Policy Adaptation

Adapting Renewable Energy Policies
To Dynamic Market Conditions
May 2014
Copyright (c) IRENA 2014
Unless otherwise indicated, material in this publication may be used freely, shared or reprinted, but
acknowledgement is requested. This publication should be cited as: IRENA (2014),“Adapting renew-
able energy policies to dynamic market conditions”. Abu Dhabi.
About IRENA
The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) is an intergovernmental organisation that sup-
ports countries in their transition to a sustainable energy future, and serves as the principal platform for
international co-operation, a centre of excellence, and a repository of policy, technology, resource and
financial knowledge on renewable energy. IRENA promotes the widespread adoption and sustainable
use of all forms of renewable energy, including bioenergy, geothermal, hydropower, ocean, solar and
wind energy, in the pursuit of sustainable development, energy access, energy security and low-carbon
economic growth and prosperity. www.irena.org
Acknowledgements
Authors: Salvatore Vinci, Divyam Nagpal and Rabia Ferroukhi (IRENA); Ethan Zindler and Anna
Czajkowska (BNEF)
Reviewers: Martin Schöpe (BMWi), David Jacobs (IASS Potsdam), Gireesh Shrimali (Indian School of Busi-
ness), Toby D. Couture (E3 Analytics), Luca Benedetti (GSE), Ghislaine Kieffer, Arslan Khalid, Diala Hawila,
Michael Taylor and Troy Hodges (IRENA), and Nico Tyabji, Vandana Gombar and Stephen Munro (BNEF).
Supporting entity: Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) provides analysis, tools and data for decision
makers driving change in the energy system.
For further information or for provision of feedback, please contact Rabia Ferroukhi, IRENA, Knowledge,
Policy and Finance Centre (KPFC), CI Tower, 32nd Street Khalidiyah, P.O. Box 236, Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates; Email: RFerroukhi@irena.org.
This report is available for download from www.irena.org/Publications.
The designations employed and the presentation of materials herein do not imply the expression of any
opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) concerning the
legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of
its frontiers or boundaries. While this publication promotes the adoption and use of renewable energy,
IRENA does not endorse any particular project, product or service provider.
Foreword
A combination of effective support policies, high learning rates and rapidly decreasing technology costs has
enabled the accelerated deployment of renewables globally. Renewables now make up a distinct share of the
energy mix in several countries with further substantial growth anticipated in the coming decades. This ongoing
transition of the energy sector opens up new opportunities for governments to reap the long-standing benefits
of a sustainable energy system. Ensuring an effective and rapid transition, however, is a challenge faced by
policy makers today. This requires the timely adaptation of policies to the dynamic market conditions caused by
changing costs, growing deployment and increasing variable generation.
IRENA’s report - Adapting renewable energy policies to dynamic market conditions - identifies key challenges
faced by policy makers due to renewable energy market dynamics and analyses policy adaptation responses to
address them. The study builds upon diverse country experiences and provides a framework for understanding
the conditions under which policy measures to support growing shares of renewables in the energy mix can be
optimised.
The report shows that with decreasing cost of renewable energy technologies, governments are adapting policy
measures to ensure that incentives are appropriately set while increasing transparency and stability within the
sector. The country case studies presented here demonstrate how such measures contribute to ensuring that the
growth of the sector remains sustainable and cost-efficient in the long-term.
The report highlights the importance of adopting a systemic approach to policy-making in order to reach high
shares of renewables. Integration of variable renewables are known to have system-wide impacts which intensify
as deployment grows. Technical measures, such as development of grid infrastructure, smart technologies and
storage as well as adequate regulatory interventions facilitate integration efforts. The report also highlights that
the growth in decentralised generation, driven by approaching grid parity and adoption of enabling policies,
is transforming the traditional ownership structures within the energy sector. This presents new challenges for
incumbent stakeholders, which need to be accounted for in the policy-making process to allow a smooth market
integration of renewables and ensure the long-term reliability of the energy system.
I am confident that the findings from this study will contribute to the ongoing discussions on pathways to further
increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy system. The lessons laid out in the report can serve
as an important reference point for countries at different stages of renewable energy market development.
Adnan Z. Amin
Director - General of International Renewable Energy Agency
3
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY10
INTRODUCTION15
METHODOLOGY16
1. ACCOUNTING FOR RAPIDLY FALLING RENEWABLE GENERATION COSTS18

1.1 Challenge: keeping pace with cost declines 18
1.2 Responses21
1.3 Lessons learned30
2. ADDRESSING TAX/RATE-PAYER BURDENS 32
2.1 Challenge: reducing impacts on tax-payers or consumers32
2.2 Responses35
3. ACCOUNTING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY’S COST COMPETIVENESS40

3.1 Challenge: preparing for the arrival of grid and socket parity40
3.2 Responses42
4. INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE POWER50

4.1 Challenge: integrating increasing generation from variable sources50
4.2 Responses54
5. THE PRISMS: USING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS TO HONE IN ON SMART POLICY68

5.1 Renewable energy penetration68
5.2 Economic development68
5.3 Technology focus71
5.4 Asset ownership71
5.5 Putting the prisms to work72
5.6 Final thought73
REFERENCES 76
FIGURES
FIGURE 1.1 SPOT PRICE OF CRYSTALLINE SILICON MODULES, JANUARY 2012 – JANUARY 2014 (USD/W) 18
FIGURE 1.2 WIND TURBINE PRICE INDEX, MEAN PRICE BY DATE OF DELIVERY, H1 2008 – H1 2014 (EUR MILLION/MW) 19
FIGURE 1.3 LEVELISED COST OF ELECTRICITY FOR SELECT TECHNOLOGIES, Q3 2009 – Q4 2013 (USD/MWh) 19
FIGURE 1.4 COMPARISON OF ANNUAL INSTALLED CAPACITY OF SOLAR PV WITH MODULE PRODUCTION CAPACITY (MW) AND
LEVELISED COST OF ELECTRICITY FOR C -SI SOLAR PV (USD/MWh) 20
FIGURE 1.5 LEVELISED COST OF ELECTRICITY RANGES IN OECD AND NON -OECD COUNTRIES, 2012-2013 (USD/kWh) 20
FIGURE 1.6 PV FIT DEGRESSION MECHANISM IN GERMANY, THE U.K. AND FRANCE, 2009-13 (EUR/MWh) 21
FIGURE 1.7 SMALL- SCALE PV CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, FEED - IN TARIFF RATE AND POWER PRICES IN GERMANY, 2006-2013 23
FIGURE 1.8 EVOLUTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY ELECTRICITY TARIFF - BASED SUPPORT MECHANISMS IN BRAZIL 26
FIGURE 1.9 WIND CAPACITY CONTRACTED IN BRAZIL (MW) AND AVERAGE PRICE (USD/MWh) 26
FIGURE 1.10 VERIFIED CAPACITY FACTORS FOR BRAZILIAN WIND PROJECTS COMMISSIONED UNDER AUCTION SCHEME AND UNDER
PROINFA FEED - IN TARIFF, 2012 (%) 27
FIGURE 1.11 US WIND CAPACITY ADDITIONS AND PTC (MW) 28
FIGURE 2.1 COST OF PV SUPPORT AS A SHARE OF 2011 ELECTRICITY PRICES IN SELECT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (EUR/MWh) 32
FIGURE 2.2 GERMAN EEG SURCHARGE ON HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY BILLS (EUR CENTS/kWh) AND INSTALLED RENEWABLE
GENERATION CAPACITY (GW), 2010-14E 33
FIGURE 2.3 INDIA’S INSTALLED RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY, 2010-13 (GW) 34
FIGURE 2.5 INDIA’S ESTIMATED ANNUAL NATIONAL SPENDING ON SUBSIDIES, 2010-13 (USD BILLION) 34
FIGURE 2.4 CHINA’S INSTALLED RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY, 2010-13 (GW) 34
FIGURE 2.6 CHINA’S ESTIMATED ANNUAL NATIONAL SPENDING ON SUBSIDIES, 2010-13 (USD BILLION) 34
FIGURE 2.7 U.K. LEVY CONTROL FRAMEWORK, 2011/12 – 2020/21 (GBP BILLION, 2011/12 PRICES) 36
FIGURE 2.8 SDE+ BUDGET CEILING PER SUBSIDY YEAR, 2008-2013 (EUR BILLION) 37
FIGURE 3.1 SMALL SOLAR PV SYSTEM COSTS IN SELECT COUNTRIES (USD/kW) 39
FIGURE 3.2 ESTIMATED COST REDUCTIONS IN RESIDENTIAL SOLAR PV BY COMPONENT, GLOBAL BENCHMARK, 2010-20 (USD/W) 41
FIGURE 3.3 RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY PRICE IN 2012, INSOLATION, AND LCOE OF RESIDENTIAL PV, Q2 2013 42
FIGURE 3.4 STATE NET METERING LIMITS IN THE UNITED STATES 44
FIGURE 3.5 COMMERCIAL AND RESIDENTIAL SMALL- SCALE PV CAPACITY IN GERMANY, ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES, 2012 (GW) 44
FIGURE 3.6 NET METERED CAPACITY VERSUS ESTIMATED LIMIT IN SELECTED U.S. STATES, H2 2013 (MW) 45
FIGURE 3.7 PV SYSTEM VALUE BY COMPONENT AND CONFIGURATION IN AUSTIN, TEXAS 46
FIGURE 4.1 AVERAGE UNSCHEDULED CROSS - BORDER POWER FLOWS FROM GERMANY, 2011-12 (MW) 52
FIGURE 4.2 GERMANY’S OFFSHORE GRID DEVELOPMENT PLAN TO CONNECT 6.5 GW OF OFFSHORE WIND PROJECTS BY 2020 AND
ESTIMATED COSTS 52
FIGURE 4.3 GERMANY’S ONSHORE GRID DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND ESTIMATED COST, 2013-23 52
FIGURE 4.4 MERIT ORDER ON A SUMMER DAY (1 JUNE 2010) IN GERMANY 53
FIGURE 4.5 MERIT ORDER ON A SUMMER DAY (1 JUNE 2012) IN GERMANY 53
FIGURE 4.6 AVERAGE DAILY SUMMER SPOT PRICE PROFILE IN GERMANY, 2010 AND 2013 (EUR/MWh) 54
FIGURE 4.7 INDIA’S GREEN ENERGY CORRIDOR PLAN, JULY 2012-2017 55
FIGURE 4.8 KEY STEPS IN GERMANY’S NETWORK DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 57
FIGURE 4.9 ANNUAL SMART METER INSTALLATIONS IN THE EU, 2011-2020 E (MILLION METERS) 60
FIGURE 5.1 POLICIES BEST SUITED FOR DIFFERING LEVELS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY PENETRATION 69
FIGURE 5.2 POLICIES BEST SUITED FOR DIFFERING LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 70
FIGURE 5.3 POLICIES BEST SUITED FOR CERTAIN TECHNOLOGIES 71
FIGURE 5.4 POLICIES AFFECTING CERTAIN ASSET OWNERS 72
6 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

TABLES
TABLE 1.1 GERMAN FIT DEGRESSION: IMPACT ON CONSUMERS 23
TABLE 2.1 PV GROWTH IN ITALY (2008-2013) 35
TABLE 3.1 COMPARISON OF NET METERING SCHEMES IN ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, DENMARK AND ITALY 43
TABLE 3.2 ECONOMICS OF PV- CONNECTED STORAGE IN GERMANY AT VARIOUS BATTERY COSTS 48
TABLE 4.1 INSTALLED GENERATING CAPACITY IN INDIA AS OF MARCH 2014 (BY REGION) 51
TABLE 4.2 ESTIMATED COST OF DELAY IN OFFSHORE WIND PROJECTS IN GERMANY 58
TABLE 4.3 ESB NETWORKS’ CHALLENGES IN INTEGRATING VARIABLE RENEWABLES 59
TABLE 4.4 MAIN POWER STORAGE APPLICATIONS 61
TABLE 4.5 KEY FEATURES OF CAPACITY MECHANISMS 63
TABLE 4.6 SELECT CAPACITY MARKET APPROACHES 64
TABLE 4.7 POTENTIAL RISKS OF AUCTION - BASED CAPACITY MARKETS 64
TABLE 4.8 SELECT EUROPEAN DEMAND - RESPONSE PROGRAMMES 66
BOXES
BOX 1.1 DEGRESSION MECHANISM FOR SOLAR PV FIT SUPPORT IN THE UK 22
BOX 1.2 CALCULATING THE ISRAEL SOLAR FEED - IN TARIFF 24
BOX 1.3 ACCELERATED DEPRICIATION FOR WIND SECTOR DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF INDIA 29
BOX 4.1 EMERGING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADITIONAL UTILITIES 55
BOX 4.2 THE RISK OF CAPPING UTILITY RETURNS ON SMART METER INVESTMENTS 60
BOX 4.3 LOOKING FORWARD: RD&D FOR STORAGE DEVELOPMENT – THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA 62
7
Acronyms
AC Alternating Current
AEEG Italy’s Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas
APS Arizona Public Service
BNEF Bloomberg New Energy Finance
BNetzA German Federal Network Agency
BRL Brazilian real
Capex Capital Expenditure
c-Si Crystalline silicon
CRS U.S. Congressional Research Service
CSP Concentrating solar thermal power
DKK Danish krone
DSO Distribution system operator
DR Demand response
EEG Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act
EUR Euro
EV Electric vehicle
FiP Feed-in Premium
FiT Feed-in Tariff
GBI Generation Based Incentive
GBP British Pound
GSE Gestore Servizi Energetici
GW Gigawatt
H1, H2 First half, second half (of a given year)
HVDC High-voltage direct current
IPP Independent power producer
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
ITC U.S. Investment Tax Credit
KRW South Korean won
kW kilowatt
kWh kilowatt-hour
LCF U.K.’s Levy Control Framework
LCOE Levelised cost of energy
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt-hour
NIS Israeli sheqel
O&M operations and maintenance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PJM PJM Interconnection LLC
PPA Power purchase agreement
PROINFA Brazil’s Programme of Incentives for Alternative Electricity Sources
PTC U.S. Production Tax Credit
PUA Israel’s Public Utilities Authority
PV Photovoltaic
Q1, Q2 First quarter, second quarter (of a given year)

R&D Research and development
RD&D Research, development and deployment
RDL Spain’s Royal Decree Law
SDE+ Netherlands’ Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie
SEDA Malaysia’s Sustainable Energy Development Authority
TSO Transmission system operator
UK United Kingdom
USD U.S. dollars
VOS Value of Solar
W Watt
Wp Watt-peak
WTPI BNEF’s Wind Turbine Price Index
9
Executive Summary
T
he conditions affecting renewable energy policy-making have shifted dramatically within a very short
time span. In some countries and jurisdictions, rapidly declining renewable generation costs have made
it challenging to set “appropriate” levels of public support. In others, the proliferation of renewables is
having unanticipated consequences for power grids and markets. Meanwhile, almost everywhere, tighter
post-recession fiscal conditions have meant that fewer funds are available to support the industry.
These conditions have prompted policy makers to reconsider how they support renewable energy develop-
ment and deployment. This has resulted in the adoption of innovative policy design features as well as in
the introduction of a new generation of support policies that are crafted to be compatible with the ongoing
transformation. Such policies are intended to be transparent and impactful, with emphasis on flexibility,
efficiency and cost effectiveness.
This report sets out to provide an overview of selected challenges emerging from dynamic markets and policy
responses being adopted to address them. In particular, it identifies four key challenges faced by policy
makers today: 1) accounting for rapidly falling renewable generation costs, 2) addressing tax/rate-payer
burdens, 3) accounting for renewable energy’s cost competitiveness, and 4) integrating variable renewable
power. For each of the challenges, innovative policies being implemented or proposed around the world are
analysed with the aim to assess their recent or potential impact and to highlight their potential risks. Through
the analysis, the report gathers “lessons learned”. A framework is then presented that allows policy makers to
assess the suitability of specific policies to different contexts.
Accounting for rapidly falling renewable generation costs
The sharp fall in renewable energy equipment costs, while a positive trend, presents challenges for policy mak-
ers to ensure that support measures are kept effective and efficient. A fine balance needs to be maintained
between implementing mechanisms that allow for cost tracking and maintaining a stable environment for
investments into the sector. In attaining that balance, countries have either implemented design features into
existing policies, such as degression rate in feed-in tariffs, or introduced new policies altogether, such as auc-
tion schemes. Some lessons that can be learned from country experiences include the following:
»»Adaptation policies that integrate technology cost-tracking features (e.g. degression schemes, auc-
tions, etc.) provide transparency and predictability to market participants.
»»The design stage of policies benefit from active engagement with stakeholders within the sector to clearly
communicate the intended policy objectives and to better calibrate specific policy elements, such as
tariff revision frequency, degression rates, etc.
»»Market-based policy support mechanisms, such as auctions, are gaining increasing prominence as a
way of reducing information asymmetry between governments and developers on generation costs.
When well designed, these can be critical to identify the appropriate level of public support and also
contribute to more predictability in the sector.

Addressing tax/rate-payer burdens
The substantial growth that has been experienced by the renewable energy sector during the past decade has
mostly been a result of financial support offered by “early-adopters”. These countries recognized the long-term
benefits of renewables from an environmental, economic and social standpoint. The support for renewables
is a means of internalising external costs not accounted for in traditional energy markets. Resilient support for
the sector translated into the scale-up in deployment, thereby leading to a substantial decrease in technology
costs and the development of the renewable energy industry. This results in relatively less support required for
further deployment. It is, however, important to ensure that the cost of support is kept under control and that it
is distributed fairly across the different stakeholders. As a result, several countries have adopted spending caps
on support for renewables directly or indirectly (through deployment caps) which are often complementary
to other deployment policies. The analysis of country responses to address this challenge yields the following
lessons learned:
»»Limiting the cost of renewables support gains importance as the market expands and deployment grows.
While providing higher support levels may be important to kick-off new technology deployment, it is es-
sential that the costs are closely monitored as the share of renewables rises.
»»Somewhat counterintuitively, capping support may improve rather than diminish investor confidence in a
market, as it provides long-term predictability to the market.
»»When designing spending control measures, a critical element is the distribution of costs across different
stakeholders. Controlling costs is as important for high-income countries concerned about their economic
competitiveness as for middle- or low-income countries focussed on basic economic development.
Accounting for renewable energies’ cost competitiveness
As renewable energy costs continue to decline and grid parity is attained in different countries, a new era of
policies will be necessary to ensure the further expansion of renewables in the energy mix. Support measures in
a ‘post-parity’ era will need to transition from being purely financial-based to those that are compatible with the
overall system of renewables promotion and the general structure of the electricity system. The report analyses
the role of policies, such as net metering, that can play an instrumental role in promoting the deployment of de-
centralised renewable energy. Net metering schemes are being widely adopted globally and while their design
features might vary, innovation is afoot on ways to address specific challenges associated with distributing costs
between consumers with or without renewable systems. Some of the lessons learned from country experiences
include:
»»Net metering policies can drive residential solar PV adoption, particularly in markets characterised by rela-
tively high electricity prices. However, policy design needs to carefully consider the “reconciliation period”
(i.e., for how long the project owners can claim back thee credit generated by the electricity fed into the
grid) to avoid unintended consequences for grid stability.
11
»»Policy makers need to estimate in a timely manner technical and economic impacts of massive deployment
of decentralised systems on transmission and distribution systems in order to ensure reliability of supply and
efficient management of the electricity system.
»»Residential-size storage systems present important opportunities to promote self-consumption and better
integrate electricity from distributed projects into the grid. Their widespread adoption will mostly depend on
the decrease in the cost of storage technology.
Integrating variable renewable power
Effective and efficient integration – in terms of physical connection, network management and market integration – is
necessary to allow an increase in the share of renewables in the energy mix. Integration of variable generation can
become a pressing challenge for the sector, particularly in markets or regions with higher rates of renewable penetra-
tion. Grid integration needs to be supported by technical and economic measures. Those include planning for and
investing in physical grid development and enhancement, promoting grid-scale storage and smart infrastructures,
and defining new market designs that consider the broad market-wide impacts of integrating variable renewables. The
analysis of country case studies on these issues yield the following lessons:
»»Inadequate grid infrastructure development can lead to geographically uneven renewable energy capacity
deployment, mismatch between transmission and generation capacity, and significant cost for system balancing.
The lead time associated with developing the infrastructure to facilitate grid evacuation and transfer can be rela-
tively long and, hence, needs to be accounted for in the planning process. “Passive” development of infrastructure
can increase costs, lead to stranded generation assets and hurt investor confidence in the long term.
»»Emerging technologies, such as smart grids, smart meters, storage applications, will play pivotal roles in manag-
ing the system to enable further integration of renewable power while maintaining supply reliability.
»»Integrating high shares of zero- or low- marginal-cost renewable power into power markets can affect the com-
petitiveness of conventional “mid-merit” or “peak” plants. Providing dispatchable capacity remuneration in some
cases may prove necessary, but it is important to ensure that such schemes incentivise only the needed capacity
and, if possible, the different forms of capacity – generation as well as demand response, potentially storage, etc.
Analytical framework
The report presents analytical frameworks or “prisms” which policy makers can use to assess which renewable energy
policy adaptation mechanisms analysed in this report might be best suited for the circumstances in their countries.
The prisms are based on country experience and on how policies have been implemented in different contexts.
it is acknowledged that policies or policy types generally do not fit neatly into clearly defined boxes. The “prisms”
adopted, however, are intended to serve as rudimentary tools for policy-making. An example of such a framework is
illustrated below. It compares the type of policy adaptation mechanisms which could be best suited for jurisdictions
where renewables have achieved “low”, “medium” or “high” penetration rates.
Other “prisms” seek to identify relevant policy types for contexts that are: 1) at varying levels of economic development
(low, middle, or high); 2) interested in supporting specific technologies (wind, solar, smart grid, storage and others);
or 3) seeking to craft policies that affect various asset owners (utilities, independent power producers, community/
residential consumers or commercial customers).

