CASES FINALS

Concept of Torts
1. Baksh v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 97336, 19 February 1993 -

Concept and Requisites

1. Cinco v. Canonoy, GR. No. L-33171, 31 May 1979 - vien

PONENTE : MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
DOCTRINE: The civil and criminal cases arising from the same causes of action may
be suspended while the pendency of the criminal action is at work, as mentioned
under Rule 111.

FACTS:
A petition for review on certiorari wherein a complaint from City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu alleging the recovery of damages due to a vehicular accident in regards
to a vehicular accident between automobile and P.R. jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot
and operated by Valeriana & Carlos Pepito.
A criminal case also being filed against driver from the same incident.

- The private respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action due to
pendency of criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section 3 of the ROC.

CC of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case, denying the p. Motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner then brought said case to the Court of First Instance
of Cebu alleging CC Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.

CFI Judge ordered the dismissal of the certiorari arguing no grave abuse of
discretion from suspension of the civil action. The petitioner has another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy by submitting his claims for damages in criminal
case. Deeming certiorari improper.

Thus present petition for review.

ISSUE : Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action

RULING : Certiorari granted, and decision of CFI Cebu is set aside.

The nature of his action was quasi-delictual governed by Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is clearly recognized in
Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC allowing an independent civil action to prosper.
It must be held that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding
the decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu suspending civil act based on
quasidelict until after criminal case is terminated.

2. Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia Ni Cristo, Inc., GR. No. 160283, 14 October 2005 - ABILGOS

Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Doctrine: Joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code,
joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint
tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.

Facts:
Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by John Chan, which is located at La
Union, adjacent to a chapel of Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC). Chan, in need of additional
sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms, hired Dioscoro Yoro, a retired general
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), alleging that he is a construction
contractor in the locality.

Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which

stipulated that the latter agrees to dig a septic tank for its perusal in the property
bordering INC. After excavation, Chan was informed by the members of the INC
that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the
latter which made its foundation affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to
the prejudice of the respondent.

INC filed a complaint against Chan and its engineer, Teofilio Oller. Both filed
an answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.
However, Chan avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely
on Yoro based heavily on Paragraph 4 of the MOA:

“Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY (Chan)
incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY (Yoro).”

INC, in its answer, asserted that the MOA should not absolve Chan from any
liability as such contract, according to the respondent, clearly shows that the
intention of the parties therein was to search for hidden treasure and that the
alleged digging for a septic tank was just a cover-up of their real intention

The RTC ruled in favor of INC, absolving Oller and holding Chan and Yoro
solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis as the diggings were not
intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to
construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. Such decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the MOA entered into by Chan and Yoro has the effect of making the
latter solely responsible for damages to the respondent.

Held:
No. The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the
fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides:

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

“The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;

(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.”
 In the present case, all the requisites are present. The tortious act was the
excavation which caused damage to the INC as it was done surreptitiously within its
premises that affected the foundation of the chapel. In addition, there was no
pre-existing contractual relation between Chan and Yoro on the one hand, and the
respondent on the other. For the damage caused to INC, petitioner and Yoro shall be
solidarily liable as they are joint tortfeasors.

Moreover, Chan’s reliance on MOA cannot absolve him from liability as it was
clearly shown that he cooperated with Yoro in committing the tort by providing in
their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside
petitioner’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating the petitioner from
liability, is the very noose that ensures that he be declared as liable.

3. FGU Insurance Corporation V. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 118889, 23 March 1998 -
OLFINDO
As Distinguished from a Crime (Art. 2177)
GR NO 147703 - CARINO
PH RABBIT BUS LINES v PEOPLE
PANGANIBAN, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Rule 111, Section 1 states that the civil action is deemed instituted at the filing
of the criminal action. Therefore, an employer, who is not a direct party to a criminal
action, may no longer appeal on the civil aspect of a judgment that is already final
and executory.

FACTS:
 Accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries, and damage to property. Admittedly, the accused had jumped bail and
remained at-large.
Counsel for the accused, hired, and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of
appeal which was denied by the trial court. Simultaneously, the petitioner filed its
notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court which was given due course.
CA ruled that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify
or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had
already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of
civil liability became final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.

HELD: NO
The court ruled no, stating Section 1 of Rule 111 which states that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense shall be deemed instituted,
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal
case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. However, petitioner is not a
direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon, its
employee.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. The subsidiary liability of
petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable.

EXTRA:
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts, or quasi-contracts.

