DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow

Sachika Vij – National Law University, Lucknow Project on “A.K. Kraipak vs.
Union of India: The Principle of Natural Justice in Administrative Decisions”

A.K. KRAIPAK VS. UNION OF INDIA: THE PRINCIPLE OF

NATURAL JUSTICE IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Keywords:- “Principle of natural justice, Administrative Bodies, Judiciary, UPSC,
Government.”

By- Sachika Vij

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .............................................................................................................. 2

DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................ 3

I. ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ 4

II. OBJECTIVE ............................................................................................................................... 4

III. RESEARCH METHODOLGY................................................................................................. 5

IV. INTRODCTION ....................................................................................................................... 5

VI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 6

VIII. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ............................................................................................... 7

IX. ISSUES INVOLVED: APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE ....... 8

X. ANALYZING THE JUDGEMENT ........................................................................................ 10

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XI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 13

XIX. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 13

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my deepest gratitude and respect to my Dr. Manoj Kumar
(Assistant Professor – Law) who gave me the opportunity to do this interesting
Project on the Case “A.K. KRAIPAK VS. UNION OF INDIA: THE
PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS”
which helped me in exploring and researching on the topic in great depth and
enriched my knowledge on the same. This project also provided to me a chance to
improve on my writing skills. I hope to be able to provide a project which is well
researched and enriching for the readers and justifies the opportunity given to me. I
also thank my friends and seniors who provided their continuous insights for
improving my project and encouraged me to complete the project within the given
time frame.

SACHIKA VIJ

Enrollment No.- 210101123

B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)

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 DECLARATION

We hereby declare that the PROJECT: A.K. KRAIPAK VS. UNION OF INDIA:
THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS submitted by me to Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh in partial fulfilment requirement for the
award of the degree of B.A.L.L.B (Hons.) is a record of bonafide project work
carried out by me under the guidance of Dr. Manoj Kumar. His guidance and
advice carried me through all the stages of writing and completing this project work.
I further declare that the work reported in this project has not been submitted, and
will not be submitted either in part or in full, for the award of any other degree or
diploma in this institute or any another university.

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 Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow
Sachika Vij – National Law University, Lucknow Project on “A.K. KRAIPAK VS. UNION OF
INDIA: THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS”

A.K. KRAIPAK VS. UNION OF INDIA: THE PRINCIPLE OF

NATURAL JUSTICE IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Keywords:- “Principle of natural justice, Administrative Bodies, Judiciary, UPSC,
Government.”

I. ABSTRACT

“Once we understand the soul of the rule as fair play in action – and it is so- we must hold that it
extends to both the fields. After all administrative power in a democratic set-up is not allergic to
fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice.”
-Krishna Iyer, J.

"In the context of India's three-tiered state structure, comprising the Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary, the principle of natural justice traditionally applies to judicial and quasi-judicial
functions. However, this research delves into the question of whether this principle can extend to
administrative actions that impact individuals' rights, challenging the notion of a strict division
between quasi-judicial and administrative actions. Drawing inspiration from Justice Krishna Iyer's
assertion that the essence of a rule is 'fair play in action,' this study explores the application of
natural justice in administrative decision-making. It primarily examines this inquiry through the
lens of the influential case A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, investigating the potential for the
principle of natural justice to ensure fairness and prevent unilateral injustice in the realm of
administrative actions."

II. OBJECTIVE

That how the principle of Natural justice can be applied to administrative bodies as that only
applies on judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, with the reference of A.K Kraipak v. Union of India
case?

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 III. RESEARCH METHODOLGY

As an author, I have adopted the doctrinal and analytical approach in the present paper as it stands
applicable in all stages of research, right from the articulation to the formation of arguments on
the issues mentioned in the research paper. This paper is the outcome of a secondary data related
to administrative law with special reference to Indian context. It is a conceptual, qualitative
research that the author has employed in writing this paper. In the later part, it is concluded by the
author, that the decisions taken via the process of administrative law shall abide by the principle
of natural justice and be done fairly if any regards it affects the rights and duties of a person.