POLICIES BEST SUITED FOR DIFFERING LEVELS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY PENETRATION
RENEWABLE ENERGY PENETRATION
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Integrating ‘real time capacity corridors” into the feed-in tariff reduction structure (1.2.1.)
Holding auctions for power contracts (1.2.3.)
Designing flexible tax policies (1.2.4.)
“Value of Solar” tariff (3.2.2.)
Permitting net metering (3.2.1.)
Grid development plan - India (4.2.1.) Grid development plan - Germany (4.2.2.)
POL ICIES
Building third-party metrics into feed-in tariffs (1.2.2.) Implementing spending caps on support for
renewables (2.2.1.)
Integrating residential storage in the system (3.2.3.)
Demand response programmes (4.2.7.)
Offshore wind connection liability

arrangement (4.2.3.)
Smart grid implementation and

smart meter rollouts (4.2.4.)
Grid scale energy storage (4.2.5.)
Capacity mechanisms (4.2.6.)
PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLES
MINIMISE COST
GOALS
TRIGGER TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
INCENTIVISE SELF -CONSUMPTION
ENSURE SECURITY AND RELIABILITY OF POWER SUPPLY
IMPROVE MARKET INTEGRATION OF RENEWABLES
Note: The degree of blue shading indicates how appropriate the goal is for each level of renewables penetration (for example, improved
market integration of renewable power applies more to the most mature markets). A reference to the individual sub-sections from the
report has been included for each policy.
Like with any policy-making, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for renewable energy. Each country is unique
with its own set of characteristics that influence how public policies are crafted and implemented. Still, today
a common set of dynamics is having global impact. And, just as importantly, a variety of innovative policy
responses are being set in motion in various corners of the world. While some of these renewable energy
policies are relatively recent, they hold great potential to support the industry as it advances to its next, all-
important phase of development, in which it attempts to compete with more traditional forms of generation
in a post-parity era.
13
Introduction
P
olicy support has played a critical role in spur- efficiency and cost effectiveness. These interesting
ring both a scale-up in renewable energy – and potentially transformative – new efforts are the
capacity deployment and a major industry ex- subject of this report.
pansion. At one time, designing these schemes ap-
peared to be relatively straightforward to legislators This report pursues three objectives. First, it aims to profile
and regulators. Some renewable energy technology renewable energy market dynamics which policy mak-
costs were high and their deployment levels were low. ers should take into account when designing new poli-
In countries with governments that were committed cy frameworks. These include: rapidly falling renewable
to promoting renewables, market-creating measures, energy equipment costs (Section 1), impact of support
such as feed-in tariffs (FiTs) and tax credits, were schemes on national budgets and/or consumer
widely adopted. electricity bills (Section 2), approaching grid parity for
renewable energy technologies (Section 3), integration
In just a few years, the situation has changed dra- of variable renewable generation and broader power
matically in many countries. Rapidly falling costs for market design considerations (Section 4).
renewable technologies, particularly for solar photo-
voltaics (PV) and onshore wind, have caused spikes Second, this report highlights interesting and po-
in installation levels. Unexpected side effects have tentially innovative policies that seek to address the
included inflated government financial liabilities and/ challenges emanating from the market dynamics
or higher consumer electricity bills. In countries with discussed earlier. These include flexible tariff or tax
the largest share of variable renewable generation in schemes which take into account “real-world” costs,
their energy mix, rapid renewables deployment has auctions to enhance price discovery and other solu-
highlighted an urgent need for upgrades and exten- tions. The result can be better controls over the amount
sions to grid infrastructure. of renewable energy which is deployed in certain time
frames and at certain costs. The report provides back-
In some cases, these unintended results have left ground and assessments of each of the highlighted
policy makers with little choice but to react post- measures as well as the potential risks associated with
factum and change the support schemes in place. implementation.
In Europe, governments are addressing the issue
through comprehensive reviews, in some cases Finally, the report draws preliminary conclusions about
resulting in retroactive FiT cuts. In the United States, which of these types of policies might be best suited
costs associated with the Production Tax Credit for different types of markets, situations or countries,
partly led to the its expiration at the end of 2013. given differing economic, political and power mar-
In Australia, states have cut support for solar in the ket structures. The conclusions are preliminary also
wake of higher-than-anticipated installation rates. because some of the policy ideas discussed in this
All of this has raised market uncertainty and lowered report are relatively new. Some solutions may be best
investor confidence. for countries with state-run utilities and lower levels of
electrification. Others may be a better fit for countries
Now, however, a new wave of policy innovation is with liberalised power markets and high connectivity
under way around the world as policy makers seek rates. The report concludes with basic “prisms” which
to craft supports that are not just transparent and policy makers can use to assess the types of renew-
impactful, but also tailored to the new realities of the able energy policy solutions that might be best suited
market. More than ever, the emphasis is on flexibility, for the circumstances in their countries.
15
Methodology
T
he analysis focusses on broad challenges which »»Impact Assessment – an assessment of the
policy makers may face when contemplating policy’s impacts as it can be measured, including
renewable energy policy frameworks, with a par- measures implemented in response to the chal-
ticular focus on electricity. These apply to a wide range lenges outlined above.
of countries, depending on the level of economic
development, degree of renewable energy penetra- »» Risk Assessment – an examination of potential factors
tion, power market structure and other factors. Four key that might undermine a new policy scheme’s success.
challenges have been identified, which are addressed
in the next four sections: In the case of the latter two, the report provides the best
information available on impacts to date and specu-
1. Rapidly falling renewable generation costs have lates to some degree about potential risks. In a number
made it difficult to calibrate public sector supports of cases, the policies highlighted have been adopted
to appropriate levels in recent years. recently, and it remains to be seen how beneficial they
will prove to be.
2. Support schemes that have been successful in
spurring renewables deployment have in some Each policy outlined in the report is assessed based on
cases proven to be relatively expensive contribut- seven selected indicators (see Table on the next page).
ing to consumer/tax-payer burdens. These are presented as a box alongside the respective
policy section and aim to highlight the characteristics of
3. Approaching (and in some locations, the arrival markets where such a policy might fit best.
of) “socket parity” for solar PV and growth in decen-
tralised generation has resulted in unanticipated Of these indicators, the “policy goal” is potentially the most
competition between distributed generators and ambiguous, and thus the potential options merit further
incumbent generators. explanation. Given that policies often have multiple, overlap-
ping aims, the following goals are not mutually exclusive:
4. Growing levels of variable renewable generation
are placing strains on certain national grids and »»Providing adequate support for renewables –
power markets which are generally unequipped Ensuring that financial support aligns with real costs
to accommodate variable sources of power. of power generation from particular technologies.
Supports should provide sufficient help to incentivise
For each of these challenges, the report analyses investment when necessary but not to “overpay”.
examples of countries or other jurisdictions that have
pursued novel policy approaches to address them. »»Minimising cost of support – Ensuring that costs
Such policies have been selected either because they associated with supporting renewables are mi-
have a proven track record of addressing the particular nimised and distributed equitably. Often, such
challenge, or because they sought to bring relatively costs result in surcharges on electricity bills or taxes.
new ideas to address it. These policy approaches are Determining who pays is an important part of de-
categorised by the challenges they seek to address. termining cost.
Each scheme profiled includes:
»»Incentivising self-consumption – Where grid par-
»»Policy Overview – an explanation of what the ity is already a reality, policy makers can empower
measure is, who it affects and what objectives it consumers to become producers by providing
aims to achieve. appropriate regulatory frameworks.

INDICATOR KEY QUESTION INDICATORS
Penetration How advanced is the market »»

Low (<5% renewable energy vs. total annual generation)
level of variable where this policy has been »»
Medium (5-20%)
renewables implemented, in terms of »»
High (>20%)
renewables deployment in the This measure refers primarily to variable renewable sources and hence
generation mix? excludes large-hydro
Economic How economically advanced »»

Low income
development are the countries and »»
Middle income
jurisdictions where this policy has »»
High income (World Bank, 2013 )
been implemented?
Policy goal What is the policy’s primary »»

Provide adequate support for renewables
objective? »»
Minimise cost of support
»»
Incentivise self-consumption
»»
Improve market integration of renewables
»»
Ensure security and reliability of power supply
»»
Trigger technology innovation
Policy type What mechanism does the Feed-in tariff, market premium, tax-based incentive, net metering, auctions,
policy use to accomplish its Renewable Portfolio Standards (quota schemes), ring-fence budget, grant,
goals? soft-loan, grid regulation, market regulation, smart meter rollout, regulated
investment return, strategic reserve, capacity mechanism, demand-
response incentive.
Eligible Which technologies can benefit All renewable energy technologies, grid, smart meters, storage
technologies from – or are affected by – the
policy discussed?
Asset ownership Who owns the generating assets »»Utilities

affected by the policy? »»Independent power producers (IPPs)
»»Private owners (individuals, farmers, residential, etc.)
»»Community (clusters of individuals, community-based organisations, etc.)
»»Businesses (owned by commercial entities, used at least partly for self-
consumption)
»»
Investment funds/banks
Complementary What associated policies (if any) A list of policies that can be implemented in concert with the case study.
policies help this policy succeed?
»»Ensuring security and reliability of power sup- Section 5 of the report uses these indicators to pres-
ply – Providing adequate transmission and ent analytical frameworks under which these novel
distribution infrastructure and adequate load policy approaches can be assessed. This is done
management mechanisms, to ensure that the through the presentation of “prisms” which policy
grid system is able to cope with higher levels makers can use when designing – or reforming – their
of variable power without risking power supply policy frameworks for renewables, and broader power
disruptions. markets. These prisms map the indicators highlighted
throughout the report against the policies presented
» »Improving market integration of renewables to illustrate which schemes potentially make the most
– Adjusting power market structures to ensure sense under specific conditions.
that renewable power is integrated and that
sufficient back-up exists as necessary. This It is important to note that this report does not contain pre-
goal captures more-effective system balanc- scriptive conclusions or recommendations. In that sense,
ing, demand management and storage its dual aims are: 1) to highlight novel policy responses to
incentives. the challenges that have arisen as the renewable energy
industry has matured and 2) to shed some light on how
»»Accelerating innovation - Creating an en- these new policy tools might best be applied elsewhere.
abling environment for fostering innovation
in technology design, production processes, This report builds on the analytical policy work con-
deployment and operation. This contrib- ducted by IRENA and several other institutions and
utes to increasing efficiency, cost reduction non-governmental organisations to date and repre-
and enhancement of competitiveness. sents original analysis and synthesis1.
1 Several figures presented in the report are derived from proprietary datasets created by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF).
17
1 Accounting for Rapidly Falling
Renewable Generation Costs
1.1 CHALLENGE: KEEPING PACE WITH are expected to level in 2014, the long-term downward
COST DECLINES trend is expected to resume due to learning-curve ef-
fects. As turbine sizes grow, more wind is harvested from
Complex technological improvements and simple a given site, meaning that even though price reduc-
economies of scale have combined to drive down tions per kilowatt (kW) may be more modest than in the
renewable energy equipment costs in recent years. past, the trend in delivered electricity costs will continue
Between December 2009 and December 2012, solar downwards at near-historical rates.
PV module prices declined by 65-70%. In 2012 alone, so-
lar module prices dropped more than 20% (see Figure Another reason for the decline in prices is a dramatic
1.1). This was also due to an expanding manufacturing improvement in the technologies used to manufacture
overcapacity that peaked in 2010 when almost twice equipment. Assembly lines have become more sophisti-
as much module production capacity existed glob- cated, automated and efficient. But sheer economies of
ally compared to demand. Module prices stabilised scale combined with major supply gluts are also impor-
in 2013 as manufacturers tried to return margins to tant reasons. Until recently, roughly twice as much final
sustainable levels. Despite an anticipated reduction capacity for wind turbine manufacturing was available
in the global surplus of solar production capacity, the around the world as demand for such equipment. The
overall trend for solar is expected to continue to be same was true for PV cells. As a result, manufacturers are
characterised by falling technology costs due to the faced with marginal profits on equipment sales. In some
high learning rates for solar PV. cases, manufacturers have actually sold equipment at a
loss, a situation that is unsustainable over the long term.
Wind turbine prices dropped by around one-quarter The capacity-demand gap has narrowed recently, al-
between 2009 and 2013 (see Figure 1.2). While prices lowing prices to stabilise and, in some cases, rise slightly.
FIGURE 1.1 SPOT PRICE OF CRYSTALLINE SILICON MODULES, JANUARY 2012 – JANUARY 2014 (USD/W)
1.2 Monocrystalline
silicon module
USD/W
Multicrystalline
1.0 silicon module
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
02 Jan
30 Jan
05 Mar
02 Apr
07 May
04 Jun
02 Jul
06 Aug
03 Sept
01 Oct
05 Nov
03 Dec
07 Jan
14 Jan
04 Mar
01 Apr
06 May
03 Jun
01 Jul
05 Aug
02 Sept
07 Oct
04 Nov
02 Dec
06 Jan
13 Jan
20 Jan
2012 2013 2014
Source: BNEF solar price index.

FIGURE 1.2 WIND TURBINE PRICE INDEX, MEAN PRICE BY DATE OF DELIVERY, H1 2008 – H1 2014 (EUR MILLION/MW)
1,5
Wind Turbine Price
Index (WTPI)
EUR million/MW
Old models
(<95m rotor diameter)
New models
1,2 (>95m rotor diameter)
1.21
1.20
1.11 1.10 1.00 1.01 0.96

0.99
1.06 0.97
1.02
0.99
0,9 0.94
0.90
0.88
0.85
0.82
0.78
0,6
H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1
2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014
Source: BNEF Wind Turbine Price Index (WTPI).

Notes: Contract prices include turbine plus towers and transport to site, and they exclude value-added tax. Turbine contracts signed for delivery in
China are excluded from this Index. “Old models” are those designed for the highest wind conditions. “New models” typically have longer blades
and are designed for lower-speed conditions. Until H2 2011, BNEF tracked both varieties of turbines as one (the “WTPI” line).
Decreasing technology costs have translated into existed in the industry over the past few years (see
lower installed costs and cheaper electricity from Figure 1.4).
renewables. As shown in Figure 1.3, the levelised cost
of electricity for solar PV technologies and onshore The virtuous cycle of high learning rates and
wind has followed a downward trajectory. For solar PV, increased deployment is driving down the costs
in particular, the decrease in the cost of generation of solar and wind technologies; meanwhile, hy-
is also linked to the production overcapacity that has dropower, geothermal, and biomass for power
FIGURE 1.3 LEVELISED COST OF ELECTRICITY FOR SELECT TECHNOLOGIES, Q3 2009 – Q4 2013 (USD/MWh)
350
USD/MWh PV - c-Si tracking

PV - c-Si
300
PV - thin film
Onshore wind
250
200
150
100
50
0
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: BNEF.
19
FIGURE 1.4 COMPARISON OF ANNUAL INSTALLED CAPACITY OF SOLAR PV WITH MODULE PRODUCTION CAPACITY (MW) AND LEVELISED COST OF ELECTRICITY FOR C-SI
SOLAR PV (USD/MWh)
70 000 350 Annual Installed

Capacity (MW)
MW USD/MWh
Module Production
60 000 300 Capacity (MW)
Levelised cost of
electricity (USD/MWh)
50 000 250
40 000 200
30 000 150
20 000 100
10 000 50
0 0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: GlobalData, 2014; BNEF.
generation are mature technologies. Renewables are The situation was further complicated by lag times
now increasingly the most economic choice for new between when policies were proposed, approved
grid supply, and they are cheaper than alternatives in and implemented. In order to guard against wind-
virtually any power system reliant on liquid fuels (e.g., fall profits by developers and to protect consumers
on islands) (see Figure 1.5). from unnecessary cost burden, policy makers are
moving quickly to re-evaluate support programmes
The speed at which prices fell, although indis- which were instituted at a time when equipment
putably positive for developers and end-users, prices were much higher and were expected to
clearly caught some policy makers by surprise. decline more slowly.
FIGURE 1.5 LEVELISED COST OF ELECTRICITY RANGES IN OECD AND NON-OECD COUNTRIES, 2012-2013 (USD/kWh)
0.60
2011 USD/kWh
0.50 Diesel-fired electricity cost range
0.40
0.30
0.20
Fossil fuel-fired electricity

0.10
cost range in OECD
0.00
Onshore wind
Offshore wind
CSP
Solar PV: large
Solar PV: small
Biomass
Hydro: small
Hydro: large
Geothermal
Onshore wind
CSP
Solar PV: large
Solar PV: small
Biomass
Hydro: small
Hydro: large
Geothermal
OECD Non-OECD
Source: IRENA Costing Alliance.

Some governments have reacted quite radically to Capacity corridors allow regulators to announce
this challenge which was further compounded by modifications in FiT levels on a pre-set periodic ba-
the global economic crisis. They implemented sharp sis. The period for review varies among countries.
subsidy cuts, sometimes with retroactive effect. Others Germany has opted for monthly reviews, while the U.K.
started thinking of creative ways of providing the nec- and France review support levels every quarter. The
essary support for the renewables sector while ensur- capacity corridors determine the extent of change in
ing that rate-payers or tax-payers see their funds used the FiT level, which depends directly on the number
in the most efficient manner possible. of megawatts (MW) connected to the grid in the
preceding period (see Box 1.1). To administer this, a
1.2 RESPONSES special project registry had to be created and moni-
tored to ensure that the changes are decided based
This section presents a set of measures that have on accurate and up-to-date information.
been adopted by various governments to address the
challenge of keeping pace with decreasing costs of The U.K., French and German degression mechanisms
renewable energy technologies. differ in design, but they share the same aim: to limit
capacity added to the grid to a manageable level
1.2.1 Integrating “real-time capacity and to align the support with the real costs of generat-
corridors” into feed-in tariff reductions ing power from these projects. Figure 1.6 demonstrates
the changes in the FiT levels in these three countries
Policy overview: Degression mechanisms – or regular, from adopting a degression mechanism. The smooth-
administrative feed-in tariff rate reductions for new er decrease in tariffs in the case of Germany has been
projects – are not new features in renewable energy achieved through the application of a degression rate
policy-making and are typically implemented annual- on a monthly basis. This rate is set for each quarter
ly. However, in late 2011 and early 2012, some countries, based on PV deployment over a preceding 12-month
such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom period.
(U.K.), added important features to make their mecha-
nisms more effective in tracking generation cost Impact assessment: Implementing a degression
reductions while avoiding potential overcompensa- mechanism based on project registries and “real-time
tion. These features included maintaining real-time capacity corridors” has certain advantages. First, it
registries of deployment and introducing capacity provides governments with a clear picture on how
corridors based on data from these registries. attractive their tariffs are by highlighting how much
FIGURE 1.6 PV FIT DEGRESSION MECHANISM IN GERMANY, THE U.K. AND FRANCE, 2009-13 (EUR/MWh)
600 Germany
EUR/MWh UK
France
500
400
300
200
100
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: BNEF based on data from Ofgem (UK), CRE (France) and BNETZA (Germany)
Note: The data gap between Q4 2010 and Q1 2011 in the case of France represents a three-month moratorium implemented to reassess FiT support.
21
Box 1.1
DEGRESSION MECHANISM FOR SOLAR PV FIT SUPPORT IN THE UK
As in most countries, the feed-in tariff policy in the UK is designed in a manner that once the system is installed
and registered, the tariff levels remain fixed and are subject only to the inflation index. As deployment costs
decrease, a mechanism for estimating the future FiT rate was established through a consultation process con-
ducted in 2012. The mechanism adopts a three-pronged approach to estimate the level of support:
1. Pre-planned degression: The frequency was revised from an annual review of tariffs to a quarterly one. The degression
takes place on a fixed date but the amount depends on the capacity deployed relative to pre-set capacity thresholds.
The relevant deployment period considered is the quarter ending three months before the degression applies. The
table below provides an overview of the deployment corridors and the degression factor which they trigger for different
capacity bands.
DEPLOYMENT CORRIDORS (MW PER QUARTER)
Solar PV capacity band (kW) Low Default High 1 High 2 High 3
<=10 0-100 100-200 200-250 250-300 >300
>10<=50 0-50 50-100 100-150 150-200 >200
>50 0-50 50-100 100-150 150-200 >200
Degression factor (% per quarter) 0% 3.5% 7% 14% 28%
2. Contingent degression: As evident from the table above, deployment under the ‘low corridor’ attracts zero degression.
However, the mechanism put in place allows for the degression to be skipped only up to two consecutive periods, after
which an automatic default rate (3.5%) applies.
3. Annual reviews: Tariff review is also conducted annually to ensure that the mechanism is operating efficiently and
effectively in adequately supporting PV deployment.
A similar degression mechanism is applied to other technologies, including wind, anaerobic digestors and biogas,
with different design characteristics depending on the technology maturity, volatility in deployment costs and policy
objectives.
Source: (U.K. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2012)
new capacity is actually being added to the system (MWh) of electricity generated from PV plants. As tariff
over a period of time. Second, they provide investors reductions are implemented more frequently, new
with clarity about the timing and the extent of tariff projects receive lower support, minimising the impact
changes. The design also lowers longer-term political on consumers’ electricity bills. In Germany, this reduc-
risk by reducing the likelihood of an uncontrollable tion was around 20% in 2013 (see Table 1.1).
boom which could lead a government to cut tariffs
suddenly or even retroactively. Risks: The success of degression mechanisms depends
on effective design and administration. The specific
The German experience shows that the degression design features of the mechanism, such as the setting
mechanism has been successful in accurately and of degression rates, capacity corridors, capacity caps,
timely tracking the decreasing cost of the technology, and the time period between successive revisions, are
as depicted in Figure 1.7. critical for the success of this adaptation measure.
Furthermore, by aligning the tariffs more accurately One of the primary design risks, as observed from the
and rapidly with falling technology costs, such a case of the U.K., is the possibility of situations where
mechanism can accelerate the reduction of the despite lower-than-expected (below capacity cor-
amount that consumers pay per megawatt-hour ridor) deployment, a degression is applied (even if in

TABLE 1.1 GERMAN FIT DEGRESSION: IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
2010 2011 2012 2013E
Cumulative installed PV capacity (MW) 17 103 24 588 32 192 35 292
Power output from German PV projects 8 296 19 399 24 072 34 674

(GWh)
Impact on consumers – total EEG 3 883 7 937 8 685 10 156

payments for PV (million EUR)
Cost to consumers per MWh of 468 409 361 293

electricity generated from PV
(EUR/MWh)
Source: Adapted from annual forecasts published by transmission system operators (TSOs) in Network-Transparenz, 2014. Figures are rounded up.
successive review rounds), further reducing the incen- deliveries begin may create a windfall for the genera-
tive for deployment (see Box 1.1). From an administration tor in a time of falling project costs.
point of view, regulators in particular must operate
timely project-by-project registries that are accurate POLICY
and maintained in real time. Delays in the registries may INDICATOR
result in lack of transparency and hence in misguided Renewables penetration: Low-medium-high
decisions. Moreover, any tariff degression mechanism Economic development: Middle-high income
needs to start from an appropriate “starting price”. If the
Policy goal: Provide adequate support for renewables;
initial level is set too high, even an aggressive degression minimise cost
schedule would not prevent windfall profits, at least for
a while. Policy type: Feed-in tariff
Eligible technologies: All renewable energy technologies

