Usarmy SF CBRN

FM 3-05.
132
Army Special Operations Forces Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations
November 2009
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to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 October 2009. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JAComments@soc.mil.
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Headquarters, Department of the Army

This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).
*FM 3-05.132
Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-05.132 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 30 November 2009
Army Special Operations Forces

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................................. iv
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1-1
ARSOF CBRN Mission ....................................................................................... 1-1
Passive Defense................................................................................................. 1-1
Active Defense ................................................................................................... 1-6
Offensive Operations .......................................................................................... 1-6
Spectrum of Conflict ........................................................................................... 1-6
Operating Environments and Potential CBRN Threats ...................................... 1-7
CBRN Support Available at Direct Reporting Units.......................................... 1-11
Chapter 2 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP CHEMICAL DETACHMENTS............................. 2-1
Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment ............................................................ 2-1
Chemical Decontamination Detachment ............................................................ 2-3
CBRN Staff Elements ......................................................................................... 2-4
Chapter 3 75TH RANGER REGIMENT DECONTAMINATION
AND RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS ................................................................... 3-1
Mission ............................................................................................................... 3-1
Manning .............................................................................................................. 3-1
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only
to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 October 2009. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JAComments@soc.mil.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers
in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign
disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-05.132, 31 August 2007.
i
Contents
Command Relationships ..................................................................................... 3-1

Chapter 4 160TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT ................................. 4-1
Chemical Defense ............................................................................................... 4-2
Nuclear Defense ................................................................................................. 4-2
Decontamination ................................................................................................. 4-3
Chapter 5 SITE EXPLOITATION SUPPORT ...................................................................... 5-1
Phases of a Site Exploitation Operation ............................................................. 5-1
Site Exploitation Support ..................................................................................... 5-1
Special Operations Forces Site Exploitation Collection Teams ......................... 5-3
Exploitation Analysis Center—Organic ............................................................... 5-4
Employment ........................................................................................................ 5-5
Chapter 6 CBRN STAFF CONSIDERATIONS AND PLANNING TOOLS ......................... 6-1
Mission Analysis ................................................................................................. 6-1
Mission Planning ................................................................................................. 6-5
CBRN Staff Responsibilities ............................................................................... 6-7
Mission Preparation ............................................................................................ 6-8
Planning for CBRN Support and Interface ........................................................ 6-11
Chapter 7 PASSIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS.................................................................. 7-1
Contamination Avoidance ................................................................................... 7-1
Individual Protective Equipment.......................................................................... 7-2
Collective Protection ........................................................................................... 7-2
Early Warning Systems ....................................................................................... 7-2
Decontamination ................................................................................................. 7-3
Appendix A UNIT AND CBRN ORGANIC SUPPORT .......................................................... A-1
Appendix B PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ........................................................ B-1
Appendix C ADVANCED CBRN TRAINING ......................................................................... C-1
Appendix D CBRN SAMPLING TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES ................................ D-1
Appendix E SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ELEMENT
DECONTAMINATION OPTIONS ...................................................................... E-1
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
ii FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Contents
Figures
Figure 1-1. CBRN CWMD core task crosswalk...................................................................... 1-2
Figure 2-1. Chemical reconnaissance detachment organization and manning ..................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. Chemical decontamination detachment organization and manning .................... 2-4
Figure 3-1. Decontamination and reconnaissance team organization and manning ............. 3-1
Figure 5-1. Site exploitation support cycle ............................................................................. 5-2
Figure 5-2. Exploitation Analysis Center organization and manning ..................................... 5-4
Figure 6-1. Support assets ..................................................................................................... 6-2
Figure 6-2. Host nation interoperability considerations .......................................................... 6-6
Figure 6-3. PCISE tasks ....................................................................................................... 6-12
Figure B-1. Levels of personal protective equipment use ......................................................B-1
Figure D-1. Sampling guidance issues ................................................................................. D-1
Figure D-2. Air and vapor sampling with Draeger kits ........................................................ D-11
Figure D-3. Storing samples in the amber sample bag ....................................................... D-12
Figure D-4. Storing samples in the blue sample bag .......................................................... D-14
Figure D-5. Sample label ..................................................................................................... D-18
Figure E-1. Operational element decontamination procedures .............................................E-1
Figure E-2. Expedient personnel decontamination site .........................................................E-3
Figure E-3. One-piece cutout .................................................................................................E-4
Figure E-4. Two-piece cutout .................................................................................................E-5
Figure E-5. EPDS rucksack component data .........................................................................E-6
Figure E-6. Aircrew decontamination stations........................................................................E-7
Tables
Table B-1. Required protective equipment .............................................................................B-2
Table B-2. Equipment level requirements ..............................................................................B-4
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 iii

Preface
Field Manual (FM) 3-05.132 is an Army special operations forces (ARSOF) Tier 2 publication. The acronym
ARSOF represents Special Forces (SF), Rangers (RGR), special operations aviation (SOA), Psychological
Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA)—all supported by the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations)
(Airborne) (SB[SO][A]).
PURPOSE
FM 3-05.132 serves as a reference document for ARSOF commanders and staff, training developers, and
doctrine developers throughout the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). It provides
commanders with doctrinal considerations for organizing their individual CBRN operations and putting them
into action to accomplish missions.
SCOPE
This publication describes ARSOF CBRN missions and tasks for the chemical reconnaissance detachment
(CRD), chemical decontamination detachments (CDDs), ARSOF CBRN reconnaissance and survey operations,
decontamination and reconnaissance teams (DRTs), and ARSOF sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and
discusses reachback capability. This publication provides a basis for understanding the requirements of
individual special operations forces (SOF) personnel operating in CBRN environments, as well as the
requirements of ARSOF staff planners across the range of military operations. The manual also provides
guidance for commanders who determine force structure, equipment, material, and operational requirements
necessary to conduct SOF CBRN missions described herein.
APPLICABILITY
FM 3-05.132 provides CBRN mission guidance to the CRD, CDD, and DRT commanders, and all CBRN
personnel throughout ARSOF. This manual gives ARSOF commanders and staffs a capabilities manual of what
the new assets can provide ARSOF in the CBRN environment. FM 3-05.132 also functions as a reference
document for training and doctrine developers throughout USASOC. This publication applies to the Active
Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and United
States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
This manual is unclassified to ensure Armywide dissemination and to facilitate the integration of ARSOF in the
preparation and execution of campaigns and major operations. Unless this publication states otherwise,
masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this manual is the United
States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and
recommended changes on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly
to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to
JAComments@soc.mil.
iv FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter illustrates how ARSOF CBRN units and capabilities support the
National Military Strategy for combating weapons of mass destruction (NMS-CWMD).
It serves to familiarize conventional staffs with the dynamics of SOF operational
support. It describes tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and capabilities
tailored to the CBRN dimension in special operations (SO) missions and activities.
ARSOF CBRN MISSION

1-1. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizing
planning for global operations against terrorist networks, which it does in coordination with other combatant
commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate United States (U.S.) government agencies. As
directed, USSOCOM executes global operations against terrorist networks. As a subordinate unit, the
USASOC has an important role in CWMD operations and recognizes that the probability of operating in a
CBRN environment exists; therefore, ARSOF must specifically organize, train, and equip to be successful in
a CBRN mission. The term CBRN environment includes the deliberate, accidental employment, or threat of
CBRN weapons and attacks with CBRN or toxic industrial materials (TIMs). ARSOF CBRN forces provide
CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, and exploitation support for SOF in support of strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives in all environments (permissive, uncertain, and hostile) to support the geographic and
functional combatant commanders’ (CCDRs’) intent and objectives. This section defines the relationships
between ARSOF core tasks and the military mission areas identified in the NMS-CWMD and describes how
ARSOF CBRN units support the execution of the ARSOF core tasks across the spectrum of combating
weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations (Figure 1-1, page 1-2). Joint Publication (JP) 3-40,
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapters 1 and 4, provide a complete description of the
NMS-CWMD.
PASSIVE DEFENSE
1-2. ARSOF units are capable of providing a wide range of specialized support to CWMD operations but
are generally not resourced to conduct large-scale CWMD operations. As such, the CBRN capabilities within
ARSOF are mostly used for passive defense and to support the execution of ARSOF core tasks. CBRN
capabilities are aligned with the four subtasks of CBRN passive defense: sense, shape, shield, and sustain. In
addition to minimizing the vulnerability to and effects of WMD attacks, the ARSOF CBRN capabilities also
minimize vulnerability to the effects of TIM accidents or events.
SENSE
1-3. CBRN “sense” is defined in JP 3-11, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) Environment, as “activities that provide CBRN threat and hazard information and
intelligence to support the common operational picture.” ARSOF units’ primary defense against CBRN
contamination is to avoid becoming contaminated. Thus, the primary focus of ARSOF staff elements and
the specialized ARSOF CBRN units (CRD, CDD, DRT) is to prevent the contamination of ARSOF units
by providing them with the most relevant information and intelligence products. CBRN sense covers the
tasks of contamination avoidance and reconnaissance/detection. Executed together, these tasks produce the
initial intelligence picture of what potential threats and environmental considerations exist in the area of
operations (AO). Additionally, the reconnaissance/detection capabilities of ARSOF CBRN units provide
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-1

Chapter 1
the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and SOF commanders with an effective, deep CBRN
strategic-reconnaissance capability to detect and assess WMD in any environment.
Figure 1-1. CBRN CWMD core task crosswalk
Contamination Avoidance
1-4. Reducing ARSOF vulnerability to a CBRN event (whether accidental or threat initiated) begins with
the contamination avoidance process during the planning phases of an operation. Contamination avoidance
begins during the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) process. The unit CBRN
officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) examine map data, geospatial imagery products, meteorological
data, and intelligence products, such as target information packets, human intelligence (HUMINT) reports,
or site surveys, to determine which areas have the greatest probability for force contamination. The unit
officer can then provide the commander with knowledge concerning what areas in the AO present the
greatest risk of contamination to the force.
1-5. Contamination avoidance is not a static process. The CBRN officer and NCO must continually
update their assessment of CBRN hazards in the AO to provide the commander with the most relevant
information of the greatest potential for the force to avoid being contaminated should a CBRN event occur.
1-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Introduction
Example Scenario
SFODA XXXX has developed a target packet on a suspected insurgent leader with
ties to heroin production. In preparation for a strike, the battalion S-2 section reviews
available imagery of the site and notices a large collection of metal barrels outside of
the compound. Due to the target’s ties to heroin production, the battalion CBRN cell
also reviews the imagery and is able to identify the barrels as potentially containing
the hazardous chemicals required for refining opium into heroin.
Reconnaissance and Detection

1-6. Every company-level organization within USASOC possesses a limited capability to conduct CBRN
reconnaissance and detection. The Army common equipment issued to each unit will detect the presence of
most military chemical compounds and high levels of beta and gamma radiation. Still, this equipment only
alerts the unit to the presence of significant levels of military chemical compounds and radiation, may
show false positive readings, and maintains extremely high detection thresholds. Only the CRD, CDD, and
DRT possess the specialized equipment and training to deliver a presumptive analysis of a potential CBRN
substance. It is the presumptive analysis that gives the commander data of such quality that operational
decisions can be made relying on this data.
1-7. The ARSOF core tasks special reconnaissance (SR) and counterproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (CPWMD) are supported by the CBRN core task sense. CRDs and DRTs provide operational
support to SR and CPWMD missions.
Example Scenario
At 0330L, a massive explosion rocks the desert in western Iraq. The explosion is of
such magnitude that seismic detectors in Baghdad recorded the event; however, no
imagery assets were available to record what happened. As word spreads, there is
concern that the explosion might have been a low-order nuclear detonation. SFODA
XXXX is tasked with infiltrating to the vicinity of the explosion site and confirming or
denying the presence of residual radiation. A 2-man element from the CRD is
attached to the SFODA to provide technical assistance in determining the presence,
type, and strength of radiation.
SHAPE
1-8. CBRN “shape” is defined in JP 3-11 as “the command and control (C2) activity that integrates the
sense, shield, and sustain operational elements to characterize CBRN hazards and threats and employ
necessary capabilities to counter their effects.” Given the unique capabilities of ARSOF CBRN units,
CBRN shape is broken down into two subtasks—CBRN staff functions and exploitation. CBRN shape is
the most critical of the four core elements as this is the integration and fusion of CBRN-related information
into the decision-making and mission-planning processes to minimize the effects of a CBRN threat or
event.
Staff Functions
1-9. The ARSOF CBRN staff has a critical role in ensuring that CBRN-related information is thoroughly
analyzed and developed to provide CBRN situational awareness of potential areas of vulnerability within
the SOF area of responsibility (AOR). The ARSOF CBRN staff will then develop a CBRN risk assessment
and vulnerability analysis in accordance with (IAW) FM 3-11.14, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Vulnerability Assessment. To enhance situational
awareness, the SOF CBRN staff establishes and maintains open lines of communication between the
different staff sections; CBRN cells at higher, subordinate, and adjacent units; and the leadership of all
assigned or attached CBRN units. The staff integration part of CBRN shape is used to support FID,
counterterrorism (CT), PSYOP, Civil Affairs operations (CAO), and information operations (IO) ARSOF
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-3

Chapter 1
core tasks. The commonality of these tasks is that none of them have active CBRN roles; however, if the
CBRN cell is not fully integrated with the other staff sections, indicators of CBRN activity or vulnerability
may be missed. In addition, PSYOP, when properly planned, are a valuable capability that may be used to
not only shape the operation, but mitigate possible negative effects of an adversary’s use of CBRN. The
following scenario further explains the importance of CBRN cells.
Example Scenario
SFODA XXXX has developed a target packet on a suspected insurgent leader with ties to
heroin production. In preparation for a strike, the battalion S-2 reviews available imagery
of the site and notices a large collection of metal barrels outside of the compound. Due to
the target’s ties to heroin production, the battalion CBRN cell also reviews the imagery
and is able to identify the barrels as likely containing the hazardous chemicals required for
refining opium into heroin. This information is passed to the SFODA prior to the strike.
The SFODA is then able to update its protection measures in the event that the barrels
are destroyed during the strike and/or an operational heroin lab is discovered, thus
reducing the possibility of casualties received from inhaling any hazardous fumes
released.
Exploitation
1-10. The primary ARSOF organic asset that supports special operations forces site exploitation (SOFSE)
operations is the CRD. ARSOF CBRN assets support SOFSE by providing tactical situational awareness
concerning the contents of the objective to the maneuver commander, packaging that information for
transmittal to higher echelons, and ensuring an uninterrupted chain of custody for any items removed from
the objective. This information provides intelligence assets at higher echelons high-quality data to analyze,
which in turn will assist maneuver commanders in determining future mission priorities. Exploitation
support is associated with direct action (DA) and CPWMD SOF core tasks. Chapter 5 outlines specific
topics concerning ARSOF CBRN asset support to SOFSE. The following scenario also further explains
exploitation.
Example Scenario
SFODA XXXX has developed a target packet on a suspected insurgent leader with ties to
heroin production. In preparation for a strike, the battalion S-2 reviews available imagery
of the site and notices a large collection of metal barrels outside of the compound. The
battalion CBRN cell is able to identify the barrels as likely containing the hazardous
chemicals required for refining opium into heroin. This information is passed to the
SFODA prior to the strike. The SFODA is then able to update its protection measures in
the event that the barrels are destroyed during the strike and/or an operational heroin lab
is discovered, thus reducing the possibility of casualties received from inhaling any
hazardous fumes released. Additionally, the SFODA requests a 4-man CRD team to
confirm/deny the presence of drugs on the objective. At the appointed hour, the mission
proceeds. The SFODA is successful in securing the compound and detaining the target.
With the objective secured, the CRD team conducts a sweep of the compound. A swipe
test of the target’s hands shows positive for heroin, which allows the team intelligence
sergeant (18F) to ask more direct questions during a tactical questioning of the target.
Additionally, once the photographs, site sketches, samples, and evidence collected are
sent to higher headquarters (HQ) for analysis, it is determined that the SFODA has
disrupted a primary source of income for a regional insurgent network, which in turn will
help shape future operations to further disrupt insurgent activity in the region.
SHIELD
1-11. CBRN “shield” is defined in JP 3-11 as “individual and collective protection measures essential to
mitigating the effects of CBRN hazards.” ARSOF units place the priority of effort for CBRN defense on
1-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Introduction
active denial operations, counterproliferation (CP) operations, and contamination avoidance to significantly
reduce the threat capability to use CBRN materials in an attack against SOF lines of effort. However, these
efforts cannot be relied upon exclusively to eliminate the threat of a CBRN attack; therefore, ARSOF units
maintain limited passive CBRN protection and operational protection measures. Should an ARSOF unit be
forced to continue operations in a contaminated environment, the ARSOF unit will depend entirely on
collocated conventional units for life support and collective protection (COLPRO) requirements. This
section is subdivided into passive protection measures and operational protection measures. Passive
protection measures differ from operational protection measures by accounting for naturally occurring
events, such as malaria outbreaks or industrial contamination and deliberate attacks while operational
protection measures are only used to protect friendly forces against a CBRN attack. All SOF core tasks are
somewhat supported by CBRN shield as ARSOF will always have access to protective measures against
CBRN threats wherever they go. Specifically, though, CBRN shield supports unconventional warfare
(UW) and FID, especially since ARSOF units conducting these missions will be working with indigenous
forces that may request protective equipment from SOF elements if their government or organization is
unable to provide it. These types of requests could present a challenging problem if there is limited
stockage of U.S. protective equipment in the theater.
Passive Protection Measures

1-12. ARSOF use passive protection measures to avoid CBRN contamination. The passive protection
measures used are developed by the CBRN staff in conjunction with the S-3 and S-2 sections during
predeployment planning. Based upon the threat capabilities, naturally occurring hazards, indigenous
activities in the AO, and any other relevant concerns, the staff sections will make a recommendation to the
commander on which passive protection measures to employ.
1-13. Medical surveillance of U.S. forces and indigenous populations is a critical part of a passive
defense. ARSOF units, especially CA elements, excel at conducting medical surveillance of indigenous
populations through the conduct of medical civic action program (MEDCAP) and veterinary civic action
program (VETCAP) operations. These operations can provide early warning of a biological or radiological
event. Should any unusual events or trends be identified by medical personnel, the CBRN staff along with
the S-2 can aid in determining if the event was a naturally occurring event or a biological/radiological
attack and advise the command on the best course of action (COA) in conjunction with the medical
personnel.
Operational Protection
1-14. ARSOF units only possess COLPRO equipment at the battalion level and higher. Thus, any ARSOF
personnel operating away from these locations will depend entirely on collocated conventional units for
COLPRO requirements. The only operational decontamination assets organic to ARSOF units are held in
the CDD, DRT, and at battalion-level or higher HQ. Appendix A provides additional information about
unit and CBRN organic support.
SUSTAIN
1-15. Due to the constantly changing and highly mobile mission set performed by ARSOF, the organic
capabilities to restore combat power after a CBRN attack are somewhat limited. The best defense against a
CBRN attack for an ARSOF element is generally avoidance. If, however, an ARSOF element becomes
contaminated either during a CBRN attack or accident, the unit’s combat power must be restored as
quickly as possible. To that end, the ARSOF element would implement one or all of the main tenets of
CBRN “sustain,” which include decontamination, resupply, medical support, and site remediation. Similar
to CBRN shield, CBRN sustain supports all ARSOF core tasks in general, but only UW and FID
specifically, and for the same reasons.
Decontamination
1-16. Decontamination is the process by which contamination is removed from a contaminated surface.
The primary decontamination units in ARSOF are the CDDs organic to SF groups and the DRTs organic to
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-5

Chapter 1
the Ranger regiment. The primary decontamination capability that ARSOF units have is the expedient
personnel decontamination system (EPDS). This capability allows ARSOF to conduct immediate and
operational-level decontamination; however, SOF must be supported by conventional CBRN units for
thorough decontamination.
Resupply
1-17. To reconstitute an ARSOF unit quickly, an effective resupply/refit mechanism must be in place.
This function is primarily handled through existing ARSOF logistics channels. The reconstitution process
begins with a thorough decontamination of equipment as soon as operationally feasible after the
contaminated unit completes EPDS procedures. If thorough decontamination is not feasible, all
contaminated equipment is destroyed in place to render it useless to enemy forces and to prevent the spread
of contamination. Logistics channels must be able to replace major end items of equipment assigned to that
contaminated unit in order to restore combat power.
Medical Support and Site Remediation

1-18. ARSOF units are not manned or equipped to provide large-scale medical support to indigenous
populations or U.S. forces if a CBRN accident or attack occurs. Similarly, SOF units are not equipped to
conduct contaminated site remediation operations. Both of these functions of CBRN sustain are beyond the
scope of ARSOF missions and must be handled by units specifically trained and equipped to conduct those
types of operations. In the absence of U.S. or coalition medical or area decontamination support, ARSOF
personnel may act as advisors to host nation (HN) agencies as they conduct operations.
ACTIVE DEFENSE
1-19. The ARSOF core task DA directly supports this military mission area. ARSOF units are only
capable of diverting, neutralizing, or destroying WMD or their delivery means on the ground. If the WMD
are being delivered by aerial means (aircraft spray, missile, bomb, or indirect fire), ARSOF units have no
organic capability to actively defend against the WMD attack.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1-20. These missions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive surgical actions by SOF or
SO-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, or recover a WMD threat. DA missions include raids;
ambushes and direct assaults; standoff attacks; terminal guidance operations; precision destruction
operations; recovery operations (including noncombatant evacuation); and antisurface, mine, and
amphibious warfare. ARSOF units perform the following:
z WMD interdiction. If directed, SOF can conduct or support DA, SR, CT, CP, and IO missions to
deter or prevent the acquisition of WMD, neutralize proliferation where it has occurred, and
operate against the threats by WMD to defeat them. ARSOF are tasked with organizing,
training, equipping, and otherwise preparing to conduct operations in support of United States
Government (USG) CP objectives.
z WMD elimination. ARSOF units are not organized to conduct WMD elimination operations.
However, the highly specialized capabilities of ARSOF CBRN units can provide unique types
of support to a WMD elimination mission.
SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
1-21. Where proliferation has occurred in regions of potential conflict, deterrence of an adversary’s
CBRN weapons employment is a principal U.S. national objective. USASOC trains and prepares forces to
meet the requirements for planned, contingency, and unexpected (but plausible) operations in CBRN
environments in the GCC’s AOR. ARSOF CBRN assets provide the GCCs and SOF commanders with an
effective, deep CBRN strategic-reconnaissance capability to detect and assess WMD in any environment.
1-6 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Introduction
1-22. Proliferation of CBRN weapons places an increased reliance on intelligence-collection efforts. The
evidence from such efforts defines the threat capability to develop, produce, stockpile, and employ CBRN
weapons. U.S. foreign policy decisions and initiatives depend heavily on the evidence of using (or
preparing to use) CBRN weapons in conflicts not directly involving the United States.
1-23. SOF are deployed worldwide across the range of military operations in peace and war. Since the
1960s, the United States has dealt with a series of asymmetric threats that have increased in lethality
exponentially over time. The evolution of terrorism has shown trends over time that evolved conventional
Cold War threats into asymmetric threats. Foreign terrorism continues to be active against U.S. targets
overseas. This activity mandates allocating additional resources to combat asymmetrical threats and protect
U.S. national interests.
1-24. Emerging asymmetric threats (such as WMD) challenge the safety of this nation and its coalition
partners. In response to these emerging threats, U.S. forces must be capable of conducting special CBRN
reconnaissance activities to provide security assistance and support to interagency or joint operations; FID,
UW, and CT operations; and CPWMD.
OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND POTENTIAL CBRN THREATS

1-25. CBRN weapons and hazards can directly influence the operational environment in which ARSOF
operate. The most notable influences of the physical environment are weather and terrain. Weather
conditions are the “uncontrollable wild card” of CBRN employment and provide useful clues to probable
times and places for CBRN use. Diligent tracking of weather conditions aids in the assessment of risks to
SOF from CBRN weapons, as well as TIM hazards. In concert with weather conditions, the terrain
influences where CBRN effects may concentrate (for example, chemical agents in low-lying areas) and in
many cases, it influences enemy CBRN targeting, such as exploiting or creating chokepoints. The AORs in
which SOF operate may contain several environments, each with a distinct set of CBRN planning factors
and considerations.
URBAN AREAS
1-26. Urban structures such as sewers, storm drains, reinforced concrete buildings, subways, and
basements can protect against spray attacks of chemical or biological agents and the effects of nuclear blast
and radiation. However, this exchange for overhead cover creates other problems. Chemical agents tend to
act differently in urban areas and will tend to collect in low areas; nonpersistent agents may enter buildings
or seep into piles of rubble. ARSOF personnel should avoid these low areas. Also, ARSOF personnel
should attempt to shut down ventilation systems in urban structures to prevent the spread of vapor or
aerosol hazards. The persistency of an agent can greatly increase when it has settled in these areas. Once an
attack has occurred, detection of chemical contamination becomes very important. Personnel must
thoroughly check areas before attempting to occupy or traverse them.
1-27. The stable environment of an urban area may increase the persistency of live biological agents and
the effectiveness of toxins. Existing food and water supplies are prime targets for biological agents.
Personal hygiene becomes very important. Leaders must establish and consistently enforce sanitary and
prophylactic measures, including immunizations. They must also ensure that all personnel drink safe water
and never assume that any local water is safe.
1-28. The population density of an urban area must be considered. During planning, the potential of
encountering a large number of contaminated, panicked, injured, and dying people must be considered.
Urban areas can be susceptible to an adversary’s use of TIMs as a weapon, especially if there is a sizable
chemical industry or storage facilities associated with the area. SOF should be aware of potential hazardous
materials (HAZMAT) they may encounter. FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, provides additional information.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-7

Chapter 1
DESERT AREAS
1-29. Desert operations may present additional problems. Desert daytime temperatures can vary from
90° Fahrenheit (F) to 125°F resulting in unstable temperature gradients that are not particularly favorable
to chemical or biological (CB) attacks. Evaporation of chemical agents during the day will rapidly create a
downwind hazard and an inhalation problem. However, with nightfall, the desert cools rapidly, and a stable
temperature gradient occurs, creating the possibility of night or early morning attacks. FM 3-11.4 provides
further information.
LOW-TERRAIN, TEMPERATE ZONE AREAS

1-30. An adversary’s use of CB or TIMs can be effective in this environment when forces are not
prepared. These weapons (nonpersistent) are more efficient when used at night and during periods of
inversion conditions. Terrain features, such as tall grass or scrub brush, have the tendency to retard the
flow of an agent cloud, thus reducing the overall size of the contamination. Also, the grass and brush may
absorb the chemical agent, which would not pose a significant effect on the mission. However, movement
through the area requires care, as the absorbed agent may be released when the vegetation is disturbed or
crushed, creating a secondary toxic hazard. Persistent agents can cling to vegetation, creating surface
exposure and an off-gassing during daylight. TIMs, such as chlorine, may tend to meander, as would a fog.
1-31. Movement of a biological aerosol over grass and brush reduces the concentration as the particles
impact on vegetation and settle out of the air. However, the cover provided by vegetation protects the
biological agent from the weather and, thus, favors the agent’s survivability, specifically the wet aerosols.
FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries), provides additional
information.
MOUNTAIN AREAS
1-32. Terrain and weather in mountainous areas magnify the requirement for a high degree of CBRN
defense preparedness. Rugged terrain limits the employment of large forces, reduces maneuver, and
impedes logistical support. Shelters are difficult to dig and may require improvisation using existing rocks,
snow, and timber. However, this same terrain may also provide caves, ravines, and cliffs as a natural
source of protection.
1-33. Chemical agents are heavier than air and will settle in valleys and depressions. Subject to mountain
breezes, agents will move down and within the valley. Thus, high dosages are less likely on crests or sides
of ridges or hills.
1-34. Radiation contamination will be erratic due to rapid changes in wind patterns, but at the same time,
the range of thermal effect increases with the clarity of mountain air. The location of hot spots may be
erratic. Additionally, a nuclear blast can produce rock and snow slides.
JUNGLE AREAS
1-35. Tropical climates require the highest degree of individual discipline and conditioning to maintain
effective CBRN defensive readiness. Leaders and staff planners must expect and plan for a rapid decrease
in unit efficiency. They must also anticipate heat casualties. Strict adherence to field sanitation is
necessary. In addition, they must ensure that special precautions are taken to maintain unit CBRN defense
equipment in usable condition. The rapid mildew, dry rot, and rust inherent in jungle areas necessitate this
requirement.
1-36. Dominant climatic features of jungle areas are high, constant temperatures; heavy rainfall; and very
high humidity. These features increase the survivability of biological agents. In thick jungle, there is
usually little or no wind, and the canopy blocks most of the sunlight from the ground, thus providing
excellent conditions for adversary use of biological agents and toxins. The same canopy that may provide
slight shielding from radiation may also enhance blast effect with tree blow-downs and projectiles. Also, a
lack of penetrating wind may result in decreased downwind hazards.
1-8 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Introduction
1-37. A jungle canopy creates good overhead cover from aircraft spray. However, persistent agents
delivered by artillery or bombs may penetrate the canopy before being released, thus creating a hazard in
the immediate area of impact. Additionally, rains can wash radiation into water collection areas, producing
hot spots.
COLD-WEATHER REGIONS
1-38. Cold-weather conditions create many added problems in CBRN defense. During the winter months,
45 percent of the North American landmass and 65 percent of the Eurasian landmass are characterized by
extreme cold and deep snow. These areas include Korea, China, Bosnia, Kosovo, Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and the United States. The former Soviet Union developed procedures to weaponize a series
of agents to be effective in extreme cold weather. Some of those agents do not have known freezing points.
In temperatures from –20°F to –40°F, agents such as Sarin (GB) become like a thickened Soman (GD).
Choking agents have increased persistency from 0°F to –40°F. Even hydrogen cyanide (AC), which
solidifies at –14°F, can be disseminated as fine particles, thereby increasing its effective time and threat.
Mustard agents employed through pyrotechnic devices create effective vapor hazards far below the
freezing point of mustard.
MARITIME ENVIRONMENTS AND RIVERINE AREAS

