Lecture Conflict Management and Resolution-3
Lecture Conflict Management and Resolution-3
Definition of conflict:
Conflict is a relationship between two or more individuals and groups who have or
think that they have incompatible goals and needs. The incompatibility may thus
be real or perceived and may be over material and/or symbolic resources.
Most people perceive conflict as a negative term and ascribe negative connotations
to it. However, inherently conflict is neither negative nor positive. Some of its
aspects may be either positive or negative.
Conflict has positive aspects when it directs attention to the injustices that need to
be addressed, when it promotes much needed change in organisations and systems,
and especially when it leads to creative problem solving. The negative aspects of
conflict are the destructive behaviour (violence leading to loss of life and
property), the pain and trauma that is a result of the violence, and the wastage of
resources that would have been better spent on creative activities. Therefore it is
the negative aspect of conflict that can and should be avoided but conflict per se is
a fact of life, inevitable, natural, unavoidable and often creative.
CAUSES OF CONFLICT
There are different ways of examining the nature of a conflict and identifying the
factors that give rise to it. Most conflicts arise from a complex and multiple set of
factors that may include the history shared by people across the divide, the social,
political, economic and cultural dynamics, the nature of the issues at stake etc.
Thus a distinction needs to be made between
1. Proximate Causes
Proximate causes are those events, which may trigger violence for example, the
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in June 1914, which was the
immediate cause of the beginning of the First World War.
2. Underlying Causes
Underlying causes are the fundamental and long-term causes, which create
conditions in which immediate triggers of conflict occur. The immediate and
underlying causes are interconnected but in conflict resolution more attention
needs to be paid to identifying the underlying and root causes if we want to work
towards sustainable peace. Theoretical explanations of the underlying causes of
conflict focus on either the human agency or the social structural conditions.
Theories under each of these categories are a reflection of the ‘nature versus
nurture’ debate: whether human beings are primarily affected by genes or by social
interactions.
i. One set of theories argues that aggressive behaviour is innate and biologically
programmed in the human species. Thomas Hobbes believed that human beings
are selfish by nature and “that humanity is characterized by careless, and indeed
relentless, thirst for power.” Edmund Burke “saw humanity as inherently
conflictual.” Sigmund Freud contends that aggression “is carried out in the name
of self-preservation, and is inherent to humans.” Aggression helps human beings
to protect and enhance their existence.
Conflict occurs in human interactions that take place within the context of the
family, the community and the society. When individuals or groups believe that the
family/society does not meet their interests, they try to change the social and
familial norms and structures by force, which often leads to situations of violent
conflict. Thus socio-structural theories argue that aggression is not innate but
its expression depends on factors external to the individual. Structural theories
lay emphasis on the organisation of society that creates the causes and conditions
for conflict. Unjust social structures and institutions play a significant role in
creating and perpetuating social conflicts. Social structures and institutions often
favour some groups of people / communities and by extension disfavour others.
This emerges as an important source of violent conflict.
i. Albert Bandura argued that there are three primary sources of human
aggression: familial settings, sub-cultural context and symbolic
modeling.
a. Social learning takes place first and foremost in the family and
human beings learn appropriate behaviour within family settings.
Bandura argues that families that have conflicts all the time are most
likely to have conflictual children. Thus violent families produce
violent offspring. Additionally, American psychiatrist, James
Gilligan, known for his work with some of the most “violent
criminals” living in America’s prisons, put forth the theory that
childhood abuse creates violent personalities. Gilligan pointed out
that most of the “criminals” living in American prisons had had a
brutal childhood- many had been beaten, sexually assaulted,
prostituted or neglected to a life-threatening degree by their parents.
He thus concluded that childhood abuse and neglect can create violent
personalities that will then manifest violent behaviour in social
institutions.
b. Subcultures are another source of social learning leading to
aggression. Bandura argues: “The highest rates of aggressive
behaviour are found in environments where aggressive models abound
and where aggressiveness is regarded as a highly valued attribute.”
However, all people raised in violent environments may not be
violent because “many people may simply aspire not to be violent.”
3. SOURCES OF CONFLICT
From the underlying causes, we now move to the specific sources of conflicts,
sometimes also referred to as issues involved in a conflict or issues at stake in a
conflict.
3.1 Information
Lack of information, misinformation and different interpretations of information
can lead to conflict. Disputants may not have sufficient information or even the
same information about a given situation. In other instances, groups and
individuals may interpret the same data or information in differing ways or they
may assign different levels of importance to the same data. Control and
manipulation of information is a major weapon in conflict situations.
3.2 Miscommunication
3.3 Resources
This relates to conflict over material resources such as land, money or objects,
which are evidently identifiable and can be negotiated. Historically, disputes over
access to and control of territory, material, economic and scarce natural resources
have been one of the dominant sources of conflict. One major element in the
colonial empire building of the 19th and 20th century was the competition for
resources and defence of national economic interests which were defined in
territorial terms. Here each faction wanted to grab as much as it could; its
behaviour and emotions were directed towards maximising gain. In extreme cases,
disputants may resort to military action or the threat of it to gain or defend access
to resources perceived as vital for survival, for example, the developed Western
countries attach a great deal of importance to maintaining their access to oil
supplies in the West Asian region and are prepared to undertake extreme measures
to do so.
