Plea Bargain Defense Strategy
Plea Bargain Defense Strategy
Plea Bargain Defense Strategy
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PLEA BARGAINING STRATEGY 2
Introduction
Plea bargaining has grown into the most significant practice in the criminal justice
system. It involves the suspect’s admission of guilt in return for a reduced sentence. In the
United States, state-level cases that involve plea bargaining have reached approximately 94%
while those at a federal level stand at 97% (Yoffe, 2017). Evidently, the use of the plea
bargain has become the most popular approach to the administration of justice. However, this
situation leads to substantial and consequential questions on the efficacy of the plea
way to manage the case workloads among prosecutors. However, the question or moral
dilemma emerges with the appropriation of the plea bargaining strategy in a system where
prosecutors hold the discretion on the matter. After all, the misuse of this discretion can
in a bid to ascertain whether the approach is feasible in the current criminal justice system in
America. Therefore, the goal of the research is to determine whether the plea bargaining
approach is an effective defense strategy for defendants through a review of relevant and
authoritative literature. Nevertheless, it is possible to take on the position for the use of plea
bargaining as it serves the goals of the parties involved under certain conditions such as
adequate representation.
Literature review
Costello (2014), the constitution requires that defendants receive a defense attorney if they
are in a position of failure to afford one. According to the author, this situation is referred to
According to the author, the constitution conferred equal opportunity to legal representation
based on the quality and due process clauses in the constitution. However, the author also
representation. The author also addresses the development of indigent representation since
Gideon. In this assessment, the author claims that the approach has remained inadequate.
According to Costello (2014), public defense attorneys for the indigent are often
all their clients. As such, this failure often leads to inadequate representation of defendants
who deserve equal and zealous representation in a court of law. More often than not,
budgetary constraints and low standards for adequate representation lead to a loss of
effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Costello claims that the low standards applied for
public defense attorneys and other professionals in the justice system regarding indigent
representation are to blame for the inadequacies that plague the system. As such, the author
paints a grim picture of an insufficient and ineffective indigent representation framework that
Rakoff (2017) takes an in-depth look into prosecutorial discretion and the plea
bargain. According to the author, the current criminal justice system in America has actively
shifted the role of sentencing from the court of law to the prosecutor’s office. According to
the article, the American System actively encourages the discretion of these prosecutors by
allowing them to negotiate plea deals. This immense power that prosecutor’s hold is not only
a challenge to potential defenders; it also threatens the integrity and effectiveness of the
criminal justice system. Rakoff’s (2017) discussion centers on the plea bargain as an
expansion of the prosecutor’s role in a bid to increase the efficiency of the system. However,
the plea bargaining approach failed to realize these benefits and instead contributed to
intensification on the fight against crime in the second half of the 20th century contributed to
stringent laws with even stricter jail terms. The precise nature of these imposed jail terms
relative to the intensity of the crime contributed to a system where defendants are usually
compelled into accepting guilt over a crime irrespective of whether they are the actual
offenders. After all, the mandatory sentencing terms are often scary to defendants who often
opt for the certainty of a short sentence and a plea deal rather than the uncertainty of going to
trial. As such, the plea deal is entangled into increasing prosecutorial discretion in the United
States.
Mackenzie et al. (2015) use their article to develop a model for plea bargaining where
it serves its intended purposes adequately. The authors focused on one advantage of plea
bargaining in particular, which involves the reduction of the severity of the crime and
sentence. Defendants choose the plea bargain because it offers a reprieve from the severe
punishment that the trial would impose on them. Therefore, a defendant perspective favors
the plea bargaining when it serves to reduce the potential sentences that would follow a
dialogic process to develop the best alternative to negotiation for the defendant. According to
the authors, the plea bargaining process involves a system of compromises and trade-offs. For
instance, each party has to make concessions on the expected outcome of the trial process.