1-39. ARSOF operating in maritime environments have the potential of encountering chemical, biological,
or radiological attacks from the shoreline. However, a chemical attack is considered the most likely. Delivery
of a nonpersistent chemical agent, in favorable climatic conditions, is no different across open water from
that of low, rolling terrain. The effects of wind and heavy surf tend to disperse a chemical cloud. Direct use
of persistent agents against deploying forces is not considered feasible, but contamination of a beach would
provide a formidable barrier. Mustard agents can remain for extended periods of time on the surface of the
water. Surface vessels operating in support of SOF risk being attacked by artillery, missile, or air depending
on their offshore location. The feasibility of using biological agents, except against large targets, is low.
However, radiological contamination as a barrier should be considered in any plan.
1-40. Operations on and around rivers present situations that have a potential to disrupt operations. Use of
both persistent and nonpersistent agents will require ARSOF to establish mission-oriented protective
posture (MOPP) levels that could degrade personnel effectiveness. During inversion climatic conditions,
nonpersistent chemical agent clouds have the tendency to follow a river’s path when channeled by the high
grass and brush along the banks. Persistent agents could be used to contaminate the riverbanks. FM 3-6
provides additional information.
CHEMICAL AGENTS
1-41. Chemical warfare (CW) agents produce both immediate and delayed effects that will degrade
operations through lethal, incapacitating, or other damaging effects to individuals as well as contamination
of equipment, supplies, and critical terrain features. The types of CW agents that could be encountered by
USSOCOM forces can be classified according to their physiological effects or their military use. These
types of CW agents include choking, nerve, blood, blister, and incapacitating agents. Agents may exist as
solids, liquids, or gases. In addition, TIMs and potentially dangerous herbicides or pesticides could be
encountered accidentally or employed by an adversary.
1-42. Choking, nerve, blood, and blister agents are chemical substances intended for use in military
operations to kill, seriously injure, or hinder military operations through their physiological effects. They
are classified as nerve, choking, or blood agents. Nerve agents are considered the primary agents of threat
to the U.S. military because of their high toxicity and effectiveness through multiple routes of entry. Nerve
agents attack the body’s nervous system. Even small quantities are extremely toxic and can cause death in
less than 15 minutes if personnel are not treated.
1-43. Incapacitating agents include blister (mustards) and compounds that affect the nervous system
(quinuclidinyl benzilate and lysergic acid diethylamide [LSD]).
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-9

Chapter 1
Note: Blister agents, such as mustard, when received in high enough doses or not treated
properly, may be lethal. Attack by these agents may cause additional constraints by taxing the
logistical force to provide additional medical support personnel and treatment.
1-44. CW agents may be disseminated by artillery, mortar shells, rockets, bombs, aircraft spray, and
unconventional delivery methods. Agents may be persistent or nonpersistent, and produce immediate
casualties among unprotected troops; restrict friendly use of terrain, objectives, and equipment; and
degrade friendly combat effectiveness by forcing protective posture and creating confusion and stress—
especially among leaders. Incapacitating agents produce temporary physiological or mental effects and
personnel may not require medical treatment to recover. These types of agents may hinder the ability to
carry out the mission.
1-45. Nerve agents have also been produced and used by terrorist groups, as evidenced by the use of Sarin
in the Tokyo, Japan, subway attack. JP 3-11 provides additional chemical-agent operational planning
considerations.
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
1-46. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines a biological agent as a microorganism (or
its toxin) that causes disease or deterioration of material. Biological agents are generally directed against
the respiratory system to maximize the organism’s ability to diffuse directly into the bloodstream and
bodily tissue. Individual protective equipment (IPE) generally provides protection against a biological
warfare (BW) attack. Generally, biological warfare agents (BWAs) may be classified into the following
broad groups:
z Pathogens. Microorganisms that produce disease in humans, animals, or plants (for example,
protozoa, fungi, bacteria, rickettsia, and viruses).
z Toxins. Any toxic substance that can be produced by a living organism.
1-47. Most organisms are naturally occurring and can be found in almost any environment. Without
proper hygiene and appropriate prophylactic measures, they have the capability to rapidly cause
incapacitating or lethal illness. When used as a warfare agent, biological agents can be disseminated in
aerosol form, by vectors such as mosquitoes and ticks, or through contaminated food or water. JP 3-11
provides additional biological agent operational planning considerations.
RADIOLOGICAL AGENTS
1-48. Nuclear threats are associated with the explosive detonation of special nuclear material. The
radiological agent (RA) threat deals with radiation hazards and radioactive materials that may be in more
common use. The threat of low-level radiation exists in all operations. This threat can exist in certain
expended rounds (depleted uranium), damaged or destroyed equipment, or contaminated shrapnel. It also
may occur from inadequate nuclear waste disposal, deterioration of nuclear power facilities, damage to
facilities that routinely use radioactive material or sources, and the direct use of radioactive materials or
compounds by an adversary (terrorism). Specialized detection equipment is required to detect lower levels
of radiation.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1-49. Nuclear weapons are similar to conventional weapons insofar as their destructive action is due
mainly to blast or shock. However, nuclear explosions can be millions of times more powerful than the
largest conventional detonations. For the release of a given amount of energy, the material mass required
for a nuclear explosion would be much less than that of a conventional explosion. The radiation effects of a
nuclear explosion are divided into two categories: initial and residual. A nuclear detonation produces its
damaging effects through four primary ways: blast, thermal radiation, ionizing radiation, and
electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
1-10 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Introduction
Blast
1-50. The blast wave created by an explosion produces a shock front that travels rapidly away from the
fireball, behaving like a moving wall of highly compressed air (approximately 900 miles per hour [mph]).
When this blast wave strikes the surface of the earth, it is reflected back, causing a second wave to be
formed. The second wave will eventually merge with the first wave (called Mach effect), and the
overpressure will essentially double. Winds generated by the blast of the weapon could reach several
hundred mph at ground zero (GZ), and be as high as 70 mph as far as 6 miles away.
Thermal Radiation
1-51. Immediately after a detonation, weapon residues emit primary thermal radiation (X-rays) that are
absorbed within a few feet of air. This energy then reemits from the fireball as thermal radiation consisting
of ultraviolet, visible, and infrared rays. The following thermal pulses result from that detonation:
z First pulse. It lasts about a second, has high temperatures, and can cause flash blindness or
retinal burns.
z Second pulse. It lasts about 10 seconds, carries about 99 percent of the thermal radiation energy,
and causes skin burns and fires.
Ionizing Radiation
1-52. The two radioactivity hazards from a nuclear detonation are ionizing radiation and fallout. Ionizing
radiation (x-rays, gamma rays, and neutrons) is emitted within the first minute of the detonation. Fallout is
the residual radiation product distributed in the air by a nuclear detonation.
Electromagnetic Pulse
1-53. An electromagnetic signal produced by a nuclear detonation is commonly known as EMP.
EMP-induced currents and voltages can cause electronic component equipment failure, affecting a wide
range of electric and communication equipment, global positioning systems, command control nodes,
vehicle ignition systems, avionics, and fire control systems.
TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS

1-54. Although less lethal than current CW agents, industrial materials are often available in enormous
quantities, do not require expensive research programs, are easily mass-produced, do not violate the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and can still produce mass casualties. TIMs could be released from
industrial plants or storage depots through battle damage, as consequence of a strike against a particular
facility, or as a desperation measure during military operations. They could also be used as improvised
chemical weapons and have potential for inclusion in clandestine programs or contingency plans.
Note: IPE does not protect against all TIMs. For example, IPE will not protect the wearer from
ammonia-based or chlorine-based industrial chemicals.
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

1-55. Riot control agents (RCAs) are chemicals that produce temporary irritating or disabling effects when
in contact with the eye or when inhaled. Generally used in the control of violent disorders, RCAs can be
effectively used to contaminate terrain and to cause degrading effects on individuals, requiring them to use
IPE for protection. U.S. policy does not classify RCAs as CW agents. Presidential Executive Order (EO)
11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, establishes
the national policy for the use of RCAs by U.S. forces in combat.
CBRN SUPPORT AVAILABLE AT DIRECT REPORTING UNITS

1-56. Chemical personnel operate throughout USASOC. Numbers, types, and locations of chemical
personnel reflect their intended missions. SF groups, 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-11

Chapter 1
Aviation Regiment (SOAR), the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, and
the 528th SB(SO)(A) each have chemical staff personnel. The chemical staff serves in the HQ operations
section (S-3), and functions as the principal advisor to the commander on all issues relating to CBRN.
During the brigade or group planning process, chemical staff personnel integrate CBRN protection
measures into the mission, and work closely with the intelligence section (S-2) to provide CBRN-related
analysis of intelligence products, and the logistics section (S-4) to ensure the required stockage of CBRN
defense materials are maintained. During operations, the CBRN staff provides technical reachback support
as needed, and coordinates for decontamination assets and sample evacuation if needed. The chemical staff
makes operational reports through the S-3 and provides other required reports as necessary.
1-57. The company chemical NCO is the commander’s chief advisor on all aspects of CBRN operations.
He provides the commander with an organic source of chemical expertise for planning and conducting
CBRN defense operations. He ensures that all detachments, teams, and sections can operate their assigned
CBRN equipment. He also trains company personnel to conduct immediate decontamination and to support
operational or thorough decontamination operations.
1-12 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Chapter 2
Special Forces Group Chemical Detachments
Each Special Forces group (airborne) (SFG[A]) is assigned two CBRN elements, the
chemical decontamination detachment and the chemical reconnaissance detachment.
The primary focus of the CRD is collection and identification. The CDD primarily
focuses on providing analysis support to SF SSE and augments the decontamination
and mitigation capabilities of the battalion HQ companies. Both the CRD and CDD
can support other SOF elements and other government agencies, as well as coalition
partners, when operating in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
(JIIM) environment.
CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT

2-1. The CRD is the primary asset used to provide advanced reconnaissance and sample collection
support in a CBRN environment or evidence collection and target exploitation support to SF SSE
operations in a non-CBRN environment. The CRD can provide support for SOF in support of strategic,
operational, and tactical objectives in all environments (permissive, uncertain, and hostile) to support the
functional and geographic CCDRs’ intent and objectives. The CRD can also provide support to other
Service SOF, conventional forces, other government agencies, coalition partners, and HN organizations.
MANNING
2-2. The CRD currently consists of a 14-man detachment. The addition of the fourth SF battalion to an
SFG(A) will increase the CRD by four. Figure 2-1 shows the current organization and manning of a CRD.
The CRD commander is a captain and the detachment sergeant is a master sergeant. These two individuals
make up the detachment HQ section. The three internal chemical detachment As (CDAs) consist of four
chemical operations NCOs of various ranks. The addition of a fourth SF battalion will increase detachment
size to four CDAs. Having these NCOs per CDA allows the detachments to conduct split-team operations
when the situation does not warrant a full team. Due to the highly specialized nature of the CRD mission,
and the time required to develop proficiency at these tasks, every effort should be made to stabilize the
personnel assigned to a CRD for a minimum of two years. Additionally, whenever feasible, CBRN
personnel new to an SFG(A) should not be directly assigned to a CRD since CRDs require personnel to be
airborne-qualified, as well as able to volunteer for Ranger school. Instead, CBRN personnel new to
ARSOF should be assigned to a CDD or CBRN staff position.
Figure 2-1. Chemical reconnaissance detachment organization and manning
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 2-1

Chapter 2
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-3. Each CRD is assigned to an SFG(A). While deployed, CDAs are best used at the advanced
operational base level and below. Additionally, during premission training, an SF battalion may request
that a CDA be attached to them for the deployment. The group commander is the approval authority for
task-organization requests. If the request is approved, the CDA will report to the battalion S-3 and integrate
into the battalion premission training plan. Upon deployment, the CDA may be further task-organized
down to company or detachment level for specific missions. The attachment orders remain in effect until
the CDA returns to the continental United States (CONUS) and completes recovery of equipment and
personnel, at which time the CDA will be reattached to the group support company.
CAPABILITIES
2-4. The CRD is a highly versatile organization that provides support for not only within the group but
also for organizations outside of the SFG(A). To provide effective mission support, the CRD must possess
numerous capabilities and resources. CRD personnel must maintain proficiency in individual, collective,
and common SOF tasks. These tasks are vitally important to facilitate integration with maneuver units and
to increase the battlefield survivability of the CDA. Each CDA must be able to—
z Detect and identify WMD agents. Detachment members must immediately detect and identify
low-level vapor concentrations of military chemical and biological agents. Additionally, the
CDA must conduct a confirmatory analysis of a solid or liquid sample on site and communicate
the results back to the maneuver commander in near-real time. At the time of writing, this
capability exists for military chemical agents but is limited to liquid sample analysis for
biological agents. As new equipment is developed, the accuracy, efficiency, and flexibility of
this task will continue to grow.
z Detect and identify radioactive sources. Team members must detect low levels of alpha, beta,
gamma, and neutron radiation; determine distance to source; identify the isotope producing the
radiation; and communicate the results to the maneuver commander in near-real time.
z Identify toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic industrial biologicals (TIBs). All detachment
members must identify samples of unknown solids, liquids, or vapors on-site and in near-real
time. At this time, the capability only exists to detect the presence of and presumptively identify
TIBs. Confirmatory identification requires the resources of a medical laboratory.
z Identify explosive compounds and gunshot residue (GSR). Team members must identify
explosive compounds from swipe tests of explosive storage areas, bomb fragments, skin, and
clothing. Additionally, each CDA must detect and identify explosive vapor signatures. The
detachment must conduct GSR testing on individuals identified by the maneuver commander.
The CDA has a redundant capacity to identify explosive compounds and GSR. This redundancy
allows the detachment to split into two-man teams and still perform this task.
z Collect samples. Each detachment must collect solid, liquid, wipe, air, vegetation, radiological,
water, sludge, biomedical, bioassay, and tissue samples. Whenever possible, three samples of
each material of interest are collected to provide the laboratory with the capability to conduct a
representative and statistical analysis. Personnel must also collect control samples, which can be
soil, air, water, or vegetation near the contaminated area, but are not contaminated themselves.
z Characterize the site. The detachment must provide the maneuver commander and intelligence
personnel a detailed description of the objective using audio and visual means. This process
begins with available imagery of the site. Upon entering the objective, CDA personnel make a
detailed diagram of the objective (to scale when possible) and identify on the diagram where
samples or evidence were collected from and the location of the photographer when samples or
evidence site pictures were taken. At the sample locations, the CDA photographer takes pictures
of the sample collection site and the sample. During postmission activities, the CDA leader will
verify the completeness and accuracy of the site diagram, label photographs with sample
numbers, and attach them.
z Analyze and report findings. A critical part of any CRD operation is interpreting the results
provided by the equipment and providing an initial analysis to the maneuver commander. This
2-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

part is accomplished by having access to multiple chemical databases (National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH], Emergency Response Guide [ERG]) on site and the
ability to have near-real time access to higher-level technical resources. The CDA leader
provides the maneuver commander with an initial analysis within 1 hour of completing the
mission, and a detailed analysis within 72 hours. The initial analysis informs the commander of
any hazards associated with the samples taken, as well as any safety precautions necessary to
protect the force. The detailed analysis provides an estimate of the potential uses for the
substances found and identified.
z Maintain chain of custody. The detachment must establish and maintain chain of custody of
samples and evidence collected on an objective until the sample or evidence is properly
transferred to an authorized agency. The specific chain-of-custody procedures used will vary
depending on the theater of operations and the level of scrutiny the samples or evidence is likely
to come under. Chain-of-custody procedures can range from internal accountability of a sample
to procedures required to allow evidence to be used in a HN court proceeding.
z Operate in confined spaces. The CRD can conduct sampling operations in confined spaces.
Examples of confined spaces include ammunition bunkers, small rooms or basements, sewer
systems, caves, and holes. Confined spaces may be either low in oxygen or contain extremely
high concentrations of chemical vapor. If this is true, the M45 protective mask does not provide
adequate respiratory protection. The detachment can measure both oxygen content and
determine concentration of chemical vapors. Personnel must check these amounts using an
M40A1/M53 mask before entering any confined space. If these conditions are either confirmed
or suspected, detachment personnel use a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) in
conjunction with the M40A1/M53 protective mask. This system provides a minimum
(depending on type) of 1 hour of respiratory protection (supplied air).
z Determine personal protective equipment needs. Detachment personnel must analyze the
intelligence data available and determine what level of personal protective equipment (PPE) is
required for the mission (Appendix B). The CDA can operate in PPE levels up to and including
Level B. Level B PPE is equipment that has a positive pressure, full face piece SCBA with Joint
Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) and two-way communications.
z Operate expedient personnel decontamination system. CDA personnel must set up, operate, and
close down the EPDS to decontaminate themselves and any other personnel that have become
contaminated on the objective. Should further decontamination be required, the CDA leader will
assist the maneuver commander in coordinating for additional decontamination assets.
CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION DETACHMENT

2-5. The CDD primarily operates the Exploitation Analysis Center (EAC), which is organic to its parent
SFG(A). It can augment the decontamination capabilities of the SF battalions if required, to include the
planning and preparation for conducting operational and SOF-specific decontamination missions. The
CDD also assists in CBRN operations planning, and limited CBRN reconnaissance to support
contamination avoidance.
MANNING
2-6. The CDD is currently organized as a 10-man detachment. The addition of the fourth SF battalion to a
SFG(A) will increase the CDD by two. Figure 2-2, page 2-4, shows the current organization and manning
of a CDD. The CDD commander is a captain and the detachment sergeant is a sergeant first class. The
detachment HQ consists of the commander, a sergeant, a computer plotter NCO, and a CBRN NCO.
Currently, there are three chemical decontamination teams (CDTs), each having one CBRN NCO and one
CBRN specialist. The addition of a fourth SF battalion will increase the CDD to four CDTs.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 2-3

Chapter 2
Figure 2-2. Chemical decontamination detachment organization and manning
2-7. The CDD is assigned to the group support company of the group support battalion. Upon
deployment notification, the group chemical staff exercises operational control of the detachment and
recommends task-organization to support the group’s mission.
CAPABILITIES
2-8. The primary functions of the CDD are exploitation analysis and decontamination. The CDD provides
support to the parent special operations task force (SOTF), and has limited capabilities to operate in
support of other units. The CDD has the following capabilities:
z Exploitation analysis support. The CDD must be able to establish, staff, and operate the SOTF
EAC in support of SF SSE operations. The detachment commander is the facility director and
the detachment sergeant is the facility noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). The
staffing requirements of the EAC will change depending on the theater and types of operations
being conducted. Specific capabilities of the EAC are addressed in Chapter 5.
z Operational decontamination. The CDD can augment the decontamination capabilities of the
HQ company assigned to the SF battalion and can assist with planning and conduct of
operational decontamination of SOTF units. Should a SOTF unit become contaminated to a
degree that is beyond the capabilities of the company, the CDD will move to a suitable location
as close to the contaminated unit as possible, and conduct MOPP gear exchange and vehicle
washdown operations as required. This level of decontamination will NOT allow the
contaminated unit to operate in reduced levels of MOPP.
z Expedient personnel decontamination system. The CDD must be able to set up, operate, and
close down the EPDS to decontaminate themselves and any other personnel that have become
contaminated on the objective. This decontamination system is for personnel only.
z Technical reachback. The CDD must be able to provide near-real-time technical reachback
assistance to all SOTF units. This support includes information concerning TIMs, chain-of-
custody questions, sample collection questions, and questions concerning health effects of
exposure to CBRN material.
CBRN STAFF ELEMENTS

2-9. Each SFG(A) receives resources with CBRN staff elements from the group level down to the
company level. These staff elements provide the commander with subject-matter expertise in CBRN-related
issues and ensure that subordinate elements maintain a high level of CBRN readiness at all times.
GROUP CBRN CELL

2-10. The SFG(A) CBRN cell consists of the CBRN officer and CBRN staff NCO. The officer works as a
special staff officer under the supervision of the group operations officer (S-3). Through staff visits,
2-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

coordination, and inspections of subordinate units, the group CBRN cell serves as a focal point for CBRN
operations. It assists subordinate units in the following CBRN defense areas to improve CBRN readiness:
z Intelligence. The CBRN cell provides technical assistance to the intelligence section for analysis
of the CBRN threat and indigenous TIM facilities. It ensures that priority intelligence
requirements (PIRs) and threat information are reflected in unit operation plans (OPLANs) and
standing operating procedure (SOPs). The CBRN cell also assists the intelligence section in
analyzing and interpreting CBRN-related samples/materials processed at the EAC. Additionally,
the CBRN cell assists subordinate units in their threat analysis.
z Personnel. The SFG(A) CBRN cell provides recommendations concerning the assignment of
CBRN personnel and assists in the professional development of subordinate unit CBRN
personnel.
z Training. The SFG(A) CBRN cell is the best resource for CBRN training. The CBRN cell
maintains a detailed catalog of available internal and external CBRN training available to the
organic CBRN detachments and operational detachments. The CBRN cell assists subordinate
units in planning and coordinating CBRN training. Upon completion of training, the group
CBRN cell maintains a database of CBRN training and operational after action reports (AARs).
The group cell also develops lessons-learned bulletins and disseminates them to subordinate
units.
z Vulnerability assessment. The group CBRN cell conducts a vulnerability assessment for the
group HQ in the event of deployment. The group CBRN cell also provides assistance when
battalions conduct vulnerability assessments.
BATTALION CBRN CELL

2-11. The battalion CBRN cell consists of the CBRN officer and CBRN staff NCO. The cell trains
personnel and helps plan CBRN operations. It also helps company CBRN NCOs. Should a battalion
element larger than detachment size (12 personnel) become contaminated, the battalion CBRN cell will
request CDD decontamination support. The battalion cell also supports the following issues:
of the CBRN threat and indigenous TIM facilities. It ensures that PIRs and threat information
are reflected in unit OPLANs and SOPs. The CBRN cell assists the intelligence section in
analyzing and interpreting CBRN-related samples/materials processed at the EAC. Additionally,
the CBRN cell assists subordinate units in their threat analysis.
z Training. The battalion CBRN cell assists the company CBRN NCOs in developing and
coordinating individual tasks training into company training events. Upon completion of
training, the battalion CBRN cell maintains a database of CBRN training and operational AARs
and submits them to the group CBRN cell.
z Vulnerability assessment. The battalion CBRN cell conducts a vulnerability assessment for the
battalion HQ in the event of deployment. The cell also provides assistance when companies
conduct vulnerability assessments.
COMPANY CBRN NCO

2-12. Each company has a CBRN NCO (E-5), and the SF battalion HQ company has a CBRN specialist
(E-4). The company CBRN NCO advises the commander on the CBRN threat, training, equipment status,
and MOPP levels. He stores, maintains, and accounts for all CBRN protective equipment assigned to the
company. The battalion HQ company CBRN team also provides decontamination support to any battalion
element that becomes contaminated and provides operational decontamination support for up to a
detachment-sized element (12 personnel) without external support.
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Chapter 3
75th Ranger Regiment Decontamination and
Reconnaissance Teams
Unlike the other ARSOF chemical detachments, Ranger chemical teams are a
regimental asset in support of the Ranger battalions. These teams perform the same
type of missions of chemical reconnaissance and decontamination for Ranger
operations that the CRD and CDD perform for an SFG(A). Ranger chemical teams
provide protection for Ranger forces that may be required to operate in high-threat or
high-risk CBRN environments. These missions may include conducting DA against
an adversary’s CBRN capabilities.
MISSION
3-1. The DRT provides CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination support for its assigned
battalion in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in all environments (permissive,
uncertain, and hostile).
MANNING
3-2. Figure 3-1 shows the composition of the Ranger DRT assigned to each Ranger battalion. The DRT
has a staff sergeant (E-6) and consists of two teams. Each team consists of one sergeant (E-5) and two Skill
Level 1 Soldiers (E-4), making it possible to support the battalion in decontamination, reconnaissance, and
protection operations in two different locations or provide larger-scale support in one location.
Figure 3-1. Decontamination and reconnaissance team organization and manning
3-3. DRTs are assigned to the Ranger support company in each Ranger battalion. The Ranger DRTs
deploy in direct support to their Ranger battalion. Each DRT can function independently during operations
while providing CBRN support. This capability allows each Ranger battalion to deploy two separate teams,
simultaneously, without the teams having to mutually support each other. The Ranger DRT can also
function as a single entity operationally or during training to support battalion-, company-, and platoon-level
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 3-1

Chapter 3
operations. The battalion regularly attaches the DRT to companies and platoons as required. DRTs can be
allocated to companies and platoons that are forward-deployed at outstations based on historical and
emerging threat reporting.
3-4. DRT personnel maintain proficiency in individual, collective, and common Ranger tasks. These
tasks are vitally important to facilitate integration with maneuver units and to increase the battlefield
survivability of the DRT. Capabilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
z Detect and identify WMD agents. Each DRT must detect and identify low-level vapor
concentrations of military chemical and biological agents. The DRT must also conduct a
confirmatory analysis of a solid or liquid sample on site and communicate the results back to the
maneuver commander in near-real time. At the time of writing, this capability exists for military
chemical agents but is limited to liquid sample analysis for biological agents. As new equipment
is developed, the accuracy, efficiency, and flexibility of this capability will continue to grow.
z Detect and identify radioactive sources. Each DRT must detect low levels of alpha, beta,
gamma, and neutron radiation; determine distance to source; identify the isotope producing the
radiation; and communicate the results to the maneuver commander in near-real time.
z Identify TICs and TIBs. Each DRT must identify samples of unknown solids, liquids, or vapors
on site in near-real time. At the time of writing, the capability only exists to detect the presence
of TIBs, but not to identify it without the resources of a medical laboratory.
z Identify explosive compounds and gunshot residue. Each DRT must identify explosive
compounds from swipe tests of areas where the explosives were stored, bomb fragments, skin,
and clothing. The DRT must also detect and identify explosive vapor signatures, conduct GSR
testing on individuals identified by the maneuver commander, and have a redundant capacity to
identify explosive compounds and GSR. Thus, the DRT can split into two-man teams and still
perform this task.
z Collect samples. Each DRT must collect solid, liquid, wipe, air, vegetation, radiological, water,
sludge, biomedical, bioassay, and tissue samples. Whenever possible, three samples of each
material of interest are collected to provide the laboratory with the capability to conduct a
representative and statistical analysis. Control samples are also collected when possible. Control
samples consist of soil, air, water, and/or vegetation near the contaminated area, but which are
not contaminated themselves. Due to the unique nature of Ranger operations, the DRT may be
required to complete its mission faster by taking fewer samples and conducting EPDS closer to
the sampling site. In such cases, control samples may not be collected.
z Characterize the site. Each DRT must provide the maneuver commander and intelligence
personnel a detailed description of the objective using audio and visual means. This process
begins with available imagery of the site. Upon entering the objective, DRT personnel make a
detailed diagram of the objective, to scale when possible, and identify on the diagram where
samples or evidence were collected from and the location of the photographer when sample or
evidence site pictures were taken. At the sample locations, the DRT photographer takes pictures
of the sample collection site and the sample. During postmission activities, the DRT leader
verifies the completeness and accuracy of the site diagram, labels photographs with sample
numbers, and attaches them to the diagram.
z Analyze and report findings. A critical part of any DRT operation is interpreting the results
provided by the equipment and providing an initial analysis to the maneuver commander. This
task is accomplished by having access to multiple chemical databases (NIOSH, ERG) on site
and having near-real-time access to higher-level technical resources. The DRT leader provides
the maneuver commander with an initial analysis within 1 hour of completing the mission, and a
detailed analysis within 72 hours. The initial analysis informs the commander of any hazards
associated with the samples taken, as well as any safety precautions necessary to protect the
force. The detailed analysis provides an estimate of the potential uses for the substances found
and identified.
z Maintain chain of custody and proper transload operations. The DRT must establish and
maintain chain of custody of samples and evidence collected on an objective until the sample or
evidence is properly transferred to an authorized agency. Once the receiving organization is
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75th Ranger Regiment Decontamination and Reconnaissance Teams
identified, the DRT must coordinate and conduct transload operations with that organization.
The specific chain-of-custody procedures used will vary depending on the theater of operations
and the level of scrutiny the samples or evidence is likely to come under. Chain-of-custody
procedures can range from internal accountability of a sample to procedures required to allow
evidence to be used in an HN court proceeding.
z Operate expedient personnel decontamination system. The DRT must set up, operate, and close
down the EPDS to decontaminate themselves and any other personnel that have become
contaminated on the objective. Should further decontamination be required, the DRT will assist
the maneuver commander in coordinating for additional decontamination assets.
z Conduct operational decontamination. The DRT conducts no-notice operational
decontamination of elements up to platoon size of its assigned Ranger battalion. Should a
Ranger element become contaminated to a degree that is beyond the capabilities of the EPDS,
the DRT moves to a suitable location as close to the contaminated unit as possible, and conducts
MOPP gear exchange and vehicle washdown operations as required. This level of
decontamination will NOT allow the contaminated unit to operate in reduced levels of MOPP.
CBRN STAFF ELEMENTS

3-5. The Ranger regiment has CBRN staff elements from the regimental level down to the company level.
These staff elements provide the commander with subject-matter expertise in CBRN-related issues and
ensure that subordinate elements maintain a high level of CBRN readiness at all times.
REGIMENTAL CBRN CELL

