FIRST DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 12724, July 28, 2020 ]

SYLVIA R. RIVERA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, J.:

It is imperative that all lawyers live by the law.1 Any lawyer who engages in deceitful conduct
deserves administrative sanctions. One such instance is present in this complaint for disbarment
against a lawyer who exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent a client resulting in
violations of the rules on notarial practice.

ANTECEDENTS

Sylvia Rivera, the surviving spouse of the late Teofilo Rivera, and Nicasio Rivera, Teofilo's son from
another woman, filed a civil case for annulment of documents, cancellation of title and damages
against Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) docketed as Civil Case No. 1470. The controversy is over a land registered in Teofilo's name
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-217758. However, the RTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit. Immediately, Sylvia and Nicasio elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA)
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53694. The CA affirmed the RTC's findings. Aggrieved, Sylvia and
Nicasio sought assistance from Atty. Bayani Dalangin who prepared a motion for reconsideration. In
due course, the CA granted the motion and ruled in favor of Sylvia and Nicasio. Upon finality of the
decision, Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for execution of judgment and then a motion to clarify writ of
execution.

Later, Sylvia discovered that Nicasio and his wife Emily de Luna executed on June 14, 2009 an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with Sale2 involving Teofilo's property. The land was sold for
P100,000.00 to Spouses James Martin and Mary Ann Wy, who were later issued TCT No. N-47751
in their names.3 Aggrieved, Sylvia charged Nicasio and Emily of estafa through
falsification.4 Thereafter, Sylvia wrote to Spouses Wy and expressed her intention to recover the
property by tendering payment of P100,000.00 and consigning the amount in court in case of
refusal.5

Meantime, Sylvia filed a complaint for the annulment of the affidavit of self-adjudication with sale
against Spouses Wy, Nicasio and Emily and the cancellation of TCT No. N-47751 before the RTC.
Likewise, Sylvia consigned the P100,000.00 in court.6 In their answer, the Spouses Wy attached a
Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated May 28, 2009 with a consideration of P4,000,000.00 and notarized by
Atty. Dalangin. However, Sylvia claimed that the deed was antedated to prevent the consignment.
Moreover, Atty. Dalangin was aware that Sylvia has an interest over the property of her late
husband.8

Thus, Sylvia filed a Complaint9 for disbarment against Atty. Dalangin on grounds of deceit and
dishonesty before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) docketed as Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) Case No. 11-3237. As supporting evidence, Sylvia submitted a certification from
the Office of the Clerk of Court that Atty. Dalangin did not submit his notarial reports for the period
February 6, 2008 to December 31, 2009.10

On the other hand, Atty. Dalangin denied that Sylvia was his client and argued that it was Nicasio
who hired his services.11 Also, Atty. Dalangin explained that the disputed property was previously
registered under TCT No. NT-217758 solely in the name of Teofilo Rivera. He has no knowledge
that Sylvia is the lawful wife of the late Teofilo. Further, Atty. Dalangin maintained that the deed of
absolute sale in favor of Spouses Wy was not ante-dated. As proof, he presented a page from his
notarial register showing that the deed was executed on May 28, 2009. Finally, Atty. Dalangin
countered that he submitted on October 11, 2011 his notarial reports for the years 2008 and 2009.12

On July 20, 2016, the IBP CBD reported that Atty. Dalangin violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules on Notarial Practice. It found that Atty. Dalangin previously acted as
Sylvia's counsel and that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale was anomalous. Accordingly,
it recommended the suspension of Atty. Dalangin in the practice of law for two years, immediate
revocation of his notarial commission, and disqualification from being appointed as notary for two
years13 viz.:

Respondent became a counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants in Civil Case No. 1470 (CA-G.R. CV No.
53694) entitled Sylvia R. Rivera and Nicasio Rivera vs. Felipe Pecache. Although he denied
lawyering for plaintiffs-appellants before the CA, his client, Emily de Luna, wife of Nicasio Rivera in
her [Sinumpaang Salaysay] dated December 19, 2011 enumerated in detail how respondent
became their lawyer, she admitted to have lost their case before the RTC and the CA so in their
desire to appeal the Decision to the Supreme Court, they asked the help of respondent who was
then working at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) and he helped them prepare their Motion for
Reconsideration before the CA without consideration although they told him that V2 of the property
will go to him. This resulted to an Amended Decision favorable to them. They then asked him to file
a motion for execution on behalf of the plaintiffs at the RTC and at that time, he was no longer
connected with the PAO.