Rule for an Accused Who Jumps Bail

The appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal
during its pendency if the accused jumps bail.
 Appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond, unless they
surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their
right to seek judicial relief. He is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.

Negligence (Art.2176 and 2179)

A. Concept
1. Gaid v. People, GR. No. 171636, 7 April 2009 - CARYL

FACTS:
Gaid was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in
Misamis Oriental. At the time several students were coming out of the school
premises.
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen sitting
near a store on the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the
road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s jeepney which was
traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the
conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to
ride at that point.

The next thing a passenger saw, Dayata was then seen lying on the ground and
caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney
had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.

Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos
carrying the body of the victim. The victim was brought to the hospital but was
pronounced dead on arrival.

The MCTC found Gaid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. RTC
affirmed. CA found petitioner guilty only of simple negligence resulting in homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is negligent

RULING:
No. Petitioner was not shown to be negligent as petitioner was driving slowly at the
time of the accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses.

Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,

as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident and the death of the
victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving
jeepney to get a ride.

In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly
upon reaching the vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen
the victim who came from behind on the left side.

The evidence on record does not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he
was hit and run over by the jeepney. Quite the contrary, the evidence discloses that
the victim was not dragged at all. The distance of 5.70 meters is the length of space
between the spot where the victim fell to the ground and the spot where the jeepney
stopped as observed by the trial judge during the ocular inspection at the scene of
the accident.

Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of
the victim’s death was the petitioner's alleged negligence, if at all, even during the
second stage of the incident.
Wherefore, a petition is granted.

NOTE:

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an

act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act

whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could
a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.

2. Gan v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. L-44264,19 September 1988 - MUROS

Ponente: FERNAN, C.J.

Doctrine: Emergency rule which states that an individual who suddenly finds himself
in danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means to avoid
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what may appear
to be a better method, unless the emergency brought about by his own negligence.

Facts:
Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While
in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck
and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about two to
three meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the
place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one
in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To
avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the
right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old
man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against
the rear of the parked jeepney. An information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide was filed against the petitioner. RRTC held the petitioner guilty. CA
affirmed. Hence, this case.

Issue:
Whether Gan should be held criminally liable for the incident.

Ruling:
The court ruled no stating the emergency rule which states that an individual who
suddenly finds himself in danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means to avoid impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what may appear to be a better method, unless the emergency brought
about by his own negligence.
B. Standard of Conduct
i.ordinary Prudent Person
1. Philippine National Railways Corporation v. Vizcara, GR. No. 190022, 15 February
2012 - KIAN
Ponente: REYES, J.
Doctrine: Article 2176 states that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as
a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is
required to conform for his own protection.

Facts:

At about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a
passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his
companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin),
Samuel Natividad (Samuel), Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara
(Joel). While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National
Railways (PNR) train, being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas),
suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the
instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other
hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries.

At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad
crossing. Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained.
The "Stop" signage was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked
by another signboard. The survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together
with the heirs of the deceased victims filed an action for damages against PNR. RTC
ruled in favor of the respondents, CA affirmed.

Issue:

WoN the petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident?

Ruling:

YES, the petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Because, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists
from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. And the "Stop,
Look and Listen" signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence,
inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger.

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

In the case at bar, the petitioners were negligent due to the omission of installing
safety railroad bars and maintain the “Stop, Look and Listen” signage to notify the
jeepney driver to the impending danger, resulting to the accident ramming of the
vehicle.
ii. Children

1. Ylarde v. Aquino, GR. No. L-33722, 29 July 1988 - INNA

Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.
Doctrine: Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it states that only the teacher and not
the head of an academic school can be held liable for torts committed by their
students.

Facts:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal and Private respondent
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher of the Gabaldon Primary School. The school was
fitted with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that
was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards
to the school children, another teacher named Sergio Banez started burying them
one by one.

Deciding to help his colleague, Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10 to 11,
after class dismissal. He ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in
order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. It was left unfinished, so
Aquino called 4 of the original 18 pupils to continue the digging after class, the next
day. These 4 pupils namely: Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga
and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was 1 meter and 40 centimeters deep.
At this point, Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the
pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and
his 4 pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent left the children to
level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about
30 meters away. Aquino wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope. Before leaving, Aquino allegedly told the
children "not to touch the stone”. A few minutes after Aquino left, 3 of the 4 kids,
Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any
warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it
to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out
of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught
him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a
result, Ylarde sustained injuries. Three days later, he died.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both
private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for damages.
Ruling:

No. Only private respondent Aquino can be held liable. As regards the principal,
the Court held that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde,
he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.
Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent
Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that Aquino acted with fault
and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation
near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2)
required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging,
knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked
aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to
level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone
was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check
on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an
obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a
direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was
but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they
just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found.

