf. also
(among many) A. E.TAYLOR, Plato: the Man and his Work, London Methuen, 1960, pp. 156-
167, and G. KENNEDY, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton, Princeton U.P. 1963, p. 150:
Plato’s speech «probably would not have won a victory in court». On p. 152 Kennedy
concludes that «the great significance of the Apology» is to show that «traditional rhetoric
was already so deeply implanted in the Greek consciousness that there was no question of
any successful deviation from it». I hope to show Plato’s more deliberate purposes.
10. See especially their Socrates on Trial, Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1989.The “principles”
quotation is from p. 210, and is explained on pp. 210-214. C. D. C. REEVE, Socrates in the
Apology, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1989, is in important ways similar and also a valuable dissent
from majority opinions.
11. See reviews by M. R. WRIGHT, CR, 42, 1992, pp. 71-72, S. R. SLINGS, Mnemosyne,
47, 1994, pp. 116-119, and C. ROWE, JHS, 114, 1994, pp. 191-192.
PLATO LOGOGRAPHOS: DEFENSE OF SOCRATES 103
shall come to consider, but one motivation reflects his scorn for the practices of
democratic justice.
Athenian legal cases were brought into court under a rubric, in this case
impiety. The prosecutor’s indictment, or charge, specified in greater detail
the nature of the offense, not in statute language. The text of Socrates’
indictment is preserved (DIOG. LAERT., 2, 40; cf. PLATO, Defense, 24 b, XENO-
PHON, Defense, 10ff.):
«This indictment and affidavit is sworn by Meletos ... against Socrates ...:
Socrates does wrong in refusing to recognize the gods whom the city reco-
gnizes, but introducing other new spiritual beings. He also does wrong in
corrupting the youth.The penalty demanded is death».
The first of these charges, not believing in the city’s gods but «new spiritual
beings» (i.e. the daimonion), is clear enough. As we shall see, claims that this
charge meant that Socrates was an atheist (cf.T. C. BRICKHOUSE and N. D. SMITH
p. 31, n. 10 and reff.) reflect confusion devised by Plato.What was «corrupting
the youth»? Following Xenophon, Aeschines, and Polycrates, most scholars
agree that the Athenians prosecuted Socrates in 399, after he had lived,
taught, and philosophized in Athens for many years, in large part because his
students Critias and Charmides were leaders of the Thirty Tyrants, who
brutalized Athens in 404, killing 1500 persons for their money12. In his seventh
Letter (324 c-d) Plato himself says that the horrors of this regime made the
preceding democracy seem like a reign of gold; he mentions that some of the
Thirty were his relatives. Hansen (p. 145, n. 12) is surely right that after the
Thirty were overthrown, Socrates would have continued to say, as he does in
all sources, that democracy was a bad form of government and should be
replaced: very dangerous language after 404. In Defense, 29 c, 30 b-c, Plato has
12. «The accuser» in Xenophon’s Memorabilia observes that Socrates taught both
Critias, «the most avaricious and violent of all the oligarchs», and Alcibiades, «the most
dissolute and arrogant of all the democrats» (Mem., 1, 2, 12). According to Xenophon (Mem.,
3, 7, 9), Socrates convinced the oligarch Charmides to enter politics. Isocrates reports that in
his attack on Socrates in 393 or 392, Polycrates argued that Socrates had been the teacher of
Alcibiades (11, 4-6). Aeschines expressly says that the Athenians executed «Socrates the
sophist» because «he was shown to be the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty who overthrew
the democracy» (1, 173). In The trial of Sokrates from the Athenian point of view, in M.
SAKELLARIOU (ed.), Démocratie athénienne et culture, Athens, Academy of Athens, 1996, p.
162, Mogens Hansen observes that of the fifteen persons who talk with Socrates in Plato’s
dialogues and whose political affiliations are known, only five are loyal democrats (and one
of these is Socrates’ prosecutor Anytos). The remaining ten were «crooks and traitors». In
Plato Defense, 24 b, another prosecutor, Meletos, claims to be philopolis, a «lover of the city»,
a «patriot». For the ancient sources for the Thirty’s 1500 victims, cf. R. W. WALLACE, Plato’s
Socrates on Obeying the Laws of Democratic Athens, Philosophia, 41, 2011, p. 91, n. 11.
