(G.R. No. 239215. July 12, 2022) : LOPEZ, M., J.
(G.R. No. 239215. July 12, 2022) : LOPEZ, M., J.
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EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 239215. July 12, 2022 ]
RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF MINOR
RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELISA R.
SARMIENTO-FLORES, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGUIG CITY,
AND ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, M., J.:
The judicial quest to discern who may be offenders as definedinapenalstatuteisattimesabstrusein
itself.OnesuchinstanceiswhetherRepublicAct(RA)No.9262,[1] ortheAnti-ViolenceAgainstWomen
andTheirChildrenActof2004,allowsthefathertoapplyforprotectionandcustodyordersagainstthe
mother who is alleged to have committed violence against their child.
ANTECEDENTS
In2005,RandyMichaelKnutson(Randy),anAmericancitizen,metRosalinaSibalKnutson(Rosalina)in
Singapore. They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby Sibal Knutson (Rhuby). In 2011, the
family lived in thePhilippines.However,RandyandRosalinabecameestrangedafterhediscoveredher
extra-marital affairs.Anyhow,RandysupportedRosalinaandRhuby.Thereafter,Rosalinagothookedin
casinos. Randy learned that Rosalina spent weeks in gambling dens and left Rhuby under the care of
strangers.Worse,Rosalinaincurredlargedebtsfromcasinofinancierspromptinghertosellthehouseand
lot, condominium unit, and vehicles that Randy provided for the family. Rosalina then rented an
apartmentandgotherselfaboyfriend.RandyadvisedRosalinatobediscreetinherillicitaffairsbecause
it is not good for Rhuby to see her mother with another man. Later, Randy discovered that Rosalina
maltreated her own mother in Rhuby'spresence.RosalinaalsohurtRhubybypullingherhair,slapping
her faceandknockingherhead.Onetime,RosalinapointedaknifeatRhubyandthreatenedtokillher.
RosalinaeventextedRandyaboutherplantokilltheirdaughterandcommitsuicide.Randyreportedthe
matter to the police station but the authorities explained thattheycannotassisthimindomesticissues.
Afterwards,RosalinasentRandyhernakedpictureswithamessagethathewouldnotseethatbodyagain.
Meantime, the neighbors of Rosalinacomplainedaboutnoisypartiesandpotsessionsinherapartment.
The lessor even terminated the lease after marijuana plants were confiscated in the premises.[2] On
December7,2017,Randy,onbehalfofminorRhuby,filedagainstRosalinaapetitionunderRANo.9262
fortheissuanceofTemporaryandPermanentProtectionOrdersbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofTaguig
City,Branch69(RTC)docketedasJDRCCaseNo.313.RandyaverredthatRosalinaplacedRhubyina
harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and psychological development.[3]
In an Order[4] dated January 10, 2018, the RTC dismissed the petition explaining that protection and
custody orders in RA No.9262cannotbeissuedagainstamotherwhoallegedlyabusedherownchild.
TheRTCratiocinatedthatthechild'smothercannotbeconsideredasanoffenderunderthelaw.Moreover,
theremediesarenotavailabletothefatherbecauseheisnota"womanvictimofviolence."TheRTCcited
the ruling in Ocampo v.Arcaya-Chua[5] (Ocampo)thataprotectionordercannotbeissuedinfavorofa
husband against his wife,[6] thus:
Notably,theoffenderunder[RANo.]9262isanypersonwhoisthehusband,formerhusband,those
whohadsexualordatingrelationshipwiththewomanorwithwhomshehasacommonchild.On
theotherhand,theoffendedpartymaybethewife,formerwife,awomanwhohasorhadsexualor
dating relationship, or with whom the man has a common child or HER child.
Fromtheforegoing,itcanbeseenthatinthedefinitionofanoffender,achild'smotherisnotincluded
as oneoftheoffenders.Instarkcontrast,achild'smotherisspecificallymentionedinthedefinition
foroffendedparty.Thiscouldleadtonootherconclusionthatachild'smothercannotbeconsideredas
an offender under [RA No.] 9262.
Moreover, a protection order is defined under Section 8 of [RA No.] 9262, to quote:
"SECTION 8. Protection Orders. — A protection order is an order issued under this act for the
purposeofpreventingfurtheractsofviolenceagainstawomanorherchildspecifiedinSection5of
this Act and granting other necessaryrelief.Thereliefgrantedunderaprotectionordershouldserve
thepurposeofsafeguardingthevictimfromfurtherharm,minimizinganydisruptioninthevictim'sdaily
life,andfacilitatingtheopportunityandabilityofthevictimtoindependentlyregaincontroloverherlife.
[x x x]"Based on the foregoing, the issuance of a protection order is for [the] purpose of preventing
further violence committed by an offender(anypersonwhoisthehusband,formerhusband,thosewho
had sexual or dating relationship with the woman or with whom she has a common child) against a
woman or her child. It does notpertaintoamotherwhoallegedlyabusedherownchild.Hence,a
protectionorderunder[RANo.]9262cannotbeissuedagainstamotherwhoallegedlyabusedher
own child.
Further, petitioner's prayer for the granting of a temporary or permanent custody of Rhubyunder[RA
No.] 9262 is likewise misplaced as Section 28 of the said law specifically states:
"SECTION28.Custodyofchildren.—Thewomanvictimofviolenceshallheentitledtothecustody
and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old [or] older but with mental or
physicaldisabilitiesshallautomaticallybegiventothemother,withrighttosupport,unlessthecourtfinds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.["]As itis,[RANo.]9262doesnotapplyinthecaseatbar.The
petitioner, who is not a "woman victim of violence[,"] cannot avail of the remedies provided therein
particularlytheissuanceofaTemporary/PermanentProtectionOrderandthegrantingofatemporaryor
permanent custody of Rhuby to him.
Tobefurtherenlightened,inOFFJCEOFTHECOURTADMINISTRATORversusJUDGEEVELYNS.
ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City [633 Phil. 79 (2010)], a judge in a
custody case issued a TPO under Sec. 15, [RA No.] 9262, granting, among others, the custody ofthe
subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent,
StephaniePulliam,tostayawayfromthehomeandofficeofChangTanaswellasfromtheschoolofthe
subject minor. The issuance of said TPO was questioned considering that it was issued in favor of
petitioner, Albert Chang Tan. In [its] ruling[,] the Supreme Court pronounced:
"x x x x
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds the finding of Justice
Salvador-FernandothatrespondentJudgeArcaya-Chuaisguiltyofgrossignoranceofthelawforissuing
aTPOinfavorofpetitionerAlbertChangTaninSPCaseNo.M-6373,sinceaTPOcannotbeissuedin
favorofamanagainsthiswifeunder[RA]No.9292(sic),knownastheAnti[-]ViolenceAgainstWomen
andTheirChildrenActof2004.Indeed,asafamilycourtjudge,JudgeArcaya-Chuaisexpectedtoknow
the correct implementation of [RA]No.9292(sic)."Applyingtheforegoingjurisprudencetothecaseat
bar, considering that the petitioner is the husband, a Protection Order cannot be issued against herein
respondent, his wife.
On a final note, granting that respondent neglected, abandoned or physically abused Rhuby,herminor
daughter,therearelawsandrulesspecificallycreatedforthelatter'sprotectionandsafetythatpetitioner
and/or Rhuby could avail of. Unfortunately, [RA No.] 9262 is not one of them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[7] (Emphases supplied)Randy moved for a reconsideration[8] and argued that RA No.
9262 used the term "a ny person" which is not limited to male offenders. The law must be liberally
construedtopromotetheprotectionandsafetyofvictimsofviolenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren.In
anOrder[9] datedMarch14,2018,theRTCdeniedthemotionandreiteratedthatRANo.9262doesnot
applytoasituationwherethemothercommittedviolenceagainstherownchild.TheRTCexpoundedthat
the word "c hildren" should not be isolated withtheterm"women"becausethetitleofthelawusedthe
conjunction "and" which denotes joinder of words, phrases, and clauses. As such, the children being
protected refer to those under the care of the woman victim of violence,[10] viz.:
InhisMotionforReconsideration,petitionerallegedthatamothermaybetheoffenderunder[RANo.]
9262. He submits that Section 3 of [RA No.] 9262 does not limit the offender to a male person.
Otherwise,thelawcouldhaveusedtheterm,"anymaleperson",andnot"anyperson".Citingthecaseof
Garcia v. Drilon, petitioner argued that the term"any person" includes lesbian relationships, to quote:
"Thereislikewisenomerittothecontentionthat[RANo.]9262singlesoutthehusbandorfatherasthe
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewisebecommitted"againstawomanwithwhomtheperson
hasorhadasexualordatingrelationship."Clearly,theuseofthegender-neutralword"person"who
[has] or had a sexual ordatingrelationshipwiththewomanencompassesevenlesbianrelationships."
([Emphases in the original])Petitioner's reliance on foregoing jurisprudence is misplaced.
Notably, theaforementionedpronouncementisnotapplicabletothecaseatbarconsideringthatthereis
no lesbian relationship between respondent [and Rhuby] as they are mother and child.
Moreover,the"person"referredtointheafore-quotedpronouncementpertainstotheindividualwho[has]
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman as a victim of violence.
It is thus clear that the foregoing provisiondoesnotapplytoasituationwhereitwasthemother
herself who had committed violent and abusive acts against her own child.
Petitioner further argued that the restrictive interpretation of the court on the definition of an offender
under[RANo.]9262doesnotholdwater,takingintoaccountSection4of[RANo.]9262,whichspeaks
of the liberal construction of theacttopromotetheprotectionandsafetyofvictimsofviolenceagainst
women and their children.
The said argument is without merit.
Petitionerisolatestheword"children"inordertoavailthereliefofaprotectionorderunder[RA
No.]9262infavorofRhubyagainstherownmother.However,aperusalofthetitleof[RANo.]9262
explicitly states: "An Act Defining Violence Against Women And Their Children, Providing For
Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, And For Other Purposes". The
conjunction used in the title is the conjunctive word "and" not the word "or". Hence, there is
joinder and not independence.x x x
x x x x
For emphasis, violence against women and their children is defined under Section 3 of [RA No.] 9262 as:
(a)"Violenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren"referstoanyactoraseriesofactscommittedbyany
personagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,oragainstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasor
hadasexualordatingrelationship,orwithwhomhehasacommonchild,oragainstherchild[,]whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.Aside from the foregoing, the
definition of children under Sec. 3(h) of said act is clear, to quote:
"(h)"Children"referstothosebeloweighteen(18)yearsofageorolderbutareincapableoftakingcare
ofthemselvesasdefinedunder[RANo.]7610.AsusedinthisAct,itincludesthebiologicalchildren
of the victim and other children under her care."Obviously, the victim being referred to in said
definition is the woman subjected to acts of violence by her offender. As it is, children being
protectedunder[RANo.]9262refertothebiologicalchildrenandotherchildrenunderthecareof
thewoman/victim.Thus,thecourtmaintainsitspositionthatachild'smotherisnotincludedasone
of the offenders under [RA No.] 9262.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
SOORDERED.[11] (Emphasessupplied)Aggrieved,RandydirectlyfiledaPetitionforCertiorari[12] before
the Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the application for
protectionandcustodyorders.Randycontendsthatheavailedoftheseremediesonbehalfofhisdaughter,
whoisavictimofviolenceinthehandsofherownmother.Furthermore,RandymaintainsthatRANo.
9262 does not limit the offender to a male person and the legislative intent is to provide all possible
protection to children.[13]
RULING
TheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSupremeCourttoissuewritsofcertiorariisnotexclusivebutsharedwith
theCourtofAppeals(CA)andtheRTC.[14] However,thisconcurrenceofjurisdictiondoesnotgiveaparty
unbridledfreedomtochoosethevenueofaction.ThepolicyonthehierarchyofcourtsadjurestheCourt
from dealingwithcausesthatarealsowellwithinthecompetenceoftheCAandtheRTCtoresolve.[15]
This Court is a court oflastresortandmustsoremainifitistosatisfactorilyperformitsconstitutional
functions.[16] The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is both a constitutional imperative and a filtering
mechanismtoenabletheCourttofocusonmoreimportantmatters.[17] Corollarily,theCourt'sjurisdiction
to issue extraordinary writs should generally beexercisedwithrespecttoactionsorproceedingsbefore
the CA, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the CA.[18]
However, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule and is subject to recognized
exceptions, to wit: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressedatthe
most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases offirst
impression where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (e) where exigency in certain situations
necessitateurgencyintheresolutionofthecases;(f)thefiledpetitionreviewstheactofaconstitutional
organ;(g)whenpetitionersrightlyclaimthattheyhadnootherplain,speedy,andadequateremedyinthe
ordinarycourseoflawthatcouldfreethemfromtheinjuriouseffectsofrespondents'actsinviolationof
their right to freedom of expression; and (h) the petition includes questionsthataredictatedbypublic
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.[19]
Here, circumstances exist to justify direct recourse to this Court. The case presents an issue of first
impression,i.e.,whetherthefathercanavailoftheremediesunderRANo.9262onbehalfofhisminor
child against the mother's violent and abusive acts. To be sure, there is no definite ruling yet on this
question to serve as a guidepost for future cases.[20] Also, the interests of justice and public welfare
demand the resolution of the controversy because it will benefit not only the parties but also children
similarly situated. More importantly, the petition raises a pure question oflawanddoesnotinvolvean
examination offactsandprobativevalueofevidence.[21] Hence,itisanopportunetimeforthisCourtto
answerthenovelquerywithfarreachingimplicationsonwhetherthefathermayapplyforprotectionand
custody orders against the mother who is alleged to have committed violence against their child.
RA No. 9262 allows
the father of the
offended party to
apply for protection
and custody orders.
In Garcia v. Drilon[22] (Garcia),theCourtpointedoutthattheCongressexcludedmenasvictimsunder
RANo.9262.Thelegislativeintentistolimittheprotectionagainstviolencetowomenandchildrenonly.
Theclassificationrestsonsubstantialdistinctionsbecausewomenandchildrenarevulnerablevictimsof
abusecomparedtomen.[23] Thedifferenceintreatmentisconsistentwiththedeclaredpolicyofthelawto
value the dignity of women and children, and protect them from violence andthreatstotheirpersonal
safety and security.[24] In that case, the Court likewise upheld the constitutionality of the remedies of
protection and custody orders to prevent further acts of violence committed by the offender against
womenandtheirchildren.[25] Inarguably,theoffendedpartiesunderthelawareonlywomenandchildren.
Nevertheless, it isimpropertoconcludethatthelawdeniesafatheroftheseremediessolelybecauseof
his gender or that he is not a "woman victim of violence."
Section 9 (b)[26] of RA No. 9262explicitlyallows"p arentsorguardiansoftheoffendedparty"tofilea
petition for protection orders. The exact provision was incorporated in Section 12 (b)[27] of the
ImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRANo.9262andSection8(b)[28] ofA.M.No.04-10-11-SC,[29]
or the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children. The statute categorically used the word
"parents" which pertains tothefatherandthemotherofthewomanorchildvictim.AbsoluteSentencia
Expositore Non Indiget.Thelawspeaksinclearlanguageandnoexplanationisrequired.[30] Thereisno
occasion for the Court to interpretbutonlytoapplythelawwhenitisnotambiguous.[31] Similarly,the
statutedidnotqualifyonwhobetweentheparentsofthevictimmayapplyforprotectionorders.Ubilex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, the courts must not
distinguish.[32]
Inanyevent,A.M.No.04-10-11-SCstatesthattheRulesofCourtshallapplyinasuppletorymannerto
petitions for protection orders.[33] Under Section 5, Rule 3 of Rules of Court, "[a] minor or a person
allegedtobeincompetent,maysueorbesuedwiththeassistanceofhisfather,mother,guardian,orifhe
hasnone,aguardianadlitem."Inthiscase,thetitleofthepetitionforissuanceofaprotectionorderis
unequivocal, to wit: "R
ANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON acting on behalf of minor RHUBY SIBAL
KNUTSON,Petitioner,-versus-ROSALINASIBALKNUTSON,Respondent."[34] Thereisnoquestionthat
theoffendedpartyisRhuby,aminorchild,whoallegedlyexperiencedviolenceandabuse.Thus,Randy
may assist Rhuby in filing the petition as the parent of the offended party.
ContrarytotheRTC'stheory,therulinginOcampoisinapplicable.Inthatcase,respondentjudgeissueda
protectionorderdirectingthecommonlawwifetostayawayfromhercommonlawhusband'shouseand
office. Respondent judge also granted the father provisional custody of his minor daughter. The
InvestigatingJusticefoundthattheprotectionorderisjustifiedwithrespecttotheminordaughterbutnot
tothecommonlawhusband.Underthelaw,aprotectionordercannotbeissuedinfavorofthehusband
against the wife. The Investigating Justice explained that the "T
PO against [the wife], insofar as it
directed the latter to stay away from the home and office of [the husband], to cease and desist from
harassing,intimidatingorthreatening[thehusband]andtorefrainfromactsofcommissionoromission
that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of [the husband],wasanomalous."[35]
However,theInvestigatingJusticeclarifiedthatthereisjustificationtoawardthetemporarycustodyofthe
minordaughtertothefather.Thereissubstantialevidencethattheprotectionorderinfavoroftheminor
daughterwasnecessaryandwouldserveherparamountinterest.Thepsychologicalevaluationreportand
the statements of material witnessesallconfi1medthatthemotherhasnotbeenagoodinfluencetoher
daughter.TheCourtsustainedthesefactualfindingsandadoptedtherecommendationoftheInvestigating
Justice that respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.[36]
On the other hand, Randy is not asking for a protection orderinhisfavor.Asintimatedearlier,Randy
filedthepetitiononbehalfoftheirminordaughterRhuby.Thepetitionisprincipallyanddirectlyforthe
protectionoftheminorchildandnotthefather.Admittedly,Randyalsoaskedforthetemporarycustody
oftheirdaughterbecausethemotherwasallegedlyunfit.Yet,theRTCdidnotevaluatethecasewhether
themothermaybedivestedofcustodyoverthechild.TheRTCignoredtheevidenceonthepretextthat
thefatherisnotallowedtoapplyforprotectionandcustodyordersbecauseheisnotawomanvictimof
violence.Onthispoint,theCourtfindsgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheRTCthatamountedto
anevasionofapositivedutyortoavirtualrefusaltoperfo1madutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallin
contemplation of law, aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonof
passionandhostility.[37] AsinOcampo,theRTCshouldhaveexaminedtheevidenceonrecordandmadea
prima facie determination as to the idealpersontowhomthetemporarycustodyofthechildshouldbe
awarded. The best interest of the child should be the primordial and paramount concern.
RA No. 9262 covers
asituationwherethe
mother committed
violent and abusive
actsagainstherown
child.
Section3(a)ofRA9262definesviolenceagainstwomenandtheirchildrenas"anyactoraseriesofacts
committedbyanypersonagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,oragainstawomanwithwhom
thepersonhasorhadasexualordatingrelationship,orwithwhomhehasacommonchild,oragainst
herchildwhetherlegitimateorillegitimate,withinorwithoutthefamilyabode,whichresultinorislikely
toresultinphysical,sexual,psychologicalharmorsuffering,oreconomicabuseincludingthreatsofsuch
acts,battery,assault,coercion,harassmentorarbitrarydeprivationofliberty."Thelawcriminalizesacts
of violence against women and their children perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband;
former husband; or any person who has or had sexual ordatingrelationshipwiththewoman,orwith
whom the woman has a common child.However,theCourtinGarciaemphasizedthatthelawdoesnot
single out the husbandorfatherastheculprit.Thestatuteusedthegender-neutralword"p erson"asthe
offender which embraces any person of either sex. The offender may also include other persons who
conspired to commit the violence, thus:
Asdefinedabove,VAWCmaylikewisebecommitted"againstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhad
asexualordatingrelationship."Clearly,theuseofthegender-neutralword"person"whohasorhad
a sexual or dating relationshipwiththewomanencompassesevenlesbianrelationships.Moreover,
while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principleof
conspiracyundertheRevisedPenalCode(RPC).Thus,inthecaseofGo-Tanv.SpousesTan[588Phil.
532(2008)],theparents-in-lawofSharicaMariL.Go-Tan,thevictim,wereheldtobeproperrespondents
in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
communityofdesignandpurposeintormentingherbygivingherinsufficientfinancialsupport;harassing
and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically.[38] (Emphases supplied)Differently stated, the fact that a social
legislationaffordsspecialprotectiontoaparticularsectordoesnotautomaticallysuggestthatitsmembers
are excluded from violating suchlaw.ThisisnotthefirsttimethatsociallegislationsinthePhilippines
with penal character usedthephrase"anyperson"todescribewhomaybeoffenders.Thereareparallel
provisions in RA No. 7610,[39] or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
DiscriminationAct,[40] RANo.7277,[41] asamendedbyRANo.9442,[42] ortheMagnaCartaforDisabled
Persons,[43] RA No. 8042,[44] as amended by RA No. 10022,[45] or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995,[46] RA No. 4670,[47] or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,[48] RA No.
9433,[49] or the Magna Carta forPublicSocialWorkers,[50] andRANo.7305,[51] ortheMagnaCartaof
Public HealthWorkers.[52] Inotherwords,identificationorassociationwithsuchgroupswillnotexempt
their members from criminal liability.Achild16yearsoldandabovewhoactedwithdiscernmentmay
still be charged with violation of RA No. 7610 if he induces or coerces another child to perform in
obscene exhibitions. A person with disability is likewise criminally liable under RA No. 7277, as
amended, if hediscriminatesorpubliclyridiculesanotherpersonsufferingfromrestriction,impairment,
oradifferentability.Thesameistruewithamigrantworkerwhoengagesintheactofillegalrecruitment
punished under RA No. 8042, as amended. Lastly, apublicschoolteacher,apublicsocialworker,ora
public health worker who interferes or prevents similar professionals in theexerciseoftheirrightsand
performance of their duties are criminally liable.
