Evidence On Biodiversity Conservation Impacts 2019
Evidence On Biodiversity Conservation Impacts 2019
Evidence On Biodiversity Conservation Impacts 2019
IMPACTS
conservationsolutionslab@chemonics.com
CONTENTS
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................2
Introduction ................................................................................................................................3
The importance of context and governance ........................................................................3
Objective ..............................................................................................................................5
Methods......................................................................................................................................5
Search strategy and comprehensiveness ...........................................................................5
Article screening and study eligibility criteria .......................................................................5
Data coding strategy ............................................................................................................6
Analysis ...............................................................................................................................6
Results .......................................................................................................................................7
Characteristics of the peer-reviewed evidence base (terrestrial focus) ..............................8
Geography of cases examined ..........................................................................................10
Characteristics of conservation interventions studied .......................................................11
Dimensions of community engagement strategies............................................................12
Occurrence of governance types.......................................................................................14
Linkages between community engagement strategies and governance types .................14
Discussion ................................................................................................................................17
Primary findings .................................................................................................................17
Limitations..........................................................................................................................18
Implications for policy and management ...........................................................................18
Conclusions ..............................................................................................................................19
References ...............................................................................................................................20
Appendix 1. Boolean Search Query.........................................................................................26
Appendix 2. Comparison of Engagement Clusters ..................................................................27
Key Words: Biodiversity conservation, community engagement, land tenure, systematic map
In response, a wide range of participatory approaches for engaging communities in conservation have
emerged over the years (Mace, 2014), predominantly aimed at achieving positive outcomes for both
natural ecosystems and poverty reduction (Reed, 2008; Roe et al., 2013). Community engagement
approaches span the range in terms of stakeholder involvement, from stakeholders as passive
beneficiaries to stakeholders as key players in the design, implementation, and management of
conservation programs (Sterling et al., 2017). While it is broadly assumed that community engagement
will enhance biodiversity outcomes, reduce poverty, and empower local communities (Adams & Hutton,
2007; Berkes, 2007; Mace, 2014; Decker et al., 2016), recent criticisms have emerged, citing community
engagement approaches’ failure to deliver (e.g., Robinson and Redford, 2001). In particular, more often
than not, the responsibilities given to local stakeholders as part of the engagement process are
unrealistic, as they lack commensurate authority or appropriate systems of financial or human capital to
provide structures that would support these strategies’ long-term success (Reed, 2008). In this sense,
understanding the governance context is key to determining who has the rights and abilities to participate
and exercise power in the decision-making process regarding natural resources.
Governance is a critical concept in multiple fields of inquiry, including political discourse, policymaking,
and human development (Smith et al., 2003; Grindle, 2004; Robinson et al., 2018). However, given its
multidisciplinary nature, governance is often vaguely defined. Here, we define governance as the formal
and informal institutions through which authority and power are organized and exercised (Larson and
Soto, 2008). Governance encompasses rules and structures as well as norms and processes whereby
access, use, and decision-making authority around natural resources are determined. As it causally links
community engagement in conservation to natural and human well-being outcomes, governance is an
important enabling condition to consider when identifying mechanisms for change. However, despite
decades of implementation and research, there remains a significant lack of clarity regarding whether and
which community engagement approaches lead to greater achievement of desired objectives. Thus,
understanding how the dynamics between different governance and community engagement approaches
affect conservation and poverty reduction outcomes is critical to effective program design.
For community engagement to be effective, proper governance structures must be in place, as they
determine who can participate, engage, and make decisions in a conservation program. Good
governance (e.g., reduced corruption, sustainable resource use, increased representation and
prioritization of marginalized people) is widely seen as a critical driver for improved human well-being. For
example, representation of impoverished populations in decision-making processes can lead to poverty
reduction (Grindle, 2004) and improved conservation outcomes (Armitage et al., 2012; Decker et al.,
2016). Furthermore, improved tenure security of local people (establishing, enforcing, and adjudicating
rights to use and access natural resources) typically improves human well-being (Lawry et al., 2016).
