From Nehru to Rajiv: India’s Foreign Policy Fiascos in the

Neighbourhood
Introduction
The Indian National Congress (INC) inherited, by default, the
reins of power from the British in 1947. In their 55-year rule, the
Congress governments have made several strategic mistakes in the
management of India’s relations. Every so often, it failed to take a
nation-centric approach in the conduct of foreign policy with
neighboring states. The combined weight of these mistakes resulted
in several wars with Pakistan, aggression, and illegal intrusions by
China. More significantly, the foreign policy fallacies of the Congress
leadership resulted in the illegal acquisition of Indian territories by
Pakistan and China. 78,000 sq. kms of Indian Territory in Jammu and
Kashmir, colloquially known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), is
under illegal occupation by Pakistan, and thirty-eight thousand
square kilometers of the Aksai Chin region in the Union Territory of
Ladakh are under Chinese occupation.1

Figure 1: Map shows border disputes between China and India (Image Source: Reuters)

1
https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/lu2722_new.pdf

1
 These strategic mistakes have jeopardized our territorial
integrity. For instance, the whole of the Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh in the Northeast region of the country is now claimed by
China (Figure 1). Jawahar Lal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister from 1947
to 64, refused to accept American support to strengthen Tibet and
later withhold support in the United Nations (UN) for
internationalizing the Tibetan appeal against a looming Chinese
attack.2 Nehru’s inept and inefficient conduct of foreign relations with
Beijing, eventually led China to assert its national sovereignty over
the Tibetan region in 1951. Had Nehru been competent, Tibet would
have been able to preserve its de-facto independence and act as a
buffer between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of
India.
Therefore, a deeper understanding of the external threats to
our border defence and risks to our internal security from our
neighbours, requires that we bring out the foreign policy blunders
committed by various governments in the past. This paper brings to
public domain the foreign policy fiascos of the various governments
committed in the past involving Congress and other opposition
parties.
It is important for at least two reasons. First, it will expose
Congress and other opposition parties. In order to gain political
mileage, opposition, especially Congress have been accusing
Narendra Modi government of mismanagement that led to “full-
blown crisis” at the India- China border after the Galwan Valley
Clashes in May 2020 and subsequent standoff thereafter between
the armed forces of the two countries.3 This paper will serve as a

2
Francine R. Frankel, “Different Worlds,” in When Nehru Looked East Origins of India-US Suspicion and India-
China Rivalry (Oxford University Press, 2020), 102–41, https://www.scribd.com/document/482443371/When-
Nehru-Looked-East-Origins-of-India-US-Suspicion-and-India-China-Rivalry-Modern-South-Asia-pdf.
3
“Indo-China Clash a ‘Full-Blown Crisis’ due to Govt’s Inefficiency: Sonia Gandhi,” inkl, June 23, 2020,
https://www.inkl.com/news/indo-china-clash-a-full-blown-crisis-due-to-govt-s-inefficiency-sonia-gandhi.

2
foundation to the Indian public and commentators to comprehend
the challenges to the defence of our borders, arose because of
foreign policy blunders committed by Congress and other opposition
parties in the past.
Second, this paper will serve as a guide for the Indian public,
empowering them with the critical skills needed to distinguish
between misleading narratives and disinformation campaigns
orchestrated by opposition parties. the opposition false accusations
of China encroaching India territory are demoralizing for the Indian
Army which has given a befitting reply to the Chinese military and has
forced PLA forces to return back to their post. 4 Not only opposition
accusations are misleading, they are disinformation campaign against
Prime Minister Narendra Modi resolve to preserve territorial integrity
of a country whose interests Congress and other opposition parties
have manipulated for partisan and personal interest.
Nehru Fancy and Romantic Vision About Neighbours
The first decade or so after India’s independence was a
formative period for Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian relationship that set
the tone for many decades to follow. However, Nehru, who was his
own Foreign Minister was given by flights of fancy and romantic
visions about neighbours. Jawahar Lal Nehru handling of Pakistan, as
well as China, are his two egregious foreign policy blunders. Even
after a passage of more than six decades it has been difficult to
obliterate or rectify the negative impact of past decisions and
strategies adopted by him.
Placating Pakistan
Pakistani tribals, supported in large numbers by Pakistan army,
invaded Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in October 1947. In the battles that
followed, the Indian army repulsed the attack, forcing the invaders to