In the twenty-first century, demands for land, fresh water and other natural
resources are growing rapidly due to increase in population as well as
consumption. Besides, environmental degradation has further complicated the
situation and the consequences are being felt the world over. In India, the shortage
of water has given rise to several conflicts at the local and regional level.
3.4 Relationships
Relationships are an important facet of human life. Gandhi was in fact always keen
to cooperate with the opponent to build relationships, which would form the basis
for a sound post-conflict life. As human beings, we have personal (family) and
social (community) and/or organisational (business) relationships. In these
relationships, people have disagreements over a variety of issues, which is very
normal. However, sometimes the interdependence created by these relationships
introduces a destructive dimension to these differences, for example, a wife is
repeatedly subjected to abuse and domestic violence but is unable to walk out of
the relationship because (apart from other social and cultural pressures) she may be
economically dependent on her husband, who is aware of this interdependence and
uses it to his advantage.
3.5 Interests and Needs
Non-fulfillment of interests and needs are a major source of conflict. The non-
fulfillment of these needs may be either a reality or just a perception. In fact,
important needs for identity, respect or participation are often at the heart of
conflicts that ostensibly seem to be a contest for material things. Conflicts usually
arise because of the denial of following needs:
When the needs of individuals, communities and nations are denied in the
abovementioned areas, it leads to structural violence. Vertical structural
violence can operate in the following arenas insulting the respective needs:
• Repression – political – the insulted need is freedom;
• Exploitation – economic – the insulted need is well-being; and
• Alienation – cultural – the insulted need is identity. For Gandhi, exploitation
was the essence of violence. He saw violence as anything that impeded
individual self-realisation and that violence could be either direct or
structural in nature. Dehumanisation is a case in point.
3.6 Structures
Structures- both social and organisational- determine who has access to power
and resources, who has the authority to make decisions and who is afforded
respect. Conflicts about or within structures often involve issues of justice and
competing goals.
3.7 Power
Power can mean different things – legitimacy, authority, force, or the ability to
coerce. It is a vital ingredient in conflict situations; conflicts either centre on the
search for more power or a fear of losing the same. However, power is intangible;
it cannot be counted. But power does not exist in a vacuum; it is present in, and
based on, relationships. Besides, one should look at resources as a key area that
determines the actual location of power or the need for power. Power conflicts can
occur between individuals, groups or nations, when one or both sides choose to
take a power approach to the relationship and wish to maintain or maximise the
amount of influence that they exert in the relationship and the social setting. It is
impossible for one side to be stronger without the other being weaker, at least in
terms of direct influence over each other. Thus, a power struggle ensues which
usually ends in victory for one side and defeat for the other, or in a ‘stand-off’ with
a continuing state of tension. Power can be either hard (coercive) or soft
(persuasive). Hard power consists of the ability to command and enforce while soft
power comprises of the ability to bring about cooperation, provide legitimacy and
inspire. In violent conflict situations, hard power dominates, as armies and militias
grapple for victory. On the other hand, soft power is essential for peacemaking and
peace-building. Power should necessarily be accompanied by accountability;
otherwise it tends to give rise to more conflicts. Being accountable would mean
finding ways to report to others and being open to be questioned by others.
3.8 Governance
Governance relates to decisions that define expectations, grant power or verify
performance. It is concerned with the way in which society is governed, the
distribution of authority and resources within it, and the legitimacy of these in the
eyes of the members of society. Governance, basically, is a process of decision-
making and the process by which decisions are implemented or (not implemented).
In simple terms, ‘governance’ is what a ‘government’ does. Politics provides the
means by which the governance process operates. ‘Good governance’ is an
indeterminate term used in development literature to describe how public
institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources in order to
guarantee the realisation of human rights.
3.9 Rights
Denial or violation of rights and the struggle for elimination of these violations are
at the heart of many conflicts. Civil and political rights are often called ‘first
generation rights’ and include rights of the individual in society to life, liberty and
freedom of opinion and expression. Gandhi had always stressed on the centrality of
the individual and felt that society could not be built on a denial of individual
freedom. Economic, social and cultural rights are known as ‘second generation
rights’ that comprise of rights to basic necessities such as food, shelter, health and
education. The ‘third generation rights’ refers to collective rights like those of
minorities and marginalised groups. Human rights are thus necessary for
individuals to lead a dignified life. Some of the major Human Rights Conventions
are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966;
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women,
1979; Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1984; Convention on Rights of the Child, 1989. Rights
may theoretically be guaranteed by the constitution of a state but in practice may
not be accessible to the marginalised or they may be intimidated by powerful
people from claiming their rights. Ultimately, the repeated denial of rights may
lead to violent conflict. Thus while analysing conflicts, it is necessary to look at
structural violence and explore the position and perception of stakeholders with
regard to rights and freedoms.