Insecure tenure and weak governance are a major problem in many developing countries around the
world, often regions of prime conservation concern (Bruce et al., 2010). Legacies of conflict and
colonialism have resulted in complex, and often inequitable, systems of property rights and representation
that can impede conservation and development goals (Kelly and Peluso, 2015). More recently, efforts to
secure tenure have focused on decentralization and devolution of rights to customary structures and local
communities (Sunderlin, 2011). However, devolution of rights can also exacerbate local inequities if not
accompanied by broader cultural changes, widening the gap in existing power structures that often reflect
ethnic, socioeconomic, and gender discrimination (Craig & Porter, 2003; Platteau, 2004).
While early conservation operated under the assumptions of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968),
implementing state and private tenure over natural resources, modern practice recognizes the potential of
stable communal governance of shared resources (Ostrom, 1999) for effective conservation (Cox et al.,
2010). Increasingly, community-based (“bottom-up”) strategies are being implemented to build local
capacities and secure rights while accomplishing sustainable resource management (Roe, 2015; Biggs et
al., 2016; Berkes, 2007). While the importance of a secure tenure and governance context is well
understood within conservation, how tenure and governance lead to improvements to social-ecological
systems as a whole remains unclear (Robinson et al., 2017; Sunderlin et al., 2014). For example, while
there is strong evidence that improving and securing local communities’ tenure over natural resources
can improve natural resource quality (Gautam et al., 2006), it can also provide incentives to invest in
agricultural intensification (Brasselle et al., 2002) or fail to prevent overexploitation (Cinner, 2005). The
social-ecological systems within which poverty, land use, and biodiversity conservation are linked are
complex and adaptive, making the understanding of key contextual features, in this case governance,
essential to informed application of community engagement to conservation.
Several recent reviews have examined linkages between land governance (e.g., bundle of rights) and
environmental outcomes (Ojanen et al., 2017); the impact of community-based conservation on
ecological, economic, attitudinal, and behavioral outcomes (Brooks et al., 2013); and linkages between
stakeholder engagement and biodiversity conservation outcomes (Sterling et al., 2017). While these
reviews are encouraging, they remain limited in scope, examining narrow dimensions of interventions
and/or outcomes. Additionally, these reviews highlight the lack of clarity regarding how community-
engagement approaches are designed. Moreover, despite increasing attention from both the conservation
practice and research arenas, it is unclear how specific community engagement approaches are best
suited for different contexts. This is particularly worrisome given widespread concerns that current
conservation and development practices are inadequate in the face of declining biodiversity and rising
global poverty. This suggests a disconnect between theory and real-world outcomes. Thus, to understand
how best to achieve win-win outcomes for conservation and poverty through natural resource
B2. Objective
This paper’s objective is to use systematic synthesis methods to assess the state of the peer-reviewed
evidence base on community engagement interventions linked to terrestrial conservation projects.
Specifically, we aim to examine the relationships between different engagement approaches and land
tenure/governance structures. Systematic synthesis methods are a powerful approach for assessing the
state of current knowledge and identify critical knowledge gaps within a policy-relevant framework (Pullin
et al., 2004; Stewart et al., 2005). These methods are considered a “gold standard” for reviews, as they
employ a reproducible and transparent method that aims to minimize bias (Pullin & Knight, 2001).
C. Methods
We conducted a scoping review that employs a systematic strategy for searching for and mapping the
evidence base (Dicks et al., 2017) to explore characteristics of community engagement approaches and
understand their relationship to governance structures. This review was undertaken as part of a joint
initiative, the Conservation Solutions Lab, between Arizona State University and Chemonics International
Inc., which seeks to build knowledge and evidence-based approaches for more effective community
engagement in conservation. As the intention of this review is primarily exploratory, it is not meant to be
exhaustive, but rather a representative assessment of the body of knowledge concerning community
engagement in conservation.
C4. Analysis
Information on community engagement approaches was coded for each study along with a set of key
dimensions based on participation, motivation, incentives, and rights to create a cross-comparative
classification scheme (Exhibit 2). This framework draws from established trans-disciplinary literature on
engagement including ladder of participation based on the stage of involvement, motivation/incentives,
and scale of participation (Arnstein, 1969; Mostert, 2003; Reed, 2008). We used a hierarchical clustering
approach to heuristically identify likely types of engagement approaches based on these six categorical
variables. We calculated a dissimilarity matrix using Gower’s distance using the package “cluster”
(Maechler et al., 2018) in R (R Core Team, 2018). Likely clusters were identified using agglomerative
clustering (“stats,” “dendextend” packages) (Galili 2018). Distribution of characteristics over each cluster
were mapped as percent of overall studies within a single cluster.