4
https://www.livemint.com/news/india/rahul-gandhis-claims-on-india-china-border-dispute-is-incorrect-says-
army-veteran-india-has-lost-land-since-1950-11692675060221.html

3
vacate some of the area they had occupied. Yet, a large portion of
J&K continued to be under Pakistan’s occupation, which is now
administered by Pakistan and oft referred as Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK).
The United States (US) and the erstwhile Soviet Union were
sympathetic to the Indian view that Pakistan was the aggressor. But
United Kingdom (UK), the erstwhile colonial power, chose to side
with Pakistan. Ironically, it was under the British pressure, articulated
by the Governor General Mountbatten, that Nehru, the Prime
Minister of a sovereign, independent country, decided to take the
matter to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) when the Indian
army was winning the battles.5 Had it been given free hand Indian
army would have pushed the Pakistani invaders out of the entire
territory of J&K.
To India’s misfortune, Nehru appealed to the UNSC and went
for a ceasefire. It was both unnecessary and uncalled for. The Indian
Army had defeated the Pakistanis, but here the Indian Prime Minister
was defeating his own armed forces. It is the result of Nehru’s
romantic vision about Islamabad as he was ‘Placating Pakistan’ that
only 55% of Kashmir is now with India.
To make matters worse for our Armed forces and security
agencies, Pakistan ceded the Yarkand River and Shaksgam Valley, part
of the illegally occupied territories by Islamabad, to China in 1963
and helped build the Karakoram Highway.6 In fact, it is one of the
major reasons why India doesn’t support Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). One of the parts of the project, the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), passes through the Indian territories

5
Rajiv Dogra, “Nehru Going to UN on Kashmir Was an Error. And He Knew It,” The Print, August 27, 2020,
https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/nehru-going-to-un-on-kashmir-was-an-error/490062/.
6
Mandip Singh, “Brijesh P Asked: Why Did Pakistan and under What Terms and Conditions Cede the Shaksgam
Valley to China? What Is the Geo-Strategic Significance of the Valley? | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses,” idsa.in, December 27, 2012, https://idsa.in/askanexpert/ShaksgamValleytoChina.

4
occupied illegally by Pakistan.7 This arm of the BRI project that links
mainland China to the Arabian Sea runs from Kashgar in China’s
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to Gwadar Port in southwestern
Baluchistan in Pakistan.
Why Nehru was in a rush to the UN? These questions have
been asked by, but more in remorse or anger and rightly so.
Sometimes, the blame is shifted conveniently to Mountbatten. It is
true that he was the evil spirit goading Nehru to make the reference
to the UN, but Nehru was not a novice.8 He had spent a lifetime
dealing with the British and observing their devious ways. Surely, as a
statesman, he should have known that the world body could be a
snake pit and that once anyone has placed itself at its mercy, there
would be diverse pulls and pressures. Yet, he experimented with the
vital national interests in an attempt to immortalized his legacy.
Hesitancy in Dealing with China
An important aspect of foreign policy fiasco that has grabbed
less attention than it deserves by political commentators and
policymakers alike is the Jawahar Lal Nehru sacrifice of Tibet. Tibet
was annexed by China in October, 1951. Had Nehru showed resolve,
Tibet would have been a buffer and a safety valve to cover Eastern
and Northeast states of India and for the airborne assault and
occupation of our territory. Thus, it was in India's strategic interest to
prevent the military occupation of the Tibetan plateau. 9 However,
once the Panchasheel agreement was signed by Nehru with China in
1954, New Delhi recognised the end of Tibet's autonomy.
Tibet, whose autonomy had been supported by the British since
1912 had acted as a buffer against Chinese aggression across the
7
Tanvi Madan, “What India Thinks about China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (but Doesn’t Explicitly Say),”
Brookings, March 14, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-india-thinks-about-chinas-one-belt-one-
road-initiative-but-doesnt-explicitly-say/.
8
Rajiv Dogra, “Nehru Going to UN on Kashmir Was an Error. And He Knew It,” The Print, August 27, 2020,
https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/nehru-going-to-un-on-kashmir-was-an-error/490062/.
9
JK, “Inviting an Invasion: Jawaharlal Nehru’s Tibetan Blunder,” The Dharma Dispatch, June 22, 2020,
https://www.dharmadispatch.in/commentary/inviting-an-invasion-jawaharlal-nehrus-tibetan-blunder.