Finally, the regulator must decide at which point in the
project development the installations can apply and Asset ownership: Residential, community, commercial, IPP,
be awarded a feed-in tariff – often this is granted when utility
planning permission is obtained. It is essential that
Complementary policies: Budgetary and capacity caps
after granting the tariff, a commissioning deadline is
set. A significant lag between when the FiT is set and
FIGURE 1.7 SMALL-SCALE PV CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, FEED-IN TARIFF RATE AND POWER PRICES IN GERMANY, 2006-2013
Capex <10kW
Capex (EUR/W) Electricity (EUR/MWh) (EUR/W)
6
Residential
power price
(EUR/MWh)
5 Feed-in tariff
<10kW (EUR/MWh)
Commercial
power price
4 (EUR/MWh)
0
Q2 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3
2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013
Source: BNEF; BSW Solar; Eurostat, n.d.
23
1.2.2 Building third-party metrics into per kWh (USD 0.16/kWh). The tariff was calculated
feed-in tariffs separately for each project based on a specific for-
mula (see Box 1.2). As such, the mechanism was ap-
Policy overview: The most effective FiT rates over the plied mainly to utility-scale plants, since the quota for
long term are those that are set high enough to in- other capacity brackets had been fulfilled at the time
centivise the desired level of generation but not too of the scheme’s introduction. This unique approach
high to constitute windfall profits for generators or to may offer a comparative advantage over capacity-
incur outsized liabilities on the government or utilities. based degressions wherein the elasticity between
Building FiTs that successfully achieve this goal can be decreasing price and increasing deployment might
challenging, however. not necessarily be as definitive as required.
In Israel, the country’s grid regulator, the Public Utilities For 2014, Israel has shifted its scheme to focus instead
Authority (PUA), took an unique approach to degres- on net metering for residential systems, having con-
sion in 2012. It decided to peg the FiT that it offered cluded that solar PV technologies are now cost com-
directly to a set of factors that closely reflect the state of petitive in the sunny nation. In addition, the country’s
solar markets. Specifically, these factors include interest Ministerial Committee on Promotion of Renewable
rates, inflation, exchange rates, the cost of capital, and Energy approved the raising of the target quota for PV
the BNEF module and inverter price indices (which are by nearly 290 MW, which were originally allocated for
based on a confidential survey of buyers and sellers of solar-thermal and wind technology (Udasin, 2014). In
such equipment). both cases, these decisions were informed in part by
the experience with the index, which allowed regula-
The objective of adopting such an approach was to tors to track “real-world” prices closely.
avoid a “solar bubble” in which the support schemes
become disconnected from actual market costs. In Impact assessment: Israel’s novel scheme was in
March 2013, the PUA significantly reduced FiTs in light effect for just a short time, so gauging its success is
of lower PV equipment prices. The rate available to difficult. Integrating the market index into the rate
medium-sized PV projects was cut by 41% to NIS 0.57 did result in the tariff declining sharply. There is little to
Box 1.2
CALCULATING THE ISRAEL SOLAR FEED-IN TARIFF
MIt Cpt
RPt = P * [ DD * ( 35% * MI
t
o o
)
+ 20% + 45% * Cp * Z
o
[
rt
Z = 0.15 * + 0.85
ro
Where:
P Base tariff in NIS/kWh (e.g. 0.66 NIS/kWh for utility-scale PV)

RPt Updated tariff in NIS/kWh
Cpt Most updated Israeli Consumer Price Index
Cpo Base Israeli Consumer Price Index
MIo Base BNEF module and inverter index (e.g 0.87+0.11 USD/Wp)
MIt Updated BNEF module and inverter index known on the day of update
Base NIS/USD exchange rate

Do
Last month average of NIS/USD exchange rate known on the day of update
Dt Interest rate factor update formula
Z Base interest rate
ro
Quarterly average of A+ non-tradable inflation indexed bonds
rt
Source: PUA, 2013

suggest that this led to a drop in market activity (or de- and other criteria and enters into power purchase
ployment), however. There were also some concerns, agreements (PPAs) with the winning bidders. Auction
that the incentives that otherwise would be provided schemes harness the rapidly decreasing costs of re-
by above-market offtake rates were blunted by delays newable energy technologies, the increased number
in acquiring land use and construction permits (BNEF, of project developers, their international exposure and
2012a). know-how, and the considerable policy design experi-
ence acquired over the last decade.
Risks: A scheme such as the one employed by Israel in 2013
is tied inherently to the longevity and accuracy of an outside When well designed, the price competition inherent
market index. The discontinuation of the index or a signifi- to the auction scheme increases cost efficiency and
cant change in its design or underlying determinants could allows for price discovery of renewable energy-based
undermine such a policy. In addition, there is the risk that electricity, avoiding windfall profits or underpayments.
such an index is inaccurate, particularly given how much The experience of several developing countries, in-
local conditions can vary. Indeed, in Israel some develop- cluding China, Morocco, Peru, South Africa and Brazil,
ers highlighted that the index portrayed global conditions, in designing and implementing auction schemes
when what really mattered was the cost of PV in Israel. were analysed in IRENA’s earlier work on Renewable
Energy Auctions in Developing Countries (IRENA,
POLICY
INDICATOR 2013a). In this sub-section, the experience of Brazil is
further discussed.
Renewables penetration: Low-medium
Economic development: Middle-high income THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE

Policy goal: Provide adequate support for renewables; The Brazilian government in 2002 set up a FiT scheme
minimise cost – the Programme of Incentives for Alternative Electricity
Policy type: Feed-in tariff

Sources (PROINFA) – to support investments in wind, bio-
mass and small-scale hydropower. Against a target of
Eligible technologies: All renewable energy technologies 3 300 MW by 2009 (distributed equally among the three
technologies), 2 888 MW was deployed (1 157 MW of
Asset ownership: Utility, IPPs, others
small hydro, 1 182 MW of wind and 550 MW of biomass).
Complementary policies: Procurement (national/state/ While successful in starting the domestic RE business,
local), target for installed capacity of renewables, target
for share of renewable energy
PROINFA was not applied in the most efficient way be-
cause of the high tariffs that were initially set. Moreover,
the selection criterion of qualified projects was based
1.2.3 Holding auctions for power contracts on the date of the environmental permit (the older the
permit the higher the priority of the project in the merit
Policy Overview: A potential way to avoid “overpay- order for contracting). This led to a “black market” for
ing” for renewable energy is to attempt to harness free environmental licenses. Although there was an estab-
market forces and to adopt instruments that allow price lished procedure for obtaining environmental licenses
discovery. This is one of the primary features of auction at each step of the project, requirements sometimes
schemes in which bids are made by the seller rather varied and licenses were frequently difficult to obtain.
than the buyer. Auction schemes also provide policy Therefore, many projects were delayed, faced large
makers with more control over the quantity of renew- cost overruns, or in some cases failed. Additional dif-
able energy that is deployed. As of early 2014, auctions ficulties included grid connections, construction delays
were the policy option of choice in at least 55 countries/ and limited domestic manufacturing capacity for local
jurisdictions around the globe, primarily developing content requirements to be effective, leading to delays
countries (IRENA, 2014). specifically for wind projects (IRENA, 2013a).
In a renewable energy auction, a grid operator, energy Experience with the FiT scheme led the govern-
regulator or energy ministry issues a call for tenders to ment to explore a legal framework to use energy
install a certain capacity or level of generation. Project auctions as a mechanism to deploy renewables.
developers typically submit bids with a price per unit Accordingly, an auction scheme to contract
of electricity to be delivered. The government or other generation capacity was launched in 2007 (see
entity evaluates the offers on the basis of the price Figure 1.8). The original motivation for auctions was
25
FIGURE 1.8 EVOLUTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY ELECTRICITY TARIFF-BASED SUPPORT MECHANISMS IN BRAZIL
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
FIT
AUCTION
BIOMASS HYDRO WIND SOLAR
Source: Adapted from IRENA, 2013a
price disclosure and efficiency in the procurement The challenge that many countries face in implement-
process by reducing the asymmetry of informa- ing auction schemes is ensuring that winning bids
tion between the industry and the government. translate into the timely development of projects and
These auctions have been technology-specific, to sustainable generation over their envisaged lifetime.
alternative energy auctions or technology-neutral. As such, projects supported through FiTs or auctions
Renewable energy technologies, in particular all have an incentive to maximise output.
wind, have seen much success during the different
rounds of auction. Nearly 13 GW of wind has been Figure 1.10 provides a comparison of capacity factors
contracted until the end of 2013 with the price of for projects deployed under the PROINFA FiT scheme
wind energy consistently reducing with a general and the auction scheme in Brazil. It is clear that projects
trend of decreasing prices (see Figure 1.9). that obtained PPAs via an auction operated at higher
FIGURE 1.9 WIND CAPACITY CONTRACTED IN BRAZIL (MW) AND AVERAGE PRICE (USD/MWh)
14 000 160 Cumulative wind

capacity contracted
MW USD/MWh (MW)
140 Wind Energy Price
12 000
(USD/MWh)
120
10 000
100
8 000
80
6 000
60
4 000
40
2 000
20
0 0
PROINFA 2009 Auction 2010 Auction 2011 Auction 2012 Auction 2013 Auction
Source: Adapted from IRENA, 2013b (data for PROINFA, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 auction) and GWEC, 2014a (data for 2013 auction using exchange
rate: 1USD = 2.2 BRL)

FIGURE 1.10 VERIFIED CAPACITY FACTORS FOR BRAZILIAN WIND PROJECTS COMMISSIONED UNDER AUCTION SCHEME
AND UNDER PROINFA FEED-IN TARIFF, 2012 (%)
80% Auctions
Average
70% PROINFA
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Jun 12
Jul 12
Jun 13
Jul 13
Jan 12
Feb 12
Mar 12
Apr 12
May 12
Aug 12
Sept 12
Oct 12
Nov 12
Dec 12
Jan 13
Feb 13
Mar 13
Apr 13
May 13
Aug 13
Sep 13
Oct 13
Nov 13
Dec 13
Source: BNEF; ANEEL; ABEEólica (2013).
capacity factors than those contracted under the FiT Impact assessment: In the August 2013 auction, 66
scheme. This is primarily due to technological improve- contracts were signed with a total capacity of 1 505
ments, but also to siting and operational choices. MW and an average price of BRL 110.51 (USD 50.9)
per MWh. The November 2013 auction resulted in
The experience from Brazil demonstrates that several the award of 39 projects with a combined installed
factors should be considered while designing and capacity of 867.8MW at an average price of BRL 124.43
implementing auction schemes. For instance, in a (USD 57.3) per MWh. In December 2013, the auction
departure from previous auctions, the government resulted in the award of 97 new projects totalling 2.3
instituted a “P90” standard for qualifying projects. This GW at an average price of BRL 109.93 (USD 50.6) per
meant that a project’s annual generation had to equal MWh (GWEC, 2014a).
90% or more of the probability of generation forecast
by wind measurement and annual generation data. These results were higher than the minimum price
The P90 standard differs from the P50 capacity factor reached in the 2012 auction that resulted in the award
required in previous auctions, which allowed for a of just 10 projects of 281.9 MW total capacity at BRL 87.94
larger margin of error in qualifying for a PPA. (USD 42.16) per MWh. The surprisingly low prices of 2012
were attributed to the low ceiling price established for
To address previous nonfulfillment of commitments as- the auction (USD 54 per MWh), among other factors
sociated with grid connection limitations, the August (Brazilian Wind Energy Conference, 2013). Factors that
2013 auction included inter-connection qualifiers. could have influenced the marginal increase in price
Developers had to connect their projects to the grid in 2013 include: 1) the developers were responsible
at their own expense if necessary, and a project may for connecting their projects to the grid at their own
only be bid in the auction if it is feasible to connect expense, if necessary; 2) the developers were respon-
it. When the project developer submits a proposal, sible for delivering the projects in a short period of two
it must identify which substation it plans to connect years; and 3) BNDES had more stringent local content
to. All substations are mapped onto the transmission requirements for financing projects.
system. In the case where multiple projects compete
to connect to the same substation, the project which In November 2013, Brazil held its first auction in
bids lowest is offered the contract. which solar projects were encouraged to compete.
27
Developers registered 3 gigawatts (GW) of potential to encourage investment in new generating capac-
capacity to bid for contracts. However, a ceiling price ity. These supports have typically come in one of two
for contracts of just BRL 126 (USD 58) per MWh was set forms:
by regulators, and no registered solar projects won »»Tax credits, which allow renewable energy asset
contracts. Later that year, a solar-exclusive auction was owners to directly reduce the taxes they pay at
held on December 27. It registered 122.82 MW of total the end of the year, pegged either to the volume
capacity at an average price of BRL 228.63 (USD 105.25) of electricity that their project has generated or
per MWh. their total investment in building the project.
Risks: The most significant risk in auctions is that de- »»Allowable accelerated depreciation, which allows
velopers will offer bids low enough to win contracts developers to amortise the costs of a renewable
but too low to ensure that they earn an adequate energy project in an expedited manner. The result is
return on investment. Such “low-ball” bids, whether higher booked costs in the earlier operating years of
intentional or not, can result in financing delays and, a project to reduce reported earnings and associ-
in the worst case, in failure of the project to be built ated taxes. Later, when the costs are fully amortised,
at all. While different countries have adopted various the asset can generate larger profits that do get
design features to avoid such a situation (e.g., intro- taxed; but in the meantime, the actual economic
ducing floor tariffs, establishing tariff benchmarks, cost to the project owner has been reduced.
etc.), the risk remains as domestic markets become
increasingly competitive. Tax policies have been used most notably in the
United States and India (see Box 1.3) to spur renew-
Successful auctions also are contingent on the power able energy deployment. The United States has relied
purchaser following through on commitments to buy on a combination of accelerated depreciation and
electricity at an agreed-upon price. Even for transactions tax credits. Wind projects commissioned before 1
in which the offtaker is government-owned or -backed, January 2014 benefitted from the Production Tax
it is important to assess its history in fulfilling contract ob- Credit (PTC) which allowed them to directly reduce
ligations and its track record on payments and dispute their annual tax bills by USD 23 for each MWh that a
resolution. Finally, the process relies on transparent and project generates over the first ten years in operation.
efficient administration of bids in order to preclude ac- Solar project owners can apply for the Investment Tax
cusations of “fixing the contracts”. Credit (ITC), set at 30% of a new project’s capital ex-
penditure. Combined with accelerated depreciation
POLICY rules, these tax credits have proven critical to the ex-
INDICATOR
pansion of U.S. renewable energy capacity. However,
Renewables penetration: Low-medium-high
the tax policies put in place in the United States
Economic development: Middle-high income require periodic extensions that are often approved
Policy goal: Provide adequate support for renewables, either close to the expiry date or retroactively. While
trigger technology innovation the ITC is available in its current form through 2016,
Policy type: Auctions the PTC has been allowed to expire four times since
1999 and officially expired at the end of 2013. At the
Eligible technologies: All
height of the financial crisis in January 2009, Congress
Asset ownership: Utility, IPP enacted a key change to make the PTC more flex-
ible through the establishment of “cash grants” that
Complementary policies: Power market liberalisation
project developers could receive in lieu of the PTC.
The grants would cover 30% of a typical wind project’s
capital expenditure. Developers quickly put the cash
1.2.4 Designing flexible tax policies grant to use, building nearly 21.3 GW of new capacity
from 2009 to 2011.
Policy overview: Policy makers have long used tax
codes as an instrument to incentivise private sector The cash grant programme expired at the end of
participation. In the context of renewable energy 2011. The PTC lived on for two more years until its expiry
development, tax policies have been used extensively at the end of 2013, but not before a key change was

Box 1.3
ACCELERATED DEPRICIATION FOR WIND SECTOR DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF INDIA
In India, accelerated depreciation rules for both wind and solar PV have played a key role in supporting deployment
of those technologies. During the initial stages of market development, the entire value of an Indian wind project could
be depreciated in the first year of its existence. First-year depreciation was then lowered to 80% around 2003 and, in
March 2012, reduced further to 15%. The incentive was withdrawn in April 2012 (PIB, 2012), along with another key incen-
tive- Generation Based Incentive (GBI). With no economic incentives in place, the installations dipped to 1 700 MW in
2012-13, compared to 3 164 MW in 2011-12 (CSE, 2014). This led the government to re-introduce the GBI scheme with the
objective of incentivising generation rather than capacity deployment as well as to allow a broader set of developers
to enter the market. However, there is growing demand for reinstating the accelerated depreciation benefit (CSE, 2014).
Accelerated depreciation benefits those projects that rely on balance-sheet financing rather than a project financ-
ing. The argument against such an approach is that it hinders the scalability of the sector (as the purpose of
lending is not directly power generation) and that it does not encourage the participation of a broader set of IPPs
that face difficulties in accessing corporate credit for wind projects. While a GBI scheme addresses this to a certain
extent, in this case investors need to take on performance risks given that the revenues become entirely dependent
on the generation of wind projects.
made to increase the flexibility of the policy. Whereas in the policy design is that if the gap between the
projects previously needed to be commissioned by LCOEs for wind and natural gas does not close, the
the time of the PTC expiry, at the end of 2013 they PTC remains on the books.
merely needed to be “under construction”. Partly as
a result of this change, developers were able to keep Impact assessment: The impact of the PTC on U.S.
considerably more projects in motion and their “pipe- wind installations is clear: they peaked in 2009 and
lines” full. The U.S. Energy Information Administration is 2012, as developers rushed to build projects ahead
projecting that 16.1 GW of new wind capacity will be of the anticipated expiry of the credit (see Figure
built in 2014-15 (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014). 1.11). As evident from the figure, each time the credit
has been allowed to expire, the following year has
Against this backdrop, the non-partisan experienced a significant drop in deployment. The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a PTC was last extended in January 2013 for one year,
paper that examined some policy options to address but the effect of its “false” expiry is permanent. Only
the shortcoming of the PTC. One option considered an estimated 600 MW of new wind capacity was
that the level of the PTC that is presently fixed at USD added in the United States in 2013, in part because
23 (and rises at the rate of inflation) could be set an- projects which would have been completed that
nually at a rate just high enough to bridge the gap year were brought on line in 2012 by developers
between the average levelised cost of electricity fearful of missing out on the PTC. Although the
(LCOE) for wind power generation and a similarly set PTC expired in January 2014, the extension in 2013
LCOE for natural gas combined-cycle power genera- included an adjustment of the eligibility criteria to
tion (CRS, 2013). include projects that began construction in 2013
and not necessarily coming online in the same
The annual adjustment was proposed with a PTC year (NREL, 2014). This has led to a positive outlook
“phase out” in mind, under the assumption that the being adopted for the industry in 2014 with over 12
LCOE for wind will continue to decline, natural gas GW of new generation capacity being under con-
prices will rise, or some combination of both will occur. struction at the end of 2013 (GWEC, 2014b).
The result would be that the PTC could be reduced
accordingly. Once that gap closes altogether, the Risks: The potential drawbacks of the proposed revi-
PTC would fall to zero and effectively sunset itself. Thus, sions of the PTC include: 1) complex implementation,
the PTC would exist on an as-needed basis. Implicit 2) issues with using LCOE as a way to compare the
29
FIGURE 1.11 US WIND CAPACITY ADDITIONS AND PTC (1999- 2014E) (MW)
16 000
MW Deployed
14 000
12 000
10 000
PTC expiration
8 000
6 000
4 000
2 000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e
Source: Adapted from IRENA, 2014. Note: The capacity addition for 2014 is estimated from GlobalData, 2014.
economics of wind and natural gas combined-cycle year might provide greater incentive for the industry
power generation, 3) regional resource and market to make improvements over a certain period of time.
variations and 4) industry’s ability to realise cost reduc-
tions (CRS, 2013). POLICY
INDICATOR
Each of these has the potential to undermine the Renewables penetration: Low-medium-high
flexible PTC proposal. The first – “complex implementa- Economic development: Middle-high income
tion” – simply refers to the difficulty overall of adding any
Policy goal: Provide adequate support for renewables ,
level of nuance to what to date has been a fixed-rate trigger technology innovation
subsidy. The second raises questions about whether
Policy type: Tax-based mechanism
LCOE is the proper metric for comparing wind with its
nearest-priced competitor in U.S. power generation. Eligible technologies: Multiple
The third refers to the fact that there are substantial re- Asset ownership: Utility, IPP
gional differences in the United States in terms of natural
Complementary policies: U.S. Production Tax Credit
resources (and hence LCOEs), raising the possibility that
a “one-size-fits-all” approach to setting a support level
may not be appropriate. Finally, the entire proposal rests 1.3 LESSONS LEARNED
on the assumption that the wind industry will continue
to innovate and reduce its costs in order for the PTC to The sharp fall in renewable energy equipment
decline and eventually disappear. Should costs not costs has both a positive and a negative impact
drop, the gap between the LCOE for wind and natural for policy-making. It is positive in that cheaper solar
gas will not necessarily narrow, and the PTC will have to PV modules or wind turbines have led to an expan-
remain at current or higher levels. sion in renewable energy deployment. It is negative
in that it can be challenging to set support levels
There is one additional and associated concern: if appropriately enough to spur market activity and
the wind industry knows that the PTC will be set annu- low enough to avoid unintended windfall profits for
ally at a level substantial enough to bridge the gap developers. Sudden efforts to rein in supports have
between wind and natural gas costs, will it still be created market uncertainty. In a number of cases,
sufficiently motivated to continue to reduce its costs? this has resulted directly in decreased private in-
A system that automatically reduces the PTC year by vestment and deployment.

Three key lessons can be learned from the experience consequences. The solutions being proposed
of the countries analysed in this section: by most of the policies here seek to address this
problem by providing greater transparency and
1. Virtually all of the policies discussed here aim at improve predictability.
providing as much transparency as possible to
market participants. In Germany, for instance, 3. Market-based policy support mechanisms,
regulators took steps to create a registry of proj- such as auctions, are gaining increasing
ects that have secured FiT access with an eye to- prominence as a way of reducing information
wards informing the broader market about when asymetry between governments and develop-
step-downs in the tariff are likely to arrive and how ers, and in identifying the appropriate level of
deep they will be. In Israel, regulators publicised public support. When well designed, these
a specific equation for calculating the rate of the schemes in their own way also provide trans-
country’s FiT based on regularly updated sources parency and predictability by providing clear
of information. guidelines to the market on how much new
capacity is being sought and by offering spe-
2. While each of these policies may have flaws, cific rules on how such power will be procured.
all present a key lesson learned: policy moves In the best cases, the auction organisers offer
that have not been communicated clearly and quite specific guidance on what projects will or
in advance to the market can have negative will not be deemed acceptable.
31
2 Addressing Tax/Rate-payer
Burdens
R
enewable energy deployment has experienced fossil fuels, it is important that it is kept under control
substantial growth during the past decade- and that its cost is distributed fairly across the different
global solar PV installed capacity has risen from stakeholders.
over 7 GW in 2006 to 137 GW in 2013, while wind capac-
ity has grown from 74 GW to 318 GW in the same period 2.1 CHALLENGE: REDUCING IMPACTS ON
(REN21, 2013; GWEC, 2014b). Much of this growth has TAX-PAYERS OR CONSUMERS
been a result of financial support offered by countries
that have been early-adopters of these technologies. The misalignment of the level of support and the cost
These countries recognized the long-term benefits of technology is one of the factors that has led to an
brought on by renewables from an environmental, unprecedented spike in renewable energy capac-
economic and social standpoint. As such, support for ity installations in some countries. This boom, driven
renewables has been seen as a means of internalising largely by attractive support rates, has in some cases
external costs presently not accounted for in traditional resulted inadvertently in an increased burden on
energy markets. Resilient support for the sector trans- consumers and tax-payers – or, as in Spain, in a “tariff
lated into a scale-up in deployment, thereby leading deficit” caused by policies that have at times forced
to a substantial decrease in technology costs and the utilities to sell electricity to consumers at rates below
development of the renewable energy industry. As a the cost of supply.
result, further deployment will not require the level of
support witnessed in the past. While the support for Figure 2.1 illustrates that in 2012, the Italian residen-
renewables has generally been much lower than for tial power price rose by 10% purely as a result of FiTs
FIGURE 2.1 COST OF PV SUPPORT AS A SHARE OF 2011 ELECTRICITY PRICES IN SELECT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (EUR/MWh)
300
PV support
EUR/MWh
7.6%
Electricity price
250
10.1%
4.4%
200
7.5%
1.0% 1.9%
150
4.5%
100
50
0
Germany Italy Spain Czech Republic UK France Greece
Source: BNEF based partly on data from Eurostat, n.d.