104 R. WALLACE
Socrates tell the dikasts that, if he is acquitted, he will continue to say and do
what he has always said and done. «Do not make an outburst, men»!
Xenophon’s Memorabilia interprets the accusation against Socrates to include
«teaching his companions to despise the established laws, by insisting on the
folly of appointing public officials by lot...; such sayings led the youth to
despise the established constitution and made them violent» (1, 2, 9). As I
have quoted (n. 12), Aeschines said the Athenians executed Socrates because
he taught Critias, «one of the Thirty who overthrew the democracy» (1, 173).
Polycrates’ accusation against Socrates in 393 or 392, put in the mouth of
Anytos, also took this line. In his response to Polycrates, Libanios says that
Socrates «is charged by his enemies with destroying the democracy»
(Defense, 57). Some scholars have wanted to think that Socrates was a
democrat. As Richard Kraut has pointed out, there is not a shred of evidence
to support this idea13. Socrates was formally charged with impiety partly
because the democratic amnesty of 403 outlawed prosecutions for offenses
committed before that date, in particular in 404.
Defense directly mentions the Thirty Tyrants only briefly at the end, as we
shall see. Rather (and here I begin my detailed analysis of this text), Plato
brilliantly focuses his defense speech on the formal rubric under which
Socrates was charged, impiety, which I agree may have been an issue in this
prosecution14, but which most ancients and moderns agree was not the main
issue. Right from the second half of the exordium and alluding to «a certain
comic poet» (Aristophanes in Clouds, 423 BC), Plato’s Socrates says that
people have long heard that he was a student of things in the sky and under the
earth and, hence, that he does not believe in the gods and that he makes the
worse argument seem the stronger. Hence, on this formulation, he was an
immoral atheist. The people who made these charges, Socrates says, are my
«dangerous accusers» (18 a-c). Please note that all this conveniently locates
Socrates’ accusers and his offense long before the horrors of 404. Note further
Socrates’ lengthy argument that such accusations were not playing by de-
mocracy’s rules, as he has had no opportunity to defend himself (18 c-e). And
note, finally, that we have shifted from the actual charge in the indictment,
which was not that Socrates was an atheist but that he believed in strange new
spiritual beings. He ends the exordium by implying that he is religious and law-
abiding. «Let the matter proceed as the god may wish ... I must obey the law»
(19 a).
13. R. KRAUT, Socrates and the State, Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1984, pp. 194-99; cf. also
R. W. WALLACE, pp. 88-89, n. 12.
14. See W. R. CONNOR, The other 399: Religion and the trial of Socrates, in M. A.
FLOWER and M. TOHER (eds), Georgica. Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell,
London, University of London-Institute of Classical Studies, 1991, pp. 49-56.
PLATO LOGOGRAPHOS: DEFENSE OF SOCRATES 105
Moving now into the arguments, and still on the theme of his early
reputation, Socrates first immediately reformulates the indictment in a way that
he can more easily defend himself against. «Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in
that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the earth; he makes
the worse into the stronger argument, and he teaches these same things to
others» (19 b). Socrates now expressly says that he owes this reputation to
Aristophanes’ Clouds (19 c), which does represent Socrates in this way, and
says that this representation is false. It may or may not be false: but Socrates
was not so charged in 399. He, then, discusses the charge of teaching, and when
mentioning other teachers in each case he also mentions pay (19 d - 20 c),
something that, notoriously, the self-styled filthy and laconizing (the Spartans
used no money) Socrates did not take, and which was also not mentioned in
the indictment. He mentions pay to separate himself off from other teachers,
again an irrelevant point to his formal charge in 399.