3.10 Culture
3.11 Ideology
3.12 Religion
3.13 Identity
The oft-asked question of the Cold War era, ‘what is your ideology’ has been
replaced in the post-Cold War era by the question ‘who are you’. People are
increasingly conscious of ‘who they are’ and asserting their cultural and social
identity. They are realigning themselves on the basis of ancestry, religion,
language, values and institutions, and are rejecting distant and alien rule. This is an
indication of the growing importance of identity consciousness in the post-Cold
War era. Identity is used to describe a person’s sense of self and the relation of the
self to the world. It is a basic human need that provides meaning and a sense of
security as well as predictability for the individual and the group within a given
social context. Without a strong sense of “who we are” and how we can “be” and
continue to exist and feel safe in our surroundings, our relationship of the self or
group to the world is threatened. Personal identity and dignity were very important
to Gandhi. He argued that the loss of self-respect had to be avoided because
without self-respect and inner security one cannot reach the road leading to self-
realisation or start on the road to nonviolence. There are multiple identities- as
broad as ‘woman’ or ‘man’ or a member of collectives such as ethnic, religious, or
racial groups or as narrow as a member of one particular family. Identities concern
people’s existential needs and values. They can be inclusive as well as exclusive;
they can endure for generations or change with shifting situations (in response to
threats, which may be either real or perceived, forcing people to adopt labels
because identity markers such as ethnicity and religion may be exploited for selfish
ends). Some identities are more important than others depending on how one
perceives one’s identity but also depending on place, times and circumstances.
Some identities may compete with each other, as in the case of former Yugoslavia.
In the 1950s and 1960s of the former Yugoslavia, many people felt pride in having
stood up to the Soviet Union in 1948 and creating a new economic system. But the
scenario changed in the 1990s, when most people in the former Yugoslavia started.
The process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia into several small states
(such as Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) was
precipitated apart from other reasons due to large-scale ethnic killings and ‘ethnic
cleansing’. With the rise in identity consciousness, religion, language and ethnicity
are increasingly serving as faultlines for conflict. In contemporary times, ethnicity
is seen as one of the most important elements of identity and the underlying cause
of most ongoing conflicts. However, it must be clarified that many conflicts that
are labeled as ‘ethnic’, suggesting that ethnicity is the cause. In reality ethnicity has
been used there as a ‘method’ by which people have been mobilised in support of a
particular leader or movement. This happens when a group or community first
feels insecure or afraid and is then persuaded that a particular group or leader can
offer them safety.
3.14 Values
Values are dear to individuals and groups – these are the beliefs that shape their
identity and faith perspectives that give meaning to their lives. Incompatibility in
ways of life and ideologies such as preferences, principles and practices that people
believe in can lead to value conflicts. When states, groups and individuals assert
the rightness and superiority of their way of life and their political-economic
system vis-à-vis other states, groups and individuals, values can then become a
major component in such conflicts. Values are often seen as a part of one’s
identity; and thus, challenge to values is often seen as a threat to identity, resulting
in defensive reactions by individuals and groups since they assume that resolution
of the conflict will require a change in values.
We are all accustomed to disagreements. They are a part of our everyday lives. They are built
into human interactions. Nevertheless, this does not imply that every social interaction is always
entirely or even partially problematic. It also does not imply that every underlying antagonistic
relationship would be exhibited with the same level of animosity or violence.
To fully comprehend the complexities of various forms and levels of conflict, we must draw on
viewpoints from various disciplines, including Anthropology, Sociology, History, Political
Science, International Relations, and Psychoanalysis. This will provide us with an
interdisciplinary perspective on conflicts.
Scholars need to agree on the types and intensities of conflict. Many researchers have
identified various sorts of conflict. Social conflicts, intercommunity conflicts, caste conflicts,
group conflicts, interpersonal conflicts, intellectual conflicts, economic conflicts, cultural
conflicts, religious conflicts, racial or ethnic conflicts, ideological conflicts, hot and cold
conflicts, north and south conflicts, regional conflicts, international or intra-national
conflicts, and so on are all possible.
According to Dennis Sandole, a typology promotes analysis, and a typology of conflicts could
aid in conflict resolution and analysis. Furthermore, studying several conflict typologies may
reveal interconnected insights into a given conflict situation. Such insights allow an analyst
and prospective third-party intervener to view a problem from multiple perspectives,
increasing the possibility of a more effective reaction.
Quincy Wright's Classification
Quincy Wright was one of the first political scientists to study conflicts and war
comprehensively. Conflict can occur between various types of entities, according to him.
Physical conflict, political conflict, intellectual conflict, and legal conflict are his four forms
of conflict. He contrasts physical conflict, which occurs when two or more things attempt to
occupy the same place simultaneously, with political conflict, which occurs when a group
attempts to force its policy on others. He further divides these two types of conflict from
ideological conflicts, in which opposing systems of thinking or values clash, and legal disputes,
in which controversies over claims or demands are resolved through mutually agreed-upon
procedures.
