Holodomor Consequences

The Holodomor and Its Consequences in the Ukrainian Countryside
Author(s): Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, Marta D. Olynyk and Andrij Wynnyckyj

Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1/4, AFTER THE HOLODOMOR: THE
ENDURING IMPACT OF THE GREAT FAMINE ON UKRAINE (2008), pp. 1-13
Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
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The Holodomor and Its Consequences
in the Ukrainian Countryside
Stanislav Kul chyts'kyi
i he Bolsheviks' political opponents rightly considered Lenin's Ap

1917 plan to build a "commune state" Utopian. Although the leaders of
Bolshevik party did succeed in creating the state they imagined, they
so with the aid of terror and propaganda. Within two decades an artif
socioeconomic order was created in the Soviet Union that simulated the one
described in the classic works of revolutionary Marxism.
In order to disguise the connection between the crisis and the accelerated
pace of building communism, Lenin called the policy that was implemented
in 1918-20 "war communism"—that is, a system of provisional measures
whose adoption was imposed by circumstances independent of the Soviet
government: the civil war and foreign military intervention. Twice in the two
decades that followed, the accelerated construction of communism led directly
to simultaneous economic, social, and political crises. In order to resolve the
first crisis, in 1921 Lenin carried out an expropriation of the "commanding
heights" of the economy and built relations based on free market principles
between the state sector and the multi-million-strong peasantry. The second
communist assault, which was implemented in 1929-32, took into account
the failure of the economic policy of "war communism." Its main goals were to
speed up industrialization of the country at the expense of domestic resources
and to expropriate the property of the so-called petty bourgeoisie—peasants,
tradesmen, craftsmen, and merchants. In keeping with the 1919 program of
the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) (RCP[b]), agricultural production
was supposed to be concentrated on Soviet state farms and communes, which
were regarded as integral links in the planned economy.
Like Lenin in 1919-20, Stalin encountered colossal peasant opposition to
the expropriation of private property. In order to create the collective farm
system, the state deported hundreds of thousands of well-to-do peasants and
imposed punitively high taxes on independent farmsteads. The collective farm
2 KUL CH.YTS KYI
system the Bolsheviks introduce

not a commune. Collective farm
of their private plots "for the m
report to the 16th Congress of
(AUCPJb]) in June 1930. For the
receive payment in the form of
was devised to describe a unit of
April 1930 the Soviet governm
deliver to the state between one
harvested grain, while the rema
up as payment for workdays.2
However, despite this publici
mandeered the collective farm
recompense. The requisitioned
the growing urban population an
with which to import equipmen
in the main grain-producing reg
Transvolga region—reacted to th
of work on the collective farms
homesteads. In 1932 famine appe
to avert a countrywide economi
Stalin announced that the Secon
at an accelerated pace. He justifi
own expression), which was im
by the Soviet Union's industrial
"mortal danger" as a result of su
In January 1933 Stalin announc
ing, which was to be replaced by
to levying a grain tax on collect
is, indirectly recognizing the pe
duction. After fulfilling their t
freely dispose of the products th
plots. This meant that collective
communist economy. The susp
construction helped overcome th
the majority of regions in the U
This was not the case in thr
a catastrophe of immense pro
Kazakhstan. The large scale of th
was the result of the forced sett
to farming, the Kazakhs were fo
to meet the assigned state delive
HOLODOMOR IN THE UKRAINIAN COUNTRYSIDE 3
the meat that remained after the quotas had been filled, they b
to death.
In the two regions that had a predominantly Ukrainian pop
Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban region of the southern RSFSR—the
of the famine was caused by the deliberate actions of the Soviet
In November and December 1932 dozens of raions in the Ukrain
Kuban were placed on so-called blacklists, and in January 1933 t
action spread throughout Ukraine. If the quantity of confiscated
meet the state grain delivery targets, the state punished the debt
in kind. Guided by existing legislation on fines in kind, Stalin's s
conducted house-to-house searches, confiscating all types of
grain. Furthermore, the Ukrainian SSR and Kuban were block
to prevent starving peasants from fleeing to other regions. Any
on the famine was processed strictly through secret bureaucratic
placed in "special dossiers."
In order to assess the relations between the state and the peas
the Second Five-Year Plan, it is crucial to recognize that in all r
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus and the Transvolga, th
unanticipated and not of catastrophic dimensions; from Stalin's
it was the result of actions aimed at the construction of the com
as proposed in the RCP(b) program. But the state's forcible m
selective dekulakization and the taxation/benefits differential),
used to integrate the peasantry into the command economy, tur
inadequate where the Ukrainians were concerned. Therefore, an ad
of violence—the weapon of famine—was used against the peasan
This terrorist action in Ukraine, and its absence in other regions
does not mean that scholars should study the Holodomor in i
the Kremlin's policy of accelerated socioeconomic transformatio
to the Union-wide famine of 1932-33. But equally wrong is the
that dilutes the specific horrors of the Ukrainian Holodomor in
famine, as some Russian scholars do.
Researchers studying the Holodomor and its consequences
mine why the Kremlin leaders, in their policies toward the Ukrain
found it necessary to launch the most horrific punitive action k
the confiscation of food from an entire nation, accompanied by p
ades and the suppression of information. This action, which was
camouflaged as state grain procurements, is the subject of h
among scholars around the world: was this an act of genocide or
this paper, the ethnonational aspects of the Kremlin's repressive
appear only as background.
To study the consequences of the Ukrainian Holodomor within
of the "revolution from above" it is necessary to establish the p
4 KULCHYTSKYI
tragedy in the agrarian s