Note: Estimates based on FiT rates and installation levels in these countries; domestic power prices from Eurostat.

for solar PV. In the U.K., this increase was around The result has been the emergence of several socio-
1% at the time, but with increasing megawatts economic benefits such as economic development
installed, this number has been rising as well. In and job creation. along the various segments of the
Germany, the impact on electricity bills has been value chain (IRENA, 2013b; IRENA and CEM, 2014). In
obvious for a few years now, but the 47% spike in Germany, for instance, the renewable energy sector
the renewable energy surcharge (“EEG Umlage”) in supported over 371 000 direct and indirect jobs in 2013
2013 shocked consumers and policy makers alike. (IRENA, 2014).
Germany is a clear example of a country whose ambi- Still, these policies have had a cost. There have been
tious – and successful – renewable energy policies led clear instances where they have inflated rate-payers’
to the development of a local industry, albeit at a cost electricity bills or tax-payers’ tax bills. Europe is chosen
(see Figure 2.2). Several gigawatts of installed renewable as a suitable example to illustrate this impact for three
energy capacity resulted in significant cost added to reasons: 1) the continent has been a front-runner in
final consumers’ electricity bills. As a result, speculations several renewable energy technology deployment,
were abound that the 2014 level of the EEG surcharge and hence the effects of support are most obvious;
was likely to exceed EUR 7 cents per kWh. To the surprise 2) for many years high FiTs were the dominant support
of many, it increased to only EUR 6.24 cents/kWh in 2014, policy in the continent, raising the overall costs of sup-
which may suggest that these costs are beginning to port, and 3) timely data are either readily available or
be contained and that some cost-efficiency measures relatively easy to calculate, because European opera-
that have been implemented are bearing fruit. tors are obliged to report periodically.
In virtually all of these cases, policy makers were will- However, the impact of support measures on consum-
ing to support the renewable energy sector seeking to ers is different depending on the form in which this
make inroads into a power sector dominated by large support is granted. FiTs, feed-in premiums and green
incumbent players such as utilities or independent certificates usually affect consumers in a similar way – by
power producers. To a large degree, the policies of adding a “renewables surcharge” to their electricity bills.
Germany, Spain, Italy, Denmark and other nations Countries using auctions as the main support measure
succeeded in allowing the renewable energy sector for renewables are likely to include their costs in the “cost
to scale up and drive down the generation costs. of electricity” component of the final consumer bill, as
FIGURE 2.2 GERMAN EEG SURCHARGE ON HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY BILLS (EUR CENTS/kWh) AND INSTALLED RENEWABLE GENERATION CAPACITY
(GW), 2010-14E
9 90
EEG surcharge on household electricity (EUR cents/kWh)
82.6
8 77.1 80
Installed renewable energy capacity (GW)
71.0
7 70
6.24
6 60.5
60
5.28
51.0
5 50
4 3.59 40
3.53
3 30
2.05
2 20
1 10
0 0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014e
Source: Adapted from Network-Transparenz, 2014. Note: ‘e’ denotes that the figure is an estimation for the given year.
Note: Figures provided by the German Ministry of Environment and BNetzA. Installed capacity numbers are from BNEF and the Capacity for 2014 is
estimated.
33
arguably this is not subsidised since projects win con- electricity at subsidised rates, as is also the case in Spain.
tracts via competitive bidding (unless the auctions are This may affect credit ratings of both the underwriting
technology-specific, in which case a subsidy is some- authorities and the companies themselves.
times included). This is the case in many Latin American
markets, such as Brazil, Uruguay and South Africa. An analysis of average annual spending on renewable
energy support – calculated as the difference between
Assessing the impact of net metering is more difficult (see the wholesale power price and the price paid to renew-
sub-section 3.2.1), for example, given the often avoided able generators – of some of the most prominent players
fixed payments for transmission and distribution. In cases among the emerging markets highlights that as India
where the cost of support does not permeate through to and China have added more renewables to their power
the consumers, as with many developing countries like generation mix (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4), the burden on
India, the state simply underwrites the debt (partly or en- consumers (or tax-payers, where subsidies are funded
tirely) that distribution companies accumulate by selling from the budget) has risen as well (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6).
FIGURE 2.3 INDIA’S INSTALLED RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY, 2010-13 (GW) FIGURE 2.4 CHINA’S INSTALLED RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY, 2010-13 (GW)
Biomass & waste Solar Small-hydro Wind Marine Geothermal Biomass & waste Solar Hydro Wind
35 200
32.4 185.4
GW GW
180
30 28.0 155.5
160
24.0
25 133.7
140
19.8
120 108.8
20
100
15
80
10 60
40
5
20
0 0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: BNEF. Note: Large hydro not included. Source: BNEF. Note: Large hydro not included.
FIGURE 2.5 INDIA’S ESTIMATED ANNUAL NATIONAL SPENDING ON SUBSIDIES, 2010- FIGURE 2.6 CHINA’S ESTIMATED ANNUAL NATIONAL SPENDING ON SUBSIDIES,
13 (USD BILLION) 2010-13 (USD BILLION)
4 8
Large-scale solar Waste-to-energy
USD billion
USD billion Biomass Large-scale solar
7
Onshore wind Biomass
3 6
Onshore wind
2 4
1 2
0 0
Sum of 2010 Sum of 2011 Sum of 2012 Sum of 2013 Sum of 2010 Sum of 2011 Sum of 2012 Sum of 2013
Source: BNEF. Note: Chart represents net cost of subsidies (i.e., exclud- Source: BNEF. Note: Chart represents net cost of subsidies (i.e., exclud-
ing wholesale electricity prices). Direct subsidies only, local incentives ing wholesale electricity prices). Direct subsidies only. China Develop-
not included. ment Bank funding and local tax breaks not included

2.2 RESPONSES the government – or a regulator – needs to be able
to track in detail how many projects are connected,
Virtually all governments around the world are now how many are applying for support and how much
concerned about the cost of support they offer (or are overall support has already been provided. This, in turn,
considering offering) to renewable generators. These depends on being able to forecast – and track – the
concerns often result in reduced levels of support output from renewable energy projects, since in all of
justified by falling costs of renewable generation from the cases discussed below, the support is provided per
particular technologies. Some governments, however, unit of electricity produced (in kWh). Lack of transpar-
implemented measures explicitly targeting spending ency of the system may, on the one hand, undermine
caps on renewables support. investor confidence over the government’s ability to
actually support the renewable energy sector. On the
2.2.1 Implementing spending caps on other hand, with no ability to track progress towards the
support for renewables cap, the government may find itself in a position where
the cap has been exceeded but there was no registry
Policy Overview: Europe has experienced a rising cost to flag it. That could result in more cost on consumers,
of support for renewables. The U.K., Italy, Germany and defeating the primary purpose of such a measure.
the Netherlands all have made explicit efforts to limit
the potential burdens on consumers. While each does ITALY: BUDGET CAP ON SUPPORT FOR SOLAR PV
it in a slightly different manner, all are setting caps on UNDER THE 5TH CONTO ENERGIA LAW
their bill levies – the amount that can be passed on Following the solar boom of 2011, when 9.3 GW of solar PV
to consumers – to cover the support. Once the cap was added to the Italian grid (see Table 2.1), the country
is reached, the policies need to either be altered in decided to limit the amount of economic support avail-
line with the budgetary prescriptions, or the support able to the technology. Under the 5th Conto Energia law,
is suspended or terminated. Some countries imple- enacted in August 2012, FiTs were allocated to projects
ment “capacity” caps, rather than budgetary limits, included in a registry administered by the Gestore Servizi
to achieve the same purposes. This way, the govern- Energetici (GSE), created specially for this purpose.
ments try to ensure that the cost borne by society is Through this registry, the regulator could track the num-
both controlled and predictable. ber of projects applying for support and ensure that the
half-yearly budget cap was not exceeded. These caps
As many developing nations embark on the renew- were set at EUR 140 million for the first registry, EUR 120 mil-
able energy route, they too need to take into account lion for the second and EUR 80 million for the third. The
the impact that any support provided to the sector caps resulted in significant slowdown of additional PV
may have on consumers. Malaysia has taken these capacity built in Italy, particularly of large-scale projects.
aspects into account by introducing a spending cap
on FiTs provided to renewables. TABLE 2.1 PV GROWTH IN ITALY (2008-2013)
YEAR ADDED CAPACITY (GW)

Impact Assessment: Below is a brief overview of five
different budget cap designs, to illustrate various ap- 2008 0.3
proaches adopted by governments. Each aims first 2009 0.7

and foremost to limit the costs passed on to consum-
2010 2.3
ers. These limitations can provide additional certainty
2011 9.3
and transparency for investors. Knowing in advance
that the caps are imposed – and will be respected 2012 3.6
– sends a strong signal that the government will not 2013 1.8
allow for too high an increase of retail electricity prices. Source: GSE, 2014.
Thus, the risk of policy changes implemented retroac- Note: 2013 data is preliminary
tively (i.e., affecting operating assets) is significantly
reduced, if not eliminated. Italy has also set a cap limiting total annual spending
on the support for PV to EUR 6.7 billion, with the govern-
Risks: One of the key requirements for such policies to ment agreeing that once this is reached, there would
work is that they need to be transparent. In other words, be no further FiT support available. This budgetary cap
35
was reached on 6 June 2013 and the FiTs stopped be- surcharge (EEG Umlage) added to consumers’ bills.
ing allocated a month later. However, the residential While energy-intensive industries benefit from dis-
segment still benefits from a tax incentive (income tax counts on that surcharge, the cost is paid primarily
deduction), which has been driving steady growth in by household consumers. The levy is set each year
this market following the FiT termination. by the regulator, following the renewable generation
forecast and consultations with transmission system
U.K.: LEVY CONTROL FRAMEWORK operators (TSOs).
The U.K.’s Levy Control Framework (LCF) provides an
upper budget limit on the annual surcharges added For calendar year 2013, the EEG surcharge was raised
to consumer bills to fund renewable energy projects. 47%, from EUR 3.59 cents/kWh to EUR 5.28 cents/kWh
It was introduced by the government in 2010 to keep on domestic electricity bills (seen earlier in Figure
a lid on expenditures that are off the government 2.2). Soon after the announcement of that increase,
balance sheet but still considered public spending. a proposal was initiated to control electricity prices
Since then, the LCF has come to be viewed by inves- via a limit on the EEG surcharge increase. Under the
tors as a source of confidence that the U.K. is less likely proposal, in 2014 the surcharge would stay level at
to overspend on renewable energy and put a high EUR 5.28 cents/kWh. From 2015 onwards, it can rise
burden on consumers. That in turn reduces the risk of by no more than 2.5% annually. A set of measures
retroactive cuts for existing assets. lowering the support for renewables and limiting the
exemptions available to energy-intensive industries
The framework also offers visibility about the government’s was proposed to achieve this goal.
ambitions and scale of support over time. Notably, the U.K.
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has Although the proposal was not implemented due
published LCF amounts out to 2020/21, with a levy cap of to objections from the Bundesrat (Upper House of
GBP 7.6 billion in 2020 (2011/12 prices), providing a long- Parliament), it was a clear attempt to set binding bud-
term framework for prospective investors (see Figure 2.7). get limitations for renewables support. In 2014, the
EEG surcharge increased to EUR 6.24 cents/kWh, and,
GERMANY: PROPOSED EEG SURCHARGE LIMIT following the September parliamentary elections, the
In Germany, support for renewables – both feed-in new government’s priority was to stop further cost
tariffs and feed-in premiums – is funded via an EEG escalation.
FIGURE 2.7 U.K. LEVY CONTROL FRAMEWORK, 2011/12 – 2020/21 (GBP BILLION, 2011/12 PRICES)
8 7.6
GBP billion
7.0
7
6.5
6 5.6
4.9
5
4.3
4
3.3
3.0
3 2.5
2.1
2
0
2011/12 2012/13 2 013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21
Source: DECC, 2013

As such, the reform sets out to concentrate on the Netherlands decided to expand the SDE+ budget
deployment of wind and solar energy, that have and to return to pricier offshore wind.
proven to be the most cost effective technologies
in Germany. Moreover, it proposes to adopt instru- MALAYSIA: FEED-IN TARIFF FUND LIMITATIONS
ments that are more responsive to the market than Malaysia approaches the spending caps in a some-
FiTs, such as auctions, to support investments in what different manner. Rather than setting an over-
renewable energy. all budget limit, it limits the surcharge passed on to
non-domestic consumers to 1.6% (previously 1%) of
THE NETHERLANDS: BUDGET CAP FOR THE STIMULER- the retail electricity price. Domestic consumers are
ING DUURZAME ENERGIEPRODUCTIE (SDE+) 2013 exempt from paying this surcharge altogether unless
The Dutch government caps its spending on new they consume over 300 kWh a month. Based on the
renewable energy projects through its SDE+ tender revenues it collects from this surcharge and trans-
scheme. Feed-in premiums are awarded to the most fers to the special renewable energy fund, and on
cost-competitive projects and technologies through forecast renewable power output, the Sustainable
a series of tender rounds, with an overall annual Energy Development Authority (SEDA) defines the
budget. This is based on the total lifetime subsidies capacity cap for projects. For the period 2012-15, this
forecast to be allocated to projects selected in that cap was set at the total of 485 MW (SEDA, 2013).
year, amounting to EUR 3 billion in 2013. After the
budget ceiling has been reached, no more funding While this design can be effective, it can be difficult
is available for new projects that year. to administer, as neither the exact amount of funds
available nor the output from renewables can be
The competition among technologies has meant forecasted accurately three years in advance. In
that low-cost sectors have dominated each year’s 2013, it became clear that the current fund is not
scheme over the past three years, starting with bio- sufficient to support larger-scale renewable devel-
gas in 2011, before it was opened up to renewable opments. For this reason, SEDA had requested an
heat in 2012 (see Figure 2.8). The drive to thriftiness additional 1% surcharge, subject to approval from
was a response to higher subsidy allocation to off- the Ministry of Energy, Water and Green Technology.
shore wind in 2009. However, in the pathway towards A more modest increase to 1.6% was granted, follow-
meeting its 2020 renewable energy targets, the ing a debate with affected consumers.
FIGURE 2.8 SDE+ BUDGET CEILING PER SUBSIDY YEAR, 2008-2013 (EUR BILLION)
Heat
10
EUR billion 9.2
Biogas
9
Hydro
8 PV
Biomass
7
Offshore wind
6
Onshore wind
4 3.5
3.0
3
2.1
2 1.5 1.7
1.5
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (n.d.).

Note: Dotted line shows the remaining budget; 2014 figure represents the new allocated budget; “biomass” includes biogas and landfill gas used
for power production; “biogas” is delivered as gas; “heat” includes geothermal and biomass heat.
37
POLICY
INDICATOR
Three key lessons can be learned from the experience
of the countries analysed above:
Renewables penetration: Medium-high
Economic development: Middle-high income 1. Limiting the costs of renewables support gains
importance with increasing market maturity.
Policy goal: Minimise cost of support
While providing higher support levels may be im-
Policy type: Budget caps portant to kick-off new technology deployment, it
Eligible technology: All is essential that the costs are closely monitored as
renewable energy share expands.
Asset ownership: N/A
Complementary policies: Feed-in tariffs, market premiums, 2. The Malaysian example illustrates that keeping
green certificates, market premiums, grants, other support
schemes
costs under control is as important for middle-
income countries, concerned about maintaining
household income, as it is for high-income coun-
2.3 LESSONS LEARNED tries, concerned about industrial competitiveness.
This in part explains why in Malaysia, the support
Policy makers need to strike a balance between being is funded largely by non-domestic consumers,
supportive of renewable energy deployment and ensur- while in Europe the schemes are funded primarily
ing that the costs associated with that support do not fall by households.
disproportionately on one segment of the population.
Offering uncapped support for renewable power genera- 3. In a somewhat counterintuitive way, a cap on sup-
tion can add a high burden on consumers or tax-payers, port may improve rather than diminish investors’
who ultimately cover the costs through an electricity bill confidence in the market, as it provides long-term
surcharge or via additional taxes. visibility and predictability to the market. It also
minimises the risk of sudden or even retroactive
Putting a budget cap on spending for renewable energy changes.
support can limit this impact greatly, and several countries
have successfully demonstrated the impact of such mea- It is important to note that these budget caps can
sures. Italy stopped providing FiT support to solar PV when – and should – be complementary to all of the poli-
the total expenditure reached EUR 6.7 billion, avoiding fur- cies analysed in the previous section. In other words,
ther escalation of the costs. The U.K. restricts its spending governments need to think about ensuring that the
via a special levy control framework, limiting the spending support they provide accurately reflects the costs of
to GBP 3.3 billion in 2014 and GBP 7.6 billion in 2020. The generation and provides sufficient incentive to devel-
Netherlands managed to reduce its annual expenditure opers; at the same time, they need to state their inten-
on renewables support from EUR 9.2 billion in 2009 to EUR 3 tions clearly and to indicate early on how big a market
billion in 2013 through strict budget allocations. they are willing to support financially.

39
3 Accounting for Renewable
Energy’s Cost Competiveness
3.1 CHALLENGE: PREPARING FOR THE The most radical cost reductions have occurred in the
ARRIVAL OF GRID AND SOCKET PARITY solar sector in the last few years, with the global aver-
age cost of a typical residential solar PV system drop-
Economies of scale of renewable energy deploy- ping more than 40% since 2010. However, the price
ment have led to significant learning gains, which of residential PV differs dramatically among markets.
in turn have resulted in improved generation ef- A residential system can be installed for around USD
ficiencies, or capacity factors. As LCOE for many 2 250/kW or even less in Germany today, but it still costs
technologies have been steadily declining, some as much as USD 4 600/kW in the U.S. or USD 4 200/kW in
have already reached the so-called grid parity in Japan (see Figure 3.1). One reason is that while hard-
many contexts. In other words, they can produce ware costs have declined, non-hardware or “soft costs”
electricity at a cost roughly equal to, or less than, associated with installation, customer acquisition and
the price of power from the grid on a levelised interconnection remain higher in some countries than
basis. others (CEM, n.d.). The overall downward trend in
deployment costs, however, is expected to continue
Hydropower projects and some geothermal tech- (albeit in a somewhat less dramatic fashion) through
nologies, for example, have been competitive for the rest of the decade (see Figures 3.2).
some time now. Onshore wind has been steadily
lowering its LCOE by reducing equipment costs and PV grid parity has already been reached in some
improving turbine efficiencies with equipment that European markets, with those in the Asia-Pacific region
can operate in less windy locations. and the Americas to follow. However, discerning the
FIGURE 3.1 SMALL SOLAR PV SYSTEM COSTS IN SELECT COUNTRIES (USD/kW)
8000
US residential
USD/kW
US non-residential
US utility
6000 Germany
Residential annual
Japanese
4000 Australian
Italian
Chinese
2000
0
06
06
07
08
09
09
10
10
11
11
12
12
13
13
14
0
0
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
4
2
2
Q
Source: IRENA Costing Alliance.

FIGURE 3.2 ESTIMATED COST REDUCTIONS IN RESIDENTIAL SOLAR PV BY COMPONENT, GLOBAL BENCHMARK, 2010-20 (USD/W)
6 Module
Inverter
4.90
5 Balance of Plant
0.55
Engineering, Procurement
0.68 3.98 and Construction
4
0.78 Other
0.70
2.96
0.56
3 2.75
0.43 0.53 2.62
0.61 0.43 2.40
0.36 2.23
2.54 0.60 0.30 2.14
0.60 2.06 1.99 1.92
0.58 0.25 0.24
2 0.28 0.56 0.24 0.23
0.54 0.53 0.23
0.65 0.51 0.50
1.75 0.65 0.49
0.63
0.60 0.54
0.26 0.59 0.57 0.54 0.53
1 0.21 0.19
0.18 0.18
0.93 0.86 0.86 0.16 0.15 0.14
0.76 0.68 0.14
0.64 0.60 0.56 0.53
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: BNEF.
exact moment when competitiveness arrives will be As costs continue to decline towards parity in different
difficult in countries where consumer power prices are countries, the need to adapt support policies arises.
subsidised. Competition from solar PV versus incumbent Achievement of PV competitiveness does not mean
sources comes most strongly at the small-scale com- that the sector requires no further support. Instead, a
mercial and residential level, where retail (not wholesale) policy transition is necessary from measures that are
electricity prices from the grid are being offset. Thus, the purely financial-based to measures that are compat-
term “socket parity” is used to distinguish from the com- ible with the overall system of renewables promotion
petitiveness of large, utility-scale PV projects. For large and the general structure of the electricity system.
projects, “grid parity” tends to refer to the LCOE of PV Alternative support incentives, such as self-consump-
compared to alternative means of wholesale electric- tion or net-metering, which may become increasingly
ity provision. Residential installations are, therefore, not relevant as decentralised PV deployment increases
competing against wholesale generation but, instead, and as grid parity is attained (PV Parity, 2013). This
with the delivered price of electricity through the grid. brings new challenges to policy makers, grid opera-
tors and utilities, as the ongoing transformation of the
While solar PV system costs clearly play a crucial role traditional energy system involves consumers now
in determining socket parity, insolation levels and lo- not only purchasing electricity from the grid but also
cal residential electricity prices are also crucial. For feeding their own excess production back into it. While
this reason, several developing countries in particular this has the potential to be a benefit for consumers, it
offer a huge potential market for PV deployment. represents possible system balancing challenges (see
While historically the primary market for PV systems in Section 4). Spain has reacted to these challenges by
developing countries has been off-grid applications, proposing to impose additional charges on residential
grid-connected solar systems play a growing role in projects, and similar proposals are under discussion
countries where transmission and distribution networks in Germany. In the United States, some utilities have
are relatively well developed, and adequate policies sought to impose monthly fees on residential PV sys-
are in place. Estimates suggest that countries such as tem owners. In the state of Oklahoma, for example, a
Turkey, Brazil and Israel have already achieved “socket new bill intends to impose an additional fixed charge
parity”, while India and Argentina are likely to do so in on consumers with distributed generation systems
the near future (see Figure 3.3). installed compared to those who do not, in order
41
FIGURE 3.3 RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY PRICE IN 2012, INSOLATION, AND LCOE OF RESIDENTIAL PV, Q2 2013
Potential
0.40 More sun 25GW residential
USD/kWh
PV market
0.35
EMEA
0.30 Denmark
0.25 Italy Spain Hawaii ASOC