Logically, a mother who maltreated her child resulting in physical, sexual, or psychological violence
definedandpenalizedunderRANo.9262isnotabsolvedfromcriminalliabilitynotwithstandingthatthe
measure isintendedtoprotectbothwomenandtheirchildren.Inthiscase,however,theRTCdismissed
Randy's petition for protection orders on behalf of his minor daughter on the ground that the mother
cannotbeconsideredasanoffenderunderthelaw.Torestate,thepolicyofRANo.9262istoguarantee
fullrespectforhumanrights.Towardsthisend,theStateshallexerteffortstoaddressviolencecommitted
against children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
Specifically,Section3(2),ArticleXVofthe1987ConstitutionespousedtheStatetodefend"[ t]heright
of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protectionfromallformsof
neglect, abuse,cruelty,exploitation,andotherconditionsprejudicialtotheirdevelopment;xxx."Also,
Article25(2)oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsadvocatedthat"[ m]otherhoodandchildhood
areentitledtospecialcareandassistance.Allchildren,whetherborninoroutofwedlock,shallenjoythe
same social protection." Further, the Philippines asastatepartytotheConventionontheRightsofthe
Child has the following international commitments, to wit:
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Convention,
x x x x
Recognizingthatthechild,forthefullandharmoniousdevelopmentofhisorherpersonality,should
grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphereof happiness, love and understanding,
x x x x
Article 2
x x x x
2. States Parties shall take allappropriatemeasurestoensurethatthechildisprotectedagainstall
forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or
beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Article 3
1.Inallactionsconcerningchildren,whetherundertakenbypublicorprivatesocialwelfareinstitutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,thebestinterestsofthechildshallbea
primary consideration.
2.StatesPartiesundertaketoensurethechildsuchprotectionandcareasisnecessaryforhisorher
well-being, taking into accounttherightsanddutiesofhisorherparents,legalguardians,orother
individualslegallyresponsibleforhimorher,and,tothisend,shalltakeallappropriatelegislativeand
administrative measures.
x x x x
Article 9
1.StatesPartiesshallensurethatachildshallnotbeseparatedfromhisorherparentsagainsttheirwill,
except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with
applicablelawandprocedures,thatsuchseparationisnecessaryforthebestinterestsofthechild.
Such determination may be necessary inaparticularcasesuchasoneinvolvingabuseorneglectofthe
childbytheparents,oronewheretheparentsarelivingseparatelyandadecisionmustbemadeastothe
child's place of residence.
x x x x
Article 19
1. States Parties shall takeallappropriatelegislative,administrative,socialandeducationalmeasuresto
protectthechildfromallformsofphysicalormentalviolence,injuryorabuse,neglectornegligent
treatment,maltreatmentorexploitation,includingsexualabuse,whileinthecareofparent(s),legal
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
x x x x
Article 39
States Parties shall take allappropriatemeasurestopromotephysicalandpsychologicalrecovery
and social reintegration of a child victimof:anyformofneglect,exploitation,orabuse;tortureor
anyotherformofcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment;orarmedconflicts.Suchrecovery
and reintegration shalltakeplaceinanenvironmentwhichfostersthehealth,self-respectanddignityof
the child. (Emphases supplied)Notably, the Committee on the Rights of theChildcommentedthat"a ll
formsofviolenceagainstchildren,howeverlight,areunacceptable.xxxFrequency,severityofharmand
intenttoharmarenotprerequisitesforthedefinitionsofviolence."[53] TheUnitedNationsChildren'sFund
recognized"violenceagainstchildrenxxxasglobalhumanrightsandpublichealthproblemsofcritical
importance."[54] Also, violence against children "takes many forms, including physical, sexual, and
emotionalabuse,andmayinvolveneglectordeprivation.Violenceoccursinmanysettings,includingthe
home,school,communityandovertheInternet.Similarly,awiderangeofperpetratorscommitviolence
against children, such as family members, intimate partners, teachers, neighbors, strangers andother
children."[55] The World Health Organizationsaidthat"[ v]iolenceagainstchildrenincludesallformsof
violence against people under 18 yearsold,whetherperpetratedbyparentsorothercaregivers,peers,
romanticpartners,orstrangers."[56] Verily,mothersmaybeoffendersinthecontextofRANo.9262.The
Courtfindsnosubstantialdistinctionbetweenfathersandmotherswhoabusedtheirchildrenthatwarrants
adifferenttreatmentorexemptionfromthelaw.Anyviolenceisreprehensibleandharmfultothechild's
dignity and development.
TheRTCmaintaineditspositionthatthechild'smotherisnotincludedasoneoftheoffendersunderRA
No.9262anchoredontheinterpretationbasedmerelyonthetitleofthelaw.Torecall,theRTCexplained
thattheword"c hildren"shouldnotbeisolatedwiththeterm"w
omen"becausethetitleofthelawusedthe
conjunction "and" which denotes joinder of phrases and clauses. As such,thechildrenbeingprotected
refertothoseunderthecareofthewomanvictimofviolence.Yet,thepenalprovisionsunderSection5of
RA No. 9262 do away with the conjunctive word "and"andusedthedisjunctiveterm"or"thatsignals
disassociation or independence, thus:
Section5.ActsofViolenceAgainstWomenandTheirChildren.—Thecrimeofviolenceagainstwomen
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the womanorher child;
(b) Threatening to cause the womanorher child physicalharm;
(c) Attempting to cause the womanorher child physicalharm;
(d) Placing the womanorher child in fear of imminentphysical harm;
(e)Attemptingtocompelorcompellingthewomanorherchildtoengageinconductwhichthewoman
orherchildhastherighttodesistfromortodesistfromconductwhichthewomanorherchildhasthe
righttoengagein,orattemptingtorestrictorrestrictingthewoman'sorherchild'sfreedomofmovement
or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidationdirectedagainstthewomanorchild.Thisshallinclude,butnotlimitedto,thefollowingacts
committedwiththepurposeoreffectofcontrollingorrestrictingthewoman'sorherchild'smovementor
conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman
orher child of custody to her/his family;
(2)Deprivingorthreateningtodeprivethewomanorherchildrenoffinancialsupportlegallydueheror
her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the womanorher child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, businessoractivityor
controllingthevictim'sownmoneyorproperties,orsolelycontrollingtheconjugalorcommonmoney,or
properties;(f)Inflictingorthreateningtoinflictphysicalharmononeselfforthepurposeofcontrollingher
actions or decisions;
(g)Causingorattemptingtocausethewomanorherchildtoengageinanysexualactivitywhichdoesnot
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directedagainstthe
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing,orrecklessconduct,personallyorthroughanother,thatalarmsor
causes substantialemotionalorpsychologicaldistresstothewomanorherchild.Thisshallinclude,but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the womanorher child inpublic or private places;
(2) Peering in the windoworlingering outside theresidence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on thepropertyofthewomanorherchildagainsther/his
will;
(4)Destroyingthepropertyandpersonalbelongingsorinflictingharmtoanimalsorpetsofthewomanor
her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financialsupportorcustodyofminorchildrenordenialofaccesstothe
woman's child/children. (Emphases supplied)Section 4ofRANo.9262mandatesthatthelaw"s hallbe
liberally construed to promote the protection andsafetyofvictimsofviolenceagainstwomenandtheir
children." Obviously, the RTC's restrictive interpretation requiring that the mother and her child to be
victims of violence before they may be entitled to the remedies of protection and custody orders will
frustrate the policy of the law to afford special attention to women and children as usual victims of
violenceandabuse.Theapproachwillweakenthelawandremovefromitscoverageinstanceswherethe
motherherselfistheabuserofherchild.Thecrampingstancenegatesnotonlytheplainlettersofthelaw
and the clear legislative intent as to who may be offenders but also downgrades the country's avowed
international commitmenttoeliminateallformsofviolenceagainstchildrenincludingthoseperpetrated
bytheirparents.TheRTC'sconsolingstatementthatchildrenwhosufferedabusefromthehandsoftheir
ownmothersmayinvokeotherlawsexceptRANo.9262isdiscriminatory.Thesupposedreassuranceis
an outright denial of effective legal measures to address the seriousness and urgency of the situation.
SufficeittosaythatonlyRANo.9262createdtheinnovativeremediesofprotectionandcustodyorders.
Other laws have no mechanisms to prevent further acts of violence against the child.
In sum, the Court refuses to be an instrument of injustice and public mischief perpetrated against
vulnerablesectorsofthesocietysuchaschildrenvictimsofviolence.TheCourtwillnotshirkitsbounden
duty to interpret the law in keeping withthecardinalprinciplethatinenactingastatute,thelegislature
intended right and justice to prevail.[57]
FORTHESEREASONS,thePetitionforCertiorariisGRANTED.TheOrdersdatedJanuary10,2018
and March 14, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court ofTaguigCity,Branch69inJDRCCaseNo.313are
SET ASIDE. Let aPERMANENT PROTECTION ORDERbe issuedimmediately.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., See separate dissenting opinion.
Hernando, Inting, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao,andMarquez, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., I concur. See separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., See Dissent.
Lazaro-Javier, J., See Concurrence.
Zalameda, J., with Dissenting Opinion.
Kho, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of Justice Caguioa.
Singh, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
[1]
Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 11-25, 106-107, and 136-138.
[3]
Id. at 51-74.
[4]
Id. at 106-110. Penned by Acting Presiding JudgeElisa R. Sarmiento-Flores.
[5]
633 Phil. 79 (2010).
[6]
Rollo, pp. 107-110.
[7]
Id. at 108-110.
[8]
See Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated January17, 2018; id. at 115-135.
[9]
Id. at 111-114.
[10]
Id. at 111-113.
[11]
Id. at 111-114.
[12]
Id. at 3-48.
[13]
Id. at 26-47.
[14]
See Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[15]
Banez, Jr. v. Concepcion, 693 Phil. 399, 412(2012).
[16]
Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, 240 Phil. 719, 732 (1987).
[17]
Gios-Samar,Inc.v.DepartmentofTransportationandCommunications,G.R.No.217158,March12,
2019, 896 SCRA 213, 284 and 290.
[18]
Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, supra note 16, at 732-733.
[19]
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,751 Phil. 301, 331-335 (2015).
[20]
See Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 805 (2003); and
Government of the United States of America v. Hon. Purganan, 438 Phil. 417, 435-436 (2002).
[21]
See Malayan Insurance Company,Inc.v.St.FrancisSquareRealtyCorporation,836Phil.442,458
(2018); CE Construction Corporation v. Araneta Center, Inc., 816 Phil. 221, 262 (2017); Far Eastern
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil.760,767(2013),citingHeirsofNicolasCabigasv.
Limbaco,670Phil.274,285(2011);Taglayv.Daray,693Phil.45,54(2012);F.F.Cruz&Co.,Inc.v.HR
Construction Corp., 684 Phil. 330, 347 (2012), citing Philippine National ConstructionCorporationv.
CA, 541 Phil. 658, 669-670 (2007); Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank,665Phil.184,197
(2011);andRepublicv.Malabanan,646Phil.631,637-638(2010),citingLeonciov.DeVera,569Phil.
512, 516 (2008).
[22]
712 Phil. 44 (2013).
[23]
Id. at 137.
[24]
See Section 2 of RA No. 9262.
[25]
Garcia v. Drilon, supra note 22, at 104-105.
[26]
Section9.WhoMayFilePetitionforProtectionOrders.—Apetitionforprotectionordermaybefiled
by any of the following:
x x x x
(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;
x x x x[27] Section 12.Who May File for ProtectionOrders. —
x x x x
b) parents or guardians of the offended party;
xxxx[28] Section8.Whomayfilepetition.—Apetitionforprotectionordermaybefiledbyanyofthe
following:
x x x x
(b) Parents or guardians of the offended party;
x x x x[29] Approved on October 19, 2004 and tookeffect on November 15, 2004.
[30]
Barcellano v. Bañas, 673 Phil. 177, 187 (2011).
[31]
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 826 Phil. 329, 344-345
(2018).
[32]
Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, 683 Phil.198, 219 (2012).
[33]
See Section 1 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, whichprovides:
Section 1.Applicability. — x x x
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.[34] Rollo,p. 51.
[35]
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, supra note 5, at 113.
[36]
See id. at 107-115.
[37]
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 481-482 (2011).
[38]
Garcia v. Drilon, supra note 22, at 103-104.
[39]
Entitled"ANACTPROVIDINGFORSTRONGERDETERRENCEANDSPECIALPROTECTION
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992.
[40]
See Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, and 20 of RANo. 7610.
[41]
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REHABILITATION, SELF-DEVELOPMENT AND
SELF-RELIANCE OF DISABLED PERSONS AND THEIR INTEGRATION INTO THE
MAINSTREAM OF SOCIETY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 24, 1992.
[42]
Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT No. 7277, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
'MAGNA CARTA FOR DISABLED PERSONS, AND FOROTHERPURPOSES',"approvedonApril
30, 2007.
[43]
See Sections 42, 44, and 46, as amended, whichprovide:
Section 42. Any individual, group or community is hereby prohibited from vilifying any person with
disability which could result into loss of self-esteem of the latter.
x x x x
Section 44.Enforcement by the Secretary of Justice.— x x x
b)Potential Violations— If the Secretary of Justicehas reasonable cause to believe that —
1)anypersonorgroupofpersonsisengagedinapatternorpracticeofdiscriminationunderthisAct;or
2)anypersonorgroupofpersonshasbeendiscriminatedagainstunderthisActandsuchdiscrimination
raisesanissueofgeneralpublicimportance,theSecretaryofJusticemaycommencealegalactioninany
appropriate court.x x x x
Section 46. Penal Clause. — (a) Any person who violates any provision of this Act shall suffer the
following penalties: x x x x
(b)Anypersonwhoabusestheprivilegesgrantedhereinshallbepunishedwithimprisonmentofnotless
than six months or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos ([P]5,000.00), but not more than Fifty
thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
xxxx[44] Entitled"ANACTTOINSTITUTETHEPOLICIESOFOVERSEASEMPLOYMENTAND
ESTABLISHAHIGHERSTANDARDOFPROTECTIONANDPROMOTIONOFTHEWELFAREOF
MIGRANT WORKERS,THEIRFAMILIESANDOVERSEASFILIPINOSINDISTRESS,ANDFOR
OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 1995.
[45]
Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT No. 8042, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995, AS AMENDED, FURTHER
IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF
MIGRANT WORKERS,THEIRFAMILIESANDOVERSEASFILIPINOSINDISTRESS,ANDFOR
OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2010.
[46]
See Section 6 of RA No. 8042, as amended by Section5 of RA No. 10022.
[47]
Approved on June 18, 1966.
[48]
See Section 32 of RA No. 4670, which provides:
Section32.PenalProvision.—Apersonwhoshallwilfullyinterferewith,restrainorcoerceanyteacher
in the exercise ofhisrightsguaranteedbythisActorwhoshallinanyothermannercommitanyactto
defeatanyoftheprovisionsofthisActshall,uponconviction,bepunishedbyafineofnotlessthanone
hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
[49] Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SOCIAL
x x x x
WORKERS," approved on April 11, 2007.
[50]
See Sections 20 and 24 of RA No. 9433.
[51]
Approved on March 26, 1992.
[52]
See Sections 32 and 39 of RA No. 7305.
[53]
See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of theChild,
General Comment No. 13 (2011).
[54]
Unicef, Gender Dimensions of Violence Against Children and Adolescents, available at
<h ttps://www.unicef.org/media/93986/file/Child-Protection-Gender-Dimensions-of-VACAG-2021.pdf>
(last visited July 12, 2022).
[55]
Unicef, Children from all walks of life endure violence, and millions more are at risk, available at
<h ttps://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/violence/>(last visited July 12, 2022).
[56]
World Health Organization, Violence Against Children, available at
<https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-children> (last visited July 12,
2022).
[57]
See Article 10 of the Civil Code.
SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION
GESMUNDO,C.J.:
IjoinAssociateJusticeAlfredoBenjaminS.Caguioainvotingtoremandthecasetothetrialcourttohear
and decide the petition under the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus[1] (Custody
Rule).
The essential facts are as follows: the father, Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), filed, on behalf of his
minor daughter, Rhuby Sibal Knutson (R
huby), against the latter's mother, Rosalina Sibal Knutson
.A.) No. 9262[2] ortheViolenceAgainstWomenandTheir
(Rosalina), a petition under Republic Act (R
ChildrenActof2004fortheissuanceofTemporaryandPermanentProtectionOrdersbeforetheRegional
Trial Court of Taguig City, Branch 69 (RTC). The RTC dismissed the petition, explaining that the
protectionorderunderR.A.No.9262cannotbeissuedagainstamotherwhoallegedlyabusedherown
child. Aggrieved, Randy filed apetition forcertioraridirectly before the Court.
ThemajoritygrantsthepetitionanddirectstheRTCtoresolvethemeritsofthepetitionbeforeit.Onthe
procedural aspect, it holds that the following exceptions to the hierarchy of courts doctrine justify the
directrecoursetothisCourt:(1)caseoffirstimpressionwherenojurisprudenceyetexiststhatwillguide
the lower courts; and (2) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancementofpublicpolicy,ordemandedbythebroaderinterestorjustice.Onthesubstantiveaspect,it
heldthat(a) thefatheroftheoffendedpartyisallowedtoapplyforprotectionandcustodyordersunder
R.A. No. 9262; and (b ) R.A. No. 9262 covers a situationwherethemothercommittedviolentacts
against her own child.
I respectfully disagree.
Certiorari is an
improper remedy
because of the
availability of
appeal; the petition
can be treatedasan
appeal iffiledwithin
the reglementary
period
It is opined that the RTC's Order dismissing the petition in this case constitutes a final order that
completelydisposedofthecase,[3] asitleavesnothingmoretobedonebytheRTCdespitetheabsenceof
trial or other proceedings.[4] Hence, the proper remedy to assail such Order is an appeal, and not
certiorari.Caselawexplainsthatappealandcertiorariaremutuallyexclusive,[5] becausetheavailability
of appeal is antithetical to the availability of the other.[6] Furthermore, when a pure question of law is
involved,anappealmaybetakendirectlyfromtheRTCtotheCourtviaaRule45petition.Inthepresent
case, while petitioner was correct in going directly to the Court, he erroneously used a petition for
certiorarias his procedural vehicle.
In some instances, the Court has relaxed this procedural rule and treatedapetitionforcertiorariasan
appeal, provided that the petition is filed withinthereglementaryperiodtofileanappeal.[7] Here,there
was no indication in the majority whether the certiorari petition was filedbeforethisCourtwithinthe
reglementaryperiodunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt(R
ule45).Jurisprudenceprovidesthatapetition
for certiorari cannot be a substitute foralapsedorlostappeal.[8] Itisacknowledged,however,thatthis
case presents a novelissue,oneoffirstimpressionwherenojurisprudenceyetexiststoguidethelower
courts.Hence,ifitisshownthatthepetitionwasfiledwithinthereglementaryperiodforanappeal,then
the Court may proceed to treat this petition as an appeal under Rule 45.
Under R.A. No.
9262, the mother of
an abused child is
not the offender
Onthemerits,thecoreissuepresentedinthiscaseiswhetheramotherofanallegedlyabusedchildcan
be considered as an offender under R.A. No. 9262.
I respectfully maintain a contrary view from the majority. A textual analysis of Section 3ofR.A.No.
9262showsthatwhentheoffendedpartyisachild,themotherisnottheoffendercontemplatedunderthe
statute.ThepolicyofliberalconstructiondoesnotmeanthattheCourt,intheguiseofinterpretation,can
enlargethescopeofthestatuteorincludeunderitsterms,situationsthatwerenotprovidedorintended.[9]
Indeed, the protection order under R.A. No.9262isintendedtobenefitthestatutorily-definedoffended
party.
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines "violence againstwomen and their children," as follows:
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refersto any act or a series of acts committedby
any personagainstawomanwho ishis wife, former wife, or against a woman withwhom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
againsther childwhether legitimate or illegitimate,within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)This provision characterizes the offender and the
offended party, as follows:
1. Offender:"a nyperson"whohasawife,formerwife,orisdating,hasorhadasexualordating
relationship, or has a common child with the woman involved.
2. Offended party: can either be —
(a) awomanwhoistheoffender'swife,formerwife,orawomanwithwhomtheoffenderhasorhada
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child; or
(b) herchild, whether legitimate or illegitimate, withinor without the family abode.
As theprovisioniscrafted,thisdefinitioncontemplatesthatawomanisnecessarilyinvolved,eitheras
(1) the main offended party or (2) one who has or had a relationship with both the offender and the
child-offended party. It issubmittedthatbyusingtheadjective"h
er"todescribethe"child,"thestatute
refers to the entire characterization ofthewomandescribedearlierintheprovision(i.e.,onewho
hasorhadarelationshipwiththeoffender).Notably,underthisdefinition,thechild-offendedpartyneed
not necessarily be related to the offender, but must be a "child" of the woman. R.A.No.9262defines
"children,"thus:"[a]susedinthisAct,[children]includesthebiologicalchildrenofthevictimandother
childrenunderhercare."Again,thekeyfactoristherelationshipofthechildwiththewoman,whoisnot
theoffenderasshownbyhercharacterizationasavictim.ThistiesinwithSec.4ofR.A.No.9262which
states that the statute "shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against womenand theirchildren."
Hence,whenthechildistheoffendedparty,thestatutecontemplatesthatthereareatleastthreepersons
involved: (1) the offender; (2) the child who is the offended party; and (3) a woman who has a
relationship with both the offender and the child-offended party.
Thepresentcase,however,involvesonlytwoparticipants—themotherasthesupposedoffenderand
herchildastheoffendedparty.Itis,thus,submittedthatthecircumstancesinthiscasedonotcreatethe
scenario in which R.A. No. 9262 is applicable.
The majority harps on the fact that the statute uses the gender-neutral word "person" to refer to the
offender, andreadsitasembracing"anypersonofeithersex."[10] Thisistrue.AsexplainedinGarciav.
JudgeDrilon,[11] therelationshipunderR.A.No.9262betweentheoffenderandthewoman"encompasses
even lesbian relationships." Indeed, when the offended party is a woman, the offendercanbeaperson
withwhomshehasasame-sexrelationship.However,whentheviolenceiscommittedagainstthechild,
as discussed above, the law contemplates the involvement of a third person (i.e., a woman)whohasa
relationship with the child as the latter's guardian or mother, as well as the offender, as the woman's
intimate partner. Hence, an abusive relationship only betweenamotherandachild,aspresentedinthe
instant case, is not the scenario covered under R.A. No. 9262, as correctly held by the RTC.
This textual analysis of the provision is also consistent with the legislative department's intended
application for the statute. Children are indisputably covered under R.A. No. 9262, but not in all
circumstances. When the matter of removing "children" fromthestatute'scoveragewasagainraisedin
theBicameralConferenceCommittee,thelegislatorsaddedthepossessiveadjective"their"toqualifythe
"children"referredtounderthestatute.TherelevantdiscussionsarequotedintheDissentingOpinionof
Justice Caguioa,[12] to wit:
Rep. Angara-Castillo. I reiterate my suggestion, we eliminate the word "children" because it's
totally unnecessary and inappropriate.
x x x x
Rep. Marcos. x x x
Idon'tknowifthisconfusestheissueoritclarifiesit.WhatistheSenateversionshouldreadasfollows,
in order to take into consideration the concerns of Representative Sarenas that priority be given to
childrenintheseabusivefamiliestowit:"AnActDefiningViolenceAgainstWomenandtheirChildren,
Providing Protective Measures and Penalties therefor and for Other Purposes."