5
Assam Himalayas. The Tibetans had enjoyed de facto independence
under the Dalai Lama for more than thirty- five years after the
collapse of Chinese imperial rule in 1912. 10 In fact, the 1914 tripartite
Shimla conference of Britain, China, and Tibet, the Chinese, though
grudgingly, accepted the British position that Tibet could not be
incorporated as a province of China which Nehru foreign policy fiasco
changed.11
During the 1950s, friendship with China became India’s
foremost foreign policy priority in whose pursuit Nehru totally
overlooked historically important played role Tibet has played in
India’s border security.
When Chinese troops advanced to Tibet in October 1950, Lhasa
wanted to appeal to the United Nations. Since it was not a member
of the United Nations, it asked India for support. India’s decision to
refuse American support to strengthen Tibet and then to withhold
support in the United Nations (UN) for internationalizing the Tibetan
appeal against a looming Chinese attack, directly resulted in coerced
talks between Tibet and China.
Instead, India asked Lhasa to talk directly to the UN. The
country which had the courage to sponsor Lhasa was El Salvador.
India, meanwhile, influenced Britain and made sure that this issue
did not pop up in the General Assembly. 12 The outcome was that
Tibet lost its autonomy and, for the first time, accepted its place as
part of China. When China attacked Tibet in 1950, Nehru forgot all his
anti-imperialistic speeches. Nehru’s acquiescence in China’s
“peaceful liberation” of Tibet put into question the credibility of its

10
“Milestones: 1899–1913 - Office of the Historian,” history.state.gov, accessed November 16, 2023,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/chinese-rev#:~:text=In%20October%20of%201911%2C%20a.
11
Francine R. Frankel, “Different Worlds,” in When Nehru Looked East Origins of India-US Suspicion and India-
China Rivalry (Oxford University Press, 2020), 102–41, https://www.scribd.com/document/482443371/When-
Nehru-Looked-East-Origins-of-India-US-Suspicion-and-India-China-Rivalry-Modern-South-Asia-pdf.
12
“Facts about the 17-Point "Agreement’’ between Tibet and China DIIR PUBLICATIONS” (Dharamsala: DIIR
Publications, May 22, 2022), https://tibet.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/FACTS-ABOUT-17-POINT-
AGREEMENT..pdf.

6
professed commitment to “right means” and respect for law evoked
to rationalize his nonalignment position.
Nehru even ignored the opposite counsel of his deputy prime
minister, Saradar Vallabhai Patel, against “precipitate unilateral action
on recognition of Tibet as part of the People Republic of China”
which was uncertain to ensure goodwill but might land India in a
situation from which it would be impossible to retrace steps.13
Moreover, India extended recognition without reference to its
inherited treaty rights, the most important of which, the settlement
of the India- Tibet frontier known as the McMahon Line had been
signed by plenipotentiaries of an autonomous Tibetan government
and of the British government during the Simla conference in 1914.14
This omission of India’s treaty rights signalled that Nehru was
scared of China and was not prepared to openly confront Beijing’s
aggressive claims of sovereignty over Tibet, which the British had
refused to recognize from 1904 once China’s inability to enforce its
will on the Tibetans revealed the fictional nature of its claim.15
Today, India is facing China intrusion and the two armies are
increasingly facing off each other because Tibet is no longer a "buffer
zone." However, there was never incursion in '1930s and '1940s
because India and China were never next to each other. Tibet always
served as the buffer zone. The 3,500 kilometres of border that we
have with, China has always been the threat, so hence the border
dispute. Pre-1949 there was hardly even a policeman on the border.
There was no need for one. Now, the military build-up that is going
on and the billions of dollars India has to spend on its border security,
which could rather be spend on other humanitarian or educational
projects.
13
Francine R. Frankel, “Different Worlds,” in When Nehru Looked East Origins of India-US Suspicion and India-
China Rivalry (Oxford University Press, 2020), 102–41, https://www.scribd.com/document/482443371/When-
Nehru-Looked-East-Origins-of-India-US-Suspicion-and-India-China-Rivalry-Modern-South-Asia-pdf.
14
Francine R. Frankel, “Different Worlds.”
15
Francine R. Frankel.

