24 - REP - State of Climate Action in South Africa - v4

July 2024
The State of Climate Action

in South Africa
Priorities for Action for the Government of National Unity
The First Assessment About the Presidential
from the Presidential Climate Commission
Climate Commission The Presidential Climate Commission (PCC) is a
multistakeholder body established by the President
This report is the Presidential Climate Commission’s
of the Republic of South Africa. The PCC advises on
first assessment of climate action in South Africa. It
the country’s climate change response and supports
presents a snapshot of South Africa’s progress toward
a just transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient
reducing emissions, enhancing climate resilience, and
economy and society.
improving the lives and livelihoods of all South Africans—
particularly those most impacted in the climate transition. The PCC produces recommendations to government
based on research and evidence and facilitates dialogue
The report is authored by Rebecca Carter, Katie Connolly,
between social partners—ultimately aiming to define the
Amanda Gcanga, Arya Harsono, Bradley Kratzer, Steve
type of economy and society we want to achieve and
Nicholls, Mikayla Pellerin, Yuri Ramkissoon, Katie Ross,
detailed pathways for how to get there.
and Clea Schumer.
The report benefitted from the review and inputs from
Zane Abdul, Dr Ric Amansure, Dr Ekin Birol, Sophie
Boehm, Michael Boulle, Jesse Burton, John Dini, Dr Scott
Drimie, Natalie Elwell, Taryn Fransen, Melissa Fourie,
Andrew Gilder, Joel Jaeger, Mandy Jayakody, Mariette
Liefferink, Liteboho Makhele, Dr Mathetha Mokonyama,
Dorah Marema, Nokwanda Maseko, Geeta Morar,
Sandra Motshwanedi, Dr Victor Munnik, Stephen
Naimoli, Dr Crispian Olver, Dr Brilliant Petja, Warrick
Pierce, Dr Noleen Pisa, Janse Rabie, James Reeler,
Joachim Roth, Bridgette Setshedi, Mikateko Sithole,
Mkhuthazi Steleki, Dr Anna Taylor, Tatjana van Bormann,
Jackie Walters, and Dr Gina Ziervogel. The authors are
grateful for their review.
Special thanks to the team at Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC)—Dr Benjamin Roberts, Dr Jarè Struwig,
and Dr Thobeka Zondi—who conducted the survey on
public perceptions toward climate change and the just
transition and contributed to Chapter 3 of the report.
The report was produced thanks to generous support
from Bloomberg Philanthropies and Germany’s Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
We are grateful for their support.
CONTENTS
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Executive summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Section 1. The environment for climate action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chapter 1. Social, economic, and policy context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 2. Governance, implementation capacity, and finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chapter 3. Public perceptions and attitudes about climate change
and a just transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Section 2. The race to build climate resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Chapter 4. Climate change impacts and adaptation action:
The race to build resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 5. A more equal, climate-resilient agriculture sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chapter 6. Securing water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Section 3. Mitigation: emissions, targets, and progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Chapter 7. Emissions: Trends, drivers, and meeting the mitigation NDC. . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Chapter 8. Decarbonising energy supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Chapter 9. Improving public transport and shifting to new energy vehicles. . . . . . . . .64
Chapter 10. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix A: L ist of stakeholders relevant to climate action and

the transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix B: Methodological approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Contents • iii
FOREWORD
We have recently witnessed the inauguration response, and the gaps where further progress
of President Ramaphosa for a second term in is needed. The report stands on the shoulders
office as head of the 7th Administration. A of years daily testimonies and experiences of
free and fair democracy is something we used many South Africans, of evidence and data
to dream about during our struggle against collection in the country and complements
apartheid, where the people of our coun- the important climate tracking work under-
try are free to choose their own leaders, are taken by the Department of Forestry, Fisheries
free to vote without any pressure on them, and Environment and many others.
and without any intimidation. This week we
The report is yet another clarion call for
witnessed political parties working together to
climate action and is unequivocal in its find-
form the new Government of National Unity.
ings: South Africa has strong commitments
During his inauguration address, the Presi- to addressing climate change, but needs to
dent highlighted several priorities for this new accelerate implementation efforts, particu-
government. One of these is accelerating the larly in areas of governance, financing, and
response to tackling climate change, which is market reform. The report clearly highlights
one of our greatest threat multipliers—exac- areas where step changes are required, which
erbating South Africa’s burden of poverty, we advise the new administration to imple-
unemployment, and inequality. ment with urgency.
Our country continues to face significant cli- This report calls for measures to be put
matic risks and impacts. Floods and droughts in place to reduce emissions and improve
have ravaged different parts of our country resilience, highlighting and prioritising
in recent months, with the impacts affecting four sectors, water, agriculture. energy, and
the poorest and most vulnerable communities transport, to usher in into low-carbon econ-
the most. These events reflect a worrying and omy that is more resilient and strengthen
increasing trend of climatic incidents, harming our global competitiveness, while addressing
people, their homes, their communities, and the triple challenges of poverty, inequality,
impacting their livelihoods. The President and unemployment.
has said that the government will not rest in
Let’s get to work, together.
addressing the climate crisis and has vowed
to tackle these challenges in a manner that is
ambitious, just, and inclusive—not only for
this generation but those that follow.
The President formed the Presidential Climate

Commission in 2020 to facilitate and oversee
this ambitious, just, and inclusive response
to climate change to a climate-resilient green
economy. The Commission is also tasked with
advising government on the efficacy of its
VALLI MOOSA
response to climate change.
Deputy Chair
In this context, despite the sobering find- Presidential Climate Commission
ings, it is my great pleasure to present the June 2024
Commission’s first independent assessment
of the state of climate action in South Africa,
which we have prepared to coincide with the
start of this 7th Administration. This report
presents a comprehensive overview of how
climate change is impacting South Africa, the
measures that different groups are taking in
•1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
South Africa is already experiencing the impacts of • Assessed progress toward multiple priority indicators
climate change, and detrimental climate impacts of change—encompassing mitigation, adaptation,
and risks are predicted to increase rapidly as we finance, and the just transition—reviewing available
move toward the end of the 2020s and into the data up until the end of 2023
next decade. In response, South Africa has set ambi-
tious goals for climate action: reduce the greenhouse
• Interviewed more than a dozen experts on this
progress to substantiate findings and provide
gas (GHG) emissions that drive global warming and broader context
adapt to the impacts of climate change.
• Studied the environment in which climate policy is
The just transition is central to South Africa’s made in South Africa, looking at the political, devel-
response to climate change—putting the lives and opment, and economic factors that are enabling or
livelihoods of people at the heart of its climate preventing progress
response to ensure that the most vulnerable and
impacted are protected, supported, and empowered
• Conducted the first nationally representative survey
on the just transition, together with the Human
in the transition. A just transition to a low-carbon and
Sciences Research Council (HSRC), surveying more
resilient economy will strengthen South Africa’s global
than 3,000 South Africans on their perceptions,
competitiveness and create opportunities to reduce
attitudes, and support for climate action and the
poverty, inequality and unemployment. South Africa’s
just transition
just transition aims to be inclusive, taking all South
Africans forward into a more prosperous future. The key finding from this work is that although
South Africa is now entering a new and more South Africa has strong commitments and public
challenging phase of climate action. The focus is support for tackling climate change and facilitating
not only on setting targets but also on achieving a just transition, progress is not happening at the
those targets. Strong government policies must drive pace and scale required to tackle a crisis of such
a rapid response to climate change in a just manner proportion. Key barriers hindering progress include
that recognises, protects, and realises human rights incoherent policies, weak governance structures,
and is supported by all stakeholders—businesses, civil insufficient finance, and inconsistent actions by the gov-
society, labour unions, communities, and citizens. ernment and other stakeholders. From these analyses,
The work of building a just transition should adhere we are beginning to identify the immediate actions that
to the three principles underpinning the just transi- must be effected to realise South Africa’s vision for the
tion as established in the country’s Just Transition just transition and overcome these barriers.
Framework: procedural justice, distributive justice, and Looking ahead, the PCC will continue to scru-
restorative justice. tinise and monitor implementation progress in
How can we be confident that the necessary prog- detail—focusing on what is working, what is not,
ress will be delivered at the pace and scale required? for whom, and why. The intention is to produce a
It is the role of the Presidential Climate Commission biennial State of Climate Action in South Africa report
(PCC) to track and offer an independent view of that so that all social partners—government, business, civil
challenge. To meet this mandate, the PCC focuses on society, and labour, among others—have the most
real and resolute progress in building a just transition, comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date information
measured through indicators of early and continued to enable change. This will complete other related but
action by government and other major stakeholders. separate tracking efforts, especially those prepared by
The focus is on not only progress in key economic the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Environment
sectors and regions but also on important cross-cutting (DFFE), such as the biennial transparency reports and
themes such as stakeholder engagement, gover- annual climate change reports.
nance, and finance. The text that follows summarises the key messages
In this context, this report presents the PCC’s first from the PCC’s first independent analysis of the
independent and evidence-based assessment of cli- state of climate action.
mate action in South Africa. In preparing this report,
the PCC has taken the following actions:
2 • The State of Climate Action in South Africa: Priorities for Action for the Government of National Unity
The context for acting
on climate change in
South Africa
South Africa is in a part of the world that is sectors at risk in the transition and how to build resil-
severely impacted by climate variability. The country ience in these sectors. In 2020, the President created
frequently experiences droughts, floods, heat waves, the PCC to oversee and facilitate a just transition in
and other extreme weather events, with evidence that the country and to forge consensus between all major
the frequency and intensity of such events are increas- stakeholder groups. In 2020–21, working with the
ing because of climate change. At 1.25°C of warming National Business Initiative, major businesses examined
above preindustrial levels today, these events have the changes that will be required in specific sectors to
already caused enormous damage to infrastructure, reach net zero emissions by the middle of the cen-
ecosystems, lives, and livelihoods, displacing thousands tury. In 2022, the cabinet adopted the country’s first
of people. They have also disproportionately impacted national Just Transition Framework, which set out a
vulnerable groups, including women and young people, unifying vision for a just transition, alongside principles
older people, the unemployed, historically marginalised and actions to guide this transition.
groups, and those living in informal settlements.
The PCC and the HSRC’s national survey shows
Climate change exacerbates South Africa’s triple that there is broad public support for acting on
challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequal- climate change and the just transition. More than
ity. South Africa is one of the most unequal countries half of South Africans believe that the transition could
in the world; the divide between the rich and the poor alleviate load shedding. Additionally, more than 40
is larger than ever, and the current unemployment rate percent of South Africans think a shift to cleaner forms
is at a record level. The health impacts from pollu- of energy like renewables will help to reduce electricity
tion caused by burning fossil fuels—a major driver of costs and help the economy grow. South Africans are
climate change—are acutely suffered by poorer com- also generally in favour of enacting stronger policies
munities, exacerbating these inequities. to support a just transition, including those related
to economic diversification, education, training,
Addressing climate change means strengthening
reskilling, and targeted employment opportunities for
adaptation measures to improve the resilience to
vulnerable groups.
immediate events (e.g., extreme weather, disasters)
as well as long-term climatic shifts that impact
water availability, food security, and human health. The mismatch between
Efforts to build climate resilience should more mean-
ingfully engage all stakeholders, especially vulnerable
commitments and action
groups, to ensure that the benefits and burden of Although there is strong public support and policy
adaptation are equitably distributed. Addressing cli- commitments for acting on climate change and
mate change and adjusting to a rapidly decarbonising driving a just transition in South Africa, there is
global economy also necessitates concurrent and sharp a notable disparity between policy ambitions and
reductions in GHG emissions—the harmful pollutants practical outcomes. South Africa is often gener-
that drive climate change. The scale of the challenge ally described as a policy-rich, implementation-poor
demands an effective and well-equipped state that country—and this is equally true for climate action.
enables trust and action among all stakeholders. There are three main drivers for the mismatch between
commitments and action:
The just transition imperative • Contradictory public policies and positions,
South Africa has increasingly prioritised a just particularly regarding the future of the energy
transition, with this agenda taking off at scale over sector, as government wrestles with immediate
the past five years. In recent years, the just transition trade-offs between energy security, economic
agenda has become a top priority of government, civil growth, the health impacts of pollution from
society, and business. The National Planning Commis- fossil fuels, and climate commitments. The lack
sion in 2017–19 aimed to coalesce the country around of consensus about the pace of the coal phaseout
shared goals for the just transition, and the DFFE is delaying the implementation of necessary policy
commissioned work to better understand the jobs and measures to prepare for and enable the transition,
Executive summary • 3
such as the draft 2023 integrated resources plan The broader systemic issues that hamper prog-
(IRP), the integrated energy plan, and the South ress in the just transition also hamper progress on
African Renewable Energy Masterplan. building climate resilience. Within the existing policy
framework, the institutional mandates and responsi-
• Inadequate technical and financial capacity
constrains the role of local governments as the bilities to address climate change are not always clear,
frontline responders to climate change and the and coordination between actors is inadequate despite
just transition. According to government reports, regular communications among at least some of the
more than 60 percent of local municipalities are clas- relevant government departments. Many municipal
sified as dysfunctional due to resource constraints, officials also tend to still view building climate resilience
structural challenges, poor governance, ineffective as additional to, rather than a fundamental element of,
and sometimes corrupt financial and administrative their core responsibilities, which hinders the uptake
management, and poor planning and service deliv- of municipal climate change plans and strategies. In
ery. At the same time, these municipalities are the addition, constrained municipal budgets impede the
front-end responders to climate impacts, playing a implementation of adaptation and resilience-building
critical role in implementing and managing adap- initiatives. More broadly, finance for climate adaptation
tation projects to improve community resilience, lags significantly behind finance channelled toward
including disaster risk management strategies and mitigation (12 percent to adaptation compared with 88
early warning systems. percent to mitigation). As a result, adaptation projects
are unevenly distributed across South Africa, with most
• Limited investments in the just transition, from concentrated in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal
public, private, international, and domestic provinces according to a recent study.
sources. Although climate and just transition finance
flows have grown significantly in recent years,
these still fall short of South Africa’s annual need, The race to reduce
especially for adaptation. Tracked annual climate
finance reached R131 billion per annum on aver-
GHG emissions
age in 2019–21, an all-time high, but still far from South Africa is currently the 14th-largest GHG
the average annual estimated needs of R334–R535 emitter in the world, and the largest emitter on
billion per annum. the African continent. The production of coal-based
electricity is the largest contributor to South Africa’s
The race to build climate emissions, accounting for more than half of the coun-
try’s emissions. South Africa’s GHG emissions increased
resilience during the 2000s, peaking in 2009 before decreasing
during the 2010s. According to the latest data, in 2022
South Africa’s vulnerability to climate change has
South Africa emitted an estimated 479 million tons of
steadily increased. According to recent data, the coun-
carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) (excluding for-
try’s food and water sectors are the most vulnerable to
estry and other land-use changes), slightly lower than
climate change due to projected changes in its cereal
the emissions levels of 2000.
yields, low capacity to acquire and deploy agriculture
technology, existing water scarcity, and limited dam As a Party to the Paris Agreement under the
storage capacity per capita. South Africa’s readiness to United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
leverage public and private investments for adaptation mate Change (UNFCCC) (along with 194 other
action has decreased due to high and persistent social countries), South Africa is committed to the global
inequality, a comparatively complex business environ- goal of reducing GHG emissions to limit warm-
ment, and declining state capacity. ing to well below 2°C while making best efforts to
meet 1.5°C. South Africa has set targets for reducing
Considering the significant risks South Africa faces
GHG emissions through 2030. The country’s revised
because of climate change (floods, droughts, heat
nationally determined contribution (NDC), which was
waves, other extreme weather events), national
submitted to the UNFCCC in 2021, sets a commit-
policies and commitments have set out a compre-
ment for national GHG emissions to be in the range of
hensive approach to building climate resilience. The
398–510 MtCO2e in 2025 and 350–420 MtCO2e in
implementation of these commitments has, however,
2030. External analysis shows that the lower end of the
been sluggish. For example, only 28 of the 95 actions
mitigation target in 2030 (i.e., 350 MtCO2e) almost
outlined by the National Climate Change Adaptation
aligns with a global trajectory of limiting warming to
Strategy are listed as fully implemented or currently
1.5°C. South Africa has also set an aspirational goal for
being implemented.
reaching net zero CO2 emissions by 2050, as articu-
lated in its Low Emissions Development Strategy and
the national Just Transition Framework. South Africa
aims to submit an updated NDC to the UNFCCC in
2025 in line with global agreements, setting updated
and strengthened targets for 2030 and 2035. Strength-
ened emissions reduction targets will align with global
imperatives for collectively reducing emissions while
maximizing local opportunities around a measured
and planned transition at a pace and scale South
Africa can afford.
South Africa is on track to meet its 2025 GHG