He also sees war as the fifth type of conflict. For him, the war in the legal sense has been
defined by the combination of all four categories of conflict mentioned above. The physical
struggle of armies to occupy the same space, each seeking to annihilate, disarm, or capture
the other; the political struggle of nations to achieve policies against the resistance of
others; the ideological struggle of people to preserve or extend ways of life and value
systems; and the legal struggle of states to acquire titles, vindicate claims, prevent violence,
or punish offenses through recognized procedures of regulation are all manifestations of
war.
Anatol Rapoport proposed categorizing confrontations into three types: battles, games, and
arguments. Their distinguishing factors include the opponent's perception, the parties' intent,
and the rational content of the circumstance. The opponent is considered a nuisance in a
battle, the objective is to injure him, and the situation is devoid of logic. In a game, the
opponent is considered an extension of oneself, the goal is to outwit him, and the scenario is
entirely rational. Furthermore, in a dispute, the opponent is seen as essential, but differently,
the goal is to persuade him, and the situation is considered rational. Rapoport's three conflict
dynamics models can be expanded upon. He identifies three types of conflicts using the four
criteria listed below.
Initially, the premise or beginning point of the dispute differs in each of the three conflict
models. There is mutual fear or hostility between the parties in fights; there is an
agreement between the parties in games to strive for mutually incompatible goals within
the constraints of specific rules, but not where the outcome can be predicted in advance;
and there is a disagreement between the parties in debates about "what is" (facts) or "what
ought to be" (values); i.e., clashes of convictions or "outlooks."
Second, the picture of the opponent (kept by each party) differs: in conflicts, the image
maintained by each party is primarily a nuisance; ideally, the opponent should vanish or, at the
very least, be decreased in size or importance. In games, each party's vision of the opponent is
that of an essential partner, regarded as a mirror image of the self; preferably, a strong opponent
who will do everything in his power to win; and a logical entity whose inner thought processes
must be considered.
Fourth, the style of interaction varies across all three types. The form of engagement in fights is
a non-rational series of acts and reactions to the other's and one's actions; use of thrusts,
threats, violence, and so on; and the course of interaction is not dependent on the
opponent's goals. In games, the parties cooperate by adhering to the rules and doing their
best to give the greatest challenge to the opponent; actions (stratagems) are chosen based
on likely outcomes, and the interaction ends when the outcome is evident to both sides.
In debates, the sides engage in verbal interaction of arguments utilizing various persuasion
strategies such as brainwashing, explaining away the opponent's beliefs, and reducing threats
connected with adopting one's outlook in the opponent's mind.
Just as you can seek to better understand political science as a whole by breaking your
examination down to the levels of individuals, groups, institutions, and states and
international relations, one way to understand international relations and the decisions
actors make is to use levels of analysis; that is, you can choose to zoom in on a particular
aspect of the interaction. To better understand the motivations of the actors in the larger
system, it is useful to break down the analysis. In international relations, you can examine the
individual, focusing on the actions that leaders in a country take; the state, focusing on the
actions of countries; and the global system, focusing on how states interact with
international organizations, nongovernmental actors, and multinational corporations.
States create policies, such as the decision to go to war or to solve a problem through
negotiation and the creation of a treaty with the assistance of an international organization
like the United Nations, that focus on either a specific level or the way that the levels
interact with one another. Conflict occurs when the policy decisions of one state create
consequences for another state that change the environment, harming the second state or
complicating the decisions it must make.
These levels of analysis serve two purposes: they provide a foundation for understanding the
different problems states face, and they help one think about how a state’s policies can
affect the international community. The characteristics and players of each level of analysis
give a more holistic way to describe conflict.
Individual Level
The individual level of analysis focuses on the decision makers within a state and how the
constraints the state places on them affect their chosen courses of action. The rules associated
with their positions limit what leaders can do; for example, the president of the United
States has the ability to move troops but cannot formally enter a war with another country
without the consent of Congress. This limits the possible policy responses US presidents have
to choose from should they feel that the United States is being threatened. Decision makers
reliably support policies that solve problems in ways that allow them to claim credit for solutions
when they are called to account for their actions. Leaders like to be able to tout their
accomplishments in re-election campaigns. They tend to prefer policy solutions that help them
gain and keep power. In the case of the individual level of analysis, power is defined as an
individual’s ability to steer policy to create outcomes that align with that individual’s
personal beliefs and preferences.
State Level
The state level of analysis focuses on the actions of states in relation to one another. State-
to-state relations occur in the context of intergovernmental organizations and in treaties
and alliances. A state’s policy choice menu is defined by where the state sees itself and where
the state wants to go in relation to other states.
In the same way that individual political actors must play by certain rules, both the people
who live in a state and the international community expect states to uphold norms of
behavior and to meet the expectations of the power behind their institutions.