7
 Nehru, not only scared of China, was its admirer too. Jawaharlal
Nehru was more concerned about China's membership into the UN
Security Council than the existence of Tibet as an independent
sovereign nation. On October 7, 1950, the Chinese attack on Tibet
started. However, on October 21, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Chou
En-Lai, the Chinese Premier, emphasising the need for a peaceful
settlement of the Sino-Tibetan problem. 16 It was not because Nehru
was concerned about Tibet but because it would be detrimental to
China's admission to the UN Security Council. The letter emphasised
that the timing was bad:
“In Tibet there is not likely to be any serious military opposition, and
any delay in settling the matter will, therefore, not affect Chinese
interests or a suitable final settlement. The Government of India's
interest in the matter is only to see that the admission of the Peoples'
Government to the United Nations is not again postponed due to
causes which could be avoided”.17
Nehru’s refusal to accept a US offer in 1955 of a permanent seat
in the UN Security Council, till then held by Taiwan is another, glaring
instance of Nehru unconcern for the India’s own strategic interests.
Congress leadership even though uncertain about how far India could
succeed in the effort to create a friendly relationship with China,
rejected the US suggestion. Nehru insisted that the seat be given to
Beijing.18
India has ever since been unsuccessfully lobbying for the seat,
with China vetoing India’s nomination, year after year. All this could
have been avoided with a little pragmatism and farsightedness on the
part of Nehru.

16
Werner Levi, “Tibet under Chinese Communist Rule,” Far Eastern Survey 23, no. 1 (January 1, 1954): 1–9,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3024669.
17
Melvyn Goldstein, “Tibet: After the Fall of Chamdo,” The Tibet Journal 16, no. 1 (1991): 58–95,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43302217.
18
Claude Arpi, “China Visit and after – Undoing Nehru’s Folly,” Indian Defence Review, May 22, 2015,
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/china-visit-and-after-undoing-nehrus-folly/.

8
Suspicious of the Changing Geopolitical Realities: Lack of Defence
Preparation
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was not inclined to building up of the
armed forces that would protect the sovereignty of the nation. The
dominant impulse among Congress leadership was that India’s
security would be bolstered not only by its natural frontiers but also
by its professions of peace and neutrality in the emerging world
order.19
Nehru was never comfortable with the armed forces. His
political indoctrination had instilled in him a desire to downgrade
India’s officer cadre rather than tap their leadership potential and
assimilate them into the machinery of government. In fact, when
Mountbatten suggested that there be a powerful chief of defence
staff, Nehru turned down the suggestion.20 This in turn created a
vacuum in the decision-making chain, into which the civil servants
stepped and taking important military decisions that they were not
equipped to handle. To make matters worse, Nehru, had a deep-
seated paranoia about the army. A week into his new government, he
walked over to the defence ministry and was furious to find military
officers working there as they do in every defence ministry in the
world). Since then, all armed service personnel work in New Delhi’s
‘South Block’ wear civilian clothes.21
Nehru’s did not take adequate steps for the development of
defence industrial bases that left India dependent on external
sources for crucial arms and ammunitions. Such dependence became
a source of embarrassment for the country which in moments of

19
Vinod Anand, “Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand” (Vivekananda International Foundation, March 2014),
https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/nehru-era-s-defence-and-security-policies-and-their-legacy.pdf.
20
Varun Ramesh Balan , “A History of the Demand for a Chief of Defence Staff,” The Week, August 15, 2019,
https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2019/08/15/a-history-of-the-demand-for-a-chief-of-defence-staff.html.
21
Fareed Zakaria, Journalist, The Post-American World (2023; repr., London: Penguin Books, 2011).

9
crisis had to reach out to friendly foreign nations with a list of
emergency procurements.
As a matter of fact, the security of arms supply would have
guaranteed steady flow of arms and spare parts for use in times of
need. With the possibility of a collusive, two-front war with Pakistan
and China being very much part of India’s defence planning since
independence, indigenous production of arms was the surest way of
defending the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
To cover up for the shortfall of arms India then had to look to
improve its security of supply by diversifying its supplier base. That
option, however, would have its own pitfalls as India became a victim
of arms embargoes, especially those imposed by the US which
suddenly decided to stop arms supply after the 1965 War and 1998
nuclear test.22
All this shows that Nehru, in conduct of foreign relations was
hesitant, overly-cautious and suspicious of the changing geopolitical
realities (which underscores his elitist mindset). His posture of a
moralist was ineffective for a country surrounded by interest-seeking,
power-maximizing nation-states. He failed to coordinate security with
foreign policy and India had to fight several wars with Pakistan and
China without any conclusive resolution of the problems.
Will the opposition, especially Congress, accept the debacle
that Nehru created for future generations of India and the human
and political cost of his faux pas in conduct of foreign relations they
had to pay. Sonia Gandhi argues that it was mishandling by the
Narendra Modi government to be reason behind the crisis at the
Sino-Indian border. However, history tells us that it was Nehru’s
fiascos responsible for threat on our Northern frontiers.
Missed Opportunity