emissions target and, according to the government’s
draft Sectoral Emissions Target (SET) Report, the
low target of the 2030 NDC (350 MtCO2e) could
be achieved with more ambitious actions in the
electricity and transport sectors. The report cautions,
however, that if key policies—such as the 2019 IRP
with its prescribed electricity build and decommis-
sioning plans—are not achieved, the 2030 target in
the NDC may not be achieved. This is pertinent given
Eskom’s recent decision to further delay the decom-
missioning of three of its oldest coal-fired power plants
(Camden, Grootvlei, and Hendrina).
over the past decade due in part to increasing climate

Four necessary sectoral change impacts, and production practices contribute
transitions to address to the challenge.
climate change and achieve Entrenched spatial, racial, and gender inequality
hinders the capacity of South Africa’s estimated
a just transition 2 million small-scale farmers to mitigate and
The report examines four sectors and the needed manage the impacts of climate change. Small-scale
transitions to address climate change and achieve farmers face limited participation and ownership in
a just transition in South Africa. These sectors were agricultural activities: around 70 percent of all agricul-
selected because of their vulnerability amidst a chang- tural income is earned by less than 7 percent of farmers.
ing climate (agriculture and water) and due to their This is especially true for black and female small-scale
outsized role in driving GHG emissions (energy supply farmers: black South Africans are estimated to represent
and transport). just a quarter of all formal farm owners, and women
are still required by most tribal authorities to acquire
Agriculture land through their husbands or male relatives. Whereas
commercial farmers have marshalled the resources
South Africa’s climate and development policy required to invest in drip irrigation, more resilient crop
framework enshrines small-scale agriculture as a varieties, and other technologies to adapt to climate
key entry point for action that furthers climate change, small-scale farmers largely require tailored
resilience, livelihoods, and household food security government support and financial incentives to do so in
in rural areas. Although South Africa has been food a way that addresses their diverse needs.
secure at the national level for decades, many South
Africans rely on subsistence or small-scale agriculture More efficient water usage, meaningful land reform
to combat household food insecurity, which affects efforts, and accelerated uptake of climate-smart
one-fifth of households. Agriculture is also the pri- agriculture (CSA) practices are key to South Afri-
mary economic activity in rural areas, where poverty is ca’s realisation of a more equal and climate-resilient
disproportionately prevalent. The productivity of South agriculture sector. However, land reform efforts,
Africa’s agriculture sector, however, has fluctuated which have largely failed to meaningfully change land-
holding patterns, will only prove an effective lever to
address climate, development, and agricultural chal- an integrated management approach that improves
lenges with more transparent, efficient, and equitable resilience and ecosystem health. Supportive strategies
processes. The adoption of CSA practices by small-scale under this shift include using an adaptive integrated
farmers, which has varied across the country, could also water resources management approach, leveraging
be accelerated by strengthening the capacity of agricul- ecological infrastructure, protection of strategic water
tural extension agents; building partnerships between resource areas, and repairing and upgrading existing
extension agents and farmers, both small-scale and infrastructure.
commercial; improving small-scale farmers’ access to
Third, achieving the goal of universal water and
capital; and enhancing the design of CSA technologies
sanitation access will require building the human
to better meet farmers’ diverse needs.
resource, financial, and technical capacity of ser-
Concurrent transformative shifts are also needed to vice providers while also looking for innovative
ensure that South Africa’s agricultural production solutions for areas that are hard to reach with tra-
system is prepared to withstand the more severe ditional, centralised water and sanitation. This shift
climate impacts that are projected over the coming will require both improving and maintaining existing
decades. This includes diversifying crops to include services by addressing the challenges currently facing
those that can better withstand extreme conditions water and sanitation service providers and extending
and ensuring vulnerable groups, especially black and service provision to places that currently lack adequate
female farmers operating at a small scale, can design service, especially informal settlements and rural/tra-
and implement the adaptation measures that work best ditional areas. Finally, shifts are also needed to ensure
in their communities. that water is allocated in the most efficient and equi-
table manner, which can be enabled through better
Water water conservation and demand management, water
supply augmentation, and reallocation among users.
The water sector is extremely sensitive to climate Greater investment is needed in the sector to sup-
change. Changes in rainfall, temperature, and extreme port these shifts.
weather events brought on by climate change may
worsen many water sector issues, including water
quantity and quality challenges. Climate change is
Energy supply
anticipated to increase existing water scarcity in South South Africa is facing severe electricity security
Africa, making it more challenging to close the exist- challenges, with load shedding increasing year
ing gaps in water and sanitation access currently facing on year, causing widespread social and economic
millions of people in the country. Poor and margin- impacts. Despite the country having one of the highest
alised groups face disproportionately high levels of rates of electrification in sub-Saharan Africa, millions
inadequate water and sanitation access. South Africa’s of people are not connected to the grid or are energy
old and poorly maintained water and sanitation infra- poor, leading to a reliance on unsafe energy sources
structure results in significant water loss and does not in these households. Additionally, air pollution from
adequately treat water and wastewater. Further, water activities along the coal value chain has significant det-
allocation is highly unequal, with most of the country’s rimental health and economic impacts.
water allocated to white farmers and businesses. These
Transitioning to a low emissions electricity system
challenges all have implications for human health, the
offers the opportunity to address these challenges
environment, and the economy.
by increasing energy security, access, and afford-
To adapt to climate change and ensure a just tran- ability while improving air quality and health.
sition for the water sector, several key shifts are Energy efficiency improvements also bring quick wins
required. One key shift will be the transition from for reducing emissions, creating jobs, and supporting
conventional planning and engineering solutions to small business development. The energy transition also
adaptive and flexible planning that produces cobene- poses risks, however, especially to those who depend on
fits while providing institutional stability. Integration the coal value chain, which is geographically concen-
of grey and green infrastructure, incorporation of “no trated and accounts for roughly 150,000–200,000 jobs
regrets” strategies that yield benefits in any future throughout the country. These risks must be consid-
climate scenario, and finalising the catchment manage- ered and properly managed, for example, through local
ment authorities would help enable this shift. A second employment diversification, reskilling, and social and
and related shift is required around the way water economic support for displaced workers.
resources and infrastructure are managed to foster
To decarbonise South Africa’s energy supply sys- enforce racial segregation, thereby creating an ineffi-
tem, renewable energy needs to be scaled rapidly cient and inequitable transport system. The minibus
while fossil fuel reliance declines. This report tracks taxi industry helps to fill some of the gaps created
progress across four key indicators that will enable this by this system but has its own safety and affordabil-
transformation: renewable energy capacity, battery ity issues. Concurrently, the automotive sector faces
storage scale-up, coal power capacity, and natural gas significant transition risks because key export mar-
consumption. Total renewable energy capacity in South kets are set to ban the sale of internal combustion
Africa reached 10.4 gigawatts (GW) in 2022, grow- engines by 2035.
ing roughly 1 GW per year since 2015. According to
Aligning South Africa’s transport and automotive
external studies, to decarbonise the energy system by
sectors with the country’s near- and long-term
2050, between 190 and 390 GW of renewable energy
goals for mitigation and a just transition will
capacity will be needed. This will require adding an
require several key shifts while also considering
average of 6–14 GW of renewable capacity per year,
the above challenges. These shifts can be categorised
a significant increase over the historical rate. Battery
as increasing collective and shared transit modes and
storage will be needed alongside renewable energy
decarbonising carbon-intensive modes of transport by
capacity; an estimated 70 GW of battery storage will be
adopting new energy vehicles (NEVs).
needed by 2050, up from the current available capacity
of less than 1 GW. Five indicators are monitored for the transport and
automotive sectors in this report: number of public
As renewable and battery storage capacity increase,
road transport vehicles, private ownership of vehi-
coal capacity must decline with 6 GW of coal
cles, share of NEVs in light-duty vehicle sales, share
coming offline by 2030 and all coal plants decom-
of NEVs in the light-duty vehicle fleet, and num-
missioned by 2042 to achieve decarbonisation by
ber of public charging stations. To decarbonise the
2050. Eskom is behind schedule on decommissioning
transport sector, the number of public road transport
per the targets set in the 2019 IRP and Eskom’s recent
vehicles will need to double by 2050 from the roughly
announcement that it will delay closing Camden,
420,000 vehicles currently in operation. To achieve this
Grootvlei, and Hendrina will put the country even
target, the rate of change over the last five years will
further off track under this indicator. Finally, although
need to accelerate by 1.9 times. Although not covered
natural gas will be used in the medium term for
by this indicator, commercial and passenger rail will
peaking power, it will need to be phased out entirely
also need to increase, with demand increasingly shifting
by 2050 from current consumption levels of roughly
from road to rail transport through 2050. The scale up
88,000 terajoules annually. Natural gas will ideally be
of public transport will help to replace private vehicle
replaced by locally produced green hydrogen as pro-
ownership, which will need to peak at 10 million in
duction capacity increases.
2035—up from 8.2 million in 2023—and then decline
For each indicator, large gaps persist between to 6 million by 2050.
historical trajectories and future targets aligned
As private vehicle ownership peaks during the next
with South Africa’s 2050 net zero CO2 emissions
decade, an increasing share of vehicle sales will need
target. There is, however, evidence to suggest that
to be NEVs. NEVs currently represent less than half a
adoption of clean technologies, including renewable
percent of total light-duty vehicle sales but will need to
energy like wind and solar, may follow rapid, nonlinear
reach 30 percent of sales by 2030 and 100 percent by
growth trajectories when supported by effective pol-
2035. As NEV sales increase, so will the share of NEVs
icy and financing.
in the vehicle fleet. This share will need to increase
from its current value of less than half a percent to 6
Transport and automotive percent in 2030 and 100 percent in 2050. Charging
The transport and automotive sectors are key infrastructure will need to concurrently increase from
economic and employment contributors for South an estimated 300 existing public charging stations to
Africa and will be vital to the country’s just transi- 30,000–45,000 by 2035.
tion. The public transport system is currently plagued
Rapid acceleration is required across all five indica-
by accessibility, affordability, and safety challenges, and
tors to get on track. Fortunately, as with the energy
its workers and infrastructure are highly exposed to
sector, adoption of clean technologies like NEVs may
climate change impacts. Addressing these challenges is
grow more rapidly than expected—surpassing linear
made more difficult by apartheid-era spatial planning
projections for growth—if supported with the requisite
and transport policies that were used to implement and
enabling conditions noted above.
SECTION 1.
The environment for

