POLICY BRIEF | OCTOBER 2022

INVIGORATING REGIONAL
EFFORTS TO BOLSTER
MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA
RYAN HASS

Executive Summary Steps to reduce risk could include forging a greater

common understanding of relevant international law,
broadening codes of conduct for operational behav-
The international system is facing acute stresses at the iors, expanding practical cooperation in the maritime
same time as great power competition is intensifying, domain, and organizing existing regional dialogues
and the two trends are mutually reinforcing. Russia’s thoughtfully to spur progress on maritime security.
invasion of Ukraine is straining food and energy
security worldwide. Deepening U.S.-China enmity is
eliminating options for both major powers to coordi-
nate responses to pandemics and climate change. Introduction
Simultaneously, maritime Asia is becoming the The long-standing peace in Asia is breaking down at
fulcrum of great power competition. As grand an accelerating rate.2 The previous four decades in
strategist Bruce Jones stated, “The Western Pacific East Asia were the most peaceful time in this region
is becoming to today what East Germany was to in the past 125 years. While there were persistent
the Cold War; the front line of tensions between the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan
world’s leading military powers. Its deep waters have Strait, they were managed below the threshold of
replaced the European heartland as the fault line of conflict. The enduring peace created the conditions
geopolitical tensions.”1 for rapid economic growth and historic improve-
ments to human welfare in every country except
North Korea.
Moreover, there are no signs that this major power
competition will abate any time soon. To the
contrary, China’s growing strategic appetite suggests This period of stable security and economic growth
that the competition will intensify in the coming now appears to be closing. The United States is
years. Regional actors must improve their ability to becoming more and more wary of China’s stra-
manage incidents and lower the risk of conflict. tegic designs in Asia, and Beijing’s own actions
and rhetoric are amplifying such concerns. China

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 1

is rapidly building up its military, becoming more lanes of communication is driving a naval arms race.
tolerant of friction with neighbors over territorial Numerous countries besides the United States and
issues, and increasingly characterizing its competi- China are pouring national treasure into this competi-
tion with others as an ideological struggle. China is tion, including Australia, India, Japan, Russia, and the
also working to establish strategic depth by pushing United Kingdom.
U.S. and other forces farther from its periphery.
What Beijing views as a prudent and necessary It is safe to assume, then, that these maritime
step to strengthen its security is seen by many in tensions are going to sharpen, not lessen, in
Washington as an attempt to forge an exclusive the coming years. China’s rapid buildup of naval
sphere of influence. capabilities will lead to greater military parity in
maritime Asia. And this may make Chinese leaders
With the United States holding diminishing leverage more confident and risk-acceptant in testing other
to deter regional countries from challenging each maritime powers. Beijing seeks greater control
other over longstanding disputes, they increasingly over contested waters and airspace it claims as its
are taking matters into their own hands. For example, own in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and
North Korea is barreling forward in its development of Taiwan Strait. China’s People’s Liberation Army will
nuclear warheads and long-range delivery systems. likely challenge American, Indonesian, Japanese,
Myanmar’s junta is shrugging off external censure and Malaysian, Philippine, Taiwan, Vietnamese, and other
asserting control of the country. And China’s disputes naval and air activities that it believes pose a chal-
with India and Japan are increasingly adopting a lenge to its control over its claimed territories.
military personality.
Such efforts will be aided by the introduction of new
Concurrently, the international system is facing its and emerging technologies, including fully autono-
most severe period of stress since the end of World mous anti-radiation weapons that are designed to
War II. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is disrupting food destroy enemy missile launchers. There may also be
and energy supplies. The world is still struggling greater use of autonomous unmanned underwater
to contain the spread of COVID-19. The effects of vehicles and unmanned air vehicles. These and other
global warming are manifesting in major catastrophic technologies will take on larger roles over time.
weather events. The developing world is experiencing
debt distress, and the global economy is teetering Additionally, China will likely establish a string of
on the edge of recession. And, unfortunately, inter- bases to support and sustain its maritime operations
national institutions are proving to be insufficient in beyond its shores. Beijing has already built airstrips,
addressing this growing array of problems. docks, barracks, and missile batteries to bolster its
force projection capabilities from its outposts in the
Many of these challenges converge in the waters South China Sea.6 As the naval strategist Alfred Thayer
of East Asia. Eighty-five percent of all global trade Mahan previously observed, a global naval power must
moves by sea, and more than 90% of global data have naval bases across the geography of its supply
flows along undersea cables.3 Within the region, over lines, each within range of the next, so that its forward
$3.4 trillion worth of goods pass through the South bases can be reinforced at times of war.7
China Sea each year, including energy and food
to support the populations of China, Japan, South China has not yet met this criterion for becoming
Korea, and Taiwan.4 a global naval power. Its only overseas military
installation is in Djibouti. China’s key supply line for
Given the centrality of the seas, China is swiftly food and fuel runs from the Middle East through
expanding its naval presence and capabilities. For the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. It is
the first time since the mid-1500s, China is investing unsurprising, then, that Beijing reportedly is seeking
massive sums to become a global naval power.5 to establish access arrangements for its naval fleet
This national development imperative to protect sea in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