Now comes the story about Chairephon, whom he calls «my hetairos from
boyhood and a hetairos to the mass of you» and who he says sided with the
democracy in 404 (21 a) –note how subtly the theme of 404 is introduced,
Socrates’ friend is a supporter of the democracy15. Adducing democratic
loyalty was a standard logographic technique to gain the jury’s sympathy, but
–bitter oxymoron– in later fifth century Athens hetairos was an elite anti-
democratic term. Aristophanes had also ridiculed Chairephon in Clouds: he
and Socrates are «charlatans, palefaces, wearing no shoes» (103-4, cf. 503-4:
«half a corpse»); Birds, 1296, 1564 call him Ó˘ÎÙÂÚ›˜, «bat», from that creature’s
nocturnal habits (cf. Horai, fr. 584 K-A, Ó˘ÎÙe˜ ·›‰·; Telemêssês (fr. 539/552
K-A) calls him Û˘ÎÔÊ¿ÓÙ˘, a charge possibly related to his summons as a
«yellow faced» (i.e. pale) witness in Wasps, 1388-1414. According to Plato’s
Defense, Chairephon visited Delphi and «dared to ask the oracle» –«men, do
not make an outburst!»– if any man was wiser than Socrates (21 a).The Pythia
said no (this story implies, of course, that Socrates is innocent of impiety).
Socrates, then, tells how he sought «with considerable reluctance» to
«investigate» (˙ËÙÂÖÓ) and «cross-examine» (âϤÁ¯ÂÈÓ) the oracle which he did
not think could be true but to which he «attached great importance» (21 b-c,22
a), by cross-questioning «in the service of the god» (23 b) those who thought
themselves wise, and thereby made himself unpopular. «Even now I continue
this investigation as the god bade me ...». If anyone thinks he is wise but is not,
«I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise... I live in
great poverty because of my service to the god» (23 b). All these comments at
once defend Socrates against the charge of impiety, and offer an explanation for
15. J. Burnet says, «it is interesting to know this; for the young men whom Socrates
influenced in later life were mostly opposed to the democracy» (p. 90, n. 4).
106 R. WALLACE
his unpopularity far from the events of 404, including his students’ murderous
plundering of wealthy Athenians (Socrates remains poor). And, he conti-
nues, when his followers imitate his ways, those whom they question «are
angry with me. They say, “That man Socrates is a pestilential fellow who
corrupts the young”» (23 c). Plato here masterfully addresses the charge of
corrupting the young, again interpreting it far from politics and also far from
any substance: these students only chose to imitate Socrates’ methods, not the
contents of his teaching.
So, in refuting his «early» accusers, Socrates mentions first Clouds, then (in
service to the god) his cross-questioning various Athenians who professed to
be wise, then his students who copied his techniques. He concludes, «There
you have the causes which led to the attack upon me ...There, gentlemen, you
have the true facts, which I present to you without any concealment or
suppression, great or small. I am fairly certain that this plain speaking of mine
is the cause of my unpopularity; and this really goes to prove that my
statements are true, and that I have described correctly the nature and the
grounds of the calumny that has been brought against me. Whether you
inquire into them now or later, you will find the facts as I have just described
them» (24 a-b). But Socrates has suppressed, he has concealed, he has not
described correctly. The elephant in the courtroom was the spectre of the
Thirty, led by Socrates’ students. Furthermore, except when mentioning
how his students copied his methods, Socrates interprets «corrupting the
young» strictly in religious terms. Plato has Socrates say, «Surely the terms of
your indictment make clear that you accuse me of teaching [the young] to
believe in new deities» (26 b), a point that the indictment by no means makes
clear.This permits Socrates to devote almost his entire defense to the charge of
religious belief. The Thirty remain unmentioned until the end of Plato’s
speech, when Socrates recounts not what he taught them, including to despise
the democracy’s established customs and laws (cf. Xenophon), but only how
they tried to implicate him in one of their murders (32 c-d). According to Plato
he said nothing but just went home: Ôé ÏfiÁˇˆ àÏÏ\ öÚÁˇˆ âÓ‰ÂÈÍ¿ÌËÓ: «I showed
not by word but by deed ... that I would do nothing unjust». Plato’s speech
conceals the real worry of Athens’ dikasts, that because the anti-democratic
Socrates taught Critias and other anti-democrats, he helped provoke and
thus was partly responsible for the overthrow of Athens’ democracy and
subsequent violence, as Aeschines, Xenophon, and Polycrates said, despite
all his claims to teach «about justice and virtue» (LYS., fr. I 2 THAL.; cf. XEN.,
Mem., 1, 1, 16), and that he might help overthrow it again.