climate action
CHAPTER 1.
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY

CONTEXT
South Africa faces significant economic and social imperative first emerged in South Africa in 1992 at the
challenges that impact climate action. The country Earthlife Africa conference and more explicitly under
faces the triple burden of high levels of poverty, unem- the labour movement spearheaded by the Congress of
ployment, and inequality: more than half of South South African Trade Unions in 2009 (Hallowes and
Africans continue to live under the poverty line (World Munnik 2023; PCC 2022b; Thorpe 1992). In recent
Bank 2023b), a third of the South African workforce years, the just transition agenda has also become a
is unemployed (World Bank 2023b), and South Africa top priority of government, civil society, and busi-
remains one of the most unequal countries in the world ness. South Africa agreed to an US$8.5 billion Just
(World Bank 2022). Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with the United
States, the European Union, France, Germany, and the
These triple challenges highlight the need for a just
United Kingdom in 2021. Following this, in 2022,
transition. Addressing the triple challenges requires that
South Africa adopted the country’s first national Just
a transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy
Transition Framework, building on recommendations
improves the lives and livelihoods of South Africans,
from the PCC, which set out a unifying vision for a
particularly those most impacted by the transition.
just transition alongside principles and actions to guide
South Africa has been working on a just transition this transition (Box 1). Most recently, South Africa has
for several years, though this agenda has taken off at prepared an investment plan for the JETP that aims to
national scale in the past five years. The just transition
Box 1 • Defining a just transition for South Africa
The Just Transition Frameworka provides a shared definition of a just transition for South Africa, building on the processes
facilitated by the National Economic Development and Labour Councilb and the National Planning Commission,c the definition
articulated in the draft Climate Change Bill,d and the views expressed in the stakeholder consultations and community engage-
ments facilitated by the Presidential Climate Commission.e Thus, this report follows the definition put forward by the framework,
which maintains that a just transition is one that:
• aims to achieve a quality life for all South Africans, to increase the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate, foster
climate resilience, and reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, in line with best available science;
• contributes to the goals of decent work for all, social inclusion, and the eradication of poverty;
• puts people at the centre of decision-making, especially those most impacted—the poor, women, people with disabilities, and
the youth—empowering and equipping them for new opportunities of the future; and
• builds the resilience of the economy and people through affordable, decentralised, diversely owned renewable energy
systems; conservation of natural resources; equitable access of water resources; an environment that is not harmful to one’s
health and well-being; and sustainable, equitable, inclusive land use for all, especially for the most vulnerable.
Moreover, the Just Transition Framework is guided by three pillars of justice drawn from literature on the just transition,f consulta-
tions facilitated by the PCC,g and international best practice guidelinesh:
• Distributive justice: ensuring that both the benefits and costs of climate change and its responses are equally shared.
• Restorative justice: ensuring that historical damages to people, communities, and the environment are addressed, recti-
fied, and ameliorated.
• Procedural justice: ensuring that all voices are at the table and heard.
Sources: a. PCC 2022b; b. NEDLAC 2020; c. NPC 2020; d. Republic of South Africa 2022; e. PCC 2022a, 2022b; f. McCauley and Heffron 2018;
Cahill and Allen 2020; g. PCC 2022b; h. Olsen and La Hovary 2021.
Section 1. The environment for climate action • 9

guide the funding in a transparent and effective manner Figure 1.1. presents a simplified, top-down depiction
while identifying areas to bridge the investment gaps of the growing movement of climate action and the
toward US$100 billion. just transition in South Africa, though there has been a
plethora of bottom-up, subnational efforts that have led
and pushed many of the listed events and milestones.
Figure 1.1 • A simplified, top-down depiction of the growing movement of climate action and the just transition
CLIMATE JUST TRANSITION

The just transition imperative emerges in environmental justice
1992
discussions during the Earthlife Africa conference.
South Africa shows unequivocal commitment to the environ-

1996
ment in the drafting of its Constitution.
South Africa ratifies the UNFCCC. 1997
South Africa ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. 2002
COP15: South Africa pledges 34% under BAU emissions by Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) highlights
2009
2020 and 42% by 2025 under the Copenhagen Accord. the importance of the just transition.
The National Climate Change Response White Paper The NCCRP refers to just transition, focusing on green jobs
(NCCRP) is published, which outlines South Africa’s long-term 2011 and skills.
climate strategy, including provisions for carbon pricing.
South Africa adopts a National Development Plan (NDP)

2013 with a focus on environmental sustainability and charting an
equitable transition to a low-carbon economy.
South Africa ratifies the Paris Agreement and submits its first South Africa is the first (and only) country to explicitly note the
intended nationally determined contribution (NDC), 2016 just transition imperative in its first NDC.
which specified peak emissions between 2020 and 2025.
South Africa’s Climate Change bill (CCB), which outlines Presidential Jobs Summit establishes the Presidential Climate
the State’s emission targets and adaptation plans, is published 2018 Change Coordinating Commission to oversee and coordinate
for public comment. the just transition for South Africa.
South Africa submits its long-term low-GHG emission devel-

opment strategy (LT-LEDS) to the UNFCCC, and adopts the
Integrated Resource Plan, which outlines the expansion 2019
of electricity supply. The DFFE also passes the National Cli-
mate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS).
President Cyril Ramaphosa constitutes the Presidential The PCC comprises Commissioners from all major social part-
Climate Commission (PCC), which would independently ners to forge consensus and partnership on the just transition,
2020
advise on the country’s climate change response and path- including with government ministers.
ways to a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy, and society.
South Africa updates its NDC to target a range of 398 - 510 South Africa is the first country to agree to a US$8.5 billion
MtCO2e by 2025 and 350 – 420 MtCO2e by 2030. 2021 Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with the EU,
UK and USA.
South Africa commits to net-zero carbon emissions by The PCC sets out a unifying objective for a just transition in the
2050 in its Long-Term Strategy, also reflected in the Just Transi- country’s first national Just Transition Framework. Just
tion Framework. 2022 transition is also introduced in the CCB. In November, the
Presidential Climate Finance Task Team (PCFTT) releases its
Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP).
South Africa’s National Assembly approves the CCB, which South Africa tables a detailed Just Energy Transition
awaits further approval from the National Council of Provinces Implementation Plan, including with a specific focus
2023
and the President. on skills development and economic diversification for the
coal-dominated Mpumalanga province.
Notes: BAU = business as usual; DFFE = Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment; GHG = greenhouse gas; UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
CHAPTER 2.
GOVERNANCE, IMPLEMENTATION
CAPACITY, AND FINANCE
Although South Africa has signalled strong commit- transition for South Africa but also impacts investor
ments to addressing climate change (Chapter 1), there confidence and therefore the necessary capital flows.
has been a notable disparity between policy ambitions
Limited human and technical capacity and resources
and practical outcomes. Indeed, South Africa is often
in South Africa are key obstacles to effective climate
described as a policy-rich, implementation-poor coun-
governance. There is limited understanding of cli-
try (Botha 2022). South Africa currently contends with
mate change and its impacts across both government
carbon-intensive growth, socioeconomic challenges,
bodies and local communities, exacerbated by outdated
and chronic energy insecurity, which hamper progress.
climate information in integrated development plans
This section examines the various drivers of South Afri- (Sibiya et al. 2023). Inadequate technical capacity not
ca’s political economy that either enable or challenge only hampers development and implementation quality
climate and just transition policies and their effective but also makes it difficult to garner political will to
implementation: governance (of both national and address climate and just transition issues (Averchen-
local government), public trust, the key stakeholders, kova et al. 2019).
and capital flows. Specific mitigation and adaptation
Fragmentation, contrasting policies, and contradictory
as well as sectoral policy implementation concerns are
government positions have created policy uncertainty
explored in later chapters; this chapter aims to out-
in the country, including around the just transition.
line the underlying conditions in which they exist and
Limited public cohesion on climate action—not only
their implications for South Africa’s climate and just
between stakeholders but also between policies and
transition goals.
government departments—has created conflicting
priorities and guidance on how to achieve South
Governance Africa’s climate goals. For example, there is a discon-
nect between the nationally determined contribution
A notable disparity exists between policy ambitions and (NDC) and the 2023 integrated resource plan (IRP)
practical outcomes in South Africa’s approach to cli- because independent modelling indicates that the
mate action. Improved governance structures—capable IRP does not adhere to NDC targets. These policies
of efficiently navigating and enacting these policies into and regulations are often at odds, perhaps because
tangible results—are critically needed. the Presidency; Department of Forestry, Fisheries and
Governance and structural issues continue to impair the Environment (DFFE); Department of Mineral
the implementation of climate and just transition Resources and Energy (DMRE); and the National
policies. Structural challenges include poor clarity on Treasury are pushing ahead with policies and frame-
roles and responsibilities of environmental competen- works without appropriate alignment between the
cies within the government, government departments players. Successful climate action in South Africa
working in silos, a lack of support to the local sphere therefore requires explicit alignment of all policies
of government, and a poor alignment of policies and to mitigate mixed messaging and dissent. The forth-
programmes (Averchenkova et al. 2019). Enhancing coming Climate Change Bill, which is expected to be
governance and implementation capabilities will require enacted later in 2024, aims to address this by “fostering
significant systemic changes to institutional capacity institutional coherence and enhance climate change
and structure. Some of the most prominent governance adaptation governance across the spheres, national and
issues are related to nonalignment of policy priori- sub-national layers of government in South Africa”
ties and disagreements over approach and definition (Republic of South Africa 2021b).
of issues, to which capacity deficiencies contribute. Corruption in the public sector has left South Africa
Uncertainty over the direction of climate change and with weakened institutional conditions that impede
energy policy, exacerbated by a lack of political will and an effective and just low-carbon transition for the
“distracted leadership,” not only stymie an effective country. Specifically, the impacts of state capture1 have