In a democracy like the United States, the state derives its legitimacy from the consent of
the people. If a state begins to act in a way that goes against what the people say they want, the
people can hold individual actors responsible and vote them out of office. The relationship
between voters and elected officials is one way to see the relationship between the
individual and state levels of analysis. In democracies, voters and those they elect form a
feedback loop in which the preferences of the voters are made tangible through the policies that
elected officials work to enact in the laws they make.
In an autocracy like North Korea, institutions are propped up by the ability of the autocrat to hold
the allegiance of the selectors needed to solidify their power. Selectors are the people that a
leader in any type of government relies on to legitimize their power and position. In a
democracy, selectors are the part of the population who can and do vote. In an autocracy, the
selectors are the people who support the leader while at the same time controlling the parts of the
country that a leader needs to legitimize their position, such as the military or the lucrative
natural resources that the state may control.
Global Level
The global—or systemic—level of analysis considers how cooperation and conflict among states
intersects with the environments in individual states to evoke change. The hallmark of this level
of analysis is the number of variables that need to be considered when trying to understand
the reasoning behind policy shifts and the ripple effect these shifts have on other countries.
For example, though India and Pakistan are not permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council and therefore, according to the terms of the United Nations Charter, are not
permitted to possess nuclear weapons, both countries have been developing and maintaining
nuclear weapons stockpiles as a high-level deterrent against the possibility that the other
country will take overtly aggressive actions. These growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons set
the stage for a situation not unlike that between the United States and the Soviet Union during
the Cold War—one of mutually assured destruction. The usual expectation of the international
community would be that states who are not supposed to be in possession of nuclear
weapons would be secretive in their development and even more secretive in their use.
Instead, India and Pakistan have chosen not to hide their nuclear stockpiles, and both
countries are fully aware of the level of conflict they must avoid to ensure they do not
provoke the other country to use its arsenal. The international community has reacted to the
nuclear buildup in India and Pakistan in a way that is markedly different from the reaction to the
nuclear buildup in North Korea. Because North Korea projects a general sense of distrust and
aggression toward most of the members of the international community and because its tests of
its nuclear stockpile are in express contravention to the wishes of the permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council, the countries of the world see North Korea’s actions as a
blatant challenge to the international system’s fine line between anarchy and order. While India
and Pakistan have made it clear that their nuclear arsenal is a tool of last resort, North
Korea does not seem to have that same level of restraint. North Korea has promised to use
its weapons whenever it feels threatened but has provided no guidelines regarding what it
perceives as a threat. Though India, Pakistan, and North Korea are all violating international
law to varying degrees, in choosing to place sanctions on North Korea but not on India or
Pakistan, the global community is choosing to punish a state that, in what the international
community perceives to be an irrational manner, seeks to threaten any and all states.
In a way, the global level of analysis is one of responsiveness rather than one of agency. A state
must first take an action, such as testifying before the United Nations Security Council, before an
international organization can respond. The anarchic nature of the international system
means that intergovernmental organizations are not able to take meaningful preventive
action to head off a state’s decision. Due to the anarchic nature of the international system,
this level of analysis is the most unpredictable. Its value lies in the way it allows a broad view
of any trends in the way events affect different states.
Levels of analysis can be used to understand how institutions make decisions. Think about each
level of analysis as a lens through which policy makers view the possible consequences of
implementing a particular solution to a problem they face. Governments can also use levels of
analysis to view how a particular situation might affect their country; each level of analysis
represents a different group of people with different wants and needs. Governments have to work
to balance the preferences and needs of each member of each level of analysis when they craft
and implement a policy.
The Cuban Missile Crisis is a classic example of how each of the three levels of analysis plays a
role in complex potential or realized international conflicts.
VIDEO
This animated clip investigates the Cuban Missile Crisis in the context of the intense unease and
brinkmanship of the Cold War and underscores just how close the United States and the Soviet
Union came to starting a nuclear war.
At the individual level of analysis, President Kennedy had to consider both his own preferences
and how his advisors would want to handle the situation. President Kennedy’s immediate circle
of advisors, known as ExComm, embodied the facets of the individual level of analysis when
they provided the president with their assessment of the crisis and offered possible solutions.
Military leaders within ExComm strove to balance their own preferences for how the United
States should project strength, favoring large shows of force and more aggressive response
measures, with their understanding of who the president was and how he perceived the world
around him. In order to get the president to support their plan over any other offered solution,
they needed to play to the president’s desire to avoid long-term engagement or escalation. It was
important to some members of ExComm to persuade the president that a more aggressive
response would lead to a more decisive American victory that would send a strong message to
Soviet leaders. These members believed that taking a strong stance would dissuade the Soviets
from taking further actions against the United States.
Figure 14.9 ExComm meets during the Cuban Missile Crisis. (credit: “National Security Council
Executive Committee” by White House Photographs/John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and
Museum, Public Domain)
At the state level, President Kennedy had to consider the actions of the Soviets in terms of the
preferences of their state—that is, their government institutions, which could override what
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev might want—in order to understand what message they hoped
the movement of missiles to Cuba would send. The United States had to be careful about what
escalation of conflict could mean in terms of potential danger to people in the United States and
in the Soviet Union. Such escalation could also set a precedent for what other states would
choose to do if placed in the same situation.