Therefore, prosecutors will be willing to reduce the charges and sentence imposed on the
defendant in the legislative recommendations in exchange for a guilty plea. The defendant is
in a position to serve a shorter time for the offense committed while the prosecutor can secure
a guilty plea with certainty. As such, the plea bargaining process is intended to be beneficial
guilty plea despite the resource constraints that plague such offices. Yang (2016) helps
expand this perception using a resource-based view of the American criminal justice system.
According to the author, the system is plagued with severe resource constraints including
funds and staff members. This article adopts the resource-based view to understanding the
implication of staff vacancies on the utilization of plea deals in the United States. The article
claims that a significant rise in the number of plea deals that prosecutors make occur during a
period of shortage of judges. Judges are integral professionals in the criminal justice system
whose discretion and oversight ensures the integrity and effectiveness of the processes
where plea bargaining is prevalent. However, any shortages contribute to an escalation of the
use of plea deals in lieu of the trial procedures as a way of managing resources strategically
in the absence of judges. The understaffed judicial system contributes to increased plea deals
and fewer incarcerations, which are a positive development for the institution. Furthermore,
the use of plea deals in times of resource scarcity also contributes to lower costs of
administration, as the fewer case goes to trial and even fewer defendants go to prison.
Joy and Uphoff (2014) argue against the use of the plea bargaining approach among
criminal defense attorneys, particular those who offer indigent representation. According to
the authors, the need to develop a cost-efficient system despite significant resource deficits
rationale behind this ideation is presented in the article as detrimental to the welfare of the
Typical interactions between the defendant and the attorney involve meeting and bargaining
for a plea deal. As such, the authors suggest that the public attorneys fail to offer sufficient
PLEA BARGAINING STRATEGY 6
scrutiny to cases and instead, opt for plea bargaining as a cheap and fast way to administer
justice. However, the authors indicate the risk of limited investigation and preparation of all
the facts relevant to the case. Therefore, even a plea bargaining situation can lead to wrongful
admission of guilt as the attorney lacks sufficient preparation to negotiate effectively with the
prosecutor. Instead, the attorney is more likely to accept the prosecutor’s terms at the
Bibas (2017) echoes this statement by claiming that the use of plea deals has marked a
departure from the values of the criminal justice system in the United States. According to the
author, the values of the system arose from a popular morality, where defendants would
undergo due process and receive adjudication from a jury of their peers. However, the
concept of plea bargaining limits the access of defendants to this system of justice. Instead, it
relegates sentencing decisions to the prosecutor whose discretion negates the concept of
popular morality. Bibas (2017) provides a balanced assessment of plea bargaining. Despite
the critique concerning a departure from popular morality, Bibas acknowledges the value of
bureaucratic processes in the criminal justice system of reducing uncertainty in the process
and increasing efficiency. Nevertheless, the author develops a coherent criticism of plea
bargaining as a loss of the democratic roots of the system and returning the power to the
Conclusion
In summation, the plea bargaining approach is a complex issue with upsides and
downsides. Public defenders can be well-placed to adopt the strategy based on its advantages
to their client and the criminal justice system. It helps limit the severity of charges imposed
on a defendant and also works towards increasing efficiency in the prosecution of suspects.
However, the interest of efficiency often comes at a cost to the defendant and the integrity of
the system. Indigent defenders may face inadequate representation in the form of limited
PLEA BARGAINING STRATEGY 7
investigation and a predisposed bias to take a plea deal. After all, the public attorneys are
overworked and doing so works to the advantage of both the lawyers and the prosecution
with little regard for the defendant. Furthermore, it has perverted the popular and democratic
processes upon which the criminal justice system was developed. Therefore, defendants have
would be advantaged in using plea bargaining. However, they need to use competent public
References
Rakoff, J. S. (2017). Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And What Can Be
Mackenzie, G., Vincent, A., & Zeleznikow, J. (2015). Negotiating about charges and pleas:
Balancing interests and justice. Group Decision and Negotiation, 24(4), 577-594.
Yang, C. S. (2016). Resource constraints and the criminal justice system: Evidence from
Joy, P. A., & Uphoff, R. J. (2014). Systemic barriers to effective assistance of counsel in plea
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/
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