Germany
Japan
0.20 Brazil Australia

France
Turkey AMER
United Kingdom South Korea California
0.15 North India
New Jersey
Argentina Israel
0.10 Canada
North China Texas Mexico
Russia South
0.05 South India
China
Indonesia Saudi Arabia
0.00
800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
kWh/kW/year
Source: BNEF.
Note: The blue line illustrates the LCOE levels (Q2 2013) for different insolation rates. Countries above the LCOE line have already reached “socket
parity”. EMEA = Europe, the Middle East and Africa; ASOC = Asia/Oceania; AMER = the Americas.
to avoid cross-subsidisation (Oklahoma Legislature, In its most basic form, net metering requires a
2014). bi-directional electricity meter, i.e., one that runs
backwards when power is fed to the grid rather than
These challenges will have the biggest impacts on consumed from it. In a basic net metering scheme,
markets with high PV adoption rates. Markets where the generator receives a flat rate for grid-delivered
solar power is just taking off will be less affected but electricity (a retail price). More-complex versions,
should not disregard these impacts, as PV grid parity such as the one in use in Italy, takes into consider-
(or even costs falling below that level) will lead to even ation the varying market price of power delivered
more rapid adoption of this technology. Rapid adop- or consumed during different periods. The design
tion of grid-connected small distributed PV projects features vary across different net metering schemes,
will require system integration efforts, as discussed in thus also affecting the financial return for investors
Section 4. and the attractiveness of the scheme. Table 3.1
provides an overview of schemes in four selected
3.2 RESPONSES regions across identified comparators, including
total programme capacity, maximum system size,
3.2.1 Permitting net metering to allow grid charges, etc.
consumers to become generators
There has been a marked rise in the adoption of net
Policy overview: Net metering supports small- to me- metering policies, with the number of such schemes
dium-scale renewable energy development by allow- (at the national or state/provincial level) increasing
ing generators to “bank” (on the electricity grid) any from 37 in 2012 to 42 as of early 2014 (REN21, 2014). Net
production which they do not consume at the time of metering, as a support instrument, has been widely
generation. They are credited for their net electricity adopted in the United States, where it originated
generation on their electricity bills. As such, the policy in the 1980s to encourage distributed generation.
can be introduced relatively simply. As of early 2014, 45 U.S. states and the District of

TABLE 3.1 COMPARISON OF NET METERING SCHEMES IN ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, DENMARK AND ITALY
ARIZONA CALIFORNIA DENMARK ITALY
Total programme Unlimited Capped 20 MW for systems Unlimited

capacity > 6 kW; unlimited for
systems < 6 kW
Maximum system size 125% of 1 MW None 200 kW

customer’s on-
site energy use
Rate awarded Retail (kWh Retail (kWh credit against Retail (kWh credit Retail price reduced
credit against retail price) against retail price) of tax and levies for
retail price) plants smaller than 20
kW; Wholesale price for
plants incentivized also
by FiT with a capacity
larger than 20 kW
Period for Annual Annual Hourly Annual

reconciliation of net
excess generation
Treatment of net Reconciled at Indefinite carry over; Reconciled at DKK Indefinite carry over;
excess generation avoided cost customer option to 1.3/kWh (~USD 0.24) customer option to
rate / adjusted reconcile net excess at redeem at value at end
average annual annual average rate of year
market price
(varies by utility)
Grid charges USD 0.70/kW None currently. The None Included in calculation
monthly charge California Public Utilities to reflect net usage
Commission is mandated
to determine an
appropriate fixed fee not
to exceed USD 10/month.
Other/ notes Grid charge Virtual net metering Annual reconciliation Italy’s ‘scambio sul
passed in and meter aggregation replaced by hourly posto’ is differentiated
November 2013 possible. New law calls for in late 2012, after a from simple net
new rules by 2017 boom. This is leading metering due to its
to a fixed tariff basis in market pricing
Columbia had voluntary or mandatory net metering within the energy sector. Some U.S. states use the
programmes in place. utilities’ “avoided cost” to calculate the rate owed,
which is generally the cost of generation (see sub-
The practice is also expanding to South Asia and Latin section 3.2.2).
America and the Caribbean, where several countries
have introduced net metering policies in recent years, In the United States, 29 of the net metering states
often in support of rooftop PV deployment. Several have in place some kind of limit on total net me-
countries in Europe, such as Belgium, Denmark, the tered capacity – either through a defined cap
Netherlands and Italy, have adopted forms of net (usually based on a percentage of each utility’s
metering, often in addition to other support measures. peak demand) or through a trigger point at which
utilities can request a binding limit (see Figure 3.4).
The classic form of net metering employed in the These vary from 0.1% (Idaho) to 20% (Utah) of peak
majority of U.S. states credits generators with the re- demand, while Maryland and New Hampshire have
tail price that they would otherwise pay to consume in place capacity limits (1 500 MW and 50 MW, re-
from the grid – thus reimbursing them for non-power spectively). Caps on individual system size run from
network charges as well. This has sparked off a 20 kW in Wisconsin to 8 MW in New Mexico. States
continuing debate on the sharing of costs between are generally divided in their treatment of annual
different sets of consumers and other stakeholders net excess generation between allowing indefinite
43
FIGURE 3.4 STATE NET METERING LIMITS IN THE UNITED STATES
Unlimited
Capped
Trigger
No state-wide
net metering
Source: BNEF.
Note: Map does not include Alaska, which is capped.
carry-over, granting the benefit to the utility or set- through net metering) is modest compared to capaci-
tling at an avoided cost rate. ties driven by FiTs in Germany and Italy (see Figure 3.5).
Impact Assessment: Net metering has proven to be There is disagreement over the balance of costs and
an effective stimulant of distributed renewable genera- benefits associated with higher levels of net metered
tion. In fact, over 1.5 GW of solar PV capacity deployed distributed capacity. Increasingly in the United States,
in the United States in 2012 was net metered, represent- utilities argue that net metering still requires grid us-
ing 99% of the total solar installations that year (Solar age while exempting payment for it, which puts a
Electric Power Association, 2013). However, the total disproportionate cost burden on other consumers.
capacity installed in that market segment (including Meanwhile, solar advocates argue that net metering
actually saves the utility transmission and distribu-
FIGURE 3.5 COMMERCIAL AND RESIDENTIAL SMALL-SCALE PV
tion costs, because energy is generated close to
CAPACITY IN GERMANY, ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES, 2012 (GW)
consumption, and it reduces the need for expensive
25 “peaking” generating capacity. Measures such as
Commercial
GW
“value of solar” take into consideration these concerns
Residential
(see sub-section 3.2.2).
20
Recently, U.S. utility Arizona Public Service (APS)

15 obtained regulatory approval to charge its net
metering customers a fixed charge. This charge is
10
supposed to address the fact that by consuming
self-generated electricity and receiving a full retail
price for the power share fed into the grid, the net
5
metering customers avoid paying transmission
and distribution charges, which have to be spread
0 among other consumers via their electricity bills.
Germany Italy US
APS’s net metering customers now pay a monthly
Source: BNEF. charge of USD 0.70/kW of installed generating ca-
Note: Residential installation is defined as <20kW; pacity while continuing to be paid for their power at
commercial is defined as 20kW-1MW.

the full retail value. Italy addresses the grid charges installed but retains about 4 GW of headroom for
problem by paying the wholesale price for the elec- further development (see Figure 3.6).
tricity fed, rather than the full retail price.
Risks: Net metering relies on the grid operating as a
Interestingly, Spain has implemented similar charges back-up for self-generators, contrary to the traditional
on self-consumption projects. Consumer-generators structures of a centralised energy system. The risk is
are charged between EUR 0.07 and EUR 0.09 per kWh that, if not designed appropriately, such schemes
consumed, and no remuneration is granted for the ex- can place a disproportionate burden on other
cess electricity fed into the grid. As such, the proposed rate-payers without PV systems. As with FiTs, there is a
net metering scheme that would allow for exports to social equity dimension to this: those that make use
the grid was never implemented. of the incentive must be able to afford the upfront
cost of a solar system, or own a rooftop to lease, and
The assertion that net metering presents a sig- those that do not may have to settle for higher grid
nificant challenge to utility business models given charges.
present PV penetration rates is somewhat prema-
ture in the United States, where only six states have Denmark may have experienced the most dramatic
PV penetration rates representing more than 1% installation boom – and consequent policy shift – from
of peak demand. This is not to suggest that the net metering. After seeing the installation of over 350
traditional utility business models do not face chal- MW of residential PV in 2012 alone, taking the country
lenges from increasing penetration of PV. The state well above its 2020 solar capacity target, it switched
of Hawaii, with the highest penetration rate at 15%, from annual to hourly net metering for the smallest
is the only instance where concerns have been systems, preventing users from using the electricity
relatively significant. It is also the only state that “credits” generated on a sunny summer day on a dark
sets limits on specific local circuits where a high winter evening. The risk of similar events in the United
penetration of self-generation creates operational States is limited by programme caps. Interestingly,
risks for the utility (such as providing backup service systems benefiting from net metering schemes that
on short notice). New Jersey has exceeded the compensate exported generation based on real-time
statutory “trigger” after which it could block new power market prices may need further attention when
net metering, but so far the state has not exercised implementing incentives for integrating residential stor-
that prerogative. California leads in total capacity age (discussed in 3.2.3). In this case, individuals could
FIGURE 3.6 NET METERED CAPACITY VERSUS ESTIMATED LIMIT IN SELECTED U.S. STATES, H2 2013 (MW)
6,000
5,500 5,258 Estimated room
MW in limit
5,000
4,500 Current net
metered capacity
4,000
Trigger
3,500
3,000 Cap
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,500
1,000
880
487 662
500 240 182 230
0
ii s
rnia ers
ey wa ett ork nd da re
lifo Ha us wY yla va wa
Ca wJ ch Ne ar Ne a
Ne ssa M Del
Ma
Source: BNEF.
45
use storage systems as a means to export electricity by net metering customers is shifted to the utility’s cus-
when it is more profitable. tomers who do not net meter. This disparity is currently
POLICY not significant due to the limited penetration of net
INDICATOR metering-driven renewable energy deployment, but it
Renewables penetration: Low-medium-high will grow and represents a potential challenge.
Economic development: Low-middle-high income

Policy overview: In part to address this, the munici-
Policy goal: Incentivise distributed renewables generation, pally owned utility serving Austin, Texas, has adopted
triggering technology innovation
a Value of Solar (VOS) alternative to eliminate cost
Policy type: Net metering shifting. It does so by setting a credit rate for solar
Eligible technology: PV, other small-scale installations system owners based not on existing retail rates, but
on a formula that quantifies the benefits enjoyed by
Asset ownership: Residential, commercial, industrial
both system owners and the distribution utility which
Complementary policies: Smart meter rollouts, "Value of provides their backup service. Austin Energy is employ-
Solar" tariffs
ing the VOS to reach a distributed solar goal from all
customer classes of 25 MW by 2020, of which 7 MW is
3.2.2 “Value of Solar” tariffs to be from residential customers.
As discussed in the previous section, net metering has In October 2012, Austin migrated its residential solar
come into wider use as a means of promoting renew- net metering customers to the VOS-based credit
able energy. However, concerns about rate-payer programme, for which a customer-owned system is
equity are being raised. In a typical net metering pro- eligible for 25 years. The VOS is calculated using the
gramme, the bill credit received by self-generators is following five cost inputs (see Figure 3.7):
equal to the full retail rate of the utility-delivered power
that is displaced. The retail rate of practically all regu- 1. Energy, defined as the wholesale cost of electric-
lated distribution utilities includes a “system”, “delivery” ity displaced by the customer’s generation;
or “capacity” component, which pays for the utility’s
investment in power plants, wires, transformers and 2. Capacity, defined as the cost of a new natural
other non-power assets necessary to provide service. gas-fuelled generating turbine that is avoided by
Therefore, the portion of those charges that is avoided the customer’s generation;
FIGURE 3.7 PV SYSTEM VALUE BY COMPONENT AND CONFIGURATION IN AUSTIN, TEXAS
0.150 Loss Savings

Levelized
(USD/kWh) Transmission and
0.125 distribution deferral
Environment
0.100 Generation capacity
Energy
0.075
0.050
0.025
0.000
al º º º º is
30
º
nt 30 30 30 45 Ax
o h t t t 1- xis
riz ut es es es A
Ho So h-w W W 1-
ut
So
Source: Rabago, et al., 2012.

Note: Degree angles are module’s tilt relative to horizontal; “1-Axis” is variable tilt and “1-Axis 30°” is fixed 30° tilt with rotation on the vertical axis.

3. Transmission and distribution deferral, defined regulators are in the process of developing a formula
as the savings from future investment in non- to determine the VOS rate. The VOS concept has also
generation infrastructure (such as power lines drawn the attention of legislators in other U.S. states,
and substations) based on an estimate of how including California, Michigan and Georgia.
much solar power customers can be relied upon
to deliver to the grid; Risks: The effectiveness of VOS-based tariffs relies on
the underlying metrics and their weighting. Errors
4. Loss savings, defined as a self-generator’s avoided raise the prospect that VOS credits are too high, al-
need for supplemental energy to cover transmis- lowing participants to receive outsized benefits rather
sion and distribution losses; and than simply getting compensated for actual costs; or
too low, which could result in under-participation. A
5. Environment, defined as the dollar savings from sudden or unexpected change in interest rates also
environmental damage that is avoided as a could render the VOS metrics inaccurate.
result of reducing the use of fossil fuels for power
generation. In Austin’s case, the first metric – the estimated cost
of displaced energy – accounts for the biggest share
Initially, the VOS-based residential tariff was set at USD (about USD 0.09) of the overall rate. The transmission
0.128 per kWh. Effective January 2014, it was cut to and distribution deferral has the smallest share (a
USD 0.107 per kWh. It will be subject to annual adjust- fraction of a cent). The USD 0.021/kWh reduction in
ment based on changes in the underlying metrics. the VOS tariff for 2014 was attributed by Austin to lower
The VOS-based residential programme is applicable prices for natural gas, the marginal generation fuel
only as a credit against a customer’s utility bill; the in Texas. The utility also cut the assumed lifespan of
utility makes no payments to participating customers. a customer solar system from 30 to 25 years. It found
The customer is billed each month for the total power that actual savings in avoided transmission-system
consumed, plus the usual additional charges paid by costs were higher than anticipated, which somewhat
every residential rate-payer. The VOS is then multiplied moderated the tariff reduction.
by the number of kWh generated by the residential
system, and that figure is then subtracted from the The fact that the VOS tariff generates only a billing
consumer’s final bill. Any surplus credits roll forward credit, not a monthly cash payment to solar system
month-to-month until the end of the year but cannot owners, may depress its uptake if it makes lenders
be carried forward into the next year. This annual “zero unwilling to finance decentralised systems. But it is
out” protects the utility from longer-term payment ob- unlikely that regulators would allow cash payments
ligations and protects the customer from a tax liability. for generation because that could expose small-
system owners to the same regulations and taxa-
Impact assessment: The migration of its net meter- tion rules that apply to conventional power plant
ing customers to a VOS-based credit programme operators.
took place after a stakeholder consultation process
in which stakeholders were made aware of the VOS
POLICY
formula and the differences between the VOS and INDICATOR
net metering (Austin Energy, n.d.). At the time of the
Renewables penetration: Low-medium-high
migration, the city of Austin had more than 1 750
rooftop installations totalling 6.6 MW, about 26% of its Economic development: High-income
2020 goal. In the first year of VOS, rooftop solar capac- Policy goal: Provide adequate support for renewables,
ity installation rose 60%, leading utility officials to be triggering technology innovation
optimistic that the 25 MW goal is achievable. Policy type: Feed-in tariff
Eligible technologies: Solar

Interest in VOS is not limited to Austin. In March 2014,
Minnesota became the first U.S. state to adopt VOS as Asset ownership: Residential, community, businesses
an option for investor-owned utilities to use in compen-
Complementary policies: Net metering
sating solar system owners for surplus electricity. State
47
3.2.3 Integrating residential storage in the generated by the PV system and dispatching it to the
system grid later in the day, hence receiving the feed-in tariff;
or increasing the share of self-consumption, by storing
Net metering policies are designed to allow the export PV energy during times of low usage and consuming
of excess generation to the grid. As the penetration it later, thereby providing further independence from
of renewables increases, however, integrating high steadily increasing electricity prices (Bundesverband
shares of variable generation becomes increasingly Solarwirtschaft (BSW), 2013).
challenging. A broad range of measures are being
adopted to address this, including those incentivising Impact assessment: The economic case for PV-
self-consumption; however, storage options, such as connected energy storage depends on a specific
batteries, have been identified as the silver bullet in household’s consumption, usage patterns, the size of
addressing this challenge. Household-size storage both the PV system and the battery, how the battery is
can also support self-consumption by saving PV- cycled throughout the day, and seasonal variations.
generated energy for when it is needed. This applies Rough calculations indicate that the payback period
in particular to markets that have relatively high retail for PV-connected energy storage systems in Germany
prices, such as Germany, where residential storage ranges from 11 to 18 years, which is far too long for
can help offset electricity bills and allow the owners most customers (see Table 3.2). Despite this long pay-
to use the stored electricity when generation from back time, the programme was fully subscribed within
rooftop panels is low. months of its launch, indicating that reasons other
than payback time were motivating the uptake.
Policy overview: In May 2013, Germany launched a
EUR 25 million subsidy programme for PV-connected Another requirement of this particular programme is
energy storage. The programme provides low-interest that no more than 60% of the output from the PV sys-
loans and a grant, or “repayment bonus”, of up to 30% tem can be exported to the grid at any single moment.
of the cost of the battery system. A new PV-connected This is beneficial from a grid management standpoint
energy storage system is eligible for a grant of up to since it reduces the early-afternoon supply peak, but
EUR 600/kW of storage, while an existing PV system it makes little sense for a consumer. By accepting the
that is retrofitted with a battery could receive up to EUR subsidy and restricting the amount of electricity that
660/kW. Thus, in principle, the funding set aside for the can be exported to the grid, the recipient is limiting the
programme could pay for up to 42 MW of storage (or revenue that he or she can receive from the FiT.
38 MW of storage retrofitted to existing PV systems).
Table 3.2 illustrates the payback periods – calculated in
There are two ways for a grant recipient to operate a terms of savings on electricity bills – for various storage
storage-connected PV system: storing the electricity system costs. For instance, a 4 kW system from RWE in
TABLE 3.2 ECONOMICS OF PV-CONNECTED STORAGE IN GERMANY AT VARIOUS BATTERY COSTS
SYSTEM SIZE PV SYSTEM COST PRE-SUBSIDY BATTERY NEW-BUILD SUBSIDY EXPECTED PAYBACK
(EUR/kW) SYSTEM COST (EUR/kW) WITH SUBSIDY
(EUR/kW) (YEARS)
3 750 18
3 250 16
2 750 14
4.5 kW PV and
1 460 2 250 600 12
4 kW battery
2 100 11
1 250 8
1 000 7
Source: BNEF.
Note: This assumes O&M costs for PV of 1.5% of capital expenditures,operations and maintenance costs for batteries of 2% and PV degradation of
0.7%. The two highlighted rows represent the products of RWE AG and BYD Auto Co., Ltd. Products costing <EUR 2 100/kW are not currently available
in the market.

2013 cost about EUR 13 500, or EUR 3 750/kW, meaning a variable patterns of generation from such installations
payback time of roughly 18 years. pose significant grid management challenges and
bring up the question of how fixed transmission and
Risks: The high costs of storage – even with the subsidy distribution costs should be covered. The U.S. states of
– mean that only early adopters will actually be able to Arizona and Texas, as well as Spain and Germany, all
invest in PV-connected storage. Even in a high-income either already have implemented or have proposed
country, such as Germany, this technology remains to implement certain transmission and distribution
unaffordable for many households. Should the costs of charges on distributed projects.
residential-size batteries decline in the near future, this
would allow for better household energy management Three key lessons can be learned from the experience
and decrease household reliance on power sourced of the regulators analysed above:
from the grid. It should be kept in mind the effect that
the high adoption of residential storage could have 1. Net metering can incentivise an uptake of resi-
on the management of the electricity system (in some dential solar PV, particularly in markets where
markets consumers could use small storage systems grid parity is approaching due to decreasing
to feed electricity into the grid according to the spot technology costs and/or high retail electric-
electricity price); therefore, preventive measures, such ity prices. However, the “reconciliation period”
as limiting the amount or restricting the time when (i.e., for how long the project owners can claim
electricity can be fed into the grid, should be explored. back the electricity fed into the grid) must be
POLICY carefully considered.
POLICY INDICATOR INDICATOR
Renewables penetration: Medium-high 2. Diffusion of net metering is raising concerns
in terms of network cost sharing since usually
Economic development: High-income
project owners pay a smaller share of the grid’s
Policy goal: Incentivise self-consumption; Improve transmission and distribution costs. Some coun-
market integration of renewables, triggering technology
innovation tries have tried to address this through special
charges incorporated in the design, while the
Policy type: Grants
“value of solar” tariff pioneered by the U.S. city of
Eligible technology: PV-integrated storage Austin, Texas, tries to address this by estimating
Asset ownership: Residential, commercial, community the real “value of solar” to the system.
Complementary policies: Feed-in tariffs, net metering

3. Residential storage systems have the potential
to better integrate the electricity from distrib-
3.3 LESSONS LEARNED uted projects with the central electricity grid;
however, at the moment these technologies
As some renewable energy technology costs continue remain prohibitively expensive for the major-
their downward trend, their uptake will be facilitated by ity of the owners of decentralised renewable
self-consumption centric schemes, especially in an generators.
environment of high residential electricity prices, rather
than by other policies such as feed-in tariffs. Ensuring Although at the moment, the opportunities pre-
policy efficiency in support of deployment in this context sented by approaching grid – and socket – parity
may face several challenges, as discussed above. These have been fully embraced mostly by developed na-
challenges become increasingly prominent as higher tions, the distributed nature of self-generation bring
levels of distributed renewable energy are deployed. a tremendous opportunity to developing countries.
While residential storage applications remain expen-
Although self-consumption is encouraged to reduce sive and will continue to be so for a while, PV equip-
the dependency of households or businesses on ment is not, and the emerging markets will soon be
centrally provided electricity, most of these projects the main source of demand for PV equipment and
remain connected to the central grid network. The installations.
49
4 Integration of Variable
Renewable Power
4.1 CHALLENGE: INTEGRATING to avoid a situation of plant idling due to the lack of
INCREASING GENERATION FROM evacuation or transmission infrastructure.
VARIABLE SOURCES
At a sub-national, national and regional level, as
Effective and efficient integration – in terms of physi- renewable generation increases, challenges associ-
cal connection, network management and market ated with grid availability, transmission capacity and
integration – has become a pressing challenge for the balancing costs become more prevalent. Such chal-
renewable energy sector, particularly in markets with lenges are further compounded for grids which do
higher rates of renewable penetration. A recent study not benefit from adequate interconnection capacity
concluded that technical integration is not a relevant to balance out excess or deficit generation. This sub-
constraint for integrating variable generation when section examines two case studies to illustrate these
the share of such renewables is between 5 and 10% of challenges from a developing-country (India) and
electricity generation, so long as specific best practic- developed-country (Germany) perspective.
es, such as improved forecasting, are implemented in
system operation (International Energy Agency (IEA), INDIA
2014). However, as penetration rates further increase, Renewables accounted for over 12% of India’s total in-
system integration and adaptation issues become stalled capacity of 243 GW as of March 2014 (excluding
more prominent. large hydropower) (Central Electricity Authority (CEA),
2014). Wind is the largest contributor with over 21 GW in-
This section reviews some of the different dimensions stalled, up 2 GW from the same period in 2013. Large-scale
of grid and system integration of variable renew- solar deployment has picked up pace, with more than
able energy generation, including expansion and 2.6 GW deployed, following the launch of the National
reinforcement of physical grid infrastructure, the role Solar Mission and the introduction of dedicated solar
of technological advancements in making networks policies in several states (MNRE, 2014). However, much
smarter and better able to cope with variability of of this renewable generation is concentrated in certain
supply, and the broader impacts of integrating higher pockets of the country that have the best resources as
levels of renewables on power markets. well as effective support policies (see Table 4.1).
4.1.1 Grid infrastructure In the Southern grid, for example, renewables ac-
count for almost a quarter of total generating capac-
Adequate grid infrastructure to evacuate renewable ity. The southern state of Tamil Nadu had the highest
generation and transmit it from generation sites to installed capacity of renewable energy at 7.8 GW, 7
load centres is critical for increasing the share of re- GW of which was wind. Other states with high renew-
newables in the national energy mix. At the generation able penetration rates include Maharashtra, Gujarat,
level, large-scale renewable energy plants are often Rajasthan and Karnataka.
located in remote areas, and hence the develop-
ment phase is often accompanied by an assessment The challenges associated with grid integration are
of the infrastructure needed to facilitate connection already apparent. Lack of adequate power evacu-
of the plant to nearest connection point. Experience ation capacity in the state grids has been a major
with grid integration has shown the need for extend- concern in transmission planning (GWEC, 2012). In the
ing such an assessment until the end-user in order to state of Tamil Nadu, for example, about 40% of the en-
identify early on any grid enhancement needed and ergy during peak wind season was lost due to power