This Court cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which
resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless
imprudence, It should be remembered that he was only ten years old at the time of
the incident, As such, he is expected to be playful and daring. His actuations were
natural to a boy his age. Going back to the facts, it was not only him but the three of
them who jumped into the hole while the remaining boy jumped on the block. From
this, it is clear that he only did what any other ten-year old child would do in the
same situation.

The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of
their Work Education. A single glance at the picture showing the excavation and the
huge concrete block would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of
strong, mature laborers and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot
comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise when Aquino himself admitted
that there were no instructions from the principal requiring what the pupils were told
to do. Nor was there any showing that it was included in the lesson plan for their
Work Education.
2. St. Luke's College of Medicine vs. Spouses Perez G.R. No. 222740
GR NO 222740
ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE v SPOUSES PEREZ
PEREZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of providing a conducive
atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant threats to life
and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained. St. Luke’s College cannot
be absolved of liability as it failed to take necessary precautions against
foreseeable harm.

FACTS:
St. Luke’s entered into a Memorandum of Intent with the Municipality of
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija for the construction of a community clinic. The said facility
consisted of a six-bed medical facility on the ground floor, and a residential space
for the medical staff on the second floor.
St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical students to the clinic, namely:
Jessa, Cecille, Murillo, and Ramos (Ramos). They were housed on the second floor of
the clinic. Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the
morning when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that there
was a fire.
When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be futile, he went back to
the bathroom and poured water on the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme
heat coming from the fire. After a considerable amount of time, he heard somebody
outside instructing him to get back from the window. When he did so, somebody
broke the window and started to dismantle the iron grills barring the same. By that
time, Ramos had started losing consciousness due to smoke inhalation and only
remembered that he was being pulled out of the building through the window.
Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical students,
including the daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting" to
asphyxia. The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an investigation on the
incident, it certified that the fire was "purely accidental in nature due to unattended
cooking,"
Respondents sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
who declared that the construction of the Cabiao Community Clinic building was in
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No. 9514) or the Revised
Fire Code of the Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical
wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature. RTC ruled in favor of St.
Luke’s. CA reversed the decision stating that although schools cannot be insurers of
its students against all risks, in the case at bar, the safety of the victims was within
the reach of petitioners and the hazard of a fire was not unforeseeable.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are negligent.

HELD:
The court ruled yes, stating that petitioners failed to take the necessary
precautions to guard their students against foreseeable harm. They were aware that
its medical students were residing at the second floor of the clinic. At the very least,
during inspection, they should have thoroughly inspected the building's physical
appearance and the documents pertinent to the premises to make sure that the
same minimized the risk to the safety of the students.
Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the direction,
supervision, management and control of the Municipality of Cabiao, and that it
ensured that there was an agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide
24-hour security to the Clinic.
Petitioners, however, cannot escape liability based on these arguments. As
held in Saludaga v. FEU, a learning institution should not be allowed to completely
relinquish or abdicate matters of safety and security to a third party as to do so
would result in contracting away its inherent obligation of ensuring a safe learning
environment for its students. Institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of
providing a conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no
constant threats to life and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
3. Jarco Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 129792, 21 December 1999, 378
PHIL 991-1008 - Pao

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.

Doctrine: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances
of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a tresspasser in the premises.

The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is
an implied invitation to such children. (Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 488,
490 [1952].

Facts: Criselda and her daughter Zhieneth were on the second floor of Syvel’s
Department store at Makati City. Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the
payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud
thud. She immediately looked behind her and beheld her daughter Zhieneth on the floor,
Zhieneth’s body was pinned to the ground by the bulk of the store’s gift wrapping
counter which resulted in her death fourteen days after the incident. The respondents
demanded reimbursement from the petitioners to which they refused to pay. The
respondents filed a complaint for damages denying their liability arguing that Criselda
as the mother was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint stating that the act of Zhieneth clinging
onto the counter was the proximate cause of its fall which the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision holding the Petitioners negligent stating that the counter was heavy and
not properly supported by its narrow base, therefore, the counter was defective and
unstable. The Court of Appeals faulted the petitioners for omitting to replace the
counter, hence this case.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is negligent resulting to the death of Zieneth