At the international, systemic level, the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in
back-channel unofficial negotiations with then Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant.
International law and norms limit what actions countries are willing to allow states to take, and
this is especially true when the potential of nuclear conflict threatens the safety of not only the
nations involved in a standoff, but also of the entire world. Secretary General Thant appealed to
the United States and the Soviet Union to think as rationally as possible and to provide each
other with the space in which to make decisions.
Beyond levels of analysis, political scientists use a variety of frameworks to help make sense of
the way states respond to the actions of other states. The chapter now turns to those frameworks.
Conventional, inter-state war has become a rare phenomenon in the post-Cold War
era. Most of the conflicts have taken place below the level of traditional conventional
war – often called ‘high-intensity conflict’ (HIC) – but above that of routine, peaceful
competition among states. Such conflicts are often referred to as “low-intensity
conflicts” (LICs). It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and
ideologies. It ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces and it is waged by
a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational and military
instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in developing countries,
but contain regional and global security ramifications. Unlike traditional war, LIC has
characteristics of an indirect impact, it is more adaptable and cheaper, and requires
considerably fewer human forces, relying on local participants. Due to stated reasons, LIC is
better adapted to causes of the conflicts in developing countries and it is there that we can find its
origins.
With the proliferation of wars connected with political and social revolution, after the Second
World War, the terms “revolutionary war”, “subversive war”, “insurrection”, and
“insurgency” became central. Whereas revolutionary war expressed a struggle for the
transformation of the political or social structures of the state, subversive war and
insurgency referred to struggles against the established authorities, usually with the help of
the people. Of the many concepts related to LICs, guerrilla warfare and small wars, in
particular, have proven survivability throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries,
including the Cold War era, though both concepts have a relatively narrow meaning and a
limited explanatory value. Guerrilla warfare focuses on the strategy used by the weak
against the strong. Guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare have become pivotal concepts since
the Second World War, particularly in the context of anti-colonialist and revolutionary
struggles. They have served as axes around which relevant types of conflict have been dealt
with, such as national liberation and revolution (often referred to as “guerrilla revolutionary
warfare”), civil war, and insurgency. The term “small war”, which is literally a translation to
English of guerrilla, emerged in the nineteenth century. It, too, referred to asymmetrical war,
but from the stronger side’s point of view. Small wars usually took place far from the
homeland and necessitated a form of military action which was different from those that
conventional forces were equipped, structured, and trained to meet. As such, the concept
anticipated much of the recent literature on low-intensity conflicts. Indeed, small war is closer to
LIC than all other concepts related to it.
Four concepts which have attracted the attention of many researchers and practitioners in the
post-Cold War era and which can be considered types of LIC are “internal
war”, “sub-national conflict/war”, “ethnic conflict” and “operations other than war”
(OOTW). “Internal war” needs no explanation. It quite explicitly refers to the shift from
wars between states to war within states that has taken place during the latter half of the
twentieth century in general. In the last decade in particular, “civil war”, a term that has
been used for many years for internal war, is still valid and often used.
“Sub-national conflict” and “ethnic conflict” both refer to the causes of conflict and
war and the actors involved, rather than the place where they occur. They concentrate
on domestic divisions, most of which are caused by the ethnic factor, especially in states
having artificial borders and, consequently, heterogeneous societies.
LICs absorb a whole spectrum of conflicts. The delineation between them is often
blurred, and combinations of types of conflict are commonplace. At different stages of
the same conflict, one may Ž and different types of LIC. For example, Afghanistan, from
1979 to 2001, has witnessed a struggle for national liberation vis-à-vis the Soviets,
insurgency vis-à-vis the pro-Soviet Afghan government, Islamic revolution against the
secular Marxist regime, and – once the Soviet forces evacuated the country and the
secular regime supported by them collapsed – a civil war between the major Islamic
factions. The problem of classification, affected by the subjectivity of those involved in
the conflict, complicates things even further. For example, what the weaker side might
define as a struggle for national liberation may be referred to by the stronger side as
insurgency.
The dynamic nature of LICs can be demonstrated by the following processes they
have undergone in the twentieth century. From an auxiliary military activity, they
became an independent phenomenon. Their stakes have slowly but consistently shifted
from national liberation to revolutions and struggles for political domination within
states, and, subsequently, from secular to religious stakes. As for strategies and tactics, LICs
have witnessed a shift from guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare to terrorism
and post-modern terrorism. The arms used in LICs by non-state actors, which in the
past were relatively primitive, have gradually become more sophisticated; at times, even
highly destructive. Finally, as far as place is concerned, most LICs have become
internal rather than external; in other words, they take place within the borders of states
and are either intra-community or inter-community conflicts.