Rep.Antonino-Custodio.Ma'amquestion.Actuallymayincidentkasi,tunaynaincidentnangyarisaamin
nayunganakis,actuallyhindin'yaanak,eh,anaknungasawanya,pero,parangshewasstillbindedby
that relationship kasi kahit hindi n'ya anak 'yung bata, kahit papa'no lumaki na sa kanya, eh. So,
dependentsakanya–so,mayholdparinyungasawanyadunsaanaknungasawanya.That'sanactual
case in our area.
Rep.Marcos.Ithinksuchasituationwouldbecoveredinfactbywomenandtheirchildren,inasmuchas
thechild is dependent upon that mother, either asward or as an adopted child. So, okay lang 'yun.
Rep.Antonino-Custodio.Kasibaka–Imean,usuallyandeveninsomecasestheyarenotadopted--they
are not adopted children eh.
Rep. Marcos.No,eveniftheyhavenotbeenofficiallyadopted,it'stantamounttoawardrelationshipor
dependency relationship. So, palagay ko covered na 'yon kasi theyarechildren.Kasinga,Ithinkthere
should beadistinctionthatthisisnotalawforallchildreneverywhereunderallcircumstances,but
rather children who are confronted with this abusive relationship within the family abode.
Rep. Antonino-Custodio. As long as, ma'am I guess the intention in the Bicameral Conference
Committee is really on record, I think we will have no problem because when the court will refer
definitelytotheminutesoftheBicameralConferenceCommittee,thentheywillseethatourintentionis
so. Just for the record.
The Chairperson (Sen. Ejercito-Estrada). Okay, we adopt the...
Rep. Marcos. Therefore, to reiterate, taking into consideration both [Representative Sarenas and
Custodio's] concerns, the Bicam transcript should therefore reflect the intent of this body to broadly
interpret the term children not only to include the biological children of the abused women or
violated mothers, butalso all children undertheircare.
TheChairperson(Sen.Ejercito-Estrada).Okay,paramataposnatalaga.[xxx]Okay,accepted,useyour
title, gano'n na rin, dinagdagan lang ng "their children". (Emphases and underscoring supplied)The
exchangesintheBicameralConferenceCommitteeemphasizedtheemotionalconnectionordependency
betweenthechild-offendedpartyandthewoman.Thescenariodepictedisoneofan"abusiverelationship
withinthefamilyabode."Relevantly,thelegislatorreferredtothewomanas"a bused"or"violated"even
when seemingly addressing a scenario of violenceagainstthechild.Thisisunderstandableconsidering
that from a mother's perspective, the paincausedtothechildmaylikewisebefeltbythemotherorthe
mother figure. Hence, the violence against the child may feel as if it is inflicted on the mother figure
herself. In the present case, this isnottheportrayedrelationshipbetweenthemother,Rosalina,andthe
child, Rhuby.
Notably, during the Senate deliberations, the sponsor of R.A. No. 9262's sourcebillacknowledgedthe
inadequacy of R.A. No. 7610 because for one, protection orders are not available in said law.Senator
Sotto narrated that "I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their
mothers.Anditbreaksmyhearttofindoutaboutthesethings.Becauseoftheinadequateexistinglawon
abuseofchildren,thisparticularmeasurewillupdatethat.Itwillenhanceandhopefullypreventtheabuse
ofchildrenandnotonlywomen."[13] Asabove-discussed,thisinclusionofchildrenwaslaterrevisitedand
qualifiedintheBicameralConferenceCommittee.RepresentativeAngara-Castillonotedthatthebenefits
to be giventochildrencanbemade"bywayofamendmentof[R.A.No.]7610"explainingthat"ifyou
scatteralltheseprovisions[benefiting]thechildren,napakaguloeh.Soifwewanttogivethemadditional
rights,thenyoujustamend[R.A.No.]7610."RepresentativeSarenasalsoclarifiedthat"wecertainlyare
talkingaboutnotjustanychildbutachildofawomanvictimofviolence."Incontrast,shereferredto
the co-parentofthewomanas"theperpetrator."Shethenexplainedthat"allchildrenarecoveredunder
[R.A. No.] 7610. But the children we want covered under this law" are those who have an emotional
connectionordependencywiththewoman.[14] ItwasatthispointthatSenatorImeeMarcosrecommended
the use of "their" to qualify the "children" covered under the statute.Fromtheselatterdiscussions,the
legislative intent becameclearthatwhentheoffendedpartyisachild,thesettingcontemplatedunder
the law is that there are three participants – thechild,thewoman,andtheoffender.Assuch,the
mother-offender cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 9262. Nevertheless, she can be heldresponsible
under R.A. No. 7610.[15]
Effective legal remedies for children
Themajoritycautionsthat"[t]heRTC'srestnct1veinterpretationrequiringthatthemotherandherchildto
bevictimsofviolencebeforetheymaybeentitledtotheremediesofprotectionandcustodyorderswill
frustrate the policy of the law. It adds that theRTC'ssupposedreassurancethat"childrenwhosuffered
abuse from the hands of their own mothers may invoke other laws except R.A. No. 9262 is
discriminatory" and is "an outright denial of effective legal measures to address the seriousness and
urgency of the situation" involving violence against women and children.[16]
Tomymind,nodenialofeffectivelegalmeasureswillresultfromthetextuallyaccurateinterpretationof
"offender" under R.A. No. 9262, and the Court would only be exercising its solemn duty toapplythe
statute as intended. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words ofastatutethereshouldbeno
departure.Thelegislatureispresumedtoknowthemeaningofthewords,tohaveusedwordsadvisedly,
and to have expressed its intent by theuseofsuchwordsasarefoundinthestatute.[17] Theremedy,as
suggested in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa, is to amend R.A. No. 7610 to include the
protection order for abused children in cases not covered under R.A. No. 9262, as in the present case.
Besides,althoughaprotectionorderisnotaremedypresentlyavailableunderR.A.No.7610,itdoesnot
preclude the Court from making such protection order available to victims of child abuse under a
duly-promulgated rule. The 1987 Constitution empowerstheCourtto"promulgaterulesconcerningthe
protectionandenforcementofconstitutionalrights,"whichincludestherighttolife,liberty,andsecurity
ofabusedchildren.Pursuanttothispower,theCourt,intheRuleontheWritofAmparo,listedprotection
order as an interim relief that a person may avail.ItissubmittedthattheCourtcanmakeavailablethe
sameinterimreliefinchildabusecasesunderR.A.No.7610,inorderforittobeareliefavailableagainst
the mother who abuses her own child, as in this case.
Forthesereasons,IjoinJusticeCaguioainstatingthatbasedontheletterandspiritofthelaw,thepresent
case does notfallwithinthepurviewofR.A.No.9262.Nevertheless,theRTCmaystillgrantreliefsto
the child under the Custody Rule, which enables courts to provide provisional andpermanentreliefto
protect the child. Notably, Sec.13oftheCustodyRuleauthorizesthecourttoissueaprovisionalorder
awarding custody of the minor to either parent. Sec. 17 thereof also authorized the issuance of a
protection ordertorequireanypersontocomplywithordersofthecourttoensuretheprotectionofthe
minor.[18] Hence,Ialsovotetopartiallygrantthepetitioninsofarastoremandthecasetothetrialcourt
for the determination of this case.
[1]
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003.
[2]
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDRENACT OF 2004, March 8, 2004.
[3]
Section1,Rule41oftheRulesofCourtstatesthat:"Anappealmaybetakenfromajudgmentorfinal
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable. x x x"
[4]
SeeCarniyan v. Home Guaranty Corporation, G.R.No. 228516, August 14, 2019, 914 SCRA 92, 103.
[5]
Butuan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,808 Phil. 443, 451 (2017).
[6]
UnderSection1,Rule65oftheRulesofCourt,oneoftherequirementsforapetitionforcertiorariis
that "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
[7]
Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, 823 Phil. 212,222 (2018).
[8]
Spouses Dycoco v. Court of Appeals, 715 Phil. 550, 561(2013),citingBalayanv.Acorda,523Phil.
305, 309 (2006).
[9]
Re:LetterofCourtofAppealsJusticeVicenteS.E.VelosoforEntitlementofLongevityPay,760Phil.
62, 97 (2015).
[10]
Seeponencia, p. 9.
[11]
712 Phil. 44 (2013).
[12]
See Dissenting Opinion, pp. 16-17, citing Congressional Records, Minutes of the Bicameral
Conference Committee dated January 26, 2004, pp. 192-202.
[13]
Garcia v. Judge Drilon, supra note 11, citingthe Senate deliberations.
[14]
See Dissenting Opinion, pp. 14-17, citing Congressional Records, minutes of the Bicameral
Conference Committee dated January 26, 2004, pp. 192-202, to wit:
Rep. Angara-Castillo. ... x x x
Idon'tthinkweshouldincludechildreninthebillexceptasincidentalbeneficiariesofthereliefstobe
grantedtothewomanvictim.BecauseRepublicAct7610isalreadysocomprehensiveastocoverthe
rights of the child.
[x x x] Andmypositionisthat,ifweneedtogivemorerights,thenweshouldamend7610because
thatistheactapplicabletochildren.Idonotthinkthisisreallywiseorprudenttoincludetheminthis
particular bill because their inclusion is already guaranteed there by way of the relief that willbenefit
them as they are granted to their mother but it's not necessary for them to bemadepartofthetitleor
really the bill itself. Except, as I said, as incidental beneficiaries of the reliefs to be granted tothe
offended mother.
TheChairperson(Sen.Ejercito-Estrada).TherewasadiscussionontheSenate,theMinorityLeadersaid
thattheydon'tmindifthemalesareexcludedfromthisbill,butnotthechildren.SoIthinkIagreewith
them and so we include the children.
Rep.Angara-Castillo.Justfortherecord,MadamChair,Iamnotsayingthatweshouldexcludechildren
fromconsiderationofbenefitsthatmayaccruetothem.WhatIamjustsayingisthat,thebenefitsthey
would like to give can be done by way of amendment of 7610 so we really have aclearlawthat
affects only the children.
Kasi,ifyouscatteralltheseprovisionsbenefittingthechildren,napakaguloeh.Soifwewanttogive
them additional rights, then you just amend Republic Act 7610.
[x x x x]
Rep.Sarenas.MadamChair,Ishouldhavebroughtthisupearlierbutwecertainlyaretalkingaboutnot
just any child but a child ofawomanvictimofviolence.And,therefore,tomakethatclear,Madam
Chair, I suggest we include in our proposal somewhere where we describe who the victims can be
following words: x x x That's a long one Madam Chair, but it does speak oftherealityofthekindof
children,notjustbiologicalchildrenofawomanvictimofviolencebutallotheryoungchildrenbelow18
or who are incapable of taking care of themselves but her children because they are children from
previousmarriage,heradoptedchildrenorachildshehasincommonwiththeperpetrator.(Emphases
andunderscoringsupplied)[15] Section2ofR.A.No.7610provides,thus:"Section2.DeclarationofState
PolicyandPrinciples.–ItisherebydeclaredtobethepolicyoftheStatetoprovidespecialprotectionto
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitationanddiscriminationandotherconditions,
prejudicial their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or
personhavingcareorcustodyofthechildfailsorisunabletoprotectthechildagainstabuse,exploitation
and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian,
teacher or person having care and custody of the same." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[16]
Seeponencia, pp. 14-15.
[17]
Republic v. Manalo, 831 Phil. 33, 57 (2018).
[18]
Section 17 of the Custody Rule provides, thus:
Section 17.Protection Order. – The court may issuea Protection Order requiring any person:
(a) Tostayawayfromthehome,school,business,orplaceofemploymentoftheminor,otherparentor
any other party, or from any other specific place designated by the court;
(b) To cease and desist from harassing, intimidating, or threatening suchminorortheotherparentor
any person to whom custody of the minor is awarded;
(c) Torefrainfromactsofcommissionoromissionthatcreateanunreasonablerisktothehealth,safety,
or welfare of the minor;
(d) Topermitaparent,orapartyentitledtovisitationbyacourtorderoraseparationagreement,tovisit
the minor at stated periods;
(e) Topermitadesignatedpartytoentertheresidenceduringaspecifiedperiodoftimeinordertotake
personal belongings not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family Court; and
(f) To comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the minor.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
Violence should not be narrowly and solely viewed as a gender issue in the context of intimate
relationships but rather, a power issue.[1] Constantly labeling women as "weak"and"victims"affirmsa
level ofheteronormativity.Womenwhoperpetrateviolenceshouldnotbeimmunefromtheforceofthe
law. On the other hand, children who suffer from domestic violence should be protected from their
abusers — even from their own mothers.
I
Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution mandatesthe"fundamentalequalitybeforethelawofwomen
andmen."[2] Consistentwiththisdirection,theState,asasignatoryoftheConventionontheElimination
of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainstWomen,isboundtotakeallappropriatemeasures"[to]modify
thesocialandculturalpatternsofconductofmenandwomen,withaviewtoachievingtheeliminationof
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiorityofeitherofthe,sexes,oronstereotypedrolesformenandwomen[.]"[3] InAlanisIIIv.Court
of Appeals:[4]
InkeepingwiththeConvention,ArticleII,Section14oftheConstitutionrequiresthattheStatebeactive
in ensuring gender equality. This provision is even more noticeably proactive than the more
widelyinvokedequalprotectionanddueprocessclausesundertheBillofRights.InRachov.Tanaka,this
Court observed:
ThisconstitutionalprovisionprovidesamoreactiveapplicationthanthepassiveorientationofArticleIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal
protectionofthelaws."Equalprotection,withinthecontextofArticleIII,SectionIonlyprovidesthatany
legalburdenorbenefitthatisgiventomenmustalsobegiventowomen.ItdoesnotrequiretheStateto
activelypursue"affirmativewaysandmeanstobattlethepatriarchy—thatcomplexofpolitical,cultural,
and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment."Article II, Section 14 implies the State's
positive duty to actively dismantle the existing patriarchy by addressing the culture that supports it.[5]
(Citationomitted)RepublicActNo.9262,ortheAnti-ViolenceAgainstWomenandTheirChildrenActof
2004, reflects this policy. It is a novel statute which guaranteesthedignityofwomenandchildrenand
mandates their protection from violence and threats to personal safety and security.[6] It addresses
domesticviolenceinintimaterelationships,whichislargelyduetounequalpowerrelationsbetweenmen
and women.[7]
InGarciav.Drilon,[8] thisCourtupheldtheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.9262,emphasizingthe
prevailing patriarchal society which empowers men at the expense of women. Thus:
[V]iolence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions
dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant rolesinsociety
while women are nurturers, men's companionsandsupporters,andtakeonsubordinaterolesinsociety.
Thisperceptionleadstomengainingmorepoweroverwomen.Withpowercomestheneedtocontrolto
retain that power. And V A W is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.[9]
(Citation omitted)Further, Garcia explained how women and their children are the "usual" and "most
likely"victimsofviolence.Thiscreatesavalidclassificationandsubstantialdistinctionbetweenmenand
women which justified the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262. Thus:
Preventingviolenceagainstwomenandchildrenthroughtheiravailmentofspeciallegalremedies,serves
the governmental objectives of protecting the dignity and human rightsofeveryperson,preservingthe
sanctity of family life, and promoting gender equality and empowering women. Although there exists
otherlawsonviolenceagainstwomeninthePhilippines,RepublicActNo.9262dealswiththeproblem
of violence within the family and intimate relationships, which deserves special attention because it
occursinsituationsorplaceswherewomenandchildrenshouldfeelmostsafeandsecurebutareactually
not. The law provides the widest range of reliefs for womenandchildrenwhoarevictimsofviolence,
which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a
personwithwhomthevictimhasorhadasexualordatingrelationship.Asidefromfilingacriminalcase
incourt,thelawprovidespotentlegalremediestothevictimsthattheretoforewerenotavailable.Thelaw
recognizes,withvalidfactualsupportbasedonstatisticsthatwomenandchildrenarethemostvulnerable
victims of violence, arid therefore need legal intervention.[10] (Citation omitted)Nevertheless, Garcia
recognized that violence and abuse may alsobeperpetratedagainstmen.[11] Women,ontheotherhand,
mayalsobeperpetratorsofviolence.[12] Theunderreportedabuseagainstmenislargelyduetosocialand
cultural expectations on masculinity which compels men to keep mum on domestic abuse.[13]
Gender must be viewed primarily as an "inequality of power," not merely as a difference assigned to
sexes.[14] The social status and role attributed tomen and women are repercussions of this inequality:
The differences we attribute to sex are lines inequality draws, not any kind of basis for it. Social and
politicalinequalityare...basicallyindifferenttosamenessanddifference.Differencesareinequality'spost
hocexcuse,itsconclusoryartifact,itsoutcomepresentedasitsorigin,thedamagethatitpointedtoasthe
justification for doing the damage after the damage has been done, the distinctions that perception is
sociallyorganizedtonoticebecauseinequalitygivesthemconsequencesforsocialpower.Distinctionsof
body or mind or behavior are pointed to as cause rather than effect, without realizing that they areso
deeplyeffectratherthancausethatpointingtothematallisaneffect.[15]RepublicActNo.9262isalaw
which intends to reject patriarchy. The reductionist thinking that women are always victims reinforces
their powerlessness. This only perpetuates and affirms the very biases and prejudices against them.[16]
Theviewwhichperpetuallylabelswomenasvictimsresultsinanarrowthinkingthatwomenarealways
weak. This does not advance gender equality, but aggravates the belief that men will alwaysdominate
women.[17] This only affirms heteronormativity:
The perspective portraying women as victims with a heritageofvictimizationresultsintheunintended
consequenceofpermanentlyperceivingallwomenasweak.Thishasnotalwaysbeenacceptedbymany
other strands in the Feminist Movement.
As early as the 70s, the nationalist movement raisedquestionsonthewisdomofawomen'smovement
anditspossibledivisiveeffects,as"classproblemsdeserveunifiedandconcentratedattention[while]the
women question is vague, abstract, and does not have material base."
In the early 80s, self-identifying feminist groups were formed. The "emancipation theory" posits that
female crime has increased arid has become more masculine in character as a result of the women's
liberation movement.
FeminismalsohasitsvariantsamongMuslims.In2009,Musawah("equality"inArabic)waslaunchedas
a global movement for equity and justice in the Muslim family. It brought together activists,scholars:
legalpractitioners,policymakers,andgrassrootswomenandmenfromallovertheworld.Theirbeliefis
that there cannot be justice without equality, and its holistic framework integrates Islamic teachings,
universalhumanrights,nationalconstitutionalguaranteesofequality,andthelivedrealitiesofwomenand
men.
There is now more space to believe that portraying only women as victims will not always promote
gender equality before the law. It sometimes aggravates thegapbyconcedingthatwomenhavealways
beendominatedbymen.Indoingso,itrendersempoweredwomeninvisible;or,insomecases,thatmen
ashumanbeingscanalsobecomevictims.[18] (Citationsomitted)Thus,violenceandabuseinthecontext
ofintimaterelationshipsisnotagenderissuebutapowerissue.[19] Withthisunderstanding,itisentirely
possible that women can be perpetrators of violence and abuse in domestic and intimate relationships.
II
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 defines "violence against women and children" as:
[A]nyactoraseriesofactscommittedbyanypersonagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,or
againstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhadasexualordatingrelationship,orwithwhomhehasa
commonchild,oragainstherchildwhetherlegitimateorillegitimate,withinorwithoutthefamilyabode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical. sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.Violent acts include physical violence, sexual violence, psychological violence, and economic
abuse.[20]
Toaddresstheseacts,thelawprovidesthreedistinctremediestothevictims:acriminalcomplaint,acivil
action for damages, and a civil action for issuance of a protection order.[21]
Acriminalcasemaybefiledagainstoffenderswhocommitanyactofviolenceagainstwomenandtheir
children under Section 5.[22] This includes: threatening, attempting, or causing physical harm to the
womanorherchild;placingtheminfearofimminentphysicalharm;attemptingtocompelorcompelling
them to engage in any conduct; restricting their movement; engaging them in sexualactivitiesthrough
force; or causing substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
Meanwhile, a civil action may also be filed under Section 36 for actual, compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages.
Oneofthelaw'sinnovationsistheremedyofprotectionorders.Aprotectionorderisissuedto"[prevent]
further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 ... and granting other
necessary relief' and to "[safeguard] the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independent1y regain
controloverherlife."[23] UnderSection8ofRepublicActNo.9262,theprotectionordermayincludeany,
some, or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c)Removalandexclusionoftherespondentfromtheresidenceofthepetitioner,regardlessofownership
oftheresidence,eithertemporarilyforthepurposeofprotectingthepetitioner,orpermanentlywhereno
propertyrightsareviolated,and,ifrespondentmustremovepersonaleffectsfromtheresidence,thecourt
shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until
respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d)Directingtherespondenttostayawayfrompetitionerandanydesignatedfamilyorhouseholdmember
atadistancespecifiedbythecourt,andtostayawayfromtheresidence,school,placeofemployment,or
any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;
(e)Directinglawfulpossessionandusebypetitionerofanautomobileandotheressentialpersonaleffects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the
petitionertotheresidenceofthepartiestoensurethatthepetitionerissafelyrestoredtothepossessionof
theautomobileandotheressentialpersonaleffects,ortosupervisethepetitionersorrespondent'sremoval
of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;
(g)Directingtherespondenttoprovidesupporttothewomanand/orherchildifentitledtolegalsupport.
Notwithstandingotherlawstothecontrary,thecourtshallorderanappropriatepercentageoftheincome
or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be
automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the
remittanceofsupporttothewomanand/orherchildwithoutjustifiablecauseshallrendertherespondent
or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h)Prohibitionoftherespondentfromanyuseorpossessionofanyfirearmordeadlyweaponandorder
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriatedispositionbythecourt,includingrevocationof
license and disqualification to apply for any license touseorpossessafirearm.Iftheoffenderisalaw
enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the
appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on the matter;
(i)Restitutionforactualdamagescausedbytheviolenceinflicted,including,butnotlimitedto,property
damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;
(j)DirectingtheDSWDoranyappropriateagencytoprovidepetitionertemporaryshelterandothersocial
services that the petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary toprotectandprovideforthe
safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any
designated family or household member consents to such relief.Republic Act No. 9262 provides three
kinds of protection orders: a barangay protection order, a temporary protection order,andapermanent
protectionorder.Thepunongbarangay,oriftheyareunavailable,thebarangaykagawad,issuesbarangay
protection orders, while trial courts issue temporary and permanent protection orders.