implementing according
not convinced that his re
be long lasting. The Gene
entitled "About the Collec
which was approved at th
document emphasized tha
farm was the agricultura
farm movement can be
corresponding to the str
lective farm cadres, and t
However, it was not a qu
qualified cadres. Of great
the peasantry tightly to t
center. The 1932 crisis fo
their cooperative form, b
keep part of their outp
enterprises that were und
ownership, formally gran
proclaimed personal for i
the right to sell their pr
Thus, they—and, above a
circulation of money and
To the end of his life Sta
state, which was outlined
Economic Problems of So
"In order to raise collectiv
surplus collective farm
modity circulation and in
state industry and the co
problems, as they say. To
originality of Stalin's com
common in the West.
The context elaborated a
under one denominator: t
collective farm market o
dent farmers. We do not
these actions had suddenl
two events took place at
separately, as has been th
In examining both the
denominator, we begin to
instruction of 8 May 1933, which was sent to the heads of party a

tive bodies, state security, the courts, and branches of the prosec
Scholars have long been familiar with this document because
instruction was found in Smolensk in an archive that was cap
Wehrmacht. It was eventually published in the USSR in the Febr
1955 issue of the journal Sotsialisticheskii vestnik. The instruction
"Now the task lies in meeting halfway the growing appeal of co
among independent laboring peasants and helping them join
farms, the only place where they can protect themselves from
impoverishment and famine."
The key word here was "famine." The Stalinist state proved that
stop short of organizing a famine, and this assurance was substa
concrete situation: in the spring of 1933 people in Ukrainian and
were dying in the hundreds of thousands—and millions. In order
this situation, Stalin and Molotov ordered Soviet officials to suspe
deportations and acute forms of repressions" throughout the co
The subtext of the instruction was that for the Kremlin the
were not a goal in themselves, but a method with which to i
RCP(b)'s program of 1919. With the help of the famine Stalin d
lions of peasants merely in order to advance along the path tow
communism. Once this was done, another task rose to the foref
the starving peasants to work effectively on the collective farm
the first time in conditions of peace party bodies were created
direct management of agricultural production—the political dep
Machine-Tractor Stations (MTSs) and Soviet state farms.
Without deliberating upon the connection between the forced
of the plans for communist construction and the punitive actio
Ukrainian peasantry, the distinguished twentieth-century Ukra
Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky arrived at the correct conclusions. In an
published in 1956 by the Paris-based Polish journal Kultura, he w
The Ukrainian peasantry's mass resistance to collectivization thre