IV. INTRODCTION

It is generally accepted that there are three categories of governmental functions- (i) Legislative;
(ii) executive; and (iii) judicial which are usually performed by three main organs of the
government in a state viz. (i) Legislature; (ii) executive; and (iii) judiciary. The legislature enacts
a law, the executive administers it and the judiciary interprets and declares what the law is. The
difficulty lies in distinguishing these functions from one another especially where, in a single
proceeding there is an overlapping of more than one function. This difficulty arises in the
applicability of the rules of natural justice too. The rules of natural justice are presumed to apply
to bodies entrusted with judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. There is no such presumption with regard
to bodies performing administrative functions. Decisions, which are purely administrative, stand
on a wholly different footing from judicial as well as quasi-judicial functions. Identifying the rules
of natural justice in the varied circumstances which confront administrative decision-makers, has
proven to be a formidable task for such bodies themselves as well as the Courts charged with
supervising and controlling their decisions. Administrative authorities are being entrusted with the
“duty to act fairly” in arriving at decisions which may have a serious adverse effect on someone’s
rights, interests or status.

Keeping in mind the above-made observations, the author has tried to analyze whether there exists
any dividing line between quasi-judicial and administrative actions and the applicability of rules
of natural justice to Administrative Actions through the case of A.K Kraipak vs. Union of India1.

1
A.K Kraipak vs. Union of India, MANU/SC/0427/1969.

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 VI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

In 1966, a service called The Indian Forest Service was constituted, the selection for which was to
be made from among the officers serving in the forest department of the state. Section 3 of the All-
India Services Act, 1951 provides that the Central Government shall after consulting the
Government of the States concerned including that of Jammu and Kashmir to make rules for the
regulation of recruitment and the conditions of the service of persons appointed to those All-India
Services. In pursuance of the power given under Section 3, Indian Forest Service (Recruitment)
Rules, 1966 were made. The Rule 4(1) of the above-mentioned Rules reads as-
“As soon as may be, after the commencement of these rules, the Central Government may recruit
to the service any person from amongst the members of the State Forest Service adjudged suitable
in accordance with such regulations as the Central Government may make in consultation with
State Governments and the Commission.”
Now the regulation 3 of Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1956 framed
under Rule 4(1) of the Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966 provided for the
Constitution of a Special Selection Board. It provided that for the purpose of making selection to
any State Cadre, the Central Government shall constitute a special selection board consisting of:
1. The Chairman of UPSC or his nominee.
2. Inspector General of Forests of the Government of India.
3. Joint Secretary. UOI.
4. Chief Secretary of the concerned State Government.
5. Chief Conservator of Forest of the concerned State Government.
Regulation 5 dealt with the preparation of the list of suitable candidates. It reads as “The Board
shall prepare, in order of preference, a list of such officers of the State Forest Service who satisfy
the conditions specified in Regulation 4 and who are adjudged by the Board suitable for
appointment to posts in the senior and junior scales of the service.”
The selection Board was to be headed by the Chief Conservator of the Forest of the State while
the final selections were to be made by the Union Public Service Commission (U.P.S.C).
In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, a person by the name of Naquishbund was appointed as the
acting Chief Conservator of forest. He had been appointed to the said post by overlooking the
seniority of three officers – Basu, Baig and Kaul. They had filed petitions against their
supersession to the higher authorities. In the meantime, when the selection Board for

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recommending the names of officers for All India Forest Service was formed, Naquishbund came
to be appointed as its ex-officio chairman. The Board recommended the names of the persons
including Naquishbund but excluding the other three officers who had been superseded. Thereafter
the selection board reviewed the cases of officers not selected earlier as a result of which a few
more officers were selected. The selections as finally made by the board were accepted by the
Commission. On the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, the impugned list was
published. Even After review Basu, Baig and Kaul were not selected. Another noteworthy point
here is that Naquishbund‟s name was placed at the top of the list of selected officers. It must be
noted that Naquishbund was also one of the candidates seeking to be selected to the All-India
Forest Service. Though he did not sit in the selection board at the time his name was considered
for selection but admittedly he did sit in the board and participated in its deliberations when the
names of Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered for selection and was also involved while preparing
the list of selected candidates in order of preference, as required by Regulation 5. However, the
list prepared by the selection board was not the last word in the matter of selection in question.
That list along with the records of the officers in the concerned cadre selected as well as not
selected had to be sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs had
forwarded that list with its observations to the Commission and the Commission had examined the
records of all the officers afresh before making its recommendation.
Aggrieved, The Gazetted Officers Association, Jammu and Kashmir along with the interested
parties brought a petition to the Court challenging the selections notified in the impugned
notification as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and on the further ground
that the selections in question were made in contravention of the Principles of Natural Justice.