Under Republic Act No. 9262, it 1s not only the victim who can file the petition for a protection order:
Section9.WhomayFilePetitionforProtectionOrders.—Apetitionforprotectionordermaybefiledby
any of the following:
(a) the offended party;
(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;
(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity;
(d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local government units (LGUs);
(e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's desks;
(t) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;
(h) atleasttwo(2)concernedresponsiblecitizensofthecityormunicipalitywheretheviolenceagainst
womenandtheirchildrenoccurredandwhohaspersonalknowledgeoftheoffensecommitted.Toenable
the law to fully protect the victims,itmandatesaliberalapplicationingrantingpetitionsforprotection
orders. This Court affirmed this approach.
In Go-Tan v. Tan,[24] petitioner filed a petition for protection order against her husband and her
parents-in-law.Inarguingagainstthepetition,respondentsarguedthattheywerenotcoveredbySection3
ofRepublicActNo.9262whichexplicitlystatesthattheoffendershouldberelatedtothevictimonlyby
marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship.[25]
Section 3 of the law provides:
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any actoraseriesofactscommittedbyany
personagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,oragainstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasor
had a sexual or dating relationship,orwithwhomhehasacommonchild,oragainstherchildwhether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery,assault,coercion,harassmentorarbitrarydeprivationofliberty.InGo-Tan,thisCourtallowedthe
filing of a petitionforprotectionorderagainstthewoman'sparents-in-law,acknowledgingthatviolence
may be committed directly or indirectlythroughotherpersons.Thisisconsistentwiththepolicyofthe
lawtopromotethesafetyofviolencevictims.[26] Thus,whileparents-in-lawarenotexpresslyprovidedin
thedefinitionofoffenders,aprotectionordermaybefiledagainstthemwhenshownthattheyhavecaused
verbal, psychological,andeconomicabusesagainstthevictim.[27] AstrictinterpretationofRepublicAct
No. 9262 will not advance its policy:
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intentmustbeeffectuatedbythe
courts.Inthepresentcase,theexpresslanguageofR.A.No.9262reflectstheintentofthelegislaturefor
liberalconstructionaswillbestensuretheattainmentoftheobjectofthelawaccordingtoitstrueintent,
meaning and spirit — the protection and safety of victims of violence against women andchildren.[28]
(Citation omitted)The law further extends protection to the victim'schildren,regardlessoftheirage.In
Estaciov.Estacio,[29] petitioner-offenderquestionedtheinclusionoftheiradultchildrenintheprotection
order.Hearguedthatonlychildrenbelow18yearsoldorthoseincapableoftakingcareofthemselvesas
defined under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 can be covered by the law.
Inupholdingtheadultchildren'sinclusionintheprotectionorder,thisCourtfoundthatpetitioner-offender
indeedcommittedviolenceagainstrespondent'throughtheirchildren.Heharassedrespondentbysending
herdegradingandthreateningmessagesthroughthechildren.Althoughthechildrenarenolongerminors,
descendants as a whole class are covered bythelawwithinthecontextofprotectionorders.Moreover,
thisCourtpointedoutthatthelawdoesnotdistinguishchildrenbasedonageaspossiblebeneficiariesof
protection orders.[30]
Even if the wording of the law provides that the term "children" in the law "refer[s] to those below
eighteen(18)yearsofageorolderbutareincapableoftakingcareofthemselves,"thisCou1iconsidered
theparties'adultchildrenwhomaybegrantedreliefunderothersectionsofthelaw.Particularly,Section
8ofRepublicActNo.9262statesthatotherformsofreliefmaybeissuedinfavorofthevictimand"any
designated family or household member."[31] This liberal reading of the provisions will give life to the
law's policy of protecting the victims.
Clearly, this case compels us to view gender as a relational and power dynamic with a broader
understandingofdomesticviolence.Withaliberalreadingofthelaw,apetitioncanbefiledonbehalfof
the child even against the mother.
This is in keeping with the law's declaration of policy, which does not only guarantee the safety and
securityofthewoman,butalsoofthechild.[32] Particularly,itstressestheState'scommitmenttoadvance
notonlytheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheConventionontheEliminationofAllForms
of Discrimination Against Women, but also the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The restrictive reading ofRepublicActNo.9262whichtreatsachildasamereadjunctoftheirmother
defeatsthelaw'spolicy.Thelawdoesnotrequirethewomantobethevictimtoaffordprotectiontothe
child.Thetextofthelawisplain.Aspointedoutbytheponencia,RepublicActNo.9262providesthat
acts of violence under Section 5 can be committed against the womanorher child.[33]
Further,underSection9(a)ofthelaw,oneofthepersonsallowedtofileapetitionforprotectionorderis
the"offendedparty."ThiscanbereadinconjunctionwithSection3(a)whichdefinesviolenceunderthe
lawasanyactoraseriesofactscommitted"against[awoman's]childwhetherlegitimateorillegitimate,
withinorwithoutthefamilyabode,whichresultinorislikelytoresultinphysical,sexual,psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse."
Moreover,Section9(b)allowsparentsorguardiansofthevictimtofilethepetitionforprotectionorder.
Thewordingofthelawdoesnotdistinguish,whichparentisallowedtofile.Itisnotonlythemotherwho
can file a petition for her child.Thegender-neutralframingoftheprovisionallowsspaceforfathersor
even guardians to file a protection order against an abusivemother.Thefather,asaparent,canfilethe
petition on behalf of his minor daughter.
Here, Randy Michael Knutson (Randy) alleged that his daughter, Rhuby Sibal Knutson (Rhuby), was
maltreated and threatened to be killed by her mother, respondent Rosalina Sibal Knutson (Rosalina).
There were instances when respondentRosalinapulledRhuby'shair,slappedherface,andknockedher
head. These are acts of physical violence that can be prevented by a protection order.
Further, Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of ChildrenAgainstAbuse,Exploitationand
Discrimination Act does not diminish the force and effect of Republic Act No. 9262.Asexplainedby
Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, childabuseunderRepublicActNo.7610doesnotdistinguish
betweenrelativesornon-relatives.Verily,Randycouldhavefiledanactionunderthislaw.However,child
abuse within the context of intimate relationships is still covered byRepublicActNo.9262.Thelaw's
distinct feature is its emphasis on violence perpetuated within the bounds of intimate and domestic
relationships, which are saturated and often shaped by gender relations as compared to other types of
relations.
On the other hand, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa's strict interpretation of the law
reducestheprotectionofthechildfromtheabusesofthemother.Itfurtherdiminishestheburdenofthe
mother and removes her sense of agency simply because she is a woman. This is not the intent of
Republic Act No. 9262. That Rhuby's mother is the respondent does not exclude Rhuby from the
protectionthelawprovides.Thisinterpretationdoesnotfrustratethelaw'sintent.Italsodoesnotdiminish
theprotectionintendedforvictimsofgender-basedviolence.Thefundamentalequalitybeforethelawof
men and women should be invoked when the situation demonstrates political and social oppressions.
Otherwise, the benefits of the law should be emphatically applied.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
[1]
J.Leonen,ConcurringOpinioninGarciav.Drilon,712Phil.44,171(2013)(PerJ.Perlas-Bernabe,En
Banc],citingA.Delschelt,RecognizingDomesticViolenceDirectedTowardsMen:OvercomingSocietal
Perceptions,ConductingAccurateStudies,andEnactingResponsibleLegislation,12KAN.J.L.&PUB.
POL'Y 249 (2003).
[2]
CONST., art. II, sec. 14.
[3]
ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(July15,1980),ratified
on August 5, 1981, art. 5(a).
[4]
G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020,
<h ttps://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66846>[Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[5]
Id.
[6]
Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 2 provides:
[7]
Section2.DeclarationofPolicy.–ItisherebydeclaredthattheStatevaluesthedignityofwomenand
children and guarantees full respect for human rights.TheStatealsorecognizestheneedtoprotectthe
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
Towardsthisend,theStateshallexerteffortstoaddressviolencecommittedagainstwomenandchildren
in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution andtheProvisionsofthe
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
Estacio v. Estacio, G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020,
<h ttps://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66987>(Per J. Leonen, Third Division]
[8]
712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, EnBanc].
[9]
Id. at 91-92.
[10]
J. Leonardo-De Castro, Concurring Opinion inGarcia v. Drilon, id. at 134-135.
[11]
Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 97 (2013) [PerJ. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[12]
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion inGarcia v. Drilon,id.
[13]
Id. at 167.
[14]
CATHARINEA.MACKINNON,FEMINISMUNMODIFIED:DISCOURSESONLIFEANDLAW,
8-9 (1st ed. 1987).
[15]
Id. at 8.
[16]
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021
<h ttps://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27269/> [Per J. Caguioa,En Banc].
[17]
J. Leonen, ConcurringOpinioninGarciav.Drilon,712Phil.44,171(2013)[PerJ.Perlas-Bernabe,
En Banc].
[18]
Id. at 170-171.
[19]
Id. at 171.
[20]
Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 3(a).
[21]
Pavlow v. Mendenilla, 809 Phil. 24, 38-39 (2017)[Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[22]
Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 5 provides:
Section5.ActsofViolenceAgainstWomenandTheirChildren.—Thecrimeofviolenceagainstwomen
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e)Attemptingtocompelorcompellingthewomanorherchildtoengageinconductwhichthewomanor
herchildhastherighttodesistfromortodesistfromconductwhichthewomanorherchildhastheright
to engage in, or attempting torestrictorrestrictingthewoman'sorherchild'sfreedomofmovementor
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidationdirectedagainstthewomanorchild.Thisshallinclude,butnotlimitedto,thefollowingacts
committedwiththepurposeoreffectofcontrollingorrestrictingthewoman'sorherchild'smovementor
conduct;
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving thewomanorherchildofcustodyoraccesstoher/his
family;
(2)Deprivingorthreateningtodeprivethewomanorherchildrenoffinancialsupportlegallydueheror
her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, businessoractivityor
controllingthevictim'sownmoneyorproperties,orsolelycontrollingtheconjugalorcommonmoney,or
properties;
(f)Inflictingorthreateningtoinflictphysicalharmononeselfforthepurposeofcontrollingheractionsor
decisions;
(g)Causingorattemptingtocausethewomanorherchildtoengageinanysexualactivitywhichdoesnot
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directedagainstthe
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing,orrecklessconduct,personallyorthroughanother,thatalarmsor
causes substantialemotionalorpsychologicaldistresstothewomanorherchild.Thisshallinclude,but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property ofthewomanorherchildagainsther/his
will;
(4)Destroyingthepropertyandpersonalbelongingsorinflictingharmtoanimalsorpetsofthewomanor
her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
[23]
Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 8.
[24]
588 Phil. 532 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez,Third Division].
[25]
Id. at 538.
[26]
Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 588 Phil. 532 (2008) [PerJ. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
[27]
Id. at 540-542.
[28]
Id. at 542.
[29]
G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020,
<h ttps://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66987>[Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[30]
Id.
[31]
Id.
[32]
Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 2.
[33]
Ponencia, pp. 13-14.
DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA,J.:
IvotetoremandthecasetothetrialcourttohearanddecidethepetitionnotonthebasisofRepublicAct
No.(R.A.)9262[1] butpursuanttotherulessetforthinA.M.No.03-04-04-SC.[2] Inthisway,protectionis
affordedtothechildwhiletheCourtstaystruetoitsmandateofupholdingthelawbasedonwhatitsletter
and spirit intend.
The crux ofthecontroversyinthiscaseiswhethertheremediesofprotectionordersandcustodyunder
R.A.9262applywhenviolenceiscommittedbyawoman,inthiscase,amother,againstherownchild.
Publicrespondent,intheassailedRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)Orders,[3] ruledinthenegative,reasoningas
follows:
Notably,theoffenderunderR.A.9262isanypersonwhoisthehusband,formerhusband,thosewhohad
sexualordatingrelationshipwiththewomanorwithwhomshehasacommonchild.Ontheotherhand,
the offended party may be the wife, former wife, a woman who has or had sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the man has a common childorHER child.
Fromtheforegoing,itcanbeseenthatinthedefinitionofanoffender,achild'smotherisnotincludedas
one of the offenders. In stark contrast, a child's mother is specifically mentioned in the definition for
offended party. This could lead to no otherconclusionthatachild'smothercannotbeconsideredasan
offender under R.A. 9262.
Moreover, a protection order is defined under Section 8 of R.A. 9262, to quote:
"SECTION 8. Protection Orders. [—] A protection order is an order issued under this act forthe
purposeofpreventingfurtheractsofviolenceagainstawomanorherchildspecifiedinSection5of
this Act and granting other necessaryrelief.Thereliefgrantedunderaprotectionordershouldserve
thepurposeofsafeguardingthevictimfromfurtherharm,minimizinganydisruptioninthevictim'sdaily
life,andfacilitatingtheopportunityandabilityofthevictimtoindependentlyregaincontroloverherlife.
x x x"Based on the foregoing, the issuance of a protection order is for purpose of preventing further
violence committed by an offender (any person who is the husband, former husband, those who had
sexualordatingrelationshipwiththewomanorwithwhomshehasacommonchild)againstawomanor
herchild.Itdoesnotpertaintoamotherwhoallegedlyabusedherownchild.Hence,aprotectionorder
under R.A. 9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child.
Further, petitioner's prayer for the granting of a temporary or permanentcustodyofRhubyunderR.A.
9262 is likewise misplaced as Section 28 of the said law specifically states:
"SECTION28.Custodyofchildren.—Thewomanvictimofviolenceshallbeentitledtothecustody
and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old [or] older but with mental or
physicaldisabilitiesshallautomaticallybegiventothemother,withrighttosupport,unlessthecourtfinds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.["]As it is, R.A. 9262 does not apply in the case at bar. The
petitioner, who is not a "woman victim of violence" cannot avail of the remedies provided therein
particularlytheissuanceofaTemporary/PermanentProtectionOrderandthegrantingofatemporaryor
permanent custody of Rhuby to him.
x x x x
On a final note, granting that respondent neglected, abandoned or physically abused Rhuby,herminor
daughter,therearelawsandrulesspecificallycreatedforthelatter'sprotectionandsafetythatpetitioner
and/orRhubycouldavailof.Unfortunately,R.A.9262isnotoneofthem.[4] (Emphasisanditalicsinthe
original)In denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent reiterated that R.A.9262
does not apply to a situation where it was the mother herself who committed violent andabusiveacts
against her own child. She explained that "children being protected under R.A. 9262 refer to the
biologicalchildrenandotherchildrenunderthecareofthewoman/victim."[5] Assuch,achild'smotheris
not included as one of the offenders under R.A. 9262.[6]
IagreewiththeRTC.Ifindthatpublicrespondent'sreadingofthelaw—thatR.A.9262doesnotcover
violence committed by a mother against her own child — is in full accord not only with the plain
language of its provisions, but also with the intent and spirit that animate it.
The present case is
not covered by R.A.
9262
Thefirstbasicruleinstatutoryconstructionisthatwherethewordsofastatuteareclear,plain,andfree
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
Here,R.A.9262unequivocallydefinesthevictimsofviolenceortheoffendedpartiesthelawintendsto
protect — the woman and her child. Notably, examiningR.A.9262indetailrevealsthatthelawisnot
intended toapplytoallchildrenvictimizedbyviolenceorabusebutonlytothechildorchildrenofthe
woman subjected to violence or abuse.
Foremost,thetitleofR.A.9262itselfqualifiesthatthechildcoveredbythelawisthechildofthewoman
subject to violence or abuse. Thus, the title of R.A. 9262 reads, "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE
AGAINSTWOMENANDTHEIRCHILDREN,PROVIDINGFORPROTECTIVEMEASURESFOR
VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."[7] This is
reiterated in Section 1 of R.A. 9262,viz.:
SECTION1.ShortTitle.—ThisActshallbeknownasthe"Anti-ViolenceAgainstWomenandTheir
ChildrenActof2004[."](Emphasis,italicsandunderscoringsupplied)Further,allthrough-outthetextof
thelaw,theterm"child"isalwaysassociatedwiththeterm"woman."Aspublicrespondentaptlynoted,
R.A.9262doesnotconsiderortreatthe"child"independentlyfromthe"woman"subjectedtoviolenceor
abuse.
Tobesure,Section3(a)ofR.A.9262,indefiningwhatviolenceagainstwomenandtheirchildrenmeans,
states,"anyactoraseriesofactscommittedbyanypersonagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,
oragainstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhadasexualordatingrelationship,orwithwhomhehas
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate[.]"[8] Further, indefiningthe
term children, Section 3(h) provides, "[a]s used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the
victim[,i.e.the woman,]and other children underhercare."[9]
In addition, Sections 5 and 6 of R.A. 9262, in enumerating prohibited acts and their corresponding
penalties, respectively state:
SEC.5.ActsofViolenceAgainstWomenandTheirChildren.—Thecrimeofviolenceagainstwomen
andtheirchildrenis committed through any of thefollowing acts:
(a) Causing physical harm tothe woman orherchild;
(b) Threatening to causethe woman orherchildphysicalharm;
(c) Attempting to causethe woman orherchildphysicalharm;
(d) Placingthe woman orherchildin fear of imminentphysical harm;
(e)Attemptingtocompelorcompellingthewomanorherchildtoengageinconductwhichthewoman
orherchildhastherighttodesistfromortodesistfromconductwhichthewomanorherchildhasthe
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm orthreatofphysicalorother
harm,orintimidationdirectedagainstthewomanorherchild.Thisshallinclude,butnotlimitedto,the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child'smovement or conduct:
(1)Threateningtodepriveoractuallydeprivingthewomanorherchildofcustodyoraccesstoher/his
family;
(2)Deprivingorthreateningtodeprivethewomanorherchildrenoffinancialsupportlegallydueheror
her family, or deliberately providingthe woman'schildreninsufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprivethe womanorherchildof a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, businessoractivityor
controllingthevictim'sownmoneyorproperties,orsolelycontrollingtheconjugalorcommonmoney,or
properties;
(f)Inflictingorthreateningtoinflictphysicalharmononeselfforthepurposeofcontrollingheractionsor
decisions;
(g)Causingorattemptingtocausethewomanorherchildtoengageinanysexualactivitywhichdoes
notconstituterape,byforceorthreatofforce,physicalharm,orthroughintimidationdirectedagainstthe
woman orherchildor her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing,orrecklessconduct,personallyorthroughanother,thatalarmsor
causessubstantialemotionalorpsychologicaldistresstothewomanorherchild.Thisshallinclude,but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or followingthe woman orherchildinpublic or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence orthe woman orherchild;
(3) Entering orremaininginthedwellingoronthepropertyofthewomanorherchildagainsther/his
will;
(4)Destroyingthepropertyandpersonalbelongingsorinflictingharmtoanimalsorpetsofthewoman
orherchild; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to thewoman's child/children.
SEC.6.Penalties.—Thecrimeofviolenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren,underSection5hereof
shall be punished according to the following rules[.] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)Likewise, Section 8, which pertains to the issuance of protectionorders,refersnotjusttoany
child—itrefersonlytothechildofthewomanvictim.Itstatesthattheimmediatereliefsgrantedbylaw
(barangay protection order, temporary protection order and permanent protection order) are for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a womanorherchildasspecifiedinSection5
thereof.
Inthesamevein,R.A.9262explicitlydefinestheoffenderorperpetratorofthecrimepenalizedtherein.
Thus, Section 3(a) provides that "['v]iolence against women and their children[']referstoanyactora
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."[10]
Following the foregoing enumeration, the offender contemplated by R.A. 9262 includes any of the
following persons: the woman's husband, the woman's former husband, the woman's sexual or dating
partner, the woman's former sexual or dating partner, or the father of the woman's child.
In Garcia v. Judge Drilon,[11] (G
arcia) the Court clarified that R.A. 9262 does not single out men as
offenders.WomenmayalsobeheldliableforviolatingR.A.9262.However,itshouldbeemphasizedthat
the Court also made it clear in Garcia that this applies only in cases when the woman-victim is in a
lesbianrelationshiporwherethereisaconspiracybetweentheperpetratoroftheviolenceorabuseagainst
thewoman(i.e.thewoman'shusband,thewoman'sformerhusband,thewoman'ssexualordatingpartner,
the woman's former sexual or dating partner, or the father of thewoman'schild)andanotherperson/s,
who may include a woman:
ThereislikewisenomerittothecontentionthatR.A.9262singlesoutthehusbandorfatherastheculprit.
Asdefinedabove,VAWCmaylikewisebecommitted"againstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhad
asexualordatingrelationship."Clearly,theuseofthegender-neutralword"person"whohasorhad
a sexual or dating relationshipwiththewomanencompassesevenlesbianrelationships.Moreover,
while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, the
parents-in-lawofSharicaMariL.Go-Tan,thevictim,wereheldtobeproperrespondentsinthecase
filedbythelatterupontheallegationthattheyandtheirson(Go-Tan'shusband)hadcommunityof
design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected fromthefamilyhome;andinrepeatedlyabusingherverbally,emotionally,
mentallyandphysically.[12] (Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied;italicsintheoriginal)Proceedingfrom
theforegoing,R.A.9262appliesonlywhenthereisawomansubjectedtoviolenceandabuse.Moreover,
since R.A.9262doesnottreatthechildindependentlyfromtheabusedwoman,andgiventheoffenders
enumeratedandcontemplatedbyR.A.9262,itbecomesquiteclearthatR.A.9262onlycoversviolence
orabuseagainstthewoman'schildcommittedbyanyofthefollowingpersons:thewoman'shusband,the
woman's former husband, the woman's sexual or dating partner, the woman's former sexual or dating
partner, or the father of the woman's child.
Stated otherwise, it isquiteclearthatR.A.9262doesnotcontemplateasituationwhereinnowomanis
abused or subjected toviolence,andinsteaditisthewomanherselfwhoistheoffenderortheonewho
inflicts violence against the victim or the offended party. Also, as explained by the Court inGarcia,a
woman may be considered as an offender under R.A. 9262 only when the woman is in lesbian
relationship or in conspiracy with other persons. To my mind, publicrespondentisthereforecorrectin
rulingthatR.A.9262doesnotapplytothepresentcase.Inthefirstplace,thereisnowomansubjectedto
violenceinthecontextofanintimaterelationshipinthiscase.Moreover,privaterespondentinthiscaseis
not in a lesbian relationship. Neither was conspiracy established between private respondent and the
husband or father of the victim.