Ruling: The court ruled yes. The event is not an accident, as justified by the statements
of Zieneth which was admitted as part of res gestae. Petitioner Panelo and another
store supervisor were informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete actions to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of
the store’s employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge
the due diligence required of a good father of a family Even if we attribute contributory
negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury
should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and
sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year-old could not have caused the counter to
collapse.
iii. Professionals

Li v. Spouses Soliman, GR. No. 165279, 7 June 2011 - DANI

Facts:

● On July 7, 1993, Angelica Soliman, an 11-year-old girl, underwent a biopsy at

St. Luke's Medical Center (SLMC) which revealed that she was suffering from
osteosarcoma, a highly malignant cancer of the bone.
● As part of her treatment, Angelica's right leg was amputated to eliminate any
remaining cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent
the disease from spreading to other parts of her body.
● Chemotherapy was recommended by her doctor.
● Her first doctor, Doctor Tamayo then referred Angelica to another doctor at
SMLC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
● However, just eleven days after the administration of the first cycle of
chemotherapy, Angelica passed away.
● The parents, herein the respondents, filed a damage suit against the
petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, MrMr. Jose Ledesma, a certain doctor Dr. Arriete
and SMLC. Respondents charged them negligence in the administration of
the chemotherapy drugs and failure to detect and address symptoms of
complications.
● In her answer, petitioner denied the allegations and asserted she had fully
explained how the chemotherapy will affect not only the cancer cells but also
the patient’s normal body parts.
● Since the medical records of Angelica were not produced in court, the trial
and appellate courts had to rely on testimonial evidence, principally the
declarations of petitioner and respondents themselves.
● The Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner.
● CA reversed the lower court’s decision.
● Hence, this petition

Issue: Whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious
side effects to the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing
chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that petitioner was negligent in
administering the said treatment.

Ruling:

● NO. The Court held that there was adequate disclosure of material risks
inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of
Angelica's parents.
 ● The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical
treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all
instances.
● Furthermore, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty
through expert testimony.
● Such expert testimony must show the customary standard of care of
physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.
● In this case, the testimony of Dr. Balmaceda, who is not an oncologist but a
Medical Specialist of the DOH's Operational and Management Services
charged with receiving complaints against hospitals, does not qualify as
expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for
chemotherapy treatment.
● There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice
action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a
duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to
disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have
consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment."
● WHEREFORE, the petition GRANTED.

Additional Info:
● DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT -a physician has a duty to disclose what
a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of
reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of
injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a
patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice
of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at
all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the
probable risks against the probable benefits.

C. Degrees of Negligence

GSIS v. Pacific Airways Corporation, GR. No. 170414, 25 August 2010 - CARYL
Ponente: Carpio, J.

Doctrine: Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, PAC and its pilots, whose own
gross negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of their own injuries, must
bear the cost of such injuries.

FACTS:
The Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation (PAC) arrived at the Manila
International Airport from El Nido, Palawan. In command of the aircraft was Ely B.
Bungabong and Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot. After the last passenger disembarked,
PAC’s pilots started its engine in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the
other end of the airport.

PAC’s pilots proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta and make a right turn to fox 1 and to
cross runway 13 in order to proceed to fox 1 bravo. Rogelio Lim, ground traffic
controller on duty at the Air Transportation Office (ATO) issued the clearance. Upon
reaching runway 13, PAC’s pilots did not make a full stop at the holding point to
request clearance right before crossing runway 13. Without such clearance, PAC’s
pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines’ (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by pilots Rogelio
Casiño and Ruel Isaac. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push and start on
runway 13. Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty at the ATO issued the
clearance. While already on take-off roll, Casiño caught a glimpse of the Twin Otter
on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway 13.

While the Twin Otter was halfway through runway 13, Galvez noticed the Boeing 737
and told Bungabong that an airplane was approaching them from the right side.
Bungabong gave full power to the Twin Otter. The PAL pilots attempted to abort the
take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft. However, the Boeing 737 still collided
with the Twin Otter.

The Boeing 737 dragged the Twin Otter about 100 meters away. Bungabong suffered
a sprain on his shoulder while Galvez had laceration on his left thumb.An ambulance
brought the two pilots to Makati Medical Center where they were treated for serious
and slight physical injuries.

PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional Trial Court complaint for sum of
money and damages against PAL, Casiño, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, Jr., and ATO’s
traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), as insurer of the Boeing 737 that figured in the collision, intervened.