INVIGORATING REGIONAL EFFORTS TO BOLSTER MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA 2

Beijing is also reportedly seeking to establish basing this region.10 Chinese officials assert that the root of
access in the Solomon Islands and other areas the problem is the increasing frequency of American
in the South Pacific, partly as a strategy to blunt air and naval military operations at China’s doorstep.
the United States’ ability to deploy its naval power
through the South Pacific into the region during a Left unaddressed, maritime competition and
conflict in East Asia.8 tensions in Asia will surely mount. And this could
negatively affect the future of global trade and the
To further bolster its competitive position, China has prospects for addressing global challenges such as
been building complementary naval capabilities with food and energy security, macroeconomic coordi-
Russia. The two countries have undertaken multiple nation, and climate change. But given the parlous
joint naval exercises: in the Mediterranean in 2015, state of U.S.-China relations, the two major powers
the South China Sea in 2016, the Yellow Sea in 2018, are unlikely to make near-term progress in lowering
and the East China Sea in 2019. Joint drills in 2019 tensions or improving risk reduction mechanisms.
and 2022 included Iran. Following both countries’ With this reality in mind, the central question is
announcement of a “no limits” partnership at a whether regional actors can advance meaningful
leader-level meeting in Beijing in January 2022, such actions to limit risk and claw open diplomatic space
efforts will probably deepen in the coming years.9 If for coordination on regional and global challenges?
China gains access to Russia’s constellation of over-
seas naval bases, it would meaningfully augment The best way these actors could reduce the risk of
Beijing’s ambition to establish global military reach. conflict in the maritime domain is by reinforcing
support for international law, building operational
In response to China’s development of anti-access/ predictability, developing a more integrated common
area denial capabilities, the United States and its operating picture, and synchronizing existing
partners are strengthening their own competencies. dialogue mechanisms to maximize their effective-
Washington is developing additional capabilities and ness. Different actors will need to make different
doctrine to frustrate and undermine China’s opera- contributions to various elements of this scaffolding.
tional advances. Under the AUKUS agreement, the Given the diffuse nature of regional activities in Asia,
United States is also working closely with Australia there likely will not be any central hub for coordi-
and the United Kingdom to develop new and nating such an approach. Therefore, efforts to limit
emerging technologies that will bolster their ability the risk of conflict will need to proceed organically
to maintain a persistent presence in the waters and and in a mutually reinforcing manner — all guided by
airspace of East Asia. Additionally, Washington is the common goals of risk reduction and improved
coordinating with European partners in the North coordination on common challenges.
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to strengthen
their presence in the waters of East Asia, as well as
cooperating with its Indo-Pacific counterparts in the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and in
Reinforce support for
other fora to promote regional stability.
international law
The tussle for military advantage is particularly
Every country in maritime Asia depends upon
intense along the first island chain — the string of
freedom of navigation to ensure goods can reach
islands from Japan’s Ryukyus through Taiwan, the
and depart their shores. However, there are funda-
Philippines, and Borneo. China’s military presence
mental differences in views among certain actors
along this chain has grown considerably as its capa-
over the scope of permissible maritime activities and
bilities have expanded. U.S. officials have registered
territorial claims.
concerns privately and publicly that Chinese military
personnel have become increasingly brazen in
conducting unsafe intercepts at sea and in the air in