Exhibit D which is the Motion for Execution signed and filed by respondent stated that he is
appearing as counsel for the "plaintiffs" without distinguishing between plaintiffs Narciso and Sylvia.
This is evidence that respondent also acted as counsel for complainant, and he is estopped from
claiming otherwise. Exhibit E which is a Motion to Clarify Writ of Execution was likewise signed and
filed by respondent as counsel for the "plaintiffs." It is difficult to believe that respondent had not at
all inquired into the details of the case and the background of the case before filing pleadings on
behalf of them. Any reasonably prudent attorney would inquire into the facts of the case before
accepting a request to file any pleading. The said motions are substantial evidence that there was an
Attorney-Client relationship between complainant and respondent.

xxxx

On the issue of the execution of Deed of Sale dated May 28, 2009, it was admitted that respondent
prepared and notarized the said Deed for Four Million Pesos (PHP 4,000,000.00) in favor of
Spouses Wy, signed solely by vendor Narciso it being his inheritance. This by itself is anomalous,
dishonest and done in bad faith intended to prejudice the rights of the complainant. First, in the Civil
Case where he became counsel for plaintiffs, it was alleged therein that the heirs of Teofilo are the
surviving spouse, herein complainant and Narciso, his son by another woman. Flaving knowledge of
this fact, he should not have proceeded with the said transaction with only one of the plaintiffs
executing the sale without the participation of his other client, to her great loss. Art. 998 of the Civil
Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half. Second, there has to be a settlement of estate and
partition of the properties of the deceased so that the proper estate tax be paid first before the heirs
to whom the property is adjudicated could legally sell their respective portions. Sad to say that these
were not done by the respondent who, as counsel should have properly advised his client.

xxxx

In light of the foregoing facts and legal basis, respondent is found to have violated his Lawyer's
Oath, the x x x Canons of Professional Responsibility and failed to faithfully comply with the rules on
notarial practice, thus it is recommended that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a two-
year period. It is further recommended that his present notarial commission, if any, be REVOKED,
and that he be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
He should also be WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be a cause for
Disbarment considering his previous disciplinary cases.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Commission's findings.15 Atty. Dalangin moved for a
reconsideration.16 On October 4, 2018, the IBP partly granted the motion and removed the penalty
of suspension, thus:

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration by reducing the
recommended penalty to Immediate revocation of the notarial commission, if subsisting, and.
Disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.17

RULING

The Court adopts the IBP's findings with modification as to the penalty.

The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and
legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and,
thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not
only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the
public. Apropos are Canons 1 and 7, to wit:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
An "unlawful" conduct refers to any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized
by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law. It does not necessarily imply the element
of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. To be "dishonest"
means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity,
honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight forwardness. A "deceitful" conduct means
the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon
another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.18

Here, Atty. Dalangin exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent Sylvia. Foremost the
caption in Civil Case No. 1470 and CA-G.R. CV No. 53694 is entitled "Sylvia Reyes Rivera & Nicasio
Rivera v. Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija." Atty. Dalangin even moved for
execution19 of judgment with preliminary words "Plaintiffs, unto this Honorable Court, most
respectfully states."20 The motion to clarify writ of execution that Atty. Dalangin filed was similarly
worded.21 Verily, there is no way Atty. Dalangin could forget that Sylvia is his client. The theory that
he counseled only Nicasio and Emily can hardly be given credit.

Likewise, Atty. Dalangin cannot deny that Sylvia is Teofilo's wife or that she has an interest in the
disputed land. As such, Atty. Dalangin should have been circumspect in notarizing the deed of
absolute sale over Teofilo's property knowing that a legal heir was left out. The transaction
disregarded the rules on succession that the widow is a compulsory heir of the
decedent.22 Corollarily, Atty. Dalangin should have refused the notarization of the deed. The 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice23 provides that:

RULE IV
Powers and Limitations of Notaries Public

xxxx

SECTION 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in
these Rules lor any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate lee specified
by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral;

xxxx

Moreover, we find that Atty. Dalangin did not timely submit his notarial reports. Admittedly, he
submitted the certified copies of his notarial register for 2008 and 2009 only on October 1 1, 201 1 or
43 months late from the date of his commission as notary public on February 6, 2008. The Rules on
Notarial Practice is explicit that a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy
of any instrument acknowledged before the notary public shall, within the first ten days ofthe month
following, be forwarded to the Clerk of Court and shall be under the responsibility of such officer. If
there is no entry to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of
certified copies herein required.24

However, there is no proof that Atty. Dalangin antedated the deed of absolute sale. Suffice it to say
1âшphi1

that a notarial register enjoys the presumption of regularity absent contrary evidence.25 In this case,
he presented a page from the notarial register showing that the deed was executed on May 28, 2009
or before the affidavit of self-adjudication dated June 14, 2009. Quite the contrary, Sylvia failed to
substantiate such accusation. On this point, we reiterate that the quantum of proof in administrative
complaints against lawyers is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden rests upon the
complainant.26 The bare allegations of misconduct are insufficient to support a case for disbarment.

Lastly, it bears emphasis that the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is their
fitness to continue in the practice of law. The findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, these proceedings do
not involve a trial but only an investigation into the conduct of lawyers.27 Hence, this Court cannot
delve on the question whether the deed of absolute sale deprived Sylvia of her inheritance which
must be threshed out in a proper civil action.

Taken together, Atty. Dalangin acted short of the standards expected of a lawyer in upholding the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Applying prevailing jurisprudence, we modify the penalty
and impose upon Atty. Dalangin the immediate revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six months.28

We remind all lawyers that membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
public's faith in the legal profession.29 To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the
law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized. Considering that, of
all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that
they live by the law.30

FOR THESE REASONS, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 4, Rule IV and Section 2(h), Rule VI of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, Atty. Dalangin's notarial commission is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED. He is also DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months. He is
likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

The suspension in the practice of law, the prohibition from being commissioned as notary public, and
the revocation of his notarial commission, if any, shall take effect immediately upon respondent's
receipt of this decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his
suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 236618, August 27, 2020 ]

JCLV REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PHIL GALICIA MANGALI,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, J.:

A private complainant cannot question the Order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal
case absent grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process. The interest of the offended party is
limited only to the civil aspect of the case. We apply this dictum in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Resolution1 dated September 22, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP No. 152450.

ANTECEDENTS

Phil Mangali (Mangali) and Jerry Alba (Alba) were charged with robbery committed against JCLV
Realty & Development Corporation (JCLV Realty) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-11-169004.2 Allegedly, Mangali and Alba removed JCLV Realty's electric
facilities with intent to gain and intimidation against persons. After the prosecution rested its case,
Mangali filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to establish intent to gain
and that the metering instruments belonged to JCLV Realty.3 The prosecution opposed the
demurrer.

On March 30, 2017, the RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the criminal case for lack of
evidence that Mangali perpetrated the robbery,4 thus:

WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED. The prosecution's evidence is not sufficient
to convict the accused, accused (sic) Phil Mangali y Galicia's case is hereby DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to the civil aspect of the case.

As regards accused Jerry P. Alba, his case is ORDERED ARCHIVED and may be revived only upon
his apprehension and/or surrender.

SO ORDERED.5
Unsuccessful at a reconsideration,6 JCLV Realty elevated the case to the CA through a special civil
action for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 152450. JCLV Realty argued that the RTC erred in
granting the demurrer because Mangali had admitted the taking of meter facilities. Moreover, the
pre-trial order which contained admission on the identity of the perpetrator is valid even if not signed
by the parties. Lastly, JCLV Realty claimed denial of due process and grave abuse of discretion on
the part of RTC when it dismissed the criminal case on a ground not invoked by the accused.7

On September 22, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition and ruled that JCLV Realty has no
personality to question the dismissal of the criminal case. The authority to represent the State in
criminal proceedings is vested solely on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and not the private
complainant who may appeal only the civil aspect of the case,8 viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of personality or authority of the
petitioner to file the Petition with respect to the criminal aspect of the case and for being the wrong
judicial remedy with respect to the civil aspect of the case.