Anotherprimordialprincipleinstatutoryconstructionisthatastatutemustbereadaccordingtoitsspirit
or intent. The legislative intent is the controlling factor ininterpretingastatute.Anyinterpretationthat
contradicts the legislative intent is unacceptable.[13]
A perusal of the spirit and intent of R.A. 9262, through its legislative history and congressional
deliberations,leadstothissameinterpretationthatthechildincludedunderR.A.9262pertainsonlytothe
child of the abused woman and not to all children subjected to violence and abuse.
R.A.9262originatedfromthreebills,twoofwhichweredraftedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandthe
third emanating from the Senate.
House Bill No. (HB) 6054 entitled An ActDefiningDomesticViolence,ProvidingProtectionMeasures
and Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes (DV Bill) pertainedtodomesticviolenceingeneral.It
soughttopenalizeviolencecommittedbyandagainstanymemberofthefamilyorhouseholdwhethera
minor,adult,orelderly.Itcoveredincidentsofspousebattery,wifeassault,womanorgirlabuse,marital
violence, wife cruelty and violence against family member. It appears that the DV Bill intended to
penalize all forms of abuse or violence committed against any person in a family setting.
On the other hand, HB 5516 entitled An Act Defining the Crime of Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, and for
Other Purposes (AntiA WIR Bill) limited the crime of violence and abuse to women in intimate
relationships.Thus,itdefinedthecrimeasactsofviolenceorabusecommittedagainstawomanwhois
his wife, or formerwife,his/herlive-inpartner,orformerlive-inpartner,oragainstawomanwhomthe
person has or had a sexual dating relationship.
Records of committee deliberations of the HouseofRepresentativesshowedthatproponentsoftheDV
Bill asserted the need for a comprehensive law on domestic violence. They emphasized that domestic
violenceiscommittedagainstallmembersofthefamilyanddistinctionastosexorapiecemealapproach
inaddressingtheissueisunnecessary.[14] Ontheotherhand,sponsorsoftheAnti-AWIRBillinsistedthat
statisticaldatasupportthatmajorityofthevictimsofdomesticviolencearewomenandeveninternational
instruments like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
recognizedtheproliferationofgender-basedviolencecommittedagainstwomen.Theyalsoexplainedthat
unliketheDVBill,theAnti-AWIRBillextendstheprotectionofwomennotonlywithintheframework
ofthehouseholdbuteventowomeninintimaterelationships.Theyfurtherclaimedthatothermembersof
the family are alreadyprotectedbycurrentlaws:R.A.7610iscomprehensiveenoughtoaddressabuses
committed against children, while the Revised Penal Code covers violence committed against other
members of the household.[15]
While therewasamovetoconsolidatebothhousebills,theywereseparatelyapprovedbytheHouseof
Representatives during their Third Reading and were both elevated to the Senate.
The counterpart bill of HB 5516 and 6054 in the Senate is Senate Bill No. (SB) 2723entitledAnAct
DefiningViolenceAgainstWomenandMembersoftheFamily,PrescribingPenaltiesTherefor,Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, and for Other Purposes.
During the plenary deliberations, theissueonSB2723'scoveragewasalsoraised.Itwasproposedthat
men be excluded from the coverage of the bill and that protection afforded by the bill be limited to
women, who are mostly the victims of gender-based violence. Subsequently, Senator Vicente SottoIII
(SenatorSotto)raisedthatthereisalsoaneedtoexpandtheprotectionaffordedtochildrensubjectedto
violenceandabuse.ItwasthenagreeduponintheSenatethatSB2723wouldincludebothwomenand
children,viz.:
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
x x x x x x x x x
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chairremindthegroupthattherewasthediscussionwhethertolimitthistowomenand
nottofamilieswhichwastheissueoftheAWIRgroup.TheunderstandingthatIhaveisthatwewould
be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
AsIsaidearlier,therearenameless,countless,voicelesswomenwhohavenothadtheopportunitytofile
a case against their spouses, their live-in partners afteryears,ifnotdecade,ofbatteryandabuse.Ifwe
broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all beabusedbythewomenortheir
spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
Ithinkthatthesponsor,basedonourearlierconversations,concurswiththisposition.Iamsurethatthe
men in this Chamber who love theirwomenintheirlivessoclearlywillagreewiththisrepresentation.
Whetherwelikeitornot,itisanunequalworld.Whetherwelikeitornot,nomatterhowempoweredthe
womenare,wearenotgivenequalopportunitiesespeciallyinthedomesticenvironmentwherethemacho
Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
x x x x x x x x x
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, thecommitteecameupwiththisbillbecausethe
familymembershavebeenincludedinthisproposedmeasuresincetheothermembersofthefamilyother
thanwomenarealsopossiblevictimsofviolence.Whilewomenaremostlikelytheintendedvictims,one
reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few
cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family members
particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less,
addressesthespecialneedsofabusedchildren.Thesamelawisinadequate.Protectionordersforoneare
not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the sameprotectiontomen,fearingthat
theymayusethislawtojustifytheirabusivebehavioragainstwomen.However,weshouldalsorecognize
that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary
support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr.President,thismeasureisintendedtoharmonizefamilyrelationsandtoprotectthefamilyasthebasic
social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our
society, I believe we have an obligationtoupholdinherentrightsanddignityorbothhusbandandwife
and their immediate family members, particularly children.
WhileIprefertofocusmainlyonwomen,Iwascompelledtoincludeotherfamilymembersasacritical
input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts,sportsgroupsand
other a1fected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removingthe"menandchildren"inthisparticularbillandfocusspecificallyonwomenalone.Thatwill
be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished
sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the
proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
SenatorSotto.Mr.President,Iaminclinedtobelievetherationaleusedbythedistinguishedproponentof
the amendment. As a matter of fact,Itendtoagree.Kungmaymaaabuso,masmalamangiyongbabae
kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I
cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment —
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
SenatorSotto.—morethanthewomen,thechildrenareverymuchabused.Asamatteroffact,itisnot
limited tominors.Theabuseisnotlimitedtoseven,six,5-year-oldchildren.Ihaveseen14,15-yearold
children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers.Anditbreaksmyhearttofindoutabout
these things.
Because of the inadequate existing lawonabuseofchildren,thisparticularmeasurewillupdatethat.[t
will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore,mayIproposeanamendmentthat,yes,weremovetheaspectofthemeninthebillbutnotthe
children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as
amended, is approved.[16]Subsequently, when the three bills were reconciled during the bicameral
conference committee, the issue on the persons coveredbytheconsolidatedbillwasonceagainraised.
Therewasaconsensusamongthemembersthatmenareexcludedfromthecoverageoftheconsolidated
bill.Astochildren,however,SenatorSotto'spropositiontoincludeallchildrensubjectedtoviolenceand
abuse was effectively modified when the members of the bicameral conference committee agreed to
further refine the definition of children covered by the law,viz.:
REP.ANGAR[A]-CASTILLO....MadamChair,ifwego–IunderstandwhenIcamein,thatyousaid
you are going to reserve the discussion of the title at the last. This one will have a bearing on the
consideration of whether this would include children in the act at all.
My pointisthat,justfortherecordbecauseIdon'tknowwhatwasagreeduponbefore1came,I
don'tthinkweshouldincludechildreninthebill,exceptasincidentalbeneficiariesofthereliefsto
begrantedtothewomanvictim.BecauseRepublicAct7610isalreadysocomprehensiveastocover
all the rights of the child.
xxxAndmypositionisthat,ifweneedtogivethechildmorerights,thenweshouldamend7610
becausethatistheactapplicabletochildren.Idonotthinkthisisreallywiseorprudenttoinclude
theminthisparticularbillbecausetheirinclusionisalreadyguaranteedtherebywayoftherelief
thatwillbenefitthemastheyaregrantedtotheirmotherbutit'snotnecessaryforthemtobemade
apartofthetitleorreallyofthebillitself.Except,asIsaid,asincidentalbeneficiariesofthereliefs
to be granted to the offended mother.
THE CHAIRPERSON (SEN. EJERCITO-ESTRADA). There was a discussion in the Senate, the
MinorityLeadersaidthattheydon'tmindifthemalesareexcludedfromthisbill,butnotthechildren.So
I think I agree with them and so we include the children.
REP. ANGARA-CASTILLO. Just for the record, Madam Chair, I am not saying thatweshould
excludechildrenfromconsiderationofbenefitsthatmayaccruetothem.WhatIamjustsayingis
that,thebenefitstheywouldliketogivetothemcanbedonebywayofamendmentto7610sowe
really have a clear law that affects only the children.
Kasi,ifyouscatteralltheseprovisionsbenefitingthechildren,napakagulo,eh.Soifwewanttogive
them additional rights, then you just amend Republic Act 7610.
x x x x
REP.SARENAS.MadamChair,Ishouldhave[brought]thisupearlierbutwecertainlyaretalkingabout
notjustanychildbutachildofawomanvictimofviolence.And,therefore,tomakethatclear,Madam
Chair, I suggest we include in our proposal somewhere where we describewhothevictimscanbethe
following words: "children are those below 18yearsofageorolderbutareincapableoftakingcareof
themselves as defined under Republic Act 7610, which is the Children[']s Protection Law and in the
context of this law, include the children of the woman from a previous marriage or relationship, her
commonchildrenwiththeperpetrator,heradoptedchildrenandthosechildrenwhodonot,herown,live
withherandaredependentonheremotionally."That'salongone,MadamChair,butitdoesspeakofthe
reality of the kind of children, not just biological children of awomanvictimofviolencebutallother
youngchildrenbelow18orwhoareincapableoftakingcareofthemselvesbutherchildrenbecausethey
arechildrenfromapreviousmarriage,heradoptedchildrenorxxxchildrenshehasincommonwiththe
perpetrator.
REP.ANTONINO-CUSTODIO.Ithinkkasamanasachildyun,eh.Ithink,whatIamscaredofmore
thananythingisthatifwespecifywemightexemptotherchildrenpa.So,kunggeneraltayo,kungchild
tangtayo,thenIthink,saklawnalahat,whetheradoptedyungchild,whetherachildniyafromaprevious
marriageorwhetherchildniyafromanother–well,all-weatherchild.Bastachild,diba?Saklawnanung
definition ng child, eh.
Ang fear ko tangnabakamayroong--youknow,byusspecifyingwhichchild,wemightexemptother
children.
REP.SARENAS.I'dreallyjustwanttoexplain.Allthosechildren–allchildrenarecoveredunder
7610. But the children we want covered under this law called Violence against Women and
Children, are the onesthatIenumerated.Sojusttomakeitclearthatthesearethechildrenwho
are usually the victims because yung iba na-cover na duon sa 7610. [Para ma-iba lang] yung
definition natin ng children, for emphasis of children victims of violence against women and
children.
REP. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO.Bakit pa natin i-lilimit.Huwag na natin i-limit. Huwag na natin i-limit.
x x x x
REP. MARCOS. Therefore, taking into consideration the concerns of the members regarding violence
against women and their children, may I suggest that the Senate title be adopted with the following
amendments: "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Children, Providing for Protective
MeasuresforThemandPrescribingPenaltiesThereforandForOtherPurposes."Ijustswitcheditaround,
kasi dapat 'yung "protective" mauna sa "penalty." 'Yun lang.
REP. ANGARA-CASTILLO.Ireiteratemysuggestion,weeliminatetheword"children"because
it's totally unnecessary and inappropriate.
REP.ANTONIO-CUSTODIO.Ma'amI'djustliketoputintothe--well,putintorecordsthatthewomen
specifiedherearethewomeninintimaterelationships,'yun'yungreferralnatintowomenhere.Whether
you put it in the title or not is not really a concern of mine but just like to makeitonrecordthatthe
women we have - - kumbaga ang saklaw nitong special law na 'to are actually women in intimate
relationships.
x x x x
REP. MARCOS. x x x
Idon'tknowifthisconfusestheissueoritclarifiesit.WhatiftheSenateversionshouldreadasfollows,
in order to take into consideration the concerns of Representative Sarenas that priority be given to
children in these abusivefamiliestowit:AnActDefiningViolenceAgainstWomenandtheirChildren,
Providing Protective Measures and Penalties therefor and for Other Purposes.'
REP.ANTONINO-CUSTODIO.Ma'amquestion.Actuallymayincidentkasi,tunaynaincidentnangyari
sa amin na 'yung anak is, actually hindin'yaanak,eh,anaknungasawan'ya,peroparangshewasstill
bindedbythatrelationshipkasikahithindin'yaanak'yungbata,kahitpapa'nolumakinasakanya,eh.So,
dependent sa kanya - - so, may hold pa rin'yungasawan'yadunsaanaknungasawa.That'sanactual
case, eh, in our area.
REP.MARCOS.Ithinksuchasituationwouldbecoveredinfactbywomenandtheirchildren,inasmuch
as the child is dependent upon that mother, either as ward or as an adopted child. So okay, lang 'yun.
REP. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO. Kasi baka - - I mean, usually and even in some cases they are not
adopted child - - they are not adopted children, eh.
REP. MARCOS. No, even if they have not been officially adopted, it's tantamount to a ward
relationshipordependencyrelationship.So,palagaykocoveredna'yonkasitheyarechildren.Kasi
nga,Ithinkthereshouldbeadistinctionthatthisisnotalawforallchildreneverywhereunderall
circumstances, but rather children who are confronted with this abusive relationship within the
family abode.
REP. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO. As long as, ma'am I guess the intention in the Bicameral Conference
Committee is really on record, I think we will have no problem because when the court will refer
definitelytotheminutesoftheBicameralConferenceCommittee,thentheywillseethatourintentionis
so. Just for the record.
THE CHAIRPERSON (SEN. EJERCITO-ESTRADA). Okay, we adopt the...
REP.MARCOS.Therefore,toreiterate,takingintoconsiderationbothRepresentativeSarenasand
RepresentativeCustodio'sconcerns,theBicamtranscriptshouldthereforereflecttheintentofthis
body to broadly interpret the term "children" not only to include the biological children of the
abused or violated mothers, but also all children under their care.
THE CHAIRPERSON (SEN. EJERCITO-ESTRADA). Okay, para rnatapos na talaga. x x x Okay,
accepted,useyourtitle,gano'nnarin,dinagdaganlangng"theirchildren."[17] (Emphasisandunderscoring
supplied)As can be gleaned from the foregoing, while Representative Bellaflor Angara-Castillo's
suggestion to completely remove the word "children" from the title of the consolidated bill was not
adopted,itwasneverthelessclarifiedthattheproposedconsolidatedbilldoesnotcoverallchildren
victimized by violence or abuse. The child which the consolidated bill intends to protect is thechild
affectedbytheabusiverelationshipthewomanvictimis/wasinto.Itisthechildofthewomansubjectedto
violenceandabuse,whetherthechildisherbiologicaloradoptedchildorachildunderhercare.Assuch,
thetitlewasrevisedtoincludetheword"their"besidechildrenandthebodyoftheR.A.9262consistently
madereferencetothechildas"herchild."Thisistomakecleartheintent,asagreedandclarifiedduring
the bicameral conference committee, thatnotallchildrensubjectedtoviolenceorabusearecoveredby
R.A.9262butonlythechildoftheabusedwomanorviolatedmotherorthechildunderhercare.Inthis
light, the present case unfortunately does not fall within the purview of the law.
WorthyofnoteaswellisthefactthatR.A.9262didnotexpresslyrepealoramendtheprovisionsofR.A.
7610, which, as raised during the congressional deliberations, provides a comprehensive protection to
minor children subjected to violence and abuse.
R.A.7610penalizeschildprostitutionandothersexualabuse,childtrafficking,andotheractsofneglect,
abuse, cruelty or exploitation committed against children. It covers all forms of abuse,neglect,cruelty
exploitation and discrimination and otherconditionsprejudicialtoachild'sdevelopment,includingacts
against a child committed by the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the
same.[18] As such, Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 penalizes all other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation against a child, which includes those committed by parents against their children, as
enumerated under Article 59[19] of Presidential Decree No.603[20] ortheChildandYouthWelfare
Code.Further,R.A.7610anditsimplementingrulesandregulationsgrantthechildreliefsagainstactsof
abuse, violence, cruelty and neglect, such as immediate protective custody and transfer of parental
authority.[21]
Indeed, had Congress really intended to repeal or amend R.A. 7610, which specifically defines and
penalizes child abuse, including thosecommittedbytheirparents,andgrantsreliefstoprotectthechild
victim, then Congress would have explicitlydoneso.DespitethefactthatR.A.7610wasraisedduring
congressional deliberations, Congress did not include any amendatory provision in R.A. 9262 on the
rightsofchildrenprovidedunderR.A.7610.Onthecontrary,Congress,duringthebicameralconference
committee,evenclarifiedthatR.A.9262doesnotcoverallcircumstancesofchildabuse.WhatR.A.9262
actually coversaretheactsofviolenceagainstthewomanandherchild,whetherbiological,adoptedor
underhercare,committedbythewoman'shusband,woman'sformerhusband,woman'sdatingorsexual
partner,woman'sformerdatingorsexualpartnerorthefatherofthewoman'schild.Achildabusedbyher
own mother is not included in any of these circumstances.
In ruling that mothers can be prosecuted under R.A. 9262 when they commit violent andabusiveacts
against their ownchildren,theponenciapositsthatR.A.9262usesthegender-neutralword"person"as
the offender which embraces any person of either sex.[22]
However,itmustbeborneinmindthat,andasshownfromtheprecedingdiscussion,legislativeintentis
ascertained from a consideration of the statute asawhole.[23] Theparticularwords,clausesandphrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the wholeandeverypartofthestatute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole.[24] Themeaningofthelawisnottobeextractedfromanysinglepart,portionorsectionor
fromisolatedwordsandphrases,clausesorsentencesbutfromageneralconsiderationorviewof
the act as a whole.[25]
In this regard, the term person under Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 cannot be read separately from the
succeeding phrases which the lawdeliberatelyusedtodescribeorqualifytheoffenderstherein.Itbears
emphasisthatSection3(a)describestheterm"p erson"asthewoman'shusband,formerhusband,person
withwhomthewomanhasorhadasexualordatingrelationship,orwithwhomshehasacommonchild.
Likewise,theuseoftheterm"person"arosefromarecognitionoftherealitythatwomenmayenterinto
intimate relationships not just withmen.Itdoesnotatallsignifythatthewomanherselfmaybean
offender,asthisinterpretationrunscountertotheveryessenceofthelaw,whichistheprotectionof
women from violence in the context of intimate relationships.
Furthermore, in defining violence committed against a child, R.A. 9262, from beginning to end,
consistentlyreferstotheabusedwoman'schild.Thisreinforcestheinterpretationthattheoffenderswith
respect to violence committed against the abused woman's child alsopertainstothewoman'shusband,
formerhusband,personwithwhomthewomanhasorhadasexualordatingrelationshiporwithwhom
thewomanhasacommonchild,orsimply,thechild'sownfather.Infact,nothinginR.A.9262explicitly
or even impliedly indicate that the woman herself oramotherisconsideredasanoffender;saveinthe
casesexplainedbytheCourtinthecaseofGarcia.Therefore,itisveryinaccuratetosaythatR.A.9262
does not limit or qualify the offenders when, in fact, the language of the law categorically does.
In stark contrast to R.A. 9262, R.A. 7610 explicitly names and penalizes parents — hence, including
mothers — as offenders or perpetrators of the violence committed against their child. As discussed,
Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 covers acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitationcommittedbyparents
against their own child. Aswell,thedeclaredpolicyofR.A.7610,asexpressedinSection2thereof,is
thattheStateshallinterveneonbehalfofthechildwhenabuse,exploitationanddiscriminationagainst
thechildarecommittedbythehisorherownparent,guardian,teacherorpersonhavingcareand
custody of the child.
Undoubtedly, R.A. 7610 is the law dedicated for the protection of a child, while R.A.9262isthelaw
enacted mainly to protect women in abusive relationships.ThecoreofR.A.7610istheprotectionofa
childfromallformsofabuse,neglectandexploitation,includingthosecommittedbytheirownparents.
Ontheotherhand,R.A.9262'sfocusisthegender-basedviolenceandabusecommittedagainstwomenin
intimaterelationships.ThisdistinctionbetweenR.A.9262andR.A.7610canalsoreasonablybeinferred
fromthefactthatR.A.9262wasmostlydrawnfromtheprovisionsoftheAnti-AWIRbillsinsteadofthe
various DV bills introduced in Congress.
During thedeliberationsofthiscase,itwasraisedthatthelegislativedebatesrevealthatR.A.9262was
intendedtoprovideamorecomprehensiveremedyandthatCongressoptednottoremovetheprotection
ofchildrenfromtheproposedmeasures.SenatorSotto'sstatementthatmothersalsocommitviolenceand
abuse against their children, and the discussion between Representative Darlene Antonino-Custodio
(Representative AntoninoCustodio) and Representative Imee Marcos (Representative Marcos) on
broadening the definition of child supposedly affirm this position.
With due respect, this is a wrong reading of the deliberations.
While Senator Sotto expressed that women, including mothers can be abusers, and thus, all children
should be part of R.A. 9262, as discussed, this proposalwaseffectivelymodifiedduringtheBicameral
ConferenceCommittee,whenthemembersdecidedtoaddtheword"their"beforechildren,tosignifythat
thechildcoveredbyR.A.9262isthechildoftheabusedwomanandnotjustanychildabusedinafamily
setting.Inotherwords,byaddingtheword"their"or"her"tomodifythewordsof"children"or"child,"
what R.A. 9262 simply intends is to extend protection not only to the abused woman, but also to the
abusedwoman'schildasheorsheisanunfortunatevictimoftheabusiverelationshiphisorhermotheris
into.
In this regard, the discussion between Representative AntoninoCustodio and RepresentativeMarcoson
broadeningtheterm"child"toincludealsothoseunderthewoman'scareshouldbereadtogetherwiththe
unanimous agreement to describe the child covered by R.A. 9262 as the child of the abused woman
confronted with such abusive relationship; as well as and the express language of the law on who the
offenders or perpetrators of the violence are. To be sure, Representative Marcos, in adopting the
suggestions to broadly define the term child, still made reference to their abused mothers:
REP. MARCOS: Therefore, to reiterate, taking into consideration both Representative Sarenas and
RepresentativeCustodio'sconcerns,theBicamtranscriptshouldthereforereflecttheintentofthisbodyto
broadlyinterprettheterm"children"notonlytoincludethebiologicalchildrenoftheabusedorviolated
mothers, but also all children under their care.[26] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)Accordingly, based on congressional records, the intent of R.A. 9262, similar to what its
language expresses, is toincludeonlythechildaffectedbytheabusiverelationshiphisorhermotheris
into, and not all childrensubjectedtoviolenceorabuseinafamily.IfR.A.9262istobeinterpretedto
includeallabusecommittedagainstachild,includingthosecommittedbytheirownmothers,thenR.A.