TABLE 4.1 INSTALLED GENERATING CAPACITY IN INDIA AS OF MARCH 2014 (BY REGION)
REGION LARGE HYDRO NON-HYDRO TOTAL CAPACITY NON-HYDRO
(>25MW) CAPACITY RENEWABLE (MW) RENEWABLES SHARE
(MW) CAPACITY (MW) (%)
Northern 16 331 5 730 64 258 8.9%
Western 7 448 9 925 87 389 11.4%
Southern 11 398 13 127 58 330 22.5%
Eastern 4 113 417 30 066 1.4%
North Eastern 1 242 252 2 901 8.7%
Islands 0 10 80 12.5%
Total 40 531 29 461 243 024 12.1%
Source: CEA (2014).
evacuation issues. Capacity deployment increased network. North-south grid connections are currently un-
rapidly, however the evacuation infrastructure could able to cope with the heavy flow of renewable power
not keep pace. This is evident from the fact that over- from the north to the south. Limited national grid ca-
all capacity utilisation factor for the state dipped by pacity to allow power flows from the northern wind gen-
more than 50% for the same month in 2012 and 2013 eration hub to the centre of consumption in the south
(Nampoothiri, 2014). This reduction has also been in often leads to electricity “detouring” to other countries
part due to grid congestion and limited flexibility of via the cross-border interconnections. It is not uncom-
base-load capacity operational in the region. Similar mon for renewable power generated in Germany’s
grid evacuation challenges have been faced by solar north to move through the Netherlands and France
developers who are often left with stranded generat- in the west, or Poland and the Czech Republic in the
ing assets awaiting enhancement of evacuation and east via cross-border interconnections (see Figure 4.1)
distribution infrastructure. before arriving at its final destination back in southern
Germany. The magnitude of recent cross-border flows
GERMANY has highlighted an urgent need for grid network devel-
With roughly a quarter of its power demand sourced opment, both nationally and internationally.
from renewable generation, the need for upgrading
and expanding Germany’s transmission and distri- Under its proposed 2014 EEG reform, Germany aims
bution network is emerging. The main grid-related to construct 6.5 GW of offshore wind by 2020, up from
challenges faced are distances between genera- 720 MW on line today (see Figure 4.2). The new projects
tion and consumption hubs, demand for offshore will need to be connected to the onshore grid and the
wind connections, and intensification of “power power then transported through to demand centres
loop-flows”. (see Figure 4.3).
Traditionally, fossil fuel and nuclear generation proj- 4.1.2 Maintaining system stability
ects have been constructed relatively close to de-
mand centres. By contrast, renewables projects – wind Wind and solar-generated power can displace mid-
farms, in particular – have been developed mostly merit power in liberalised markets (see sub-section
in the northern parts of the country. A large share of 4.1.3), but it cannot fully substitute other generation
Germany’s 32 GW of onshore wind capacity oper- technologies in most markets due to variable gen-
ates in the north. The hubs of German industry with eration patterns. A certain margin of dispatchable
the highest power demand, on the other hand, are generation (i.e., plants that can be switched on
centred in the southern parts of the country. and off as required, with fast ramp up/ramp down
capability) must stay on the system to supply power
This expanded average distance between power gen- in the event of lower provision from renewables. With
eration and consumption has created an urgent need increasing penetration of variable renewables, the
for a radical overhaul and expansion of Germany’s integration costs related to balancing, maintaining
51
FIGURE 4.1 AVERAGE UNSCHEDULED CROSS-BORDER POWER FLOWS FROM GERMANY, 2011-12 (MW)
Phase shifting
transformer
NL Unplanned flows
428
899
PL
435
DE Possible loop
BE 536
667 flow route
436
268 CZ
775
SK
2213
1248
AT
764
CH
FR
New HVDC
New AC
UpgradesSource: Adapted from CEPS, MAVIR, PSE SA and SEPS, 2013.
adequacy and grids may vary depending on

FIGURE 4.2 GERMANY’S OFFSHORE GRID DEVELOPMENT PLAN TO
CONNECT 6.5 GW OF OFFSHORE WIND PROJECTS BY 2020 AND
system-specific characteristics (e.g. profile of bal-
ESTIMATED COSTS ancing units) (IEA, 2014). These costs can, however,
be minimised, for instance by adapting existing
regulatory frameworks to effectively manage the
HVAC scheduling and dispatch of renewable power.
800
HVDC This is particularly relevant for markets where re-
EUR 11bn
newables are entitled to priority dispatch, thereby
1,390
necessitating the need for improved forecasting to
km minimise cost of system management.
Source: German Offshore Grid Development Plan, 2014. Governments, grid operators and regulators often find
themselves in a challenging position of balancing
FIGURE 4.3 GERMANY’S ONSHORE GRID DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND
the dual objectives of supporting the deployment of
ESTIMATED COST, 2013-23
reneawble energy while maintaining grid stability and
reliability of supply. Although wholly new market de-
New HVDC
signs have yet to emerge, some countries are already
New AC
2,100 rolling out various ways to reward those on both the
Upgrades
supply and demand side of the electricity equation
for being willing to provide flexibility. Smart grid tech-
1,700
nologies can also help address this issue and energy
EUR 21bn storage technologies are poised to play a significant
role once their costs are reduced.
4,400
4.1.3 Merit-order
800
effect and price
HVAC
EUR 11bn suppression HVDC
1,390
Power market structures vary widely among countries.

km km
In many countries, electricity systems are centrally
Source: German Onshore Grid Development Plan, 2013. managed, with a monopoly supplier (often a vertically
Note: “HV” relates to high-voltage cables’ “AC” - alternating current; “DC”- integrated, state-owned power company) maintain-
direct current.
ing control over power supply and, consequently, over

deployment of renewable capacity. In such cases, challenged as a result of what is often referred to as
retail tariffs often do not reflect the actual cost of sup- the merit-order effect.
plying electricity, with the responsibility of distribution
and retailing resting with a state-owned entity. This can be well demonstrated by the case of
Germany, where some flexible power providers,
In liberalised markets, however, “pool” designs are primarily natural gas generators, are facing sig-
common – for instance in Europe and the United nificant challenges. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the
States – wherein dispatch is based on marginal costs impact of integrating higher shares of renewables
of generation for each power producer. In such a in the country, using generation data from 1 June
market structure, renewables, which in most cases 2010 and 1 June 2012 to show how higher shares of
benefit from priority dispatch and that enter the renewables pushed coal and gas plants out of the
market at zero or minimal marginal costs (by virtue of market.
their minimal operating costs), are creating a situa-
tion where the commercial viability of flexible power A high influx of renewable electricity can suppress
providers, primarily natural gas generators, is being wholesale power prices (see Figure 4.6) and push
FIGURE 4.4 MERIT ORDER ON A SUMMER DAY (1 JUNE 2010) IN GERMANY
Demand: 71.93 GW
200
USD/MWh 180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
-20
-40
-60
-80
-100
-120
-140
-160
-180
MW
Source: BNEF.
Note: The adopted colour scheme is as follows- blue (solar and onshore wind), green (biomass), red (nuclear), brown (lignite), grey (natural gas),
black (coal) and dark grey (oil). Light blue (extreme right) signifies demand response.
FIGURE 4.5 MERIT ORDER ON A SUMMER DAY (1 JUNE 2012) IN GERMANY
Demand : 70.12 GW
USD/MWh 200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20 0 40000 60000 80000 100000
-40
-60
-80
-100
-120
-140
-160
-180
MW
Source: BNEF.
53
FIGURE 4.6 AVERAGE DAILY SUMMER SPOT PRICE PROFILE IN GERMANY, 2010 AND 2013 (EUR/MWh)
60
EUR/MWh
55
Summer 2010
50
45
40
Summer 2013
35
30
25
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Hours
Source: BNEF based on data from European Energy Exchange.
some incumbent generators out of the merit order, 4.2 RESPONSES

especially when the wind/sun conditions are favour-
able, as has been the case frequently in Germany. Governments and regulators around the world, par-
Solar PV projects in particular, typically maximise ticularly in countries with medium-to-high levels of re-
output at times of peak demand and thus reduce newable penetration, have been innovating to ensure
the market clearing price at what would otherwise renewables integration while maintaining system sta-
be lucrative moments for incumbent generators. bility and reliability. As a result, diverse regulatory and
technological options are now either already operat-
In Germany, the country’s four major utilities ing or in design to address both grid and associated
traditionally looked to peak demand times as op- market issues. This sub-section first examines available
portunities to recover costs associated with long- options for grid infrastructure upgrades, then shifts to
term investments in infrastructure. Now, with prices system management options and finally focusses on
substantially reduced and the merit order shifted the relevant market adjustments.
by renewables, these incumbent generators are
more likely to operate fewer hours in the year and at 4.2.1 Grid development plan: India
lower prices. The high renewables influx (and their
impact on power market prices) combined with Policy Overview: The grid development roadmap
low carbon prices under the EU Emissions Trading is outlined in India’s five-year plan (2012-2017) and
Scheme have led to a situation where natural gas is elaborated on in the Power Grid Corporation of
plants in particular have suffered operational loss- India’s Green Energy Corridor Report, released in
es. In response, German utilities have announced 2012 (POWERGRID, 2012). The plans are developed
plans to scale down their gas generation capacity. by the Planning Commission of India in consultation
In April 2014, the German Federal Network Agency with various ministries, and the national Power Grid
(BNetzA) confirmed that it received 47 requests Corporation is responsible for implementing them.
pending from utilities to shut down power plants, up
68% from October. This case is symbolic of broader The issue of disproportionate geographical distribution
challenges currently faced by utilities and of the of renewable power generation, as discussed in sub-
need for them to diversify business strategies and section 4.1.1, could be partially addressed by a larger
look at new opportunities (see Box 4.1). inter-connected transmission system. However, as of

Box 4.1
EMERGING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADITIONAL UTILITIES
The dynamics of a transitioning electricity market are implementing alternative business strategies. Some
presenting particular challenges for traditional utilities. utilities have started expanding their geographical
Rising deployment of renewable energy and its impact focus and continuing their existing business models
on wholesale power prices is affecting the profitabil- (providing power generation from fossil and renewable
ity of generation assets across the utility portfolios. sources) abroad. They are targeting primarily markets
Additionally, rapidly growing deployment of decentral- with high (or growing) electricity demand to invest in
ised solutions, such as rooftop PV, is altering the tradi- thermal or large-scale renewable generation. In their
tional ownership structures that have prevailed within domestic markets, utilities are increasingly considering
the energy sector for decades. Many utilities are now various downstream activities. These may include, but
compelled to adapt their business models to be better are not limited to: demand-side management (on both
placed to tap into the opportunities that the transition the industrial and residential levels), smart-home man-
presents. Emerging technological fields, such as distrib- agement, offering distributed generation packages
uted storage, smart grids, transport sector electrification (including generation equipment and installation,
and demand response, while adding to the complexity operations and maintenance services), sale or loan of
of conventional operations, also provide opportunities energy efficiency products. New utility strategies also
for diversification of activities. require thorough organisational changes within the
utilities, which have been operating under their tradi-
As a result, utilities – particularly in Europe and tional business models for decades without the need
the United States – are considering or already for significant business innovation.
the end of 2012, inter-regional transmission capacity transmission network. In January 2014, the southern
in India was just 32 GW. The five-year plan envisages grid was synchronously connected to the rest of the
capacity to double to 65 GW by 2017, thanks to a sub- national grid as part of the country’s “One Nation – One
stantial share of the overall investment directed to this Grid – One Frequency” initiative. While this benefits the
expansion (see Figure 4.7). The plan also envisages overall management of an electricity sector faced with
improved grid management practices, centred on acute power deficits, it also has positive implications
managing variable renewable electricity generation for integrating variable renewable generation such as
through storage capacity deployment and real-time solar and wind (PIB, 2014). The plan also proposes to
monitoring of power flows, to allow early detection of establish renewable energy management centres to
stress situations. be collocated with respective load dispatch centers
at the state and regional-level. Such an arrangement
In addition to renewables-specific grid development aims at facilitating real-time data monitoring, coor-
plans, other important milestones have been reached dinated forecasting efforts and more cost-effective
recently to improve the management of India’s stressed management of the grid (POWERGRID, 2012). As such,
FIGURE 4.7 INDIA’S GREEN ENERGY CORRIDOR PLAN, JULY 2012-2017
Intra-state transmission upgrades
Inter-state transmission upgrades
Energy storage
USD bn 7.23 Renewable energy management centre
Real-time monitoring system
Dynamic reactive compensation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Source: POWERGRID, 2012.

Note: The INR 434 billion amounts to roughly USD 7 billion.
55
to allow proper scheduling and dispatching of genera- effectively in a timely and co-ordinated manner. A
tion from wind power plants, the grid code mandated complex system of checks and balances can en-
wind energy forecasting on a day-ahead basis with sure that bottlenecks are identified early on and ad-
70% accuracy. Forecasting can be done either on an dressed through established alternative procedures.
individual developer basis or on a joint basis for an This however, requires transparent co-operation be-
aggregated generation capacity of 10 MW or above. tween the grid actors responsible for plan implementa-
Variations in actual generation beyond ± 30% of the tion, regulators and the government. A critical success
schedule leads to the generator bearing pre-set pen- factor in designing regulatory regimes that improve grid
alties (CEA, 2013). discipline and minimise costs from integrating renew-
able energy is ensuring compliance. India’s experience
Impact Assessment: A clearly defined grid investment with mandating forecasting on project developers
timeline established by policy makers can create demonstrates the need for more closely analysing the
important visibility for private sector players seeking distribution of specific responsibilities and costs across a
to make investment decisions, particularly regarding range of stakeholders that can collectively contribute to
the development of new renewable energy projects. smoother integration of renewables.
Understanding grid constraints can reduce project de-
velopment costs, prevent connection delays and lower 4.2.2 Grid development plan: Germany
risks of future curtailments. For these advantages to be
realised, however, strong implementation is needed. Policy overview: In Germany, the government has ac-
knowledged that grid upgrades must be prioritised for its
There have been several important developments in Energiewende2 to succeed. By obliging its TSOs to submit
regard to smart grid technologies in India The Ministry of binding grid development plans, Germany is ensuring
Power approved 14 smart grid pilot projects across the national network development visibility. In return, the
country with the aim of using these as test beds for sub- government has established a funding mechanism that
sequent large-scale roll out. The functionalities covered allows TSOs to pass some of the associated costs on to
in the pilot projects include advanced metering infra- the final consumers and that guarantees fixed returns
structure, demand side management and response, on investments. To ensure the successful rollout of the
outage management system, power quality manage- network development plans, in July 2013 the German
ment, renewables integration, street light automation government passed a policy package that intends to:
and smart home, electric vehicles and energy storage.
The Puducherry Smart Grid Pilot, one among the 14 »»Streamline planning procedures, making BNetzA
selected projects, has been operational with over 1400 a “one-stop shop” for obtaining all necessary
smart meters deployed, renewables integrated through planning permissions, thereby, minimising the
net metering, demand response measures in place and state-level approval requirements;
smart street lighting system introduced (POWERGRID,
2014). »»End the full network charge exemption for energy
intensive industries, with an aim to gradually move
Developers met the introduction of wind forecasting towards a system rewarding energy efficiency
regulations with scepticism, stating that compliance and creating a positive relationship between pay-
was challenging for individual projects and rallying for ments and consumption; and
more accurate, region-wide predictions which can be
conducted by a centralised dispatcher. With projects »»Extend the investment framework from sole trans-
unable to produce forecasts within the set margins, the mission upgrades and developments, to cover
regulation has been suspended temporarily (Pearson, investments in high-voltage distribution networks
2014). Regulators are now tasked with identifying the and related research and development (R&D).
most suitable mechanisms through which grid stability
can be ensured, especially while integrating growing Impact Assessment: Through this set of measures, the
shares of variable renewable generation. German government expects to secure the EUR 21
billion that the TSOs estimate will be needed to build
Risks: Major grid upgrade plans are useful to renew- 3 600 kilometres of new lines and to upgrade 4 900
able energy markets only if they are implemented kilometres of existing lines by 2023. A separate offshore
2 Energy transiton or turnaround, a term which refers to the decision to phase out nuclear power and replace it largely with renewable generation.

network development plan has also been developed, 4.2.3 Offshore wind connection liability
to ensure that offshore wind connections are well arrangement: Germany
planned and co-ordinated (see sub-section 4.2.3).
As a relatively new policy, the German government As part of its Energiewende, Germany aims to devel-
grid plan cannot be fully assessed yet. However, the op 6.5 GW of offshore wind by 2020, a target recently
streamlined planning process aims to cut planning reduced from the previously expected 10 GW by that
times from the current approximately ten years to five date. In recent years, many projects from the offshore
years (see Figure 4.8). wind pipeline faced delays cause by grid connec-
tion issues. In November 2011, one of Germany’s four
Risks: A risk regarding the grid development policy TSOs, TenneT, announced that it would be unable
frameworks is the accuracy of the TSO forecasts, which to connect North Sea projects on time, resulting in
might understate or overstate actual transmission ca- severe delays and losses to developers.
pacity needs and thus could risk the development of
needed infrastructure or create unnecessary costs. This Policy Overview: In response, German lawmakers
makes it essential that these plans are cross-checked by passed an amendment to the Energy Act aiming to pro-
an independent organisation – as in the German case, tect generators from revenue loss caused by delayed
where BNetzA can approve or reject parts of TSOs’ plans. grid connections or interrupted transmission. Affected
power producers are entitled to fixed compensation
The second big risk is the social acceptance of the payments amounting to 90% of the FiT they would claim
new projects. Transmission lines in close proximity to otherwise. The risk exposure to TSOs in cases of delay has
households can be controversial, especially if home- been limited by placing a cap on the total annual com-
owners receive no associated direct benefits. Thus it is pensation at EUR 110 million. The overall cost of the sup-
critical that development plans adequately consider port is passed on to consumers as transmission charges,
engagement of the public to overcome social accep- which have also been capped at EUR 0.0025 per kWh.
tance barriers. This is particularly true in cases where
additional costs associated with development are Impact Assessment: In this case, various stakeholder
perceived to be or actually are borne by consumers. interests are being taken into account to ensure
greater investment certainty for those willing to deploy
POLICY capital. Assuming a FiT of EUR 190/MWh, a 200 MW
INDICATOR
offshore wind project can lose up to EUR 400 000 per
Renewable penetration: Medium-high
day of delayed connection, resulting in a 12-month
Economic development: High income cost of around EUR 150 million. Table 4.2 shows that
without this regime, offshore wind project operating
Policy goal: Improve integration of renewables; ensure
security and reliability of power supply losses could amount to more than EUR 1.1 billion.
Policy type: grid development

Risk: While aimed at improving investor certainty, the
Eligible technology: N/A policy introduces an additional levy on consumer
Asset ownership: Utility, IPPs, investment funds/banks

bills. Germany already experiences among the high-
est electricity prices in Europe, and the relatively high
Complementary policies: Renewables support
costs of offshore wind generation might influence
FIGURE 4.8 KEY STEPS IN GERMANY’S NETWORK DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Accomplished Next Steps
Scenario Network Federal Corridor Line path

framework development Requirements permitting permitting
components plan Act
Source: BNetzA, n.d.

Note: Each year, the TSOs develop a scenario-based network development plan and present it to the BNetzA. The Federal Requirements Act needs
to be adopted every three years. TSOs must consider several alternative routes for each corridor, put their plans out to the public, then conduct an
environmental impact assessment before receiving permission.
57
TABLE 4.2 ESTIMATED COST OF DELAY IN OFFSHORE WIND PROJECTS IN GERMANY
WIND FARM SUBSTATION MW DELAY (MONTHS) COST OF DELAY

(EUR MILLION)
Amrumbank West HelWin II 288 15 274
Nordsee Ost HelWin I 295 12 224
Meerwind HelWin I 288 12 219
Dan Tysk SylWin I 288 5 91
Butendiek SylWin I 288 5 91
Global Tech I BorWin II 400 3 76
Veja Mate BorWin II 400 3 76
Borkum West II DolWin I 200 6 76
Source: BNEF.
future policy-making towards a more-planned grid information and communication technology into every
infrastructure development strategy. aspect of electricity generation, delivery and consump-
tion to improve reliability of the system and enable it to
POLICY react more effectively to variability in generation (IRENA,
INDICATOR
2013c). This is increasingly emerging as a significant
Renewables penetration: Medium-high
opportunity for transmission system operators as well as
Economic development: Medium-high income distribution system operators (DSOs) that are seeking to
adapt their operations towards integrating higher shares
Policy goal: Improve renewables integration, ensure
security of power supply of variable power into the grid.
Eligible technology: Offshore wind

Table 4.3 presents elements of the Irish DSO ESB
Asset ownership: Utility, IPPs, others Networks’ 2013 electrification programme, identify-
ing future alternatives to physical network reinforce-
Complementary policies: Feed-in tariffs for offshore wind,
grid development plans ments, in reaction to rapidly increasing shares of
wind power entering the network system. Combined
with smart meters, discussed later, and improved
4.2.4 Smart grid implementation and communication channels between TSOs and DSOs,
smart meter rollouts these solutions provide a good illustration of the
shift towards stronger and smarter networks.
The transition towards an energy system dominated by
renewable energy is feasible, but it will require upgrad- These are technical options at the disposal of grid
ing the existing infrastructure and implementing new operators on both the transmission and distribution
innovative solutions to accommodate a high share of levels. However, the regulatory structure in many
variable generation. Smart-grid technology is one such countries still incentivises grid operators to invest
solution that can help overcome variability challenges, in traditional solutions when installing new grids or
support distributed generation and improve system-level upgrading old ones rather than in cost-effective
efficiency (IRENA, 2013c). Traditional grids were designed “smart” technologies, including smart meters and
for a one-way interaction between the generator and smart transformers (IRENA, 2013c). It is in the hands of
consumer. The grid of the future can be envisaged to policy makers to provide adequate incentives and
incorporate a diverse set of power plants of varying scales regulatory frameworks to facilitate the deployment
feeding into an interactive network at different stages in of newer technologies. Policy makers in countries
order to cater to the demands of an increasingly electri- such as Italy, Portugal and Finland have adapted
fied consumer base. Such a smart grid is inherently based their regulatory frameworks to provide grid opera-
on a two-way flow of electricity, but also incorporates tors with premium rates of return on certain types of

TABLE 4.3 ESB NETWORKS’ CHALLENGES IN INTEGRATING VARIABLE RENEWABLES
CHALLENGE CURRENT SOLUTION IDENTIFIED FUTURE ALTERNATIVES
Voltage and VAR optimisation,

Voltage rise Network reinforcement
demand-side management, storage
Demand-side management, state

Network capacity Network reinforcement estimation, network reconfiguration.
storage
Wind turbines connected to the

Sources of reactive power Transmission network
distribution grid, storage assets
Aging network assets Network reinforcement/replacement Asset monitoring, voltage control
Source: BNEF, 2013.