RTC ruled in favor of PAC and stated that the proximate cause of the collision was
the negligence of Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., as ATO’s traffic control supervisor,
ground traffic controller, and air traffic controller, respectively, at the time of the
collision. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Who among the parties is liable for negligence

RULING:
Rules of the Air of the Air Transportation Office apply to all aircrafts
registered in the Philippines. The Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter in this case were
both registered in the Philippines. Both are thus subject to the Rules of the Air. In
this case, only the Twin Otter was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off
roll. The Rules of the Air provide:

2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an

aerodrome shall give way to aircraft taking off or about to take off.

Therefore, PAL’s aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, not simply
because it was on the right side of PAC’s aircraft, but more significantly, because it
was "taking off or about to take off."

For disregarding PAL’s right of way, PAC’s pilots were grossly negligent. It was a
clear summer evening in April and the Boeing 737, only 200 meters away, had its
inboard lights, outboard lights, taxi lights, and logo lights on before and during the
actual take-off roll. PAC’s defense, that it did not matter whether the clearance was
premature or not as long as the clearance was actually granted, only reveals their
poor judgment and gross negligence in the performance of their duties.

The court is convinced that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision is
the gross negligence of PAC’s pilots. In this case, the fact that PAC’s pilots
disregarded PAL’s right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right before
crossing an active runway was the proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for
such gross negligence on the part of PAC’s pilots, the collision would not have
happened.

Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides that when a plaintiff’s own negligence is the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, PAC and its pilots, whose own gross
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of their own injuries, must bear
the cost of such injuries.

Under the law, GSIS, as insurer subrogee of PAL’s right to claim actual or
compensatory damages in connection with the repair of the damaged Boeing 737, is
entitled to reimbursement for the amount it advanced.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.

NOTE:
Gross negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other persons may be affected.

D. Contributory Negligence (Art. 2179)

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.38 Phil 789 - PAO

Ponente: Fisher, J.
Doctrine : Article 2176 of the Civil Code - Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relationship. Is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code - The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

FACTS: On January 29, 1915 at the San Mateo station at the province of Rizal
Cangco, an employee of the railroad company used a pass provided by the
company to board the train for free. When he was about to alight the train as he
stepped off onto the platform, his foot came into contact with a sack of
watermelons causing him to slip and fall violently. His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly
crushed and lacerated. The train car moved forward possibly six meters before it
came to a full stop. He was then brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of
Manila where an examination was made resulting in the amputation of his arm. The
result of the operation being unsatisfactory he was brought to another hospital
where another operation was performed amputating the member higher up near the
shoulder incurring Cangco of medical and surgical fees amounting to P790.25. The
Court of First Instance held that “although the sacks of melons were so placed as to
obstruct passengers to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had
failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded
from recovering. Judgement entered in favor of the defendant company, thus this
appeal.

Issue: Whether or the Manila Railroad Company is liable for the damages suffered
by Cangco.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held the Manila Railroad Company liable for the
damages suffered by Cangco. The liability of the defendant company in the case
was based on the breach of its contractual obligation to provide safe means of
entering and leaving its trains. The court rejected the company’s argument that
Cangco’s own negligence in alighting from the moving train contributed to his injury
to which the court responded that The company’s liability was direct and immediate,
and proof of due care and diligence in the selection and control of its servants did
not relieve it of its liability and that they had a duty to provide safe facilities for its
passengers and that its failure to do so constituted negligence as emphasized by
the court. Wherefore, the petition is granted.
Proof of Negligence
Anonuevo v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 130003, 20 October 2004 - ABILGOS

Ponente: TINGA, J.
Doctrine: Article 2185 of the Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor
vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the accident,
does not apply to non-motorized vehicles. The court held that the distinction
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is based on their nature and risks
they pose. Motorized vehicles, being capable of greater speeds and causing more
damage in accidents, are subject to higher standards of care.
FACTS:
Jerome Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong on his
bicycle, while Jonas Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane, was driving his Lancer
car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the
employer of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan.

Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street
when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result and
forced him to undergo four (4) operations. Villagracia filed a complaint for damages
before the RTC against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo.

A testification was made by an eyewitness. Alfredo Sorsano, against

Añonuevo. According to his statement, the latter was “umaarangkada” or speeding
as he made left turn into Libertad. However, Añonuevo argued that Villagracia’s
bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a
1948 Municipal Ordinance No.18, nor was it duly registered with the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance. He claimed that Villagracia
violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety
gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by
analogy.

“Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a

person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap
he was violating any traffic regulation.”