Exhibit 2. Key community engagement dimensions coded for during data extraction
Community Engagement Dimensions Characteristics
Motivations for involving the community Biodiversity benefits, community benefits, both
Yes/no
Types of incentives
Incentives for involvement
How were incentives selected?
How often were incentives provided, and how many?
D. Results
The initial dataset comprises 252 studies (204 articles). The following analysis focuses on a subset of 168
studies (137 articles) that focus on terrestrial ecosystems (including forests, grasslands, deserts,
wetlands, and urban environments).
Most articles were led by authors at academic institutions (66 percent, Exhibit 3). Among these authors,
23 percent (n=31) were working directly with/in the organization implementing the community
engagement and biodiversity conservation intervention. The number of articles published increased over
time, with the most appearing in 2013 (Exhibit 4).
Exhibit 5. Frequency of study design type (unlabeled column includes studies lacking
information)
Most articles used a non-experimental study design (Exhibit 5) to examine the impacts of community
engagement approaches on ecological, behavioral, and human well-being outcomes. Overall, a majority
of cases examined effects on human well-being (Exhibit 6A), focusing specifically on economic (n=46
cases) and material well-being (n=41 cases). Several also examined impacts on social capital, such as
change in conflict, community cohesion, and trust (n=29 cases). Comparatively, other elements of human
well-being, such as cultural and spiritual values, health, safety and security, and rights and participation,
were under-examined (Exhibit 6B). A considerable number of cases examined habitat-level impacts (e.g.,
forest/habitat cover) as well as changes in individual behavior (e.g., change in harvest practices, or
attitudes towards conservation). Many articles that claimed to measure ecological and human well-being
outcomes in fact measured some type of behavioral change, such as in management practice or
perceptions of conservation. While these are not true measures of either change in ecosystems or well-
being, they could represent intermediate outputs required to achieve those outcomes.
Exhibit 8. Frequency of scale at which community engagement was examined within the
evidence base
Cases spanned a wide geographic range, with a higher concentration of study effort in Latin America;
eastern and southern Africa; and East, South, and Southeast Asia, and relatively less in northern Africa,
The majority of studies examined community engagement within area protection and area management
interventions. Fewer studies examined interventions that proposed alternative natural resource protection
methods, raising awareness and communication, harnessing market forces, and habitat restoration
(Exhibit 9).
Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
# cases (overall) 23 79 38 37 30 22 23
Primarily
Primarily local Primarily local
Scale (what scale was local (with Primarily local Local &
(with a few (with a few
the approach applied Local a few sub- (with a few National Sub-
sub-national to sub-national
to?) national & sub-national) national
international) & national)
national)
Leadership (is the
leadership for the Mostly shared
Shared External Internal Shared Shared Shared
approach internal to the (some external)
community?)
Community focus (are
specific groups Specific
General Mostly general Varies General General Varies
targeted by the demographics
approach?)
Incentives (are explicit
incentives offered for Yes Primarily yes Varies No Yes Varies Yes
engagement?)
The terms used to describe community engagement strategies were highly varied, including in definitions
and usage. When using a hierarchical clustering approach to identify emergent types of community
engagement approaches based on defining characteristics, agglomerative (via Ward’s method) and
divisive clustering both identified seven likely clusters based on minimizing within clusters and maximizing
distance between them (optimizing for maximum cluster distinctness). Agglomerative clustering resulted
in more balanced (even-sized) clusters, and was thus used to assign studies to cluster types.