9262wouldalsocoverabusescommittedbygrandparents,uncles,aunties,elderbrotherorsister,orany
personlivinginthefamilyabode—circumstanceswhicharecertainlybeyondwhatR.A.9262intends.In
includingmothersasoffendersunderR.A.9262,andconsequently,allothermembersofahousehold,as
whattheponenciadoes,theverypolicyforthecreationofR.A.9262,whichistoprotectwomenagainst
violence in the context of intimate relationships, is effectively diluted. It also results inaconflationof
lawsandanabjectconfusionabout,andmaypossiblyconflictwith,thecoverageofR.A.7610.Truly,a
statutemustbeconstrued,notonlytobeconsistentwithitself,butalsotoharmonizeitwithotherlawson
thesamesubjectmatter,astoformacomplete,coherentandintelligiblesystem.[27] Theoperativewordis
to harmonize — not to confuse.
Response to Senior
Associate Justice
Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen (Justice
Leonen)
Justice Leonen, in his Concurring Opinion, opines that "violence and abuse in the context of intimate
relationships is not a gender issue but a power issue."[28] From this, he makes the argument that it is,
therefore, "entirely possible that women can be perpetrators of violence and abuse in domestic and
intimate relationships."[29] The ultimate conclusion from thesepremisesisthatthevictimsofwomenin
general, when they commit violence or abuse, can therefore seek the remedies under R.A. 9262.
While I agree with the premises, I do not agree that the premises warrant the conclusion.
I do not dispute thatdomesticabuseisanissueofpower.lnfact,abuseingeneralisanissueofpower.
Irrespective of context — whether it be in interstate relations(developedvs.developingcountries),the
Statevs.itscitizens,employersvs.itsemployees,parentsvs.theirchildren—theabilitytocommitacts
ofabuseisdirectlylinkedtopower.Powermaycomefromdifferentsourcesandindifferentforms:itcan
be political, economic, or rooted in culturalnorms,justtonameafew.Thisiswhylagreethatevenin
domesticsettings,abuseisanissueofpower.Historicallythough,alotofsocieties,includingours,have
givenmalesthesocialdutytoearnforthefamily.Ithaslongbeenthesocialexpectationforthewomanto
take care of the family and be a "housewife," while thehusbandistheoneexpectedtoearn.Thismay
indeed have skewedpowerindomesticrelationshipsinfavorofthemales,astheywouldnaturallyhold
economicpowerasaresultofthissocialexpectation.Nottomention,thereareotherfactorsaswellthat
contribute to abuse in domestic settings, such as gender socialization, to which most — regardless of
gender — are subjected, which perpetuate the notion that females are "the weaker sex."
Ithereforeacceptascorrectthepremisethatdomesticabuseisanissueofpower.WhatIcannotconcede,
however, is that this premise implies the following conclusion: that we can read R.A.9262beyondits
letter.
If this Court were the floors of Congress, and we were debating on the choice between enacting
"Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children," on the one hand, and a general "Anti-Domestic
Violence"measure,ontheother,lwouldsupportthelatter.Afterall,abuse,asafunctionofpower,cango
both ways regardless of sex.
Unfortunately,wearenotinthehallsofthelegislature.Instead,weareinacourtoflaw.Ourfunctionis
toapplythelaw,notdiscussordebateitswisdom.Andinmyview,asIamreadingthelawinitsentirety,
R.A.9262anditsprovisionsareclear:itonlyappliesinsituationswherewomenaresubjectedtoviolence
inthecontextofintimaterelationships.Thereferencetochildren,torepeat,hasalwaysbeeninrelationto
the woman subjected to violence. It covers situations where the child of an abused woman is
himself/herself subjected to abuse as a result of, or in connection with, the abuse against the woman.
Abuse against children in other contexts is covered by R.A. 7610.
JusticeLeonenalsowantstheCourttoliberallyapplyR.A.9262tothepresentcase,inthesamewaythat
the Court did in the cases of Estacio y Salvosa v. Estacio ySantos[30] (E
stacio)andGo-Tanv.Spouses
Tan[31] (Go-Tan).
However,asIseeit,thesecases,infact,fortifythepositionthatwhatR.A.9262penalizesistheviolence
committed against the woman and her child in the context of intimate relationships and not all abuse
committed against a child, as in the present case.
In Go-Tan, the victim was a woman, who was abusedbyherhusband.TheCourtruledthatR.A.9262
also applies to the husband's parents, asitwasallegedthatthehusband,conspiredwithhisparents,"in
tormenting [the wife] by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically."[32]
Similarly, in Estacio, the offender was the husband and the victim were the wife and their three (3)
children. As the trial court found, which the Court affirmed, that the offender-husband/father has
committed acts of abuse and violence against his wife and their three (3) children, the issuance of
protection orders also in favor of the children was proper. The Court said:
Here, petitioner's intent to intimidate and dominate respondent is readily seen. Back when they still
cohabited,petitionerwouldverballyandphysicallyabuserespondentinfrontoftheirchildren.Histhreats
tokillherweresorealthateventheirchildrenadvisedhertoleavetheconjugalhomebecausetheyfeared
forherlife.Whenhenolongerhadcontactwithher,petitionerresortedtousingtheirchildrenaspawns.
Hewouldusethispassive-aggressivebehaviortoasserthisperceiveddominanceoverrespondentwhenhe
could not get what he wanted. All of these can be characterized as psychological violence committed
against respondent, which have disrupted respondent's life.
Thus,whetherpetitionercommittedactsofviolencedirectlyagainsthischildrenisbesidethepoint.That
thechildrenwereexploitedsothathecouldindirectlyharassrespondentissufficientbasisfortheir
inclusioninthestay-awaydirective.Tobeginwith,petitionerhimselfdraggedtheirchildreninthe
controversy. With the stay-away directive, petitioner can no longer use their children to inflict
violenceonrespondent.[33] (Emphasissupplied)Toemphasize,aplainreadingofR.A.9262leadstoonly
one conclusion: it is meant to protect women who are subjected to violence in thecontextofintimate
relationships. The case before the Court is not about violence and abuse against women in intimate
relationship.ResorttoR.A.9262isthereforeerroneousandunwarranted.ItisincumbentupontheCourt
nottoundulyexpandR.A.9262'scoveragebeyonditsclearsphereofapplication.Toquotethewordsof
theCourtinGarcia,"Congresshasmadeitschoiceanditisnotourprerogativetosupplantthisjudgment.
Thechoicemaybeperceivedaserroneousbuteventhen,theremedyagainstitistoseekitsamendmentor
repealbythelegislative.Bytheprincipleofseparationofpowers,itisthelegislativethatdeterminesthe
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law."[34]
The trial court may
still grant reliefs to
the child under
A.M. No.
03-04-04-SC
While the purposeoftheponenciatoprotectthechildinthiscaseisquiteunderstandable,itneedlessly
confuses the laws that should apply.
Aswell,whilethecircumstancesofthepresentcasemakeitfallwithinthepurviewofR.A.7610,thereis
noshowingfromthenarrationofthefactswhethertherewasaComplaintorInformationforviolationof
R.A.7610thathadbeenfiledagainstprivaterespondentwhichmaybestowupontheRTCthejurisdiction
to issue protective reliefs under said law.
Nevertheless, while R.A. 9262 is not the appropriate law in this case and the RTC may not have the
jurisdictiontotryandhearthecaseforviolationofR.A.7610,Ifindthatpetitionerandhisminorchild
are not without any remedy.
Torecall,infilingthepetitionwiththetrialcourt,petitionernotonlypraysfortheissuanceoftemporary
andpermanentprotectionordersagainstprivaterespondent,butalsoforthetemporaryandpermanent
custody of his minor child. As such, the instant petition can be treated as a Petition for Custody of
MinorsandheardanddecidedfollowingA.M.No.03-04-04-SC.Underthisrule,apartfromdetermining
custody based on the best interest of the minor child, the trial court alsohastheauthoritytogrant
provisional and permanent reliefs for the child's protection.
Section13ofthesaidruleprovidesthatafterthefilingofananswerortheexpirationoftheperiodtofile
thesame,thetrialcourtmayissueaprovisionalorderawardingcustodyoftheminortoeitherparent,in
this case to petitioner, taking into account all relevantconsiderationsincludingpreferenceoftheminor
child, unlesstheparentchosenisunfit.[35] Thisawardofcustodytothefatherinthiscasewillbeatotal
and complete protection against the acts of the mother against the child.
Shortofgivingfullreliefbywayofacustodygrant,thetrialcourtisauthorizedunderSection17toissue
a Protection Order requiring any person:
(a) Tostayawayfromthehome,school,business,orplaceofemploymentoftheminor,otherparentor
any other party, or from any other specific place designated by the court;
(b) To cease and desist from harassing, intimidating, or threatening suchminorortheotherparentor
any person to whom custody of the minor is awarded;
(c) Torefrainfromactsofcommissionoromissionthatcreateanunreasonablerisktothehealth,safety,
or welfare of the minor;
(d) Topermitaparent,orapartyentitledtovisitationbyacourtorderoraseparationagreement,tovisit
the minor at stated periods;
(e) Topermitadesignatedpartytoentertheresidenceduringaspecifiedperiodoftimeinordertotake
personal belongings not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family Court; and
(f) To comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the minor.[36]
Notethatparagraph(f)grantsthetrialcourtsufficientauthoritytoissueincidentalandnecessaryreliefsto
protectachildfromanyformsofviolenceandabuse,includingthosecommittedbyhisorherownparent,
asinthiscase.Thus,inpursuitofthebestinterestoftheminorchild,theCourtmayremandthecaseto
thetrialcourtforthepurposesofhearingpetitioner'sprayerforcustodyofhisminorchildfollowingthe
aforementioned rules.
Lest I be misunderstood, I am one with theponenciainitsdesiretofulfilltheState'sdutyofshielding
children from all forms of abuse and exploitation. However, I cannotjoinwiththeponencia'sresortto
R.A.9262inthiscase.Indeed,thesolemnpoweranddutyoftheCourt,foremost,istointerpretandapply
the law within the boundaries set by its language and intent. It does not include the power to correct,
expand, or supplant by readingintothelawwhatisnotwrittentherein.[37] Inrulingthatmotherscanbe
offenders under R.A. 9262, the ponencia reads into the law something which the language and spirit
simplydonotprovide.Thisisabreachofthecourt'ssolemnduty.Thisisjudiciallegislation—onethat
has the deleteriouseffectofconflatingpenallaws,tothedetrimentoftheaccusedwhoisentitledtothe
proscription that all doubts be resolved in their favor.
In fine, all the foregoing considered, I find that public respondent did not errindenyingpetitionerthe
reliefs prayed for under R.A. 9262. Considering both the plain language and intent of the law, the
circumstances of this case clearly do not fall within the purview of R.A. 9262.
Thatsaid,toprotecttheparamountinterestandsecurityoftheminorchild,andtogiveprivaterespondent
herrighttodueprocess,thetrialcourtmaybedirectedtotreatthepetitionasapetitionforthecustodyof
a minor and hear and decide the case with dispatch following A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
WHEREFORE,IvotetoPARTLYGRANTthepetitionbutonlyinsofarasremandingthecasetothetrial
court to hear and decide the petition under the rules provided in A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
[1]
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING
FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on March 8, 2004.
[2]
RULE ON CUSTODY OF MINORS AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN RELATION TO
CUSTODY OF MINORS, approved on April 22, 2003.
[3]
OrdersdatedJanuary10,2018andMarch14,2018,rollo,pp.106-110and111-114,respectively,both
penned by Acting Presiding Judge Elisa R. Sarmiento-Flores.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 108-110.
[5]
Id. at 113; emphasis in the original.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
712 Phil. 44 (2013).
[12]
Id. at 103-104.
[13]
Federal Express Corporation v. Airfreight 2100,Inc., 800 Phil. 292, 304 (2016).
[14]
See Transcript of the Hearing on Committee onWomen dated February 19, 2002 and August 27, 2002.
[15]
See id.
[16]
Garcia v. Judge Drilon, supra note 11, at 86-89.
[17]
CongressionalRecords,MinutesoftheBicameralConferenceCommitteedatedJanuary26,2004,pp.
192-202.
[18]
See Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles.
[19]
ART. 59.Crimes.—Criminal liability shall attachto any parent who:
(1) Conceals or abandons the child with intent to make such child lose his civil status.
(2) Abandons the child under such circumstances as to deprive himofthelove,careandprotectionhe
needs.
(3) Sells or abandons the child to another person for valuable consideration.
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's station in life and financial
conditions permit.
(5) Fails or refuses, without justifiable grounds, to enroll the child as required by Article 72.
(6)Causes,abates,orpermitsthetruancyofthechildfromtheschoolwhereheisenrolled."Truancy"as
here used means absence without cause for more than twenty schooldays, not necessarily consecutive.
Itshallbethedutyoftheteacherinchargetoreporttotheparentstheabsencesofthechildthemoment
these exceed five schooldays.
(7)Improperlyexploitsthechildbyusinghim,directlyorindirectly,suchasforpurposesofbeggingand
other acts which are inimical to his interest and welfare.
(8) Inflictscruelandunusualpunishmentuponthechildordeliberatelysubjectshimtoindignitionsand
other excessive chastisement that embarrass or humiliate him.
(9) Causes or encourages the child to lead an immoral or dissolute life.
(10) Permits the child to possess, handle or carry a deadly weapon, regardless of its ownership.
(11) Allows or requires thechildtodrivewithoutalicenseorwithalicensewhichtheparentknowsto
have been illegally procured. If the motor vehicle driven by the child belongs totheparent,itshallbe
presumed that he permitted or ordered the child to drive.
"Parents"ashereusedshallincludetheguardianandtheheadoftheinstitutionorfosterhomewhichhas
custody of the child.
[20]
Approved on December 10, 1974.
[21]
R.A. 7610, Sec. 28 states:
SEC. 28. Protective Custody oftheChild.—Theoffendedpartyshallbeimmediatelyplacedunderthe
protectivecustodyoftheDepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopmentpursuanttoExecutiveOrderNo.
56, series or 1986. In the regular performance of this function, the officer oftheDepartmentofSocial
Welfare and Development shall be free from any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody
proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603. (AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS
VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on June 17, 1992)Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. 7610 provide:Sec. 8. Investigation. — Not later than forty-eight (48) hours after
receiptofareportonapossibleincidentofchildabuse,theDepartmentshallimmediatelyproceedtothe
home or establishment where the alleged child victim is found and interview said child to determine
whetheranabusewascommitted,theidentityoftheperpetratorandtheneedofremovingthechildfrom
hishomeortheestablishmentwherehemaybefoundorplacinghimunderprotectivecustodypursuantto
Section 9 of these Rules.
Whenever practicable, the Department shall conduct the interview jointly with the police and/or a
barangay official.
Tominimizethenumberofinterviewsofthechildvictim,hisstatementshallbetranscribedorrecorded
on voice or video tape.
Sec. 9. Protective Custody. — If the investigation discloses sexual abuse. serious physical injury or
life-threatening neglectofthechild,thedulyauthorizedofficerorsocialworkeroftheDepartmentshall
immediately remove the child from his home or the establishment where he was found and placehim
under protective custody to ensure his safety.
Sec.10.ImmunityofOfficerTakingtheChildUnderProtectiveCustody.—Thedulyauthorizedofficer
orsocialworkeroftheDepartmentandtheassistingpoliceofficerorbarangayofficial,ifany,whoshall
takeachildunderprotectivecustodyshallbeexemptfromanycivil,criminalandadministrativeliability
therefor.
Sec. 11. Notification of Police. — The Department shall inform the police or other law enforcement
agency whenever a child victim is placed under protective custody.
Sec.12.PhysicalExamination;Interview.—TheDepartmentshallreferthechildwhoisplacedunder
protective custody to a government medical or health officer for a physical/mental examination and/or
medical treatment. Thereafter, the Department shall determine the rehabilitation or treatment program
which the child may require and to gather data relevant to the filing or criminal charges against the abuser.
Sec. 13. Involuntary Commitment. — The Department shall file a petition for the involuntary
commitmentofthechildvictimundertheprovisionsofPresidentialDecreeNo.603,asamended,ifthe
investigation con firms the commission of child abuse.
Sec. 14. Suspension or Deprivation of Parental Authority. — The Department shall ask the Court to
suspendtheparentalauthorityoftheparentorlawfulguardianwhoabusedthechildvictim,Provided,that
incasesofsexualabuse,theDepartmentshallaskforthepermanentdeprivationorparentalauthorityor
the offending parent or lawful guardian.
Sec.15.TransferofParentalAuthority.—TheDepartmentshall,incaseorsuspensionordeprivationof
parentalauthorityandifthechildvictimcannotbeplacedunderthecareofanextofkin,asktheproper
CourttotransfersaidauthorityoverthechildvictimtotheDepartmentortotheheadofadulyaccredited
children's home, orphanage or similar institution. (RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE CASES, adopted on October 11, 1993)[22]
Seeponencia, pp. 10-11.
[23]
Aisporna v. CA, 198 Phil. 838, 847 (1982).
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id.
[26]
CongressionalRecords,MinutesoftheBicameralConferenceCommitteedatedJanuary26,2004,pp.
201-202.
[27]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) v.Court of Appeals, 735 Phil. 622, 628 (2014).
[28]
Concurring Opinion of Justice Leonen, p. 5.
[29]
Id.
[30]
G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020, accessed at
<h ttps://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66987>.
[31]
588 Phil. 532 (2008).
[32]
Id. at 538.
[33]
Supra note 30.
[34]
Supra note 11, at 89.
[35]
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, supra note 2.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Agote v. Judge Lorenzo, 502 Phil. 318, 334 (2005).
CONCURRENCE
LAZARO-JAVIER,J.:
The ability to ask the right
question is more than half the
battle of findingtheanswer.—
Thomas J. Watson, Founder,
International Business
Machines Corporation
I concur.
The ponencia illustrates the importance of first correctly defining the issue so we may arrive at the
appropriate ruling.
Here,thefactsarestraightforward.Thechildhasallegedlybeenabusedbyhermotheraftersheandher
spouse,thechild'sfather,becameestranged.Thechild'sfathersoughtgovernmentprotectiononbehalfof
the child. The policeallegedlydidnotprovideassistance.Sohepetitionedthetrialcourtforrelief,on
behalf of the child.
Whatsowedthetrialcourt'sconfusion,apparently,wasthefather'sinvocationofRepublicAct.No.(RA)
9262,theAnti-ViolenceAgainstWomenandTheirChildrenActof2004,[1] anditsruleofprocedure,the
Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children. Somehow, the title of this rule is
thought-provoking as itisambiguous–asworded,itseemstoimplythatthereisaruleontheviolence
inflicted upon women and their children, or stated differently, that violence against women and their
childrenmayberegulatedandthattheRuleprovidesthatregulation.Aswell,asthethoughtprocessof
the trial court has shown, the belief in error was that Rule could only be availed of by womenfor
womenandon behalfoftheirchildren.
This thought process was in error as itglossedovertheseconsiderations:(i)thefactthatchildrenhave
fatherstoo,(ii)thatwhenthereismaritalbreakdownortheseparationofunmarriedcouples,therecould
be permutations of the traditional family set-up, where the decision-making responsibilities for and
parentingtimeorcontactwiththechildrenaresituatedamongseveralbutnotnecessarilyunitedloci,and
(iii)eachoftheselocicouldpotentiallysummontheprotectionofthelawforthechildrenbeingallegedly
abused.
The foregoing three (3) matters are explicitly recognized by the Rule on Violence Against Womenand
theirChildren.ItsSection8isclearonwhomayapplyforaprotectionorder–theoffendedpartyorthe
legal agents of the latter, the parent/s or the guardian/s, among a host of others. As we canreadfrom
Section 8, the applicant for the protection order need not be for the applicant's own protection. The
applicant maysimplybeaconduit.Thelegalbasesforthisareplenty.Section3,Rule3oftheRulesof
CivilProcedure,asamendedrecognizesthelegitimacyofclaimsstakedbylitigationguardiansonbehalf
oftheirwards.Inthecaseofmarriedcouples,thisrepresentationisavailabletoparents,asrecognizedby
Article220(6)oftheFamilyCode–thataparentorbothparentshavetherighttorepresenttheirchildren
in all matters affecting their interests.
Childabusematterscaneitherberelationalornon-relational.Relationalchildabuseisgovernedbyand
large by RA 9262. RA 7610 may also be invoked because this statute does not distinguish between
relatives and non-relatives. If the child abuse is by a stranger, the offense belongs to RA 7610.
The RuleonViolenceAgainstWomenandtheirChildrendealsonlywithprotectionordersfallingunder
RA9262.Thismeansthattheprotectionissoughtforthewomanand/orherchild(bothbiologicaland
thoseonlyunderhercare)inadomesticorintimatesetting,andsubsidiaritytogetherwiththelatter,on
behalf of members of their family and/or household. Takeawaythissettingorthechild'squalifying
status, child abuse would be dealt with under RA 7610 and its administrative processes for protective
custody.Buttheproperpartywhomayinvokethemisnotonlythewomenandtheirchildren.Asubset
of others may invoke them on their behalf. In the same manner, these laws may beinvokednotonly
againsttherelationalfigurewhohasallegedlycommittedtheabusebutalsothosewhoconspiredwiththe
former.
Here, the trial court asked inerror,isthefatherentitledtoinvoketheRuleonViolenceAgainstWomen
andtheirChildren?ThequestionisinerrorsincethefatherwasnotinvokingtheRuleforhisownbenefit
butforthechild,onherbehalfThetrialcourtshouldhaveasked,maytheallegedlyabusedchild'sfather
seekaprotectionorderonbehalfofthechild?Hadtheissuebeenframedthisway,andhadthetrialcourt
beenalertedtothisframing,itwouldhaveavoidedthemistakenreferencestothecaselawitcitedinits
assailedOrderandwouldhaveresolvedtheissueappropriately.Asitis,weonlycouldsurmiseastowhat
hashappenedtothechild,andhopethatthedelayinthedispositionofthecasebelowhasnotfactoredin
any further harm to her.
ACCORDINGLY,IjointheMajorityinreversingtheassaileddispositionsofthetrialcourtandinissuing
a Temporary Protection Order against the mother of the child.
[1]
Republic Act. No. 9262, Anti-Violence Against Women and TheirChildrenActof2004,Approved:
March 08, 2004.