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 3

Disputes over maritime territorial claims linger in
various areas in East Asia, even though the United Advance codes of
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
has a mechanism in place to address such disputes. conduct to bolster
In 2016, for example, an ad hoc tribunal under
UNCLOS invalidated China’s expansive maritime operational safety
claims in the South China Sea.11 To ensure interna-
tional law continues to play a stabilizing role, coun- and predictability
tries should take their disputes to UNCLOS tribunals
for resolution, and all those in the region must recog- There has been important progress in bolstering
nize the tribunal findings — even if China for the time operational safety. For example, the Western Pacific
being exercises indignation against the results. Naval Symposium developed a Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES) and, in 2001, Malaysia
Actors in the region must also reach a more and Indonesia signed an agreement for preventing
common interpretation of navigational rights in incidents at sea (known as MALINDO). Regional
exclusive economic zones and territorial seas. Given countries developed a Malacca Straits Security
that the United States is an imperfect champion Initiative to bolster operational safety through this
for upholding UNCLOS principles (it has not ratified critical waterway. In 2014, the United States and
the treaty and is unlikely to do so for the foresee- China adopted rules of behavior for the safety of air
able future), other countries that have ratified and and maritime encounters.
abided by the treaty must work together to narrow
differences of interpretation and use international Looking forward, regional actors will need to build
law to guide operational behavior. Indeed, a growing upon these efforts. And because Washington and
number of countries have taken steps to contest Beijing are unlikely to expand bilateral codes of
excessive maritime claims through bilateral and conduct for military activities in the near term, these
multilateral consultations, diplomatic channels, and actors should provide a platform for both major
operational assertions of rights.12 powers to participate.

These efforts, by and large, do not take a position Washington and Beijing disagree on the source
on competing claims, but rather are intended to of the problem and proper response to it. For
demonstrate commitment to upholding the princi- Washington, the primary source of risk to maritime
ples of freedom of navigation and secure sea lines Asia is unsafe or unprofessional Chinese behavior
of communication. The more that regional and as Beijing seeks to solidify its sphere of influence.
global actors contribute to such efforts, and narrow For Beijing, the activities of U.S. and allied military
differences of interpretation among them over platforms along its periphery are the source of poten-
what navigational rights are permissible in different tial conflict. Chinese leaders do not see the virtue in
contexts, the more that such principles will be creating a more predictable and safer environment for
recognized. This chorus effect should have the side the U.S. and its partners to operate near their shores.
benefit of lessening the risk that freedom of naviga-
tion issues will be further subsumed as an element Codes of conduct for operational behavior may need
of U.S.-China competition. to be built in a piecemeal fashion by various actors.
It would be helpful, for example, for the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium to forge a common
understanding of what constitutes a “safe distance”
between vessels in various scenarios and what types
of actions would constitute unsafe behavior. Such
steps could helpfully build upon this forum’s past
work in developing CUES.13

