G.R. No. L-21754
G.R. No. L-21754
G.R. No. L-21754
Remotigue Law Offices, Valeriano S. Carillo, Domingo Berido, Jose G. Davide, Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
and Cesar Kintanar for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for respondent-
appellants.
ANTONIO, J.:
Writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) granting
the petition for mandamus and prohibition filed in Civil Case No.
R-7715.
Petitioner Hilario Davide was a District Supervisor in Mactan District, comprising the municipalities of
Opon and Cordova, Province of Cebu. He had been a District Supervisor for fourteen years. On
June 17, 1961, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 3134, the Municipality of Opon was
converted into the City of Lapu-Lapu, and providing, among other positions, that of City
Superintendent of Schools, who shall have all the powers and duties in respect to schools of the city
as are vested in division superintendents in respect to schools of their divisions.
In the annual budget for the City of Lapu-Lapu for FY 1962-1963, an appropriation for the position of
City Superintendent of Schools for the period May 27 to June 30, 1962 (Exhibit "L-6") was included.
On June 25, 1962, respondent Director of Public Schools wrote respondent Secretary of Education
(Exhibit "I") informing the latter that the budget of Lapu-Lapu City did not carry an item for the
position of City Superintendent of Schools, although such a position was provided in the national
budget beginning July 1, 1962. The Director inquired from the Secretary as to the proper action
which his office should take regarding the matter. The Director's query was referred to the Office of
the President, and on August 9, 1962, the Assistant Executive Secretary, in a second indorsement
(Exhibit "K-3"), informed the Secretary of Education that petitioner's ad interim appointment dated
November 6, 1961 had not been released by the Office of the President as it was affected by
Administrative Order No. 2, dated December 31, 1961, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal,
which withdrew, recalled and declared without effect all ad interim appointments extended or
released by former President Garcia after December 13, 1961, hence, the confirmation of petitioner's
appointment by the Commission on Appointments may he disregarded, and petitioner should be
directed to desist from performing the duties of City Superintendent of Schools of Lapu-Lapu City. In
a third indorsement dated September 3, 1962 (Exhibit "K-2"),the Secretary of Education invited the
attention of the Director of Public Schools to the Assistant Executive Secretary's second
indorsement. With the approval of the Secretary of Education, the Director of Public Schools
authorized the Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, respondent Fructuoso R. Yanson, to
exercise supervision' and administration over all schools in Lapu-Lapu City (Exhibit "G") By virtue of
said authority, Yanson exercised such supervision and administration.
On October 8, 1962, petitioner flied a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
preliminary injunction, with the Court of First instance of Cebu (Civil Case No. R-7715).After hearing,
a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On May 30, 1963, judgment was rendered the portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment: (1) declaring his
petitioner the officer de jure of and to the office of the City Superintendent of Schools
of Lapu-lapu City, his appointment thereto and the confirmation thereof being valid,
legal and subsisting; (2) perpetually (a) enjoining the respondents, individually and
collectively, from enforcing the recommendation granting respondent Fructuoso
Yanson authority to exercise administration and supervision over the schools of the
Division of Lapulapu City, (b) restraining then, jointly and severally from divesting or
excluding the petitioner in the exercise of his right to the office of City Superintendent
of Schools of Lapulapu City or excluding him from such office; (3) declaring the
recommendation of respondent Benigno Aldana dated August 21, 1962, authorizing
respondent Fructuoso Yanson to exercise supervision and administration over the
schools of the division of Lapulapu City and the approval thereof by respondent
Alejandro Roces as illegal and therefore null and void.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents contend that since petitioner's appointment was never released by the Office of the
President, the said appointment was therefore effectively withdrawn and rendered null and void by
Administrative Order No. 2.
In this connection, Exhibit "A" presented by petitioner is a copy of his appointment dated November
6, 1961. It is not signed by President Garcia, but the words "Original Signed" are stamped above the
President's name. There is no certification that it is a duplicate original, or that it is a true copy of the
original. On the witness stand, petitioner testified that he was first verbally notified of his appointment
on or about November 10, 1961, by the City Mayor, that on or about December 9, 1961, he was
given a copy of his appointment (Exhibit "A"), and that he never received the original thereof. The
admission of Exhibit "A" was objected to by respondents on the grounds that it was not properly
identified. It was, however, admitted in evidence as part of petitioner's testimony. Respondents did
not adduce any testimonial evidence, but on the issue of whether or not petitioner's appointment was
released to him, they introduced in evidence Exhibit "3-C", which is the second indorsement dated
August 9, 1962, of the Assistant Executive Secretary, stating that petitioner's appointment "has not
been released" from the Office of the President.