Why does Plato’s Defense not explain the previous relationship of Socrates
with important members of the Thirty? Plato offers Socrates the best defense
of all: silence. Had Plato addressed this issue, it would stand as an issue. Silence
helped it go away. Indeed, many scholars have denied its significance because
Plato does not mention it. Defense’s claim that Socrates’ bad reputation was
due to Aristophanes’ Clouds, performed 24 years earlier, is a red herring –but
PLATO LOGOGRAPHOS: DEFENSE OF SOCRATES 107
as Plato brilliantly saw, a useful one for the impiety indictment, because it
represented Socrates as rejecting the conventional gods. Plato brilliantly
distracts our attention away from the real basis for Socrates’ reputation, as a
philolaconian anti-democrat who professed to teach justice and virtue but
whose students overthrew Athens’ democracy and killed 1500 people for
their money, and who refused to apologize or to change his ways16. In my
view, both Xenophon and Plato (see below) rightly say that Socrates sought
execution in 399 because he was and felt responsible for the nightmare of 404,
but knew he could not alter his behavior.
Finally (24 b ff.), Socrates turns to the actual indictment and engages in
dialogue with Meletos, trapping him into stating absurdities by arguments that
are far from compelling, while again avoiding directly addressing the charges
brought against him. For example, when Socrates refutes Meletos’ ridiculous
claim that only he, Socrates, corrupted the youth (25 a), it does not follow that
Meletos does not care about the youth (25 c), or that Socrates does. And when
Meletos is reluctant to answer, Socrates says that the law compels him to (25
d). Implication: Socrates is law-abiding. Socrates trots out the hackneyed
argument that if a teacher corrupts his pupils he risks being harmed by them
(25 e). He then gets Meletos to agree (within the speech! Plato’s brilliant device)
that the charge meant corrupting the youth in religious matters (26 b) –a point
other contemporaries did not agree with (cf. n. 12)– and then ties Meletos up in
arguments regarding his (Socrates’) religious beliefs by arguing that he is not
an atheist (26 c) –but the indictment did not accuse Socrates of being an
atheist. Socrates’ whole line of argument, that you can’t believe in horsiness
without believing in horses and so too of gods (27 b), is irrelevant to the actual
charge brought against him, which said that Socrates believed in spiritual
beings but not the right ones.
Here I must mention another comic touch by our brilliant but mocking
logographer. When Plato has Meletos say that Socrates believes the sun is a
stone, Socrates replies, «Do you imagine you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my
dear Meletos? Have you so poor an opinion of these gentlemen [the dikasts],
and do you assume them to be so unversed in letters as not to know that the
writings of Anaxagoras of Klazomenai are full of theories like these?» (26 c-d).
While flattering the dikasts just as logographers would, Plato and Socrates
knew very well that the dikasts were ignorant of Anaxagoras’ writings.
Socrates refutes not the indictment (for example, by discussing his actual
religious views) but what Plato sets up as Meletos’ claim that Socrates did
16. Contrast E. DE STRYCKER and S. R. SLINGS, pp. 12-13, n. 5: «Socrates was not found
guilty because he was irreligious or a corruptor of the young, but because the judges could not
admit that his lofty religious and educational ideals were genuine and sincere».
108 R. WALLACE
not believe in any gods, by showing that it was inconsistent with the indictment.
Refuting not the indictment but Meletos’ supposed interpretation of it is a
masterly, clever courtroom strategy rather than substantive argument. What
we need to hear is a discussion of Socrates’ actual religious views, which are
referred to only very briefly at the end of the speech. In addition, the passage is
full of references to dikastic thorubos, outbursts, the emotional irrationality of
the crowd of dikasts.