22
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-state-of-indias-public-sector-defence-industry/

10
 India’s lack of defence preparation and humiliating defeat in
1962 War with China under Nehru made it vulnerable vis-à-vis
Pakistan. This debacle set in motion forces that prepared the ground
for the 1965 War. With Nehru removed from the scene after his
death in 1964, the probability of war increased. The replacement of
Nehru by Shastri (perceived to be less assertive by Pakistan)
reinforced the perception of Indian vulnerability.
On the Pakistan side the famous threat of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's
“thousand-year war against India” on the floor of the UNSC and the
statement of the British delegate, Sir Patrick Dean, stating the British
case for self-determination in Kashmir, had created an expectation
that in the event of war, the West will not intervene in favour of
India. On the American side there was intense annoyance of U.S.
President Johnson at what he perceived to be Nehru's high profile
moral posturing rhetoric coupled with the repeated requests from
India for ever-increasing quantities of food-aid. 23
Pakistan was also successful in sealing an alliance with China
was sealed with the 1963 Sino-Pak treaty, which ceded part of
Pakistani-occupied Kashmir to China and helped build the Karakoram
High creating a direct road link between Pakistan and China.
Moreover, U.S.-Pak relations were in a good functioning order, with a
steady supply of American arms and training for Pakistani military. 24
Fortunately for India, the U.S. did not intervene the way Pakistan had
anticipated.
The conflict began following Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar,
which was designed to infiltrate forces into the Indian State of
Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against legitimate
Indian rule. Indian Armed forces retaliated by launching a full-scale
military attack on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day war caused

23
Subrata K. Mitra, “Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned: Contradiction and Coherence in India’s Foreign Policy,”
India Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2009): 24, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45072910.
24
Subrata K. Mitra, “Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned.”

11
thousands of causalities on both sides and witnessed largest
engagement of armed vehicles and the largest tank battles since
World War II.25
But in the end, there were no clear winners of 1965 War, both
countries went for the ceasefire and signed the Tashkent Agreement.
In terms of the Agreement, India returned the Haji Pir Pass, which
had been won from Pakistan. All that Pakistan did to reciprocate was
to promise an end to the hostilities. It did not even keep this promise.
This dealt a heavy blow to our diplomacy.
The Indian Army had captured the Haji Pir Pass which overlooks
Pakistan occupied Kashmir. But as a result of the negotiations in
Tashkent between India and Pakistan, New Delhi did not insist on
Pakistan vacating Chhamb, the town holds great strategic value. 26 As
a result, even today Chhamb is with Pakistan.
Haji Pir Pass was strategically very important. If we had
retained that post that we had captured, things could have been
different. By returning the Pass or not subsequently regaining it, India
lost a strategic advantage. From the outcome of the war a lesson
should have been learnt that if one start losing the gains of war at
the negotiating table, they become a disincentive for future wars. As
late Lieutenant General Dayal, the hero of the Battle for Haji Pir,
subsequently said, “The Pass would have given India a definite
strategic advantage. It was a mistake to hand it back. Our people
don’t read maps”.27
Unfortunately, Congress leadership would not learn this lesson
and the nation and future generations had to pay the price. The
majority of infiltrations by terrorists from Pakistan into Kashmir
continues to happen from this area to the present day. Had the pass
25
osprey.com, “M48 Patton vs Centurion,” Osprey Publishing, January 20, 2016,
https://www.ospreypublishing.com/uk/m48-patton-vs-centurion-9781472810922/.
26
Agha Humayun Amin, “The Battle of Chamb-1971,” web.archive.org, August 29, 2000,
https://web.archive.org/web/20000829175714/http://www.defencejournal.com:80/sept99/chamb.htm.
27
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/comment/return-of-haji-pir-still-haunts-us-287239