Exhibit 11 describes the seven emergent types across six characteristics. Most approaches focused on
communities at large (Clusters 1, 2, and 4) while others emphasized approaches for both a broad
population and targeted demographic groups (Clusters 3 and 6). Meanwhile, Cluster 7 focused on
specific groups (e.g., women, indigenous peoples, and youth). Motivations for community engagement
were mixed, ranging from biodiversity-focused programs to ones with dual goals for nature and human
communities. Cluster 1 comprises 9 percent (n=23) of cases, defined by local-scale approaches, jointly
led by internal and external actors, that use explicit incentives to engage communities. Communities were
typically first engaged in programs’ implementation phase. Examples of approaches in this cluster include
ecotourism, community-based forestry, and payments for ecosystem services. Cluster 2 is the largest,
Cluster 4 comprises 15 percent (n=37) of cases, primarily local-scale approaches with shared leadership
(internal and external) of programs. Programs tend to be targeted to the general community and do not
employ explicit incentives for participation or compliance. The point of initial community involvement
varies, with most engaging during the design or implementation phases. In contrast, Cluster 5 (12
percent, n=30) cases are primarily national-scale approaches with shared leadership. These approaches
target the general population and generally offer an incentive for involvement. Communities are typically
first involved during the design phase. Cluster 6 (9 percent, n=22) approaches are primarily local efforts
with shared leadership that target both general and specific portions of the population. Use of incentives
is mixed, and communities are first involved in the scoping phase. Last, Cluster 7 (9 percent, n=23) cases
are primarily local-scale approaches with shared leadership that target specific demographic groups using
explicit incentives for involvement. Communities are typically involved during the design phase.
Exhibit 12. Counts of stated motivation types driving inclusion of communities in the
intervention grouped by outcomes types studied
Exhibit 13. Counts of governance types as defined by land tenure types and leadership
actions taken
The majority of cases examined concerned lands owned and controlled by the state, followed by
communal lands (under continuous local management) and, lastly, private ownership. In the cases
examined, control was most often devolved to the local level in communal lands and in mosaics of mixed
tenure types (Exhibit 13).
D6. Examination of linkages between community engagement strategies and governance types
Exhibit 14. Land tenure types grouped by community engagement approach clusters
Several patterns emerged between linking different engagement types within different land tenure
contexts (Exhibit 14). Community engagement Cluster 2 has the most representation in the evidence
For Cluster 2 engagement within state-tenured lands, the motivation for involving communities in the
conservation intervention was either biodiversity benefits or a mix of community and environmental
benefits; in only one case was engagement motivated by community benefits alone. The scale of these
projects was either local or subnational, and all cases were externally led. These external actors include
national government officials (primarily from protected area authorities), conservation NGOs, and tourism
operators. These community engagement interventions involve communities defined spatially by distance
from the protected area of interest; in no case was the community itself involved in defining itself. Explicit
incentives were provided in all but two cases, and these used tourism as an alternative livelihood to link
residents with monetary benefits from conservation activities. Monetary incentives are heavily
emphasized in these engagement types, often coupled with local infrastructure projects (funding the
building of schools, roads, etc.). Empowerment was not described as a benefit/incentive in these cases.
In all studies but one, communities were not involved in the intervention until the implementation phase or
as recipients of outcomes. The data shows that in some cases communities did not even have the option
not to participate; participation was assumed, particularly in the case of tourism (Wunder, 2000; Charnley,
2005). In the single Cluster 2/state tenure study that involved the community at the planning/design
phase, the implementing NGO undertook a consulting process and emphasized residents’ consent to
participate in the intervention. However, no capacity building was reported in this study, so it is unclear
whether informed participation in planning actually took place.
The two second-largest groups both arose in mixed-tenure contexts, involving Cluster 2 and 5
engagement strategies. Similar to the state tenure/Cluster 2 group, the mixed tenure/Cluster 2 group is
most often motivated by biodiversity to engage with local people, and has been implemented at all scales.
Leadership in these cases is always external, and mostly from NGOs and nonprofits, although three
cases had national-government leadership and one was led by private landowners. The community was
only defined spatially or not at all in these cases, and only one study considered an intervention with a
specific focus within the community, as farmers were the only targets of the project. All studies in this
group but one had explicit incentives for involvement; these incentives varied more than in the state
tenure/Cluster 2 group. While alternative livelihoods and direct payments were common, more than half of
the studied interventions also implemented capacity building via training, one empowered members of the
community to act as leaders, and several supported infrastructure development besides direct payments.
Despite the entirely external leadership in this group, four of the cases included the community at the
design/planning stage of the project; only two within this group involved residents exclusively as
recipients of outcomes.
In the Cluster 5/mixed tenure group, two of the cases listed community benefits as the primary motivation
for engaging with the community. None of these study interventions occur at the local level, and all but a
single case with internal leadership features a partnership, potentially stemming from the complex tenure
situation in those cases. These partnerships are between local communities (sometimes organized into
conservancies and committees) and the national government. All engagement cases here are general,
but the community was never defined. All studies involved explicit incentives for engagement; three cases
involved tourism (e.g., trophy hunting) as an alternative livelihood mechanism, and several involved
training and capacity building. Direct payments, infrastructural development, and community
empowerment via the partnerships described above were also used as incentives throughout these
cases, varying these strategies. Three of these studies did not describe what community involvement in
the intervention looked like; however, all but one of the remaining cases involved the community at the
design phase. Residents’ involvement continued into the implementation phase as the coupled leadership
structure necessitated community participation in ongoing decision-making.