The RTC ruled in favor of Villagracia, holding Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo liable for injuries suffered by Villagracia. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether Villagracia’s failure to comply with traffic regulations and install safety
devices on his bicycle constitutes negligence.

HELD:
No. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices,
whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or
mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure
and the injury sustained.

In the present case, Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from
ten (10) meters away, thus he could no longer claim not having been sufficiently
warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that Añonuevo was recklessly
speeding as he made the turn likewise led the court to believe that even if
Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not
have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.

Moreover, it was incumbent upon Añonuevo to establish that Villagracia’s

failure to install the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that
Añonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect proves that there was no causal
connection. Therefore, the reckless behavior of Añonuevo would have imperiled
anyone unlucky enough within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the
intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists.

Standard Insurance Co., Inc. v. Cuaresma, GR. No. 200055, 10 September 2014 -
CARINO
GR NO 200055
STANDARD INSURANCE v CUARESMA
PERALTA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A party would not constitute forum shopping for filing a separate action
based on a different cause of action arising from the same act or omission.
Moreover, Rule 111 allows the party not offended in a criminal action to file a
separate civil action even if the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the
criminal action.
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner
Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma
and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an accident at North
Avenue, Quezon City.
Cham then executed a Release of Claim in favor of petitioner subrogating the
latter to all his rights. Petitioner addressed the respondents demanding the payment
for the repair of the vehicle driven by Cham. Meanwhile, an information was filed
with the METC charging Cham of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property.
METC ruled in favor of the petitioner after presenting its evidence exparte.
RTC reversed the decision stating that the petitioner were not able to prove that the
proximate cause was the respondent’s negligence. CA affirmed the decision, hence,
this case.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the parties that are not offended in the criminal case can file a
separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case.
2. Whether the petitioner was able to prove its claims of negligence.

HELD:

1. The court ruled yes, stating that Rule 111 allows the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even if the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the
criminal action.
Therefore, the petitioner, who is subrogated to the rights of Cham, cannot be
guilty of forum shopping for its separate civil action.

However, while the petitioner’s action is valid, it failed to prove that the
accident was due to the negligence of the respondent. Moreover, it failed to show
that the officer who prepared the Traffic Accident Investigation Report had
sufficient knowledge of the facts of the case.

2. The court ruled no, stating that the evidence presented by the petitioner
failed to preponderantly establish negligence on the part of the respondents. The
Traffic Accident Investigation Report, which was submitted as evidence, could not
be given probative weight because the investigating officer who prepared it was not
presented in court to testify. Since the evidence did not sufficiently establish
negligence on the part of the respondents, it would be unfair to hold them liable for
the damage sustained by Cham's vehicle. Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Josefa v. Manila Electric Co., GR. No. 182705, 18 July 2014 - KENNETH
5.Defenses
a. Plaintiff’s Negligence

Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, GR. No. L-8328, 18 May 1956 - KIAN
Ponente: MONTEMAYOR, J
Doctrine: Proximate cause is defined as that which, in natural ant continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without
which the result would not have occured. A proximate cause cannot be the basis of
an action if there was a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury between the prior cause and the injury.

Facts:
Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located
on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking
condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. Standing
on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’
galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so
the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila
Electric Company strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet
from it, causing his death by electrocution. The electric wire was an exposed,
uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on the street and carrying a
charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Peñaloza’s house
was constructed.

His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company. After
hearing, the trial court rendered judgement in their favor.

Issue:

WoN the Company's negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was
the proximate cause of the death

Ruling:

No, it was not the proximate cause of the death. Because, it was the
reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street
and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length
of 6 feet.

According to ARTICLE 2179 of the New Civil Code. When the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In the case at bar, the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno
himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media agua” just
below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and
experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and
had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a
stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the
instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was
standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arm’s length,
evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he
turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his
own electrocution.
PLDT v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. L-57079, 29 September 1989 - MUROS

Ponente: REGALADO, J.
Doctrine: Plaintiff’s Negligence as the Proximate Cause. When the plaintiff's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

FACTS:
Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. Respondents alleged that they failed to notice the open trench
because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. Wife suffered
injuries on her arms, legs, and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while
the husband suffered cut lips. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered. PLDT
denied liability stating that the injuries suffered by the spouses was due to their own
negligence, if at all, it is Barte, an independent contractor which undertook the
construction that should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against
Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner
be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence or
carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. RTC ordered PLDT to pay the
respondents, and Barte to reimburse PLDT. CA initially reversed the decision, but
after a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents, it affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
Whether the spouses were negligent and therefore, may not be able to recover
damages.