SO ORDERED.9

JCLV Realty sought reconsideration10 but was denied.11 Hence, this recourse.12 JCLV Realty
contends that the authority of the OSG applies only in ordinary appeals. The private complainant can
file a special civil action for certiorari to question the criminal and civil aspect of the case. Yet, the CA
mistook its petition as an ordinary appeal. On the other hand, Mangali maintains that JCLV Realty
has no legal standing to file certiorari proceedings because the reliefs sought directly affects the
criminal aspect of the case. Hence, the OSG's consent is necessary.

RULING

In any criminal case or proceeding, only the OSG may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State before the Supreme Court and the CA.
This is explicitly provided under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book III of the 1987
Administrative Code of the Philippines,13 thus:

Section 35. Power and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by
the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or
controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the service of a lawyer. It shall have the
following specific power and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (Emphasis supplied.)

The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the
criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. The interest of the private offended party
is restricted only to the civil liability. In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited
to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the OSG. The private offended party may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the
civil aspect of the case.14 Differently stated, the private offended party may file an appeal without
the intervention of the OSG, but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Also,
the complainant may file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG,
but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.15

Corollarily, we dismissed petitions filed by the private offended party questioning the acquittal of the
accused or dismissal of the criminal case without the consent of the OSG. In Bangayan, Jr. v.
Bangayan,16 the respondent lacks personality to file a petition for certiorari before the CA because
she prayed for the reversal of the trial court's order granting the petitioners' demurrer to evidence
and the conduct of a full blown trial. The respondent did not even briefly discuss the civil liability of
the petitioners, to wit:

A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial
court's order granting petitioners' demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the
criminal case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is
apparent that her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners.
Because bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal.
Thus, Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.

Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said case, the OSG
joined the cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the requirement that criminal actions be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Second, the acquittal of the
accused was done without due process and was declared null and void because of the nonfeasance
on the part of the public prosecutor and the trial court. There being no valid acquittal, the accused
therein could not invoke the protection of double jeopardy.

In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City joined
the cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate
court. Furthermore, she cannot claim to have been denied due process because the records show
that the trial court heard all the evidence against the accused and that the prosecution had formally
offered the evidence before the court granted the demurrer to evidence. Thus, the petitioners'
acquittal was valid, entitling them to invoke their right against double jeopardy.17 (Emphasis
supplied; citation omitted.)

Likewise, in Jimenez v. Sorongon18 the petitioner has no standing to question the dismissal of the
criminal case since his main argument is about the existence of probable cause. This dispute
involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.
A similar ruling was applied in Anlud Metal Recycling Corp. v. Ang,19 to wit:

The real party in interest in a criminal case is the People of the Philippines. Hence, if the criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court, the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the State.

As a qualification, however, this Court recognizes that the private offended party has an interest in
the civil aspect of the case. Logically, the capability of the private complainant to question the
dismissal of the criminal proceedings is limited only to questions relating to the civil aspect of the
case, It should ideally be along this thin framework that we may entertain questions regarding the
dismissals of criminal cases instituted by private offended parties. Enlarging this scope may result in
wanton disregard of the OSG's personality, as well as the clogging of our dockets, which this Court
is keen to avoid.
Therefore, the litmus test in ascertaining the personality of herein petitioner lies in whether or not the
substance of the certiorari action it instituted in the CA referred to the civil aspect of the case.

Here in this Rule 45 petition, petitioner argues that the RTC erred when it concluded that "there is no
evidence of conspiracy against private respondent Ang." Petitioner goes on to enumerate
circumstances that collectively amount to a finding that based Oil probable cause, respondent
conspired with the accused in defrauding Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation.

Clearly, petitioner mainly iisputes the RTC's finding of want of probable cause to indict Ang as an
accused for estafa. This dispute refers, though, to the criminal, and not the civil, aspect of the case.
In Jimenez v. Sorongon, We similarly ruled:

In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since
the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the the existence of probable
cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of
the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This
involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Given that nowhere in the pleadings, did petitioner even briefly discuss the civil liability of
respondent, this Court holds that Anlud Metal. Recycling Corporation lacks the requisite legal
standing to appeal the discharge of respondent Ang from the Information for estafa. On this ground
alone, the petition already fails.20 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes21 the petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari before the RTC seeking to annul the MTC's decision acquitting the respondents. In that
case, the petitioner has no authority in filing the petition because if assails the admissibility of
evidence which only the State may question, viz.:

xxx [T]he Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the
Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines
on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.

