G.R. No. 166738 - Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Eduardo Rumbaua https://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&v...

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G.R. NO. 166738 - ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA V. EDUARDO RUMBAUA

G.R. No. 166738 - Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Eduardo Rumbaua

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 166738 : August 14, 2009]

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner, v. EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

1
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her Petition for Review on Certiorari,
the decision dated June 25, 20042 and the resolution dated January 18, 20053 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and
void on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand,
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner's complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
against the respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown
by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof
after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother's death; he
represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he
was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.

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Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal service proved futile.5
The RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to
ensure that no fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.6 Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson's
report negated the presence of collusion between the parties.7

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition.8 The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to
assist in all hearings of the case.9

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her charges.

The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva
Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondent's family did not
approve of their relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the
petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted
the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a
"secret marriage" in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married in
Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived together; the
petitioner stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his parents in
Novaliches.

The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months of their marriage. At
that point, the respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their
marriage would affect his application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple's
daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioner's house in Fairview; they would have sexual
trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he lost his employment
with PAL.10

In 1994, the parties' respective families discovered their secret marriage. The respondent's mother tried
to convince him to go to the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living
separately from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992
and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent indicated as well in his
visa application that he was single.

In April 1995, the respondent's mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his
mother's death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent's
action, the petitioner severed her relationship with the respondent. They eventually reconciled through the
help of the petitioner's father, although they still lived separately.

In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, the
petitioner and her mother went to the respondent's house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with
one Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an
affair with Cynthia.11 The petitioner apparently did not believe the respondents and moved to to Nueva
Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.12

The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between her and respondent
had ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their
marriage contract;13 and the testimony, curriculum vitae,14 and psychological report15 of clinical
psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on the petitioner: a
Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw
a Person Test; a Sach's Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.16 She thereafter prepared a psychological
report with the following findings:

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TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning
remained intact. She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations
especially if it is within her interests. She is pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had
reservations from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Her
age speaks of maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant attitude
which makes her a subject for manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years of
their relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday
things will be much better for them. But upon the advent of her husband's infidelity, she gradually lost
hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of
being aggressive and very cautious at times - so as to fight with the frustration and insecurity she had
especially regarding her failed marriage.

Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he believes

that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use
others for his own advancement with an extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would
do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner.

REMARKS

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged
with it. In love, "age does matter." People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life with
another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or
let love die - it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.

In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really happened for her towards the
young respondent - who used "love" as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she
extended towards him. He made her believe that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful - only to
reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that
he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner look like an innocent fool. His
character traits reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe and
incurable.17 [Emphasis supplied.]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties' marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the
testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:

x x x

Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed limited or
block [sic] out communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like petitioner's birthdays and
Valentine's Day; going out only on occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to have
sexual intercourse.

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which show the
psychological incapacity of respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to
enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family
Code). This incapacity is "declared grave, severe and incurable."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and
respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.

SO ORDERED.18

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The CA Decision

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.19 The CA decision of June 25, 2004
reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties' marriage.20

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag's psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the
respondent's so-called "narcissistic personality disorder;" it did not discuss the respondent's childhood and
thus failed to give the court an insight into the respondent's developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed
to explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent's incapacity was "deep-seated" and
"incurable."

The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be psychological, although its
manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party
was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed,
knowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
In the present case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her
because of his parents' objection to their marriage.

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution of January
18, 2005.21

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that '

1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina22 (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed

with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15,

2003;

2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert

witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper

justice with mercy; and cralawlibrary

3. Dr. Tayag's testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.

The petitioner prays that the RTC's and the CA's decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA's
decision be set aside and the RTC's decision be reinstated.

The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took
effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court's decision and remanding the case
for further proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.23

The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.

THE COURT'S RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to
appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:

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(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC24 - - which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published - - is
geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial
regulation provides:

SEC. 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within
fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the
lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.

The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was
rendered despite the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the
petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the
requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.

The petitioner's argument lacks merit.

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does
not create or remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already
existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,25 as we held in De
Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:26

Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and
may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any
procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes27 and
Navales v. Navales28 have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the
Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus,
what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be
certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner's objection regarding the Molina guideline on
certification lacks merit.

A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper

The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts' decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC
for further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her
evidence during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that
remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this
regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to

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serve the ends of justice.

We do not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not
procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the
trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the
period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary
prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party's rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and
produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel
as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for
declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner's counsel had not been negligent in handling
the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner's counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would
justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro
Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:29

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be
admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new
counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by
counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the
instant case.

Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner's requested remand.

Petitioner failed to establish the

respondent's psychological incapacity

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court
first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence;
and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be

resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and

nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage

and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as

the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from

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dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their

permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)

alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although

its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the

parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have

known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption

thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of

the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as

a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by

qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The

evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The

manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have

attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such

incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily

absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the

assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise

of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential

obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional

emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright

incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a

natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality

structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the

obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code

as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to

parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,

proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts'

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as

counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a

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certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement

or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting

attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is

deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent

function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.31 These
requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left
to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.32 We emphasized this approach in the
recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting33 when we explained:

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioner's
evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected
of him as a husband.

A. Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondent's condition

The petitioner's evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with
her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her
greeting cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e)
blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was
cohabiting with another woman in 1997.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and
should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,34 we ruled that it was not
enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor - an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations - had to be shown and was not shown in this
cited case.