Ruling:
The court ruled yes, stating that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep
swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused the
swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot be
made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the
absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from
the inside lane. It further stated that the jeep was not running at 25 km/ph as it
claimed, since he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the accident
mound if it was true. Lastly, he should have used lights to see the accident mount
b. Fortuitous Event
Real V. Belo, G.R. NO. 146224, 26 January 2007 - INNA
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Doctrine: Article 2180 states that the owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. So Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of its
employees.

Facts:

Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food
Center of the Philippine Women's University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate,
Manila. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters
fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU.
Around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at
petitioner's Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls
in the area, including respondent's stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by
the Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due
to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank
installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire,
respondent demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to
accede to respondent's demand.

Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the MTC,
petitioner contended that the fire was due to fortuitous event. MTC ruled in favor of
respondent, RTC and CA affirmed.

Issue:

WoN the fire was a fortuitous event thereby exempting petitioner from liability

Ruling:

No, fire is not a fortuitous event thereby, does not exempt petitioner from
liability. Because, the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG stove and
tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent the
fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including respondent's
fastfood stall.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from
the cause of injury or loss.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible

for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG
stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and
periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her
cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the
necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent.

d. Last Clear Chance

Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, G.R. Nos. 79050—51, 14 November 1989 -
Muros

Ponente: CORTES, J
Doctrine: The doctrine of last clear chance In order for the doctrine of last clear
chance to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had
the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or
should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to
avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the
existence of the peril. In this case, there was no evidence to suggest that the
jeepney driver knew of the impending danger.

FACTS:
Spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and
Maricar together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and
seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at
Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa. The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger
jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner thereof. Upon
reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at
a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a
speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached
on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a result of
the accident David Ico, spouses Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino
Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. After the accident the
driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez has never been seen and has
apparently remained in hiding. Maricar Baesa through her guardian filed an action
for damages araising from quasi-delict against Pantranco. RTC ruled against
Pantranco. CA modified the decision increasing damages. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:
Whether the last clear chance is applicable in this case.
Whether the employer should be held liable.

Ruling:
The court ruled no, stating that for the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident
was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have
been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does
not know or could not have known the existence of the peril.
In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not
return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to the proper lane by
anything beyond the control of its driver. Moreover, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was
speeding towards Manila

The court ruled yes, stating that the evidence provided by the petitioner was far
from sufficient. No support evidence has been adduced. The professional driver’s
license of Ramirez has not been produced. There is also no proof as to his
educational attainment, his age, his weight and the fact that he is married or not.
Neither are the result of the written test, psychological and physical test, among
other tests, have been submitted in evidence. Petitioner failed to do this. Hence, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED

Southeastern College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 126389, 10 July 1998 -
OLFINDO
Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, GR> No. L-53401, 6 November
1989 - Vien
PONENTE: PARAS, J.
DOCTRINE: Assumption of Risk Wherein in a case where the plaintiff voluntarily
and knowingly assumes the risks at hand of the dangerous activity the plaintiff was
participating at the time of the injury bars them of recovery.
FACTS:
This is a case wherein a clash of evidence is at hand. Typhoon “Gening” hit Ilocos
Norte flooding the area Isabel Lao Juan otherwise called, “Nana Belen” lived. They
scurried the water to 5 Sisters Emporium along with Aida Bulong; A sales girl &
Linda Alonzo Estanillo, a ticket seller to assess the damage of the merchandise.
- Deceased screamed ‘ay!” and sank at the water, the two people behind her
tried to help but got scared by the electric wire dangling from a post.

Antonio Yabes, tried to go to the deceased but the water surrounding her body was
grounded thus going to City Hall of Laoag along with his wife Jane, Jo Ros Yabes
and Ernesto to cut off electricity to retrieve her body. Dr. Jovencio; a health officer,
assessed her cause of death as having ‘cyanotic’ skin and circulatory shock
electrocution.

Engineer Antonio Juan noticed certain fluctuations in the electric meter and went
over to assess the area, but found no lineman of INELCO available. The Heirs filed
against the petitioners an action for damages, with defendants using testimonies to
prove that the electrical system of INELCO had no defects before the typhoon.
- Defendants argued that the heirs cannot recover damages arising from Nana
Belen’s electrocution given the doctrine of “assumption of risk” after diving
into the flood she has voluntarily assumed the risks

ISSUE: Whether or not Nana Belen died of electrocution and INELCO can be held
liable for her death.
RULING:
Yes, Nana Belen died of electrocution given the evidence of burnt wounds on her
left palm showing a visible mark of electrocution which resulted towards her
untimely demise.