DISSENTING OPINION
ZALAMEDA,J.:
Nothing hurts a parent more than seeing one's childinpainorindanger.Afraidforhisbelovedchild's
safetyinthehandsofthechild'smother,theanxiousheartofafatherimpelledhimtofilethiscasewhich
now presentsacompellingpredicament:whetheramotherwhoabusesherchildcouldbeconsideredan
offender under Republic ActNo.(RA)9262[1] ortheAnti-ViolenceAgainstWomenandTheirChildren
Act of 2004. Theponenciaanswersintheaffirmative.Itrulesthatafathercanapplyforprotectionand
custodyordersagainstamotherallegedtohavecommittedactsofviolenceagainsttheirchildunderthe
auspices of RA 9262.
While I agree that,underSection9(b)ofRA9262,afatherhasstandingtofileacaseonbehalfofhis
minorchild,Iamconstrainedtodissentontheponenia'sconclusionthatRA9262maybeusedagainsta
mother who inflicted violence upon her own child. Both statutory text andcongressionalrecordsshow
thatRA9262wasspecificallyenactedtocoveractsofviolencecommittedonwomenandchildrenbya
woman's intimate partner. It wasnotintendedtocoveractsofviolencecommittedbyawomanagainst
her own child. Be that as it may, remand is proper to allow petitioner to avail of the remedy for the
protection of his child under A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC[2] (CustodyRule),asproposedbyJusticeAlfredo
Benjamin S. Caguioa.
Text of the law does
notcoverallkindsof
violence; statute
contemplates
violence committed
in the context of an
intimate relationship
As can be gleaned from the title of the law itself, thereferencetochildrenisinrelationtothewoman
victim of violence - "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
Section 3 of RA 9262 also defines the phrase "violence againstwomen and their children" as follows:
SECTION3.DefinitionofTerms.—AsusedinthisAct,(a)"Violenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren"
refers to any act or aseriesofactscommittedbyanypersonagainstawomanwhoishiswife,former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or hadasexualordatingrelationship,orwith
whom he has a commonchild,oragainstherchildwhetherlegitimateorillegitimate,withinorwithout
thefamilyabode,whichresultinorislikelytoresultinphysical,sexual,psychologicalharmorsuffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.[3]Clearly, RA 9262 does not purport to cover all kinds of violence committed
against a woman; rather, it contemplates only violence committed in the context of an intimate
relationship, i.e., former orexistingmarriageorsexualordatingrelationshipbetweentheoffenderand
the woman victim of violence.
Moreover, while the definition considers the possibility of harm against a child (whether a child in
commonwiththeoffenderorthewoman'schildfromadifferentrelationship),thelawdefinestheoffender
to be the woman's former or current intimate partner or the father of her child. As such, the law's
definition of violence does not cover harm inflicted upon a child by the mother herself.
This interpretation is consistent with thewordingsoftheotherprovisionsofthelaw,whichpresuppose
that the victim is the woman or her child, thus:
SECTION8.ProtectionOrders.—AprotectionorderisanorderissuedunderthisActforthepurposeof
preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specifiedinSection5ofthisActand
granting other necessary relief. x x x
x x x x
SECTION28.Custodyofchildren.–Thewomanvictimofviolenceshallbeentitledtothecustodyand
support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old or older but with mental orphysical
disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Avictimwhoissufferingfrombatteredwomansyndromeshallnotbedisqualifiedfromhavingcustody
ofherchildren.Innocaseshallcustodyofminorchildrenbegiventotheperpetratorofawomanwhois
sufferingfromBatteredwomansyndrome.[4]AsaptlyemphasizedbyJusticeCaguioa,thelawconsistently
andrepeatedlyassociatestheterm"child"with"woman."[5] Thelawdoesnottreatthechildindependently
of the woman victim.[6]
Onthisscore,theponenciadeclaresthatRA9262allowsthefatheroftheoffendedparty(child)toapply
forprotectionandcustodyorders.Insupportthereof,theponenciacitesSection9(b)ofRA9262,which
allows "parents or guardians of the offended party" to file a petition for protection order.
However, Section 9 (b) should be interpreted to mean that a father has standing to file a petition for
protection orderiftheprotectionsoughtisforhischildwhohasbeenavictimofviolencetogetherwith
themother.Thiscanhappeninascenariowherethemotherhadasubsequentrelationshipwithsomeone
who inflicted violence against her and/or her child, and for some reason, the mother refused to file a
petitionforprotectionorder.Thecomplexitiesoftheissuecouldpreventthewomanfromexhaustinglegal
remediesforherandherchild.Thelaw,however,allowsotherrelativesandevenconcernedcitizenstofile
thepetition.ThisisconsistentwiththecharacterizationthatthecrimepunishedunderRA9262isapublic
crime, thus:
SECTION25.PublicCrime.—Violenceagainstwomenandtheirchildrenshallbeconsideredapublic
offensewhichmaybeprosecuteduponthefilingofacomplaintbyanycitizenhavingpersonalknowledge
of the circumstances involving the commission of the crime.Thus, while a father hasstandingtofilea
petitionforprotectionorderunderRA9262,itshouldbeagainstapersonwithwhomawomanhasorhad
a relationship, and not against the woman herself. Congressional records further support this conclusion.
Legislative records
show that RA 9262
was primarily
enacted to protect
women from
gender-based
violence committed
by their intimate
partners or the
fathers of their
children; children
aremerelyincidental
beneficiaries, and
the law only covers
children of women
victims
ThelegislativehistoryofRA9262revealsaconsciouschoicetolimittheoffenderstobeensnaredbythe
law. Such restraint stems from a policy decision to accord special protection to women, who are
disproportionately affected by violence. In opting to focus on gender-basedviolenceanditsimmediate
effects,legislatorsnecessarilyrejectedtheinclusionofallotherkindsofviolence,likethatcommittedby
a mother against her child.
Acloserstudyoftherationaleandprogressionoftheoriginatingbillsisnecessary,ifonlytoelucidatethe
intendedcoverageofRA9262.Thecoverageofthelawwassuchahighlycontentiousissuethatitledto
theapprovalofthreeseparatebillswithvaryingscopes:(1)HouseBillNo.(HB)6054,alsoknownasthe
Anti-Domestic Violence Bill (Anti-DV Bill);[7] (2) HB 5516, or the Anti-Abuse of Women inIntimate
Relationships (Anti-A WIR Bill);[8] and (3) SenateBill No. (SB) 2723.[9]
The Anti-DV Bill, hadbroaderprovisions.Itcovereddomesticviolence"committedbyandagainstany
member of the family or household[,] whether minor, adult or elderly."[10] Thus, the offender was not
limitedtowomen'sintimatepartners,andevencoveredmothers.TheAnti-DVBilllistedthefollowingas
offenders:
1.WhoMayBeLiable-Anypersonwhoshallcommitanyactoractsashereindefinedshallbeliablefor
the crime of domestic violence. This includes, but not limited, to the following:
a) ascendants and descendants;
b) the spouse or former spouse, live-in partner or former live-in partner of the victim;
c) a partner in a dating or sexual relationship, current or former;
d) parents and siblings, whether biological or adoptive;
e) domestic workers/helpers or household staff; and,
f) relatives by consanguinity or affinity including step-parents and step-siblings.[11]
In contrast, the Anti-A WIR Bill, merely covered former and current intimate partners of abused
women.[12] By express provision, other family members, including children, were directed to resort to
other laws, such astheRevisedPenalCodeandRA7610.[13] Nonetheless,theAnti-AWIRBillgranted
them the option to seek the issuance of a protection order under the proposed law.[14]
ThoseadvocatingfortheexpansiveprotectionundertheAnti-DVBillarguedthatthelawshouldprotect
everyone–wives,husbands,children,elderly,andevensame-sexpartners–from"allformsofabusethat
takeplaceinthehome."[15] Theyclaimedthat"womencanalsobeguiltyoftheactsubjectmatterofthe
bills, especially if psychological abuse is considered."[16]
Meanwhile,thosesupportingthenarrowly-drawnprovisionsoftheAnti-AWIRBillclaimedthatthelaw
should be single-minded and incisive; the focus should be on gender-basedviolenceagainstwomenin
intimate relationships, as that is the gap in legislation.[17] Advocates and resource persons further
emphasized that other forms of abuse were already covered byexistinglaws.[18] FormerRepresentative
Bellaflor Angara-Castillo, one of the authors of the Anti-A WIR Bill, expounded thus:
I think what the legislation we need right now is really a bill focused on women in intimate
relationships because that is the gap in our present legislation. It's not really about domestic
violence where you includeeverybodywithinthehouseholdwhetheritbethewomen,Imean,the
wife, thehusband,thechildren,theparents,thestepparents,stepchildren,eventhe...yeah,anyone
within the household and we have always said that that is very misleading. You say it isasifyouare
acceptingtheassumptionthatyoucanhaveviolenceagainstthewomenonlywithinthehomebutthatis
not correct. Because many acts of violence are committed against the womenoutsidethehome,inthe
workplace oranywhereelse.AndIsaidwhatweneedisafocusedlegislationonwomeninintimate
relationships. Because if you include the man, the children, the children are already covered by
RepublicAct7610.IfthereisanythinglackingintheprotectionofchildreninthatRepublicAct,by
allmeanswecanamendit.Ifyouarethinkingofprotectionofthemen,theyarealreadycoveredby
the Revised Penal Code and so are the other members of the household who are there. But it is
whenawomanisabused,awomaninanintimaterelationshipbeingabusedbyherpartner,thereis
wherewedon'thaveaspecificlegislationthatwilltellyouwhatarethelegalremediesavailabletoher
to protect herself. x x x x[19]During the deliberations of the House of Representatives' Committee on
Women,Ms.MaureenPagaduan,thenExecutiveDirectoroftheWomen'sLegalBureau,Inc.,emphasized
the importance of a law focusing on abuse by women's intimate partners:
Thesecondpointofresistance.Thebillislimitedinscopeandexcludeschildrenasprimarybeneficiaries.
It also does not cover other members of the household. So eto pa yung ni-re-raise na isang issue.
The[A]nti-AWIR[B]illisspecificallyfocusedonwomeninintimaterelationshipsbecauseofthedistinct
nature of abuse against women in intimate relationships characterized by intimacy, cohabitation or
marriage. Pag sinabing intimacy, may sexual na tinutukoy yung abuse, sexual abuse, particularly.
Furthermore, children andothermembersofhouseholdarenotwithoutremedies.Therearelaws
designedtoprotectchildren,housemaids,andotherfamilyrelatives.RepublicAct7610,knownas
the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act is
comprehensive enough to address the special needs of abused children. Nilinawnaminitongakay
Congresswoman Bella Angara.
Thenatureofrelationshipbetweenhousehelpandhousemaidsisdistinctfromthatofwomeninintimate
relationshipssincetheformerischaracterizedbyanemployer-employeerelationship.Therefore,anyform
ofviolenceandabuseagainsthousehelparecoveredbyourlaborlaws.AngdistinctsaAWIReyung
abuse na mula sa kapangyarihan na sexual. Iyon ang pinaka-distinct. Ano ang ibig sabihin ng
abusong nangyayaring iyon. The other members of the family including men may avail of the
release provided by existing laws. The Revised Penal Code penalizes any person guilty of inflicting
physical injuries against another. The victim may alsoopttofileforcivilactionfordamagesandother
release under the Civil Code.[20]Relatedly, Atty. Evalyn Ursua cautioned that a broad anti-domestic
violencelawcouldbeweaponizedandusedagainstwomen.[21] Thus,sheurgedCongressto"considerthe
distinct situation of women and [to] not disempower them further by giving more power to the
abusers."[22] Ms. Elizabeth Angsioco of the Democratic Socialist Women of the Philippines further
emphasizedthattheinclusionofotherkindsofviolencecoulddilutetheprotectionenvisionedbylaw,and
even prejudice women, thus:
Concernponaminitokasiwhenthe[A]nti-AWIR[B]illwasbeingdeveloped,yungparticularreliefsna
itoaremeantforwomen.Andpagkaibinigaynatindoonsamenatthesametime,weareverymuch
concerned that pag pumasa yung DV as written with the existing reliefs in that bill, it will
eventually be anti-women and we areveryconcernedaboutthis,YourHonors.[23]AstotheSenate,SB
2723initiallyhadasimilarscopeasHouse'sAnti-DVBill,covering"anyactoraseriesofactscommitted
byandagainstanymember/softhefamilyoragainstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhadadating
relationship, within or without the family abode..."[24] SB 2723 was envisioned to be a "synthesized
measure" harmonizing two conflicting bills – the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" which covered abuse
committed by and against any member of the family, and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act" which only pertained to abuse committed by a woman's intimate partner.[25]
However,duringtheplenarydeliberations,theSenatevotedtoadoptaversionthatisnarrowerinscope.
The delimitation was intended to refocus the main purpose of the law, i.e., to protect women against
domestic abuse. The text, as amended, approximates the final wordingusedinRA9262.Thepertinent
portions of the deliberations read:
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
AsIsaidearlier,therearenameless,countless,voicelesswomenwhohavenothadtheopportunitytofile
a case against their spouses, their live-in partners afteryears,ifnotdecade,ofbatteryandabuse.Ifwe
broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all beabusedbythewomenortheir
spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
Ithinkthatthesponsor,basedonourearlierconversations,concurswiththisposition.Iamsurethatthe
men in this Chamber who love their women in their livessodearlywillagreewiththisrepresentation.
Whetherwelikeitornot,itisanunequalworld.Whetherwelikeitornot,nomatterhowempoweredthe
womenare,wearenotgivenequalopportunitiesespeciallyinthedomesticenvironmentwherethemacho
Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
x x x x
The President Pro Tempore.The session is resumed.Senator Legarda is recognized.
Senator Legarda.Mr. President, just for clarification,may I repeat my amendment.
Onpage1,line15,thephrase"andagainstanymemberofthefamilyoragainst"bedeleted;afterwhich,
insert the phrase "ANY PERSON AGAINST A WOMAN WHO IS HIS WIFE, FORMER WIFE,
HIS/HER LIVE-IN PARTNER OR FORMER LIVE-IN PARTNER OR AGAINST;"
Insert the phrase, "OR WITH WHOM THE PERSON HAS A CHILD IN COMMON, OR HAS A
BLOODRELATIONSHIPTHROUGHACHILD,"afterthephrase"awomanwithwhomthepersonhas
or had a dating relationship" on page 1, line 16;
x x x x
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removingthe"menandchildren"inthisparticularbillandfocusspecificallyonwomenalone.Thatwill
be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished
sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the
proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
x x x x
SenatorEjercitoEstrada.Theamendmentisaccepted,Mr.President.[26]Thus,theamendmentmadeSB
2723substantiallysimilarwiththeAnti-AWIRBill,inthatbothfocusedonviolencecommittedagainst
women in intimate relationships, and the offenders were the women's intimate partners.
Duringthebicameralconferenceonthethreeconflictingbills,itwassuggestedanewthatthedefinitionof
violence against women be expandedtocoverotherfamilymembers.[27] RepresentativeAngara-Castillo
objected to the proposal, emphasizing, among others, the main object of the bill:
I think we are losing sight of the fact that we arepassingabillforwomen.Andthisisbecauseofthe
recognitionthatthecrimeagainstwomenisgender-based.So,itisnotacaseof,forinstance,themother
gettingangrywiththesonorthefathergettingangrywiththedaughter.Wearetalkingaboutabillbased
on gender-based approach to the crime againstwomen.xxx[28]Ultimately,thecommitteevotedagainst
the proposal and opted to adopt the definition of violence in SB 2723, which, except its reference to
children, had a similar thrust with the Anti-A WIR Bill.
Notably,duringthebicameralconference,thecommitteealsodecidedtoincludeasperpetratorsthefather
ofawoman'schildandthewoman'ssexualpartner.[29] Theinclusionwasintendedtocoverpersonswith
whomthewomanhadasinglesexualact(asopposedtoadatingrelationship),andthefatherofchildren
born of rape.[30] Nonetheless, the expansion of offenders was still very limited; it still required sexual
relations or fatherhood.
Thus, the legislative history of RA 9262 shows a clear intent to frame its provisions in the contextof
gender-based violence in intimate or sexual relations. This is in recognition of the fact that violence
againstwomenis"closelylinkedwiththeunequalpowerrelationshipbetweenwomenandmenotherwise
known as 'gender-based violence.'"[31] Violence against women is "a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power."[32]
Onthispoint,IsharetheviewofJusticeMarvicM.V.F.Leonenthatviolenceinintimaterelationshipsis
ultimatelyanissueofpower,andnotmerelyofgender.[33] Itistruethatwomenmayalsobeaggressors;
theyarenotalwayspowerlessvictims.Nonetheless,thelegislaturemadeaconsciouspolicychoicewhen
it confined the law's coverage to violence against women and the resulting harm to their children.
This special focus was justified by statistics on violence against women at the time SB 2723 was
presentedtotheSenateplenary–"Femaleviolencecomprisedmorethan90%ofallformsofabuseand
violence and more than 90% of these reported caseswerecommittedbythewomen'sintimatepartners
suchastheirhusbandsandlive-inpartners."[34] Incontrast,therewerenostatisticsonviolencecommitted
by women. Hence, concerns were raised against legislating on an issue without any empirical basis.[35]
Thus, RA 9262 should not be construed tocoverallkindsofviolencecommittedbyanyperpetrator.It
was enacted to specifically address one form of violence, i.e., gender-based violence committed by
women'sintimatepartnersorthefathersoftheirchildren.Toholdotherwisewouldbetoharkbacktothe
broad coverage of the Anti-DV Bill, which Congresshasdeliberatelyabandoned.Moreover,aspointed
out by women's rights advocates, such broad scope may result in theweaponizationofthelawagainst
women, who are supposedly the primary beneficiaries of the law.
Indeed,despitetheprogressionofjurisprudenceindefiningotherpossibleoffendersunderRA9262,case
law remains consistent that the main offender should be an intimate or sexual partner of the woman
victim,or,attheveryleast,thefatherofherchild.Forinstance,inGarciav.Drilon,[36] theCourtrejected
thecontentionthathusbandsorfathersaretheonlypossibleperpetratorsofviolenceunderRA9262,asin
factitconcededthatRA9262mayevenencompasslesbianrelationships.InGo-Tanv.SpousesTan,[37] the
Court applied theprincipleofconspiracytoholdparents-in-lawasproperco-respondentsinacasefiled
byawifeagainstherabusivehusband.Nevertheless,inalloftheforegoingcases,RA9262wasapplied
given the existence of underlying intimate or sexual relations, i.e., the main offending party was an
intimate or sexual partner of the woman victim.
Legislators likewise contemplated the inclusion of children underthemantleofRA9262tobelimited.
Theprotectionofthelawisintendedfor"womenandtheirchildren,"notwomenandchildrenseparately.
Itisclearfromthetitleofthelawthatthechildrencoveredbytheactarethechildrenofwomenvictims
of violence.
Theponenciacitestheuseofthedisjunctiveterm"or"inthepenalprovisionsunderSection5ofRA9262
to further the interpretation that the law covers women and children separately.[38] This interpretation,
however, ignores the intent of the law as canbegleanedfromthecongressionaldeliberations.Thatthe
law covers children of women victims of violence only, not all children, was emphasized during the
bicameral deliberations, to wit:
REP.SARENAS:MadamChair,Ishouldhavebroughtthisupearlierbutwecertainlyaretalking
aboutnotjustanychildbutachildofawomanvictimofviolence.And,therefore,tomakethatclear,
Madam Chair,Isuggestthatweincludeinourproposalsomewherewherewedescribewhothevictims
canbethefollowingwords:"childrenarethosebelow18yearsofageorolderbutareincapableoftaking
careofthemselvesasdefinedunderRepublicAct7610,whichistheChildrens(sic)ProtectionLawand
inthecontextofthelaw,includethechildrenofthewomanfromapreviousmarriageorrelationship,her
commonchildrenwiththeperpetrator,heradoptedchildrenandthosechildrenwhodonot,herown,live
with her and are dependent on her emotionally." x x x
REP. MARCOS:x x x
Idon'tknowifthisconfusestheissueoritclarifiesit.WhatiftheSenateversionshouldreadasfollows,
inordertotakeintoconsiderationtheconcernsofRepresentativeSarcnasthatprioritybegivento
children in these abusive families to wit: An Act Defining Violence Against Women and their
Children, Providing Protective Measures and Penaltiestherefor and for Other Purposes."
REP. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO: Maám, question. Actually, may incident kasi, tunay na incident na
nangyari saaminna'yunganakis,actuallyhindin'yaanak,eh,anaknungasawan'ya,pero,parangshe
wasstillbinded(sic)bythatrelationshipkasikahithindin'yaanak'yungbata,kahitpapa'nolumakinasa
kanya, eh. So, depende sa kanya—so,mayholdparin'yungasawan'yadahildunsaanaknungasawa.
That's an actual case, eh, in our area.
REP. MARCOS: I think such a situation would be covered in fact by women and their children,
inasmuchasthatchildisdependentuponthatmother,eitherasawardorasanadoptedchild.So,okay,
lang 'yun.
REP. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO: Kasi baka --- I mean, usually and even in some cases they are not
adopted child - they are not adopted children, eh.
REP.MARCOS:No,eveniftheyhavenotbeenofficiallyadopted,it'stantamounttoawardrelationship
ordependencyrelationship.So,palagaykocoveredna'yonkasitheyarechildren.Kasinga,Ithinkthere
shouldbeadistinctionthatthisisnotalawforallchildreneverywhereunderallcircumstances,but
ratherchildrenwhoareconfrontedwiththisabusiverelationshipwithinthefamilyabode.[39]Further,
inthebicameraldeliberations,RepresentativeAngara-Castillomaintainedherpositionastheauthorofthe
Anti-A WIR Bill that the childrenshouldbeincludedonlyasincidentalbeneficiariesoftherelieftobe
granted to the woman victims:
Madam Chair, if we go – I understand when I came in, that you said you are going to reserve the
discussion of the title at the last.Thisonewillhaveabearingontheconsiderationofwhetherthe(sic)
would include children in the act at all.
My point is that,justfortherecordbecauseIdon'tknowwhatwasagreeduponbeforeIcame,I
don'tthinkweshouldincludechildreninthebill,exceptasanincidentalbeneficiariesofthereliefs
to be granted to the woman victim. BecauseRepublicAct7610isalreadysocomprehensiveasto
cover all the rights of the child.
Inthesamemannerthatwhenwewereconsideringchildlabor,wedecidednottomakeamagnacartafor
childlaborbecausewealreadyhaveexistinglawonchildlaborbutmerelytoamendexistinglegislation.