INVIGORATING REGIONAL EFFORTS TO BOLSTER MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA 4

Similar initiatives should be undertaken to demar-
cate rules for military aircraft encounters. There are Advance efforts to
no binding rules specific to aircraft encounters in any
international convention. However, in 2018, defense develop a common
ministers in Southeast Asia adopted nonbinding guide-
lines. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian operating picture
Nations (ASEAN) could explore expanding the adoption
of these guidelines by including participants in the and patterns of
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus),
a grouping that also comprises Australia, China, India, coordination
Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and
the United States.14 If adopted, the guidelines could The Information Fusion Center (IFC), located in
materially lower risk among many of the main actors Singapore, has provided a tremendous service for
operating in the region. the region by helping to establish a common oper-
ating picture in maritime Asia.17 The center provides
An Open Skies mechanism that resembles the model a venue for representatives from 24 nations — which
previously in place between Russia and NATO coun- represent around 70% of the global gross domestic
tries could also be beneficial. As Michael O’Hanlon product — to combat piracy and protect maritime
and James Steinburg have argued, obtaining mutual trade.18 Continuous attempts should be made to
agreement on unarmed aerial surveillance among broaden the geographic scope, increase the types of
participating countries in Asia could prevent miscal- activities being tracked, and spotlight operators that
culation and promote openness and transparency are challenging regional rules and norms.
related to military forces.15
For instance, the region is confronting depleting fish
ASEAN leaders could also develop an understanding stocks due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated
for the uses and limits of autonomous weapons (IUU) fishing. But no single country can address this
systems in the region. This initiative could build challenge alone. Resolving the problem requires broad
upon the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and maritime domain awareness, as well as coordination
other historical precedents.16 The purpose would between maritime law enforcement and other agen-
be to establish boundaries of acceptable behavior cies to counter IUU fishing wherever it occurs. A new
for interactions involving autonomous platforms fusion center in the Western Pacific could link with the
enabled by artificial intelligence — in both the IFC in Singapore to raise visibility on IUU fishing and
maritime and air domains in the geographic scope of spur coordinated responses to incidents.
ASEAN. The understanding could be broadened over
time to cover waters and airspace administered by Awareness of IUU activities is insufficient, however,
other governments in Asia. to effectively protect fish stocks in the Pacific.
Increased awareness will need to be paired with
expanded interdiction capabilities. This will require
elevated and persistent U.S. Coast Guard presence
with shiprider arrangements for local maritime
law enforcement officers, as well as fast response
cutters on American Samoa potentially.19 It will also
require significant new investments in maritime
law enforcement capacity building for the front-line
states most heavily impacted by IUU fishing.

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 5

Even if such efforts are insufficient in the near term
to deter Beijing from continuing its IUU fishing, Expand and
they could over time put the spotlight on Beijing for
destroying the maritime habitat, thereby sharpening regularize dialogue
the choice for China of whether to continue plundering
ocean resources. Taking these steps might also help mechanisms and
instill a greater collective purpose in the Pacific.
other exchanges to
On a broader level, the region should seize the
opportunities that crises present to galvanize action.
build relationships
Coordination has strengthened in response to
previous tragedies, including the 2004 Indian Ocean As a rule of thumb, it is easier for officials who have
earthquake and tsunami and the 2011 earthquake genuine relationships with each other to manage
and tsunami in Japan. Following these crises, the incidents and advance maritime security. Of course,
United States and other capable countries coor- building relationships takes time and repeated inter-
dinated to deliver humanitarian assistance and actions. Empowered officials should meet each other
disaster relief. Should future crises emerge in the regularly, but this will have to be at regional meetings
region, ASEAN or a subset of its members could play given Asia’s geography. To draw senior officials to
a critical role in helping coordinate relief efforts. these gatherings, the meetings must be scheduled
on a consistent basis and deliver practical progress
in addressing common challenges.
In addition, there may be value in creating greater
regional transparency around seabed natural
resource exploration and exploitation activities. There is already a dense collection of regional
These activities often spark the escalation of groupings (see table 1). These forums provide a
tensions and disputes. If the IFC or a similar body neutral venue for U.S. and Chinese counterparts to
could raise awareness regionwide of seabed explo- meet. They also offer an opportunity for the rest
ration and exploitation, it could increase the costs of the region to remind both major powers of their
and risks to any parties that try to unilaterally extract responsibility to look beyond each other to address
resources in contested areas. key challenges in Asia and globally.