3-6. The regimental CBRN cell consists of the CBRN officer and CBRN staff NCO. The CBRN officer
works as a special staff officer under the supervision of the regimental operations officer (S-3). Through
staff visits, coordination, and inspections of subordinate units, the regimental CBRN cell serves as a focal
point for CBRN operations. It assists subordinate units in the following CBRN defense areas to improve
CBRN readiness:
of the CBRN threat and indigenous TIM facilities and ensures that PIRs and threat information
are reflected in unit OPLANs and SOPs. The cell also assists the intelligence section in
analyzing and interpreting information about CBRN-related materials. If necessary, the CBRN
cell assists subordinate units in their threat analysis.
z Training. The regimental CBRN cell is the best resource for CBRN training in the Ranger
regiment. The cell maintains a detailed catalog of internal and external CBRN training available
to the organic CBRN detachments and operational detachments. The CBRN cell assists
subordinate units in planning and coordinating CBRN training. Upon completion of training, the
regimental CBRN cell maintains a database of CBRN training and operational AARs. The cell
also develops lessons-learned bulletins and disseminates them to subordinate units.
z Vulnerability assessment. The regimental CBRN cell conducts a vulnerability assessment for the
regimental HQ in case of deployment. The regimental CBRN cell also provides assistance when
BATTALION CBRN CELL

3-7. The battalion CBRN cell consists of the CBRN officer and CBRN staff NCO. The battalion cell
trains personnel and helps plan CBRN operations. It provides assistance to company CBRN NCOs and the
assigned DRT. The battalion cell also assists subordinate units in the following CBRN defense areas:
are reflected in unit OPLANs and SOPs. The CBRN cell assists the DRT and intelligence
section in analyzing and interpreting CBRN-related samples or materials collected from an
objective. The CBRN cell also assists subordinate units in their threat analysis.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 3-3

Chapter 3
z Training. The battalion CBRN cell assists the company CBRN NCOs and the DRT in
developing and coordinating individual and collective tasks into training events. Upon
completion of training, the battalion CBRN cell maintains a database of CBRN training and
operational AARs and submits them to the regimental CBRN cell.
battalion HQ in case of deployment. The cell also provides assistance when companies conduct
vulnerability assessments.
COMPANY CBRN NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER

3-8. Each company has a CBRN NCO (E-5), and the battalion HQ company has a CBRN specialist (E-4).
The company CBRN NCO advises the commander on the CBRN threat, training, equipment status, and
MOPP levels. He stores, maintains, and accounts for all CBRN protective equipment assigned to the
company.
3-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Chapter 4
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR[A]) has no

requirement for special CBRN teams, such as the CRD or DRT, because of its
mission. With the exception of their aircraft, the internal decontamination teams
perform the same functions as their conventional forces counterparts. Aviation
personnel pay special attention to their aircraft and focus closely on chemical
defense, nuclear defense, and decontamination.
CBRN STAFF ELEMENTS

4-1. The regimental CBRN cell consists of the CBRN officer and CBRN staff NCO. The CBRN officer
works as a special staff officer under the supervision of the regimental operations officer (S-3). Through
staff visits, coordination, and inspections of subordinate units, the regimental CBRN cell serves as a focal
point for CBRN operations. It assists subordinate units in the following CBRN defense areas to improve
CBRN readiness:
are reflected in unit OPLANs and SOPs. The cell also assists the intelligence section in
analyzing and interpreting information about CBRN-related materials. If necessary, the CBRN
cell assists subordinate units in their threat analysis.
z Training. The regimental CBRN cell oversees CBRN training and readiness in the aviation
regiment. The cell maintains a detailed catalog of internal and external CBRN training available
to the organic CBRN detachments and operational detachments. The CBRN cell assists
subordinate units in planning and coordinating CBRN training. Upon completion of training, the
regimental CBRN cell maintains a database of CBRN training and operational AARs. The cell
also develops lessons-learned bulletins and disseminates them to subordinate units.
z Vulnerability assessment. The regimental CBRN cell conducts a vulnerability assessment for the
regimental HQ in case of deployment. The regimental CBRN cell also provides assistance when
BATTALION CBRN CELL

4-2. The battalion CBRN cell consists of the CBRN officer and CBRN staff NCO. The battalion cell
trains personnel and helps plan CBRN operations. It provides assistance to company CBRN NCOs and the
assigned DRT. The battalion cell also assists subordinate units in the following CBRN defense areas:
are reflected in unit OPLANs and SOPs. The CBRN cell assists the DRT and intelligence
section in analyzing and interpreting CBRN-related samples or materials collected from an
objective. The CBRN cell also assists subordinate units in their threat analysis.
z Training. The battalion CBRN cell assists the company CBRN NCOs and the DRT in
developing and coordinating individual and collective tasks into training events. Upon
completion of training, the battalion CBRN cell maintains a database of CBRN training and
operational AARs and submits them to the regimental CBRN cell.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 4-1

Chapter 4
battalion HQ in case of deployment. The cell also provides assistance when companies conduct
vulnerability assessments.
COMPANY CBRN NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER

4-3. Each company has a CBRN NCO (E-5), and the SOAR battalion HQ company has a CBRN
specialist (E-4). The company CBRN NCO advises the commander on the CBRN threat, training,
equipment status, and MOPP levels. He stores, maintains, and accounts for all CBRN protective equipment
assigned to the company.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE
4-4. The blades of rotary aircraft cause the dispersal of air (and chemical agent vapors) below the aircraft.
The use of chemical agents against aircraft in flight is not effective. However, it does not mean aircrews
are immune to chemical exposure. Hazards include liquid chemical agents getting on the aircraft through
aerosol dispersal or aircraft inadvertently flying through a chemical agent cloud.
4-5. Flying an aircraft while wearing a protective mask and hood places the pilot and aircrew at an
elevated risk, especially at night. The commander must evaluate the elevated risk and determine if the
flight is necessary. This procedure should only be used once chemical weapons have been used in the
theater of operations. The mask and hood should be kept on under the flight helmet even when using night
vision goggles (NVGs). If aircrew members begin to show symptoms of chemical agent poisoning, the
pilot should land the aircraft even if self-aid or buddy-aid has been administered.
Note: The chemical makeup of atropine (the active drug in the nerve agent antidote kit) can
cause difficulty in flying.
NUCLEAR DEFENSE
4-6. It is unlikely that personnel will be warned of an actual enemy nuclear attack. However, if
notification has been received by intelligence sources of an impending nuclear threat, special
considerations must be made for both parked and flying aircraft and the aircrew.
ACTIONS TAKEN FOR PARKED AIRCRAFT

4-7. In a high-risk nuclear threat environment, aircraft need to be protected. Numerous factors should be
considered when intelligence leads to a threat. Personnel should—
z Park aircraft inside natural revetments, bunkers, barricades, or man-made structures (hangars),
and tie aircraft down to protect them from strong winds.
z Remove rotor blades, if possible, to reduce aircraft damage from strong winds.
z Tape the windscreen of the aircraft to help it withstand the overpressure. However, this
procedure is not effective in locations subjected to high overpressure effects.
z Keep all nonessential communications and avionics equipment turned off and, when practicable,
covered with plastic. Doing so will help protect equipment from the effects of the EMP
produced by a nuclear blast.
4-8. During premission planning, pilots and mission planners should identify those areas most likely to be
affected. The aircrews should—
z Stay outside the minimum safe distance limits.
z Be familiar with the effects of a nuclear burst and what actions to take during a burst.
z Be aware that nuclear bursts can cause flash blindness. Aircrews should consider the following:
During the day, there is little chance of flash blindness unless personnel actually focus on
the fireball.
4-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
At night, however, there is a substantial risk of flash blindness, as the use of NVGs
enhances the intensity of the flash.
Flash blindness can occur before individuals know they have retinal burn.
One pilot could wear a patch over one eye. This practice allows vision in this eye in case
blindness occurs to the unprotected eye and the other pilot.
ACTIONS TAKEN FOR FLYING AIRCRAFT

4-9. Aircrews can take several immediate actions to protect the aircraft, but all actions are dependent on
whether the pilot has become blinded by the fireball of a nuclear explosion. Personnel should react as
follows:
z The pilot should look away and turn the aircraft away from the fireball immediately.
z Pilots should be aware during descent that blast effects and EMP may damage electronic
equipment and aircraft flight controls.
z Even though a nuclear burst is visible, the aircraft may not be within range to receive severe
damage. Therefore, a pilot should not land immediately in trees unless there are no suitable
landing areas or clearings nearby.
z After landing the aircraft, the crew should remain inside.
z All personnel should wait until the blast wave has passed. The positive and negative phases of
the blast will occur about the same time.
4-10. If the pilot is blinded, he should not attempt to land the aircraft but to gain altitude until vision
returns. (During the first seconds after the flash, the immediate reaction is to gain altitude.) Personnel
should not tamper with EMP-hardened equipment as it may downgrade the EMP protection capabilities.
Only the manufacturer may install this type of equipment
Note: The effectiveness of EMP protective equipment is not fully known, so it may be that
various controls may yet become affected.
ACTIONS TAKEN FOR AIRCREWS

4-11. Once the pilot has landed the aircraft, personnel should ensure that all debris has fallen and that the
airframe has no structural damage. If no significant damage is present, the crew continues the mission. If
the aircraft is not capable of flight, the pilot should notify higher elements.
4-12. Aircraft can fly safely through fallout. However, exposure to fallout may cause alpha radiation
particles to become ingested and, subsequently, can cause radiation sickness. The use of protective masks
may provide some protection initially, but the canister or filters of the masks cannot withhold the tiny alpha
particles for a prolonged duration.
DECONTAMINATION
4-13. A detailed explanation of immediate, operational, thorough, and clearance decontamination
procedures can be found in FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination. The 160th SOAR(A) only has resources to conduct
operational decontamination. If a detailed aircraft decontamination operation is necessary, the regiment
requests support from conventional forces units. The battalion and regimental CBRN cells coordinate this
decontamination support from collocated conventional units. The aviation regiment provides—
z Any specialized decontamination equipment required (for example, DecoFogger or equivalent).
z Training for the conventional decontamination element on operating procedures for specialized
equipment.
z Pilots and crew chiefs to ensure sensitive equipment and electronics are not damaged during the
decontamination process.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 4-3

Chapter 5
Site Exploitation Support
This chapter defines the role that ARSOF CBRN assets have in supporting special
operations forces site exploitation (SOFSE). In the current operating environment,
operations are conducted based on intelligence information in order to maximize the
effects of the operations. A critical source for intelligence collection is at the site of
an operation. A detailed, thorough, and rapid exploitation of the objective is critical to
collecting intelligence to develop future operations, as well as collecting evidence
that can be turned over to law enforcement (either U.S. or HN) authorities for
criminal prosecution of any individuals detained during the course of the operation.
SOFSE support operations can occur in a hostile, uncertain, or permissive
environment in support of any SOF mission, to include CWMD operations.
PHASES OF A SITE EXPLOITATION OPERATION

5-1. The three critical elements of a comprehensive site exploitation operation are mission planning,
collection, and analysis. The mission planning phase starts when an ARSOF maneuver commander identifies
the need for exploitation support. The supporting intelligence section assists the collection team in
developing the collection plan that is then briefed to the maneuver commander. The intelligence section also
coordinates for analysis of any collected materials through either the supporting EAC or other theater assets.
5-2. The collection phase begins once the objective is secured by the maneuver force. The collection team
ensures that it is rapidly, yet methodically, examined for items that can be used to disrupt or attack U.S.
interests (weapons, explosives, explosive components, WMD-related materials) and items of intelligence
value (cell phones, computers, data storage devices, documents). Once the search is complete, all items
found are collected, associated with a subject on the objective if possible, and have a chain of custody
established. The collection team immediately attempts to identify any unknown samples collected using
specialized equipment and determines if there are any immediate hazards to personnel on the objective. All
collected materials are then transported to an analysis facility for further processing.
5-3. The analysis phase of a site exploitation mission only occurs when the collected material is
transported to an EAC for analysis and begins when the collected materials arrive at the center. The
analysis team leader ensures the proper and efficient processing of collected materials and prepares all
technical information reports for submission to the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) intelligence
section. The JSOTF section further disseminates the reports as required. In addition to preparing reports for
operational use, the EAC also uploads relevant data (biometric data, chemical signatures, tire tread marks)
to USG databases to provide a permanent record of findings and transfers/disposes of any collective
materials, as required.
SITE EXPLOITATION SUPPORT

5-4. The two ARSOF components that require site exploitation support are the Ranger regiment and the
SF group. Because of organization and mission differences, each of these two organizations has different
site exploitation support capabilities. Figure 5-1, page 5-2, shows a detailed explanation of the site
exploitation support cycle.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 5-1

Chapter 5
Figure 5-1. Site exploitation support cycle
RANGER REGIMENT
5-5. The requirement for site exploitation support is determined during the normal MDMP by the
maneuver commander. Once this requirement is identified, the battalion DRT is attached to the maneuver
force. The battalion intelligence section assists the DRT leader in developing the collection plan for the
mission. The DRT leader then briefs the maneuver commander on the collection plan. Since the Ranger
regiment does not have the capability to exploit electronic devices, the battalion intelligence section
coordinates further exploitation of any material collected on the objective. If the maneuver element is
operating in the same theater as a JSOTF, the battalion intelligence section can coordinate with the JSOTF
to have the JSOTF organic EAC further analyze any materials collected, such as computer hard drives, cell
phones, or document exploitation. If the maneuver commander determines that it is not feasible to transport
the collected materials to the JSOTF EAC, the battalion intelligence section can coordinate with
geographic combatant command theater exploitation assets for further analysis of collected materials.
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

5-6. Once the maneuver commander determines a requirement for site exploitation support beyond the
capabilities of his organic assets, the supporting CDA is attached to the maneuver force. The CDA leader
5-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

assists the SFODA intelligence sergeant (18F) in developing the collection plan for the operation. The 18F
also requests EAC support through the chain of command. The collection team identifies unknown substances
and captures biometric information, but must send the collected materials to the EAC for a more detailed
analysis. Upon mission completion, the collection team transports any collected materials to the EAC for
exploitation of electronic media and data storage devices. The EAC also uploads relevant data (biometric data,
chemical signatures, tire tread marks) to USG databases to provide a permanent record of findings.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SITE EXPLOITATION

COLLECTION TEAMS
5-7. The two ARSOF CBRN units that function as SOFSE collection teams are the CRD and DRT. These
SOF detachments operate as an independent element that can be modified and attached to operational
elements based on mission requirements. Collection teams may be attached short term for a specific
mission or long term for integration into a forward deployment.
5-8. Collection teams have the capability to perform detailed SOFSE operations with advanced organic
equipment. As such, they are capable of conducting or directing an exhaustive exploitation of an objective,
and documenting and packaging materials collected beyond the capabilities of the operational element.
Additionally, the CRD and DRT can fully operate in a CBRN-contaminated or oxygen-deficient
environment. Each collection team has the following capabilities:
z Explosive detection and identification.
z Radiological detection and identification.
z TIM detection and identification, to include WMD agents and precursors.
z Fingerprint capture.
z Retinal scan capability.
z Capture of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) material on both living and deceased persons.
z Document capture.
z Capture of shoe or tire track impressions.
z Technical photography.
5-9. SOFSE collection teams have three different methods of mission support: deliberate, hasty, and
home station.
DELIBERATE EMPLOYMENT
5-10. In the deliberate employment process, the maneuver commander identifies the need for and requests
collection team support in the mission planning phase. The maneuver commander and intelligence section
develop the collection plan for the exploitation site and communicate any special characteristics of the site
(confined space, contaminated air, suspected activity at site) and special collection requirements (toxic;
solid, liquid, or vapor; evidentiary requirements) to the collection team leader. Once the team arrives,
personnel validate the collection plan and coordinate transportation and life-support requirements. For
mission execution, the collection team leader reports directly to the maneuver commander until the
exploitation phase begins. Once exploitation begins, the team reports to the collection manager appointed
by the maneuver commander. If the collection team leader also acts as the collection manager for the
operation, he continues to report to the maneuver commander. Upon return to the staging area, the team
leader makes any nonhazardous, nonelectronic items (papers, photographs, bomb-making materials,
weapons) available to the maneuver commander for examination, and provides an initial technical analysis
of the items found and samples collected within 1 hour of returning. After briefing the maneuver
commander, the team leader contacts the organic EAC and advises it of the nature of the materials being
transported. The team then transports the items and samples collected from the site to the EAC for further
exploitation. The team leader monitors the progress of the analysis, and verifies that the EAC has furnished
the maneuver commander with a detailed analysis report within 24 hours from the time that the EAC has
finished analyzing the collected materials.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 5-3

Chapter 5
HASTY EMPLOYMENT
5-11. If an operational element discovers an unexpected CBRN hazard or an objective with a significantly
larger amount of intelligence materials than expected, a collection team may be called in if the maneuver
commander deems necessary. In this case, the collection team assists the maneuver commander or
designated collection manager in developing the collection plan at the site. The major drawback to this type
of operation is that it will require more time on the objective than a deliberate operation. The more
information about the site that can be shared with the collection team before they arrive will decrease the
amount of time required to develop the collection plan and thus reduce the overall time spent on the
objective. Once the collection team arrives and the collection plan is developed, the employment
procedures and timelines for a deliberate operation apply.
HOME STATION
5-12. Collection teams can provide training on basic search, documenting, exploiting, and packaging TTP
to operational elements when not forward-deployed. They can also be integrated into operational element
training scenarios to exercise communication and coordination procedures.
EXPLOITATION ANALYSIS CENTER—ORGANIC

5-13. The EAC is established when in a deployed environment. At home station, personnel habitually
assigned to the EAC during deployments perform their daily duties associated with their modified table of
organization and equipment (MTOE) position. During predeployment planning, all necessary specialized
skill sets not organic to the CDD are identified and the appropriate personnel are attached to the CDD for
premission training to assume the EAC mission upon deployment. During deployment, the EAC officer in
charge (OIC) reports directly to the JSOTF intelligence section OIC.
5-14. The EAC is manned by a combination of CDD and military intelligence detachment personnel. The
CDD commander is the OIC of the EAC, and the CDD sergeant will be the EAC NCOIC. The computer
plotter (E-6) and CBRN NCO (E-6) each become the analysis team leaders, and the two-man
decontamination teams combine to form the rest of each analysis team with the sergeants (E-5s) as the
assistant team leaders (Figure 5-2). The EAC OIC task-organizes other special skilled personnel as
required to ensure the most efficient and thorough analysis is conducted for each set of collected material.
Figure 5-2. Exploitation Analysis Center organization and manning
5-15. When fully manned, the EAC has the following capabilities:
z Latent print lifting—submitting to database and query of database.
z Trace material detection and identification.
z Document and media exploitation, to include cell phones.
z Biometric support—submission and query of ground collected.
5-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

z 360-degree mapping of brass to determine if it came from the same weapon, is a firing pin mark,
or is unique.
z Tire and tread mark impression.
5-16. The EAC has access to a secure Internet portal that will upload data to and query existing USG
databases, instead of local ones, for biometric data, chemical signatures, radiological signatures, and tire
and tread mark identification. This portal provides centralized storage of all collected data and is accessible
by all authorized USG agencies. The EAC does not maintain a static capability suite.
EMPLOYMENT
5-17. The EAC is an SFG(A)-unique asset that can support theaterwide SOF exploitation analysis
requirements. Once the EAC has deployed into theater, it will be collocated with the SOTF HQ. The EAC
has two different methods of employment: deliberate and hasty.
DELIBERATE EMPLOYMENT
5-18. In the deliberate employment process, once the maneuver commander requests collection team
support, the EAC is given a warning order (WARNORD) to prepare to receive items from that mission.
The analysis team leader creates a folder to store information concerning the items recovered from the
mission. Once contacted by the collection team leader, the analysis team will make necessary preparations
to receive the recovered materials. The analysis team leader advises the EAC OIC if any specialized
personnel are required to assist in the analysis. Upon arrival of the collection team, the team leader will
brief the EAC OIC and analysis team leader about the exploitation operation, sign over custody of the
materials, and transfer all data files associated with the recovered materials to the analysis team leader. The
collection team remains accessible to the analysis team for the duration of the analysis process should any
questions arise. When the analysis is complete, the EAC NCOIC conducts a quality check of the analysis
products, furnishes a copy to the collection team leader, and turns the products over to the SOTF
intelligence section NCOIC for processing. The EAC OIC then coordinates disposition instructions of the
recovered materials with the intelligence section OIC.
HASTY EMPLOYMENT
5-19. Should a maneuver element recover materials from an objective without a collection team present,
the maneuver commander can request support from the EAC through intelligence channels. The SOTF
intelligence officer tasks the EAC OIC to provide support to the maneuver commander and assign an
analysis team. Upon receipt of the tasking, the EAC OIC assigns an analysis team and dispatches the
analysis team leader to pick up the recovered materials from the maneuver commander and transport them
to the EAC for analysis. This type of employment only occurs with non-CBRN materials.
Note: Only CRD or DRT personnel can move CBRN materials.
5-20. Upon arriving at the maneuver element’s location, the analysis team leader debriefs the maneuver
NCOIC of the operation concerning the collection procedures and signs for the recovered materials. Once
the analysis team leader arrives at the EAC, the procedures and timelines for a deliberate employment
apply.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 5-5

Chapter 6
CBRN Staff Considerations and Planning Tools
This chapter provides planning considerations to supplement those already in place

when conducting deliberate or time-sensitive planning for operations in a CBRN
environment. Primarily designed for SOTF staff planners, these considerations can be
applied to any staff involved in the planning for CBRN operations. Detailed mission
planning is vital to SOF mission success. Planners at every level must provide the
most complete and accurate information available to ensure mission success and
personnel survival. SOF CBRN planners must be brought in early in premission
activities and used continuously until mission completion.
MISSION ANALYSIS
6-1. The hazards of operating in a CBRN environment require a higher degree of mission analysis,
planning, and mission-specific training than that normally associated with established primary missions.
Mission analysis conducted by a higher HQ provides operational element commanders with sufficient
information to begin mission planning. Planners must clearly understand the commander’s intent.
6-2. Mission analysis involving CBRN, whether during time-sensitive or deliberate planning, must be
able to focus staff planners throughout the decision-making process. This is accomplished by applying a
narrowing-down process. Planners use a series of questions to assess the suitability, feasibility, and
acceptability of undertaking a special operation in a CBRN threat environment The following
considerations should be incorporated into existing mission analysis SOPs when faced with a CBRN threat:
z Analyze higher headquarters’ order. Planners should determine mission and intent, concept,
timelines, adjacent units’ missions, and assigned AOs. They review for CBRN protection
guidance and specified or implied CBRN defense tasks, such as exposure guidance. Analysis
also includes evaluating potential SOF employment for appropriateness, feasibility, and
supportability early in the planning cycle and before target assignment (joint targeting
coordination board representation). Planners provide clear guidance to commanders for
executing SO missions by asking the following questions:
Is this an appropriate mission for SOF? SOF should be used against those key strategic or
operational targets that require unique SOF skills and capabilities. If the targets are not of
operational or strategic importance, then SOF should not be assigned as a substitute for
other forces.
Does this mission support the theater campaign plan? If the mission does not support the
GCC’s campaign plan, then there are probably more appropriate missions available for SOF.
Is this mission operationally feasible? Does it require SOF to operate in a CBRN
environment longer than they can sustain themselves? The JSLIST provides effective
protection from contamination for up to 24 hours once contaminated. Current protective
undergarments provide limited protection (up to 12 hours) against vapor exposure only.
Butyl rubber gloves provide 6 hours of protection from contamination. Protection factors
less than the 24 hours provided by the JSLIST must be planned for (maritime—salt water
degrades protection factor). SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare
and should not be assigned missions that are beyond their capabilities. Planners must
consider the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, more heavily armed or mobile forces,
particularly when in hostile territory.
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Chapter 6
Are the required operational resources available to support the mission? Some SOF
missions require support from other forces for success. Are these resources capable of
supporting in a CBRN environment? Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing,
and sustaining employed SOF. Support can include airlift, maritime transport, intelligence,
communications, and logistic support. Even though a target may be vulnerable to SOF,
deficiencies in support may affect the likelihood for success or may entirely invalidate the
feasibility of employing SOF. SO chemical detachments must be considered in planning
and be prepared to perform “dirty” exfiltration decontamination.
Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Commanders should recognize the high value
and limited resources of SOF and ensure that the benefits of the mission are worth the risks.
Assessment of risk should consider not only the potential for loss of SOF units and
equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on U.S. diplomatic and political interests
should the mission fail.
z Conduct initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Planners must define the operational
environment, describe the battlefield effects, evaluate the adversary, determine the most
probable or most dangerous adversary COA (to include TIM considerations), determine
adversary offensive and defensive CBRN capabilities, and determine adversary CBRN usage
intent. They must also determine threat values—superstitions, fears, religious beliefs, and so
on—that may be exploited to deter use of CBRN weapons and determine enemy centers of
gravity, vulnerabilities, and limitations. Planners analyze how the enemy conceptualizes the
situation and the opposing friendly situation, and identify water sources and any local demands
against that water supply. Decontamination sites are located away from local water supplies to
prevent contamination of that water source.
z Determine specified and implied tasks. Planners review the plan or order for further specified or
implied CBRN defense tasks.
z Review available assets. Commanders review the status of available assets (forces, equipment,
supplies, and host-nation support [HNS]) to support identified tasks (Figure 6-1).
z Availability of detection and identification equipment.
z Availability of collective protection for rest and relief.
z Medical pretreatments, prophylaxis, treatments, and evacuation.
z Decontamination of equipment and casualties.
z Resupply of expendable gear (for example, clothing, IPE, masks, gloves, drink bags, and medical kits).
z Equipment recovery and evacuation of contaminated equipment and personnel.
z Mortuary affairs—policy, standards, and procedures.
z Emergency destruction and evacuation of munitions—United States or captured.
z Safe transportation and handling of CBRN samples.
Figure 6-1. Support assets

z Determine constraints. Shortage of mission-essential assets at the individual, unit, and theater
levels is an immediate constraint on operational capabilities. Other CBRN defense constraints
include levels and rates of supply, rates of usage, decontamination throughput capability, water
availability, protective suit life expectancy, environmental considerations, military and civilian
advanced CBRN training readiness (Appendix C), and HN CBRN support requirements.
Note: An assessment of psychological impacts of U.S. forces having chemical or biological

defense equipment that is not available to HN personnel should be included.
z Identify critical facts or assumptions. Unit leaders determine CBRN facts or assumptions that
are specific to mission situations, and use mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
6-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) to assist in making
determinations. Unit leaders analyze the situation in the context of METT-TC:
Mission refers to the ability of personnel to accomplish the required tasks (while wearing
protective equipment) and the criticality of the mission in relation to force survivability
(how much risk is acceptable).
Enemy refers to enemy activity. For example, it would be somewhat fruitless to attempt the
thorough or reconstitution levels of decontamination if chemical-laden missiles were
continually impacting or excessive sniper or SOF activity existed.
Terrain and weather refers to the suitability of the land in regard to decontamination
operations. This assessment includes composition, degree of roughness or vegetation,
vertical slant, availability of water sources, and available space.
Troops and support available refers to the ability and proficiency of personnel. Sufficient
personnel (both in the context of numbers and training) may not exist to effectively conduct
large-scale decontamination operations. To a degree, this factor is interrelated with the
mission component. On one hand, decontamination operations may not be required for a
group of people who can function effectively in IPE, while at least the appearance of
extensive decontamination operations may be needed to motivate personnel who have been
psychologically affected by the use of chemical agents. The length of time that personnel
have already been at MOPP4 will affect the criticality of decontamination efforts.
Personnel will almost certainly need to find or create (decontaminate) a clear area after 36
hours of MOPP4, whereas this is not nearly as critical at the 2-hour point.
Time available refers to the timing associated with, or required for, task completion. In
general, thorough or reconstitution decontamination operations are exceptionally time-
consuming. Time itself brings options with it. For example, if an area is not needed for
mission operations, it can be clearly identified with warning placards and left to weather.
Civil considerations refer to the local populations that are contaminated or may become
contaminated. For example, a SOF element possessing complete IPE may operate in a local
village where there is no IPE available. What are the implications of the village coming
under CBRN attack and the postattack welfare and sustainability of the protected SOF?
What are the likely reactions of the surviving populace and the logistics considerations for
scores of sick and dying littering the area?
z Consider additional factors. In addition to METT-TC, planners should also consider the
following factors:
Agent toxicity. Although the use of skin decontamination kits associated with immediate
decontamination is always required, extending the effort into the personal level or above
may not be required for a variety of reasons. One factor is agent toxicity. For example, if
personnel are well trained and protected, the contact hazard associated with miniscule
drops of mustard agent (HD) (lethal dose [LD] 50 of 1400 milligrams [mg] per person)
does not begin to approach the contact hazard of ethyl-S-dimethylaminoethyl
methylphosphonothiolate (VX) (LD of 5 mg per person—a figure 280 times deadlier).
Operational decontamination activities are potentially more beneficial with VX because the
human penalty associated with inadvertent contact (for example, through a hole in a glove)
is much higher.
Agent persistency. It is probable that some threat agents could have largely dissipated
before an installation could get to the point of focusing concentrated decontamination
efforts. For example, given a missile ground burst with GB, the agent should be effectively
weathered in 18 minutes under typical weather conditions of 20 degrees Celsius (°C) (68°F)
and 3 knots wind speed.
Specific hazard to personnel. Personnel must assess whether the hazard is one of contact,
inhalation, vapor skin penetration, skin penetration through cuts or scratches only, or
ingestion. The answers to these questions provide insight to the type (if any) and extent of
decontamination that may be required.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 6-3