In its petition for certiorari filed with the RTC, petitioner seeks the annulment of the MTC decision
acquitting herein respondents. In so doing, petitioner raises issues on the admissibility of evidence
ℒαwρhi ৷

which it submitted to prove the guilt of the accused. These issues necessarily require a review of the
criminal aspect of the case and, as such, is prohibited. As discussed above, only the State, and not
herein petitioner, who is the private offended party, may question the criminal aspect of the case.

The above cases raised issues that necessarily require a review of the criminal aspect of the
proceedings. In the same manner, JCLV Realty are praying for reliefs which pertain to the criminal
aspect of the case. Foremost, the arguments in the petition for certiorari are centered on Mangali's
identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Secondly, JCLV Realty prayed that the March 30, 2017
Order be "annulled, reversed and set aside and that a new one [will] be rendered denying the
[accused'] Demurrer to Evidence." Lastly, nowhere in the petition did JCLV Realty discuss Mangali's
civil liability. In contrast, it is ultimately seeking the reinstatement of the criminal case against
Mangali.
Notably, this Court has already acknowledged that the acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the
criminal case may be assailed through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of
due process rendering the judgment void.22 In People v. Judge Santiago,23 the private offended
party filed a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that trial court acquitted the accused
without trial on the merits despite the conflicting positions of the parties. This Court ruled that the
acquittal is a nullity for want of due process because the trial court deprived the prosecution an
opportunity to present evidence. Also, we declared that the victim can avail certiorari to question the
validity of acquittal.

In Dela Rosa v. CA,24 we sustained the private offended party's right to file a special civil action
for certiorari in assailing the dismissal of a criminal case and ruled that the OSG's intervention is not
necessary. In that case, the trial court's dismissal of the case on the ground that the accused is
entitled to a speedy trial is capricious and unwarranted. In People v. Court of Appeals,25 the victim
filed a petition for certiorari to assail the decision of the appellate court acquitting the accused from
the crime of rape. This Court reversed the judgment of acquittal because the appellate court merely
relied on the evidence of the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. We likewise
held that the victim has legal standing to bring a special civil action for certiorari. In any event, the
OSG joined the victim's cause in its comment thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

In Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,26 the trial court dismissed the criminal charge for estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents against the petitioner on the basis solely of the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. We ruled that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion because it did not make an independent evaluation of the merits of the case. Hence, the
private respondent properly filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court to question the
dismissal of the criminal case. In David v, Marquez,27 the private offended party brought a special
civil action for certiorari to the CA and questioned the patently erroneous order of the trial court
quashing the informations on the supposed ground of improper venue. We held that the victim has
the legal personality to file a petition for certiorari on her own and not through the OSG.

In this case, we find that JCLV Realty was not deprived of due process. Notably, JCLV Realty
participated in the proceedings and presented evidence until the prosecution rested its case. The
prosecution likewise opposed the demurrer. On this point, there is no denial of due process
especially when the parties are granted an opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments
or pleadings.28 Also, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case
on a ground not raised in the demurrer to evidence, i.e. the prosecution failed to positively identify
the accused. It is settled that the identity of the offender is indispensably entwined to the commission
of the crime.29 The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to establish the identity
of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be proven, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal.30 On the other hand, a demurrer to evidence is defined as
an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue.31 The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict.32 In granting the demurrer, the RTC considered the entirety of the prosecution evidence but
found them insufficient to establish the identity of the accused.

Finally, double jeopardy has set in. It attaches when the following elements concur: (1) the accused
is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and
(4) the accused is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his/her consent.33 Here,
all the elements are present. A valid Information for the crime of robbery was filed against Mangali
before the RTC. Also, Mangali had pleaded not guilty to the charge, and after the prosecution rested,
the criminal case was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence. Absent grave abuse of discretion or
denial of due process, the grant of demurrer to evidence is a judgment of acquittal which is final and
executory.34

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September
22, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP No. 152450 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Reyes, J., Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
 Manila

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 244076. March 16, 2022 ]

FELIX CHINGKOE AND ROSITA CHINGKOE, PETITIONERS, VS. FAUSTINO CHINGKOE AND
GLORIA CHINGKOE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision1 dated April 30, 2018 in CA-G.R. CV No. 106434, which reversed
the Decision2 dated May 12, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