Andmypositionisthat,ifweneedtogivethechildmorerights,thenweshouldamend7610becausethat
is the act applicable to children. I do not think this is really wise or prudent to include them in this
particular bill because their inclusion is already guaranteed there by way of the relief that willbenefit
them as they are grantedtotheirmotherbutit'snotnecessaryforthemtobemadeapartofthetitleor
really of the bill itself. Except, as I said, as incidental beneficiaries of the reliefs to be granted to the
offendedmother.[40]Verily,thelanguageofSection5(a)shouldbeunderstoodwithinthecontextthatwhat
the law intends to address is gender-based violence, and children of women victims of such violence,
usually caught in the crossfire, are incidental beneficiaries of the law.
Remedy may be
found in RA 7610;
RA 9262 cannot be
applied in this case
without violatingthe
proscription against
judicial legislation
Petitioner is not without remedy. The alleged acts of private respondent Rosalina Sibal Knutson
(Rosalina) may fall under Section 10 (a)ofRA7610,whichpenalizes"[a]nypersonwhoshallcommit
anyotheractsofchildabuse,crueltyorexploitationortoberesponsibleforotherconditionsprejudicialto
the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended."
WhileitisrecognizedthatRA7610doesnotcontaintheinnovativeremediesofprotectionandcustody
orders provided under RA 9262, this is a necessary consequence of the language of RA 9262, whose
wisdomisnotsubjecttotheCourt'sreview.Notably,Section8oftheAnti-AWIRBillprovidesthatother
family members, including children, should resort to other laws such asRA7610whenfilingcriminal
complaints for abuse, but they were allowed to apply for a protection order provided in the bill.
Unfortunately, the proviso on the extension of the protection orders to other family members was not
adopted in theenactedlaw.Bethatasitmay,theCourtcannotapplytheprotectionordertochildrenin
situations where the mother is the abuser.
TheprimordialdutyoftheCourtismerelytoapplythelawinsuchawaythatitshallnotusurplegislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not
makeorsuperviselegislation,orundertheguiseofinterpretation,modify,revise,amend,distort,remodel,
or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.[41]
Undeniably,thepromotionofwelfareandbestinterestofchildrenarenoblepurposes.Iaminfullsupport
of the State policy to exert efforts to address violence against children in keeping with our obligation
under the Constitution and international human rights instruments to which we areaparty.TheCourt,
however, cannot go beyond its constitutional mandate and exercise a power that is clearly vested in
another branch of the government, no matter how noble the cause and the liberal interpretation clause
under Section 4[42] of RA 9262 notwithstanding.
To illustrate, the Court in the1997caseofRepublicv.AlarconVergara[43] (V
ergara),acknowledgedthe
purposeofouradoptionlawsbutwasconstrainedtodenythejointadoptionbyanalienandhisspouse,a
former Filipino citizen, of the two minor children who are relatives of the latter,viz:
Wearenotunmindfulofthemainpurposeofadoptionstatutes,whichisthepromotionofthewelfareof
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied withcompassion,understandingandlessseverityin
viewofthefactthatitisintendedtoprovidehomes,love,careandeducationforlessfortunatechildren.
Regrettably,theCourtisnotinapositiontoaffirmthetrialcourt'sdecisionfavoringadoptioninthecase
at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however,thatthelawonthematterisamended,wecannotsustain
the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.[44]Article 184oftheFamilyCodecitedinVergara,which
proscribes adoption byanalienexceptinverylimitedcircumstances,hasbeenamendedin1998byRA
8552,followedbytherecentlyenactedRA11642.Theamendatorylawsnowprovideforawiderlatitude
foradoptionbyforeignnationals.Indeed,Congressrespondstocallsforneworamendatorylegislationto
confrontgapsinourlegalframework.AnyperceivedinadequaciesofRA7160shouldthusbedirectedto,
and addressed by, Congress.
Case should be
remanded and tried
under A.M. No.
03-04-04-SC
EvenifthiscasedoesnotfallunderRA9262,thetrialcourtmaystillprovideprotectivereliefsinfavorof
petitionerandhisminorchild.IjoinJusticeCaguioa'sopinionthatthepetitionfiledbeforethetrialcourt
shouldbetreatedasoneforcustodyofaminor.Thereafter,thetrialcourtshouldapplytheCustodyRule
and grant the appropriate reliefs.
The Custody Rule applies to petitions for custody of minors and writs of habeas corpus in relation
thereto.[45] Section 2 to 4 of the Rule specify thebasic requirements for a petition for custody:
SECTION2.Petitionforcustodyofminors;whomayfile.—Averifiedpetitionfortherightfulcustody
ofaminormaybefiledbyanypersonclaimingsuchright.Thepartyagainstwhomitmaybefiledshall
be designated as the respondent.
SECTION3.Wheretofilepetition.—ThepetitionforcustodyofminorsshallbefiledwiththeFamily
Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found.
SECTION 4.Contents of petition. — The verified petitionshall allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and of the respondent;
(b) Thename,ageandpresentwhereaboutsoftheminorandhisorherrelationshiptothepetitionerand
the respondent;
(c) The material operative facts constituting deprivation of custody; and
(d) Such other matters which are relevant to the custody of the minor.
The verified petition shall beaccompaniedbyacertificateagainstforumshopping,whichthepetitioner
mustsignpersonally.ThepetitionbeforethetrialcourtmeetsthebasicrequirementsoftheCustodyRule.
It was verified and filed by petitioner, a person claiming rightful custody of hischild.Itwasalsofiled
before the FamilyCourtofthecitywherepetitionerallegedlyresides.[46] Moreover,thepetitionnarrates
facts supporting petitioner's prayer for temporary and permanent custody of his minor child.[47]
Thus, there is no procedural hindrance to treating the petition as one for custody of a minor. Even
assuming that there is, petitioner may simply amend his petition to fully conform with the Custody
Rule.[48]
In theapplicationofsuchRule,thetrialcourtmayissueaprotectionorderrequiringthecommissionor
omissionofactsnecessarytoprotecttheminor.[49] Thus,whilepetitionermaynotavailoftheprotection
order specifically provided in RA 9262, he may still obtain the same protections through the Custody
Rule.ItisinthiswaythattheCourtmayexerciseitsliberalitywithoutviolatingitsmandate.TheCourt
need not unnecessarily extend the application of the law to protect the interests of the minor child.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petitioninsofarasitpraysfortheissuanceofaprotectionorder
underRepublicActNo.9262.ThecaseshouldbeREMANDEDtothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedings
following A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
[1]
Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: 08 March 2004.
[2]
RULE ON CUSTODY OF MINORS AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN RELATION TO
CUSTODY OF MINORS.
[3]
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[4]
Underscoring supplied.
[5]
Dissenting Opinion of J. Caguioa, pp. 5-6.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Entitled"ANACTDEFININGDOMESTICVIOLENCE,PROVIDINGPROTECTIONMEASURES
ANDPENALTIESTHEREFOR,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES";substitutedHB376,583,1320,2753,
2858, and 4941.
[8]
Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF ABUSE OF WOMEN IN INTIMATE
RELATIONSHIPS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"; substituted HB 35.
[9]
Entitled"ANACTDEFININGVIOLENCEAGAINSTWOMENANDMEMBERSOFTHEFAMILY
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR
VICTIMS,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES";substitutedSB594,644,775,864,1263,1527,1574,1915,
and 2490.
[10]
HB 6054, Sec. 3.
[11]
HB 6054, Sec. 5. Emphasis supplied.
[12]
HB 5516, Sec. 3 reads:
SEC. 3. Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships. - The crime of abuse of women in intimate
relationshipsiscommittedbyanypersonagainstawomanwhoishiswifeorformerwife,his/herlive-in
partnerorformerlive-inpartner,oragainstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhadasexualordating
relationship through any of the following acts: x x x[13] HB 5516, Sec. 8 reads:
SEC.8.CriminalComplainttobeFiledbyFamilyorHouseholdMember.Familyorhouseholdmembers
abused under Sections3(e)and3(g)hereinmayfilecriminalcomplaintsundertheRevisedPenalCode,
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of ChildrenAgainstChildAbuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act", and other relevant or applicable laws, without prejudice to their
applying for a protection order under the provisions of this Act.[14] Id.
[15]
House Committee on Women Records, 12th Congress,p. 7 (19 February 2002).
[16]
Id. at 5.
[17]
House Committee on Women Records, 12th Congress,p. 4 (27 August 2002).
[18]
House Committee on Women Records, 12th Congress,pp. 12-13 (19 February 2002).
[19]
House Committee on Women Records, 12th Congress,pp. 3-4 (27 August 2002).
[20]
Id. at 12-13. Emphasis supplied.
[21]
Id. at 40.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id. at 20-21. Emphasis supplied.
[24]
SB 2723, Sec. 3 (a).
[25]
II RECORD, SENATE 12TH CONGRESS 3RD SESSION 833-834(10 December 2003).
[26]
III RECORD, SENATE 12TH CONGRESS 3RD SESSION104-105 (14 January 2004).
[27]
Minutes oftheBicameralConferenceCommitteeontheDisagreeingProvisionsofSB2723andHB
5516 and 6054, p. 17 (26 January 2004).
[28]
Id. at 20.
[29]
SeeRepublicActNo.9262(2004),Sec.3(a):"Violenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren"refersto
anyactoraseriesofactscommittedbyanypersonagainstawomanxxxxwithwhomthepersonhasor
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child x x x x"
[30]
MinutesoftheBicameralConferenceCommitteeontheDisagreeingProvisionsofSB27235516and
6054, pp. 25-30 and pp. 50-55 (26 January 2004).
[31]
Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 91 (2013).
[32]
Id. at 92.
[33]
Reflections of J. Leonen, pp. 3-4.
[34]
II RECORD, SENATE 12TH CONGRESS 3RD SESSION 832(10 December 2003).
[35]
House Committee on Women Records, 12th Congress,pp. 7-8 and 35-36 (27 August 2002).
[36]
712 Phil. 44 (2013).
[37]
588 Phil. 532 (2008).
[38]
Ponencia, p. 14.
[39]
Minutes oftheBicameralConferenceCommitteeontheDisagreeingProvisionsofSB2723andHB
5516 and 6054, pp. 194-201 (26 January 2004). Emphases and underscoring supplied.
[40]
Id. at 192. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[41]
H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 824 Phil. 613, 636-637 (2018) citing
Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353-498 (2014).
[42]
SECTION4.Construction.-ThisActshallbeliberallyconstruedtopromotetheprotectionandsafety
of victims of violence against women and their children.
[43]
336 Phil. 944 (1997).See also In re Lim, 606Phil. 82 (2009).
[44]
336 Phil. 944, 948-949 (1997). Emphasis supplied.
[45]
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, Sec. 1.
[46]
Rollo, p. 52.
[47]
Id. at 52-67.
[48]
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, Sec. 1, inrelationtothe2019AMENDMENTSTOTHE1997RULESOF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 10, Secs. 1 and 2.
[49]
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, Sec. 1.
DISSENTING OPINION
SINGH,J.:
Abuse is gender-blind. Women, children, andevenmen,areallsusceptibletoabuseandviolenceatthe
handsoftheverypeoplewhoaresupposedtoprotectandcareforthem—theirownfamilymembersand
loved ones. Quite unnaturally, the family has become a breeding ground for violence and abuse.
In 2018, basedonthepreliminaryfindingofthe2017NationalDemographicandHealthSurvey,onein
everyfourever-marriedwomenaged15to49hasexperiencedphysical,sexualoremotionalviolenceat
the hands of their husband or partner. One in every five women, or 20%, has experienced emotional
violence; 14% has experienced physical violence; and 5% has experienced sexual violence from their
currentormostrecenthusbandorpartner.[1] Thissocietalprevalenceofviolenceagainstwomenandtheir
children (VAWC) by their intimate partners, i.e., their current or former husband, live-in partner,
boyfriend or girlfriend, is what Republic Act No. (R
.A.) 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act, sought to address.[2]
We recognize that women and children are not the only victims of domestic violence. Men are also
susceptibletoabuseinintimaterelationships.TheCourtitselfhasconcededthatmencanalsobevictims
ofdomesticabuseinapatriarchalsocietysuchasours.[3] Itishightimethatwealsoacknowledgethata
woman,asinthiscaseamother,whoisexpectedtotakecareofherchildrenandnurturethemwithlove
andaffection,canalsobetheperpetratoroftheabuse.lnsuchasituation,thecourtsareexpectedtostep
in and breathe life tothechildren'sconstitutionalrighttobeprotectedfromallformsofneglect,abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[4]
However, while it is true that in all actions concerning children, the primordial consideration should
alwaysbethebestinterestsofthechild,[5] itisequallytruethatthefirstandfundamentaldutyoftheCourt
is to apply the law in a manner that would give effect to its letter and spirit.
Thus, I take exception to the ponencia's conclusion that the protection and custody orders under R.A.
9262 may be issued against a mother whomaltreatsherownchild.Suchaninterpretationconstitutesa
clear departure from and an unconstitutional expansion of the scopeofthelaw.Thechildhereandher
father are not without any remedy. The present case should be treated as a petition filed under
A.M.-03-04-04-SCortheRuleonCustodyofMinorsandWritofHabeasCorpusinRelationtoCustody
of Minors, as pointed out by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa (J ustice Caguioa) in his
Dissenting Opinion.
ThiscasestemmedfromaPetitionfortheissuanceofTemporaryandPermanentProtectionOrdersunder
R.A. 9262 filed by Randy Michael Knutson (R
andy) on behalf of his minor daughter, Rhuby Sibal
Knutson (Rhuby), against his estranged wife and Rhuby's mother, Rosalina SibalKnutson(R
osalina).
Generally,RandyaverredthatRosalinaplacedRhubyinaharmfulenvironmentdeleterioustothechild's
physical,emotional,moral,andpsychologicaldevelopment.RandyaccusedRosalinaofneglectingRhuby
and inflicting psychological andphysicalinjuryonthechild,amongothers.ClaimingthatRosalinawas
unfit, Randy also prayed that he be given the custody of Rhuby.
TheRegionalTrialCourtofTaguigCity,Branch69(RTC)dismissedthePetition.AccordingtotheRTC,
protection and custody orders in R.A. 9262 are not available against a mother who is alleged to have
abusedherchildasthechild'smothercannotbeconsideredasan"offender"underthesaidlaw.Moreover,
citingOcampov.Arcaya-Chua,[6] theRTCratiocinatedthataprotectionordercannotbeissuedinRandy's
favor because he is not a "woman victim of violence."
Randy moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC. Hence, this Petition.
Awomanmaybethe
offending party
under R.A. 9262
onlyifsheisorwere
in a same-sex
relationship or if
there is conspiracy
Citing Garcia v. Drilon[7] (Garcia), the ponencia maintains that based on theuseofthegender-neutral
word"person"inSection3(a)ofR.A.9262,whichdefinesVAWC,thelawalsocontemplatesasituation
where the mother is the perpetrator of the violent and abusive acts against her own child.
I respectfully differ. TheponenciamisappliedGarciain the present case.
InGarcia,wheretheconstitutionalityofR.A.9262waschallengedforbeingviolativeofthedueprocess
andequalprotectionclauses,theCourt,inholdingthatthelawdoesnotsingleoutmen,enunciatedthata
woman may also be anoffendingpartyunderR.A.9262incaseswherethesame-sexpartnerina
lesbian relationship inflicts violence against her partner or the latter's childorachildunderher
care, or in situations where conspiracy is present, but not in a situation where the violence is
inflicted on the child by the mother herself, as in the present case. The Court held:
ThereislikewisenomerittothecontentionthatR.A.9262singlesoutthehusbandorfatherastheculprit.
As defined above, VA WC may likewisebecommitted"againstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasor
hadasexualordatingrelationship."Clearly,theuseofthegender-neutralword"person"whohasor
had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage,formermarriage,orasexualordatingrelationship,itdoesnotprecludetheapplication
of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan,
Spouses Tan, the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper
respondentsinthecasefiledbythelatterupontheallegationthattheyandtheirson(Go-Tan'shusband)
had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassingandpressuringhertobeejectedfromthefamilyhome;andinrepeatedlyabusingherverbally,
emotionally,mentallyandphysically.[8]Thecardinalruleinstatutoryconstructionisthatininterpretingthe
meaningandscopeofatermusedinthelaw,acarefulreviewofthewholelawaswellastheintentionof
thelawmustbemade.Infact,legislativeintentmustbeasce1iainedfromaconsiderationofthestatuteas
a whole, and not its isolated parts or particular provisions alone.[9] Aisporna v. Court of Appeals[10]
instructs:
xxxLegislativeintentmustbeascertainedfromaconsiderationofthestatuteasawhole.Theparticular
words,clausesandphrasesshouldnotbestudiedasdetachedandisolatedexpressions,butthewholeand
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be
extracted from any single part, portion or section orfromisolatedwordsandphrases,clausesor
sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act asawhole.Everypartofthestatute
must be interpreted with reference to the context. This meansthateverypartofthestatutemustbe
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the generalintentofthewhole
enactment, not separately and independently. x x x[11]Section3 of R.A. 9262 pertinently provides:
Section 3.Definition of Terms. - As used in thisAct,
(a)"Violenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren"referstoanyactoraseriesofactscommittedbyany
personagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,oragainstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasor
hadasexualordatingrelationship,orwithwhomhehasacommonchild,oragainstherchildwhether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery,assault,coercion,harassmentorarbitrarydeprivationofliberty.Itincludes,butisnotlimitedto,
the following acts:
x x x x x x x x x
(h)"Children"referstothosebeloweighteen(18)yearsofageorolderbutareincapableoftakingcareof
themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological
children of the victim and other children under her care. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)As can be gleaned from the above, the offending party under the law is "any person" who
commitsviolenceagainstawomanwithwhom"thepersonhasorhadasexualordatingrelationship,or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Concomitantly, the victims under R.A. 9262 are "women andtheirchildren."
Theprimaryruleinaddressinganyproblemrelatingtotheunderstandingorinterpretationofalawisto
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.[12] This is the plain meaning rule of statutory
construction.[13]
Asisevidentfromtheuseoftheconjunctiveword"and"aswellasthepronoun"her"/"their"inbetween
the words "women"/"woman" and "child"/"children" all throughout the law, including its short title,
violence againstachildfallsundertheambitofR.A.9262onlyifitiscommittedagainstthechildofa
woman,includingachildunderhercare,byapersonwithwhomthewomanhasorhadasexualordating
relationship,orwithwhomthewomanhasacommonchild.Thelegislativeintent,ascanbegleanedfrom
theplainletterofthelaw,istoprotectwomenandtheirchildrenagainstdomesticviolenceperpetratedby
their partners—both men and samesex partners. The lawrecognizesthatviolenceagainstawoman's
offspring is the most insidious form of violence against the woman herself.
l agree with Justice Caguioa's Dissenting Opinion that an examination of the legislative history and
congressional deliberations on the bills that eventually became R.A. 9262 reveals the intent of the
legislature tolimittheapplicationofthelawtoviolenceagainstthechildoftheabusedwomanorchild
underhercare,andnotextendittoallchildrensubjectedtoviolenceandabuse,asthelattercasealready
fallswithintheambitofR.A.7610,ortheSpecialProtectionofChildrenAgainstAbuse.Exploitation
and Discrimination Act.
The Court should
not encroach on the
realm of the
Legislative
Department
Again,Iconcedethebasicrulethatthebestinterestsofthechildshouldbetheprimaryconsiderationin
cases involving their welfare and custody. However, the bedrock principle of separation of powers, on
whichoursystemofdemocracyisanchored,precludesthisCou1tfromexceedingitsconstitutionalduty
to apply the law in accordance withitsletterandintentandfromencroachingontherealmexclusively
allocated to the Legislative Departmenttomakelaws.Otherwise,theCourtwillbeengaginginjudicial
legislation and violating its own sacred duty to uphold the Constitution.
The ponencia states that R.A. 9262 should be liberally construed and thus the RTC's restrictive
interpretation requiring that the mother and her child be the victims of violence before they may be
entitled to the remedies of protection and custody orders should be rejected.[14]
Indeed,Section4ofR.A.9262statesthat"the[law]shallbeliberallyconstruedtopromotetheprotection
and safety ofvictimsofviolenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren."However,R.A.9262'sunequivocal
languageprecludesinterpretation,whichisresortedtoonlywhenthelawisambiguous.[15] Ifthelanguage
of the law is clear,thereisnoroomforinterpretationbutmerelyapplication.[16] Assumingtherewasan
ambiguity,theliberalconstructionofR.A.9262isnotalicensefortheCourttoundulyexpandthescope
ofthelawandassumeapowerexclusivelyvestedinthelegislature.TorulethatR.A.9262alsoappliesin
cases where the offending party is a woman and the victimofabuseisherownchildwoulddefeatthe
legislature's clear intent to limit the law's application to VAWC cases.
Toclose,itisimportanttostressthatRhubyandotherminors,aswellastheirfathers,similarlysituated
are not left without recourse. To stress, abuse by a mother of her own child falls under R.A. 7610.
Moreover, protective and custody orders may be applied for against the abusive mother under
A.M.-03-04-04-SC.
Inconclusion,aremandtotheRTCisproperunderthepremises.Thereisaneedforthecourtaquoto
resolve the present Petition on the merits, albeit under A.M.-03-04-04-SC, and not R.A. 9262.
WHEREFORE,IDISSENTandvotetoPARTLYGRANTthePetitionandREMANDthecasetothe
RegionalTrialCourtofTaguigCity,Branch69forfurtherproceedingsunderA.M.No.03-04-04-SCor
the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelationtoCustodyofMinors,andnot
under Republic Act No. 9262.
[1]
One In Four Women Have Ever Experienced Spousal Violence (Preliminary results from the 2017
National Demographic and Health Survey), accessed at
<h ttps://psa.gov.ph/content/one-fourwomen-have-ever-experienced-spousal-violence-preliminary-results-
2017-national>.
[2]
VAWC Frequently Asked Question, accessed at <https://pcw.gov.ph/vaw-faqs/>.
[3]
Estacio vs. Estacio, G.R. No. 211851, 16 September 2020, accessed at
<h ttps://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/18911/>.
[4]
CONSTITUTION, Art. XV, Sec. 3, par. (2).
[5]
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 3.
[6]
633 Phil. 79 (2010).
[7]
712 Phil. 44 (2013).
[8]
Id. at 103-104; citations omitted; emphasis supplied.
[9]
Laurel, A Study Guide in Statutory Construction:Cases and Materials, Manila: Rex Book Store, 1999.
[10]
198 Phil. 838 (1982).
[11]
Id. at 847; citations omitted; emphasis supplied.
[12]
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252198, 27 April 2021,
accessed at <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/19520/>.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Ponencia, pp. 14-15.
[15]
Miramar Fish Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of InternalRevenue, 735 Phil. 125 (2014).
[16]
Id. at 145.
Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: March 15, 2023
This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System
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