Chapter 6
Type of contaminated surface. Chemical agents are removed from some surfaces easier
than others. For example, agents can be easily removed from metal but they cannot be
removed from untreated wood or concrete block. The type of surface includes such factors
as composition (metal or wood), surface shape (smooth, rough, crinkled, multiple bends, or
catch basins), and ability to manipulate the surface (turning over dirt is much easier than
turning over runway surfaces).
Extent of contamination. The three considerations in this area are total area coverage
(small areas are potentially workable whereas decontamination of large areas is generally
not cost effective), the concentration of agents in the area (surface deposition of g/m2 with
resulting vapor hazard of mg/m3), and the criticality of the item or area in question. If the
items are not essential to mission operations, it is easier and safer to let them weather.
Present or forecasted weather conditions. The effect of weather will play an important part
in any decontamination decision, both in terms of the need for the operation and in terms of
what effect the weather will have on personnel. Increases in temperature or wind speed will
result in decreased agent persistency times. However, these same conditions may resuspend
agents in dust or powder form, and make it more difficult for personnel to work at MOPP4.
Equipment limitations. This factor is critically important. SOF leadership must accurately
compare the numbers and types of decontamination assets available with the
decontamination results desired. For example, there may be sufficient M291 kits to handle
skin decontamination, but insufficient M295 kits to effectively use them for operational
decontamination operations. Further, many agents’ characteristics of insolubility with water
and limited hydrolysis are determining factors why certain decontamination apparatus, such
as the M17, can move contamination (to a degree) from one place to another, but cannot
neutralize the agent to the point an overall reduction in MOPP easily occurs.
z Conduct risk assessment. Planners conduct a detailed assessment of risks and mitigating
measures during COA development.
z Determine initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). Planners should list
less than 10 questions that focus on a specific event and provide intelligence required to support
a single critical decision.
z Determine initial CBRN operation plan. The commander determines key events or triggers that
will initiate CBRN actions. He prioritizes use of CBRN assets and identifies likely CBRN or
TIM hazard areas (these areas become named areas of interest).
z Plan use of available time. Planners overlay friendly timelines with projected enemy timelines
to mitigate or exploit the visible windows of risk or opportunity.
z Conduct a mission analysis briefing. The planners brief mission analysis products and
recommended restated mission. They explain the key CBRN factors, which include discussion
of CBRN and TIM hazards, their associated risks, and critical mitigation measures.
z Develop initial commander’s intent. The commander states his intent, which includes conditions
for success with respect to the adversary, the terrain, or the desired end state.
z Issue commander’s guidance. Unit leaders issue the key CBRN aspects of command guidance,
which include CCIR, risk guidance, priorities of support (avoidance, protection,
decontamination, recon, and smoke), timelines, and rehearsals.
z Issue a warning order. The commander issues a WARNORD, unless the threat is immediate.
CBRN guidance in unit WARNORDs is generally restricted to minimum protective posture or
time-sensitive requirements; for example, initiating medical immunizations and prophylaxis,
initiating contamination avoidance measures, preparing medical treatment facilities to receive
CBRN casualties, or preparing for decontamination operations.
z Review facts/assumptions. Commanders and unit leaders review determined requirements and
ensure plans and orders are the appropriate guidance.
6-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

MISSION PLANNING
6-3. The effects of CBRN weapons can negate the operational advantages afforded SOF because SOF
have limited CBRN defense infrastructure. Therefore, SOF rely heavily on threat assessment, early
detection, contamination avoidance, and self-decontamination. Deployed SOF may carry and operate all
dismounted and essential equipment with them. If threat analysis does not accurately identify CBRN risks,
commanders may not consider IPE to be mission-essential and may deploy their units without adequate
CBRN protection. Assuming IPE is available, extended periods in MOPP may be unacceptable under all
but emergency conditions. Timely and accurate intelligence, use of field expedients, foreign or captured
CBRN equipment, and maximum use of weather and terrain are key considerations for SOF operating in
CBRN environments. Designated SOF detachments are uniquely trained to infiltrate deep into adversary
rear areas to confirm or deny the adversary’s CBRN capability. The role of SOF in counterforce operations
is an integral element of the deliberate planning process. Mission planning must not be limited to
individual CBRN defensive measures. Planning must consider the overall mission, its intent, and its
subsequent impact.
6-4. Detailed mission planning based on specific, comprehensive, and current intelligence is vital to
successful execution of SOF missions and, potentially, the very survival of a SOF element. Collection and
analysis gives appropriate attention to regional CBRN threats. Intelligence assets define the operational
environment, describe the battlefield effects, evaluate the adversary, determine the most probable or most
dangerous adversary COA (including TIM considerations), determine adversary offensive and defensive
CBRN capabilities, and determine adversary CBRN usage intent. SOF personnel must have a thorough
knowledge of the operational area, to include geographic, political, social, economic, informational,
military (enemy order of battle and operational concepts), and environmental conditions. Also, for some
missions, SOF personnel must know the language, customs, ethnic and religious affiliations, and
antagonisms of the local population that may affect mission execution (for example, custom of wearing a
beard precludes a tight seal on a gas mask). This level of area orientation is best achieved through previous
operational experience, mobile training teams, deployments for training in the area, or intensive
preemployment study of the intended operational area.
6-5. SO missions must be planned completely—insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction—
before committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy situation, environmental characteristics of the
operational area, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, tactical considerations,
logistic requirements, and the size and composition of the command and support structure dictates the size
and capabilities of the assigned force. Planners must consider the CBRN defense procedures used by
components when involved in joint operations.
Note: Planners should consider establishing component working groups to resolve

interoperability issues.
6-6. SOF mission planners ensure adequate situational awareness is a central concern for commanders
and staffs. A well-developed, exercised, component-compatible CBRN warning and reporting system
provides a significant measure of protection by assisting forces to avoid the hazard. Accurate and timely
understanding of the hazard and its effects minimizes the possibility of either excessive or inadequate
protection of the force, maintaining a protective posture longer than necessary, or misusing scarce CBRN
defense assets, such as early warning, detection, reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination units.
These assets are combat multipliers and must be managed effectively to support the campaign plan and
protect capabilities with high vulnerabilities to the effects of CBRN weapons.
6-7. SOF missions must plan for medical support, to include management and treatment of casualties, and
the impact of CBRN casualties on a mission. Medical CBRN defense should be fully integrated into the
deliberate planning process to maximize readiness. Key elements include casualty estimation, prophylaxis,
diagnostics, mass casualty management, evacuation of contaminated patients, patient decontamination,
evacuation of decontaminated patients to medical treatment, and requirements for stand-by or surge
medical operations. The GCC’s planning should recognize that CBRN attacks have the potential to create
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 6-5

Chapter 6
mass casualties. The treatment and evacuation of CBRN casualties will be difficult and hazardous both to
the patients and to medical personnel.
Note: Evacuation of contaminated patients is only conducted in extreme circumstances when the
contaminated element does not possess any capability to decontaminate the patient before
transport. If evacuation is required, the contaminated unit will make every effort to reduce the
contamination on the patient by removing gross contamination prior to transport.
6-8. Planners must ensure interoperability of SOF with conventional forces that either host or support
their activities. Common standards for CBRN defense, especially training and equipment, must be
established to maximize effectiveness and prevent inadvertent vulnerabilities in joint force capabilities.
Gaps in the CBRN defense capabilities of multinational coalition forces must be addressed to ensure
coalition cohesion and effectiveness in both planning and operations. This is especially true during time-
critical contingency operations. For example, if SOF are operating from naval surface vessels during forced
entry operations, they must be prepared to function compatibly with the host vessel in the areas of
weapons, communications equipment, shipboard logistics, and CBRN defense procedures. Planners also
must ensure interoperability of SOF with HN forces and equipment as listed in Figure 6-2.
1. Determine communications procedures and links to give deployed SOF elements CBRN situational
awareness of the following:
• Threat early warning.
• Threat description (type, level, and estimated effects) and updates.
• Situation-specific guidance on local CBRN response.
• Primary U.S. or foreign agencies responsible for providing CBRN situational awareness.
2. Determine technical CBRN detection capabilities of HN.
3. Determine HN alarm signals and procedures.
4. Determine HN decontamination capabilities for personnel, aircraft, and equipment as follows:
• Decontamination equipment type, condition, and availability.
• Decontamination procedures.
• Levels of HN training: currency and proficiency.
• HN plans or capability for decontaminating HN personnel.
• Estimated overall effectiveness of HN decontamination capability.
5. Determine specialized decontamination equipment and procedures SOF elements must possess
while residing on HN installations.
6. Determine HN equipment compatibility: air and ground components.
7. Consider the emergency recall requirements for unsupportable CBRN hazard situations.
Figure 6-2. Host nation interoperability considerations
6-9. Regardless of the level of security involved, key planners from all disciplines (for example,
intelligence, fire support, communications, logistics, PSYOP, and CAO) must be involved in all phases of
SOF mission planning. Commanders should evaluate all SOF operational mission criteria in considering
mission advisability. SOF missions require clear rules of engagement (ROE) for execution that could
encompass a diverse set of tasks, to include—
z Disabling or confiscating CBRN weapons and materiel, including emergency operations to
dispose of dangerous materiel that cannot wait for normal processing.
z Detaining enemy or third-country nationals associated with CBRN weapons or who otherwise
might be considered war criminals.
z Countering efforts to remove CBRN assets from an adversary country.
6-6 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

z Caring for displaced civilians and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) IAW international law and
interacting with nonmilitary entities, especially to provide information to international
organizations and news media to counter disinformation efforts related to CBRN weapons.
z Giving special considerations for American citizens, ambassadors, and precious cargo, to
include medical care and IPE.
CBRN STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

6-10. The planning of SOF missions involves many staff elements. Each is skilled in a specific area that
enables the planning team to analyze issues and to meet mission objectives. The staff elements are
discussed below with emphasis being on their CBRN duties.
6-11. When faced with an enemy willing to use CBRN weapons to produce mass casualties, the S-1 needs
to be exploring short-notice personnel replacements for SOF personnel as well as CBRN defense units. In
the law enforcement arena, the S-1 should consider that current doctrine requires providing CBRN
protection and training for EPWs.
6-12. The S-2’s primary concern is determining the enemy’s CBRN capabilities and intent, such as
weapon inventory, location, and likelihood of employment (how determined the enemy is to use it). An S-2
works with the CBRN special staff who analyzes and interprets how weather and terrain may determine
where CBRN weapons could be used against friendly forces (participate in a CBRN vulnerability analysis),
as well as develop CBRN-specific PIRs and intelligence requirements. The S-2 ensures that the statement
of intelligence interest includes CBRN capabilities. Also, the S-2 considers possible collateral damage to
friendly troops and noncombatants if attacking CBRN storage and delivery areas, and industrial targets that
house toxic chemicals.
6-13. The S-3 analyzes how to develop the CBRN defense task organization for components, analyzes the
effects that a CBRN attack will have on friendly COAs, and recommends actions in response to a CBRN attack.
6-14. The S-4 develops policy for linking HN civil defense support, as well as equipping and training
identified mission-critical civilians, contractors, third-country nationals, and Department of Defense
(DOD) personnel. S-4 logistics planning should include component liaison officers to facilitate component
support. In addition, the S-4 ensures that a CBRN logistic system for supplies and repairs is in place and
ready to perform. The S-4 coordinates and monitors the status of equipment, expenditure of IPE and
supplies, and the movement of CBRN assets. The S-4 may also be required to locate and use alternate main
supply routes due to CBRN contamination and to critique plans based on CBRN equipment shortages. The
S-4’s engineers assist in the construction of decontamination sites. The S-4’s transportation personnel keep
ports and airfields operational and clear of contamination. The surgeon oversees S-4 medical issues.
6-15. The S-5 ensures that CBRN considerations have been included in both OPLANs and concept plans.
The S-5 coordinates HN approval of decontamination sites, operations, and equipment or facility support.
The S-5 must participate in recommending the GCC’s response to CBRN attacks. When developing COAs,
the S-5 must consider both previous CBRN employment and possible future CBRN employment by enemy
forces. The S-5 also develops the friendly force nuclear weapon employment policy for the theater if an
authorization for use is received from the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense.
6-16. The S-6 focuses on the theater forces’ ability to send and receive CBRN reports. This includes
having a dedicated net (if deemed necessary by the GCC) for CBRN reporting and ensuring that
components have communications capabilities to communicate with both joint and multinational forces.
6-17. The CA staff planner participates in the MDMP and recommends CA forces and series that support
missions based on the commander’s intent. The planner ensures that the CA augmentation supports the
commander’s objectives for CBRN, which may include HN decontamination assistance and providing
protective equipment to civilians and HN support personnel.
6-18. The CBRN officers ensure CBRN-trained personnel are used as subject-matter experts (SMEs)
prepared to advise the commander and staff as to the effects of CBRN on all aspects of a mission. A CBRN
officer must ensure the coordination between SOF elements, multinational forces, and HN assets for
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 6-7

Chapter 6
CBRN equipment, information dissemination, defensive operations, and emergency response. Special
plans are also included to protect nonmilitary personnel from CBRN threats.
6-19. The surgeon ensures that medical personnel within the theater are prepared to provide medical
support for CBRN injuries and contaminated casualties. The surgeon ensures the immunization status of
the medical staff members, as well as all military personnel for whom the surgeon is responsible. In
addition, the surgeon coordinates the availability of Class VIII medical supplies. Medical personnel must
be briefed on agent symptoms and be aware of known enemy CB agents within the theater, as well as
radiation exposure limits. Biological agent symptoms could be misdiagnosed as common cold symptoms
until it is too late. Quantities of antidotes and related treatment supplies must be on hand, and resupply
ordered. In addition, the medical staff supports the theater mortuary affairs staff to ensure contaminated
remains are properly handled and evacuated.
6-20. The PSYOP staff planner participates in the MDMP and recommends PSYOP forces and series that
support missions based on the commander’s intent. The planner ensures that the PSYOP augmentation
supports the commander’s objectives for CBRN, which may include programs designed to dissuade an
adversary from initiating a CBRN attack or implementing programs designed to mitigate fear in friendly
populations and help restore order in the event of an attack.
6-21. The public affairs (PA) section prepares to issue press releases dealing with U.S. policy regarding
the use of CBRN weapons, as well as explaining the nature of such weapons. This publicity can help gain
support for the United States around the world. The PA staff should also be prepared to release articles
showing how the United States prepares and trains for this type of warfare. These articles and releases are
coordinated with higher HQ before release to the media. This effort, in turn, can help deter the enemy from
using such weapons against the United States.
6-22. The legal officer prepares to advise the GCC on the ROE for nuclear weapons, as well as RCAs
IAW EO 11850. In addition, the legal officer prepares to advise on the furnishing of CBRN training and
equipment to civilians and the legal ramifications of attacking CBRN or industrial targets. The joint force
will require clear ROE for execution of the mission, which could encompass a diverse set of tasks.
6-23. The chaplain can contribute to maintaining morale when faced with mass casualties using CBRN
weapons. In addition, by continuing to provide religious services, even if in MOPP4, the chaplain provides
an important spiritual need for the troops.
MISSION PREPARATION
6-24. At this stage of premission activity, SOF refine support requirements and tailor training to the CBRN
mission requirements discussed in the following paragraphs.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-25. Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in identifying relevant targets,
COA development, and mission planning and execution. The ability to interface with theater and national
intelligence systems and assets is critical for SOF mission success. Additionally, SOF mission
accomplishment may hinge on target or intelligence updates provided by other government agencies. A
SOTF, if formed, must also have these same interfaces.
6-26. The nature of many SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more
detailed than that needed in conventional operations. SOF often require intelligence to avoid enemy forces,
regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to
engage an enemy.
6-27. Intelligence support to SOF requires an expanded focus of the standard scope of intelligence
functions. This fact is particularly true in FID operations where intelligence must contain aspects related to
political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and relationships, as well as enemy and friendly
forces and target-specific data.
6-8 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

6-28. SOF missions are particularly sensitive to HN and enemy collection efforts. Counterintelligence
support is also considered in protecting sensitive SOF missions across the range of military operations.
6-29. Commanders at all levels should fully understand the capability and effectiveness of HN intelligence
and security services to collect information on SOF units and personnel.
Note: Additional specific guidance on intelligence support is provided in JP 3-05 and the JP 2-0
series of publications.
METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-30. Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support services are critical to the success of SOF
missions. From initial planning through execution, environmental intelligence should be included in the
decision-making process. Unique local conditions may expedite or negate a particular COA. A study of
general climatology, hydrography, and specific weather forecasts for the AO may provide the commander
with the information necessary to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute, support, and sustain
specific operations. Potentially, the execution decision may be based on exploiting certain adverse weather
and METOC conditions to provide cover for operations while avoiding those environmental conditions that
will hamper operations. However, these decisions often require finesse and judgment to ensure that, while
the weapon systems are operating near their environmental limits, they do not exceed them. With the
increased reliance on space capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental
effects on space operations. METOC support personnel can also provide information that will allow the
SOF commander to plan for the possibility of the loss of one or more critical space-based systems.
LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-31. The theater special operations command (TSOC) or the JSOTF commander determines SOF
theater of operations logistics requirements for the GCC. Logistics support for SOF units is provided
through one or more of the following functional areas.
Service Support
6-32. The logistics support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service, except where
otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of
whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the special operations
command, the joint force special operations component command, or a JSOTF. SOF logistics support
includes the sustainment and replenishment of all classes of supply, maintenance, transportation, facilities,
and services.
Joint In-Theater Support

6-33. The majority of SOF missions require joint logistic planning and execution. When the theater
Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the GCC determines if another
Service component can satisfy the requirement through common or joint servicing arrangements. Joint
logistic arrangements may also be used when normal Service support cannot satisfy requirements. SOF
often require nonstandard arrangements when operating in locations geographically separated from
established theater Service support infrastructures. GCCs and theater Service component commanders, in
coordination with the TSOC, ensure that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and
provided.
SO-Peculiar Support
6-34. SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services are defined as those items and services
required for SOF mission support for which there is no broad conventional requirement. Responsibility for
developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and
services belongs to the USSOCOM CCDR. This support will be provided to theater-deployed SOF via
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 6-9

Chapter 6
USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service
components.
Note: FM 3-05.140, Army Special Operations Forces Logistics, contains additional information
on SOF logistics support.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-35. Communications systems support to SOF is global, secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be
flexible so that it can be tailored to any mission and add value to the SOF operational capability.
Communications systems support the full range of SO worldwide. Normally, C2 of SOF is through SOF
channels. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and anytime using national capabilities to the
maximum extent possible. The SOF operational unit must have a variety of methods for communicating,
reporting, and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location. Communications systems
must never compromise the SOF operational unit.
6-36. SOF communications systems support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures,
personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit
levels. Communications systems support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions normally
are controlled at the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political
considerations may require control at higher national levels. To provide for necessary control, SOF
communications systems offer seamless connectivity from the lowest to the highest levels.
6-37. SOF communications systems must be interoperable with each other, with conventional forces, with
U.S. national resources, and with allies and HNs. SOF communications systems must integrate not only
with state-of-the-art systems (the CBRN warning and reporting system), but also with less-sophisticated
equipment often found in less-developed nations.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-38. The political sensitivity of many SO, especially in peacetime, mandates that thorough and accurate
PA guidance be developed during the operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most
operations. PA planning should accurately reflect the objective of the mission for domestic audiences and
be consistent with both the overall PSYOP effort and operations security requirements. The commander
having operational authority develops proposed PA guidance that is coordinated with supporting
commands and government agencies, as appropriate, before forwarding that guidance to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval.
Note: FM 3-61.1, Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, contains additional
information regarding PA support of SOF.
LEGAL SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-39. SOF missions frequently involve a unique set of complex issues. There are federal laws and
executive orders, federal agency publications and directives, and theater ROE that affect SOF activities.
These guidelines become especially important during sensitive peacetime operations when international
and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements affect mission planning and execution.
Commanders must seek legal review during all levels of planning and execution of SO missions, to include
planning of the theater ROE.
SPACE SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-40. As space-based support to military operations continues to improve, SOF commanders and planners
should be aware of potential space support operations and their integration with SO.
6-10 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

COMBAT CAMERA SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-41. Combat camera use provides still and video documentary products that support SO missions. Many
teams supporting SOF are specially equipped with night vision and digital image transmission capabilities.
Combat camera also provides gun-camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera
imagery is used to show allies, adversaries, and civilian populaces the effects of U.S. operations and to
counter enemy disinformation with on-screen or gun-camera evidence.
MEDICAL SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-42. SOF medical support is characterized by an austere structure and limited number of medical
personnel with enhanced medical skills. SOF medical personnel provide emergency treatment and a basic
level of medical care at the team level. Medical support provided to SOF units in the AO is planned and
conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Provision of medical support beyond this capability
depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure
umbrella is extended to cover the lack of internal capability or to meet requirements for additional medical
assets, such as antidotes (nonorganic), advanced trauma life support, surgical intervention, evacuation, and
medical logistics. Certain operations may also require security requirements be in place to preclude
compromising the names of SOF personnel upon entry into the conventional medical system. Preparation
includes prophylaxis and the practice of certain CBRN procedures to achieve a level of proficiency that
allows safe mission accomplishment. Medical personnel must be briefed on agent symptoms and known
enemy chemical and biological agents within the theater. As mentioned earlier, the early stages of
biological agent symptoms can be misdiagnosed as common cold symptoms.
PLANNING FOR CBRN SUPPORT AND INTERFACE

6-43. The inherent qualities of SO involve detailed planning and foresight. Intelligence preparation of the
SO area is critical to all planning when an AO contains a CBRN threat. The operational commander uses
this intelligence information while formulating a risk assessment. Based upon his assessment, decisions
will be made that involve tradeoffs between the amounts of protective equipment, rations, ammunition, and
supplies that can be carried and yet allow mission completion.
6-44. SOF CBRN planners should determine who their adjacent units are for a mission and then plan,
coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and execute (PCISE) with those units throughout the operation to
ensure streamlined and effective planning. Figure 6-3, page 6-12, lists the tasks involved in PCISE.
6-45. SOTF commanders may receive the mission to collect materiel and environmental samples (vapor,
liquid, solid) and clinical specimens (dead animal tissue) as evidence to support intelligence and
operational requirements to substantiate that a CBRN attack has occurred, provide presumptive
identification of agents used, survey the degradation of such products, or identify delivery systems and
their nation of origin. Sampling operations are particularly important if a potential adversary uses
previously unknown agents or if an adversary allegedly uses a CBRN agent first. Therefore, the collection
of samples and background information must be as detailed and comprehensive as possible.
6-46. An adversary may use RAs to restrict the use of terrain or to cause delayed casualties. Further,
residual radiation from RAs can potentially result in high dosages for those who operate in the
RA-contaminated area. A SOF element may collect samples to verify the use of RAs and to identify the
radionuclides of the RAs.
6-47. The data from sampling operations supports the IPOE process and directly relates to ongoing and
future operations. Sampling operations may be done to—
z Collect baseline bioenvironmental samples for background levels of indigenous biological
material in a given area.
z Collect and identify suspected CBRN samples, such as chemical, biological, environmental
(vapor, liquid, solid), and clinical specimens (tissue) from animals or suspected contaminated
animal specimens.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 6-11

Chapter 6
z Collect RA samples, such as RAs spread throughout an area as radioactive dust particles, pellets,
or industrial waste.
z Provide presumptive identification of chemically or biologically contaminated samples.
Note: Special CBRN reconnaissance tasks include sampling operations, CBRN-related technical
evaluation and observation, and advice and training on special CBRN reconnaissance skills.
PLANNING
z Make an estimate of the situation.
z Determine the concept of the operation.
z Determine the decisive point and identify the main and supporting efforts.
z Outline the who, what, when, where, why, and how, to include the following:
Assign missions to subordinate units.
Task-organize.
Allocate resources.
Identify support requirements.
z Continue planning contingency and implied follow-on missions.
COORDINATING
z Manage terrain.
z Produce and disseminate OPORDs, plans, fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), and other
directives.
z Request, receive, emplace, brief, and task additional assets from higher HQ.
z Support subordinate-unit requirements, manage problems with adjacent units, and inform
higher HQ of battalion plans and intent. Send liaison officer to higher and adjacent units.
z Tie in support requirements.
INTEGRATING
z Maintain close contact and exchange information with all staff members at higher HQ,
subordinate units, and attached chemical support units. Exchanges include personal visits
and radio or written communications.
z Distribute essential information, decisions, orders, and plans.
z Attend formal and informal conferences, and provide input.
z Participate in briefings and establish message control procedures.
z Perform liaison duties, when appropriate.
SYNCHRONIZING
z Arrange activities in time, space, and purpose to produce the maximum relative combat
power at the decisive point.
EXECUTING
z Implement the commander’s guidance and intent for effects.
z Ensure targeting partners have well-defined definitions or methods for describing the effects
their specialty brings to bear on the operation.
z Integrate multiple staff sections and organizations into an effective effects organization.
Figure 6-3. PCISE tasks
6-48. A CRD may augment a SOF element conducting a unilateral collection mission, such as technical
observations to support surveillance of known or suspected CBRN facilities in hostile areas where the
threat precludes the use of other human intelligence means. The CRD may provide CBRN technical
training to SOF elements if the mission requirements prevent the CRD from augmenting the element. Also,
6-12 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

the detachment may provide CBRN defensive skills training to HN personnel if the HN personnel speak
English or if language support is provided and HNS agreements allow such training.
Note: Appendix D provides further information on SOF CBRN advanced sampling TTP.
Additional sampling information is provided in FM 3-11.19, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance. Appendix E explains
the procedures to conduct SOF element decontamination options.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 6-13

Chapter 7
Passive Defense Operations
A robust passive defense capability can both reduce the effects of a CBRN incident
and provide a psychological deterrent to threat forces that may be considering
conducting an attack against U.S. interests using CBRN materials. The nature of
ARSOF missions and unit compositions offer some significant advantages in passive
defense. ARSOF units are highly mobile and do not need to occupy large areas to
function. As such, it is very difficult to successfully conduct a CBRN attack against
ARSOF units. However, because of their mobility ARSOF units have very limited
organic CBRN defensive and early warning capabilities. The priority of effort in
ARSOF CBRN passive defense operations is contamination avoidance and
coordination with conventional force units for COLPRO and decontamination
requirements.
CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE
7-1. Most ARSOF missions require small elements of ARSOF Soldiers to operate away from large U.S.
base clusters. This procedure is both a strength and weakness in contamination avoidance. It is a strength
because if the enemy decides to attack U.S. forces with CBRN materials, it will generally target large troop
concentrations to have the most effect both in casualties and media coverage. Since most ARSOF elements
are not located on large base clusters, there is a greater chance that they will not be targeted for a CBRN
attack. However, it is also a weakness because operating away from large base clusters means that ARSOF
generally have, at best, only limited access to COLPRO equipment and may be forced to abandon their
base entirely in the event of a CBRN attack.
7-2. When selecting the location for a new ARSOF base camp, units should consider the vulnerability to
a CBRN attack. The importance of these considerations must correspond with how likely the enemy is to
use CBRN materials in an attack. Units should consider the following when selecting a location:
z Proximity to industrial facilities.
z Civilian population density around the base camp area.
z Threat CBRN capabilities.
z Meteorological data (prevailing wind direction and speed, precipitation amounts).
z Proximity to water sources.
z Terrain.
7-3. If a CBRN release, whether accidental or intentional, occurs within the AO of an ARSOF element,
every effort should be made to stay a safe distance from that area. The CRD or DRT can determine the
extent and type of contamination and provide estimates as to how long the contamination will last. If the
CRD or DRT is not available, ARSOF elements can coordinate with conventional units to help determine
what areas are contaminated. Also, ARSOF units should engage the local population to determine where
contaminated areas exist.
7-4. ARSOF commanders can reduce the vulnerability to contamination and disease by enforcing
uniform standards and personal hygiene, and ensuring that all personnel have received any required
vaccinations before deployment.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 7-1

Chapter 7
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

7-5. ARSOF units are issued either the JSLIST protective overgarment or the chemical protective
undergarment (CPU) depending on mission requirements. Either of these will provide temporary protection
against most chemical or biological agents and against alpha and beta radiation indefinitely. Since ARSOF
units generally operate in small groups over large areas, resupply of CBRN protective gear may not be
feasible. ARSOF units mainly use the existing supplies of protective gear to escape the contaminated area.
7-6. Due to the nature of some ARSOF missions and the threat assessment, the mission commander may
decide not to bring IPE due to space and weight constraints. Should an ARSOF unit unknowingly enter a
contaminated area without IPE, personnel can take the following steps to reduce the possibility of exposure
to contamination:
z Cover all exposed skin. Even ordinary clothing provides some protection against CBRN
contamination. The main concern is to minimize the skin contact with the agent. If an item of
clothing becomes contaminated with liquid agent, the Soldier should remove it immediately and
cover it with a clean article of clothing. If that is not possible, he should apply dry, absorbent
material (dirt, sawdust, foot powder) to the contaminated area to absorb as much contamination
as possible. He should change the contaminated article of clothing as soon as possible.
z Breathe through a wet cloth. Breathing through a clean, wet cloth will stop most large
particulate matter from entering the respiratory tract. The cloth will mainly be effective against
radioactive dust particles and some industrial chemicals. Soldiers should make sure to wash the
cloth frequently to avoid contamination buildup.
z Wear sealed eye protection. Chemical and biological agents can rapidly enter the circulatory
system through the eyes. Wearing sealed eye protection will best help limit exposure and
prevent eye damage.
z Tape down all openings in clothing. Soldiers can try to make a sealed outer garment by applying
tape to cuffs, collars, and zippers. This method will help reduce the chance that the
contamination will make direct contact with skin.
Note: These steps are for escape purposes only. Upon encountering contamination, personnel
must immediately retreat to the last known uncontaminated location and coordinate for
decontamination or medical treatment.
COLLECTIVE PROTECTION
7-7. ARSOF units do not have any significant organic COLPRO capability. All COLPRO requirements
must be coordinated with conventional forces units. Should a large-scale CBRN event occur where
ARSOF is operating and the GCC determines that ARSOF needs to continue operations in the
contaminated area, the affected ARSOF elements must coordinate for sufficient COLPRO space to
continue to conduct operations.
EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