materialised in recent climate-related disaster events.
The abuse of public funds has exhausted current
Local government action
capital reserves (Masuku 2019) that could have been Local governments are tasked with providing basic
invested in stronger adaptation measures (see Chapter services to communities in South Africa, but they face
5) or used to help mitigate impacts of environmen- challenges in discharging their mandates, with implica-
tal hazards, such as the landslide damage from the tions for climate action. Thus, they are a critical sphere
recent KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) floods (Evans 2022b). of government in ensuring climate action, including
Although chasing down corrupt or captured officials responding to climate-related disasters, local economic
and leaders is necessary, it is still insufficient for effec- development, implementing adaptation plans and activ-
tive and accountable governance (Makgetla 2021a; ities, providing infrastructure, and land-use planning
Masuku 2019). Effective solutions require systemic and management. However, local governments face
changes to block illegitimate influences on government many challenges in discharging their mandate—some
decision-making and implementation processes. of which stem from the national level, and others that
are self-inflicted. There are also structural problems. As
A more robust monitoring, evaluation, and learning
such, local government has had inconsistent success in
framework could help to track the effectiveness of
climate initiatives and action. This is problematic for
policy implementation and its contribution to achieving
climate action given that many environmental duties lie
climate and just transition goals. Additionally, bolster-
at the local level (Glasser and Wright 2020).
ing political will across government tiers and aligning
local initiatives with national directives—as will be The misalignment between local initiatives and national
covered in the following section—are imperative for directives is significant. A disconnect exists between
coherent policy execution. policymaking and implementation (particularly when
implementers are required to fund policies that they
did not develop) (Low 2022). National economic
policy and local economic development and planning Local governments are also constrained in terms of
are also disjointed because national strategies and local capacity. Local governments often lack technical
investments are generally not pursued in consultation expertise and skills, including softer skills that enable
with metropolitan municipalities and often do not con- them to build relationships and partnerships within
sider local development plans (CoGTA 2016). government, the private sector, and the broader com-
munity (Pers. Comm. 2024c; SACN 2022). Capacity
There are structural issues in the way spheres of gov-
challenges also include positions being filled based on
ernment are arranged, and local governments generally
political allegiance (not skills) and the lack of skilled
lack support. Constitutionally, local governments
financial officers, especially in smaller municipalities and
are equal but autonomous partners to national and
rural areas (SACN 2022). Gaps in capacity and skills
provincial governments. However, due to political
are more glaring in smaller municipalities.
arrangements and party structures, which are hierarchi-
cal by their nature, there has been a general weakening Chronic capacity constraints and insufficient budget
of the voice of local governments, with more impor- allocations also lead to an endless cycle of funding
tance given to provincial (rather than local) leaders and shortages. The Department of Water and Sanitation
officials (SACN 2022)—especially in terms of project (DWS), for example, is forced to repeatedly provide
and financial management—which exacerbates existing underperforming municipalities with grants to repair
problems with budget spending and service delivery. water services infrastructure due to poor mainte-
Local governments also lack support from national nance and operation by municipalities. Municipalities
and provincial governments. Specifically for climate are losing about 1.66 billion/cubic meter (m3) per
change action at a local level, some local government year through nonrevenue water (i.e., water lost
departments are unaware of how to select, prioritise, through leaks and similar issues), at an approximate
and implement climate actions (Pers. Comm. 2024c). cost of R6/m3, which amounts to R9.9 billion each
There is a need for a single repository of climate year (DWS 2018).
information as well as likely benefits to building a
Local government actions are stymied by poor man-
community of practice among local officials from across
agement and a lack of enforcement mechanisms for
the country who are grappling with similar challenges
service delivery. In early 2023, the Presidency stated
(Pers. Comm. 2024c).
that 163 out of 257 municipalities were dysfunctional
Local governments’ potential contributions to the due to poor governance, ineffective and sometimes
climate response are constrained by a lack of financial corrupt financial and administrative management,
resources. The financial model used for local govern- and poor service delivery and planning (Presidency of
ment is inherently unsustainable. Municipalities rely the Republic of South Africa 2023). The number of
mainly on revenue collection to operate effectively, municipalities that need state intervention continues to
through tariffs for basic services, and receive the small- grow (AGSA 2022; Thusi and Selepe 2023). Accord-
est proportion of funding from the state compared ing to Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs,
with other spheres of government—approximately 10 in 2023, a total of R1.7 billion was withheld from
percent (National Treasury 2023). If municipalities are 15 municipalities across seven provinces due to the
unable to generate sufficient income through revenue failure of municipalities to adhere to budgetary regula-
collection for municipal services, there is a limited bud- tions (CoGTA 2023).
get for all local-level services, even as the need to make
System and process deficiencies also impact service
such services climate resilient is increasing. The South
delivery at the local government level. Corruption and
African Cities Network reports that due to a deteriorat-
cadre deployment,2 which are much more prevalent
ing economic outlook, the COVID pandemic, austerity
in local rather than national government (Xolani et
measures, and other poor economic conditions, fewer
al. 2022), are often strong indicators of governance
households are paying their service delivery bills, lead-
failure and are primary drivers for depleting the fund-
ing to increased service debt (SACN 2022). Additional
ing required for effective service delivery (Ndevu and
funding is provided to local government through
Muller 2018). Following record-breaking rainfall and
conditional grants, but due to capacity constraints and
flooding in 2022, the Auditor-General of South Africa
poor financial management and oversight, these grants
found that failure to embed preventative controls, a
can often go unspent (Kruuse 2023). With additional
lack of effective leadership, and restricted human and
climate-related responsibilities, local governments are
financial resources slowed disaster response and relief
under increased pressure to provide services that do
provision to communities in KZN and the Eastern
not have a budget allocation—a provision that is not
Cape (AGSA 2022).
stipulated in the Climate Change Bill.

Despite these challenges, there are innovative examples in the President, ruling party, and state institutions
of successful climate response strategies at the local and departments were well below 50 precent, and
level. Some local governments have adopted custom- trust in courts of law and the Public Protector were
ised responses to climate change that are a better fit at 43 percent and 42 percent, respectively (Moosa
for their specific type of municipality. This assists with and Hofmeyr 2021).
resource constraints and provides tailored solutions to a
Climate change remains a low public priority and is not
complex problem. Some municipalities have developed
often top of mind in the country’s political conscious-
myriad strategies to deal with various aspects of climate
ness, though energy issues remain at the forefront.
change and developed task teams and partnerships with
Thus, there is little public pressure and few political
organisations and companies to assist with resourcing
costs for misalignment with climate ambition (Calland
and response planning. Greater support from national
2023). Both top-down and bottom-up communication
and provincial governments is required to assist all local
of climate and just transitions concerns suffer from a
governments to overcome the diagnosed challenges
lack of discourse on the topic, which has dampened
and effectively mitigate and adapt to climate change.
progress on South Africa’s ability to implement effec-
tive transition interventions. Essential to building
Trust in public institutions public trust in national directives to address climate
and transition-related issues is to engage the key actors
Public support and trust in public institutions are identified in Section 2.5.
important pillars in facilitating just and equitable cli-
mate action, though levels of trust in government are
currently low. Trust in institutions is an important pre- Key actors accelerating or
requisite to implement climate change adaptation and
mitigation policies (Dirksmeier et al. 2023). Moreover,
hampering progress on
social injustices arising from low-carbon transitions can climate change and a just
be detected from public opinions, especially from those
who are directly affected (Wang and Lo 2021).
transition
Stakeholders in the South African policy landscape—
Several surveys indicate low levels of trust in gov- including those who represent affected communities
ernment to oversee and facilitate a just transition. In (e.g., forums, associations, councillors, etc.); NGOs
a recent PCC/Human Sciences Research Council and civil society organisations (CSOs); and district,
(HSRC) survey (elaborated further in Chapter 3), regional, and national government representatives—by
respondents assigned greater responsibility for prevent- and large acknowledge the threat of climate change and
ing climate change from worsening to environmental need for climate action (PCC 2022a). However, many
groups and large companies over the national gov- within these various groups maintain their own agendas
ernment. Respondents also assigned individuals more or those of their respective constituencies, which leads
responsibility than local and foreign governments, to competing priorities in the country’s transition to
which could indicate that South Africans largely dis- a more just, low-carbon economy. Stakeholders of the
trust public institutions to address the climate crisis. transition, therefore, essentially fall in two camps: those
Moreover, according to the 2023 Edelman Trust who drive (or delay) the policy and those who are
Barometer, South Africans generally trust business affected by policy changes. In some cases, these groups
and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) more overlap. But often the former neglects the needs of
than government. Two-thirds of respondents from the latter. For example, though some South African
the Edelman study felt that government was a source companies and industry associations endorse advanc-
of misleading information as opposed to business (25 ing policies that enable renewable energy growth,
percent) and NGOs (23 percent). Only one-third of major industry players continue to oppose key climate
South Africans in the study indicated that they trusted policies and have yet to begin transition planning
the government to do what is right in terms of cli- (InfluenceMap 2023).
mate change, and less than half felt the same about
business (Edelman 2023). The latest in a series of It is thus important to highlight the key players who
repeated surveys conducted by Afrobarometer found affect the drivers of change in South African climate
that the trust of South Africans in public institutions and just transition policy development. Table A-1
is the lowest since the study began in 2006 and was in Appendix A provides a full list of relevant actors
declining (Moosa and Hofmeyr 2021). Only media involved in South Africa’s policy landscape based on
broadcasters and the Department of Health had a trust several existing stakeholder maps, notably those put
proportion of above 50 percent of respondents. Trust together by the Presidential Climate Commission
(PCC) and Climate Investment Funds (CIF). Table net zero by 2050 (WBA 2021). This includes setting
A-1 seeks mainly to identify the key players in climate interim emissions reduction targets, supporting sup-
and just transition policy decision-making as well as pliers in reducing their GHG emissions, and having
the communities affected by such decisions. It does management-level expertise on climate while ensuring
not chart out the power dynamics of these actors at incentives are decoupled from fossil fuel growth.
this time, but this may be adopted in future iterations
Despite the PCC and other governmental efforts to
of this exercise, informed by consultations with rele-
be more inclusive of stakeholders, private corporations
vant stakeholders.
have had more say in the nature and pace of change
A handful of key industry players continue to command whereas affected communities and civil society voices
much of the resource development and distribution, are often sidelined (Mathe et al. 2023). Nongovern-
political discourse, and policy influence in South Africa. ment stakeholders and CSOs play an essential role in
Historically, South Africa’s economy has been driven holding the state accountable to its own legislation,
largely by sectoral interlinkages and policy relationships policies, and targets while representing communities,
between public and private economic actors in the creating public awareness of climate change and actions
energy and extractive (mining and minerals) indus- by the state to deal with climate change, and ensur-
tries, often referred to as the minerals-energy complex ing the needs of their constituencies are considered
(MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). The influence of (Amansure 2022). Exclusion of such groups exacer-
the MEC enabled an economic dependence on coal bates the disenfranchisement that communities already
through strong political alliances with state actors such feel. Consequently, a present lack of funding for these
as the DMRE, which tends to not provide the enabling organisations is further hindering meaningful participa-
environment necessary to support widespread adoption tion in a full democratic process.
of renewable energy. Additionally, lenient lobbying
Moreover, many listed and private companies are
regulations enable companies to avoid disclosing their
directly impacted by the transition from fossil fuels,
activities and their access to “non-public engagement
with only a proportion undertaking medium- to
pathways” to influence policy, limiting transparency
long-term planning to adapt to the transition (WBA
(Mathe et al. 2023).
2021). There remains a gap in private companies’ just
The presence and power of the MEC has, however, transition planning processes to minimise transition
dwindled considerably in recent years. Beyond a shift in risk and negative impacts and to promote the competi-
national direction toward net zero emissions, decreas- tiveness of South African companies in the low-carbon
ing costs of renewables against rising and volatile costs economy. However, this is not entirely the fault of
for coal have shifted private investment toward cleaner the individual enterprises themselves; as discussed in
alternatives while also weakening the economic signifi- Section 2.1, policy uncertainty and lack of political
cance of the coal value chain (Baker and Burton 2023). consensus at the national level makes planning for the
Following a legacy of corruption and state capture, transition difficult.
many of the relationships that were central to the MEC
Though workers in these industries and the
have also come undone. Yet the low-carbon transition
communities that rely on them generally agree that
will require key minerals (e.g., copper, manganese, and
climate change is increasing vulnerabilities and that
rare earth minerals) that are abundant in South Africa
rising emissions need to be addressed, some also
to support the development of clean technological
find that the transition and climate action are being
alternatives. Thus, the MEC will remain a relevant and
deployed too hastily (PCC 2022a). Some feel that
significant player in the South African economy even
international pressure is prompting the South African
after fossil fuels are transitioned out, albeit one that is
government to act fast rather than carefully, and many
more decarbonised.
important stakeholders are often not consulted, leaving
Two of the major players in the MEC are Eskom (the these communities feeling disenfranchised. Following
state-owned electricity utility) and Sasol (the major pet- the Komati Power Station closure, for example, the
rochemicals company). These two companies are the impacts on the workers and surrounding communities
largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters in South Africa, created tensions and highlights the need to involve the
and both recently have committed to achieving net stakeholders and communities that are directly affected
zero emissions by 2050 (Bega 2021; Lenferna 2021). by the transition (see Section 8.1. for the just transition
However, the World Benchmarking Alliance found that lessons learned from Komati). Global experiences
both companies still have room for improvement in with coal closures indicate that giving fair warning
aligning company policy and further advancing credi- of closures, several years at least, is key to the process
ble transition plans to showcase how they will achieve and to letting people manage their lives; however,