An examination of the cases decided by this Court involving ad interim appointments extended by
President Garcia during the last months of his term in office clearly indicates that in those cases
where the validity of the appointment was not sustained, the same was more influenced by the
doubtful character of the appointments themselves than by the contention that President Macapagal
had validly recalled them. Thus, where the ad interim appointments are "so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and
the appointee's qualifications", such appointments were sustained as having been made regularly
after a full consideration of the qualification of the candidate and, therefore, removed from the
interdiction in Aytona v. Castillo. As this Court explained in the cases
1
of Merrera, Gillera, and Quimsing, Aytona v. Castillo did not declare Administrative Order No. 2 of
2 3 4
President Macapagal valid and all appointments made by then outgoing President Garcia ineffective.
"... the resolution of the majority in this case has not specifically declared the
"midnight" appointments to be void. The resolution in substance held that the
Court had doubts about their validity, and having due regard to the separation of
powers and the surrounding circumstances, it declined to overthrow the executive
order of cancellation and to grant relief."
In other words, Court not only did not categorically declare Administrative Order No.
2 valid and all appointments made by then outgoing, President Garcia, ineffective,
but clearly indicated that its decision was more influenced by the doubtful character
of the appointments themselves and not by the contention that the President had
validly recalled them. As a matter of fact, in the that Aytona case it was stated that,
"the filling up of vacancies (by the outgoing President) in important positions, if few,
and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may
undoubtedly be permitted." It is for the foregoing basic consideration, i.e., the
necessity of filling the position, that the appointee is qualified, and that it was not one
of those mass ad interim appointments' issued in a single night, that this Court
upheld the validity of an appointment to the position of Auxiliary Justice of the Peace
(Merrera v. Liwag, G.R. No. L-20079, promulgated September 30, 1963), extended
by President Garcia and released on December 20, 1961, notwithstanding
Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal. 5
Indeed the validity of the appointments made after December 13, 1961 by former President Garcia
was considered by the Court not in the light of Administrative Order No. 2 recalling such
appointments but on the basis of the nature, character and merit of the individual appointments and
the particular circumstances surrounding the same. Evident in aforementioned pronouncements is
6
this Court's continuing concern for the constitutional prohibition against removal from office without
lawful cause. Thus, in Jorge v. Mayor, wherein the promotional appointment on December 13, 1961
7
of Nicanor Jorge as the Director of Lands, a career official in the civil service, was sustained, Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Court, emphasized that Jorge's appointment is featured by a
recognition of his tenure by the Macapagal administration itself, since he was allowed to hold and
discharge undisturb his duties as de jure Director of Lands for nearly eleven months, and it was only
in mid-November 1962 that the attempt was actually made to demote him and appoint an outsider in
his place, and "[i]f anyone is entitled to the protection of the civil service provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those against removals without lawful cause, it must be the officers who,
like herein petitioner, entered the Civil Service in their youth, bent on making a career out of it, gave
it the best of their lives and grew gray therein in the hope and expectation that they would eventually
attain the upper reaches and levels of the official hierarchy, not through political patronage, but
through loyalty, merit, and faithful and unremitting toil.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that appellee Hilario Davide was extended an ad interim
appointment as City Superintendent of Schools of Lapu-Lapu City on November 6,1961, as a result
of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications. As a matter of fact, in the letter of the Director of Public Schools, dated September 25,
1962, to the appellee, said official recognized that the "ability and loyalty as a public servant" of
appellee was "beyond question." (Exhibit "K") It has been shown also that appellee was furnished a
copy of his appointment as City Superintendent of Schools (Exhibit "A")sometime in November
1961, duplicate copy of which was furnished the Secretary of Education (Exhibit "4"). We find,
therefore, that appellee's case is not within the purview of those appointments that have been
proscribed in Aytona v. Castillo (supra).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed, and the decision of the court a quo dated May 30,
1963 declaring appellee to be the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified City Superintendent of
Schools of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby affirmed.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.