7-8. ARSOF units are equipped with chemical agent alarms at the company and detachment levels.
Properly emplaced, they will provide enough early warning of nerve or blister agent vapor clouds for
personnel to don their protective equipment and move away from the contaminated area.
7-9. Due to the nature of ARSOF operations, ARSOF units may not be able to properly emplace the
chemical agent alarms to provide adequate early warning. If this is the case, the following procedures may
provide enough early warning for the ARSOF unit to either don protective equipment or avoid becoming
contaminated. If any of the following are observed, immediately don mask, sound the alarm per unit SOP,
seek cover, conduct immediate decontamination if necessary, and don MOPP gear:
z Unexplained low-hanging clouds.
z Unexplained liquid puddles.
7-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Passive Defense Operations
z Unexplained dead or dying animals.

z Unexplained smells (for example, the smell of freshly cut grass in a desert environment).
z Reports of contamination from local population.
z Unexplained physical reactions (choking, convulsions) from nearby individuals.
DECONTAMINATION
7-10. ARSOF elements use decontamination procedures modified to fit the particular situation. ARSOF
units may be operating in denied or nonpermissive territory and therefore require a high degree of stealth in
all phases of a mission. The modified decontamination procedures do not compromise the critical survival
principles of stealth, contamination avoidance, or preventing the spread of contamination throughout the
AO. These procedures may be modified to accommodate the addition of site entry and security personnel
who might be added to the mission profile.
7-11. Commanders must evaluate the threat, tactical situation, and decontamination system availability
when deciding how to decontaminate. An ARSOF unit entering a contaminated environment to conduct a
mission or becoming contaminated while operational has three options for decontamination:
z Unsupported SOF element decontamination.
z Expedient personnel decontamination system.
z Dirty exfiltration decontamination.
Note: Appendix E defines and explains the specific procedures for these three options.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 7-3

Appendix A
Unit and CBRN Organic Support
COMMON DETECTION EQUIPMENT

1. Chemical Agent Detector Paper, M8. National Stock Number (NSN): 6665-00-05-0829. M8 is
chemically treated, dye impregnated paper. It detects liquid V and G (nerve), and H (blister) CW agents. It
does not detect vapors or agents in water. Exposure to liquid insecticides, antifreeze, and petroleum
products may cause false readings (Navy nonasset).
2. Chemical Agent Detector Paper, M9. NSN: 6665-01-049-8982, Technical Manual (TM) 3-4230-229-10.
M9 detector paper detects the presence of liquid chemical agents (nerve and blister), but does not identify the
specific agent or its type. M9 paper reacts to CW agents by turning a reddish color. Exposure to liquid
insecticides, antifreeze, and petroleum products may cause false readings. The paper can be attached with an
adhesive back.
3. Chemical Agent Automatic Alarm, M8A1. NSN: 6665-01-105-5623, TM 3-6665-312-12&P. The M8A1
is a nerve agent alarm. The system consists of the M43A1 detector, as many as five M42 alarm units, and
various power supplies.
4. Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm, M21. NSN: 6665-01-302-1968. The M21 is a two-man-portable,
passive infrared sensor that detects nerve and blister agent vapor clouds from a distance of 3 to 5 kilometers.
It can be used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. It consists of a detector, tripod, M42 remote
alarm unit, transit case, power cable assembly, and standard military power source (Air Force [AF]
nonasset).
5. Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm, M22. The M22 is an advanced point-sampling, chemical
agent alarm system. It detects standard nerve and vesicant agents. The system consists of the detector, as
many as five alarm units, and various power supplies. This system replaces the M8A1 alarm in most SOF
units (Navy special operations forces [NAVSOF] nonasset).
6. CBRN Reconnaissance System FOX, M93A1. NSN 6665-01-323-2582, FM 3-11.3, Multiservice
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination
Avoidance. The FOX (M93A1) is a fully integrated CBRN reconnaissance system with a dedicated system
of CBRN detection, warning, and sampling equipment integrated into a high-speed, high-mobility armored
carrier. Its components include a Mobile Mass Spectrometer (NAVSOF and AF nonasset).
7. Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS). NSN 6665-01392-6191, TM 3-666-F349-12&P. The
BIDS is a self-contained biological detection lab mounted on a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicle (HMMWV). It has sample detectors, identification equipment, navigation devices, weather sensors,
and communication links. The BIDS is an Army Corps-level asset (SOF nonasset).
8. Chemical Agent Detector Kit, M256A2. NSN: 6665-01-563-7473, TM 3-6665-426-10. The M256A2
chemical agent detector kit is designed to detect and identify blood (AC and CK), blister (H, HN, HD, CX,
and L), and nerve (V and G series) agents, and consists of a carrying case, 12 sampler-detectors, instruction
cards, and M8 paper.
9. Water Testing Kit for Chemical Agents, M272. NSN 6665-01-134-0885, TM 3-6665-319-10. The M272
is a lightweight, portable kit that detects and identifies harmful amounts of CW agents present in raw and
treated water. It detects AC, HD, L, and nerve agents (Navy nonasset).
10. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM). NSN: 6665-01-199-4153. The CAM is used to search and locate
contamination, specifically nerve and blister agents. It is a battery-operated, portable-point monitoring
system. It cannot realistically assess the vapor hazard over an area from one point. It weighs 8.6 pounds
(AF nonasset).
11. Individual Chemical Agent Detector (ICAD). NSN 6665-01-340-1693. The ICAD is a miniature chemical
agent detector for nerve, blood, choking, and vesicant/blister agents. The ICAD has a slower detection
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 A-1

Appendix A
response time for some agents and may not be suitable for individual force protection missions in certain
roles (Army and AF nonasset).
12. Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM). NSN 6665-01-357-8502. The ICAM merges two
improvements to the CAM. These improvements are a modular design and an updated electronics board.
The modular design significantly reduces repair time (NAVSOF and AF nonasset).
COMMON PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

1. Protective Mask, M24. NSN 4240-00-808-8799, TM 3-4240-280-10. The M24 mask protects personnel
in aircraft and on the ground against all known CB aerosols and vapors. It can be attached to the aircraft
oxygen system using an M8 adapter kit (AF and NAVSOF nonasset).
2. Protective Mask, M40A1. NSN 4240-01-258-0061, TM 3-4240-342-10. The M40A1 mask protects
against CB agents, radioactive fallout particles, and battlefield contaminants. It has a silicone face piece,
binocular lens system, voicemitter, drink tube, clear and tinted inserts, and standard thread filter canister.
3. Combat Vehicle Crewman Mask, M42. NSN 4240-01-258-0065, TM 3-4240-342-10. The M42-series
mask has the same components as the M40 with an additional built-in microphone for wire
communications. The filter canister is attached to the end of the hose with an adapter for the chemical
protective filter unit (CPFU) connection (AF and Navy nonasset).
4. Aircrew Protective Mask, M43. NSN 4240-01-208-6966. The M43 mask has a form-fitting, butyl-rubber
facepiece with a lens mounted close to the eyes, an integrated hood with a skull-type suspension system, a
portable battery or power-operated blower and filter system, and an inhalation air distribution assembly
(AF and Navy nonasset).
5. General Aviator Protective Mask, M48, NSN 4240-01-386-4686, TM 3-4240-342-20&P; M49, NSN
4240-01-413-4096, TM 3-4240-342-20&P. The M48 and M49 masks are an upgrade of the M43 Type I
mask. Its improved blower is chest-mounted. The blower is lighter, less bulky, and battery-powered (AF
and Navy nonasset).
6. Protection Assessment Test System (PATS), M41. NSN 4240-01-0365-8241, FM 3-11.4. The M41 is
used to check the face seal of protective masks (NAVSOF nonasset).
7. Aircrew Uniform Integrated Battlefield (AUIB). The AUIB is a standard combat uniform for aircrews.
It replaces both the battle dress overgarment (BDO) and the NOMEX flight suit, and provides CBRN and
flame protection (AF and NAVSOF nonasset).
8. BDO. NSN 8415-01-137-1704, FM 3-11.4. The BDO is a camouflage, expendable, two-piece
overgarment. It protects for 24 hours against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, and
radioactive particles. Maximum wear time is 30 days in an uncontaminated environment (NAVSOF
nonasset).
9. Chemical Protective Glove Set. NSN 8415-01-033-3518. This protective glove set consists of an outer
butyl-rubber glove and an inner cotton insert.
10. Chemical Protective Footwear Cover (CPFC). NSN 8430-01-021-5978, FM 3-11.4. CPFCs are
impermeable and have unsupported butyl-rubber soles and uppers. Two variations are fielded: one with a
single-heel flap, and the other with the newer fishtail double-heel flap (NAVSOF nonasset).
11. Green/Black Vinyl Overboot (GVO/BVO). NSN 8430-01-048-6305. The GVO is olive-drab with elastic
fasteners. It protects against CBRN agents, rain, mud, or snow. The BVO is very similar, except it is black
with enlarged tabs on each elastic fastener.
12. Joint Services Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST). The JSLIST program, a four-Service
effort to field a common chemical protective ensemble, has produced a new protective overgarment that is
currently being fielded. Testing continues on the glove and boot. Program objectives include reduced heat
stress, compatibility with all interfacing equipment, longer wear, and washability.
13. Simplified Collective Protective Equipment (SCPE), M20A1. NSN 4240-01-166-2254, FM 3-11.4. The
SCPE consists of an expandable liner, blower/motor assembly, protective entrance, support kit, and
replacement liners. It is lightweight and mobile, allowing for the conversion of existing structures into
protected C2 centers (AF and Marine nonasset).
A-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Unit and CBRN Organic Support
14. SCPE, M28. NSN 42400-01-331-2938, FM 3-11.4. The M28 is a lightweight modular system. It has tent
liners, hermetically sealed filter canisters, recirculation filters, and protective and tunnel entrances for litter
patients. Improvements are a medical air lock, tent interface, and liquid agent resistance.
COMMON DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT

1. Portable Decontamination Apparatus, M11. NSN 4230-00-720-1618, TM 3-4230-204-12&P. The M11
decontaminates small areas that personnel must touch. It is a steel container with an aluminum spray head
assembly and a nitrogen gas cylinder that provides pressure. It is filled with 1 1/3 quarts of
decontaminating solution, enough to cover 135 square feet (AF and NAVSOF nonasset).
2. Power-Driven Decontamination Apparatus, M12A1. NSN 4230-00-926-9488, TM 3-4230-204-12&P. The
M12A1 is power-driven and includes a pump unit, heater unit, 500-gallon tank unit, and personal shower
unit (SOF and AF nonasset).
3. Lightweight Decontamination System (LDS), M17. NSN 4230-01-251-8702, TM 3-4230-228-10. The M17
is portable, lightweight, and consists of a combined pump and heater unit, 1,500-gallon or 3,000-gallon
collapsible rubberized tank, and personal shower unit.
4. Skin Decontamination Kit (SDK), M291. NSN 4230-01-101-3984, TM 3-4230-216-10. The M291 is
used for skin and equipment decontamination. It is nontoxic, eliminating the need for inert trainers.
5. Decontamination Kit, Individual Equipment, M295. NSN 6850-01-357-8459, FM 3-11.4. The M295
uses absorptive resin, unlike the liquid-based kits. It is a pouch, designed to fit in the cargo pocket of the
Army combat uniform (ACU), and contains four individually wrapped, wipe-down mitts to decontaminate
personal equipment.
6. Super Tropical Bleach (STB). NSN 6850-00-297-6653, FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination. STB is effective
against lewisite, V and G agents, and biological agents. It ignites on contact with liquid mustard agent or
any organic compound such as JP8, diesel, or any petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) product.
7. Calcium Hypochlorite (HTH). NSN 6810-01-065-2410, FM 3-11.5. HTH is a decontaminant that is used
only when STB is not available. It is effective against lewisite, V agents, and all biological materials,
including bacterial spores. HTH ignites on contact with liquid mustard agent or any organic compound
such as JP8, diesel, or any POL product. Personnel should observe the same precautions as for STB.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DETECTION EQUIPMENT

1. Sabre 4000. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment manufactured by Smiths Detection, Inc.
Provides presumptive identification of known WMD agents, narcotics, explosives, and TICs. Can be used
in either vapor sampling or swipe sampling modes. Uses ion mobility spectrometry analysis technique.
Currently fielded to CRDs.
2. Inspector 1000. COTS equipment manufactured by Canberra, Inc. Real-time isotope identification and
classification; able to determine the location and strength of sources. Displays dose rate equivalent H*(10).
Audible warning and alarm limits for gamma and neutron dose rate. Detects alpha, beta, gamma, and
neutron (with neutron adapter) radiation. Estimates source strength and distance, and can identify isotope.
Currently fielded to CRDs. Note: Source shielding can affect results.
3. Hazmat-ID. COTS equipment manufactured by Smiths Detection, Inc. Provides confirmatory analysis of
solid or liquid samples using Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrometry. Has input ports for keyboard and
mouse, MS Windows OS, and supports external storage devices. Can receive and transmit data via
Ethernet connection in conjunction with a communications platform. Currently fielded to CRDs.
4. First Defender. COTS equipment manufactured by Ahura Scientific, Inc. Provides presumptive
identification of known WMD agents, narcotics, explosives, and TICs. Uses Raman laser spectroscopy.
Can conduct identification through clear plastic or glass containers of solid or liquid samples. Currently
fielded to CRDs.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 A-3

Appendix A
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

1. Apache Protective Mask, M45A1. TM 3-4240-341-10. The M45A1 provides protection without the aid
of forced ventilation air. It is compatible with aircraft sighting systems and night vision devices. It has
close-fitting eyepieces, a voicemitter, a drink tube, and a low-profile filter canister.
2. M53 mask. The M53 has been approved for SOF use. It is compatible with SCBA, powered air-purifying
respirator (PAPR), and closed-circuit breathing apparatus (CCBA).
3. Chemical Protective Undergarment (CPU). FM 3-11.4. The CPU is an expendable, two-piece
undergarment that is worn under a standard uniform. It protects for 12 hours against chemical agent
vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, and radioactive particles (alpha and beta only).
4. SCBA. COTS equipment. Provides up to 1 hour of supplied air.
5. Draeger PAC III. COTS equipment. CCBA. Provides up to 4 hours of supplied air.
6. PAPR. Provides powered filtered air supply. Attaches to M45 and M53 masks.
JOINT EQUIPMENT
1. Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System. This system can detect the actual on-site presence or
approach of biological agents, can collect samples to analyze for selected agents, and uses a sensor network
command to provide early warning to take protective action. It consists of several monitoring units that can
be used in the defense of large sites, such as airfields. A HMMWV and trailer are used to transport the
system’s components.
2. Portal Shield, Sensor Network Command Post. This system detects and identifies biological agents. It
consists of several monitoring units that can be used in the defense of large sites, such as airfields.
3. Joint Service Light CBRN Reconnaissance System (JSLCBRNRS). NSN 6665-01-323-2582. The
JSLCBRNRS will detect, mark, and warn of CBRN hazards on the battlefield. The system will use the
HMMWV and the light-armored vehicle as mobile platforms to move sophisticated sensors and analysis
equipment on the battlefield (NAVSOF and AF nonasset).
4. Modular Decontamination System (MDS). The MDS consists of a decontamination pumper and two
high-pressure washer modules. Each module may be transported on a 3/4-ton trailer. The MDS is
supported by two 3,000-gallon, self-supporting fabric water tanks and one 125-gallons per minute (gpm)
water pump (NAVSOF nonasset).
5. Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Detector (MICAD). The MICAD is a near-real-time
integrated CBRN detection, warning, and reporting system. Using existing detectors, it automates data
gathering, formats sensor data, transmits alarms, and issues CBRN1 and CBRN4 reports (NAVSOF
nonasset).
6. Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD). The JCAD detects nerve and blister agents. It is lightweight,
portable, and has interferant technology that reduces false alarms. The JCAD will allow detection of
emerging threat agents.
7. Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD). The JSLSCAD is a passive,
infrared detection unit that detects nerve and blister vapor clouds at a distance of up to 5 kilometers while
the detector is moving.
8. Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). The JBPDS provides common-point detection for all
services. It detects BWAs at low threshold levels and identifies the agents within 15 minutes.
9. Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS). The SDS includes CB decontaminants that increase
decontamination efficiency, are less caustic, and require no water. Development goals include
neutralization with less contact time, no scrubbing, fewer health risks, and improved storage stability.
10. Joint CBRN Warning and Reporting System (JWARN). The JWARN is a system of computers,
printers, and software. This equipment is tied together with communications that will enable personnel to
rapidly detect, identify, and disseminate data on CB threats.
A-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Appendix B
Personal Protective Equipment
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT LEVELS

B-1. Military PPE is not effective for all TICs and TIMs. In some cases, it is necessary for CRD and CDD
personnel to don civilian chemical equipment (CCE). This equipment is mandated and certified by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA provides guidelines for selecting
appropriate PPE and categorizes equipment ensembles into four levels, A through D. The uses at each level
are explained in Figure B-1, and required equipment is outlined in Table B-1, page B-2.
z Hazardous substances have been identified and the highest level of

Level A protection is required for skin, eyes, and respiratory system.
z In any conditions in which the hazardous substance is unknown.
z Type and atmospheric concentration of substance have been identified.
z The highest level of respiratory protection is necessary.
z A lesser level of skin protection is needed.
Level B
z There is less than 19.5 or more than 23.5 percent oxygen.
z The HAZMAT is unknown and there is no direct skin contact or splash
hazard.
z Types of contaminants are identified.
z Substances will not adversely affect or be absorbed through any exposed
skin.
Level C
z Air purifying respirator (APR) is available that can remove the contaminants.
z All criteria for use of APR are met.
z There is more than 19.5 and less than 23.5 percent oxygen.
z When the atmosphere contains no hazard and when there is no potential
Level D for splashes, immersion, or unexpected inhalation of, or contact with,
hazardous levels of any chemicals.
Figure B-1. Levels of personal protective equipment use
Note: Level D is generally considered a work uniform offering minimal protection.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT SELECTION AND USE

B-2. Personnel responding during the initial phase of a CBRN event or incident, when the agent or
airborne concentration is unknown, should enter the exclusion zone using Level A or Level B PPE. A
lesser level of protection is not acceptable unless air monitoring or a hazard analysis indicates otherwise.
B-3. The ERG provides a reference for first responders during the initial phase of a TIM or risk of release
other than attack incident, including initial isolation and minimum protective action distances and PPE. The
ERG provides a quick cross-reference index for identification numbers, guide numbers, and alphabetical
listing of names of materials that are then incorporated into a table of initial isolation and minimum
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 B-1

Appendix B
protective-action distances to the 90th percentile (90 percent probability that hazard will not exceed these
distances).
Table B-1. Required protective equipment
Equipment Level A Level B Level C Level D

Open-system breathing apparatus X X
Air-purifying/powered respirator X
Totally-encapsulating chemical-protective suit X X
Hooded chemical-resistant clothing X X X
Coveralls* X X X
Face shield* X X X
Escape mask* X X X
Long underwear* X X X
Gloves, outer, chemical-resistant X X X
Gloves, inner, chemical-resistant X X X X
Boots, chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank X X X X
Boot covers, outer, chemical-resistant (disposable) X X X
Hard hat* X X X X
Note: Equipment marked with an asterisk (*) is optional and task-dependent.
CBRN INCIDENT CONCENTRIC AREAS

B-4. There are three concentric zones surrounding a CBRN incident: the hot zone (or exclusion area), the
warm zone (or decontamination zone), and the cold zone (or support zone).
HOT ZONE (EXCLUSION AREA)

B-5. The hot zone is an area immediately surrounding a CBRN incident that extends far enough to
prevent adverse effects from released contamination to personnel outside the zone. This area is assumed to
pose an immediate health risk to all persons, including rescuers.
B-6. When a chemical is unidentified, worst-case possibilities concerning toxicity must be assumed and
Level A PPE (including pressure-demand self-contained underwater breathing apparatus [SCUBA]) worn,
depending on the situation. When the chemical is a chemical warfare agent (CWA), Level A PPE should
be worn during the initial response.
B-7. Supplied-air respirators (such as airline respirators) should not be used because the air hose may be
degraded by chemicals or heat, the hose may become tangled, and such devices are not practical for
operations during an emergency.
B-8. APRs are rarely appropriate for CBRN response because most CBRN incidents involve at least one
of the following conditions which would preclude use of an APR:
z An oxygen-deficient atmosphere (less than 19.5 percent oxygen content).
z An unidentified contaminant.
z An unknown concentration of a contaminant.
z A concentration of contaminant above the NIOSH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
value.
z A high relative humidity.
B-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

WARM ZONE (DECONTAMINATION ZONE)

B-9. The warm zone is the area between the hot and cold zones where decontamination operations
(decontamination corridor) and hot zone support take place. It includes control points for the access
corridor, and thus assists in reducing the spread of contamination.
B-10. Generally, the level of PPE is the same as that worn in the hot zone, unless professional judgment or
air monitoring indicates a lower level of PPE is safe to use. A lower level of protective clothing can be
used when the risk of secondary contamination is low. For example, a Level B nonencapsulating suit
(National Fire Protection Association [NFPA] splash-protective suit) can be used if a Level A
encapsulating suit (NFPA vapor-protective suit) is required in the hot zone. If the risk of inhaling gassing
vapors is also low (that is, the chemical is not highly volatile or the decontamination area is set up outdoors
with good natural ventilation), it may be acceptable to use a lower level of respiratory protection. Air
contaminants should be identified and measured to assure safety before a lesser level of respiratory
protection is used.
B-11. Medical personnel wearing respirators and heavy gloves will find it difficult to provide advanced
medical care in the warm zone; therefore, this care is not administered until the victim is transferred to the
cold zone (support zone). Electronic items, such as cardiac monitors, generally are not taken into the
decontamination zone because the equipment may not be safe to operate and may be difficult to
decontaminate.
B-12. Decontamination is not required for all victims. Victims exposed only to TIC gases or vapors that do
not have skin or eye irritation generally do not need decontamination. Victims who have been decontaminated
or who do not require decontamination should be transferred immediately to the support zone.
B-13. If potentially contaminated, medical personnel must be decontaminated. Many incidents have
occurred involving seemingly successful rescue, transport, and treatment of chemically contaminated
individuals by unsuspecting emergency personnel who—in the process—contaminate themselves, the
equipment, and the hospital where the patient is taken. Therefore, all patients (except those with life-
threatening injuries) must be thoroughly decontaminated before admission into any medical treatment
facility.
B-14. All potentially contaminated patient clothing and belongings that have been removed and bagged
should remain in the decontamination area until properly decontaminated.
COLD ZONE (SUPPORT ZONE)

B-15. The cold zone is an area that is readily accessible and provides a clean location for support
operations. The incident commander, medical personnel, and other support persons and equipment operate
in this zone. Only standard precautions need be used when interacting with victims when they have been
decontaminated or did not require decontamination.
Air Monitoring
B-16. Air monitoring will help ensure that the PPE used by personnel at the incident site (for example, in
the exclusion zone) is sufficient or if the PPE needs to be upgraded or downgraded.
B-17. Decontamination personnel may want to confirm that they have successfully decontaminated the
patient before they are released to the support zone. The effectiveness of decontaminating victims of liquid
chemical contamination can be done with a combination of methods, such as air monitoring and swipe
testing. For instance, with wipe sampling, cloth or paper patches may be wiped over a decontaminated
surface or skin. Color changes may be noted that could indicate the possible presence of remaining residual
liquid chemical contamination. The presence of beta and gamma radiological contamination can be readily
confirmed by passing a radiation detector over the entire body. Air monitoring can detect chemical vapors
emanating from any residual liquid contamination remaining on the victim.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 B-3

Appendix B
Protection Against Biological Warfare Agents and Radioactive

Material (After an Attack)
B-18. For protection against BWAs and radioactive material (after an attack), a minimum of Level C PPE is
recommended. This equipment includes a full-face, air-purifying respirator (equipped with a P-100 or
high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA] filter), rubber gloves, Tyvek or equivalent garments, and hood and
boot covers. A PAPR—if available—is preferred for respiratory protection.
Note: For T-2 mycotoxins, use the PPE as described in Table B-2, pages B-4 and B-5.
Table B-2. Equipment level requirements
CWA TIM BWA Radiological/Nuclear
HOT ZONE
Level A (initially) with Level A or B (initially) Depending upon the Short-duration
NIOSH-certified SCUBA. with a NIOSH-certified situation: exposure:
SCUBA (level depends
The PPE level may be upon the chemical or Level A or Level B (with Level C with a NIOSH-
lowered if air monitoring situation). NIOSH-certified certified, full-face,
indicates this is safe to SCUBA). nonpowered APR
do. The PPE level may be (equipped with the
lowered if air monitoring Level C (with NIOSH- combination of a P-100
indicates this is safe to certified PAPR, equipped filter and organic vapor
do. with HEPA filters). and acid gas cartridges/
canister) is acceptable.
Level C (with NIOSH-
certified full-face APR,
equipped with P-100 PAPR (equipped with the
filter). combination of a HEPA
or P-100 filter and
organic vapor and acid
gas cartridges/ canister)
is preferred.
Gloves, Tyvek (or

equivalent) garments,
hood, and boot covers.
Extended-duration
exposure (days, weeks,
months):
Level B or Level C with a

PAPR (equipped with
HEPA or P-100 filter and
organic vapor and acid
gas cartridges/ canister),
gloves, Tyvek (or
equivalent) garments,
hood, and boot covers.
Note: When responding to fires or entering buildings on fire, structural firefighting gear should be worn,
including helmet, SCUBA, and turnout gear (thermally insulated coat, pants, and boots).
B-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Table B-2. Equipment level requirements (continued)
CWA TIM BWA Radiological/Nuclear
WARM ZONE
Same PPE level as hot Same PPE level as hot One PPE level lower Same PPE level as used
zone (or one PPE level zone (or one PPE level than the hot zone. during short-duration
lower than that used in lower than that used in exposure in the hot zone.
the hot zone if the hot zone if
professional judgment or professional judgment or
air monitoring indicates air monitoring indicates
this is safe to do). this is safe to do).
COLD ZONE
Standard Precaution Standard Precaution Standard Precaution Standard Precaution
PPE PPE PPE PPE
Protection Against CWAs and TIMs

B-19. Those in primary triage direct potentially contaminated patients to either the ambulatory
(nonmedical) or nonambulatory (medical) decontamination stations. If necessary, life-saving procedures
would be performed in the nonambulatory (medical) decontamination station. Those performing
decontamination or assisting in the decontamination would have to wear PPE. Once the patients leave the
decontamination stations, they are considered clean, and they proceed to secondary triage.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 B-5

Appendix C
Advanced CBRN Training
With the increasing threat that terrorist organizations may use WMD, multiple
courses and organizations have been established to prepare first responders to deal
with these incidents. ARSOF CBRN forces can enhance unit capabilities by having
first-responder and other HAZMAT training.
CENTER FOR NATIONAL RESPONSE

C-1. The Center for National Response (CNR) is located in Gallagher, West Virginia, and serves as an
ideal location for ARSOF to conduct CBRN training. The location has over 10,000 acres of semi-wilderness
area surrounding the tunnel that can be used for training purposes. It is uniquely suited as a multipurpose
exercise facility that is designed to meet a wide range of WMD consequence management and CT
requirements for the federal, state, and local organizations. The tunnel’s physical configuration enhances
experience at the individual, unit, and multiorganizational agency level. It serves as a valuable asset in
preparing ARSOF to meet current and future threats and challenges. The tunnel is ideal for consequence
and crisis-management emergency response exercises and provides a realistic environment where CRDs,
CDDs, DRTs, and other SOF CBRN personnel can practice their techniques in mitigating the effects of a
WMD incident.
C-2. The CNR has several scenario venues available. The sets are as follows: the postblast rubble area
with hazards and vehicles; the subway train and station with mezzanine; three chemical, biological, or drug
laboratories at different levels of sophistication; a highway WMD HAZMAT incident that can be
configured with a wide variety of chemical, biological, and radiological sources with numerous vehicles;
and a cave and a bunker complex that can be used in a multitude of scenarios. The CNR also has a
confined-space emergency egress trainer. More information about the CNR is found at
http://www.centerfornationalresponse.com/index.html.
EDGEWOOD CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL CENTER

C-3. The U.S. Army’s Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) is located at Aberdeen Proving
Ground in Edgewood, Maryland. The ECBC provides a direct relationship between ECBC’s chemical and
biological defense experts and ARSOF CBRN personnel by way of advanced CBRN training programs.
This unique relationship allows the scientist and engineer to share their knowledge, experience, and expert
talents directly from the lab and into the classroom. Each training event is a tailored program by the CBRN
unit to fulfill the unit’s specific mission requirements regarding a CBRN threat. Each training event lasts
from 1 to 14 days and is designed by the SOF unit selecting from 43 different modules. The selected
modules are then grouped together to create a training package and provide the ultimate training
experience. The course of instruction covers, but is not limited to, a chemical and biological overview of
agents, detection, protection, decontamination, sampling, mitigation, and treatment. A “lanes approach”
can be taught to split a particular team into their own specialized components and train simultaneously on
different subjects. ECBC encourages units to train at Aberdeen Proving Ground so the Soldier can use as
many of ECBC’s 1200 personnel and unique CB facilities as possible. However, mobile training teams can
conduct courses anywhere in the world. More information about ECBC is found at
http://www.ecbc.army.mil/ps/svcs_advanced_cbrn_training.htm.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 C-1