Note: VVO to refers to Volt/VAR optimisation.
grid investments, such as digital grid management. introducing regulatory frameworks for smart meter
Another related area is mandated smart meter in- rollout. The experience of Netherlands in particular
stallations, which has perhaps seen the most rapid illustrates how these concerns can be addressed.
regulatory progress in Europe.
Netherlands rollout: The Netherlands undertook a na-
SMART METER ROLLOUTS tional smart meter deployment beginning in 2012. The
Policy overview: Smart meters can act as grid sensors objective of the scheme is to install 7.5 million electric
and provide valuable information to improve distribu- and 6.5 million natural gas devices by 2020. Under the
tion grid management. Data from smart meters can initiative, smart meters are being installed in newly con-
be used to optimise voltage levels, extend the life of structed buildings as well as those under renovation.
grid assets and help pinpoint network outages, all of The initiative offers consumers an opt-out clause under
which become increasingly important as shares of which they may refuse to have a smart meter installed
variable renewable power rise. They are also comple- or may block it from being read remotely.
mentary to other measures, such as net metering,
time-of-use rates and demand response, all of which Impact assessment: By providing detailed consumption
help manage the system with high level of renewables data, smart meters have a potential to facilitate demand-
penetration. While there is variation among the spe- response activities, particularly through aggregation
cific functionalities, in general they require the substitu- of data from several smaller consumers and hence
tion of existing analogue and mechanical meters with enhancing grid management. Such data availability,
digital devices capable of transmitting and receiving however, raises privacy concerns, and the Dutch smart
data from a customer’s premises to a utility communi- meter rollout signifies an important shift in terms of data
cations network. protection. The act transferred authority for installing and
maintaining the meters from private suppliers to the coun-
The EU has mandated that member states roll out smart try’s power network operators. As a result, smart metering
meters to 80% of customers by 2020, with member nations became a regulated activity in the Netherlands, with its
having implemented the mandates to varying degrees. installation and operating costs reimbursed via retail elec-
Annual installations in the region are expected to reach tricity rates paid by the consumer.
27 million meters by 2020 (see Figure 4.9).
To address privacy concerns, the act limits how of-
The digital nature of smart meters and their ability to ten network operators may read smart meters and
actively monitor consumption patterns have raised pri- prohibits continuous data flows. Customers won op-
vacy concerns among different stakeholders, primar- tions at both ends of the continuum: adopters may
ily communities. These concerns are affecting policy- approve higher frequency data flows, while sceptics
making in terms of standardising design features and may opt out of smart grid-enabled services.
59
FIGURE 4.9 ANNUAL SMART METER INSTALLATIONS IN THE EU, 2011-2020E (MILLION METERS)
30
million meters 26.9
25 24.6
23.3
Others
21.0
Poland
20
Austria
16.5 Portugal
15 Belgium
Netherlands
10.6
Germany
10
UK
6.2
5.1 Spain
4.3
5
3.4
France
0
2011 2012 2013e 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e
Source: BNEF, 2012b.
Risks: Smart meter rollout policies to date have been POLICY

POLICY INDICATOR
INDICATOR
hampered by several factors, including concerns from
customers about the privacy of their data, reluctance Renewables penetration: High
from regulators to pass associated costs on to rate- Economic development: High income
payers, caps on utility rates of return (see Box 4.2) and
Policy goal: Improve market integration of renewables;
higher capital spending priorities among utilities. ensure security and reliability of power supply; triggering
technology innovation
Data protection concerns have been a major chal-
Policy type: Utility regulation
lenge for policy makers designing smart meter
rollout schemes. Creating a central data provider to Eligible technology: Smart meters
be in charge of managing this data flow (as in the Asset ownership: N/A
Netherlands) is one way of ensuring a certain level of
Complementary policies: Net metering, time-of-use rates,
protection. However, it may be hard for such a body demand response
to provide this data to DSOs in a timely manner which
allows them to apply other mechanisms of their smart
networks to react to unexpected developments such 4.2.5 Grid-scale energy storage
as rapid demand swings. The data and privacy con-
cerns can also be addressed by allowing consumers Affordable and reliable grid-scale power storage tech-
to opt out of participating – an option which dilutes nologies can play an important role in overcoming
smart meters’ value proposition. the variability of renewable generation. Section 3.2.3
Box 4.2
THE RISK OF CAPPING UTILITY RETURNS ON SMART METER INVESTMENTS
Spain provides an example of the challenges posed by This puts the regulated rate of return at around 6.5% for
capping the rate of return that a utility can generate by 2014. Such a return is below the current weighted average
investing in smart meter infrastructure. The country’s Royal cost of capital for Spanish utilities of 7.3-8.9%. With returns for
Decree Law (RDL), passed on 1 February 2013, set rates for distributors lower than the cost of capital, grid investment
2013 and 2014. The rate of return under the RDL is based on could be stymied in the coming years, and smart metering
ten-year government bonds plus 200 basis points for 2014. and smart grid projects could be impacted.

presented the case for promoting residential storage constitutes almost 99% of energy storage capacity
systems as a means to encourage self-consumption globally (USAID and MNRE, 2014).
and reduce the need for financial and non-financial
support, especially in an environment of approaching To address this issue, governments are seeking to lend
grid parity. a hand in expediting cost reductions. In California, for
instance, regulators in October 2013 approved a plan
At an electricity system level, the role of grid-scale that would require the state’s utilities to add 1.3 GW
storage options in improving grid management, of new power storage capacity by 2020. Italy’s ap-
alongside other measures discussed elsewhere – such proach (outlined below) has been somewhat similar.
as policies supporting smart grids, demand-side re-
sponse and adequate infrastructure capacity – can Another power storage source, lithium-ion batteries
be substantial for three primary reasons. Grid-scale in electric vehicles (EVs), could play a significant
storage options can: 1) reduce the need for fossil-fuel role in the future. Rapid EV adoption would add mil-
based balancing capacity by enabling a time-shift lions of new flexible sources of power storage to the
for generated energy, 2) relieve grid-related technical grid. While such a scenario would inevitably come
constraints by allowing for peak shaving of demand with its own set of challenges for policy makers, it
and 3) facilitate participation of variable renewables would offer a very different route for addressing the
in grid balancing, thus contributing to grid stabilisation power storage issue. Approximately 200 000 EVs
(USAID and MNRE, 2014; IRENA, 2012). Table 4.4 pro- were sold worldwide in 2013 (International Council
vides an overview of the main storage applications. on Clean Transportation, 2014). Sales are poised to
rise in coming years as lithium-ion battery prices
In certain contexts, storage applications have the po- decline.
tential to reduce the cost of renewables integration by
up to 20% and thus ease the decarbonisation of the ITALIAN INVESTMENTS IN GRID-SCALE STORAGE
power sector (Pudjianto, et al., 2013). From a technical Policy Overview: Terna, the Italian TSO, estimated that
and economic point of view, however, the number of 1 600 gigawatt-hours of wind power, valued at roughly
grid-scale storage options available remains relatively EUR 130 million, was lost in the country due to grid con-
limited. Energy storage methods – including electro- straints between 2010 and 2012. In this context, Italy’s recent
chemical (e.g., batteries), chemical (e.g., conversion Grid Development Plan called for the development of 35
to hydrogen), electric (e.g., capacitors), thermal ener- MW of grid-scale storage units at three critical sites by 2014.
gy (e.g., molten salts), mechanical (e.g., flywheel) and In 2012, the Grid Defence Plan added a requirement that
compressed gas systems – continue to suffer from high a further 40 MW of storage should be built by 2015. These
capital and operating costs, except for pumped hydro policies allow for the consideration of several technologies,
used by transmission grids. Pumped hydro storage all of which must be able to store and deliver power almost
TABLE 4.4 MAIN POWER STORAGE APPLICATIONS
AREA APPLICATION SYSTEM COST LIMITATION
Deferred grid upgrade – avoided cost of upgrading

Load levelling and peak shaving
substations, grid interconnections and capacity
Energy system Wind turbines connected to the distribution grid, storage

Time shifting
management assets
Price arbitrage – difference between

Asset monitoring, voltage control
electricity price during day and night
Frequency and voltage regulation Prevention of fluctuations in power supply
Power quality
Reserve power Prevention of power outages
management
Fluctuation suppression Increasing value and utility of renewables in constrained grids
61
instantly. The Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas Risks: The rationale behind Italy’s policy is to enhance
(AEEG) is responsible for defining the return guarantee for flexibility on a grid where renewables play a vastly ex-
each project, which can be proposed by distribution and panded role compared to just five years ago. The policy
transmission system operators (DSOs and TSOs). could have a long-term effect of helping to reduce the
cost of power storage technologies by assisting the
Impact assessment: Terna has committed the largest industry in scaling up. In the short run, however, the
investments to date to meet the government’s plans. Italian policy is being implemented while such costs are
Its entity, Terna Plus, has begun work on the following still high. Although the necessity for grid-scale storage is
projects: clear, the rapidity with which costs will decline depends
on several factors, including R&D to improve efficiencies
»»Six projects accounting for 35 MW of energy in- (see Box 4.3) and achieving economies of scale.
tensive storage corresponding to 240 MWh under
the Grid Development Plan for which a 10.4% POLICY
return on assets is guaranteed by AEEG; INDICATOR
Renewable penetration: High
»»Two projects accounting for 16 MW of power- Economic development: High income

intensive storage under the Grid Defence Plan Policy goal: Improve market integration of renewables;
equally securing a 10.4% return on assets guaran- ensure security and reliability of power supply; triggering
teed by AEEG;
Policy type: Regulated return on investment
»»An unspecific number of projects to a total of 24 Eligible technology: All grid-scale storage
MW of power-intensive storage, under the Grid
Defence Plan, for which the sites still must be de- Asset ownership: Utility, others
fined, securing a 9.9% return on assets guarantee Complementary policies: Demand response, strategic
by AEEG. Such projects will mainly contribute in reserve, smart meter rollout
ultra-fast frequency regulation and primary and
secondary regulation for renewables integration.
4.2.6 Capacity mechanisms
Terna has signed a first contract with NGK Insulators
for upto 70 MW of storage units, under which Historically, capacity mechanisms – or payments –
NGK will deliver the first 35 MW for an estimated have been introduced to ensure system stability and
EUR 100 million (NGK Insulators, 2013). The com- to secure electricity supply at times of demand spikes.
pany also plans to build 130 MW of storage in the In Europe, the policy option has been revived, as high
short-to-medium term, which represents 55 MW shares of variable renewable electricity in certain
above what was set in the Grid Development markets have increased the need for dispatchable
and Defence Plans. These storage units should back-up capacity. This is in addition to the impact
contribute greatly to grid stabilisation and load of integrating increasing renewables into the market
management, making integration of renewables (see Section 4.1.3) on wholesale electricity prices.
easier and limiting curtailment. The reduction in spot prices harms the profitability
Box 4.3
LOOKING FORWARD: RD&D FOR STORAGE DEVELOPMENT – THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA
Given the potential of large-scale storage as a stra- by securing KRW 6.4 trillion (USD 38 billion) from the
tegic technology for grid stability, South Korea has public and private sector by 2020. By December
launched extensive research, development, and 2012, the government had committed KRW 304 billion
deployment (RD&D) programmes. With its national (USD 1.8 billion) for the 2013-2017 period. The govern-
investment plan to develop the energy storage indus- ment also hopes that the sector will be a key source
try, the country aims to become a market leader of employment.

of conventional generation capacity (mostly flexible key features of the two different segments of capac-
plants) on the one hand and disincentivises long-term ity mechanisms: price based and quantity based.
investments in new capacity. This has led to significant
concerns, especially in the EU, about the long-term Capacity mechanisms can be far more elaborate. A
reliability and resilience of the electricity system. regional transmission organisation in the United States,
PJM Interconnection LLC (PJM), has a very advanced
Policy Overview: Capacity mechanisms can take operating capacity market, and rapid renewable
several forms and target different types of gen- deployment in Europe may prompt policy makers to
erators based on the needs and consumption pat- consider this option. The U.K. and France have made
terns identified by TSOs or regulators. In essence, considerable progress with their capacity market de-
capacity mechanisms reward the availability of signs, with the U.K. opening the first auctions in 2014, for
dispatchable capacity or demand reductions in delivery scheduled in 2018, while France aims to have
response to expected system stress resulting either a fully operational certificate-based scheme in 2016.
from variability of renewables, power plant failure
or demand spikes. Plants are usually paid per MW Under the PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model, reliability re-
available to the system. quirements can be met through bilateral transactions,
but in reality they take place mainly through centrally
Some countries have had forms of capacity payments cleared auctions. France is pursuing a “capacity cer-
in place for decades, including Chile, Argentina, tificate” design, while the U.K.’s proposed scheme
Greece, Ireland, Spain and Russia. These have often incorporates capacity auctions. Germany, which
been limited to enhancing a “strategic reserve” of currently operates only a strategic reserve scheme, is
capacity. Germany’s “ResKV”, for example, prohibits considering capacity market options for the future and
decommissioning plants which BNetzA considers has expressed interest in the French model, although
strategically important in providing stability of supply it could follow the two-segment design preserving its
when the system is under stress. These plants (mostly reserve practice. Table 4.6 outlines key differences in
combined-cycle natural gas projects) are rewarded the approaches being adopted.
for being available when called upon but no longer
participate in the power market. As such, allocation Impact Assessment: PJM represents a capacity mar-
of such capacity is done through a regulatory pro- ket which has helped to ensure that marginally profit-
cess rather than a market-based approach. There able generators stay on line and provide power when
are ongoing discussions in Germany that propose needed. For their part, the French and UK capacity
an auction-based mechanism to procure additional markets have yet to prove themselves, as they are not
generation capacity to build a strategic reserve fully operational. Their impact on system reliability and
(BDEW, 2013). Table 4.5 provides an overview of the cost remains to be proven.
TABLE 4.5 KEY FEATURES OF CAPACITY MECHANISMS
FEATURE PRICE-BASED QUANTITY-BASED
Price »»
Established by regulator/ system »»
Variable, determined by the market
operator (usually through capacity auctions)
»»
Often linked to fixed costs of a peaking »»
Often determined by auctions (either
plant or value of lost load pay-as-bid or auctions with a uniform
clearing price)
Capacity requirement »»
Fixed by regulator/system operator/ »»
Fixed by regulator/system operator/
government government
Who earns? »»
Generators »»
Generators
»»
Occasionally tiered based on baseload »»
Incentives for different forms of capacity
and peaking plants (e.g., South Korea)` (generation, demand response,
interconnectors)
Who pays? »»
Typically suppliers (and hence »»
Typically suppliers based on peak
consumers via bill surcharges) based on consumption (plus a target margin)
consumption
63
TABLE 4.6 SELECT CAPACITY MARKET APPROACHES
AUCTIONED CAPACITY MARKET FOCUSSED CAPACITY MARKET CAPACITY CERTIFICATES
Auctioning of capacity and demand- Two-segment capacity market – »»

Requiring electricity suppliers to
side response alongside the power strategic reserve combined with some buy sufficient capacity certificates
market, with capacity prices fluctuating capacity mechanism options: to cover their customers’ peak
according to demand. Demand for »» Strategic reserve – covering old, demand from generators to operate
capacity is typically set in the auction currently uneconomic generation at times of stress. The capacity
by the regulator, following consultations plants set to go off line, but needed certificate allocation process is
with the TSOs. in the short run for grid stability. regulated by the grid operator.
»» Capacity mechanism options – Electricity suppliers recover costs
creating long-run incentives for new from customers who can opt out of
more-efficient generation, incentivise guaranteed supply at peak times if
load shifting and demand they judge the cost too high.
response.
Source: Agora, 2013.
An advantage of a well-functioning, technology- Risks: The attributes described above can be realised
neutral capacity market is that it establishes an with careful capacity market design. Yet there is also
equivalent value between the cost of generation a potential for failure, which could mean either that
and demand-side management: both options adequate capacity is not provided in time or that its
can equally bid into an auction, or receive cer- costs escalate and are reflected in increasing retail
tificates. This could potentially reduce the need electricity prices. Table 4.7 discusses the key elements
for additional dispatchable generation capacity. that must be considered in order to mitigate that risk.
All three capacity markets discussed here – the In its recent draft state-aid guidelines, the European
U.K., France and PJM – establish that. However, as Commission (2014) stated that any such scheme
a relatively unexplored policy option in the context must be a last resort to solving capacity adequacy
of integrating renewables, capacity markets carry problems and should be open to generators from the
several uncertainties. neighbouring countries.
TABLE 4.7 POTENTIAL RISKS OF AUCTION-BASED CAPACITY MARKETS
RISK GUIDING QUESTION THE UK AND PJM EXPERIENCE
Incorrect What is adequate The "reliability standard" is a measure which the U.K. grid operator develops
assessment for margin for secure each year to establish the amount of capacity it wishes to procure through
capacity needs supply? auctions. This is approved by the regulator and reviewed each year, to allow for
correction.
Inadequate How many auctions Under the PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model, a centrally cleared auction is held
number and and when? three years ahead of delivery. Incremental auctions are also organised in
timing of auctions advance of the delivery year to balance changes in load forecast and allow
suppliers to adjust their positions.
Adequate What is the In the U.K. design, a proposed auction price cap helps to prevent cost
remuneration acceptable price? escalation while ensuring that the price offered covers the so-called “cost of
new entry” with a sufficient margin.
Contracted What penalties Financial penalties are put on generators in both the PJM and the future U.K.
generation is not should be in place? capacity markets, if they fail to meet their contractual obligations.
delivered

POLICY »»Duration of curtailment (ranging from a few min-
INDICATOR utes to hours);
Renewable penetration: High
Economic development: High income

»»Amount of demand curtailed; and
Policy goal: Ensure security and reliability of power supply
»»Voluntary versus mandatory curtailment, once a
Policy type: Capacity market customer opts into a scheme.
Eligible technologies: Flexible generation capacity

Impact Assessment: Demand-response measures
Asset ownership: Utility require no direct subsidies and can be operated via
Complementary policies: Demand response, strategic markets. Technical costs of implementation can be
reserve, grid development plans quite low – installation of simple load-control devices
can be enough to operate the schemes – and the
demand response is called upon when it is cheaper
4.2.7 Demand-response programmes than other forms of electricity provision.
Policy Overview: Demand response is a mechanism that The PJM market (see Section 4.2.6) is already cutting 7%
requires or encourages consumers to reduce their load off its seasonal peaks through various demand response
during periods of peak demand or in response to an actions. Although further analysis is required, a rough esti-
emergency. Due to technological, financial and regulatory mate from the Smart Energy Demand Coalition (2011) sug-
issues, demand-response mechanisms have tended to fo- gests that reductions of 6-11% in seasonal peaks are pos-
cus on large-scale industrial consumers. The arrival of smart sible in Europe through demand-response programmes,
grid technologies, however, has the potential to expand depending on the profiles of commercial, industrial and
demand-response participants to smaller consumers. residential resources available in each market.
In the context of increasing renewable genera- Most countries experiencing serious stress on their pow-
tion, demand-response incentives can contribute er systems as a result of rapid renewables growth adopt
to system stability and lower consumption peaks. several different types of demand-response schemes,
Furthermore, widespread adoption of smart grid as they consider it a cost-efficient option for smoothing
technologies – smart meters, in particular – allow for demand peaks and preparing for emergency events
demand response to play an even more active role in (which can be caused by a power station trip, renew-
contributing to system balancing. ables output drop or other system malfunctions).
Depending on the mechanism, incentives consist of To address these challenges, demand-response

an up-front capacity or availability payment (USD/ measures are used by regulators in four general
kW) and/or a payment for unconsumed units of designs: as part of capacity markets, as “emergency
electricity (USD/kWh). Customers may face penal- mechanisms” to ensure security of supply in a system
ties for failure to curtail when called upon to do so. stress situation, as a part of a wholesale power market
While demand-response programmes can take design and as ancillary services provision. These cat-
different forms, they are typically established and egories are not mutually exclusive – emergency ser-
administered by grid operators (TSOs) and include vices and ancillary services provision in particular can
the following five elements: overlap, as is the case in Ireland (Eirgrid, 2012) – but
they can vary in their operations. Table 4.8 illustrates
»»Reward schemes for participants, such as elec- how these designs differ and how advanced these
tricity rate discounts, monthly payments, or one- schemes are in four European countries.
off remunerations;
Risks: Demand response is a proven and relatively
»»Notification periods prior to demand-response simple approach to contribute to increasing system
action requirement sent by a TSO to the partici- reliability during periods of stress and can also provide
pant required to take action (these can vary from a revenue stream to large demand-side units. A big
just a few hours to many days); risk comes from the signed-up consumers failing to
65
TABLE 4.8 SELECT EUROPEAN DEMAND-RESPONSE PROGRAMMES
CAPACITY MARKET EMERGENCY WHOLESALE POWER ANCILLARY SERVICES

MECHANISM MARKET
Design feature Demand response (DR) Short-notice and short- "Consumption blocks" DR eligible to
effectively treated as duration curtailment in can be traded on the participate in various
generation capacity system stress situations; energy market. ancillary markets.
and eligible for often TSO can cut off
"capacity payments" supply to participating
usually awarded consumers without
via auctions (more prior notice.
on capacity market
designs in sub-section
4.2.6).
UK To be launched in 2018; No, although recently No (wholesale Short-term operating

transitional DR planned proposed demand- customers can avoid reserve.
for 2016 (auctioned in side balancing reserve peak prices by load
2015). can be used in stress shifting).
situations.
France DR procured for Interruptible load A proposal under The balancing

capacity since 2011; programme Brottes Law will allow mechanism is open
full capacity market operational. demand curtailment to DR; however,
planned to launch in “blocks” to be traded in penetration is extremely
2016. the energy markets. low.
Germany No specific plans Interruptible load No (wholesale DR participating in

yet but under programme customers can avoid tertiary reserve.
consideration. operational. peak prices by load
shifting).
Ireland DR eligible for Winter Peak Demand No (wholesale Short-term balancing