to undo Stalin's ambitious economic plans. This was the reason
Stalin's wrath and vengefulness vis-à-vis Ukraine, and it coincide
the feelings of resentment among Russian officials who were offen
the Ukrainians' "insolence." Stalin and the Soviet Russian bureaucr
which he was the head, decided "to teach the khokhols some sens
losses that Ukraine endured as a result of Stalin's policies were hor
Paradoxically, the phrase "to teach the khokhols some sense" cor
the phrase, "to teach the collective farmers any sense," which S
used in a letter that he wrote to Stalin on 15 March 1933 (histor
6 KULCHYTSKYI
of its existence only in 199

the all-Union chief about t
thus: "The unsatisfactory p
raions shows that starvatio
tive farm workers."7 Ther
two statements. The terror
associations in people from
It was eminently clear tha
based on the principles di
The Soviet leaders and colle
defined positions. The sta
stricted food requisitioni
the forcibly created collec
of collective farming and
defined procurements.
This consensus between th
Model Statute of the Agric
of Collective Farm Shock
restricted the size of priva
are, depending on local con
explained frankly in a speec
of the Kuibyshev collectiv
"Comrades, it is clear that
be turned into the kind [of
going out to work."8
After the Holodomor the
game, which the Russian
to communal farming—had
hunger, which constantly
farms were created, they
munal farming system. H
acquiesced to serf-like labo
This change in mentality,
by recollections of Ie. Kosy
Dnipropetrovsk oblast, wh
1933harvest:
We put locks on our houses

the rural soviet, the [party
The entire village—from chi
grass and to poison mice an
we ourselves were surprise
and three, and even five times. And from our sandy plots, from o
hectares we took 15 centners each of spring and winter wheat, 17
of high-quality oats, 13 centners of corn, and 15 of barley. For one
we received over one pood of grain and 3 rubles 90 kopecks in c
In Ukraine, the harvest of 1933 was accompanied by huge

by the collective farmers' physical incapacity for work. There
shortage of labor, which the authorities struggled to overcom
mobile brigades of collective farmers living in districts that h
during the Holodomor, and also by temporarily suspending th
to territorial units of the Red Army. Red Army soldiers, wor
industrial enterprises, and students played a significant role in
In 1934 Kosior, recalling the shortcomings of the previous yea
campaign, declared that, according to the most modest estimat
reached several hundred million poods, and it was only the goo
"to a certain degree erased all the mistakes during the harvestin
In previous years, losses during poor harvests were also c
Third Conference of the CP(b)U held in July 1932 the Ukraini
figures of the absolute losses during the 1931 harvest: Panas L
a figure ranging between 100 and 150 million poods; Kosior—b
150 million poods; Oleksandr Shlikhter reported 150 million
Skrypnyk's figure was closer to 200 million poods. Although t
not purport to be accurate, they give a good idea of the scale o
amounted to one-half of the annual food stocks of Ukraine's rur
Meanwhile, the real harvest of 1932 cannot be estimated at all,
Tauger's long-term efforts.12
As a result of the conversion from food requisitioning to pu
government's situation in 1933 turned out to be completely diffe
the state was seizing, in the form of state grain deliveries, what
its hands on, but with every passing year it found less and les
In contrast to those years, Ukraine had already fulfilled its stat
plan from the 1933 harvest by early November. The colossal loss
any impact on the state plan because the mandatory requisition
from the ungathered harvest. The peasants, exhausted from st
the ones who suffered.
Although the collective farm peasantry had succeeded in wres

for itself within the command economy, it was forced to provid
an excessively large proportion of its surplus products. Let
climate conditions for two years: 1933 and 1936. With 1,419 m
grain standing in the fields and 317 million poods delivered to th
the ratio of grain production to the total output stood officially
an amount equal to that of the second half of the 1920s, and tw
8 KULCHYTSKYI
pre-Revolution ratio. Howe

were recorded in 1933. In ord
production, these losses mus
harvest was lost (this figure
and independent foreign exp
grain handed over to the stat
of production was not lower
In 1936 the harvest covered
The state took delivery of 5
in any previous year, includ
The specific weight of the s
39.5 percent. Harvested crop
grain production was over
accurate figure without know
field and granary. What is k
agricultural sphere was norm
ratio of grain production to
40-percent level.13
A comparison of the years
its advantage all the savings
ing losses. However, after th
changes appeared in the live
expand their subsidiary bran
farming, bee-keeping, and
ticipation of able-bodied mem
increased. During 1937 every
zone received an average of
a crucial supplement to the
Between 1934 and 1937 collec
calves. In 1937 there were 11
farms.14
Returning to Stalin and Molotov's instruction of 8 May 1933 banning "mass