Appendix C
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND

C-4. Dugway Proving Ground (DPG) is the primary CB defense testing center under the reliance
program—a program that determines the reliability and survivability of all types of military equipment in a
CB environment. DPG is located in the Great Salt Lake Desert, approximately 85 miles southwest of Salt
Lake City, Utah. DPG provides a remote location for SOF CBRN units to train realistic scenarios with role
players. Each training event is a tailored program by the CBRN unit that may include the use of simulated
CBW agents with unique disseminations to add realism to all training events. Interim and formal AARs
include exercise videos and immediate feedback by SMEs (Ph.D. Level). All results and feedback are
confidential to protect the unit. In addition to CBRN training, DPG provides several training venues for SOF
to integrate into their training. DPG has many ranges for SOF use, to include desert warfare and live-fire
training, land navigation and off-road mobility, and close air support ranges. Additionally, unmanned aircraft
systems, nine drop zones, and a full-scale biological and chemical training and testing facility are available for
use. More information about DPG is found at https://www.dugway.army.mil/sites/local/. The school also
offers the additional courses discussed below.
TECHNICAL ESCORT
C-5. The scope of the school is to perform technical escort duties involving field sampling, detection,
identification, limited decontamination, and mitigation/remediation of hazards associated with CBRN
materials. It is located in Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. More information can be found at
http://wood.army.mil.
ADVANCED CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL INTEGRATED RESPONSE COURSE

C-6. This course is designed to provide students with hands-on incident-response opportunities in real and
simulated chemical and biological environments. This course is 40 hours in length and offered in several
locations by the federal government and some universities.
FIELD MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES COURSE

C-7. This course is designed for Medical Service Corps officers and Chemical Corps officers and NCOs
in medical or chemical specialties. Class instruction and laboratory and field exercises prepare graduates to
become trainers in the first-echelon management of chemical and biological agent casualties. This course is
40 hours in length and taught at APG. More information on the course can be found at
https://ccc.apgea.army.mil/courses/in_house/brochureFCBC.htm.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCHOOL

C-8. The Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) continues in its evolution as the nation’s education
and training center for DOD nuclear-core competencies. It is located at Kirkland Air Force Base, New
Mexico. The school is run by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and offers multiple courses,
to include the following:
z Consequence Assessment Tool Set, Level 2.
z Geospatial Intelligence for Consequence Assessment.
z Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability, Level 1.
z Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability, Level 2.
z Joint Nuclear Explosive Ordnance Disposal Course.
z Joint DOD-Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Surety Executive Course.
z Joint Planners Course for Combating WMD.
z Nuclear Weapons Orientation Course.
z Proliferation, Terrorism, and Response Course.
z Radiological Accident Command, Control, and Coordination.
z Radiological Emergency Team Operations.
C-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Advanced CBRN Training
z Theater Nuclear Operations Course.

z WMD Command, Control, and Coordination.
Note: More information about DNWS can be found on the DTRA Web site at
http://www.dtra.mil.
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRAINING

C-9. Many fire departments across the United States offer certification in HAZMAT courses. These
include confined-space training, clandestine labs, emergency response to terrorism, and incident
management. Although these classes are tailored toward first responders, they also provide excellent
training for SOF CBRN personnel. Oftentimes, SOF are the first units onto an objective. HAZMAT
training and certification allow SOF the ability to continue operations despite an AO that may contain or be
contaminated with HAZMAT.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 C-3

Appendix D
CBRN Sampling Techniques and Procedures
GENERAL
D-1. The collection of environmental and background (control) samples are an integral part of the
investigation of allegations of CBRN use. As a routine technique, field personnel collect a minimum of
four samples: three of suspected contamination and one in an unaffected area for control. Samples must be
kept cool or cold, if possible. The types of samples taken and the collection methods depend upon the
circumstances encountered by the collector (Figure D-1). Field collectors and analysis centers define
techniques and collection requirements. The protection and sampling equipment used by a SOF element is
tailored to fit specific situational requirements. Collection techniques vary according to the circumstances
under which an element must work (for example, dead animals may be a sample source and should be
triple bagged). A neat sample is an ideal sample medium for collection and laboratory analysis.
Additionally, the return and recovery of any sample identification or test equipment previously used to
identify CBRN agents are of great value to a laboratory conducting analysis. These items should be
recovered, packaged, and shipped for analysis. Different information may be derived from each type of
sample.
z Use glass or polypropylene bottles.

z Use gloves made of nitrile; avoid Latex gloves.
z If local containers must be used, include two identical unused containers along with the sample.
z Do not use paper bags, as this sample will be of no value.
z Generally, try to sample from point sources. Sample as close to the discharge (point) source as
possible.
z Always collect samples from control and target sites. Provide at least one control sample.
z Try to collect multiple control samples at one or more nearby control sites; make sure control
samples are the same type as the target sample.
z Use duplicate samples to confirm chemical presence at a sampling spot.
z Select a sampling spot that has the highest probability of finding target compounds. Only one
opportunity may exist to take a sample. Use maps, imagery, geological information, and weather
data.
z Collect target samples first; find areas to collect control samples.
z Sample during the coolest part of the day in summer and the warmest part of the day in winter.
z Use the wind speed and direction to determine the surface contamination location.
z Watch out for high winds in arid areas because they will dilute target compounds to undetectable
levels.
Figure D-1. Sampling guidance issues
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SAMPLING (ENVIRONMENT)

D-2. Environmental samples include air, water, soil, and vegetation samples of suspected contamination.
Background or control samples may be air, water, soil, or vegetation. In addition, control samples help
determine the normal condition of the air, water, soil, and vegetation around the suspected contaminated
area. The collection of environmental samples requires the collection of control samples. Control samples
allow the analysis center to compare an uncontaminated sample with a contaminated sample and to
determine whether a compound is naturally occurring in the environment. Collectors take samples of soil,
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-1

Appendix D
water, and vegetation from areas that are approximately 500 meters upwind of an alleged attack area to
ensure that an accurate comparison can be made. Control samples must be generically the same as those
collected in an alleged attack area. For example, if a SOF element collects leaves from an apple tree in an
attack area, it should collect sample leaves from an apple tree outside the contaminated area. If the team
collects water from a pond in the attack area, it should collect samples of water from a pond (not a moving
stream) in a nearby clean area. The size of an environmental control sample should be about the same as
those taken from an attack area. Each type of sample is explained below.
Air or Vapor Samples

D-3. Air or vapor is a good sample matrix since it is well mixed. Air or vapor from a sample site contains
a static concentration of contaminants. The concentration of contaminants depends upon the flow rate of
the contaminant into the environment, the wind speed, the physical state of the contaminant, the terrain
contours, and temperature as a variable.
D-4. When: Collectors should perform sampling as soon as possible after the alleged use of an agent.
D-5. Where: When a facility emits chemicals into the atmosphere, the best places to obtain samples are as
close to the emission source as possible (the chemical’s concentration is maximal at that point). Natural
and man-made terrain features, such as hills, rows of buildings, and valleys sometimes aid the collector by
channeling emissions. When these features are close to a particular facility, the collector uses the
downwind side, if possible, for sample collections, as emissions remain concentrated due to the channeling
effect. The collector determines where downwind typically is for the site and collects environmental
samples from that point. For collection in a possibly contaminated location (if the situation permits), he
uses a detector kit, such as the M18A2, initially to determine if a possible vapor hazard exists from known
chemical agents. Also, he uses the kit to test possible toxic agent munitions. He takes air samples with the
white strip tubes and saves them for laboratory analysis. Small air samplers also enable the collector to
obtain vapor samples from alleged toxic agent munitions at a safe distance while EOD personnel render the
munitions safe. If EOD personnel are not on the scene, the air sampler can be started, but the collector
should stand at a safe distance while the sampler is operating.
D-6. How: Contaminants are sampled for later identification by using devices that draw air through filter
material. The fragrances of these products are volatile organic compounds that can be absorbed on the filter
and skew analytical results. Smoke also severely interferes with the air sampling; therefore, the collector
should avoid cigarette, vehicle exhaust, and campfire smoke. Shipboard sampling operations must consider
the products (for example, fuels, solvents, and gases) that are present and can cause false readings. The
primary method for collecting air samples is with the PAS-1000 automatic air sampler with Tenax tube for
a total of 3 to 4 minutes, when possible. The collector places the Tenax tube in a 2-1/4-inch piglette after
taking the sample. (A pig or piglette is a heavy-duty metal container designed to contain small sample
containers for transport to the laboratory.) He seals the piglette around the cap either with pressure-
sensitive or Teflon tape. Once the piglette is sealed, he places it into a plastic bag, folds the bag around the
piglette in a circular motion, and inserts the first bag into the second bag and folds again. The collector
uses any type tape to secure the plastic around the piglette after he makes the fold. He then places the
piglette into a cooler or refrigerator during transport and transfer.
Note: Persons sampling air should not use cologne, perfume, insect repellent, medical creams,
or strong soaps before taking a sample.)
Soil Samples
D-7. Soil is a good place to sample for toxic organic compounds. Soil may contain large amounts of
compounds of interest. For best results, it is essential that the collector sample at the precise site of
compound deposition.
D-8. When: A collector should sample as soon as possible after the alleged incident.
D-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

D-9. Where: A collector should recognize contamination by discoloration or apparent deposition of

material on the soil’s surface. If discoloration or deposition of material is evident, he uses a garden trowel
or wooden tongue depressor to scrape up the soil. He collects only discolored soil or deposited materials, if
possible. A collector should take multiple samples at different depths.
D-10. How: The collector should avoid direct contact with the sample. He takes soil samples by scraping
into a collection container the top 2 to 5 centimeters of soil from areas that appear to be contaminated. If
the collector samples chunks or clods of earth, he selects those that are no larger than 10 by 5 by
1 centimeters. Also, he collects a control sample of the same soil type or texture. Using a knife, spoon,
spatula, or similar item, he scrapes the top 2 to 5 centimeters of suspected soil into a collection container.
He uses a glass bottle or jar as a container when available. He may also use plastic bags. When using glass
bottles or jars, he seals the cap with either pressure-sensitive or Teflon tape and marks the container for
identification. The collector places the sample in a bag, pushes out excess air, and seals it by folding over
the open end two to three times and wrapping with any tape when using plastic bags. He inserts the bag
into a second bag, and then seals, tapes, and marks it for identification. If possible, he places samples in a
piglette. It is important to seal the piglette well so volatiles do not escape. Also, the collector places a
tamper-resistant seal across storage bags.
Vegetation Samples
D-11. Vegetation, as it exists, provides an excellent means for collecting samples.
D-12. When: The collector should sample as soon as possible after the alleged incident.
D-13. Where: When it is possible to figure out a probable center of attack in a vegetated area, the collector
takes samples near the center of the area, about 100 meters upwind of the area. Also, the collector takes
samples at several 100-meter increments downwind of the area. If the collector can discern a contamination
pattern in the area, he should report it.
D-14. How: The collector makes a visual survey of the area and dons protective equipment before
collecting vegetation. He enters the area from an upwind direction, collects vegetation samples that are
different from normal, and selects leaves that have wilted or appear to have been chemically burned. He
collects vegetation that appears to have liquid or solid substances deposited on its surfaces. This may
appear as a shiny or moist area. The collector collects vegetation at several locations within the suspected
contaminated area. He uses a cutting tool or any sharp object and cuts several affected leaves or a handful
of grass whenever possible. The sample should never be crushed. The collector places sample into a plastic
bag and squeezes the excess air out of the bag and seals it. He folds over the open end of the bag two to
three times and wraps it with any type tape. The minimum size sample of value is three leaves or three
handfuls of grass. One leaf is of little value, but should be collected. Bark is acceptable but not preferred.
The collector marks the bag for identification, takes a control sample of similar material from an unaffected
area, and then seals, tapes, and marks the control sample.
BIOMEDICAL SAMPLING
D-15. The purpose in collecting samples is to determine if a toxic substance is present in the natural
environment or if it has been artificially introduced. Biomedical samples collected during an investigation
include blood, urine, and tissue samples from living victims, and blood and urine samples from unexposed
control sample persons.
D-16. When: The collector should sample as soon as possible after the alleged incident or report of activity.
D-17. Where: The selection of human sampling controls must be carefully considered due to potentially
large deviations introduced by ethnic diets, racial or cultural differences, physiological makeup, and living
conditions. Animal controls also warrant careful consideration.
D-18. How: Trained medical personnel should collect biomedical samples (human or animal). Collectors
must have express authorization to collect biomedical samples from the dead to preclude any state or
religious complications that could jeopardize a mission.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-3

Appendix D
Note: FM 4-02.7, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support
in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment, contains additional clinical
specimen information; FM 3-11.19 contains additional information on environmental samples.
RADIOLOGICAL AGENT SAMPLING

D-19. Radiological sampling operations are important to determine if and where a threat uses an RA. The
collection of samples and background information must be as detailed and comprehensive as possible.
Each sample is processed and analyzed to provide data for analysis. Sample processing includes the
collection of the sample, handling and transfer, and the associated administrative procedures. The
administrative procedures ensure a documented chain of custody and a detailed description of the
collection procedure. After laboratory analysis of the sample, intelligence personnel analyze the data to
produce the intelligence to support operational requirements. An adversary may scatter RAs as
radionuclide dust or as pellets of radioactive materials. The RA dust will cover vegetation, soil, and water
surfaces. RA pellets do not cover vegetation surfaces like a dust, but remain on the surface of the soil.
Also, RA pellets sink to the bottom of bodies of water. A SOF element can take samples of vegetation, soil,
or water to collect the RA pellets or dust. The SOF element does a ground radiological reconnaissance
(GRR) to locate the RA. Since the purpose of an RA sampling mission is to collect RA samples, the
element should terminate the GRR after the RA is found. The radiological safety of the SOF element is a
constant concern. RA-contaminated areas emit high doses of radioactivity; therefore, the element monitors
the radiation throughout the RA sampling mission. The SOF element must not exceed the commander’s
operational exposure guide. The element chooses the environmental samples based on measurements the
collector makes with the element’s radiacmeter.
Water Samples
D-20. The SOF element should collect enough water to obtain information about the RAs.
D-21. When: Intelligence assets will provide information on the presence of indicators that may indicate
the need for sample collection (such as higher-than-normal amounts of security, increased flow of smoke
from a facility chimney, or water from a water discharge pipe). The best time to collect water samples from
allegedly contaminated field areas is just after the start of a rainstorm when runoff is beginning. Natural
surface drainage will concentrate any remnants of radionuclides in depressions, streams, or ditches.
D-22. Where: The collector should collect water from the slow-moving areas of the stream or body of water.
D-23. How: If the collector believes that the use of RAs has occurred, he should use the AN/PDR 27, the
AN/VDR 2, or any radiac instrument that measures dose rate to confirm that a sample is contaminated
(hot). The collector immerses a capped or stoppered container to the desired depth. He removes the cap or
stopper, allows the container to fill, and then caps the container. An alternate method for deeper water is to
use a plastic, pump-operated siphon to pump water from a specific depth. The following minimum
quantities for a sample are necessary for analysis of surface or water discharge sources—two liters, and
drinking water sources—one liter.
Soil Samples
D-24. Soil is a good place to collect RAs (dust or pellets). It is essential that the collector monitor the
sample before collection to ensure the sample is contaminated (hot).
D-25. When: The collector should sample as soon as possible after the alleged incident or report of activity.
D-26. Where: The collector collects RA samples from any place where a radiacmeter indicates contamination
(hot). If RA deposits material is evident, the collector uses a garden trowel or the scoop provided in the
M34 soil sampling kit to scrape up the soil. He collects only contaminated (hot) soil, if possible.
D-27. How: The collector should avoid direct contact with the sample. He collects soil samples by scraping
the material from contaminated areas into a collection container. He collects a control (uncontaminated)
sample of soil of the same type or texture. He scrapes the soil into a collection container using a knife,
D-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

spoon, spatula, or similar item. When using glass bottles or jars, he seals the cap with pressure-sensitive
tape and marks the container for identification. The collector then places the sample in one bag, pushes out
excess air, and seals it by folding over the open end two to three times, and wrapping with any tape when
using plastic bags. He inserts the first bag into a second bag, and then seals, tapes, and marks it for
identification. If possible, he places samples in a piglette and places a tamper-resistant seal across the
storage bag.
Note: The minimum quantities necessary for analysis are gamma spectrometry plus gross alpha
or gross beta—2 kilograms of soil (approximately one square foot area, three inches deep) and
gross alpha or gross beta only—100 grams.
Contaminated Vegetation Samples

D-28. The collector obtains samples of vegetation that appear to be different from normal. He selects
leaves that have wilted or appear to have been chemically burned. He collects samples of vegetation that
appear to have liquid or solid substances deposited on their surfaces (this may appear as a shiny or moist
area).
D-29. When: The collector obtains samples as soon as possible after the alleged incident or report of activity.
D-30. Where: When it is possible to calculate a probable center of attack in an area, the collector obtains
vegetation samples near the center of the area, about 100 meters upwind of the area, and in several
100-meter increments downwind of the area. If the collector can discern a contamination pattern in the
area, he should report it.
D-31. How: The collector makes a visual survey of the area and dons protective equipment before
collecting vegetation. He enters the area from an upwind direction, collects vegetation samples that the
radiacmeter indicates are contaminated (hot), and collects vegetation at several locations within the
suspected contaminated area. He uses a cutting tool or any sharp object and cuts affected leaves or grass
whenever possible. The collector places at least three liters of densely packed sample in plastic bags or in a
1-gallon, wide-mouth plastic jar. He double-packs the bag or places the plastic jar in a plastic bag. He
marks the bag for identification and collects a control sample of similar material from an unaffected area.
He seals, tapes, and marks the control samples. The minimum quantity of a vegetation sample necessary for
analysis is at least 3 liters per sample.
SAMPLE INFORMATION REPORTING, PACKAGING,

AND SHIPMENT
D-32. Although a sample collected from an alleged attack area can be significant, it can become useless if
the collector (SOF element) does not record essential information about its collection or improperly packs
the sample and it breaks during shipment to an analysis center. The following paragraphs discuss
information required when acquiring samples and describe the preferred methods for handling and packing
samples for shipment. A complete history of the circumstances about each sample’s acquisition is provided
to the agency exploiting the sample. Critical information includes—
z Meteorological conditions at the time of sampling and the alleged attack.
z The length of time after the alleged attack when the sample was taken.
z Circumstances of acquisition, how the collector obtained the sample, and where the collector
found the sample.
z A physical description. The physical state (solid, liquid, powder, apparent viscosity), color,
approximate size, identity of the specimen (military nomenclature, dirt, leaves), and dose rate (if
radiologically contaminated).
z Circumstances of agent deposition. The type of delivery system, a description of how the
weapon functioned, how the agent acted on release, sounds heard during dissemination, a
description of any craters or shrapnel found associated with a burst, and colors of smoke,
flames, or mist that may be associated with the attack.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-5

Appendix D
z Agent effects on vegetation. A description of the general area (jungle, mountain, grassland) and
changes in the vegetation after agent deposition (color changes, wilting, drying, dead) in the
main attack and fringe areas.
z Agent effects on humans. How the agent affected personnel in the main attack area versus fringe
areas; the duration of agent effects; peculiar odors that may have been noticed in the area before,
during, or after an attack; measures taken that alleviated or worsened the effects; and the
approximate number of victims and survivors (including age and gender).
SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL

D-33. To prevent confusion, the collector uses the sample identification number when referring to the
sample or to information concerning its acquisition. A sample identification number contains the following
information:
z Country of acquisition. This two-digit alphabetic code stands for the country from which the
collector took the sample. Note: The country acquisition codes are contained in FM 3-11.19,
Appendix E.
z Date acquired. This six-digit numerical code stands for the year, month, and day that the
collector took the sample.
z Sample sequence number. This three-digit numerical code is assigned by the CRD. It begins
each collection day. The first sample collected is 001, the second 002, and so forth.
z Sampler identification. This two- or three-digit alphabetic abbreviation represents the sampler’s
first and last name. When the sampler’s identity must be protected, he should code the identity
using XA through XZ and then XXA through XXZ, if necessary. The collector maintains an
index of codes and identities separately within the classified files so that the sampler can be
recontacted. Example of sample identification number: LA850115-002-JD; LA—Collector took
sample in Laos; 850115—Sample obtained on 15 January 1985; 002—This is the second sample
obtained on 15 January 1985; JD—John Doe collected the sample. Samples must be carefully
controlled to be of greatest value. The collecting element assigns an identification number and
affixes it to the sample or its container to aid in the identification of samples.
ACQUISITION AND SHIPMENT OF SAMPLES

D-34. The collecting element provides a formatted message for transmission when possible. During SO in a
theater in which a SOF HQ is deployed, the collecting element transmits the message via the fastest means
through the fewest channels to the radiological-chemical and biological sampling control element
(R-CBSCE). If an R-CBSCE has not been deployed to the AO, sometimes in a low-sample volume
peacetime operation, the collecting elements transmit the message via the fastest means through the fewest
channels to the message addressee. In addition, a written report accompanies each sample or batch of
samples. The collecting element properly classifies the acquisition message. An acquisition message
contains the following information:
z The sample identification number is a part of the subject line if only a single sample is in the
text. Otherwise, reference should be made to the sample number within the message body with
its background information. If the logistics base team ships the sample immediately, then it must
include the shipment date, the mode of transportation, courier identification, the air bill of lading
number, the flight number, the destination, and the estimated time of arrival in the message. In
addition, the element should maintain the chain-of-custody document.
z Background information surrounding the sample.
z Questionable circumstances surrounding acquisition of a sample.
z The name of another country or agency that got a sample from the same event or area and is not
shown on the message address.
z A recommended priority and rationale for analysis to guide the analysis center on the
operational element’s assessment of the potential value of the sample.
D-6 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

z All details that relate to the acquisition of the sample despite how insignificant they may seem to
the collector.
z Disposition of samples according to their physical category.
D-35. The team ships all samples via the fastest, safest means (preferably via technical escort unit [TEU]) to
the theater R-CBSCE or to a location that the R-CBSCE designates. If there is no R-CBSCE in-theater, the
team sends the samples IAW preplanned instructions from the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological
Analysis and Technical Evaluation Board (R-CBATEB) established at the Chemical Research,
Development, and Engineering Center (CRDEC), Aberdeen, Maryland.
D-36. The R-CBATEB should be involved during the mission-planning process for technical and
specialized support. The R-CBATEB will direct, in advance, that the collectors send the samples to the
particular locations, dependent on the category of the sample. To decide the final destination of the sample, the
R-CBATEB uses considerations, such as “Is the sample chemical or biological in content? Is the sample
content completely unknown? Is the sample a possible combination of chemical and biological material?”
D-37. Regardless, the R-CBATEB must be notified earlier than receipt of the sample so additional
instructions or deviations from standard instructions can be given. The collector ships RA samples via the
fastest, safest means (preferably via TEU) to the radiological laboratory at the U.S. Army Hygiene Agency,
Edgewood, Maryland. Before shipment, the collector contacts Commander, Technical Escort Unit, ATTN:
SMCTE-OPE, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010.
D-38. The TEU controls the transport of samples to their final destination. The TEU should not ship
suspected toxic samples or munition systems to the CONUS technical centers or intelligence agencies
without coordination and before approval by the recipient.
WITNESS INTERVIEWS
D-39. Interviewing an alleged victim or witness is the most critical phase of an investigation. Generally, if
the mission requires interviews with alleged victims or interrogation of threat forces, then trained
interrogation teams should accompany the SOF element. Although sample collection is important in
defining allegations of agent use, the interview process remains the most important phase of an
investigation. Only through interviews can background information, attack data, and agent dissemination
be discerned about an alleged attack. Each collector must constantly be aware of how he may
unconsciously influence a witness’s testimony. Vocal tones, facial expressions, body language, and the
manner in which a collector poses questions can affect testimony. Therefore, SOF elements must
constantly monitor themselves, interpreters, and the interviewee. The types of questions used are monitored
to ensure that they do not lead the witness toward a foregone conclusion. The following material covers, in
detail, the rationale and techniques used for successful interviews. It is to be used as a guideline.
ELEMENTS OF PROPER INTERVIEWING

D-40. Each interview should be conducted in a way that is as psychologically comfortable for the witness
as possible. Collectors using an interpreter should position themselves so they can monitor the witness and
the interpreter. By doing this, the collector maintains control of the interviewer’s direction and speed. A
tape recorder may preserve actual conversation that can be reviewed later. Key interview elements are as
follows:
z When interviewing more than one person in a group of people, ensure that each person is
questioned alone. This prevents any cross-pollination of ideas.
z Questions should not lead to a yes- or no-type answer. If the witness does not understand the
question, he or she may respond with yes to avoid displeasing the collector. This response could
result in a rapid but inaccurate interview.
z Do not become emotionally involved with the state of affairs or surroundings of a witness
during an interview. These actions may mislead the collector and skew the results. The collector
must remain hardened to the given task.
z Be aware that disinformation and propaganda may be presented. Testimony should describe
scientific reality and not a social or political truth.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-7

Appendix D
z Understand that many people have neither the education nor the means to establish the scientific
causality of an event. Because of this, the witnesses may identify a wrong factor as the cause of
the event. While accounts are totally sincere, they may also be inaccurate.
z Do not assume anything about information received surrounding an investigation.
Misinformation operations of varying intensity and sophistication can come from any group of
people. Political webs are complex and collectors must not allow themselves to be manipulated.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
D-41. The interviewer uses information about a witness’s social and environmental background to help
establish his credibility and relationship to an alleged attack. It also helps calm a witness and sets the tone
of the interview.
D-42. The most important part of the background is establishing the correct names and all aliases of the
witness. This is critical. In multicultural societies, individuals often use different names that correspond to
each society in which they exist. Without all names, recontacting a witness may be impossible. Because of
the confusion in combat areas, a photograph of the witness can often aid in recontacting the witness.
D-43. The interviewer should establish the witness’s military training and service. This information often
helps in detecting a witness’s possible political motives. Understanding a witness’s degree of training also
helps in building credibility.
ATTACK DATA AND AGENT CHARACTERISTICS

D-44. The description of how an alleged CBRN attack occurred is critical in determining whether or not an
attack occurred. A collector’s questioning is most difficult during this part of an interview. A collector
should ensure that the witness is not led toward any conclusion. Often, the best way to proceed is by asking
questions such as “What happened next?” or “What was it like?” This way, the witness can describe events
in his own words without being influenced by the collector.
D-45. The collector should always ask questions that require the witness to describe or explain a situation.
During questioning, the collector should not assume that any specific event occurred. For example, instead
of asking, “What color was the agent?” the collector should instead ask, “Was there a color associated with
the event?”
D-46. If the event involved a weapon, the collector should ensure that his questioning derives information
on how the weapon functioned. Information that shows the witness’s awareness of a difference between
high-explosive and toxic agent weapon functioning is also important.
COLLECTING MATERIAL AND SAMPLES

D-47. Collection of material and environmental CBR samples is performed for several purposes:
determination that an attack occurred, identification of agents used, specifications of delivery systems used
and country of origin, and the determination of the level of CBR technology involved. Evidence reliability
is of extreme importance. Therefore, the collection of samples and background information must be as
detailed and comprehensive as possible. Information presented by witnesses must be screened to ensure
that hearsay is not substituted for accurate reporting. Key factors to remember include the following:
z Each CDA will be prepared to conduct sampling missions, either deliberate or hasty.
z Hasty sampling missions will be conducted as targets of opportunity arise using the sampling
jump kit, which the CDA will carry on each mission.
z Deliberate sampling missions will be conducted IAW the mission sampling plan using the
facility ChemBio sampling kit. The sampling vests will be tailored to the plan with the following
items:
Bio: teal.
Wipes: orange.
Solids: yellow.
Liquids: blue.
D-8 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

z All samples will be properly packaged, labeled, and documented for transfer of custody.
z Before all sampling, the area will be photographed.
SAMPLING PRIORITIES
D-48. Background information for each collected sample must be detailed, simple, and clearly stated. All
samples will fall into one of the following priority categories:
z Priority I. These samples are of bulk agent (contents of drums, barrels, final lab product) and
delivery systems, including masks worn by deceased personnel.
z Priority II. The environmental samples (soil, surface, liquid, vegetation, and biomedical) are
from areas where alleged CBR attacks have occurred.
z Priority III. This category is the acquisition of CBR defensive materials, such as antidote kits,
decontamination equipment, detection gear, and protective equipment.
SAMPLING CONSIDERATIONS
D-49. The type of sampling may vary based on the nature, source, type and method of dissemination, and
location of the site. Normally, the best location for sampling is where casualties have occurred, where there
are many wilted or discolored plants, or where there are many dead animals (fish or birds). This is not
always the case when dealing with biological agents because of an incubation time period. Other
considerations include the following:
z Solid samples (powders, solids, paints, metals)—if collected at an incident scene, impact area,
blast zone, operating facilities, and locations where runoff may collect—may be useful. The
collector should look for areas that exhibit stains, powdering, or particulate matter on surfaces,
vegetation, or on the ground. Less-preferred areas are those areas exposed to direct sunlight and
high temperatures. Stains on walls, floors, or carpets, and crusting around valves and
windowsills are also excellent sampling locations.
z Other than casualties, aerosols may leave little residue. Water, vegetation, and PPE (especially
filters) downwind from the sampling site may provide useful samples.
z Blanks or control samples should be prepared in the same manner as the actual sampling. The
control sample is collected upwind of the site that is known to be free of contamination. The
control sample determines if the contamination is naturally occurring or not. Comparison
sampling ensures that proper procedures were followed when sampling was conducted. In some
circumstances, a suitable blank (samples) may be difficult to obtain. When a sampling is
questionable, blanks will consist of an unopened or unused sampling tool and sampling jar for
each sample taken. If time allows, controls will be similar to the samples taken.
z Soil samples should be taken over a surface area 3 1/2 inches by 3 1/2 inches to a depth of no
more than 1/2 inch (true required depth is dependent on absorption of substance into soil).
Samples should be taken as close to the center of contamination as possible. Samples may be
taken near bodies of fallen victims. When sampling plants, seeds, and any debris, they should be
placed in separate containers. Prepackaged sterile spoons or scoops will be used to collect soil
samples. Fresh, sterile spoons or scoops will be used for each sample taken.
z Stones should be no more than 1/4 inch to 1/2 inch. These samples should be placed in a plastic
freezer bag. Volume of stones should be approximately 200 to 300 milliliters.
z Snow samples should be collected from the layer of suspected exposure to chemical or
biological agents. Should new snow have fallen, coordination through the Staff Weather Officer
should be made, and then a determination will be made on how much new fallen snow has
occurred. This will aid the team in determining how much snow should be removed before
coming into contact with possible contaminated snow. Surface area to be sampled is 3 1/2 inches
x 3 1/2 inches to a depth of no more than 1/2 inch.
z Vegetable, leaves, grasses, and grain matter should never be collected by hand. These require
the use of scissors and forceps. Particular attention should be paid to the discoloration or
withering of the matter.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-9