Exhibit 15 shows how many cases coupled various government actions with various engagement types.
Cluster 2 approaches are most commonly applied in conjunction with continued state control; legal rights
and mixed actions also accompanied this engagement type in relatively high numbers. Among cases that
involved continued state control, all types of engagement approach were represented except for Cluster
5; Cluster 2 approaches were most common, followed by Clusters 1, 3, and 4. Mixed actions are
particularly clustered around Cluster 2 engagements, with very few applications of other engagement
types. There is a notable even spread of engagement types applied in cases of de facto/status quo local
control of land resources. For example, Cluster 2 approaches were primarily run under state-led control of
resource tenure. In contrast, Cluster 3 and 5 approaches predominantly involved devolution of tenure
rights to local actors and actions to maintain existing local control.
Among the largest group, Cluster 2 with state control, 10 of the 12 cases involved state ownership and
management of land. Biodiversity benefits are underscored as an incentive for engaging with local
communities. In this case, the scale of engagement ranged from local to national, but all cases were led
by the national government, NGOs, or tourism operators, and communities were spatially defined. Explicit
monetary incentives and tourism development were the most common ways to encourage public
participation.
In contrast, the two second-largest groups among actions taken involve devolution of power to the local
level. For Cluster 3 and devolution of power, there is a notable change in motivation emphasis from the
state control group described above, with most cases being either motivated by community benefits, or a
mix of biodiversity and community benefits, with only a single case having biodiversity benefits as a
primary motivation for involving local people. All these cases occur at either local or national scales (e.g.,
national movements to devolve natural resource rights and management responsibilities to local
communities). All leadership is internal and consists of either small local governments or committees
formed by the community to manage a specific area or resource. Communities were not explicitly defined
among these cases, but the case with a definition appears to be fitting: “Such a regime or unit should
comprise a defined group collectively managing and exploiting common property resources within a
defined jurisdiction” (Taylor, 2009). All cases have explicit incentives for involvement but three, and these
are more varied than the state control group, due to the coupling of increased empowerment with
monetary and development incentives. For these cases, communities were also involved at the scoping
stage in half the cases, and otherwise in the design phase. Often, community planning was supported by
NGOs, the government, or tourism companies.
For Cluster 5 approaches with devolution to local control, there was a wide variety of motivations for
involving the community, as well as three cases in which the motivation was unclear. All these projects
were carried out at a national level; most featured a partnership between internal and external leadership.
In this case, power is devolved to the community primarily through defined government means — for
E. Discussion
E1. Primary findings
There are significant gaps in understanding of the mechanisms by which tenure and engagement interact
to improve human well-being. Overall, the evidence base was dominated by non-experimental studies,
focusing primarily on human well-being and habitat outcomes. In general, we found several gaps in
understanding of community engagement, including clarity and detail regarding who communities are and
how they are engaged. Our work shows that communities are almost never involved in biodiversity
conservation interventions until the implementation phase or as recipients of outcomes, with participation
either assumed or forced. This presents several challenges to better understanding of how different
engagement approaches succeed under different governance/land tenure regimes. With little
consideration of how engagement is elicited, there is understandably limited evidence that accounting for
tenure concerns is a priority either.
The evidence base is characterized by considerable gaps, which limit the extent to which we can
generalize these findings to other contexts. Geographically, there is little to no information on northern
Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and parts of Asia, while a few countries, like Mexico, Tanzania, and
Nepal, have seen unmatched levels of research effort. Most of the community engagement interventions
were not implemented until the 1990s or later, making long-term monitoring and evaluation of a good
proportion of these studies impossible. This is reflected in the short-term, non-experimental research
projects that comprise the majority of the evidence base; long-term, more robust examinations are
needed, as are systematic reviews. This will help address the dearth of information on the larger-scale
environmental impacts of these interventions.