deportations" and "acute forms of repressions," it should be noted that this ban
pertained only to the countryside, which had been subdued by the famine. It
was precisely in the spring of 1933 that the Kremlin launched mass repressions
of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including Communist Party members, under
the slogan of the struggle against bourgeois nationalism as the main threat
to the Soviet order. These repressions were carried out in tandem with the
party and state leaders' demonstrative attention to the linguistic and cultural
aspects of "Bolshevik" Ukrainization in the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time,
Ukrainization outside the borders of Ukraine was labeled "Petliurite," and then
banned. The crowning point of the Kremlin's two-pronged policy vis-à-vis
Ukraine was the transfer in mid-1934 of the republic's capital from proletarian
Kharkiv to the country's national center, the city of Kyiv. Afte

this move no longer alarmed the Kremlin leaders.
The distinguished Russian agricultural expert Viktor Danilov
ethnonational composition of Soviet citizens who were represse
between August 1937 and July 1938. He discovered that Russia
58.3 percent of all those arrested, while only 16.2 percent of tho
Ukrainians.15 Meanwhile, according to the 1937 census, Rus
55 percent of the total population of the USSR and Ukrainians,
Analyzing the correlation between these figures, Danilov asked
ing question: how can one claim that Ukrainians were the focu
attention on the part of the Soviet punitive organs when the R
suffered the greatest losses during the Great Terror—not just
but also relative losses?
Nevertheless, it must be stated that Ukraine was at the epicen
repressions. In 1937-38 the state security organs arrested 26
the Ukrainian SSR, and in 1932-33, i99»ooo.17 Thus, the num
arrested during the Holodomor is only slightly below the Great
Responding to Danilov's question during our last meeting, I tol
Great Terror in Ukraine began at the same time as the Holodom
Why did Stalin destroy Ukrainians to a greater degree than
answer to this question may be found even in Stalin's now-
spondence with his closest associates, Kaganovich and Molotov.
nationality policy was always cloaked in the lexicon of "ardent in
However, the hypothesis that none other than Ukraine was at
of the Stalinist repressions is corroborated by an immense am
material.
There are no grounds to regard the mass repressions targeting the citizens
of Ukraine as ethnic purges, although this particular notion does appear in
Ukrainian-language historical literature. The conflation of the Holodomor
with the Great Terror in the two Ukrainian-speaking regions of the USSR is
explained not by ethnic considerations but by the political concerns of the
Kremlin leaders. It is worth revisiting the reflections of Lysiak-Rudnytsky:
Stalin's policies on Ukraine boiled down to a gigantic attempt to break

the resistance of the Ukrainian people by methods of physical violence.
Yet, at issue was not the total annihilation of Ukrainians, as was done
to the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, and some
peoples of the North Caucasus; Ukrainians were too numerous for
this. Nevertheless, Stalin consistently sought to destroy all the leading
Ukrainian social groups in order to decapitate the nation, force it to
capitulate, and turn it into a submissive tool in the hands of the Kremlin
powers that be.18
10 KULCHYTSKYI
Therefore, the Holodomo

The nature of terror by f
other campaigns of preve
all-Union famine in 1932-
regions as a result of the
grain-consuming region
food supply of population
tant. However, the all-Un
beginning, of the Holod
caused the same kind of f
situation changed qualitat
all foodstuffs in order to
the expected social explos
utterly dependent on foo
Stalin set about feeding t
and Soviet state farms.19
the only people who were
the sowing campaign. Th
The demographic consequ
security service were so
that millions of people h
world. In order to put a s
information on the mort
Soviet Union. During his
January 1934, the Soviet
Union had grown from 1
1933-20 The latter numbe
early 1933 (165.7 million)
annual natural increase, w
In announcing this figur
famine in the USSR.
This fabricated Stalinist

publications. Demographe
tion at the beginning of
pendent Russian historian
Maksudov) writes, "One c
leaders of the country, an
consequences of the soc
not have failed to guess t
countryside [were] chang
how or to what extent."21
It is not known who war
upcoming population census, but the date of this warning