At present, the overlapping regional meetings do

not appear to follow any strong sequence or logic.
A group of esteemed former officials could examine
the multiplicity of dialogues to determine whether
there might be any benefit to adjusting the meetings’
timing and sequencing; one forum could generate
momentum for other groups to advance their pieces
of Asia’s maritime security agenda.20

INVIGORATING REGIONAL EFFORTS TO BOLSTER MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA 6

TABLE 1

LIST OF REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY FORUMS

Forum Members
ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on ASEAN, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the Democratic
Maritime Security (ARF ISM) People’s Republic of Korea, the EU, India, Japan, Mongolia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea, Russia,
Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, the U.S.
ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of
Plus (ADMM-Plus) Korea, Russia, the U.S.
Maritime Security Expert Working
Group (MSEWG)
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) ASEAN
Asia-Pacific Heads of Maritime Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Federated States
Safety Agencies (APHoMSA) of Micronesia, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati,
Mongolia, Malaysia, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Papua
New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, the
Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, the U.S., Vanuatu, Vietnam
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of
(EAMF) Korea, Russia, the U.S.
Heads of Asian Coast Guard ASEAN, Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, China, India, Japan,
Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and
Turkey
North Pacific Coast Guard Forum Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the U.S.
(NPCGF)
Regional Cooperation Agreement ASEAN, Bangladesh, China, Denmark, Germany, India, Japan, the
on Combating Piracy and Armed Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, the U.K., the
Robbery against Ships in Asia U.S.
(ReCAAP)
Southeast Asia Cooperation and Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Fiji, France, Germany,
Training (SEACAT) Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom,
United States, Vietnam
Western Pacific Naval Symposium Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Indonesia,
(WPNS) Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the
Philippines, Russia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand,
Tonga, the U.S., Vietnam

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 7

 Conclusion major powers may remain cautious about endorsing
risk reduction initiatives until they feel confident in
the strength of their deterrent against the other.
The great power rivalry between the United States
and China is most directly demonstrated in the In the meantime, regional countries cannot sit idly
waters of the Western Pacific. The Asian maritime by while the United States and China seek this
domain is growing more contested and more confidence. Even if the recommended actions in this
crowded. This reality magnifies how important it is paper do not lower the temperature of U.S.-China
to lower the risk of war by reducing the potential for tensions, they should help reduce the risk of military
incidents that could escalate. escalation. And such an outcome would serve the
interests of all countries in the region. For this reason,
Investing in efforts to lower maritime risk will gain Asian powers should advance practical mechanisms
urgency in the coming years. It is almost a given that to limit the risk of conflict and enhance opportuni-
both the United States and China will invest signifi- ties for cooperation. To begin with, they could forge
cantly in their naval maritime technological base. greater consensus around international law, build
They will also continue to bolster their deterrent up codes of conduct, create greater unity of effort
capabilities. The United States is already working and a common operating picture, and use dialogues
with its partners to accelerate the innovation of new to foster relationships among the chief actors. With
and emerging technologies. It is then developing systemic stresses growing and great power relations
new doctrines and plans to obtain an edge in the use deteriorating, there is no time to waste.
of those technologies. Similarly, China is advancing
its own historic naval buildup, looking for ways to
expand access for its forces overseas, and appar-
ently pursuing opportunities for coalition building
with Russia and potentially others as well. Both