LICs are currently the most common conflicts in the international system. Despite
their name and the inclination to portray them as less dangerous than HICs, they may
be highly intensive and inflict destruction on the peoples involved. They also threaten
the stability of the international system. Furthermore, they put the value of force as an
instrument of politics into question and might even negatively affect the future of the
nation-state.
Most of the countries in the international system are heterogeneous. Third World or
Second-Tier countries in particular feature ethnic, tribal, or religious divisions and
often suffer from contentious minorities seeking the right of self-determination and
striving for secession. In many Asian and African countries, such divisions are a result of their
artificially drawn boundaries. The state-to-nation ratio in those countries is
asymmetrical: national challenges to the existing state-system from below the level of
the state lead to strong claims, on national grounds, that there are too few states in the
particular region.
However, if one takes the view of a Third World or Second-Tier party, the so-called
LIC usually means something that is rather highly intense and destructive.
First, the conflict may often entail vital interests such as survival. Second, more
people have been killed in LICs, or “small wars”, in more than 50 years than died in the
Second World War. During the Cold War, LICs inflicted millions of casualties on
peoples involved. For the Ž first time, in the period 1975–94, intrastate war deaths
exceeded the interstate war deaths – and by a wide margin. While civilians accounted
for 10 percent of those killed during the First World War, and 52 percent of those killed
in the Second World War, they make up some 90 percent of contemporary war deaths.
Third, LICs may bring about the displacement of up to millions of people. The world
total of refugees grew from around two million in 1970 to over 16 million in 1995, with
20 to 30 million people displaced within their own national borders. In other words,
for too many people, the conflict has been a high-intensity rather than a low-intensity
one.
LICs can spread across state borders in two main processes: diffusion and escalation.
Diffusion occurs when LICs affect the stability of neighboring countries in various
ways, such as: refugees radicalizing ethnic populations abroad, rebel activities in
neighboring countries undermining state control over its territory and provoking military
clashes, hot pursuit operations and interdiction campaigns on other countries’
territory, success of insurgents or revolutionaries in one country encouraging further
spread to other countries (the so-called demonstration effect), etc. These have been typified by
the Vietnam War during the Cold War era and the cases of Rwanda and
Burundi and Kosovo in the post-Cold War era.
But there is also the danger that LICs might escalate to non-conventional confrontation. For
example, LIC in Kashmir may escalate to HIC between India and
Pakistan, which both countries wish to avoid, especially in light of their respective
nuclear capability.
It has been widely accepted that war ought to be the servant of politics. In the wars of
the past, e.g. the Napoleonic wars, the American civil war, the First World War, or the
Second World War, which were conventional, there used to be a relatively high correlation
between the military and the political achievements.
The distinctive features that separate International Armed Conflicts (IACs) from non-
international armed conflicts (NIACs) under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are the
structure and status of the parties involved, the threshold of intensity required to constitute an
armed conflict and the applicable norms.
The threshold to be met for the existence of an IAC is lower in comparison to the
requirements for classification of an NIAC (below). According to the ICRC Commentary to
the Geneva Conventions of 2016, ‘even minor skirmishes between the armed forces, be they
land, air or naval forces, would spark an international armed conflict and lead to the applicability
of humanitarian law’. This can in some cases be one shot fired or one person captured (so long as
the state has given instructions) for IHL to apply, while in other cases (e.g. a summary execution
by a secret agent sent by his government abroad), a higher level of violence is necessary.
Under the rules for IACs, persons who have a right to engage in hostilities during an armed
conflict are granted the status of ‘combatants’. Upon capture, combatants are granted protections
as POWs and immunity from prosecution for taking part in hostilities. IHL also provides
protection to POWs in the form of minimum conditions of detention and humane treatment while
in custody of enemy forces.
Historically, NIACs – also referred to as ‘civil wars’ – were internal matters for states to
which no international laws applied. This was changed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II (AP II), which governs all conflicts that are ‘not of
an international character’. This can take the form of armed hostilities between a State
party against a non-state group on its own territory, or between two or more non-state
groups.
Article 1(2) of AP II specifies that it does not apply to situations such as internal disturbances
and tensions, riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature. If a
situation involving armed hostilities does not meet the requirements of a NIAC, it will be subject
only to national laws of the state in whose territory it is taking place and overall international
human rights norms. In order to distinguish an armed conflict from less severe forms of
violence or internal disturbances, Common Article 3 requires a certain threshold to be met.
First, the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity e.g. the state party resorts to using
military force, as opposed to regular police action. The ICTY has provided several indicators
upon which reliance could be placed to enable a determination regarding the intensity of the
fighting such as the number, duration, and intensity of armed confrontations, whether the
fighting is widespread, and the types of weapons and equipment used. Second, the non-state
groups must be organised to an extent that they may constitute a “party to the conflict”.
Organisation is determined by factors such as whether the forces follow a command structure
and have the capacity to sustain military operations.