On 27 June 1936 the Central Executive Committee and th
Commissars of the USSR (Sovnarkom) banned abortion
November 1955). Ukraine's birthrate rose from 766,000 in
in 1937.22 However, the date of the census was approachi
abortions did not have a fundamental impact on the tota
The census took place during the night of 6 January 193
head of the Central Administration of Economic Account
SSR (TsUNKhU), and other directors of the census cam
high state honors. Newspapers and journals began publish
census data. However, everything came to a crashing
republics submitted data to Moscow on their total popula
the census. In particular, Ukraine's population in 1937 tu
than the one recorded during the 1926 census.
A comparison of the data on the top ten numerically la
in the USSR, which are contained in these two censuse
catastrophe that had struck the Ukrainians and Kazakhs.
figure of 100 to indicate the total population in 1926, in
picture of the population increase emerges: Armenians, 1
Azerbaijanis, 125.1; Russians, 120.7; Georgians, 115.3; Uzbe
102.9; and Jews, 101.6. Meanwhile, the population of Ukr
had decreased to 84.7, and the Kazakhs to 72.3.23
The main cause of the drop in the Ukrainian and Kazak
the famine that each of these nations had experienced. T
of Russians was explained not so much by a high birthra
of the policy of indigenization outside the borders of re
nations." In other words, during the 1937 census the milli
Belarusians who resided permanently outside their respec
registered as Russians. After the Holodomor, the autocht
of the Kuban region no longer broached the question of
Ukrainian SSR.
To this day historians have only a superficial understanding of the processes

that were taking place in the consciousness of Soviet citizens on the eve and
in the course of the Second World War. There is no doubt, however, that an
awareness barrier was forming between the generation that was approaching
adulthood and the generation that had had firsthand experience of all types
of terror, including terror by famine. No public statements could be made
about the Famine of 1932-33. Furthermore, not even members of families that
had lived through the Holodomor ventured to discuss it at home so as not to
endanger their children and themselves and risk being accused of disseminat
ing anti-Soviet propaganda.
The temporally distant consequences of the Holodomor were clearly mani
12 KULCHYTSKYI
fested after Nazi German

were caused not so much
the low moral-psychologi
ern and central directions
strong resistance, in the
ing. The majority of Red
of encirclement. At the s
whatsoever. Red Army tr
had caused them so much
captured throughout the
tured in 1941 alone.24
In 1942 the mood among
Ukraine began to change
who had acquiesced to t
state, the Nazis set out sy
create Lebensraum for se
the physical existence of
a counteroffensive in earnest.
The historical memory of the Holodomor was actively and systematically

repressed for several decades afterward. With the advent of perestroika in the
late 1980s, scholars finally began to uncover the true history of the famine.
Unfortunately, many of the voices that could have told what happened in the
countryside had already fallen silent by that time. Nonetheless, some few have
been captured, and can restore the memory of the past.
Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk and Andrij Wynnyckyj
Notes
I. Stalin, Tvory (Kyiv, 1951), 12:283.

V. Danilov, R. Manning, L. Viola et al, eds., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: kollektivi
zatsiia i raskulachivanie: dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927-1939, 5 vols.
(Moscow, 1999-), 2:383-84.
Stalin, Tvory, 13:183.
KomunistychnapartiiaRadians'koho Soiuzu v rezoliutsiiakh i rishenniakhz'izdiv,
konferentsii i plenumiv TsK, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1980), 431.
I. Stalin, Ekonomicheskie problemy sotsializma v SSSR (Moscow, 1952), 93. The
English translation is located at: http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/EPS52.pdf,
97-98.
Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, Istorychni ese, ed. Frank Sysyn and Iaroslav Hrytsak, 2 vols.
(Kyiv, 1994), 2:297-98. Khokhol is a derogatory Russian epithet for Ukrainians.
7. R. Pyrih et al., comp., Holod1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma

dokumentiv (Kyiv, 1990), 443.
8. See M. A. Vyltsan, Zavershaiushchii etap sozdaniia kolkhoznogo
gg. (Moscow, 1978), 28.
9. See M. I. [Mikhail Ivanovich] Kalinin, Vypolniaem zavetyLenina
68. One centner equals 100 kilograms; one pood equals 16.38 kilo
pounds.
10. Komunist, 17 June 1934.
11. Stanislav V. Kul'chyts'kyi, Tsina "Velykoho perelomu" (Kyiv, 1991), 193,213.
12. Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Soviet Famine of 1932-1933," Slavic
Review 50, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 70-89; Mark B. Tauger, Natural Disaster and
Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of1931-1933, Carl Beck Papers in Russian
and East European studies 1506 (Pittsburgh, 2001). For a critical review of Tauger's
arguments, see David Marples, "Debating the undebatable? Ukraine Famine of
1932-1933," Ukrainian Weekly, 14 July 2002, http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/
archive/2002/280205.shtml (accessed 2 October 2013).
13. Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, Holodomor 1932-1933 rr. iak henotsyd: trudnoshchi usvi
domlennia (Kyiv, 2008), 360-61.
14. Ukrainskaia SSR vperiodpostroeniia i ukrepleniia sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva
(1921-1941), vol. 7 of Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR, ed. lu. lu. Kondufor et al. (Kyiv, 1984),
422-23.
15. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, vol. 5, bk. 2,18.

16. Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937goda: obshchie itogi; Sbornik dokumentov i
materialov (Moscow, 2007), 110.
17. V. M. Nikol's'kyi, "Represyvna diial'nist' orhaniv derzhavno'i bezpeky SRSR v
Ukraini (kinets' 1920-kh-1950-ti rr.): Istoryko-statystychne doslidzhennia" (Doc
tor of Historical Sciences diss., Donetsk National University, 2003), 119.
18. Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, Istorychni ese, 2:297.
19. O. A. Antipova et al., comp., Golod v SSSR, 1930-1934 gg. / Famine in the USSR,
1930-1934 (Moscow, 2009), 83.
20. Stalin, Tvory, 13:332.
21. Sergei Maksudov, Poteri naseleniia SSSR (Benson, Vt., 1989), 272.
22. O. P. Rudnyts'kyi, "Demohrafichni naslidky holodu 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraïns'kii
RSR," in Istoriia narodnoho hospodarstva ta ekonomichnoï dumky Ukraïns'koï
RSR, vol. 24 (Kyiv, 1990), 25.
23. lu. A. Poliakov et al., eds., Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937g.: kratkie itogi
(Moscow, 1991), 97.
24. M. Mel'tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soiuz i bor'ba za Evropu,
1939-1941 gg.: dokumenty, fakty, suzhdeniia (Moscow, 2000), 512.

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The Holodomor and Its Consequences in the Ukrainian Countryside

Author(s): Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, Marta D. Olynyk and Andrij Wynnyckyj

Stanislav Kul chyts'kyi

i he Bolsheviks' political opponents rightly considered Lenin's Ap

system the Bolsheviks introduce

tragedy in the agrarian s

instruction of 8 May 1933, which was sent to the heads of party a

The Ukrainian peasantry's mass resistance to collectivization thre

of its existence only in 199

We put locks on our houses

In Ukraine, the harvest of 1933 was accompanied by huge

Although the collective farm peasantry had succeeded in wres

pre-Revolution ratio. Howe

Returning to Stalin and Molotov's instruction of 8 May 1933 banning "mass

Kharkiv to the country's national center, the city of Kyiv. Afte

Stalin's policies on Ukraine boiled down to a gigantic attempt to break

Therefore, the Holodomo

This fabricated Stalinist

It is not known who war

upcoming population census, but the date of this warning

To this day historians have only a superficial understanding of the processes

fested after Nazi German

The historical memory of the Holodomor was actively and systematically

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk and Andrij Wynnyckyj

I. Stalin, Tvory (Kyiv, 1951), 12:283.

7. R. Pyrih et al., comp., Holod1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma

15. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, vol. 5, bk. 2,18.

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