INVIGORATING REGIONAL EFFORTS TO BOLSTER MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA 8

 References
1 For further writing on the evolution of the 2022, https://apnews.com/9d5172dafc703b7d-
Western Pacific as a geopolitical fault line, see ccc4ac175a984c91.
Bruce D. Jones, To Rule the Waves: How Control
11 Permanent Court of Arbitration Award for Case
of the World’s Oceans Shapes the Fate of the
Nº 2013-19, July 12, 2016, https://pcacases.
Superpowers (New York: Scribner, 2021), 163.
com/web/sendAttach/2086.
2 For further writing on the long peace in Asia,
12 In addition to the United States, other actors
see Richard C. Bush, “Conference on the risks
including the United Kingdom, France, Australia,
to the Asian peace: Avoiding paths to great
and Japan have conducted freedom of naviga-
power war,” (conference remarks, Taipei, June
tion operations in the region in recent years.
17, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-re-
cord/conference-on-the-risks-to-the-asian- 13 “Risky Competition: Strengthening U.S.-China
peace-avoiding-paths-to-great-power-war/. Crisis Management,” (Brussels: International
Crisis Group, May 2022), 27, https://www.
3 Bruce D. Jones, To Rule the Waves, 4.
crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/
4 Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, and Ronald china/324-risky-competition-strengthen-
O’Rourke, “China Primer: South China Sea ing-us-china-crisis-management.
Disputes,” (Washington: Congressional
14 Ibid., ii.
Research Service, February 2021), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prod- 15 James Steinberg and Michael E. O’Hanlon,
code=IF10607. Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China
Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton
5 Bruce D. Jones, To Rule the Waves, 163.
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014),
6 Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, and Ronald 197-198.
O’Rourke, “China Primer: South China Sea
16 Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre, “AI and
Disputes.”
International Stability: Risks and Confidence-
7 Bruce D. Jones, To Rule the Waves, 184. Building Measures,” (Washington: Center for a
New American Security, January 2021), https://
8 Patricia M. Kim, “Does the China-Solomon
www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-in-
Islands security pact portend a more interven-
ternational-stability-risks-and-confidence-build-
tionist Beijing?,” The Brookings Institution, May
ing-measures.
6, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2022/05/06/does-the-china-solo- 17 “Fact Sheet on Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
mon-islands-security-pact-portend-a-more-inter- and Launch of IFC Real-Time Information-
ventionist-beijing/. Sharing System (IRIS),” Ministry of Defense and
the Singapore Armed Forces (MINDEF), May 14,
9 Tony Munroe, Andrew Osborn, and Humeyra
2019, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/
Pamuk, “China, Russia Partner up Against West
mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/arti-
at Olympics Summit,” Reuters, February 4, 2022,
cle-detail/2019/May/14may19_fs.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-
china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow-backs- 18 Bruce D. Jones, To Rule the Waves, 171.
beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/
19 Alexander B. Gray, “Guarding the Pacific:
10 Lolita C. Baldor, “Milley: China more aggressive, How Washington Can Counter Beijing in the
dangerous to US, allies,” AP News, July 24, Solomons and Beyond,” War on the Rocks,

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 9

 September 30, 2022, https://warontherocks.
com/2022/09/guarding-the-pacific-how-wash-
ington-can-counter-china-in-the-solomons-and-
beyond/.

20 In the maritime security domain, the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) focuses on environmental protection,
mariner safety, fisheries management, resource
management (other than fisheries), counterter-
rorism, law enforcement, and naval operations.
See Dita Liliansa, “ASEAN Conceptualizations
of Maritime Security,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, December 1, 2021, https://
amti.csis.org/asean-conceptualizations-of-mar-
itime-security/.

INVIGORATING REGIONAL EFFORTS TO BOLSTER MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA 10

 About the author
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Michael H.
Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He is also a nonresident affiliated
fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Hass focuses his research and analysis on enhancing
policy development on the pressing political, economic, and security challenges facing the United States in
East Asia.

Acknowledgments
The author presented an earlier version of this paper at the Jakarta Geopolitical Forum on August 24, 2022.
The author wishes to thank Kevin Dong for research support, Bruce Jones and Michael O’Hanlon for providing
feedback, Lori Merritt for editing, and Chris Krupinski for layout.

Disclaimer
The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions.
Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innova-
tive, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of
any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its
management, or its other scholars.

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 11