VIII. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

The petitioners as well as the respondents raised arguments with respect to the nature of the power
conferred on the selection board.
The petitioners contended that Rule 4 as well as Regulation 5 prescribes that the selections should
be made after “adjudging” the suitability of the officers belonging to the State service. The word
“adjudge” the meaning of which is “to judge or decide” indicates that the power conferred on the
selection board was a quasi-judicial power. It was contended on their behalf that such a power is
a judicial power not an administrative one and it has to be exercised in accordance with the well

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accepted Rules of Natural Justice, the violation of which has been rightly claimed. Naquishbund,
being a candidate for Indian Forest Service cannot be an adjudicator of the same.
On the other hand, the learned Attorney General on behalf of the respondents argued that the power
exercised by the selection board is not a quasi-judicial power but an administrative power. To
support this contention, it was further admitted that the proceedings before the selection board
were not quasi-judicial because the board was not required to decide about any “right”. The duty
of the board was merely to select officers who in its opinion were suitable for the Indian Forest
Service. He interpreted the word “adjudge” as being “found worthy of selection”.
It was also contended by the learned Attorney General that after all the selection board was only a
recommendatory body. Its recommendations had first to be perused by the Home Ministry and
then by the UPSC. The final recommendations were made by the UPSC. Therefore, the grievances
of the petitioners have no real basis. Keeping in mind the validity of the administrative actions
taken, all that has to be seen is whether the final decision is just or not. Finally, in the form of
arguendo, it was also contended by the learned Attorney General that the mere fact that one of the
members of the board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the whole selection
process.

IX. ISSUES INVOLVED: APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

In order to understand the arguments raised by both the parties, it is necessary to understand the
scope of principles of natural justice. In a phrase it can be described as “judicial fairness in decision
making” and its main aim is to secure justice or prevent miscarriage of justice. It is a branch of
public law and is held to be a very formidable weapon that can be wielded to secure justice. The
definition of the term “natural justice” is difficult to give but its essential characteristics can be
enumerated in two maxims namely-

(i) audi alteram partem,

(ii) nemo judex in causa sua.

The first maxim literally meaning “hear the other side” provides that before taking a decision other
party must be heard. De Smith says- “No proposition can be more clearly established than that a

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man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property until he has a fair opportunity of answering the
case against him”.

The right to fair hearing has always been used as a base onto which a fair administrative procedure
comparable with due process of law can be built. In Ridge v. Baldwin2, the House of Lords held
by majority that the power of dismissal of an employee couldn’t be exercised without giving
reasonable opportunity of being heard and without observing the principles of natural justice.

The second phrase literally means that “No man shall be a judge in his own cause”. This maxim
ensures that the adjudicator must not have any interest or bias in the case in which he is deciding.
As the famous saying goes “justice should not only be done but must be seen to have been done”
In the case of a judicial body, the independence and impartiality of the judge an absolute conditions
because without these qualities the public confidence which is their real strength would weaken.

In the opinion of the Apex Court, a precondition to decide for or against one party without proper
regard to the true merits is bias. Bias can be of three types i.e., personal bias, pecuniary bias, or
official bias. In the cases of bias what the aggrieved party has to prove is the likelihood of bias and
not the real existence of the same.

In the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana3, Bhagwati, CJ, observed, “We agree
with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man
can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a likelihood of bias it is in accordance with
natural justice and common sense that the Judge likely to be biased should be incapacitated from
sitting.”