the government’s refusal to commit to timelines for Figure 2.1 • Breakdown of financing sources in South
closures impedes effective planning for training and Africa, 2019–2021
redeployment. Ensuring affected communities and
workers are not just heard and accounted for but are
also part of the policy design and decision-making Concession 2% Grant 1%
process is required to foster the procedural justice Government 4%
principles under the Just Transition Framework.
Finance Equity 18%
Finance for climate change and a just transition cur-

rently fall short of South Africa’s needs. The climate
transition will require considerable financial resources
from multiple sources. The estimated total cost
of decarbonisation, adaptation, and just transition
measures until 2050 is approximately R8.5 trillion
Debt 75%
(World Bank 2022).
Climate finance flows have grown significantly in

recent years but still fall short of what South Africa
requires annually to reach its climate targets (de
Source: De Aragão Fernandes et al. 2023.
Aragão Fernandes et al. 2023). Tracked annual cli-
mate finance reached R131 billion per annum on
average in 2019–21, an all-time high, but still far from
the average annual estimated needs of R334–R535
billion per annum. Figure 2.2 • Breakdown of the funding allocations
by types of projects in South Africa,
The majority of tracked climate finance (2019–21) 2019–2021
came from domestic sources, with only 9 percent from
international sources. Most funding came from private
actors, including commercial sources, corporations, Dual Benefits 7%
philanthropists or donors, NGOs, and households
(de Aragão Fernandes et al. 2023). Of private finance,
98 percent was domestic. Most financial flows were Adaptation 12%
through debt instruments with a borrowing cost of
between 10 percent and 12 percent (see Figure 2.1
for a breakdown of finance sources). Other finance
flows were through tracked equity finance, government
expenditure, concessional debt, and grants (de Aragão
Fernandes et al. 2023).
The overwhelming majority of funding was allocated to

mitigation projects versus adaptation projects. Fig-
ure 2.2 provides a breakdown of funding allocations Mitigation 81%
by project type.
Most private and public sector spending was directed

at clean energy projects. Climate finance for agricul- Source: De Aragão Fernandes et al. 2023
ture, forestry, and other land use as well as for water
(wastewater and drought) expanded over the last two
years. There was a reduction in the tracked climate
finance for low-carbon transport (de Aragão Fernandes
et al. 2023). Increased concessional and grant funding,
blended finance, and increased funds for adaptation
activities are clearly needed.
CHAPTER 3.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND

ATTITUDES ABOUT CLIMATE
CHANGE AND A JUST TRANSITION
In 2023, the PCC partnered with the HSRC to con- as well as community members in Mpumalanga using
duct the first nationally representative survey on the in-depth interviews (Mohlakoana et al. 2023). The
just transition. Although previous surveys on climate results showed that most interviewees (72 percent)
change had been done (e.g., Chapman et al. 2023; were aware of the possibility of mine closures and
Poortinga et al. 2004), relatively little was known expressed concern (78 percent) that this would impact
about public perceptions of the just transition in South their jobs and ability to support their families. Despite
Africa. This section presents previous research on pub- the concerns about the transition, respondents over-
lic attitudes and opinions and makes comparisons with whelmingly (94 percent) did not want their children
the recent PCC/HSRC survey on the just transition. to go into coal mining and recognised a link between
coal, air pollution, and health issues (Mohlakoana et
al. 2023). Interviewees did not trust the government
Previous research on to administer the just transition aid and would prefer
attitudes and perceptions aid be delivered by an independent body not affiliated
with the government. Regarding reskilling, respon-
about climate change dents perceived renewable energy as a nascent industry
and the just transition in and did not want to receive training for a job that did
South Africa not have opportunities readily available (Mohlakoana
et al. 2023). Although this study is based on a small
The South African public ranks environmental prob- sample of respondents in coal-dependent communities
lems and climate change very low on the list of priority and is not representative of the broader community
issues facing the country (Ipsos 2022; Mpako and Gov- in these localities, it does provide insight into per-
indasamy 2023). Surveys show that unemployment, ceptions of vulnerability and preferred social policy
cost of living/inflation, crime and corruption, and choices in the context of the just transition. As more
service delivery issues tend to be the highest-ranked research evidence becomes available on these dynam-
concerns (Ipsos 2022; Mpako and Govindasamy ics, decision-makers will be able to determine whether
2023).3 These issues, in turn, tend be given higher this initial evidence is indicative of more general
political priority as well. Although economics, safety, public sentiment.
and service delivery concerns are undoubtedly of crit-
However, a larger group of national stakeholders were
ical importance, climate change is likely to exacerbate
more positive about the benefits the transition might
many of these issues and other existing challenges in
bring. More than 750 stakeholders representing key
South Africa over the next two or three decades. The
social partner groups (government, business, labour,
relatively low ranking of environmental issues, how-
civil society) were consulted over 13 months in
ever, does not necessarily mean that South Africans
2018–19 through workshops and meetings spanning
are unconcerned about the impact that environmental
all provinces to collect feedback to update the National
shocks are having on society and their lives. In fact,
Development Plan 2020 (Monteith 2019). During the
direct survey questions on environmental and climate
engagements, stakeholders indicated that they viewed
change concerns find that South Africans report con-
job creation through the renewable energy sector as a
siderable degrees of concern.
major opportunity of the transition (Monteith 2019).
Recent research reveals concern about the impacts of Other frequently cited opportunities associated with
the just transition in South Africa among those mostly the just transition included using renewable energy
likely to be directly impacted. In a recently published to replace coal; increasing climate change awareness,
study, researchers assessed policy perceptions of 51 education, and climate-sensitive behaviours; and
current and former coal miners and Eskom workers