Socrates’ section on arguments now shifts again (28 b ff.), to moving
passages about his life, activities, and values, beginning with his commitment to
justice even at the cost of his own life because death may not be anything bad
(these passages will support Xenophon that in court, Socrates seemed to seek
execution), and linking these with patriotism, for example in military service
(another motif of Attic courtroom speeches), and with the god’s instructions
(29 b). Here, finally, we shift out of pure courtroom debate strategies into a mix
including some discussion of what may echo Socrates’ own views and persona,
as perhaps Plato wanted to account for why the court condemned him despite
this brilliant speech. So he has Socrates say that, if the court should order
him to stop philosophizing «I will obey the god rather than you... I shall not
cease to practice philosophy» (29 c) –as if the god commanded him to practice
philosophy, a delicious oxymoron17, not least as religion was based on received
conventions of which Socrates was relentlessly critical. Socrates’ defiant
assertion may not contradict his statements that he is law-abiding, but would
certainly provoke the dikasts. «I shall not change my conduct, even if I am to
die many times. Don’t make an outburst, men! ... Be sure that this is what the
god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for the city than
my service to the god. Do not create a disturbance, men! ... Indeed, men, I am
far from making a defense now on my own behalf, as might be thought, but on
yours, to prevent you from wrongdoing by mistreating the god’s gift to you
by condemning me... I was attached to this city by a god... as upon a great and
noble horse which ... needed to be stirred up by a horsefly18. It is to fulfil some
such function that I believe the god has placed me in the city ... I am a gift of
god to the city» (30 b-31 b). As a defense against a charge of impiety, all this is
nonpareil, while Plato has Socrates candidly acknowledge that he was by nature
a public provocateur. In response the dikasts can only burst out in thorubos,
hubbub, confirming their irrationality.
Socrates now talks briefly about his divine sign (31 c-d), his single mention
of what the actual indictment refers to, «strange new spiritual beings», the sign
that forbade him from taking part in democratic politics (and therefore,
17. Cf. R. HACKFORTH, The Composition of Plato’s Apology, London, Cambridge U.P.,
1933, pp. 92-93.
18.The archaizing standard English translation «gadfly» is a defensive euphemism.
PLATO LOGOGRAPHOS: DEFENSE OF SOCRATES 109
avoiding his civic responsibilities was not his fault but the god’s). He then
narrates his refusal to disobey the law during the Arginousai crisis (32 b-c):
in contrast to the irrational demos, we are to conclude that he was law-abiding,
but in fact Athens had no law outlawing trials of more than one person19. And
then he mentions his refusal, «not in words but in action», to obey the Thirty’s
orders to arrest Leon (32 c-d). He does not explain why he did not try to warn
Leon of the danger facing him, or convince his students of their wrongdoing.
Finally, without naming Critias or anyone else he proclaims that he has never
taught anyone. «If anyone says that he has learned anything from me..., be
assured that he is not telling the truth» (33 b). This is nonsense, as Plato well
knew. Just a few lines later Socrates says he seeks to teach (‰È‰¿ÛÎÂÈÓ) the
dikasts (35 c), and a few lines after that, he says his method was to approach
individuals privately, trying to persuade them to be good and wise (36 c).
The argument that he does not teach is a further defense against the
indictment’s charge of corrupting Critias and Charmides, and other evil oli-
garchs (cf. 33 b): he never taught them a thing, he is not responsible. Only in
these final sections of the argument does Plato have Socrates engage, however
partially and briefly, the substance of the charges brought against him in 399.
In the peroration, Socrates excoriates the democratic jury for yielding to
emotional appeals, as litigants bring children into court or beg for mercy. He
ends, «I leave it to you and the god to judge me in the way that will be best for
me and for you» (34 d-35 d).
I conclude that with the partial exception of Socrates’ brief defiance of
the court (but in favor of the god) at the end of the speech, Plato has
produced a brilliant lawyer’s defense. He constantly draws the argument away
from the central issue, whether in 404, distant from the fooleries of Aristo-
phanes’ Clouds, Socrates shared guilt for the Thirty’s murders and robberies and
continued to represent a danger to Athens. Plato reformulates the impiety
charge in such a way that Socrates can easily refute it. He claims that the
indictment’s mention of corrupting the young refers strictly to religion, or else
implies that it wasn’t Socrates’ fault if his youthful admirers imitated his
methods. Only at the end, outside the main argument, does Socrates mention
his own religious peculiarities (the daimonion) –something the Athenians will
not have cared about– and briefly defend himself against involvement with the
Thirty: he refused to cooperate, he did not teach anybody anything, he was
law-abiding.