ANTECEDENTS

Faustino Chingkoe (Faustino) and his wife, Gloria Chingkoe (Gloria), were the registered owners
of a parcel of land in Lopez Jaena St., Ayala Heights, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 8283 (subject property). Faustino alleged that sometime in 1990, he allowed his
brother, Felix Chingkoe (Felix), to occupy the subject property. Upon the request of Tan Po Chu,
their mother, Faustino signed an undated Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of Felix.
Tan Po Chu assured Faustino that she will keep the undated Deed of Sale because she just wanted
to appease Felix who was then becoming an alcoholic.3

On the other hand, Felix averred that he had been in possession of the subject property since
1989. After five years of occupying the subject property or on October 10, 1994, Felix purchased it
from Faustino for P3,130,000.00. Both parties then signed the Deed of Sale before a notary public,
Atty. Reynaldo Z. Calabio (Atty. Calabio). Despite repeated demands, Faustino refused to surrender
the Owner's Duplicate of TCT No. 8283 which prevented Felix from having it transferred to his name.
Felix later discovered that Faustino had mortgaged the subject property to Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC). This discovery prompted Felix to file a complaint for specific
performance with damages to compel Faustino to turn over the TCT, and facilitate its transfer
pursuant to the Deed of Sale.4

In its Decision5 dated May 12, 2014, the RTC ruled in favor of Felix and held that the testimony
of Tan Po Chu failed to overturn the presumption of regularity of the notarized Deed of Sale. Further,
the RTC noted that the notary public, Atty. Calabio, testified that both parties appeared before him
when he notarized the Deed of Sale. The RTC ruled, thus:
 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds for the plaintiffs, Spouses Felix and Rosita Chingkoe, and
declares the existence and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, over real property as
described in and covered by TCT No. 8283 registered under the name of the defendants, Spouses
Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe, as acknowledged on October 10, 1994 before notary public Reynaldo
Z. Calabio.

As and by way of attorney's fees, the Spouses Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe are ordered to pay
the Spouses Felix and Rosita Chingkoe the amount of P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.6

Felix filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the RTC's ruling to include an order to surrender
the TCT. The RTC granted the motion and modified the dispositive portion directing the spouses
Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 8283 to Felix and
Rosita.7

Meanwhile, Faustino filed an appeal before the CA seeking the reversal of the RTC's Decision.
In its assailed Decision dated April 30, 2018, the CA granted Faustino's appeal and gave credence
to the testimony of Tan Po Chu that Faustino only signed the Deed of Absolute Sale to appease
Felix without the intention to sell the subject property. The CA held that Felix failed to prove that he
paid the contract price of P3,130,000.00 rendering the contract void for lack of consideration. The
CA highlighted that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of both parties point to the intention
of Faustino to sign the Deed of Sale only to give in to the request of his mother.8 Thus, the CA
disposed:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of defendants-appellants is hereby GRANTED. The

SO ORDERED.9 (Emphases in the original and citation omitted)

Felix sought reconsideration but the CA denied his motion.10

Hence, this petition. Felix argues that the CA erred when it considered the testimony of Tan Po
Chu as "critical" without elaborating how the trial court misjudged in its assessment of Tan Po Chu's
credibility as a witness. Further, Felix posits that the CA did not explain how the testimony of Tan Po
Chu outweighed his testimony as to the signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the purchase
price, and Atty. Calabio's testimony regarding the appearance of the parties before him to
acknowledge the Deed of Sale.11 Finally, Felix insists that he be awarded actual damages because
of lost business opportunity which he could have pursued had he been able to secure a mortgage
over the subject property.12

RULING

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court's judicial review is generally
confined only to errors of law. However, this rule admits of exceptions,13 one of which is when the
CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court's, such as in this case.

We find that the records do not support the CA's findings.

Settled is the rule that notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be
overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.14 Being duly notarized, the Deed of Sale carries
with it the presumption of regularity, authenticity, and due execution. "It has been the consistent rule
that without clear, convincing, and more than preponderant evidence to controvert the presumption
of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its
execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand."15

In this case, the CA overturned the presumption of regularity of the notarized Deed of Sale
based solely on the testimony of Tan Po Chu. However, her testimony only consisted of repetitive
and unresponsive answers insisting that she pleaded with Faustino to prepare a document to
appease Felix:

xxxx

Q This document, Exhibit "1" was prepared upon your instruction, is that correct?