opportunities around small scale agriculture, climate- conceptual model to guide the survey design and
smart agriculture and improving water conservation, analysis (see Appendix B for more details on the
and strengthening food security. conceptual model).
Key challenges to achieving a just transition mentioned The survey was structured based on the HSRC’s South
by stakeholders included a lack of government coordi- African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), which has
nation and consultation and insufficient involvement of been administered nationally on an annual basis since
communities and ordinary people in decision-making 2003. Data was collected through face-to-face inter-
(Monteith 2019). These challenges align with the gov- views and questionnaires, which were translated into all
ernance issues facing climate change and just transition South African languages. The survey was undertaken
policy implementation as highlighted in Chapter 2. between August and October 2023 and achieved a
nationally representative sample of 3,103 respondents
In previous studies, stakeholders have been surveyed
aged 16 years or older. The results were weighted to
about what actions would help facilitate a just tran-
ensure the sample matched the demographics of the
sition. The most-mentioned actions fell into four
general population, using Statistics South Africa’s latest
categories: the energy transition (renewable energy,
available midyear population estimates for benchmark-
decentralised energy, affordable energy, more compet-
ing purposes (i.e., the sample size and population is
itive energy market); restoration of land (sustainable
drawn and then weighted such that it is representative
land use, densification of cities, land rehabilitation); safe
of all South African adults). The final weighted pop-
water for all (land-water-energy nexus, fairness in water
ulation therefore represented a little over 43 million
use, enforcing water laws); and green growth (reskilling
respondents aged 16 years and older.
of fossil fuel workers, green economy). These results,
though not nationally representative, give important
insight into the types of policies and actions stakehold- Survey results
ers would support as part of climate action and the
just transition. Climate change perceptions
Half of South Africans (50 percent) reported that they
PCC Survey purpose know a lot or a fair amount about climate change,
which shows a steady improvement in knowledge levels
and approach since this question was first fielded by the HSRC in
The PCC partnered with the HSRC to conduct 2007 (Figure 3.1). However, half of South Africans
the first nationally representative survey on the just currently report knowing little to nothing of climate
transition. The survey included 21 questions to change, despite the increasing prominence of climate
uncover the following: change coverage in the media during the aftermath
of recent climate and weather disasters through-
• Awareness of and concern about climate change out the country.
• Personal experience with extreme weather events One in 10 South Africans display scepticism regarding
• Perception of responsibility for address- the existence of climate change in 2023. This figure is
ing climate change lower than what was recorded in 2020 (16 percent),
but it remains higher than many countries across
• Awareness of the general concept of the energy tran- different world regions (Figure 3.2). More notably,
sition and the phrase just transition specifically
scepticism regarding the cause of climate change
• Support for the transition away from coal remains persistently high among South Africans, with
toward renewable energy and perceived impacts just 17 percent of the public in 2023 saying that the
of such a shift climate has been changing mostly due to human activ-
• Support for various policy measures to mitigate ity and 31 percent saying natural and human causes
against negative impacts of the transition were equally the cause (the corresponding figures
were 20 percent and 27 percent in 2020, respectively).
• Perceptions of who should be involved in and Scepticism that climate change is caused predominantly
responsible for the transition by human activity is high in South Africa compared to
other countries in the world, including other BRICS
In this brief review, a few of the issues from the survey
nations such as India, Russia, and China.
are highlighted. A comprehensive report with all
results will be completed and released in late 2024.
In undertaking the project, the HSRC suggested a
Attributing climate change to human activity in the Figure 3.1 • Climate change awareness, 2007–23:
South African context is not necessarily a precursor for How much, if anything, would you say
being concerned about climate change. Approximately you know about climate change?
two-fifths (41 percent) of South Africans reported
being very or extremely worried about climate change.
Based on correlation analysis, the association between Nothing A little A lot/a fair amount
the cause of climate change and concern about climate
change was significant but moderate in nature (Cram-
100%
er’s V = 0.306).4 This concern level is a slight decrease
from 2017 and 2020 (50 percent), although the pro-
portion of respondents who are not at all or not very 80%
worried has remained mostly steady. At the same time,
most South Africans (74 percent) reported that they or
60%
their families had been impacted by extreme weather
events over the last 10 years to at least a minor extent,
including 13 percent to a great extent. 40%
Experiences varied significantly based on provin-
cial location (see Chapter 4), and such experiences
20%
have a significant effect on levels of concern about
climate change.
0%
South Africans are increasingly likely to feel more per- 2007 2017 2022 2023
sonally responsible for protecting the environment. On
a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal), the sur-
vey asked respondents to rate to what extent they feel a Source: Based on the Human Sciences Research Council’s South African Social Atti-
personal responsibility to protect the environment, and tudes Survey for 2007, 2017, 2022, and 2023.
the mean value was 6.35. This is an increase over the
average value of 5.50 from the 2017 survey. Breaking
down the results by socioeconomic status reveals that
Figure 3.2 • South African views on the cause of climate change in a comparative perspective
50
% of national weighted population
40
30
20
10
0
India
Switzerland
South Africa 2020
South Africa 2023
Russia
Philippines
Slovakia
China
Korea (South)
Australia
United States
Thailand
All-country avg.
Hungary
Norway
Lithuania
New Zealand
Croatia
Austria
Italy
Sweden
Spain
Finland
Taiwan
Denmark
Iceland
Germany
France
Slovenia
Japan
The world’s climate has been changing mostly due to natural processes The world’s climate has not been changing
Source: ISSP 2020; HSRC SASAS 2023 PCC just transition module.

individuals in the wealthier households had a higher However, more people (13 percent) trusted the private
sense of personal responsibility than those in the poorer sector or businesses than local government (10 per-
households. This difference could reflect the fact that cent). The relatively lower trust in local government
environmental concerns tend to be displaced by eco- could be related to the local governance challenges
nomic concerns when basic needs are not being met highlighted in Chapter 2.
and/or because consumption levels and carbon emis-
sions are significantly higher for wealthier households, Just transition perceptions
meaning that they do tend to more directly contribute
to climate change (IEA 2022; Peisker 2023). Less than one-third of South Africans report knowing
a lot about the country moving away from coal to
In terms of institutions that bear the most responsi- renewable energy. It was assumed that there would be
bility for preventing climate change from worsening, low baseline awareness of the phrase just transition,
South Africans were most likely to select environmental therefore, respondents were introduced to the concept
groups (34 percent), large companies (32 percent), by stating the general idea that South Africa is mov-
and the national government (29 percent). Respon- ing away from coal as follows: “Most of South Africa’s
dents could select up to three options. These results electricity currently comes from coal. There are now
may have less to do with who South Africans think is actions being taken to change from coal power to other
to blame for climate change and more to do with the sources of energy (like solar and wind).” Respondents
expectations of institutions to act in the greater inter- were then asked whether they had heard or read about
ests of society. The national government is the entity these efforts. The highest portion of respondents (41
that is most trusted to manage the transition from coal percent) said they had read or heard a little about this,
to other forms of energy sources (Figure 3.3). More whereas 31 percent said they had heard or read quite
than a quarter (26 percent) mentioned they trusted a bit or a lot.
the government, with a tenth mentioning a committee
established by the President, such as the PCC, and a Very few South Africans are familiar with the term just
similar share mentioning local government. Just more transition. Only 9 percent reported having heard it and
than a tenth (13 percent) mentioned businesses or the knowing what it means, and 78 percent said they had
private sector. This shows that trust is complex and not heard it or did not know. This seems to indicate
multifaceted and that despite negativity, the national that there is more awareness of the general concept
government is still the body expected to drive large of the energy transition in South Africa but very little
national projects. The just transition thus affords an understanding of the specific term just transition. This
opportunity for the national government to garner finding seems to be echoed in research in other coun-
support for the just transition and to build trust. tries as well—in a survey of over 9,000 respondents
across 10 European countries, two-thirds of respon-
dents said they could explain the concept of the energy
Figure 3.3 • Whom do you MOST trust to manage transition to someone, either precisely (19 percent) or
the just transition? vaguely (47 percent) (Chandeze et al. 2023). In com-
parison, a national survey on just transition perceptions
100% in Japan from January 2022 found low awareness of
the term just transition, with roughly 20 percent of the
National government 26% 6,000 respondents reporting that they were familiar
80% with the concept (Chapman et al. 2023). These results
may indicate that the concept of the energy transition is
The PCC 13%
better understood than the just transition.
60%
Private sector 13% Awareness is an important precursor to behaviour
change. The national survey on just transitions in
40% Don't know 12% Japan found a positive correlation between knowledge
NGOs 11% of the just transition and willingness to take action
to foster the just transition through behaviours such
20% Local government 10% as installing solar panels or switching to an electric
Community leaders 7% vehicle (EV) (Chapman et al. 2023). And in Europe,
Trade unions 7% where energy transition knowledge and climate change
0% Other 1% concern is quite high, over 90 percent of respondents
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organisation. reported that they had already changed their behaviour
Source: HSRC SASAS 2023 PCC just transition module.
in some way in response to climate change (Chandeze To better understand the perceived impacts of the
et al. 2023). In this survey, data on behaviour was not transition, respondents were asked what positive
collected, but it was found that knowledge of climate impacts, if any, they believe will happen because of
change was significantly positively associated (p < the shift from coal to other energy sources (Figure
0.000) with concern about the environment, which, 3.5). The most frequently selected benefits had to do
in turn, was significantly associated (p < 0.000) with a with energy—over half of South Africans believe the
sense of personal responsibility to take action to protect transition will reduce or end load shedding, and 41
the environment. This tends to be a precursor for percent believe it will lead to reduced energy prices.
behavioural change. A further 41 percent believe the transition will help
the economy grow, but there seems to be a weaker
The majority of South Africans report that they
association with positive health and environmental
approve of the idea of moving away from coal toward
impacts. Only 13 percent said that none of the
other sources of energy like wind and solar, with 62
potential positive impacts would occur.
percent approving or strongly approving and just 13
percent disapproving (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4 • To what extent do you approve or disapprove of actions being taken to change from coal to other
sources of energy (like solar and wind)?
20% 6%
21% 41% 4% 9% Neither approve Refuse/
Strongly approve Approve Strongly disapprove Disapprove nor disapprove Don't know
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Total Percent Approving 62% Total Percent Disapproving 13% Total Percent Neurtral 26%
Note: The x-axis shows the percentage of respondents who selected each option. The six top bars break down all responses to the question, and the bottom two bars group together all
respondents who approve (strongly approve plus approve) and disapprove (strongly disapprove plus disapprove).
Figure 3.5 • Perceived positive impacts of energy transition
Load shedding will reduce or end 51%

The economy will grow 41%
Electricity prices will decrease 41%
There will be more jobs than before 30%
People’s health will improve 22%
Women and youth will have more opportunities 21%
Air pollution will decrease 21%
None of the above (positive impacts) 13%
The health of the environment will improve 13%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55%
Percent of respondents

Outside of South Africa, the energy transition tends most worried about having to pay more for electricity
to be more associated with positive impacts on the (33 percent), followed by loss of job or income (32
environment and health than on the economy and percent). As with potential benefits, the energy and
energy prices. For example, over 60 percent of Euro- economic impacts seem to have the greatest salience
pean respondents believed the transition would have to South Africans. A similar proportion of European
net positive impacts on air quality and health, 63 respondents (33percent) reported concern that the
percent of Americans believed it will improve local air energy transition would impact their job or the sector
and water quality, and 52 percent of Japanese respon- in which they work (Chandeze et al. 2023).
dents anticipated that it would contribute to a healthier
There is strong support for policies that could be
environment (Chandeze et al. 2023; Chapman et al.
enacted to help mitigate potential negative impacts
2023; Tyson et al. 2022). A slight majority (52 per-
from the transition (Table 3.1). The highest support
cent) of Europeans thought the impact on energy
was expressed for policies related to improved eco-
prices would be net negative, and Americans were more
nomic opportunity, including education, training and
likely to say the impact on the pricing of energy goods
skills, and targeted employment opportunities for
would be negative (40 percent) than positive (29 per-
vulnerable groups. A slightly lower share of people was
cent) (Chandeze et al. 2023; Tyson et al. 2022). The
partial to short-term financial support for displaced
socioeconomic context in South Africa compared to
workers and a basic income grant. Although these
Europe, Japan, and the United States likely contributes
differences should not be overstated, it seems that first
to energy and economic benefits being more salient to
preference among the public would be for policies that
South Africans. Unfortunately, the authors were not
would enhance employment-related opportunities.
able to identify any surveys on perceptions toward the
just transition or energy transition that had been con- South Africans think the country should accept finan-
ducted in middle- or low-income countries for a more cial assistance from wealthy countries to support the
direct comparison. transition but are split on whether the government
should manage the funds. Approximately two-thirds
South Africans also are concerned about potential
(64 percent) said that South Africa should accept
negative impacts of the transition. First, respondents
such financial assistance, but only 34 percent thought
were asked how worried they are that they or their
the government should manage it. One-seventh (14
family will be negatively impacted by the transition.
percent) said South Africa should not accept financial
Just over a quarter (27 percent) reported being very or
assistance, and the remaining respondents said they did
extremely worried, 29 percent were somewhat worried,
not know or did not have an opinion.
and 22 percent were not very or not at all worried.
Another 15 percent said the transition will not impact
them or their family. In terms of the specific negative
impacts of concern (Figure 3.6), respondents were
Figure 3.6 • Are you worried about any of the following happening to you or your family because of the
change from coal power to other forms of energy (select all that apply)?
Having to pay more for electricity 33%
Loss of a job or a source of income 32%