"capacity payments". Reduction scheme customers can avoid open to DR.
discontinued but Short peak prices by load
Term Active Response shifting).
programme partly
replaces it.
Source: BNEF.
Note: Cells with blue background indicates operating programmes, while white indicates proposed or partly operating programmes and orange
indicates no DR programme in place at the moment.
supply the contracted capacity. A strong regulatory of smart infrastructure revolving around smart meters
and enforcement structure is thus needed to verify the and interactive grids.
availability of loads and to ensure the correct function-
ing of the scheme. In order to reduce this risk, several Allowing for “aggregated demand response units” is also
demand-response programmes provide the TSO with gaining currency, as purposefully created companies provid-
automatic control of the loads for short response ing aggregation platforms execute fast, targeted curtailment
times, rather than leaving it at the discretion of end- on short notice. Such operations, however, again require
customers, particularly those dealing with emergency load-control devices and digital communication technol-
situations. However, this may not always be possible or ogy to be installed at customers’ premises and linked to an
the most economically-efficient approach. aggregation platform. While this is not inherently a barrier, it
can be cost prohibitive for smaller loads. Smart metering and
In the wider context of integrating renewables and the related communications infrastructure can be leveraged
smoothing load curves, the potential from large con- to help further the penetration of demand response.
sumer demand-response schemes is fairly limited, with
many of the very biggest players, such as aluminium Finally, market design needs to enable demand-
smelters, already participating. As a result, policy mak- response participation and requires appropriate
ers are looking increasingly at small commercial and adaptation. Demand-response uptake has been
even household-level demand response as a key most successful in countries with some form of capac-
source of capacity, as is the case in France. Such ity markets, which allow for it to be effectively treated
an approach can leverage upon the emergence on par with generation. Capacity markets can allow

demand response to prevent overpayments to inef- account smart technologies capable of improving
ficient thermal generation capacity, which would system reliability without unnecessary additional fossil
otherwise be incentivised to remain on line. In extreme fuel generation capacity. In all of these cases, the role
cases, high uptake of demand-response measures of TSOs is fundamental and radically different from the
can even prevent governments from providing subsi- “pre-renewables” times, as providing security of supply
dies for additional new peaker plants. is becoming more complex and challenging.
POLICY
INDICATOR Three key lessons can be learned from the experience
Renewable penetration: Medium-high of the countries analysed above:
Economic development: High-income level

1. Not adequately accounting for grid infrastructure
Policy goal: Ensure security and reliability of supply, trigger development in renewable energy policy design
can lead to geographically uneven capacity de-
Policy type: Demand-response incentive ployment and in general to a mismatch between
transmission and generation capacity. The lead
Eligible technologies: N/A
time associated with developing adequate grid in-
Asset ownership: Utility, private owners, businesses frastructure to facilitate grid evacuation and transfer
generation to end-users can be long and, hence,
Complementary policies: Smart grid development
and smart meter rollout, strategic reserve, capacity needs to be accounted for in national planning
mechanisms process. “Passive” development of infrastructure
can increase costs, lead to stranded generation as-
sets and hurt investor confidence in the long term.
4.3 LESSONS LEARNED
2. New technologies, such as smart grids, smart meters
As the level of renewable power in the generation and storage, have the potential to play pivotal roles in
mix increases, policy makers need to ensure that the effectively and efficiently managing the system so that
policies they implement not only provide investment more renewable power can be integrated without a
incentives but are incorporated into broader energy risk of supply disruptions. Smart meter rollouts, how-
strategies. Ignoring the impacts which high shares of ever, have raised privacy concerns, and adequate
variable renewable power have on the reliability of measures need to be taken to address them.
supply can lead to higher costs later. Large grid in-
vestments may be needed to connect and integrate 3. It is important to realise that high shares of zero-or
renewable sources, and additional subsidies may be low- marginal-cost renewable power entering the
required to maintain sufficient back-up generation. system at variable times have an impact on the
operations of power markets, by both pushing tra-
The examples of Germany and India show that provid- ditional fossil fuel (typically gas-based) plants out
ing a long-term, transparent grid development plan is of the merit order and depressing prices overall.
necessary to accompany rapid renewables develop- Providing some form of dispatchable capacity re-
ment. Both of these countries implemented their plans muneration in some cases may prove necessary,
taking into consideration geographically uneven but care should be taken to ensure that such
renewables deployment. schemes incentivise only the necessary capacity
and, if possible, different forms of capacity – gen-
A “system management approach” developed early eration as well as demand response.
could help high renewables concentration in the first
place. Identifying priority areas for renewable energy All of the measures discussed in this section are a con-
deployment in conjunction with grid availability as- sequence – rather than a cause – of rapid renewable
sessments, and needs for grid improvements, has a energy deployment. As such, they should be viewed as
potential to improve co-ordination between these ac- complementary to all of the policy options discussed in
tivities and prove more cost efficient across the system this report. Implementing some of them early improves
(i.e., across generation, transmission and distribution the chances of substantially lowering the overall costs
costs). Such a systemic approach should take into of transition to a low-carbon power system.
67
5 The Prisms: Using Analytical
Frameworks to Hone
In on Smart Policy
W
hen it comes to renewable energy 5.1 RENEWABLE ENERGY PENETRATION
policy-making, there is no one-size-fits-all
solution. Each jurisdiction is unique with The stage of development of a renewable energy
its own set of characteristics that influences how market to some degree influences what policy goals
policies are crafted and implemented. With that in are more relevant and what types of measures are
mind, this section sets out to provide an indication most suitable. Markets with low renewable capacity
of the suitability of the policy adaptation measures on line require policy makers to focus on providing
analysed in this report to different contexts. To cap- sufficient “market-creating” support to stimulate
ture the varying conditions, this report highlights investments in the sector, while at the same time en-
four frameworks or “prisms” policy makers can look suring that developers are not overcompensated.
through as they consider which policy adaptation As the deployment of renewables increases, the fo-
approach fits best. cus tends to shift towards ensuring that the support
cost is minimised and is fairly distributed across dif-
The prisms have been constructed using the indicators ferent stakeholders. Moreover, markets with medium
discussed in the Methodology section of this report. or high penetration rates for renewables inevitably
Countries or jurisdictions are categorised based on: prompt policy-making to address the challenge
of smooth market integration, to ensure the long-
»»varying levels of renewable penetration (low, me- run security and reliability of supply. In this context,
dium or high); Figure 5.1 presents the different policy adaptation
measures discussed in this report and illustrates their
»»varying levels of economic development (low, potential relevance to markets with varying penetra-
middle or high); tion of renewables.
»»support directed at specific technologies (wind, Certain types of policies analysed in this report are
solar, smart grid, storage and others); and applicable in multiple market conditions. For instance,
holding auctions for power contracts can be a useful
»»seeking to craft policies that affect various asset means of price discovery in many markets, regard-
owners (utilities, IPPs, community/residential con- less of the level of renewable energy penetration.
sumers or commercial customers). The same could be said for establishing effective net
metering programmes. Other policy types have more
Sections 5.1 through 5.4 examine each of these limited applicability or relevance. For instance, the
categories in greater detail. Section 5.5 offers an need for capacity markets tends to become acute
example of how policy makers may apply these after renewables begin to account for enough power
prisms in conjunction with one another to construct generation to affect the grid and power markets.
a policy structure that is most appropriate for their
jurisdiction. As such, it is acknowledged that policies 5.2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
or policy types generally do not fit neatly into clearly
defined boxes. The “prisms” adopted in this section, A related but somewhat different question arises
however, are intended to serve as rudimentary tools around the level of market development. In most
for policy-making. cases, developing countries have seen lower levels

FIGURE 5.1 POLICIES BEST SUITED FOR DIFFERING LEVELS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY PENETRATION
RENEWABLE ENERGY PENETRATION
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Integrating ‘real time capacity corridors” into the feed-in tariff reduction structure (1.2.1.)
“Value of Solar” tariff (3.2.2.)
Grid development plan - India (4.2.1.) Grid development plan - Germany (4.2.2.)
P OLI C I E S
Building third-party metrics into feed-in tariffs (1.2.2.) Implementing spending caps on support for
renewables (2.2.1.)
Integrating residential storage in the system (3.2.3.)


Capacity mechanisms (4.2.6.)
MINIMISE COST
GOALS
Note: The degree of blue shading indicates how appropriate the goal is for each level of renewables penetration (for example, improved
market integration of renewable power applies more to the most mature markets).
of renewable energy penetration. However, that is not the challenge of integrating substantial portions of
always the case and, in particular, some of the larger variable renewables into an established power grid or
so-called middle-income nations have seen very market.
substantial volumes of renewable capacity deployed.
The linkages between the stage of economic de-
The policy types examined for this report have varying velopment and renewables integration enablers,
levels of applicability for countries at different levels such as grids and R&D infrastructure, are strong. For
of economic development, but they are somewhat instance, grid infrastructure in low-income countries
slanted towards middle- and higher-income countries. is often marked by high losses in transmission and
This is in part because these countries have had the distribution, whereas grids in high-income countries
capacity to provide the financial support necessary are more advanced in terms of control, monitoring
to create markets for renewables domestically. As a and operation. This may affects the introduction of
consequence, they often are also the ones faced by policies, such as net metering, which have direct
69
relevance for distributed generation, since their suc- applicability in countries with low, middle and high
cess depends on the physical availability of a distribu- economic development, although until now these
tion network that can handle reverse flows as well as types of measures have been implemented particu-
regulatory structures that can manage them at a larly in middle- or higher-income countries.
system-level. Figure 5.2 maps out those interlinkages by
presenting an overview of the relevance of the policy In addition to taking into account the level of renew-
adaptation measures studied in this report for countries able energy penetration and their country’s overall
at different stages of economic development. level of economic development, a question for policy
makers revolves around the availability of resource en-
Some of the other policies illustrated here, for example dowment -- and which renewable energy technolo-
spending caps on renewables support, might have gies should be deployed to exploit these.
FIGURE 5.2 POLICIES BEST SUITED FOR DIFFERING LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Implementing spending caps on support for renewables (2.2.1.)
Integrating “real time capacity corridors” into the feed-in tariff reducion structure (1.2.1.)

PO LI CI ES
Building third-party metrics into feed-in tariffs (1.2.2.)
Grid development plan - India (4.2.1.) and Germany (4.2.2.)
“Value of Solar” tariffs (3.2.2.)

arrangement (4.2.3)
Integreting residencial storage in

the system (3.2.3.)
Demand response programmes

(4.2.7.)

Capacity mechanisms (4.2.6)
MINIMISE COST
GOAL S

5.3 TECHNOLOGY FOCUS 5.4 ASSET OWNERSHIP
Renewable energy technologies require a specific The development or reform of renewables policies af-
mix of policies along the stages of development. fects all players involved in a country’s power genera-
Supporting their development requires a constant tion, delivery and consumption segments. Still, some
adaptation of policies that are best suited to the policies have a more direct impact on stakeholders
stage of development. While some policies can in a certain segment of the energy value chain.
be designed to be technology-specific, others can It is important to understand these impacts and to
be technology-neutral. A typical example is renew- deploy measures that can mitigate any unintended
able energy auctions, which can either be held for consequences which put at risk the broader long-
contracting capacity of a specific technology to term sustainability of the energy system.
promote its deployment, or be competitive across
technologies in identifying least-cost options. It is With increasing deployment of decentralised renew-
equally important for policies to focus in a timely able energy systems, in particular PV, the ownership
manner on other complementary non-generating structures of the energy sector are undergoing a
technologies, for example R&D of storage infrastruc- transition in many countries. Many of these systems
ture, smart grids, etc., that support the growth and are owned by individuals or community-based
smooth integration of renewables into the system. organisations. This redistribution of asset ownership
within the energy sector, as well as the increasing role
Technology-specific policies need to consider the local of renewables in meeting the electricity demand, is
resources available as well as the development of strong affecting traditional utilities in some countries (e.g., in
distribution chains. Further reduction in the levelised Europe and some U.S. states). Nearly all of the policies
cost of generating renewable energy will also come analysed in this study are directly relevant to utilities
from reducing “soft” costs (associated with installation, since a focus of this study has been markets where
connection, etc.). These are among the key reasons for renewables have achieved sufficiently enough market
the difference in deployment costs in different countries penetration to pose a challenge for energy industry
and regions. Figure 5.3 provides an overview of the incumbents. These utility-relevant policy types include:
relevance of the different policies covered in this report fostering grid scale storage projects, establishing ca-
to some generating and non-generating technologies. pacity markets, and others.
FIGURE 5.3 POLICIES BEST SUITED FOR CERTAIN TECHNOLOGIES
ELIGIBLE TECHNOLOGIES
WIND SOLAR OTHER RENEWABLE SMART METERS STORAGE

ENERGY
TECHNOLOGIES
Integrating “real time capacity corridors” into the feed-in tariff Grid development plans - India (4.2.1.) and
reducion structure (1.2.1.) Germany (4.2.2.)
Holding auctions for power contracts (1.2.3.) Demand response programmes (4.2.7.)
Implementing spending caps on support for renewables (2.2.1.) Smart grid implementation and smart meter
rollouts (4.2.4)
POL ICIE S
Designing flexible tax “Value of Solar” tariffs Grid scale energy

policies (1.2.4.) (3.2.2.) storage (4.2.5.)
Offshore wind Permitting net

connection liability metering (3.2.1.)
Building third-party Integreting

metrics into feed-in residencial storage
tariffs (1.2.2.) in the system (3.2.3.)
Integreting
residencial storage
in the system (3.2.3.)
71
The analysis reveals that, irrespective of the level of eco-
nomic development and market maturity, we are likely 5.5 PUTTING THE PRISMS TO WORK
to observe (and in some markets already are observ-
ing) a shift away from the traditional central supply of This report sets out to provide an overview of the
power to a much more diverse and distributed portfolio different renewable energy policy adaptation tools
of generating assets. With the advent of small-scale available to policy makers. The prisms outlined
generation, community-wide systems, as well as in- above have been designed to allow a basic “fil-
creasingly relevant IPPs, the role of the utility is changing. tering out” of policies that may be inappropriate
under certain circumstances. Taken together,
In markets with high levels of renewables penetration, however, these prisms have the potential to allow
the most forward-looking utilities are re-thinking their busi- policy makers to hone in on the best regime for
ness models. Meanwhile, markets with less advanced their jurisdiction.
energy infrastructure now have the very real potential to
leapfrog the traditional “utility-transmission-consumer” The four prisms can be combined to produce a
model directly to more diversified systems. All of these wide variety of results. This sub-section offers just
need to be considered up-front when a new regulation one example of how the prisms can be overlaid
is being designed, and utmost consideration should against one another to yield potentially useful
be given to the impact that this shift in generating asset information. While it is not intended to capture the
ownership may have on generators, transmission sys- complexities of policy-making, the below example
tem operators, governments and consumers. Figure 5.4 merely illustrates how context-specific factors
attempts at illustrating who owns the generating assets can influence the selection of appropriate policy
that is affected by the different policies. mechanims.
FIGURE 5.4 POLICIES AFFECTING CERTAIN ASSET OWNERS
MAIN ASSET OWNERS
PRIVATE OWNERS/ BUSINESSES IPPS UTILITIES

COMMUNITIES
Integrating “real time capacity corridors” into the feed-in tariff reducion structure (1.2.1.)
Building third-party metrics into feed-in tariffs (1.2.2.)
Implementing spending caps on support for renewables (2.2.1.)

P OLICIES
Integreting residencial storage in the system (3.2.3.)
“Value of Solar” tariffs (3.2.2.)
Holding auctions (1.2.3.)
Grid development plans – India and Germany (4.2.1.)

and (4.2.2.)
Offshore wind connection liability arrangements (4.2.3.)
Smart grid implementation and meter rollout (4.2.4.)
Capacity mechanism (4.2.6.)

EXAMPLE: A MIDDLE- INCOME COUNTRY WITH Finally, suppose that the policy maker wants to make
STRONG LOCAL WIND RESOURCES AND LOW RENEW- sure that the new policy he or she implements exclu-
ABLE ENERGY PENETRATION SEEKS A SUPPORTIVE
POLICY WHERE THE COSTS ARE NOT BORNE BY sively affects utilities or IPPs and not other asset owners.
TAXPAYERS. That eliminates the potential for integrating “real-time
capacity corridors” into feed-in tariff reduction struc-
Consider a country that has identified excellent wind tures. And it leaves holding auctions as the most viable
resources along its coastline. The country is middle in- policy option, given the circumstances.
come and has yet to install wind capacity. What type
of policies might be most appropriate? This is but one example of how these prisms can
be used in conjunction with each other to narrow
At least five of the policies identified in this report down policy options to one that is potentially most
can potentially be supportive for wind project appropriate.
development:
5.6 FINAL THOUGHT
»»Integrating “real-time capacity corridors” into the
feed-in tariff reduction structure (1.2.1) The renewable energy industry today finds itself at a
critical juncture. Technology costs have decreased
»»Holding auctions for power contracts (1.2.3) rapidly, making them increasingly competitive against
fossil fuel-based conventional generation. Yet the
»»Designing flexible tax policies (1.2.4) development of renewable energy and increasing its
share in the national (and global) energy mix cannot
»»Implementing spending caps on support for re- be fully achieved purely on the grounds of cost com-
newables (2.2.1) petitiveness. Without doubt, governments need to take
measures to introduce adequate policies which allow
»»Offshore wind connections liability arrangement for a smooth, system-level integration of renewables in
(4.2.3) a cost-efficient manner, while maintaining the long-
term reliability of the energy system.
However, not all of these policies are appropriate for
middle-income nations. Offshore wind connection For their part, many policy makers remain steadfast in
liability arrangements are a best fit for high-income their commitment to renewable energy, but they often
countries. Meanwhile, spending caps on support for face substantial fiscal constraints in sufficiently support-
renewables are generally most needed in countries ing the sector. These circumstances have prompted
with medium-to-high levels of renewable energy a wave of renewable energy public policy innovation.
penetration. That leaves the following three policy While many of these new measures are reactive and
options: have been crafted in response to renewable capac-
ity boomlets, they do have the potential to serve the
»»Integrating “real-time capacity corridors” into the industry well over the longer term – provided that
feed-in tariff reduction structure (1.2.1) they offer the level of flexibility, longevity and certainty
required. Additionally, the potential for cross-regional
»»Holding auctions for power contracts (1.2.3) exchange of lessons learned from policy-making ex-
periences is significant as more countries embark on
»»Designing flexible tax policies (1.2.4) the pathways of energy system transition.
Now consider that the country policy maker also wants As discussed, there is no one-size-fits-all approach
to shield local taxpayers from bearing the costs associ- to renewable energy policy-making. Legislators
ated with the new policy. That eliminates the potential and regulators must be guided by their unique
for using most flexible tax policies to support the local local economic and political circumstances while
wind industry, and leaves just two policy options: inte- taking into account the availability of natural re-
grating “real-time capacity corridors” into the feed-in sources to fuel renewable energy projects. However,
tariff reduction structure (1.2.1) and holding auctions important insights can be gained by looking across
for power contracts (1.2.3). borders for best-practice examples. There exists
73
a short but rapidly expanding track record of how serve as rudimentary tools for those at the initial stages
certain schemes have performed, and these “lessons of designing policy schemes.
learned” can be integrated into further policy-making.
As such, the transition towards a renewable energy- There are inherent limitations on any conceptual
dominant power sector is a systemic one, involving a mechanism intended to guide policy-making. In real-
broad range of stakeholders; hence, policy-making ity, policies or policy types generally do not fit neatly
will benefit from an all-inclusive approach that consid- into clearly defined boxes. Ultimately, the most im-
ers costs and benefits across the sector. portant decisions which policy makers must take are
fundamentally qualitative.
This report took a structural approach to surveying the
landscape of innovative thinking about renewable Still, there is value in imposing a structural framework
energy policy which is now very much under way. The on such discussions. Our modest hope is that this
frameworks constructed were intended to highlight to report and the tools it offers shed useful light on the
policy makers approaches which have been adopted critical questions confronting policy makers globally.
in certain contexts and that therefore may be consid- In the best of circumstances, we hope that it guides
ered under similar circumstances. These “prisms” can better-informed policy-making.

75
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79
IREN A Hea d quar te r s
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Policy Adaptation

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Policy Adaptation

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Adapting Renewable Energy Policies

To Dynamic Market Conditions

This report is available for download from www.irena.org/Publications.

1. ACCOUNTING FOR RAPIDLY FALLING RENEWABLE GENERATION COSTS18

3. ACCOUNTING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY’S COST COMPETIVENESS40

4. INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE POWER50

5. THE PRISMS: USING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS TO HONE IN ON SMART POLICY68

6 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

8 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

Accounting for rapidly falling renewable generation costs

10 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

Accounting for renewable energies’ cost competitiveness

Integrating variable renewable power

12 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

RENEWABLE ENERGY PENETRATION

LOW MEDIUM HIGH

Holding auctions for power contracts (1.2.3.)

Designing flexible tax policies (1.2.4.)

“Value of Solar” tariff (3.2.2.)

Permitting net metering (3.2.1.)

Integrating residential storage in the system (3.2.3.)

Demand response programmes (4.2.7.)

Offshore wind connection liability

Smart grid implementation and

Grid scale energy storage (4.2.5.)

Capacity mechanisms (4.2.6.)

PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLES

TRIGGER TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION

INCENTIVISE SELF -CONSUMPTION

ENSURE SECURITY AND RELIABILITY OF POWER SUPPLY

IMPROVE MARKET INTEGRATION OF RENEWABLES

16 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

Penetration How advanced is the market »»

Economic How economically advanced »»

Policy goal What is the policy’s primary »»

Asset ownership Who owns the generating assets »»Utilities

2012 2013 2014

Source: BNEF solar price index.

18 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

1.11 1.10 1.00 1.01 0.96

Source: BNEF Wind Turbine Price Index (WTPI).

USD/MWh PV - c-Si tracking

70 000 350 Annual Installed

Source: GlobalData, 2014; BNEF.

Fossil fuel-fired electricity

Solar PV: large

Solar PV: small

Solar PV: large

Solar PV: small

Source: IRENA Costing Alliance.

20 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

DEPLOYMENT CORRIDORS (MW PER QUARTER)

Solar PV capacity band (kW) Low Default High 1 High 2 High 3

<=10 0-100 100-200 200-250 250-300 >300

>10<=50 0-50 50-100 100-150 150-200 >200

>50 0-50 50-100 100-150 150-200 >200

Degression factor (% per quarter) 0% 3.5% 7% 14% 28%

Source: (U.K. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2012)

22 Ad a p ting Renewab l e Ene rgy Pol i c i e s to D yn a mic M a rke t C o n d it io n s

1. ACCOUNTING FOR RAPIDLY FALLING RENEWABLE GENERATION COSTS18

3. ACCOUNTING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY’S COST COMPETIVENESS40

4. INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE POWER50

5. THE PRISMS: USING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS TO HONE IN ON SMART POLICY68