Appendix D
z Filters from casualties are of potential value due to the entrapment of agent inside the filter.
Filters should be individually placed in 6-milliliter plastic bags. Each filter should be separately
bagged and noted. When removing the filter from the casualty, ensure the casualty is deceased
before removing filter from mask.
z Samples from walls, vehicles, or other types of immovable objects should be taken by scraping
the contaminated surface and collecting the scrapings into a sample jar. Rubbing the surface
with dry cotton wool or cotton wool soaked in distilled water, acetone, or another suitable
solvent may be another way to secure a sample. When using a solvent to secure the sample,
personnel should not dip the cotton wool into the solvent; rather, they should pour the solvent
onto the cotton wool. This method will prevent any cross-contamination.
z Where biomedical samples cannot be taken, then swipes will be taken of casualties. Using sterile
swabs in tubes, both nasal passages, both ears, and the gum line will be swiped, and a picture of
the casualty taken.
z Fabrics such as clothing and upholstery may be another source for sampling. Using a scalpel,
personnel should cut no more than a 3 1/2-inch x 3 1/2-inch square. For carpeting, personnel
should cut no more than a 1 1/2-inch x 1 1/2-inch square. Attention should be paid when securing
this type of sample. If a fabric, upholstery, or carpet is stained, the entire stained area should not
be cut out and treated as a sample. The sample should consist of part of the stained area and part
of the unstained area. Using forceps, personnel should place the item in a sample jar.
z Sampling team should have enough sampling equipment to take a minimum of 10 samples of all
necessary types (vapor, soil, snow, or water).
z Small dead animals (birds, rodents) may also be a source of samples. Personnel should ensure
the animal is dead before handling it. Personnel should never handle carcasses by hand. Heavy
tweezers, tongs, or forceps should be used to place the sample in a plastic bag. When closing the
bag, as much air as possible should be removed from it without damaging the sample. The
sample will be logged in the Evidence Collection Form.
z Individually sealed sterile swabs may be used to collect liquid samples. Personnel should dab the
swab into the liquid and hold until the swab absorbs as much liquid as possible. Personnel should
place the swab into a small container. Personnel should place the lid over the mouth of the
container, pinning the swab stick against the side of the mouth and the lid. Holding the lid and
container, personnel should break off the swab stick allowing the swab to remain in the jar, and
close the lid. The excess stick may be thrown into a waste container. It should be noted that for
chemical samples, the jar should be made of glass. This same method may be used to collect dry
biological samples. The container for dry biological samples may be made of plastic or glass.
Note: The glass (brown) container should be used for either chemical or biological material, and
the plastic one for biological material only.
GENERAL SAMPLING INSTRUCTIONS

D-50. The collection of samples is an integral part of chemical agents being used in an attack. The types of
samples taken and the collection methods depend upon the circumstances encountered by the collector. The
individual collecting the sample should—
z Plan each use of the Nitrile gloves to avoid cross-contamination. The M34A1 kit contains only
four pairs; carry excess gloves as needed.
z Use M-8 paper to confirm the presence of suspected liquid chemical agents.
z After each sample collection, discard used gloves and other components that may cause cross-
contamination. Items may be left at sampling site, returned as samples themselves, or disposed
of IAW decontamination site procedures.
z Take outdoor samples—one sample upwind and out of the sample site. This one will become the
control sample. Assign it a Sample Control Number and note that it is the control sample. If
sampling for Priority I, a control sample is not required.
D-10 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

z Use extreme caution when using cutting tools or scissors in the contaminated environment so no
cuts or nicks are made in your PPE gear.
z Take care not to cross thread lids on the jars. Leakage of jar contents will occur.
z Write as much information as possible on sample documentation forms and custody seals before
putting on PPE gloves and Nitrile gloves.
z Nick the plastic packaging material before the sampling mission or remove the sampling
equipment and seal it in Ziploc-type bags with tabs. Either technique helps in opening the
equipment on site.
z Make sure the custody seal sticks to the Teflon jars. A custody seal is mandatory on the sealed
edge of the Whirl-Pak bag.
z At a minimum, ensure three Soldiers go down to the sampling site—one sampler, one packager,
and one for security.
z Ensure that one Soldier samples, while another serves as packager and prepares the packaging
equipment. The packager uses Teflon tape around the threads of the Teflon jars to prevent leakage.
z Place completed samples into a cooler with dry ice or instant ice packs when possible. Place an
inventory inside a plastic bag and tape it to the inside lid of cooler. Seal the cooler with tape.
z Be careful when using commercial coolers. Pad the inside of the cooler to prevent the contents
from banging around.
D-51. Sampling operations are particularly important if a potential adversary uses previously unknown
agents or if an adversary allegedly uses a CBRN agent first. Therefore, the collection of samples and
background information must be as detailed and comprehensive as possible. The different types of samples
and the process in handling each is explained in Figures D-2 through D-4, pages D-11 through D-16.
TASKS PROCESS
• Step 1. Select the appropriate tubes for the measurement required.

• Step 2. To determine number of compressions required per tube, read the instruction
Prepare sheet enclosed in the sampling tube container.
the
• Step 3. Open both tips of the tube using the Draeger tube opener.
tubes.
• Step 4. Insert the Draeger tube into the pump with the arrow on the tube pointing to the
pump.
• Step 1. Check the number of strokes required from the Instructions for Use of the
Draeger Tube. (Located on the inside of the tube container. It varies depending on
sample.)
• Step 2. Hold the pump so that the end-of-stroke indicator and stroke counter are facing
Take a you.
reading.
• Step 3. Squeeze the pump until it stops.
• Step 4. Release the pump until the bellows is fully expanded.
• Step 5. Continue until the stroke counter registers the number prescribed in the
Instructions for Use sheet.
• Step 1. Remove the sample tube from the pump.

• Step 2. Place the tube in sealer, rigid, piglette. Use Teflon tape and caps to seal the
ends of the pipe.
Package • Step 3. Remove the 7-inch x 11-inch Whirl-Pak bag from the kit, as follows:
the Tear off the top portion of the bag along the perforated edge.
sample.
Using the white tabs, pull bag apart to open.
Drop the jar into the bag.
Remove excess air from the bag. Then, while holding metal tabs, whirl the bag
around three times.
Figure D-2. Air and vapor sampling with Draeger kits
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-11

Appendix D
TASKS PROCESS
Bend the wire ends onto the bag to secure and store the contents.
Write the Sample Identification Number on the custody seal and apply the
custody seal over the rolled edge of the Whirl-Pak bag.
• Step 4. Collect any other required samples from this site and prepare each sample
as indicated.
• Step 5. Place up to three Whirl-Pak bags with jars into the amber sample bag.
Package the
sample • Step 6. Remove excess air from the amber sample bag and roll down the top of the
(continued). bag.
• Step 7. Wrap tape all the way around the amber sample bag making at least three
turns. (After tearing tape off the roll, try to fold a quick-pull tab in the tape so it is
easy to grasp again.)
• Step 8. Write the sample type (soil, surface, liquid, or air) on tape, the number of
samples in the bag, and the date-time-group. Initial the sample.
• Step 9. Place all sealed amber sample bags into a single drawstring bag.
Figure D-2. Air and vapor sampling with Draeger kits (continued)
Note: Be careful when opening tubes since glass splinters may come off. Use the Draeger tube
opener and not the pump to open tubes. The tube opener collects discarded tips and prevents
glass splinters from entering the pump.
Note: Have the piglette cap prepared with pressure-sensitive or Teflon tape because it is difficult
to work with tape when wearing gloves.
PROCESSING SOIL SAMPLES
• Step 1. Locate the sampling area.

• Step 2. Look for the following:
Discolored and oily-looking spots.
Dead animals.
• Step 3. Using the following steps, take samples from three points for each site (using a different jar at
each point), 100 meters upwind (control sample), GZ, and 100 meters downwind.
• Step 4. Write the suspected chemical agent contamination (if known) and fill in the sample
documentation.
• Step 5. Remove from the kit a pair of Nitrile overgloves, if needed. Use scissors if necessary to open
the packaging. Place Nitrile gloves over MOPP gloves.
• Step 6. Prepare one jar at a time by removing the jar from packaging, opening, and placing Teflon
tape around the threads.
• Step 7. Scoop a thin layer of topsoil (no more than 1/2-inch deep) from a small area into the sample
container. Fill the sample jar to no more than 75 percent of its volume.
• Step 8. Screw the cap on tightly and pass the sample to the packager.
• Step 9. Remove the 7-inch x 11-inch Whirl-Pak bag from the kit as follows:
Tear off the top portion of the bag along the perforated edge.
Using the white tabs, pull the bag apart to open.
Remove excess air from the bag. Then, while holding metal tabs, whirl the bag around three
times.
Figure D-3. Storing samples in the amber sample bag
D-12 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

PROCESSING SOIL SAMPLES (continued)
Write the Sample Identification Number on the custody seal and apply the custody seal over the
rolled edge of the Whirl-Pak bag.
• Step 10. Collect any other required samples from this site and prepare each sample as indicated.
• Step 11. Place up to three Whirl-Pak bags with jars into the amber sample bag with the sample
documentation.
• Step 12. Remove excess air from the amber sample bag and roll down the top of the bag.
• Step 13. Wrap tape all the way around the amber sample bag, making at least three turns. (After
tearing tape off roll, try to fold a quick-pull tab in tape so it is easy to grasp again.)
• Step 14. Write the sample type (soil, surface, liquid, air) on tape, the number of samples in the bag,
and the date-time-group. Initial the sample.
PROCESSING SURFACE SAMPLES

• Step 2. Using the following procedures, take samples from three points for each site (using a different
jar at each point), 100 meters upwind (control sample), GZ, and 100 meters downwind.
documentation.
tape around its threads.
• Step 6. Open jar; use tweezers to remove the swipe from the jar. Squirt or pour a small amount of
distilled water or acetone onto the surface to be sampled. Holding the wipe with tweezers, blot the
target surface (an area about the size of your palm) with the swipe. Place the swipe back into the jar.
• Step 7. Screw the cap on tightly.
Remove excess air from the bag. Then, while holding metal tabs, whirl the bag around three
times.
• Step 9. Collect any other required samples from this site and prepare each sample as indicated.
• Step 10. Place up to three Whirl-Pak bags with jars into the amber sample bag with sample
documentation.
• Step 11. Remove excess air from the amber sample bag and roll down the top of the bag.
• Step 12. Wrap tape all the way around the amber sample bag, making at least three turns. (After
• Step 13. Write sample type (soil, surface, liquid, or air) on tape, the number of samples in the bag,
Figure D-3. Storing samples in the amber sample bag (continued)
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-13

Appendix D
Note: Sample documentation must state what type of swipe and reagent was used.
D-52. When sampling liquids from open sources, pools, lakes, or streams, the sampler should avoid placing
the tip of the extension tube to the bottom of the liquid source because it could draw in debris. When
sampling for contamination in water, the sampler should vary the depths of taking the samples because
different chemicals have different weights.
PROCESSING LIQUID SAMPLES

Droplets on vegetation.
Containers (drums, barrels).
Stagnant pools with oily globules or suspended solids.
Streams or ponds with dead animals or fish.
• Step 3. Using the following procedures, take samples from three points for each site (using a
different jar at each point), 100 meters upwind (control sample), GZ, and 100 meters downwind.
documentation.
tape around its threads.
• Step 7. Attach extension tube to the tip of the syringe. Place the tip of the tube in the suspected
contamination. Pull back the plunger and draw up the maximum amount of liquid into the syringe.
• Step 8. Position tip of tube over the jar opening and expel liquid into jar.
• Step 9. Take multiple samples to ensure jar is filled to 75 percent of its volume.
Remove excess air from the bag; holding metal tabs, whirl the bag around three times.
• Step 12. Wrap tape all the way around the blue sample bag, making at least three turns. (After
• Step 13. Collect any other required samples from this site and prepare each sample.
• Step 14. Place up to three Whirl-Pak bags with jars into the blue sample bag with sample
documentation.
• Step 15. Remove excess air from the blue sample bag and roll down the top of the bag.
• Step 18. Place all sealed blue sample bags into a single drawstring bag.
Figure D-4. Storing samples in the blue sample bag
D-14 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

PROCESSING LIQUID SAMPLES (ALTERNATE)

Droplets on vegetation.
Containers (drums, barrels).
Stagnant pools with oily globules or suspended solids.
Streams or ponds with dead animals or fish.
• Step 3. Using the procedures below, take samples from three points for each site (using a different
jar at each point), 100 meters upwind (control sample), GZ, and 100 meters downwind.
documentation.
packaging. Place Nitrile gloves over MOPP gloves.
• Step 6. Prepare one jar at a time by removing jar from packaging, opening, and placing Teflon tape
around its threads.
• Step 7. Remove a scoop from the protective clear packaging.
• Step 8. Scoop approximately 70 milliliters of suspected contamination into a sample jar. Fill the jar to
75 percent of its volume.
• Step 9. Take multiple samples to ensure jar is filled to 75 percent of its volume.
• Step 12. Collect any other required samples from this site and prepare each sample as discussed.
documentation.
• Note. This method is quicker, but the Soldier should take extra precaution to avoid splashing liquids
on his MOPP suit.
Figure D-4. Storing samples in the blue sample bag (continued)
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-15

Appendix D
PROCESSING VEGETABLE SAMPLES

Discoloration.
Withered spots.
Oily droplets.
Any unnatural particularities.
• Step 3. Take samples from three points for each site (using a different jar at each point), 100 meters
upwind (control sample), GZ, and 100 meters downwind.
documentation.
• Step 5. Remove from the kit a pair of Nitrile overgloves, if required. Use scissors if necessary to open
packaging. Place Nitrile gloves over MOPP gloves.
• Step 6. Prepare one jar at a time by removing jar from packaging, opening, and placing Teflon tape
around its threads.
• Step 7. Use tweezers to grasp material to be sampled and use scissors or another cutting tool to cut
suspected contaminated vegetation. For grasses, cut near the base of the blades. For leaves, cut at
the stem of the leaf. Place three to four samples in each jar. Do not crush or smash vegetation.
Tear off top portion of bag along perforated edge.
Write the Sample Identification Number on the custody seal and apply custody seal over rolled
edge of Whirl-Pak bag.
• Step 10. Collect other required samples from this site and prepare each one as discussed.
documentation.
• Step 13. Wrap tape all the way around the blue sample bag making at least three turns. (After tearing
tape off roll, try to fold a quick-pull tab in tape so it is easy to grasp again.)
Figure D-4. Storing samples in the blue sample bag (continued)
MISCELLANEOUS SAMPLES
D-53. Chemical or biological munitions fragments, whether from a shell, bomb, rocket, grenade, or spent
aircraft spray tanks, can be a highly definitive source of samples. Whole munitions (duds) are highly
desirable but should be disarmed by a qualified EOD expert. If a piece of ordnance is suspected of being a
chemical or biological round, and an EOD expert is not available, the sampler should stand off as far as
possible and use vision aids (binoculars) to identify and note any markings. Small pieces of fragments
should be packaged the same way as soil, water, or vegetation.
D-16 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

DANGER
Do not approach unexploded ordnance.
D-54. Used detector kits, gloves, or boots can be packaged and brought out as samples. When packaging
large items such as boots, the sampler should use scissors to remove pieces of the item. He should also
ensure it is double-bagged, sealed, and then placed into another bag.
D-55. Small animals, fish, and birds may be retrieved as samples. If they will fit into a Teflon jar, the
sampler should package them as normal. If they are too big to fit in a jar, he should use a cutting tool to
remove a thumb-sized portion of the intercostal muscle from the areas between the ribs, and then package
it as normal.
CONTROL SAMPLES
D-56. The collection of environmental samples requires the collection of control samples. Control samples
allow the analysis center to compare and determine whether a compound is naturally occurring in the
environment. Soil, water, and vegetation samples should be taken 500 meters upwind of the alleged attack
area. Control samples must be generically the same as those in an alleged attack area. For example, if the
sampler collects leaves from an apple tree in an attack area, he should collect leaves from an apple tree
outside the contaminated area. The size of an environmental control sample should be about the same size
as one taken in the attack area.
SAMPLE REPORTING
D-57. One person other than the sampler or packager will keep a detailed reconnaissance log of pertinent
information in a notebook. All entries are identified by the sample number. The reconnaissance log is
opened when the sampling team leaves the objective rally point (ORP) or hide site and closed after the
team passes the sample to the proper agency. Each entry contains the following:
z Sample identification number.
z Physical description of environmental sample or object photographed.
z Date and time of collection.
z Weather at time of sampling.
z General description of the area where samples or photos were taken, to include grid coordinates,
azimuths, or distances to known landmarks.
z Description of any items of interest in the immediate area (condition of bodies, craters,
vegetation, dead animals, birds, fish, odors, equipment).
SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION
D-58. To prevent confusion, the sampler uses the sample identification number when referring to the
sample or to information concerning its acquisition. The number contains the following:
z Country of acquisition. This two-digit alphabetic code stands for the country from which the
collector took the sample. A complete listing of country codes can be found in FM 3-11.19.
Example: PR = Puerto Rico.
z Date acquired. This six-digit numerical code represents the year, month, and day that the
collector took the sample. Example: 2 July 2007 = 070702.
z Sample sequence number. The collector assigns this three-digit numerical code. It begins anew
each collection day. Example: The first sample collected is 001, the second 002, and so on.
z Sampling unit unit identification code (UIC). This code represents the sampling unit. Example:
WA8TAA.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 D-17

Appendix D
z Sampler identification. This two- or three-digit alphabetic abbreviation stands for the sampler’s
first and last name. Example: JD = Joe Dirt who took the sample (Figure D-5). Example of
complete identification number: RQ-070702-001-WFG1AA-JD.
PROJECT CODE: TECH SOIL SAMPLER: JOE DIRT

SAMPLE NUMBER: SO001-04/MMDDYY/3–5 FEET
TIME COLLECTED: 1435 PRESERVATIVE: 4C
TYPE OF SAMPLE: ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS: ACROLEIN
Figure D-5. Sample label
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
D-59. Samples must be carefully controlled to be of greatest value. A chain of custody must be recorded
using a chain-of-custody form (for example, FM 3-11.19, Figure E-2, Sample or Specimen Custody
Document).
D-60. The Specimen Custody Document (FM 3-11.19) must be completed by the collector. The collector
must ensure he retains a copy of the chain of custody. The country codes are contained in FM 3-11.19,
Table E-2. The collector must also complete the following required reports found in FM 3-11.19:
z Sample Chain-of-Custody Form (Appendix E).
z Sample CB Incident Interview Form (Appendix E).
D-61. After the sample is taken, it must be evacuated immediately. The sampling unit coordinates its own
assets and transports the sample to the sample transfer point. A qualified escort must accompany the
sample during the entire evacuation process to ensure safety and a proper chain of custody. A technical
escort is preferred during the entire process of evacuation but having one may not always be practical
because of the limited number of TEUs. The technical escort takes the sample to the radiological, chemical,
and biological sample collection point. If the determination is made to send the sample to CONUS for
analysis, an additional technical escort must be coordinated to accompany the sample to CONUS from the
port of debarkation until final hand-off to the receiving laboratory.
WORK AREA AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

D-62. Incremental to sample preparation and validity is having a clean work space. The 112th CRD uses
aluminum foil placed on a flat surface near the sampling area to provide a clean work space to place
equipment. In the event that aluminum foil is not available, commercial tarp material can be substituted.
D-63. Sampling waste can easily become a problem if not properly managed. Each workstation must
maintain a waste area for expended sampling pipettes and hazardous trash. Aluminum foil folded upward
at the corners (to prevent spills) will be used to contain immediate waste at each station. At the completion
of sampling, each station’s waste will be consolidated into one waste bag, whether trash is to be removed
or left in place.
D-18 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Appendix E
Special Operations Forces Element
Decontamination Options
UNSUPPORTED SOF ELEMENT DECONTAMINATION

E-1. When conducting unsupported SOF element decontamination, the initial action to be taken is to
locate and secure an upwind decontamination site (also serves as an ORP). The same personnel tasked to
set up the ORP will secure the site. The remaining members of the element (operational team) will assume
MOPP4 and move to the contaminated area to conduct the mission. As the operational team conducts the
mission, the decontamination site personnel assume MOPP in preparation for the return of the operational
team. As the operational teams return to the ORP, each member is checked for contamination at a liquid- or
vapor-contamination control line (CCL) using available detection equipment. If contamination is detected,
the decontamination procedures outlined in Figure E-1, pages E-1 and E-2, should be followed.
STEPS ACTIONS
While the operational element moves to the ORP, the decontamination element members at the
ORP set up a modified hasty decontamination site. The site will include a hot line (HL) and a
1 sump for disposal of contaminated clothing and equipment. As the operational element returns
from the mission, one of the decontamination team members acts as the station operator/monitor,
while the other ORP members provide security for the decontamination site.
2 Once the operational element reaches the HL, it stops and awaits direction from the site operator.
The site operator directs a decontamination element to check any sample or equipment found for
3 contamination. If these are contaminated, the decontamination team will perform the required
decontamination procedures.
Once decontamination has been performed, the decontamination teams place the sample or
4 equipment in a Mylar bag (or other acceptable substitute) and hand it to another “clean” team
member, who then seals the bag and places it on the clean side of the HL.
Once all collected equipment and/or samples have been disposed of, the decontamination team
commences checking the operational teams for contamination. Personal equipment is removed
from the operational team members and checked using the appropriate detectors. If contamination
is found, the equipment will either be decontaminated at that time or placed in the sump (to be
5
decontaminated at a later time). In either case, the equipment must be rechecked prior to reuse in
order to ensure that it has been properly decontaminated. Once this procedure has been
completed for the first operational team member, the site operator will direct that member to enter
the decontamination site.
Using “buddy system” decontamination procedures, the first team member will decontaminate the
second team member’s protective mask using a personnel and equipment decontamination kit.
6 The first team member then rolls the protective mask hood of the second member, using extreme
caution to prevent the transfer of contamination to the exposed neck area or the breaking of the
mask seal during the rolling process.
Continuing the “buddy system,” team members remove the chemical protective overgarment
(CPOG), BDO, and chemical protective boots (if worn). The use of knives, scissors, or other
cutting tools is necessary for this step.
7
Note: The cutting instrument being used must be decontaminated after each cut. Once CPOG,
BDO, and boots have been removed and placed in the sump, that person moves to the next
station (10 to 15 meters away and upwind of the garment removal area).
Figure E-1. Operational element decontamination procedures
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 E-1

Appendix E
STEPS ACTIONS
The second station will be located at the CCL. This clearly marked line (approximately 10–15
meters upwind of the clothing removal station) is where personnel are assisted with the removal of
the chemical protective gloves and boots. As with the first station, the boots will need to be cut to
assist with their removal. Again, the cutting tool will need to be decontaminated after each cut. The
8 assisted person is stopped on the downwind side of the CCL. The gloves are removed by pulling
them inside out as they are being removed. Once removed, they are placed in the sump. After the
gloves are removed, the boots are cut and the Soldier is assisted in removing the boots (one at a
time). As the first boot is removed, the Soldier takes one step over the CCL with that foot. The
second boot is then removed on the downwind side of the CCL. Both boots are then placed in the
sump, and the Soldier proceeds to the final station (on the upwind side of the CCL).
At the final station, each Soldier’s protective mask is checked again for contamination. If
9 contamination is found, the mask is decontaminated again before removal. If found to be clean, the
mask is removed (after the air has been checked for contamination).
All Soldiers are processed through the decontamination using the stated procedures until the
10 operational team and decontamination team have been completed, leaving only the station monitor
left in MOPP4.
The station monitor then polices all contaminated material in the decontamination station area and
11 places it in the sump. The sump is closed, and the station monitor performs personnel
decontamination on himself (removing protective clothing).
The grid coordinates are recorded and forwarded to higher HQ by the decontamination element.
12
The mission is continued.
Figure E-1. Operational element decontamination procedures (continued)
EXPEDIENT PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM

E-2. The EPDS is designed to address SOF equipment shortfalls in personnel decontamination procedures
and equipment. The system is a one-man, portable, lightweight system that does not displace an undue
amount of an individual’s combat load. The EPDS is a validated system that provides rapid effective
decontamination procedures that are easily integrated into existing SO tactics. This system weighs less than
20 pounds, can be set up within 10 minutes, and can decontaminate up to 20 personnel at a rate of less than
5 minutes per individual.
E-3. EPDS tactical planning guidelines are as follows:
z Decontamination of the force will occur at the closest permissive site to the target permitted by
the tactical situation. In some missions, such as maritime interdiction operations,
decontamination will likely occur directly on the objective after it is secure.
z Timely and effective decontamination is critical to prevent CBRN casualties. SOF
contamination challenges may be considerably higher than the standard 10/m2 that
JSLIST-approved material is designed to protect against.
z CW breakthrough times on SOF PPE dictate the need to conduct decontamination at the soonest
opportunity consistent with the tactical situation. CW breakthrough times are significantly
reduced in case of saltwater-exposed PPE, further heightening the importance of rapid
decontamination.
z The nature of SOF operations in the CBRN environment dictates that the use of a supporting
force to conduct decontamination is often tactically infeasible. The SOF decontamination
capability must reside completely within the force and be effective postmission for both healthy
personnel and casualties.
z Contamination control is paramount. The reduction or elimination of the spreading of liquid or
solid contamination off target and back to friendly forces, mission-critical mobility platforms, or
forward staging bases is critical.
z The procedure and equipment should not produce undue logistical burdens in terms of training,
acquisition, or maintenance.
E-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

E-4. The following is a generic sequence of events for a mission requiring EPDS in a potentially
contaminated area. Figure E-2 depicts a basic layout for an EPDS decontamination site. Figures E-3
(page E-4) and E-4 (page E-5) provide the steps that are involved in one- and two-piece cutout procedures.
A generic EPDS mission sequence is as follows:
z Step 1. Determine the presence of contamination or the possibility of contamination. Establish a
contamination control area. Ensure all personnel who are contaminated remain in that area.
z Step 2. Call for EPDS.
z Step 3. Designate operating and security personnel for EPDS.
z Step 4. Establish HL, mark HL, and designate CCL.
z Step 5. Set up a decontamination line, considering environmental factors, such as wind, rain, and
poor ventilation. Break out equipment and set it up according to space availability.
z Step 6. Upon completion of setup, direct contaminated personnel to begin an equipment drop.
(All personnel working EPDS should decontaminate boots and gloves first.) Place all sensitive
equipment that requires decontamination into equipment bags.
Note: Personnel should work in pairs whenever possible.
z Step 7. Establish a litter decontamination line if indicated. Include an emergency medical

treatment (EMT) station in the hot zone.
z Step 8. Establish the triage area as the casualty collection point (CCP) and locate it on the clean
side of the CCL.
z Step 9. Begin the decontamination process.
Figure E-2. Expedient personnel decontamination site
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 E-3

Appendix E
One-Piece Cutout
z Step 1: Direct breakout of Mk1 medical kits.

z Step 2: Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the hot line.
z Step 3: Decontaminate each other’s hoods with the M295. If time permits, decontaminate as much
area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off-gassing.
z Step 4: Direct into first shuffle pit.
z Step 5: Decontaminate feet by shuffling feet in pit.
z Step 6: Direct to the next shuffle pit. (Cutters begin cut-out procedures).
z Step 7: Cut both straps off the hood and loosen the neck cord.
z Step 8: Direct contaminated person to bend forward at the waist.
z Step 9: Make sure cutter rolls hood up from the rear bottom as far as possible and gathers bottom
into neck cord. (Cutter then cuts tails of cord if needed and decontaminates hands).
z Step 10: Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble worn. (Cutter
decontaminates hands.)
z Step 11: Release or cut boot closures. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 12: Make sure contaminated person steps out of boots. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 13: Unzip zipper across the back (if fast-rope insertion and extraction system [FRIES]). (Cutter
z Step 14: Start at the lower side of the zipper center (if dry suit, cut from center rear neckline) down
one leg as far as possible. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 15: Cut down other leg from area of buttocks down as far as possible. (Cutter decontaminates
hands.)
z Step 16: Cut up from top edge of zipper through neck dam (if FRIES). (Cutter decontaminates
hands.)
z Step 17: Remove suit forward, stripping down, and have contaminated person step out one foot at
a time. Remove glove with garment; if not, strip gloves before CPU removal. (Cutter
CPU REMOVAL
z Step 1: Start at top rear center and cut down middle of back. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 2: Make sure contaminated person extends arms forward and down. (Cutter pulls forward and
down, folding it inside out as best as possible to contain external contamination. Cutter
z Step 3: Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg and have contaminated person step out of CPU
trouser. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 4: Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and then the second, having
the contaminated person step onto safety pad. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 5: Make sure contaminated person proceeds to mask drop area, decontaminates hands, and
uses breath-hold technique with assisted mask removal from decontamination line.
z Step 6: Move to redress area and redress; move to exfiltration area.
z Step 7: Monitor and administer buddy-aid, if necessary. Ensure that personnel who develop
symptoms of exposure are taken to the triage area for treatment.
Figure E-3. One-piece cutout
E-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Two-Piece Cutout
z Step 1: Direct breakout of Mk 1 medical kits.