I am not worried because I think there will be no 27%
consequences
Worse load shedding for my household 24%
Damage to the local environment 19%
Negative impacts on my health or that of my family 17%
Don’t know 8%
I am worried about some other consequence 2%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Percent of respondents selecting each option
Table 3.1 • Support for just transition policy measures, ranked from highest to lowest support
POLICY SUPPORT
Improve Help women, Support local busi- Training and Short-term financial Create a basic
education to youth, and vul- nesses and create skills pro- help to workers income grant
help people nerable groups job opportunities in grammes for who lose jobs and that all South
find jobs in new find jobs (%) affected areas (%) workers who can’t find new ones Africans would
sectors (%) lose jobs (%) right away (%) receive (%)
Agree 79 77 77 75 70 70
Neutral 13 15 14 18 19 16
Disagree 6 5 6 4 8 12
Don’t know /
2 3 3 3 3 2
refuse
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Recommendations and
next steps
This survey represents a critical baseline on the state of
knowledge about and perceptions toward the just tran-
sition in South Africa and shows how climate change
opinions are evolving. As part of its ongoing monitor-
ing and evaluation duties, the PCC aims to continue to
partner with HSRC to administer this survey again in
the future to track how both just transition and climate
change knowledge and perceptions are changing over
time. This will also enable the PCC to monitor the
impact of its own work because building public aware-
ness and consensus on the just transition and climate
action is key to its mission as well as to the success of
related policy.
These results will also feed into the PCC’s communi-

cations strategy and annual work plans as more work
is needed to socialise the concept of the just transition
and correct misinformation about climate change
among the public and stakeholders. The PCC will
work to bolster public understanding and trust about
the just transition and climate change and its potential
impacts while addressing any misconceptions identified
in the results and building upon points of consensus.
The full survey results and detailed analysis will be
made available in a separate report to be published on
the PCC’s website.
SECTION 2.
The race to build climate

resilience
CHAPTER 4.
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND

ADAPTATION ACTION: THE RACE
TO BUILD RESILIENCE
Observed and projected
climate change impacts
South Africans are already experiencing widespread have been affected to some degree by extreme weather
and, in some instances, devastating impacts of cli- events over the past decade. Figure 4.1 shows the dif-
mate change. The country’s annual temperature has ferentiated experiences of these events across provinces.
increased twice as fast as the global average since 1990
These are some of the most dramatic climate-related
(DEA 2013; Republic of South Africa 2021b), and the
events in recent years:
number of rainy days across the country has signifi-
cantly decreased, with more intense rainfall events and
dry periods (DEA 2013). These observed changes have
• Nationwide heat wave (November–March 2023):
Most of South Africa faced heat wave conditions
led to numerous extreme climate-related events, includ-
from late 2023 (SAWS 2023) through early 2024.
ing drought, floods, and extreme heat. Seventy-three
The combination of climate change and the El Niño
percent of South African households have reported to
state—a natural phenomenon that brings warmer
Figure 4.1 • Extent to which South African households in different provinces report being affected by extreme
weather events (such as floods, big storms, droughts, heat waves) over the past 10 years
Limpopo
34% 60% Gauteng

35%
North West Mpumalanga
33% 38% 47%

Northern Cape
44% 60%
34% KwaZulu-Natal
Free State
Western Cape 40%
Eastern Cape
31%
Source: HSRC 2023.
Section 2. The race to build climate resilience • 25

and drier conditions to some parts of the world, report being impacted by extreme weather events
including South Africa—contributed to abnormally during the last 10 years than residents of other prov-
high temperatures (Evans 2024). Large parts of the inces (Figure 4.1).
Northern Cape, North West, and Free State prov-
• Avoiding Day Zero in Cape Town (2015–18):
inces, for example, all experienced extreme heat From 2015 to 2018, Cape Town was affected by a
and maximum temperatures, which broke 63-year- 1-in-400-year drought that brought the city’s 4.6
old records in some areas (SAWS 2023). The high million residents to the verge of running out of
temperatures led to livestock losses and a decline water—Day Zero (Hill-Lewis 2023). A protracted
in agricultural crop yields (Stats SA 2024a), and lack of rainfall and outdated water infrastructure left
6,000 wildfires—affecting an estimated 100,000 water supplies at minimum levels and led the city to
hectares—were reported between December 2023 restrict household water use to just 87 litres per per-
and January 2024 in the Western Cape (Ngcuka son per day (Baker 2018). On a more macro level,
2024). Although the health impacts were not as well the drought led to an estimated R15 billion in losses
documented, extreme heat can exacerbate chronic to the Western Cape province’s economy, equiv-
medical conditions among vulnerable populations alent to 3.4 percent of its gross domestic product
and cause dehydration, cramps, exhaustion, and (GDP) (WBG 2022).
strokes (Ngcuka 2024).
• The Nelson Mandela Bay water crisis (2015-23): The frequency and intensity of such events are likely
The Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipal- to increase due to the effects of a changing climate
ity has only just recently emerged from a crippling (IPCC 2022). Future projections indicate that the
eight-year drought that placed severe stress on its west and south of the country are likely to experience
water system. When seasonal rains arrived late in drier conditions, and wetter conditions are predicted
2022, poorly maintained water infrastructure and for the east (DEA 2013). Mean monthly tempera-
high water demand left the municipality’s four tures are consistently projected to rise by 2.0°C by the
dams operating at a combined 15 percent capacity 2050s and 4.2°C by the 2090s under a high-emissions
(Majavu 2022). Residents were asked to reduce their scenario (WBG 2021). Although the severity of climate
daily water consumption to just 50 litres per day, and impacts depends on global efforts to reduce GHG
many households were left reliant on water tankers emissions, these changes are expected to result in more
after going days without municipal water (Sizani frequent droughts, floods, and heat waves (Johnston
and Mbovane 2023). Water supplies have since et al. 2024). Tropical cyclones might also become
been replenished from rain, but water restrictions more intense due to projected climatic changes (John-
remain in place and the threat of water shortages ston et al. 2024).
continues as leakages in distribution systems lead to The economic, environmental, and social damage
losses ranging between 30 percent and 40 percent of climate change, both observed and anticipated,
(Pawson 2023). threaten to undermine South Africa’s achievement
• The KZN floods (April–May 2022): The KZN of its development goals and ability to overcome its
province was struck with record-breaking rain for intertwined challenges of poverty, inequality, and
four days in April 2022, with rainfall exceeding 200 unemployment (PCC 2022b; Republic of South Africa
millimetres (mm) in a 24-hour period (PCC 2023a; 2021b). South Africa is vulnerable to climate change
SAWS 2022). The subsequent overflow of 18 rivers exacerbating existing water and food insecurity, but the
caused floods and erosion that led to the loss of an country also faces risks related to health, human set-
estimated 443 lives and directly impacted 19,112 tlements, infrastructure, and critical ecosystem services
households by halting economic activity, damaging (WBG 2021). Increasingly, severe droughts and floods
properties, limiting mobility, and disrupting essential have damaged public infrastructure, which has suffered
services (PCC 2023a). Additional flooding in May from decades of mismanagement and underinvestment,
exacerbated the destruction of critical infrastruc- and have complicated the provision of basic public ser-
ture and caused fatalities across 8 of the province’s vices, to which many South Africans already lack access
11 municipalities (PCC 2023a). The eThekwini (Johnston et al. 2024). The tourism sector, which
Municipality alone suffered economic losses upwards directly contributed 3.5 percent to South Africa’s GDP
of R540 million, and it is still struggling to get key and employed 4.7 percent of the workforce in 2022
public infrastructure fully functional, most notably (Stats SA 2024b), could also see a 4 percent decline
wastewater treatment systems (PCC 2023a). Res- in future visitors to national parks due to drought-re-
idents of KZN were significantly more likely to lated losses to biodiversity (Johnston et al. 2024).
Importantly, the disproportionate impacts of climate
change on socially and economically vulnerable groups, In support of these objectives, adaptation priorities
including black and female South Africans, are likely include increasing institutional capacity, governance,
to increase entrenched and already high inequality and legal frameworks; further developing the scientific
(Johnston et al. 2024) without addressing their unique basis for strengthening the national and provincial gov-
vulnerabilities. Transformational change is therefore ernments’ readiness to respond; mobilising funding for
required to justly transition toward a climate-resilient adaptation; and implementing prioritised actions.
society in a way that improves the lives and livelihoods
Since 2016, however, South Africa’s vulnerability to
of all South Africans.
climate change has steadily increased, and its read-
iness to leverage public and private investments for
The implementation gap adaptation action has decreased. These two compo-
for climate adaptation nents—vulnerability and readiness—inform South

Africa’s Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
South Africa’s updated NDC and its National Cli- (ND-GAIN) Index5 score, which has remained rela-
mate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) outline a tively the same overall despite ups and downs over the
comprehensive approach to address its climate vulner- past three decades, as shown in Figure 4.2 (ND-GAIN
abilities, with the latter serving as a national reference 2021). The sharp decline in its ND-GAIN score since
point for coordinated action across all sectors and 2016 can partly be attributed to increasing climate
administrative levels (DFFE 2019). The NCCAS’s vulnerability (ND-GAIN 2021). According to most
primary objectives are to recent data, the country’s food and water sectors are
the most vulnerable to climate change due to projected
• build climate resilience and adaptive capacity to changes in its cereal yields, low capacity to acquire and
respond to climate change risk and vulnerability; deploy agriculture technology, and limited dam storage
• promote the integration of climate change adapta- capacity per capita (ND-GAIN 2021). South Africa’s
tion response into development objectives, policy, readiness to translate investment into effective adapta-
planning, and implementation; tion action to address these vulnerabilities has declined
since 2016 due to high and persistent social inequality,
• improve understanding of climate change impacts as measured by the poorest quintile’s share of national
and capacity to respond to these impacts; and income, comparatively complex business environment,
• ensure resources and systems are in place to and declining governance (ND-GAIN 2021).
enable implementation of climate change
responses (DFFE 2019).
Figure 4.2 • South Africa’s ND-GAIN score
ND-GAIN score
50.5
50
49.5
49
48.5
48
47.5
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Note: ND-GAIN = Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative.

Source: ND-GAIN 2021.

South Africa’s increasing vulnerability to, and declining
readiness for, climate change suggests that progress
Bridging the implementation
in adaptation planning has not translated into imple- gap for climate adaptation
mentation of adaptation actions at the scale and pace
Literature has identified five complementary factors
required to keep up with intensifying climate change
or gears that must be present—to differing degrees in
impacts. Although the DFFE is currently working
different contexts—to close this implementation gap
to further refine the National Tracking and Evalua-
for adaptation (Mogelgaard et al. 2018). These five
tion System in coordination with subnational actors
gears are policy frameworks, leadership, coordination
to better track and evaluate adaptation action (Pers.
mechanisms, information and tools, and supportive
Comm. 2023a), only 28 of the 95 actions outlined by
financial processes (Figure 4.3). The following sections
the NCCAS are listed as fully implemented or currently
evaluate achieved progress and challenges across each
being implemented (DFFE 2019, 2021a). Most of
of these factors in South Africa, against the definitions
these 28 actions aim to enable the planning, implemen-
established by Mogelgaard et al. (2018).
tation, and monitoring and evaluation of adaptation
action (DFFE 2019, 2021a) rather than actually
implementing adaptation initiatives. Failure to address Policy frameworks
climate vulnerabilities could worsen South Africa’s
Mogelgaard et al. (2018) define adaptation policy
labour productivity, threaten biodiversity, and nega-
frameworks as “including political commitments,
tively affect human and livestock health (WBG 2022).
mandates, and laws that support the integration of
As vulnerable groups are disproportionately impacted
adaptation objectives into development planning and
by climate change, high levels of poverty and inequality
sectoral strategies,” and they note that such frameworks
magnify the cost of inaction to improve South Africa’s
are more likely to catalyse implementation when they
climate resilience (WBG 2022).
include mechanisms for accountability or enforcement.
South Africa has mainstreamed adaptation into its