The Court in Manak Lal vs. Dr. Prem Chand4 held, “the test is not whether, in fact, a bias has
affected the judgment, the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend
that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final
decision of the tribunal”.

2
Ridge vs. Baldwin [1964] AC 40.
3
Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 657.
4
Manak Lal vs. Dr. Prem Chand 1957 SCR 575.

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In the case of State of U.P vs. Mohammed Nooh5, the officer who held departmental inquiry and
passed the order, himself gave evidence and thus acted as prosecutor and the judge. Das C.J
delivering the majority judgement said that the rules of natural justice were grossly violated.

Similarly, in the case of Rattanlal vs. Managing Committee6, X was a witness as well as one of
the three members of an inquiry committee against Rattanlal. The Court set aside the dismissal
order of Rattanlal on the ground that the proceedings were vitiated because of the bias of one of
the members.

Now, that we have discussed in general the concept and applicability of the Principles of Natural
Justice, we can analyze the judicial interpretation that took place in the present case.

X. ANALYZING THE JUDGEMENT

A five-judge bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hidyatullah, CJ and Grover, Shelat, Bhargava
and Hegde, JJ. through Hegde, J. held that the selections made by the selection committee were in
violation of principles of natural justice.

The Hon’ble Court found the power exercised by the Selection Board as an administrative one and
tested the validity of the selections on that basis. It held that the concept of rule of law would lose
its importance if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging
their functions in a fair and just manner. Also, it is a must to charge administrative authorities with
the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner in a Welfare State like India, where
the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. In the words of Hegde, J.-

“The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but to act justly and fairly and not
arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a
judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision.”

It further observed that the dividing line between an administrative power and quasi-judicial power
is being gradually obliterated.

5
State of U.P vs. Mohammed Nooh 1958 SCR 595.
6
Rattanlal vs. Managing Committee 1993 SCR (3) 863.

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The Court held that the basic principle of nemo judex in causa sua was violated by appointing
Naquishbund as a member of the selection board. Though he did not participate in the deliberations
of the board when his name was being considered yet the very fact that he was a member of the
selection board and that too holding the post of the post of the Chairman had a significant impact
on the decision of the selection board. Also, he participated in the deliberations when the claims
of his rivals i.e., Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered. He was also present when the list of
selected candidates in order of preference was being made. Hence, it is very clear that from the
very inception of the selection process, at every stage of his participation in the selection process,
there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under such circumstances, the Court could not
believe that Naquishbund could have been unbiased.

Further the Court observed that the question is not whether Naquishbund was actually biased or
not. The real question is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to
have been biased. As discussed earlier in Supra Manaklal the Court had made it clear that the test
was not actual bias but a reasonable apprehension of bias. It held that it is difficult to prove the
state of mind. Therefore, in deciding the question of bias ordinary course of human conduct is
taken into consideration. Owing to this, the Court observed that there was a personal interest on
part of Naquishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure his position without further challenge
and so he cannot be said to be impartial, fair and just while making the selection.

The Court while making this judgment took assistance of certain other landmark judgments which
are discussed as below:

The Court observed that in In Re H.K (An Infant), the validity of the action taken by an
Immigration Officer came up for consideration. Lord Parker, C.J observed thus:

“I myself think that even if an immigration officer is not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity,
he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the
subsection, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that
the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to
act judicially, but of being required to act fairly.”

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Also, in the case of State Of Orissa vs Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors7, Shah, J. speaking for the
Court, dealing with an enquiry made as regards the correct age of a government servant, observed
thus –

“We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and
cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an
administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated, must be made
consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the
State…Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from
quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now
being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-
judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative
enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry.”

In this case, for the first time, without the assistance of any foreign judgement, the Supreme Court
had decided that Principles of Natural Justice were applicable not only to judicial and quasi-
judicial functions, but also to administrative functions. The present case has made the position
clearer.

In Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala8 , the Court observed that the rules of natural
justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case
must be depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the
law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons
appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of
natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that was
necessary for just decisions on the facts of that case.