In the present case, the respondent's stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly
irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner's
testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application
for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondent's failure to greet the
petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming
petitioner for his mother's death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at
best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological
incapacity. Likewise, the respondent's act of living with another woman four years into the marriage
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself

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admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.

To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these
imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at
the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the
words of Navales v. Navales:35

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on
the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

b. Dr. Tayag's psychological report and court testimony

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were
based on the information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias,
her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above.36 For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent
from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized
the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world
revolves around him"; and who "used love as a deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner]
extended towards him." Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a generalization that
respondent was a person who "lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged "in
promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the respondent's
character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable."

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling
his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report - i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" - is
an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of
the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag's subsequent testimony in court cured whatever
deficiencies attended her psychological report.

We do not share this view.

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A careful reading of Dr. Tayag's testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the
parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately
explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent's condition was grave and incurable. To directly
quote from the records:

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:

Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh. "E-7", there is a statement to
the effect that his character traits begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial
personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please explain in layman's word, Madam Witness? cralawred

DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:

A: Actually, in a layman's term, narcissistic personality disorder cannot accept that there is something
wrong with his own behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are
eccentric; they are exemplary, demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested
by the fact that respondent abused and used petitioner's love. Along the line, a narcissistic person cannot
give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly,
narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and gratification without the help of others and
this is where the petitioner set in.

Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder? cralawred

A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation under personality disorder
[sic] this is already considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind
of developmental disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years and brought about by
one familiar relationship the way he was reared and cared by the family. Environmental exposure is also
part and parcel of the child disorder. [sic]

Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present? cralawred

A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he entered marriage.
[Un]fortunately, on the part of the petitioner, she never realized that such behavioral manifestation of the
respondent connotes pathology. [sic]

x x x

Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else,
how will you describe the character of this respondent who is living with somebody else? cralawred

A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one
who indulge in philandering activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of another
person, and this [is] again a buy-product of deep seated psychological incapacity.

Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe
the psychological incapacity? [sic]

A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say incurable in nature and at this
time and again [sic] the psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being
able to give meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.

Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the respondent and the petitioner,
Madam Witness? cralawred

A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and so if it takes enough that

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such psychological incapacity of respondent already existed long before he entered marriage, because if
you analyze how he was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy
symbiosis developed between the two, and this creates a major emotional havoc when he reached adult
age.

Q: How about the gravity? cralawred

A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never had an inkling that his
behavioral manifestation connotes pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit again
that such behavior of his connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the respondent is not
detrimental to himself but, more often than not, it is detrimental to other party involved.

x x x

PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:

Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here? cralawred

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent never appeared at my clinic.

Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning wife to annul their marriage with her
husband in general, what can you say about the respondent? cralawred

A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning to their relationship. If
you analyze their marital relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start of the
[marriage], the respondent to have petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their family
knew of their marriage [sic]. Respondent completely refused, completely relinquished his marital
obligation to the petitioner.

x x x

COURT:

Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner, can you really enumerate the
specific traits of the respondent? cralawred

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent attitude of the respondent.

Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment? cralawred

A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a
set of responsibility. I think that he finished his education but he never had a stable job because he
completely relied on the support of his mother.

Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific? cralawred

A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of the mother merely because
respondent happened to be the only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic]
developed between the son and the mother simply because the mother always pampered completely,
pampered to the point that respondent failed to develop his own sense of assertion or responsibility
particularly during that stage and there is also presence of the simple lying act particularly his
responsibility in terms of handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact that
respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact they are legally married.

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Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty
hurting the petitioner because on the part of the petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with another
woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the guts to feel guilty or to atone
said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically this falls under antisocial personality.37

In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag's answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:

x x x

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO

Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness? cralawred

DR. NEDY TAYAG

A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this very moment, no scientific
could be upheld to alleviate their kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person
suffering from any kind of disorder particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that they are
suffering from this kind of disorder, and then again curability will always be a question. [sic]38

This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person
suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the
nullity of a marriage - namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage, psychological
incapacity relating to marriage - and in her own limited way, related these to the medical condition she
generally described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent's exact condition except

in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short

on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic

personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was

already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent's

awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are

critical to the success of the petitioner's case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what

the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the

respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person

sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or

psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.39 If a psychological disorder can

be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted

and given credit.40 No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered

in this case, particularly about the respondent's early life and associations, and about events on or

about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us

to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner

related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of

the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent's life were examined and

given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his

focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in

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the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character

and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent's family

opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his

mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages

have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of

basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. The

continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few

married couples have likewise permanently separated simply because they have "fallen out of love," or

have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger years.

Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the
trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitioner's evidence in its present state is
woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioner's marriage to the respondent should be
nullified on the ground of the respondent's psychological incapacity.

The Court commiserates with the petitioner's marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be
unwilling to discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one's spouse.
Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to
comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to
assume.41

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75095.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

* Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second Division effective August 1, 2009 per Special Order No.

670 dated July 28, 2009.

** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective August 1, 2009 per Special Order No.

671 dated July 28, 2009.

*** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective June 3, 2009 per Special Order No.

658 dated June 3, 2009.

**** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective May 11, 2009 per Special Order No.

635 dated May 7, 2009.

1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, and concurred in by Associate Justice Eloy

R. Bello, Jr. and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine (both retired); rollo, pp. 26-34.

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