12
been held by us, the distance from Jammu to Srinagar through
Poonch and Uri would have been reduced by over 200 Kms.28
Indira Doctrine: more rhetoric than reality
Indira Gandhi succeeded Shastri after his sudden death just
after he had signed the Tashkent agreement with Pakistan in 1966. A
set of foreign policy principles were authored by Indira Gandhi (Indira
Doctrine) to coordinate security with foreign policy. It centred on
dissuading the influence of external countries within South Asia that
have either implicit or explicit anti-Indian agendas, primarily via the
deployment of India’s military forces as both a deterrent and an
interventionist foreign-policy tool.29
However, this doctrine was more rhetoric than reality. Not only
Indira Gandhi failed to convert India’s victory in the 1971 war into a
durable peace with Pakistan, the attempt to work out a sphere of
influence, that would bring the whole of South Asia under Indian
sphere of influence, safeguarding and furthering India’s national
interest, did not achieve success. It did not alleviate security situation
India faced from its neighbours.
A major domestic crisis emerged on the scene in East Pakistan
with the general elections in which the Awami League swept polls
and won an overall majority in Pakistan's national assembly and
staked claim to form the government, generating a regime crisis and
a confrontation between East and West Pakistan. On 25 March 1971,
an army of 40,000 West Pakistani soldiers descended on East
Pakistan, unleashing a systematic reign of terror. The leader of the
Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and airlifted to

28
Palki Sharma, “Operation Gibraltar: The Day When Pakistan Infiltrated Deep within India through Haji Pir
Pass,” WION, August 28, 2020, https://www.wionews.com/india-news/operation-gibraltar-the-day-when-
pakistan-infiltrated-deep-within-india-through-haji-pir-pass-323788.
29
https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191848117.001.0001/acref-9780191848117-
e-118

13
a jail in West Pakistan. The reign of terror unleashed by the Pakistani
army created a massive flight of refugees to India.30
In the event, when India entered the War in East Pakistan to
fight the Pakistani army jointly with the Bangladeshi Freedom
Fighters, the US-Pakistan-China axis swung into action, putting India
under pressure to restrain Bangladeshi freedom fighters while
manoeuvring to get the UN to send observers to East Pakistan. At this
junction the USSR came to India’s rescue, blocking U.S. and China on
the Security Council by applying the veto and balancing the American
seventh fleet.31 This gesture of Moscow still reverberates among
Indian masses, evident during the ongoing debate on India’s neutral
stand in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia War.
Although, in military terms, the war was a complete victory for,
the Simla Agreement that we had with Pakistan at the end of the
1971 War, culminating in the liberation of Bangladesh, brought to the
fore another bungling at the negotiating table by the Congress
leadership. The Agreement called for, among other things, the
exchange of POWs between the two countries. Whereas India
returned all the 93,000 Pakistani POWs, Pakistan reneged on its
commitment and returned only 617 Indian POWs, holding back 54,
who are still languishing in Pakistani jails, if alive. 32 The territory in
the Western front - which the India army had brought under its
control - was transferred back to Pakistan, without extracting any
commitment from Islamabad, which would give a semblance of
permanence to the Line of Control and secure a lasting solution to
the Kashmir dispute. 33

30
Subrata K. Mitra, “Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned: Contradiction and Coherence in India’s Foreign Policy,”
India Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2009): 26, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45072910
31
Ashley J. Tellis, “‘What Is in Our Interest’: India and the Ukraine War,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, April 25, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/what-is-in-our-interest-india-and-ukraine-
war-pub-86961.
32
Soutik Biswas, “The Mystery of India’s ‘Missing 54’ Soldiers,” BBC News, January 26, 2020, sec. India,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51191199.
33
Sukhwant Singh, “1971: Assessment of Campaign in the Western Sector,” Indian Defence Review, April 22,
2020, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/1971-assessment-of-campaign-in-the-western-sector/.