Hence, taking all the above decisions as well as some other English decisions into consideration,
the Court declared that Principles of Natural Justice are applicable to administrative functions also
and struck down the selection process on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice.

7
State Of Orissa vs Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors 1967 SCR (2) 625.
8
Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala 1969 SCR (1) 317.

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 XI. CONCLUSION

Therefore, what emerges from this case is that although the Courts are making distinctions between
the Quasi-Judicial and Administrative powers but at the same time there is one common element
of fair procedure in both the cases which can be referred to as the “duty to act fairly”. This duty
arises from the same general principles, as do the rules of natural justice.

In England, as discussed earlier the case of Ridge v. Baldwin9 has been characterized as the “The
Magna Carta of Natural Justice” as it gave a new orientation to the concept of quasi-judicial with
a view to facilitate the application of natural justice to administrative functions.

Similarly, the preceding pages show that the case of AK Kraipak vs. Union of India is a landmark
judgement in the development of administrative law in India and has strengthened the rule of law
in this country. Though the applicability of rules of natural justice to administrative functions had
already been made in Dr Binapani’s case10, it had not gained as much importance as it deserved.
In the present case while extending the application of these principles to administrative function
as well, Hedge, J. observed that - “If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent
miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to
administrative inquiries”

A mere perusal of the above given view shows that this case was successful in attributing the due
importance which lacked previously, and gave finality to the fact that rules of justice applied to
administrative functions too. No authority can absolve itself from the liability to act in a lawful
manner.

XIX. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Basu Durga Das, Administrative Law, 6th ed.; Kamal Law House, Kolkatta, 2005.

2. De Smith‟s Judicial Review of Administrative Action; 6th ed.; Sweet & Maxwell, 2007.

9
Ridge v. Baldwin, AC 40 UKHL 2.
10
State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, 1967 SCR (2) 625.

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3. Jain M.P& Jain S.N, Principles of Administrative Law; 6th Enlarged ed.; Vol. I ; Wadhwa
Nagpur, 2010.

4. Jain M.P, Indian Administrative Law: Cases and Materials; Vol. I.1994; Wadhwa and
Company Nagpur, 1994, 1996.

5. Jain M.P, Treatise on Administrative Law; 1996 ed.; Wadhwa and Company Nagpur, 1996.

6. Massey I.P, Administrative Law; 7th ed.; EBC, 2008.

7. Pandey T.N, “Rule of Natural Justice in the Administration of Law”, Vol. 131, Taxman, 2003.

8. Sathe S.P, Administrative Law, 7th ed.; LexisNexis Butterworth‟s Wadhwa Nagpur, 2008.

9. Takwani C.K, Lectures on Administrative Law; 4th ed.; EBC, 2011.

10. Wade H.W.R & Forsyth C.F, Administrative Law; 10th edn.; Oxford, 2009. 1. Basu Durga
Das, Administrative Law, 6th ed.; Kamal Law House, Kolkatta, 2005.

11. De Smith‟s Judicial Review of Administrative Action; 6th ed.; Sweet & Maxwell, 2007.

12. Jain M.P& Jain S.N, Principles of Administrative Law; 6th Enlarged ed.; Vol. I ; Wadhwa
Nagpur, 2010.

13. Jain M.P, Indian Administrative Law: Cases and Materials; Vol. I.1994; Wadhwa and
Company Nagpur, 1994, 1996.

14. Jain M.P, Treatise on Administrative Law; 1996 ed.; Wadhwa and Company Nagpur, 1996.

15. Massey I.P, Administrative Law; 7th ed.; EBC, 2008.

16. Pandey T.N, “Rule of Natural Justice in the Administration of Law”, Vol. 131, Taxman,
2003.

17. Sathe S.P, Administrative Law, 7th ed.; LexisNexis Butterworth‟s Wadhwa Nagpur, 2008.

18. Takwani C.K, Lectures on Administrative Law; 4th ed.; EBC, 2011.

19. Wade H.W.R & Forsyth C.F, Administrative Law; 10th edn.; Oxford, 2009.
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