Overall, articles rarely provided explicit definitions and details for the communities involved. Lack of detail
on the identity and composition of communities in question limit our ability to understand the
heterogeneity of impacts of conservation, much less intuit underlying cultural and contextual factors that
may be in play. Spatial definitions are the most common ways for outsiders to delineate who is included in
“communities,” and this can have implications for intervention design, implementation, and outcomes.
This method may entrench power disparities or create increased tensions and conflicts when it clashes
with local understandings of community composition (Berkes, 2007; Jones, 2008).
It is clear from our analysis that there are only a few dominant types of community engagement
strategies, despite the plethora of named “approaches” that exist. To evaluate and analyze approaches,
the conservation community must have a more transparent and shared language to describe community
engagement strategies. Our findings also show that despite assumptions that involving stakeholders in
decision-making can enhance conservation outcomes, the most commonly applied approach has external
leadership and only a minority of approaches emphasize community empowerment. Cases in which local
stakeholders have scoped and led implementation is even rarer, and only three studies out of the 203 in
our review examined traditional natural resource management schemes with beneficial conservation
outcomes (e.g., protected sacred forests). This indicates that local stakeholders are not engaged as often
as modern conservation rhetoric or even “bottom-up development” practitioners suggest (Ferse et al.,
2010; Joshi & Rao, 2017).
E2. Limitations
This study is not meant to be a comprehensive, but rather a representative, assessment of the evidence
base on links between community engagement and governance in conservation. In particular, a potential
bias of this study is that the primary source of data is derived from peer-reviewed literature, and
substantial relevant knowledge likely is contained in unpublished grey literature sources (Haddaway and
Bayliss, 2015). However, insight from peer-reviewed literature highlights key gaps in academic research
priorities. The occurrence of gaps also highlights areas that academic discourse has neglected, despite
its prevalence in practice.
We set out to analyze the outcomes of community engagement in biodiversity conservation interventions
as it relates to governance and tenure by systematically assessing the state of peer-reviewed literature on
the subject. Our analysis revealed that the current evidence base is lacking the robust data needed to
uncover the links between governance context, strategic interventions, and outcomes. This assessment
does show, however, a significant lack of coherence in the characterization of community engagement
approaches, which impedes robust evaluation of utility and impact. We conclude that although there is a
widely held assumption within the biodiversity conservation field that engaging communities in
interventions can improve environmental outcomes and human well-being, our analysis shows that there
is insufficient data to show when and how this might be effectively applied. Overall, community
participation has been limited, and tenure is marginally considered, with consultation and benefit sharing
being the most common methods of increasing community support for conservation efforts.
Community engagement is poorly defined in biodiversity conservation practice. This leads to the
conclusion that the way in which we currently engage communities is generally not well informed by
evidence nor theory, but potentially on supposition, conservation fads, and conventional wisdom. We
argue that this is not sufficient to address the highly complex situations practitioners must face along with
other key stakeholders.
Security of tenure is one factor that is frequently poorly understood and dealt with, in terms of how
conservation practitioners engage with communities, as Robinson et al.’s recent overview (2018) of
issues and recommendations clearly attests. In 2002, 21 percent of forests in developing countries were
owned or designated for use by indigenous peoples and communities; today, approximately 31 percent of
the forests in developing countries are. Nonetheless, very little is known about the mechanisms used by
states at the national level to recognize and allocate tenure rights to indigenous peoples and
communities, especially in developing countries (Rights and Resources Initiative, 2015). This means that
more often than not in developing country contexts, ambiguity over rights, and lack of clarity over which
stakeholders hold prerogatives where there are overlaps in claims, clearly affects communities’
willingness and ability to engage in conservation, though evidence to validate or invalidate this contention
is scarce. Understanding how rights are recognized and materialized is a key next step for conservation
and sustainable development practitioners.
As global biodiversity losses continue to mount, and while impoverished local communities dependent on
forest resources to support their livelihoods remain marginalized in planning and decision-making, new
approaches to community engagement are desperately needed that consider tenure as a starting point.
Here, explicit theories must be tested in different contexts and the evaluation of outcomes should be more
transparent and holistic than what our analysis has shown (e.g., Qiu et al. 2018). For conservation to
effectively address global sustainable development challenges, widespread and cohesive learning must
occur across sectors and become a basis for planning and implementation. Security of tenure as applied
to community engagement will need to become a key indicator and object of learning in years to come.
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