INELCO is deemed to be responsible for Nana Belen’s death as they are a public
service operator providing a supply of electric current they failed in shutting down
the flow of electricity once the typhoon had hit Ilocos Norte, given that such
typhoon can cause harm and evident flooding it is then their responsibility to close
of the electric current from their system as soon as possible.
VALENZUELA V. CA - G.R. 115024, 7 February 1996 - JIA
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
DOCTRINE: Emergency Rule states that an individual who suddenly finds himself in
a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution.
FACTS:
Petitioner Valenzuela was heading to Manila when she noticed that there was
something wrong with her tires. She stopped to check the tires. People present in the
area told her that her rear right tire was flat so she parked her car along the
sidewalk. Valenzuela was at the rear of her car when she was bumped by Li’s car.
Li, on the other hand, was on his way home, travelling at 55 KPH. Considering
that it was raining, he alleged that his visibility was affected and the road was wet.
He contended that he was blinded by a car coming from the opposite direction that
temporarily blinded his vision so he swerved to the right to avoid collision and
bumped Valenzuela’s car.
However, Police investigation showed that it was not entirely dark and things
can still be seen despite the rainy weather. The report also narrated that Li’s car was
moving fast and that he smelt of liquor.
Lower court held Li to be guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Li is negligent
2. Whether Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence
RULING:
1. Yes. Li is found to be driving “very fast” and smelt of liquor. Valenzuela’s car
was close to the sidewalk, contrary to his claims that the point of impact is at
the centre of the lane. The Supreme Court further held that an average
motorists’ alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes.
The conditions during the event would have still provided ample time to react
to the road if he was alert. However, Li’s speed and drunken state were the
factors that contributed to his failure to properly read in the situation. Hence,
he is found to be negligent.
2. No. The emergency rule applies for her. The flat tire during such weather, a
case of emergency, allowed her not to be faulted for stopping at a point both
convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. The
emergency was not her fault and it was evident that she had taken all
reasonable precautions.
SPOUSES SANTOS V. HON PIZARDO, GR. 151452, 29 July 2005 - JIA
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
DOCTRINE: Prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to
an action to enforce the civil liability arising from the crime especially as the latter
action had been expressly reserved.
FACTS:
Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection to the collision between a
Viron Transit Bus and a Life Ace Van. The van’s driver died along with 3 of its
passengers including a 2-month old baby. Sibayan was convicted. However, since
there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil
liability was made.
Petitioners then filed an action for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit
and its President. Viron moved to dismiss the same on the grounds of improper
service of summons, prescription and laches and defective certification of
non-forum shopping. Petitioners argued that the right to file a separate action in
this case prescribes in 10 years from the finality of the decision in the criminal
action.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that actions based on
quasi-delict prescribes 4 years from the accrual of the cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether the action has already prescribed
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that even if the cause of action ex quasi delicto
had already prescribed, petitioners may still pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation. This is so because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from the crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

SABIDO v. CUSTODIO, GR. NO. L-21512, 31 August 1966 - Vien

PONENTE: CONCEPCION, CJ
DOCTRINE: CONCURRENT CAUSES
FACTS:

A petition for review instigated by Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda, in the
decision of the CFI of Laguna.
In Barrio Halang, Lumban Laguna around 9:30 AM two 6x6 trucks one driven by
Nicasio Mudales (Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company) and other driven by Aser Lagunda
and Prospero Sabido in opposite directions in a road curve.
Custodio a passenger at the LTB Bus riding the left side of the bus full of passengers
was side swiped by the track resulting to his death. He was hanging in the left side
of the truck making LTB Company liable for damages where the driver and
conductor are negligent in allowing Custodio to ride there.

Belen Makabuhay, Custodio’s widow testified the truck was running fast when it met
the LTB Bus where the driver Aser Lagunda had the opportunity to avoid the
collision if it swerved to the right side of the road instead of the middle in passing a
curve.

Lagunda driver had testified that 3 hanging passengers were at the left side of the
bus of Nicasio Mudales and didn't use the canal at right sight of the road under the
guise of “canal is not a passage of trucks.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the bus company, the bus driver and the truck owner
are liable for the damages
RULING:
Both trucks to the court’s knowledge were negligent in not driving onto their
designated lanes wherein they both did not kept near the right side of the roads .