SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA
NICOLAS, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide
through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of
the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly
liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of
P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan
with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being
then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and
unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar,
in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to
traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep
bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to
turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court,
showed that:

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch shrimps
at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should)
borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon. The
deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also wanted to (come)
along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan
Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota
Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00
o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock that afternoon, (defense
witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of
Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of
beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go

1
 bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove
the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately
there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer each. After
waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his
companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the
LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz
caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin
sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back
seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at a speed
of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at
the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the car was
running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway
because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright
lights on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body
away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two
vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.

xxx

As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the
highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep
swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car while the
back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by a
sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters at
the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained
consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him.
Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin.
Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal
Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night
(Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs. 2

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the
prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer
that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that:

…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the
road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela,
when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the opposite
direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car which
turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped
across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit "1") and a
sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the
driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal
Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were all
brought for treatment.3

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal
Case No. 066 in petitioner's favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT
GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.

SO ORDERED.4

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial
court's judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed
that the decision appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and
damages.

On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas
spouses, thus:

2
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby
held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate
cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount
of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,

SO ORDERED.5

In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred,
Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at least
twelve (12) bottles of beer…between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m."6 It found that petitioner's act of driving while
intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No.
4136)7 and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,8 a statutory presumption of negligence existed.
It held that petitioner's act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself "because the mishap,
which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation."9

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992
denied the motion.

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our
consideration:

FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY
FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND
THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE
AGAIN.

SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD

DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT
THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH
THE PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS
IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS
WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.

THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE

COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION
SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING
BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.

In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?

(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?

(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine
to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of
the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his
civil liability. He argues that the trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was
the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for
indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put
him in "double jeopardy."

3
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not
recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt.
Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,
the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for
awarding indemnity and damages.1âwphi1.nêt

Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him
in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."10 When a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense.11 This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must
be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. 12 In the
instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and
the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final.
Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was
the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second
criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment,
the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second
criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission.13 There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.14 The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.15 This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code,16 where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions
have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or
omission.17 The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different
rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of
Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question
of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.

On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the
criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He
concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.

Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment of
acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or
imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt,
allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.

Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the
appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was
not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the
possibility that "the accused was really negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent
with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is
consistent with the record…the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction." 18 The foregoing
clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
4
established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a
suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and
indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for
damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that
the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for damages violated the doctrine
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.19 He avers that since Manchester held that "The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate
court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and
damages.

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask
us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1,
1983, while the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the
promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by
the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was
not then customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in the information, the
trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees
for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of
the Manchester doctrine to speak of.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal
actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.20 As correctly pointed out by
private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended
party be stated in the complaint or information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial.

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private
respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in
the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in
this case.

Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual
damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the
filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal,
temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so
alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.21 Recall that the information in Criminal Case No.
066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure
effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the
effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing
fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no
basis for petitioner's allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the
appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution
dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
5