14
 However, at home, Indira Gandhi like Shastri nationalized the
Kashmir issue. Congress leadership reaped great electoral dividends
on the military success of our armed forces for Congress in terms of
important victory in the regional assemblies.34
In the end, no lasting agreements with Pakistan could be
secured and India under Indira leadership allowed Bhutto, to play his
limited cards masterfully. Indira Gandhi was embroiled in domestic
politics, leading to the declaration of a state of Emergency in 1975
and her subsequent ouster from power in 1977. The price of Mrs.
Gandhi old politics of manipulation for partisan and personal reasons
was paid by India.
The rump state of Pakistan was able to regroup its forces
swiftly, maintained its pivotal role between the US and China, and
was able to secure support from both. In fact, within two years of the
Simla Agreement, Pakistan was busy mobilizing support within the
UN and among Islamic countries to its claims to Kashmir and was
engaged in buying arms from the US. Moreover, when the US and
USSR got engaged in Afghanistan, Pakistan became the beneficiary of
massive American aid.35
Further, the neighbours took the initiative to launch the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, to
decrease India’s influence in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region. 36 It
ceased, an attempt by India to create a sphere of influence that
would bring the whole of South Asia under New Delhi’s leadership. It
would have made India a dominating player in regional politics and
providing a safety-net to our interest.
Rajiv Gandhi’s Island Nation Adventures: An Embarrassment to
India Foreign Policy.
34
Subrata K. Mitra, “Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned: Contradiction and Coherence in India’s Foreign Policy,”
India Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2009): 26, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45072910
35
Subrata K. Mitra, “Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned: Contradiction and Coherence in India’s Foreign Policy,”
India Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2009): 26, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45072910
36
Subrata K. Mitra, “Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned.”

15
 Ranjiv Gandhi, who came into politics purely due to Indira
Gandhi and was certainly an accidental PM due to the sudden death
of her mother, lacked any experience in foreign affairs. He failed to
provide country a cohesive foreign policy.
Rajiv Gandhi, tainted by allegations of kickbacks in Bofors Deal, sent
Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) to Sri Lanka in order to mediate
between the Lankan state and LTTE or Tamil Tigers. The IPKF instead
of helping the Tamils ended up fighting them and the debacle ended
when our forces had to come back unaccomplished in 1989.
What actually happened:
In 1984, upon taking up office as Prime Minister, Rajiv
expressed concern at the deteriorating ethnic situation in Sri Lanka,
but stated that India did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of
Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government agreed to undertake secret
talks with Tamil 'terrorists' but by early 1987, there had been still no
progress in negotiations. Moreover, the steady flow of Tamil refugees
into India (similar to the developments in East Pakistan in 1971) had
put pressure on the government for a credible reaction. 37 In the
meanwhile, Sri Lanka imposed a military blockade of the Jaffna
peninsula, a region in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. India air
dropped food to Jaffna violating Sri Lanka's air space.38
Then Sri Lankan PM Jayewardene invited India to resolve the
Tamil armed insurgencies and the uprising in Jaffna. Rajiv Gandhi
visited Colombo and signed the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, 1987, specified the conditions
needed to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, under
this agreement was to recognize Tamil as the official language, lift the
state of emergency, not to search for military help from any other
country. India was to ensure that Indian territory was not used for
37
https://mealib.nic.in/?2513?000#IIN
38
“Chapter 1 : Operation Poomalai – the Jaffna Food Drop – Bharat Rakshak,” Bharat Rakshak, October 5, 2009,
https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1987ipkf/chapter01/.

16
activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and sovereignty of Sri
Lanka, and to provide military assistance in implementing the
accord.39 The Tamil Tiger leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was not a
party to the accord.

Figure 2: India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) was signed by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and
President Junius Jayawardene on 29 July, 1987 (Image Source: Colombo Telegraph)

Accordingly, Indian troops (organized as the Indian Peace

Keeping Force (IPKF) which eventually grew to 100,000 troops strong)
were airlifted to Sri Lanka.40 IPKF primary responsibility was to
reconcile between the Tamils & Lankans. However, the force was sent
without proper training on diplomacy or clear instructions. It is
undisputed that soldier’s require well-defined task and the means to
carry them out. However, both were missing in case of the IPKF. It
was ill equipped with no proper maps or logistics and a little backing
by intelligence. There was no clarity to Indian military commanders
on the ground about their mandate. They were thrown into a conflict
without any thought-out planning.41
On the other hand, the LTTE was getting support from the
Indian Tamils, backed by local Tamil Nadu politicians. However, the
IPKF didn't intervene in it due to domestic politics of the Congress.
General Elections due in India in 1988, and Prime Minister Rajiv