z Step 2: Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the hot line.
z Step 3: Decontaminate each other’s hoods with the M295. If time permits, decontaminate as much
area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off- gassing.
z Step 4: Direct into first shuffle pit.
z Step 5: Decontaminate feet by shuffling feet in pit.
z Step 6: Direct to the next shuffle pit. (Cutters begin cut-out procedures).
z Step 7: Cut both straps off hood and loosen neck cord.
z Step 8: Make sure contaminated person bends forward at the waist.
z Step 9: Ensure cutter rolls hood up from the rear bottom as far as possible, gathers bottom into
neck cord, and cuts tails of cord, if needed. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 10: Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble worn. (Cutter
z Step 11: Start at top rear center and cut down the back of the top garment. (Cutter
z Step 12: Tell contaminated person to extend his arms forward and down, cutter pulls top forward
and down (folding in on itself as best as possible to contain and isolate). Glove should come off
with top; if not, remove gloves. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 13: Cut down each side of legs. (Cutter decontaminates hands.) Grasp rear center of trouser,
cut straps above where straps cross and allow to fall as contaminated person steps forward and
away.
z Step 14: Release or cut boot closures. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 15: Tell contaminated person to step out of boots. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
CPU REMOVAL
z Step 1: Start at top rear center and cut down middle of back. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 2: Make sure contaminated person extends arms forward and down. (Cutter pulls forward
and down, folding it inside out as best as possible to contain external contamination. Cutter
z Step 3: Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg, have contaminated person step out of CPU trouser.
(Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 4: Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and then the second,
having the contaminated person step onto safety pad. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)
z Step 5: Make sure contaminated person proceeds to mask drop area, decontaminates hands, and
uses breath-hold technique with assisted mask removal from decontamination line.
z Step 6: Move to redress area and redress; then move to exfiltration area.
z Step 7: Monitor and administer buddy-aid if necessary. Make sure personnel who develop
symptoms of exposure are taken to the triage area for treatment.
Figure E-4. Two-piece cutout
E-5. The basic operating principles of litter decontamination include the following:
z Always follow management of life-saving ABCs (check airway, check for breathing, and check
for circulation) first.
z Spot decontaminate cutaway of protective garment or mask to facilitate care of ABCs.
z Make sure a casualty that is affected in any ABC areas is not in the litter decontamination area.
z Always use the current decontamination media: 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution, M291, M295,
and SDS.
z Use the Raven decontamination litter.
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 E-5

Appendix E
z For litter decontamination, use the cutout procedure similar to the onion peel procedure.
z Use the exact cut template that corresponds to the ensemble worn (currently JSLIST VII and
FRIES).
z To control the spread of contamination, ensure the hand of the cutter is decontaminated first.
The hands and cutting tool must be decontaminated before each cut.
z For successful decontamination, first decontaminate the patient’s boots and gloves.
E-6. The following procedures are specific to the EPDS litter casualty:
z Keep litter parallel to EPDS line.
z Ensure environmental factors and the casualty flow remain unchanged.
z Move casualties from the EMT station to the litter decontamination area on a Raven stretcher.
Note: Although not stated after each step, cutter should decontaminate hands and tools between
every step or touch.
E-7. The decontamination site must have specific personnel on hand. At each site, there should be one HL
director, two scrubbers and cutters, and two or more medical personnel determined by the number of
medical or chemical casualties. The EPDS requires specific equipment and parts. Figure E-5, pages E-6
and E-7, provides the component data for the EPDS rucksack.
DIRTY EXFILTRATION DECONTAMINATION

E-8. The purpose of dirty exfiltration is to remove a contaminated SOF element from its tactical
environment so that decontamination can take place in a permissive environment. Dirty exfiltration
decontamination activities include decontamination for personnel using either a detailed troop
decontamination (DTD) or EPDS, and may or may not include spot decontamination of the exfiltration
platform. Dirty exfiltration decontamination should occur as soon as tactically feasible after contamination.
There are numerous issues to consider regarding the decontamination of exfiltration platforms in dirty
exfiltration. The SOF decontamination element—
z Ensures the aircrews remain in place in the aircraft.
z Removes any additional protective lining, cover, or equipment from the exfiltration platform
after one contaminated element has exited the platform.
z Checks the exfiltration platform for any residual contamination.
z Decontaminates the exfiltration platform to the maximum extent possible with available
equipment.
Note: FM 3-11.5 contains additional decontamination details.
Item Note Quantity
Water is carried in a 5-gallon collapsible bladder inside a vector

Boundary Bag pack. If available, seawater may be used. Two boundary bags are 3
cut down and used for the shuffle pit. One is used for a container.
Baja Bag 5
Large Hook Knife 3
Scissors 4
Blue chemlites are used to mark the bottom of decontamination
Chemlite, Blue 1
bags or shuffle pits.
Chemlite, Red Red chemlites are used to mark HL. 1
Figure E-5. EPDS rucksack component data
E-6 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Item Note Quantity
Chemlite, Green Green chemlites are used to mark CCL. 1

Additional waterproof protective mask bags with equipment belts
Electric Scissors 2
for carrying decontaminated media and cutters.
Poly bags used for containment of removed PPE to reduce off-
Poly Bag (7 ml) 6
gassing in the decontamination area.
SDS 5
SDS pads used to step on as a protective barrier after protective
SDS Pad socks are removed. 1
68% Calcium
Hypochlorite (6 oz) Calcium hypochlorite is carried for biological agents. 2
Head Lamp 6
Figure E-5. EPDS rucksack component data (continued)
BASIC AIRCREW DECONTAMINATION ACTIONS

E-9. The decontamination actions identify a standard set of instructions to doff aircrew equipment and
clothing after actual or suspected CBRN contamination. Figure E-6, pages E-7 through E-9, depicts how
decontamination stations can be systematically arranged to use equipment and allow aircrew redress.
STATION 1
z ATTENDANT: Wipe (bleach, water, and paper towel) crew member above shoulders.
z CREW MEMBER: Stow personnel items.
DUST HANDS
z ATTENDANT: Dust from knees to boots.
z ATTENDANT: Carefully dust blower and hang on rack.
DUST HANDS
z ATTENDANT: Unsnap suspension assemblies on manifold from one side and reattach to
other. Dust manifold and hang on rack.
DUST HANDS
z ATTENDANT: Remove harness, vest, life preserver unit (LPU), exposure suit, and so on.
DUST HANDS AFTER EACH ITEM
z ATTENDANT: Undo flight suit leg zipper and cut bootlaces.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Remove boot using the boot remover.
DO NOT LET FOOT TOUCH THE GROUND
z ATTENDANT: Tube sock foot. Discard boot. Repeat step.
DUST HANDS AFTER EACH BOOT
z CREW MEMBER: Loosen suit cuffs and reattach Velcro.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER/ATTENDANT: Remove and discard Nomex gloves.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Ensure next station is clear. Keep equipment away from body and go to
next station.
z CREW MEMBER: Remove equipment from rack.
Figure E-6. Aircrew decontamination stations
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 E-7

Appendix E
STATION 2
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Ensure next station is clear. Keep equipment away from body and go to
next station.
z ATTENDANT: Hang equipment on rack. Crew member and attendant should dust hands.
Crew member steps into shuffle box and faces rack.
z Liquid hazard area (LHA) ATTENDANT: Lower zipper on flight suit.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Face vapor hazard area. Assume race dive position.
MAINTAIN EYE CONTACT WITH ATTENDANT
z LHA ATTENDANT: Remove flight suit to knees. Remove Butyl gloves. Tube sock hands.
DO NOT TOUCH CREW MEMBER’S SKIN
DUST HANDS
z LHA ATTENDANT: Remove suit from legs. Ensure tube socks are retained on crew
member’s feet or replace them. Discard suit.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Lift foot back for tube sock removal by LHA. Extend foot forward for tube
sock replacement by LHA. Step out of the shuffle box. Repeat with other foot. LHA removes
shuffle box.
ATTENDANTS DUST HANDS

z LHA ATTENDANT: Tighten hood adjustment straps.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Face LHA.
z LHA ATTENDANT: Release and stow chinstrap and communications connection.
DUST HANDS
z LHA ATTENDANT: Remove tube socks from crew member’s hands.
DUST HANDS
z Vapor hazard area (VHA) ATTENDANT: Place new tube socks on crew member’s hands.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Grasp aircrew eye and respiratory protection (AERP) mask with hand
closest to rack.
STATION 2A
z LHA ATTENDANT: Disconnect bayonets and snaps.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Face decontamination rack and lean head toward LHA.
z LHA ATTENDANT: Remove helmet and stow.
DUST HANDS
z LHA ATTENDANT: Check crew member for contamination by using the CAM.
z VHA ATTENDANT: Brief crew member on mask removal. (Tell crew member to turn 1/8
toward VHA.)
z LHA ATTENDANT: Loosen hood adjustment straps.
DUST HANDS
z LHA ATTENDANT: Before removing mask, take tube sock off hand that removes mask and
place hand on stomach.
z LHA ATTENDANT: Raise hood apron off shoulders.
Note: Crew member takes several deep breaths, holds breath, and closes eyes tightly.
Figure E-6. Aircrew decontamination stations (continued)
E-8 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

STATION 2A (continued)
z CREW MEMBER: Place R/L hand under the neck dam and lift AERP mask off head passing
over shoulder to LHA attendant. Do not touch outside of hood. Hands back.
z LHA ATTENDANT: Discard mask and tube socks.
DUST HANDS
z CREW MEMBER: Hands forward.
z VHA ATTENDANT: Guide crew member to the VHA.
STATION 3
UNDRESS AREA
z CREW MEMBER: Remove any remaining clothing.
z CREW MEMBER: Redress and proceed to collection point and contact ground mission
commander.
EXPEDIENT UNDRESS
z CREW MEMBER: Remove AERP and flight equipment as required. Redress. Proceed to
collection point and contact ground mission commander.
Figure E-6. Aircrew decontamination stations (continued)
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 E-9

Glossary
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR after action report
ABC airway, breathing, circulation
AC hydrogen cyanide
AERP aircrew eye and respiratory protection
AF Air Force
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
APR air purifying respirator
ARSOF Army special operations forces
AUIB Aircrew Uniform Integrated Battlefield
BDO battle dress overgarment
BIDS Biological Integrated Detection System
BVO black vinyl overboot
BW biological warfare
BWA biological warfare agent
C2 command and control
CA Civil Affairs
CAM Chemical Agent Monitor
CAO Civil Affairs operations
CB chemical or biological
CBR chemical, biological, and radiological
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCBA closed-circuit breathing apparatus
CCDR combatant commander
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCL contamination control line
CDA chemical detachment A
CDD chemical decontamination detachment
CNR Center for National Response
COA course of action
COLPRO collective protection
CONUS continental United States
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
CP counterproliferation
CPFC chemical protective footwear cover
CPOG chemical protective overgarment
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 Glossary-1

Glossary
CPT captain
CPU chemical protective undergarment
CPWMD counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
CRD chemical reconnaissance detachment
CRDEC Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center
CT counterterrorism
CW chemical warfare
CWA chemical warfare agent
CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction
DA direct action
DNWS Defense Nuclear Weapons School
DOD Department of Defense
DPG Dugway Proving Ground
DRT decontamination and reconnaissance team
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EAC Exploitation Analysis Center
ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
EMP electromagnetic pulse
EMT emergency medical treatment
EO Executive Order
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPDS expedient personnel decontamination system
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ERG Emergency Response Guide
F Fahrenheit
FID foreign internal defense
FM field manual
FRIES fast-rope insertion and extraction system
GB Sarin
GCC geographic combatant commander
GD Soman
GRR ground radiological reconnaissance
GVO green vinyl overboot
GZ ground zero
HAZMAT hazardous materials
HD mustard agent
HEPA high-efficiency particulate air
HL hot line
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
Glossary-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Glossary
HQ headquarters
HTH calcium hypochlorite
IAW in accordance with
ICAD Individual Chemical Agent Detector
ICAM Improved Chemical Agent Monitor
IO information operations
IPE individual protective equipment
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JBPDS Joint Biological Point Detection System
JCAD Joint Chemical Agent Detector
JP joint publication
JSLCBRNRS Joint Service Light CBRN Reconnaissance System
JSLIST Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology
JSLSCAD Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector
JSOTF joint special operations task force
LD lethal dose
LHA liquid hazard area
LSD lysergic acid diethylamide
MDMP military decision-making process
MDS Modular Decontamination System
METOC meteorological and oceanographic
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations
mg milligram(s)
MICAD Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Detector
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
mph miles per hour
MSG master sergeant
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSOF Navy special operations forces
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NMS-CWMD National Military Strategy for combating weapons of mass destruction
NRC National Response Center
NSN National Stock Number
NVG night vision goggle
OIC officer in charge
OPLAN operation plan

Glossary
ORP objective rally point

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PA public affairs
PAPR powered air-purifying respirator
PCISE plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and execute
PIR priority intelligence requirement
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PPE personal protective equipment
PSYOP Psychological Operations
RA radiological agent
RCA riot control agent
R-CBATEB Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Analysis and Technical Evaluation
Board
R-CBSCE radiological-chemical and biological sampling control element
RGR Ranger
ROE rules of engagement
S-1 personnel officer
S-2 intelligence officer
S-3 operations officer
S-4 logistics officer
S-5 plans officer
S-6 command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate officer
SB(SO)(A) Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus
SCPE Simplified Collective Protective Equipment
SCUBA self-contained underwater breathing apparatus
SDS Sorbent Decontamination System
SF Special Forces
SFC sergeant first class
SFG(A) Special Forces group (airborne)
SFODA Special Forces operational detachment A
SGT sergeant
SME subject-matter expert
SO special operations
SOA special operations aviation
SOAR(A) special operations aviation regiment (airborne)
SOF special operations forces
SOFSE special operations forces site exploitation
SOP standing operating procedure
SOTF special operations task force
SPC specialist

Glossary
SR special reconnaissance
SSE sensitive site exploitation
SSG staff sergeant
STB super tropical bleach
TEU technical escort unit
TIB toxic industrial biological
TIC toxic industrial chemical
TIM toxic industrial material
TM technical manual
TSOC theater special operations command
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USG United States Government
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
UW unconventional warfare
VHA vapor hazard area
VX ethyl-S-dimethylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate
WARNORD warning order
WMD weapons of mass destruction
SECTION II – TERMS
aerosol
A liquid or solid composed of finely divided particles suspended in a gaseous medium. Examples of
common aerosols are mist, fog, and smoke.
agent
See biological or chemical agent. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this
publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)
biological agent
A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals, or causes the deterioration of
materiel. (JP 1-02)
biological weapon
An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod
vectors. (JP 1-02)
blister agent
A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the skin. Also called vesicant
agent. (JP 1-02)
blood agent
A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects bodily functions by preventing the
normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP 1-02)
chemical agent
A chemical substance which is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or
incapacitate mainly through its physiological effects. The term excludes riot control agents when used
for law enforcement purposes, herbicides, smoke, and flames. (JP 1-02)

Glossary
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense

Measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerabilities and/or effects of a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear incident. Also called CBRN defense. (JP 1-02)
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment
Conditions found in an area resulting from immediate or persisting effects of chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attacks or unintentional releases. Also called CBRN environment. (JP 1-02)
chemical contamination
See contamination.
chemical warfare
All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/
agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations. Since riot
control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be
referred to separately or under the broader term “chemical,” which will be used to include all types of
chemical munitions/agents collectively. Also called CW. (JP 1-02)
chemical weapon
Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not
prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a munition or device specifically designed to
cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a) above, which would
be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically
designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b)
above. (JP 1-02)
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The CWC, which entered into force for states parties on 26 April 1997, bans the acquisition,
development, production, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It prohibits the use of riot control
agents as a method of warfare. It provides for the destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and
production facilities within 10 years after entry into force. It contains a vigorous challenge regime to
ensure compliance. The United States ratified the CWC on 25 April 1997.
coalition
An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)
collective protection
The protection provided to a group of individuals which permits relaxation of individual chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear protection. Also called COLPRO. (JP 1-02)
combatant command
A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander
established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice
and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have
geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)
contaminated remains
Remains of personnel which have absorbed or upon which have been deposited radioactive material,
or biological or chemical agents. (JP 1-02)
contamination
1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological or chemical agents on
or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. 2. (DOD only) Food and/or water made unfit for
consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive
elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the
decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02)

Glossary
contamination control
A combination of preparatory and responsive measures designed to limit the vulnerability of forces to
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and toxic industrial hazards and to avoid, contain, control
exposure to, and, where possible, neutralize them. (JP 1-02)
decontamination
The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making
harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to
or around it. (JP 1-02)
deliberate planning
A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that
occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions
regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (FM 1-02)
detection
In chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments, the act of locating chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear hazards by use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detectors or
monitoring and/or survey teams. (JP 1-02)
dirty
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense contaminated.
dispersion
1. A scattered pattern of hits around the mean point of impact of bombs and projectiles dropped or fired
under identical conditions; 2. In antiaircraft gunnery, the scattering of shots in range and deflection about
the mean point of explosion; 3. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or
activities which are usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability; 4. In chemical and
biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol form. (JP 1-02)
electromagnetic pulse
The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most commonly caused by a nuclear
explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and
voltage surges. Also called EMP. (JP 1-02)
Executive Order 11850
The Executive Order dated 8 April 1975, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical
Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, that renounced the first use of herbicides in war (except for
specified defensive uses) and the first use of riot control agents (RCAs) in war except for defensive
military modes to save lives.
ground zero
The point on the surface of the Earth at, or vertically below or above, the center of a planned or actual
nuclear detonation. (JP 1-02)
hot spot
Region in a contaminated area in which the level of radioactive contamination is considerably greater
than in neighboring regions in the area. (JP 1-02)
immediate decontamination
Decontamination carried out by individuals immediately upon becoming contaminated to save lives,
minimize casualties, and limit the spread of contamination. This may include decontamination of some
personal clothing and/or equipment. (JP 1-02)
individual protective equipment
In chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear operations, the personal clothing and equipment
required to protect an individual from chemical, biological, and radiological hazards and some nuclear
hazards. (JP 1-02)

Glossary
industrial chemicals
Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry,
government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of
producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use.
Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also
can be military chemical agents.
joint special operations task force
A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry
out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or
other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations
units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)
lysergic acid diethylamide
Formerly lysergide, commonly known as acid, is a semi-synthetic psychedelic drug of the ergoline
family. Also called LSD.
mission-oriented protective posture
A flexible system of protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination.
This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and equipment (mission-oriented
protective posture gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature,
and humidity. Also called MOPP. (JP 1-02)
mission-oriented protective posture gear
Military term for individual protective equipment, including suit, boots, gloves, mask with hood, first
aid treatments, and decontamination kits issued to military members. Also called MOPP gear.
(JP 1-02)
Mylar
A trademark used for a thin, strong polyester material.
nerve agent
A potentially lethal chemical agent which interferes with the transmission of nerve impulses. (JP 1-02)
nonpersistent agent
A chemical agent that when released dissipates and/or loses its ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15
minutes. (JP 1-02)
nuclear defense
The methods, plans, and procedures involved in establishing and exercising defensive measures
against the effects of an attack by nuclear weapons or radiological warfare agents. It encompasses both
the training for, and the implementation of, these methods, plans, and procedures. See also CBRN
defense.
off-gassing
Vapor release of biological or chemical agents.
pathogen
A disease-producing microorganism that directly attacks human tissue and biological processes.
(JP 1-02)
persistency
In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to the duration of its
effectiveness under determined conditions after its dispersal. (JP 1-02)
persistent agent
A chemical agent that, when released, remains able to cause casualties for more than 24 hours to
several days or weeks. (JP 1-02)

Glossary
protection
Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary
personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastrucure deployed or located within or outside
the boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 1-02)
protective mask
A protective ensemble designed to protect the wearer’s face and eyes, and prevent the breathing of air
contaminated with chemical and/or biological agents. (JP 1-02)
radionuclide
A nuclide (type of atom specified by its atomic number, atomic mass, and energy state, such as carbon
14) that exhibits radioactivity.
riot control agent
Any chemical, not listed in a schedule of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction which can produce
rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time
following termination of exposure. Also called RCA. (JP 1-02)
sensitive site exploitation
A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic
data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents.
Also called SSE. (JP 1-02)
special operations command
A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan,
coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned
operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)
sterilize
To remove from material to be used in covert and clandestine operations, marks or devices which can
identify it as emanating from the sponsoring nation or organization. (JP 1-02)
survey
The directed effort to determine the location and the nature of a chemical, biological, and radiological
hazard in an area.
toxic industrial biological
Any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or
commercial processes which could pose an infectious or toxic threat. Also called TIB. (JP 1-02)
toxic industrial chemical
A chemical developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry,
government, or academia. For example: pesticides, petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, poisons, etc.
These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human
casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use. Hydrogen cyanide,
cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also can be military
chemical agents. Also called TIC. (JP 1-02)
toxic industrial material
A generic term for toxic or radioactive substances in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form that
may be used, or stored for use, for industrial, commercial, medical, military, or domestic purposes.
Toxic industrial material may be chemical, biological, or radioactive and described as toic industrial
chemical, toxic industrial biological, or toxic industrial radiological. Also called TIM. (JP 1-02)
toxin
Poisonous substances that may be produced naturally (by bacteria, plants, fungi, snakes, insects, and
other living organisms) or synthetically. (JP 1-02)

Glossary
weapons of mass destruction

Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to
destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield explosives or
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or
propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also
called WMD. (JP 1-02)

References
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, 20 September 2006
FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 15 April 2005
FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 29 September 2006
FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries), 3 November 1986
FM 3-11.3, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, 2 February 2006
FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
(NBC) Protection, 2 June 2003
FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Decontamination, 4 April 2006
Vulnerability Assessment, 28 December 2004
Reconnaissance, 30 July 2004
FM 3-11.86, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Biological Surveillance,
4 October 2004
FM 3-61.1, Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 1 October 2000
FM 4-02.7, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment, 15 July 2009
TC 3-10, Commander’s Tactical NBC Handbook, 29 September 1994
TM 3-4230-204-12&P, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual (Including Repair Parts and
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TM 3-4230-214-12&P, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts and Special
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15 August 1992
TM 3-4230-216-10, Operator’s Manual for Decontaminating Kit, Skin: M258A1 (NSN 4230-01-101-
3984) and Training Aid, Skin Decontaminating: M58A1 (6910-01-101-1768), 17 May 1985
TM 3-4230-228-10, Operator’s Manual for Decontaminating Apparatus: Power-Driven, Lightweight,
M17 (NSN 4230-01-251-8702), 15 May 1989
TM 3-4230-229-10, Operator's Manual for Decontaminating Kit, Skin: M291, (NSN 4230-01-251-8702),
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TM 3-4240-280-10. Operator’s Manual for Mask, Chemical-Biological: Aircraft, ABC-M24 and
Accessories and Mask, Chemical-Biological, Tank, M25A1 and Accessories, 15 March 1988
TM 3-4240-341-10. Operator Instructions for Mask, Chemical-Biological: M45 (NSN 4240-01-414-4034)–
Extra Small (EIC 123); (4240-01-414-4035)–Small (EIC 123); (4240-01-414-4051)–Medium
(EIC 123); (4240-01-414-4052)–Large (EIC 123), 20 May 1998
TM 3-4240-342-10, Operator’s Manual for Mask, Chemical-Biological, Aircraft: Apache Aviator,
M48 (NSN 4240-01-386-0198)–Small (4240-01-386-4686)–Medium (4240-01-386-0201)–
Large (4240-01-386-0207)–Extra Large, 13 September 2002
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 References-1

References
TM 3-4240-342-20&P, Unit Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts and Special Tools List for
Mask, Chemical-Biological: Aircraft, Apache Aviator, M48 (NSN 4240-01-386-0198)–Small
(4240-01-386-4686)–Medium (4240-01-386-0201)–Large (4240-01-386-0207)–Extra Large
13 September 2002
TM 3-6665-312-12&P, Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts
and Special Tools List for M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (NSN 6665-01-105-5623)
and Auxiliary Equipment M10 Power Supply (6665-00-859-2225); M10A1 Power Supply
(6665-00-093-2739); M228 High Profile Mounting Kit (6665-00-859-2212); and M182 Low
Profile Mounting Kit (6665-00-110-9492), 17 March 1985
TM 3-6665-319-10, Operator’s Manual for Water Testing Kit, Chemical Agents: M272
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TM 3-6665-349-12&P, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts and Special
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TM 3-6665-426-10, Operator’s Manual for Detector Kit, Chemical Agent: M256A2 (NSN 6665-01-
563-7473), 2 November 2009
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JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006
JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003
JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),
30 April 2004
JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments,
26 August 2008
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Executive Order 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot
Control Agents, 8 April 1975
References-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Index
A detection equipment, 1-10, A-1 R

through A-3, E-1
agent characteristics, D-8 radiological agents, 1-10
direct action (DA), 1-4, 1-6, 3-1
agent persistency, 6-3, 6-4 reachback, iv, 1-12, 2-4
agent toxicity, 6-3 E risk assessment, 1-3, 6-4, 6-11
aircraft decontamination, 4-3 electromagnetic pulse (EMP),
1-10, 1-11, 4-2, 4-3 S
B employment, 1-1, 1-6 through special CBRN reconnaissance,
biological agents, 1-7 through 1-8, 5-3 through 5-5, 6-1, 6-7 1-7, 6-12
1-10, 2-2, 3-2, 6-11, 7-2, A-2 expedient personnel special reconnaissance (SR),
through A-4, D-9, E-8 decontamination system 1-3, 1-6
C (EPDS), 1-6, 2-3, 2-4, 3-2, T
3-3, E-2, E-3, E-7, E-8
chemical agents, 1-7 through toxic industrial biological (TIB),
1-10, 2-2, 3-2, 6-11, 7-2, A-2 F 2-2, 3-2
through A-4, D-9, E-8 foreign internal defense (FID), toxic industrial chemical (TIC),
chemical decontamination 1-2, 1-3, 1-5, 1-7, 6-8 2-2, 3-2, A-3, B-1, B-3
detachment (CDD), iv, 1-1, toxic industrial material (TIM),
1-3, 1-5, 2-1, 2-3 through H
1-1, 1-7 through 1-9, 1-11,
2-5, 3-1, 5-4, B-1, C-1 host nation (HN), 1-6, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-3, 4-1, 5-3, 6-2,
chemical defense, 4-1, 4-2 3-3, 5-1, 6-2, 6-6, 6-7, 6-9, 6-4, 6-5, B-1, B-4, B-5
6-10, 6-13
chemical reconnaissance U
detachment (CRD), iv, 1-1, hostile environment, 1-1, 2-1,
1-3, 1-4, 2-1 through 2-3, 3-1, 5-1 uncertain environment, 1-1,
3-1, 4-1, 5-3, 5-5, 6-12, 7-1, 2-1, 3-1, 5-1
J
A-3, B-1, C-1, D-6, D-18 W
joint special operations task
Civil Affairs operations (CAO), force (JSOTF), 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, warning order (WARNORD),
1-3, 6-6 6-9 5-5, 6-4
commander's critical weapons of mass destruction
information requirement M
(WMD), 1-1, 1-2, 1-6, 1-7,
(CCIR), 6-4 mission, enemy, terrain and 2-2, 3-2, 5-1, 5-3, A-3, C-1
commander's intent, 6-1, 6-4, weather, troops and support through C-3
6-7, 6-8 available, time available, and
civil considerations
counterproliferation (CP), 1-5,
(METT-TC), 6-3
1-6
mission planning, 5-1, 5-3, 6-1,
counterterrorism (CT), 1-3, 1-6,
6-5, 6-6, 6-8, 6-10
1-7, C-1
multinational force, 6-7
D
deployment, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 3-3,
P
3-4, 4-1, 4-2, 5-3, 5-4, 6-5, passive protection, 1-5
7-1 permissive environment, 1-1,
2-1, 3-1, 5-1, E-7
30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 Index-1

FM 3-05.132
30 November 2009
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0931703
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with
initial distribution number 115859, requirements for FM 3-05.132.
PIN: 084325-000

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FM 3-05.

Army Special Operations Forces Chemical,

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Field Manual Headquarters

Army Special Operations Forces

Command Relationships ..................................................................................... 3-1

ii FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 iii

iv FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

ARSOF CBRN MISSION

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-1

Figure 1-1. CBRN CWMD core task crosswalk

1-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Reconnaissance and Detection

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-3

1-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

Passive Protection Measures

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-5

Medical Support and Site Remediation

1-6 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND POTENTIAL CBRN THREATS

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-7

LOW-TERRAIN, TEMPERATE ZONE AREAS

1-8 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

MARITIME ENVIRONMENTS AND RIVERINE AREAS

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-9

1-10 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

CBRN SUPPORT AVAILABLE AT DIRECT REPORTING UNITS

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 1-11

1-12 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT

Figure 2-1. Chemical reconnaissance detachment organization and manning

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 2-1

2-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION DETACHMENT

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 2-3

Figure 2-2. Chemical decontamination detachment organization and manning

CBRN STAFF ELEMENTS

GROUP CBRN CELL

2-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

BATTALION CBRN CELL

COMPANY CBRN NCO

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 2-5

Figure 3-1. Decontamination and reconnaissance team organization and manning

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 3-1

3-2 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

CBRN STAFF ELEMENTS

REGIMENTAL CBRN CELL

BATTALION CBRN CELL

30 November 2009 FM 3-05.132 3-3

COMPANY CBRN NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER

3-4 FM 3-05.132 30 November 2009

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR[A]) has no

CBRN STAFF ELEMENTS

BATTALION CBRN CELL