A Yes, sir, because at that time Felix was sick and I asked him [Faustino] to do that, I asked him
to issue that document to appease Felix.

Atty. Flores

I move to strike out every answer that is not in connection with my question, the only question to
you is, [is] this document was prepared upon your instructions, that is the only question.

xxxx

Court

Q When you did that, did you intend to command Faustino?

A Well, I insisted that he make the document if only, as I said, to appease his brother Felix, sir.

Atty. Flores

Your Honor please, I am not asking the reason for the issuance of the document, my simple
question was, did she instruct the making out [sic] of the document, I am not asking about the
reason for the document.

xxxx

Court

Anyway, the witness has been asked several times and she kept on telling us that it was she
who insisted, that was her last word with the son Faustino to make that document.16

A further review of her testimony reveals that she could not even read the document and did not
know about the contract price. What she understood is that the document given to Felix was only
temporary but will be replaced with a "real document concerning the sale," viz.:

Atty. Flores

Q Did you tell Faustino what kind of document was going to be prepared?
 A I just told him to make a certain document, I do not know what it was all about, only something
that Felix can hold on to, sir.

xxxx

Q Do you know how to read English and understand the same?

A No, sir.

Q Do you know that this document states that it is a deed of sale and that the contract price is
P3,130,000.00?

xxxx

A No sir, I even asked my other child to read, it for me.

xxxx

Atty. Flores

Q In any event, this person you asked to read, and interpret this document is someone you trusted?

A I did not know what to think, it was just read to me and I did not pay too much attention to it
anyway, sir.

xxxx

Q You told him [that] the document was for real or only that it was simulated?

A I told Felix that that was a temporary document only but I promised him also that when the
time comes, the real document would be given to him.

Q What do you mean by temporary document?

A What I mean by temporary was only a temporary document to save him from going crazy, sir.

Q And you say that a final and real document will follow?

A That is right, yes, sir.

Q What kind of document do you have in mind that will be for real?

A A real document concerning the sale, sir.17 (Emphases supplied)

It can be gleaned from Tan Po Chu's testimony that she was incompetent in attesting as to the
validity of the sale for the simple reason that she never understood it and even admitted that she "did
not pay too much attention to it." Significantly, she had no part in the preparation of the Deed of Sale
and she was neither present when it was signed and notarized nor was she part of the discussion of
its terms of agreements. Clearly, the trial court correctly considered Tan Po Chu's testimony
insufficient to overturn the presumption of regularity of the notarized Deed of Sale.
 We emphasize that the evaluation of the witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.18 Too, it is a basic
rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that she/he knows of her/his own
personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from her/his own perception. A witness may not
testify on what she/he merely learned, read, or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she/he has learned, read,
or heard.19

In contrast, there is ample evidence to prove the validity of the Deed of Sale and the parties'
intention in the execution of the contract. The rule is that one who signs a contract is presumed to
know its contents, especially if the person who signed has caused the preparation of the document.
It is, thus, reasonable to conclude that Faustino knew the contents of the Deed of Sale which was
executed with legal formalities.20

First, the notary public, Atty. Calabio, attested in open court that both parties appeared before
him when he notarized the Deed of Sale.21

Second, Faustino admitted that his staff prepared the Deed of Sale, and that he and his wife
voluntarily signed it, to wit:

Q The terms and conditions of Exhibit 4 [Deed of Absolute Sale] are provisions of the contract,
are these your [Faustino] authorship?

A They were taken from standard form, sir.

Q But you initiated the drawing up of that document?

A Yes, sir.22

Q There is a signature on the first page, on the top margin, do you know whose signature is this?

A First is mine [Faustino], and the second is that of my wife.

Q Why do you know that this is the signature of your wife?

A We have been signing documents together and I know her signature, sir. 1a⍵⍴h!1

Q What about this signature?

A This is the signature of one of my staff who helped preparing [sic] this document, sir.

Q Why do you say that this is her signature?

A She was one of my staff, sir.23

Third, the CA's conclusion that the Deed of Sale was an absolute simulation contradicts the
evidence presented. Apropos, Articles 1345 and 1346 of the Civil Code provide:
 Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the
parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce a legal effect or alter the parties' juridical situation.24 However, a
reading of Faustino's testimony clearly shows that he fully intended to be bound by the Deed of Sale,
to wit:

Q Did you ever realize at any stage of this case that this contract which is Exhibit 4 did not
express the true intentions of the parties?