39
“Indo-Lanka Accord,” July 29, 1987, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN
%20LK_870729_Indo-Lanka%20Accord.pdf.
40
Reuters Staff, “Factbox-India’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” Reuters, October 17, 2008, sec. Asia Crisis,
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUKCOL223047.
41
https://www.outlookindia.com/national/why-rajiv-gandhi-sent-military-to-sri-lanka-and-how-ltte-played-
both-sides-news-240574

17
Gandhi was concerned about his party’s election prospects in Tamil
Nadu.42
The Tamil Tigers themselves welcomed the IPKF as a short-term
respite from the Sri Lankan Army. The Tamil Tigers were only biding
their time and once they thought the time was ripe, they turned
against the IPKF. So, eventually the IPKF, unprepared, without any
guidance and ill-equipped, entered into armed conflict with the LTTE
and 1200 of our forces were martyred, while several thousand got
injured.43
Fresh elections in Sri Lanka brought the Sinhala nationalist
Government of Premadasa, which was strongly anti-Indian. Due to
the failure of the mission, PM Ranasinghe Premadasa, to India’s
embarrassment, asked New Delhi to abandon the accord and pull
back its forces in 1989.
To summarize, Rajiv Gandhi move was deeply flawed because
there was no consensus in the perception of the mission by the key
players. Indian policy was dictated by the double commitment to the
peaceful resolution of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka - a process to be
brokered by India and not any other extra-regional force. The
commitment of the Sri Lankan government was limited to the using
of the IPKF to counterbalance the Tamil Tigers, but not necessarily to
a genuine federal power-sharing as in India.
There was no coherence in India’s policy. MGR (then Tamil Nadu
chief minister MG Ramachandran) had his own Tamil Nadu policy,
India had its own policy.44 Rajiv, an accidental Prime Minister imposed
on a Republic, that is India, failed to develop a cohesive foreign
42
A.S. Kalkat, “India’s Lanka Odyssey: Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka,” India Foundation, July 2, 2022,
https://indiafoundation.in/articles-and-commentaries/indias-lanka-odyssey-indian-peace-keeping-force-in-sri-
lanka/.
43
Reuters Staff, “Factbox-India’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” Reuters, October 17, 2008, sec. Asia Crisis,
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUKCOL223047.
44
“Rajiv Gandhi’s Sri Lanka Policy Led to His Death: Natwar Singh,” Hindustan Times, July 31, 2014,
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/rajiv-gandhi-s-sri-lanka-policy-led-to-his-death-natwar-singh/story-
0JLTRSHTUF92n32q904rnL.html.

18
policy. His adventurous intervention in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka
ended in a new addition to the legacies of Congress fiascos in the
conduct of foreign relations.
Conclusion
An analysis of the limits of India's power under Rajiv reveals the
structural constraints and policy shortcomings that have been
characteristic of Indian foreign policy in the 20 th century. First, the
foreign policy, unlike today, was identified too much with the
personality of the prime minister, as with Nehru and Indira, and not
seen as the cohesive outcome of institutional decision-making. Prime
ministerial domination of foreign policy kept it from becoming
professional. Second, the doctrine of ‘Panchsheel’ set an ideological
limit to national power, offering a blend of liberal goals and
enlightened self-interest in principle, but because of incompetency of
Congress leadership, especially Nehru, India managed to combine
only the worst of both worlds. Finally, the domestic politics of
manipulation for partisan and personal reasons by the Congress,
involving countervailing forces and using democratic means, as by
Tamil Politicians, to put democratic constraints on India's foreign
policy, denied it coherence and strength.
These fiascos involving the Congress governments emboldened
Pakistan and China to support insurgencies in Punjab, Kashmir, and
the North East to destabilize the country over the course of next two
decades. Numerous terror attacks were carried out by Pakistani
terror outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad in the
Indian heartland including the dastardly attack on the Indian
Parliament in 2001. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai exposed
loopholes in the security system that India had in place to deal with
this “new brand” of terrorism—urban warfare characterized by
symbolic attacks, multiple targets, and high casualties. Manmohan
Singh, a remote control operated Prime Minister and leading a
coalition of parties now in opposition, failed to act after these terror
19
attacks. However, this situation does not persist now as perpetrators
of these acts now know they will be punished.

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