19. See D. M. MACDOWELL, The Law of Classical Athens, Ithaca, NY, Cornell U.P.
1978, p. 189, and R. W. WALLACE, When the Athenians did not obey their laws, in G. THÜR
and B. PALME (eds), Symposion 2011, Vienna, Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2013, pp.
115-116.
110 R. WALLACE
One central point drives Socrates’ defense throughout: that the god at
Delphi commanded him to do philosophy –an oxymoron, as I have said.When
asked if there was anyone wiser than Socrates, the Pythia said no. Can Delphi
really have said this 20? The Pythia will surely have known little –and of that,
little good– about Socrates, a man who never traveled (PLAT., Cr., 52 b) and
whom the Athenians considered an «idle prattler» (à‰ÔϤۯ˘)21, a subversive
teacher, and impious, not believing in the traditional gods as for example in the
Clouds, which is why Socrates was accused under this rubric, and which
contributed to his conviction. In Xenophon (Defense, 15), the Pythia is reported
to have told Chairephon something different, that there was no man freer
(âÏ¢ıÂÚÈÒÙÂÚÔ˜), juster (‰ÈηÈfiÙÂÚÔ˜), or more temperate (ÛˆÊÚÔÓ¤ÛÙÂÚÔ˜)
than Socrates. Although H. W. Parke reports that «modern scholars have
unanimously rejected Xenophon’s tradition in favor of Plato’s»22, we can trace
the origin of Plato’s story about Delphi and Socrates as wise, sophos. In a well-
known tale of the seven sophoi, Greece’s first intellectuals, in the early sixth
century (e.g., DIOG. LAERT., 1, 27-28), some Milesian fishermen recovered a
golden tripod from the sea.The Milesians sent to Delphi to discover its owner,
and were told it belonged to the wisest man. They gave it to Thales, but he
passed it on to another sophos as wiser, and so on around the seven. Finally,
Thales deposited the tripod at Delphi, each of the seven thinking that he was
not the wisest man. Plato’s Delphi story linked Socrates with the venerable
seven sophoi. Whatever the Pythia may or may not have told Chairephon
(Plato calls Chairephon Gorgias’ friend: Gorg., 447 b; the Pythia was famous for
ambiguity), Plato’s version is myth, not history, and like the Palamedes parody,
his intelligent and learned readers will have understood it as such. Meanwhile,
the masses are fooled by Socrates’ conclusion that the god commanded him
to do philosophy, a daring paradox, the god will have commanded no such
thing. Plato wrote in Gorgias (454 e) that the purpose of rhetoric is to induce
belief; it is indifferent to truth or falsity. So we have here.
What were Plato’s purposes in writing Defense? First, he defends his
teacher (and also Socrates’ followers, a valid thesis of Danzig [n. 1]), because
Socrates had not done this very well, and presents a compelling portrait of him.
20. For various answers to this question, cf. C. D. C. REEVE, pp. 28-32, n. 10 (Why Delphi
praised Socrates’ wisdom), M. C. STOKES, Socrates’ mission, in B. S. GOWER and M. C.
STOKES (eds), Socratic Questions: The Philosophy of Socrates and its Significance, London
and New York, Routledge, 1992, pp. 26-81, and G. DANZIG, pp. 49-53, n. 1. For different
reasons from mine, the tradition is doubted by H. ERBSE, Die Nachrichten von Anklage und
Verteidigung des Sokrates, Hermes, 132, 2004, p. 138, and R. HACKFORTH, pp. 101-102, n. 16.
21. EUPOLIS, incert. fab., 386 K-A, AR., Frogs, 1491-1499, AMEIPSIAS, Konnos, fr. 9 K-A;
cf. LYS., fr. 1 THAL.
22. Chaerephon’s inquiry about Socrates, CP, 56, 1961, p. 249.
PLATO LOGOGRAPHOS: DEFENSE OF SOCRATES 111
Robert W.WALLACE
(Evanston, Illinois)
112 R. WALLACE
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Robert W. WALLACE
(Μτφρ. (Aννα ΤΑΤΣΗ)