A The intention has always been there, up to now, the intention has always been there, sir. I
have no intention to drive away my brother, never.

Q You said that your mother was the one who asked you to draw this kind of document?

A She asked me to give assurances to my brother that eventually this house will go to him, that
was my commitment to my mother, that this house will go to him once we have fully satisfied the
obligation of the house and eventually my house.

xxxx

Q In other words, you delivered this document to your mother after it was drawn and signed by you?

A This one, Exhibit 4, not the one you showed me, sir.

Q The original of this document?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you delivered the original of that document to your mother, what was your
instruction to her, if any?

A I have informed her that when the payment of the house and my house is complete, both of us
will process the title to its individual owner, that is why she will safe keep it until the house is fully
paid and until I get my house and both of us will have our own individual house.25 (Emphasis
supplied)

Indeed, Faustino conceded that there was such a Deed of Sale, but only that he and his wife
were induced by his mother to draw up the document and sign it. According to Faustino, his mother
even asked him to assure his brother that the house in question will eventually be the latter's
property. These circumstances support the true nature of the document. Faustino's excuses are
therefore flimsy and specious.

Fourth, the CA erred in declaring that Felix's supposed failure to prove payment renders the
Deed of Sale void. Failure to pay consideration is different from lack of consideration; actual
payment of the obligation is not one of the three (3) essential requisites of a valid contract.26 In
other words, non-payment of an obligation does not render a contract void, in which case, the
remedy of the injured party is simply demand fulfillment, or rescission of the contract under Article
1191 of the Civil Code.27

In any case, the subject Deed of Sale28 states:

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION ONE HUDRED
THIRTY THOUSAND ONLY (P3,130,000.00) Philippine currency, paid in full by the
VENDEE, receipt is hereby acknowledged by the VENDORS, to the full satisfaction, the VENDORS
hereby these presents, SELL, CEDE, CONVEY, and otherwise dispose of the above described
parcels of land, unto the said VENDEE, the heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns
free from any and all liens or encumbrances. The VENDORS also warrants that Property [sic] is not
subject to deficiency or non-payment of realty tax and any kind of tax[.]29 (Emphasis supplied)

Given that Faustino failed to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the Deed of Sale,
the attestation of payment in it sufficiently proves that Felix has fully paid the purchase price.
Invariably, Faustino cannot now be allowed to disavow the contractual effects of the notarized deed.
It is true that parol evidence may be admitted to challenge the contents of an agreement "where a
mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings."30 However, evidence must
be clear and convincing and of sufficient credibility as to overturn the written agreement. The flimsy
protestations of Faustino are not substantiated by any compelling evidence. As borne out by the
notarized deed, a perfected contract of sale was forged between the parties, and Faustino received
in full the payment of P3,130,000.00 from Felix for the sale of the subject property. Faustino even
caused the preparation of the Deed and if its terms were not in consonance with his expectations, he
could have easily insisted on the provisions he wanted. Thus, the RTC was correct in its findings.

It is a well-settled principle that:

[T]he law will not relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous agreement
they entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what they were doing.
Courts have no power to relieve them from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because
their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments. Neither the law nor the courts
will extricate them from an unwise or undesirable contract which they entered into with all the
required formalities and with full knowledge of its consequences.31

However, with respect to Felix's claim for actual damages based on unrealized profits, the same
has no merit. His claim for actual damages is based only on his testimony that he failed to undertake
a business venture because Faustino refused to surrender the TCT of the subject property to him.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. x x x."32 Time and again, this Court ruled that actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on
speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact of damage but must depend upon competent
proof that they have indeed been suffered by the injured party and based on the best evidence
obtainable as to the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts that could gauge whatever
compensatory or actual damages were borne.33 Hence, Felix's testimony of unrealized profits alone,
without receipts, documents, or other similar evidence, cannot be a basis for the award of actual
damages.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated April
30, 2018, in CA-G.R. CV No. 106434 is REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 101, Quezon City dated May 12, 2014, and its Order dated July 30, 2015 in Civil Case No.
Q-95-22865 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

Leonen, (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.