The difference in scope between Common Article 3 and the definition of a NIAC under
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II is that the latter adds the requirement that the organised
armed group be under a responsible command and exercise control over a territory which
allows them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. Moreover, the
conflicts to which Additional Protocol II applies are between a State party and a non-state actor,
whereas Common Article 3 can apply to NIACs between two groups of non-state actors within
the territory of a State party to the Geneva Conventions.
A striking difference between the law on IACs and NIACs is the absence of ‘combatant’
status in the latter; there are no defined rights and obligations for those taking active part
in hostilities in a NIAC. There is also no special status, such as that of Prisoner of War, for
those captured by the other party to the conflict. Common Article 3 and Article 5 of AP II do,
however, provide that persons deprived of liberty for reasons related to the conflict must be
treated humanely in all circumstances. In particular, they are protected from murder, torture, as
well as cruel, humiliating or degrading treatment.
The government of Pakistan is involved in non-international armed conflicts with various armed
groups acting throughout its territory, particularly Taliban-affiliated groups in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and independence fighters in Balochistan.
Overview
There are multiple and overlapping armed conflicts in Pakistan. The conflicts have also spilled
over into Afghanistan.
• In 2002, Pakistan began conducting military operations against foreign fighters hiding in its
tribal areas. In response to these attacks, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan group (TTP)
formed out of veterans of armed conflicts in neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan,
and local Pakistani militants.
• In 2004, Pakistan began launching military offensives against fighters believed to be
affiliated to al-Qaeda in the tribal areas near its Afghan border. The United
States simultaneously began targeting suspected al-Qaeda members in the same area through
drone strikes. Further offensives were launched in subsequent years. In 2014, Pakistan
launched a ‘counter-terrorism’ operation, Zarb-e-Azb, against various non-state armed
groups.
• In parallel, armed groups are fighting the government over independence of the province of
Balochistan.
Classification
Two criteria need to be assessed in order to answer the question whether a situation of armed
violence amounts to a non-international armed conflict.
• First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond
internal disturbances and tensions.
• Second, in every non-international armed conflict, at least one side to the conflict must be a
non-state armed group which must exhibit a certain level of organization in order to qualify
as a party to the non-international armed conflict. Government forces are presumed to satisfy
the criteria of organization.
Intensity of violence
Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required
intensity threshold, such as the number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the
types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces
participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the
number of civilians fleeing; and the involvement of the United Nations Security Council.
Attacks in Pakistan are claimed by a variety of armed groups such as the Balochistan
Liberation Army, the Khorasan Branch of the Islamic State group (IS-K), Jamaat-ur-
Ahrar , or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
The Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an umbrella group reuniting some of these groups
and cooperating with others. Despite being a relatively loose structure composed of various
smaller armed groups, the TTP reportedly has an official common leadership, a central
spokesperson and a common public relations policy. However, this structure has at times been
called into question by internal division, fracturing and voluntary surrenders of high ranking
members. Still, attacks continue being carried out in the name of the TTP. The TTP have claimed
or carried out some of the most notorious and large-scale attacks, such as the Peshawar school
attack in 2014, the attack at Bacha Khan University, and the Karachi airport attack, which
illustrates their operational capacity.
At times, the TTP has controlled territory in Pakistan’s tribal areas. It has been controlling the
Swat Valley for a number of years. Reportedly, the TTP created both underground tunnel
systems and IED-preparation factories. The TTP has claimed responsibility for attacks in
neighbouring countries, such as a 2009 attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan.
The TTP’s organisational structure is further illustrated by its ability to enter peace talks with the
Pakistani government. Moreover, it gives interviews to media. It has released videos showing its
armed activities.
Some fractions have broken away from the TTP, such as Jamaat-e-Ahrar (or Jamaat-ul-Ahrar),
who took over some of the TTP structure. They have carried out a considerable number of
attacks, including some of the deadliest attacks in recent years. Other high-level attacks are being
attributed to the group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
A number of different groups are operating in Pakistan and their relationships are not always
clear. Shifting alliances and affiliations, in-fighting and collaborations have been reported. The
Haqqani Network, for instance, has both been reported to fight alongside the TTP, but also for
the Pakistani government and the Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda appears to have strong links with
the TTP, but the exact degree of involvement is difficult to ascertain. Similarly, Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi has been reported to have ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group.
Two issues are raised by the U.S. drone strikes for the classification of armed conflicts.
First, the question arises whether carrying out drone strikes on Pakistani territory without
the Pakistani government’s consent leads to an international armed conflict. While the U.S.
intervention generally seems to be tolerated by Pakistan, at times the Pakistani government has
objected to it or called it a violation of the state’s sovereignty, especially for strikes outside the
tribal areas. However, according to some reports, the Pakistani government only publicly objects
to the drone strikes, but privately acquiesces to them or even cooperates. The Pakistani position
is inconsistent over time and among different government entities. Neither the U.S. nor
Pakistan seems to consider that the strikes have triggered a conflict between the two states.
While the ambiguous attitude of Pakistan on the drone strikes exemplarily illustrates the
difficulty and sensitivity of establishing consent in some situations, overall there appears to be
some form of consent.