overall development and policy framework. Approved
in 2011, the National Climate Change Response Pol-
icy’s call for climate change action provided the basis
Figure 4.3 • Gears to bridge the gap between adaptation planning and implementation
INFORMATION
PLANS & TOOLS ACTION
FINANCIAL
LEADERSHIP POLICY PROCESSES
FRAMEWORKS
COORDINATION
MECHANISMS
Source: Mogelgaard et al. 2018.
for mainstreaming both mitigation and adaptation and 2019). Almost all sectors that are considered highly
led to a proliferation of adaptation policies, plans, and vulnerable have also developed adaptation strategies
strategies across sectors and spheres of government based on their vulnerabilities, however, the quality and
(DFFE 2019). The National Development Plan 2030, capacity to act on these strategies varies considerably
established in 2013, identifies climate change as an and on average remains low (Pers. Comm. 2023a).
external driver of change and emphasises enhancing the
Multiple hurdles to implement plans and policies are,
climate resilience of South Africa’s people and econ-
however, slowing down progress. With close to 300
omy, including by channelling public investment into
municipalities across South Africa, it is difficult for the
research, new agricultural technologies, and the devel-
DFFE to provide continuous planning support, and
opment of adaptation strategies and support services
high staff turnover necessitates having to repeatedly
for smallholder farmers to protect rural livelihoods
start over (Pers. Comm. 2023a). Without a common
(NPC 2013). Submitted to the United Nations Frame-
methodological framework to guide the mainstream-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
ing process, the aggregation of response plans across
2021 and drawing from the NCCAS (DFFE 2019), its
sectors and government levels remains difficult (DFFE
updated NDC included an adaptation component for
2019). Within the existing policy framework, the
the first time (Republic of South Africa 2021b), detail-
scope of institutional responsibilities to address climate
ing planned adaptation actions across key sectors most
change are not always clear despite regular communica-
likely to be impacted by climate change.
tions among at least some of the relevant government
Guided by this national framework, efforts to spheres and sectors (DFFE 2019). Numerous private
mainstream climate adaptation across sectoral and coping and adaptation measures are being imple-
subnational plans and policies are ongoing. With mented autonomously by businesses and households
support from the DFFE and the South African Local in response to the impacts of extreme weather and
Government Association (SALGA), through the Local climate events (Pers. Comm. 2024b). However,
Government Climate Change Support Programme, all planning and regulation of private adaptation action
provinces and district municipalities, as well as some is proving a challenge for many government entities
local municipalities, have developed climate change (Pers. Comm. 2024b).
response strategies based on climate risk and vulnera-
South Africa’s Climate Change Bill may prove helpful
bility assessments (DFFE 2019). Some provinces and
in overcoming some of these challenges. The bill aims
municipalities have also begun to integrate their climate
to enable a more coordinated achievement of a low-car-
response strategies into their strategic plans, but full
bon, climate-resilient society by outlining the required
resourcing and implementation is yet to be realised,
contributions by and relationship between adminis-
even in the most advanced municipalities (DFFE

trative and sectoral government entities (Republic of
South Africa 2022). It requires, for example, that the
Leadership
objectives of a national adaptation strategy and plan As Mogelgaard et al. (2018) note, “Sustained, per-
(currently the NCCAS) be integrated into national sistent leadership, from inside or outside government,
planning policies and programmes (Republic of South including by political leaders, bureaucrats, and civil
Africa 2022). The bill also mandates designated depart- society organizations . . . can manifest itself by heads
ments to develop coherent sectoral plans, including of state launching new strategies that encourage
for agriculture, the environment, health, and human mainstreaming, ministries creating new institu-
settlements (Republic of South Africa 2022). Once tions, or citizens championing innovating initiatives
approved, metropolitan or district municipalities would that accelerate implementation of mainstream-
also be legally required to conduct a climate needs ing commitments.”
and response assessment to develop a climate change
response implementation plan that is coherent with and Leadership from diverse actors, both public and private,
supports provincial, metropolitan, or district munic- across administrative levels has backed building climate
ipal planning instruments, policies, and programmes resilience as a national priority. The achievement of a
(Republic of South Africa 2022). low-carbon, climate-resilient society is a central prior-
Although the Climate Change Bill aims and is expected ity of the Ramaphosa administration, with the cabinet
to help address the fragmentation of strategic and having recently approved a framework—developed
technical responsibilities within government, climate by the PCC—to guide the just transition (Republic
change is still viewed as a fringe issue by many minis- of South Africa 2023). As the designated custodian
tries and has not yet been fully mainstreamed into key of environmental issues, the DFFE has supported
sectoral policies (WBG 2022). This fragmentation has sectoral departments and other government entities
also prevented the potential for economies of scale that to understand and address climate-related risks by
could be achieved through joint training programmes providing climate risk projections and recommending
for staff across relevant ministries (WBG 2022). evidence-based adaptation strategies across key sectors
through the long-term adaptation scenarios (Pers.
Comm. 2023a). Universities have also demonstrated
strong leadership as knowledge brokers by provid-
ing policymakers with evidence-based inputs into NCCAS (DFFE 2019). Line departments are respon-
policies and strategies and translating research into sible for the integration of climate change responses
actionable information (DFFE 2019; Pers. Comm. into their respective sectoral plans at both the national
2023b). Of 486 climate-related projects implemented and provincial levels (DFFE 2019). In alignment with
from 2000 to 2020 that addressed adaptation, local the NCCAS, provinces and municipalities should
governments or municipalities, especially metropoli- also develop and implement adaptation plans, with
tan municipalities, were found to most frequently be municipalities responsible for the provision of basic
the lead, implementing, or host agent, followed by services, disaster risk management, and other important
local NGOs and universities or research institutions climate response actions (DFFE 2019). The private
(Sibanda et al. 2023). sector enhances public efforts by providing insights,
experiences, and resources (DFFE 2019) as well as
Nonetheless, stronger political will and capacity to
including climate risks in their corporate planning and
address climate change risks are required to implement
implementing measures to protect their assets and
adaptation measures at the required scale and pace. The
operations. Civil society, labour groups, academia,
Climate Change Bill, for example, was introduced in
and community leaders help to guide and support the
February 2022 but was only approved by the National
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of adap-
Assembly in October 2023 and the National Council
tation initiatives (DFFE 2019). Although coordination
of Provinces in April 2024. There is also an uneven
has improved over the last decade, fragmentation has
distribution of adaptation projects across South Africa,
not yet been overcome.
with most of the adaptation projects evaluated by
Sibanda et al. (2023) concentrated in the Western Cape A range of coordination bodies and mechanisms have
and KZN provinces. A 2023 survey of South African been established to enable these and other relevant
government officials found that limited political will, actors to align actions while avoiding duplication and
gaps in human capacity, and the absence of a mandate inefficiency in adaptation responses. These include the
at the local level are among encountered barriers to PCC, which President Ramaphosa established in 2020
climate adaptation (Sibiya et al. 2023). Many municipal as a multistakeholder entity to provide independent,
officials tend to still view building climate resilience as transparent advice on South Africa’s climate change
additional to, rather than a fundamental element of, response (PCC 2022b). The Inter-Ministerial Commit-
their core responsibilities, which hinders the uptake tee on Climate Change plays a key role in coordinating
of municipal climate change plans and strategies national adaptation action (Republic of South Africa
(Pers. Comm. 2023b). This has led to the integration 2021b). At the subnational level, seven of South
of climate change into the standard curriculum for Africa’s nine provinces and all metro areas rely on
municipal politicians to improve their understand- coordinating forums for climate change (Pers. Comm.
ing and prioritisation of climate adaptation, without 2023a). These include the Nelson Mandela Bay Cli-
which little is achieved (Pers. Comm. 2023a). Munic- mate Resilience Forum, KZN Premier Climate Change
ipal budget constraints are also a significant barrier Advisory Forum, and the Provincial Climate Change
to the implementation of local adaptation action (see Coordinating Forum in the Mpumalanga province
Section 4.3.5). (Pers. Comm. 2024a). Additionally, the National Trea-
sury and Banking Association of South Africa jointly
Coordination mechanisms coordinate initiatives through the Climate Risk Forum,
which convenes regulatory agencies and industry
The third factor included in Mogelgaard et al.’s 2018 associations and supervises the implementation of the
evaluative framework is coordination mechanisms: technical paper, “Financing a Sustainable Economy”
“Coordination mechanisms across sectors and between (Fallasch et al. 2023; National Treasury 2021b).
government departments, such as inter-ministerial
steering committees or task forces, that support shared Yet despite the benefits that these mechanisms and
mainstreaming goals . . . can cut across policy lev- others provide, improved implementation of adapta-
els, encompass public and private institutions, and tion plans and policies will require more frequent and
encourage ongoing public engagement.” coordinated communication between actors to fully
overcome fragmented actions, avoid duplicative efforts,
and improve investment efficiencies (DFFE 2019).
As the impacts of climate change transcend sectoral
South Africa’s government remains fragmented (Pers.
and administrative lines, diverse actors are responsible
Comm. 2023b), with poor coordination across and
for and contribute to the coordination of adaptation
between spheres constraining adaptation planning,
action in South Africa. At the national level, the DFFE
implementation, and monitoring (Sibiya et al. 2023).
leads the coordination and implementation of the

Many institutions are actively working to advance Africa’s settlements to improve their integration of
climate-related research, including the South African climate adaptation into local planning instruments and
Weather Services, North-West University, the Univer- processes and enable more climate-resilient cities and
sity of the Witwatersrand, the Council for Scientific and towns (CSIR GreenBook 2023). The Let’s Respond
Industrial Research, the University of Cape Town, Stel- Toolkit also guides local governments and stakehold-
lenbosch University, and the South African National ers with practical tools and technical information to
Biodiversity Institute. There is, however, limited inter- use local planning processes to respond to climate
institutional coordination and no central database or change (Dazé 2017).
platform to share data with one another (DFFE 2019).
The uneven distribution of and fragmentation between
In addition to clarifying and harmonising institutional
climate service providers has, however, led to vari-
mandates for climate action, both in terms of adapta-
ances in the capacity of public institutions to manage
tion and mitigation, the Climate Change Bill will help
climate risks. Efforts must also be made to improve
to reinforce the role of different coordination mecha-
the uptake of climate services by the most vulnerable
nisms, including Provincial and Municipal Forums on
populations. The expansion of early warning systems
Climate Change (Republic of South Africa 2022).
to under-served groups, locations, and sectors requires
more funding. Marginalised communities should also
Information and tools be better integrated into campaigns to raise awareness
Mogelgaard et al. (2018) note that “information of the actions they can take to prepare for and respond
and tools, including learning initiatives, training, or to weather alerts and community-based systems (PCC
access to technical expertise that enables mainstream- 2023a). Residents of the informal settlement Quarry
ing . . . [with] knowledge brokers . . . can facilitate Road, for example, were trained by researchers at the
information sharing across sectors and policy domain . University of KwaZulu-Natal to develop hazard maps
. . bridging the implementation gap.” that identified areas prone to flooding and evacuation
routes to improve their understanding of their risks,
and municipal officials have communicated warnings
Contributions from a rich ecosystem of stakehold-
via WhatsApp to make information more accessible in
ers over the past two decades have contributed to an
the face of limited climate literacy (Evans 2022a).
improved understanding of South Africa’s climate
vulnerabilities. For example, the University of Cape
Town, among others, has long supported public and
Supportive financial processes
private decision-making by serving as knowledge Mogelgaard et al.’s (2018) fifth factor is supportive
brokers who translate research into actionable infor- financial processes, which they say must “encourage
mation for planning, provide evidence-based inputs decision-makers to consider climate risks as well as
for policymaking, and provide training for government identify, track, and cover costs to adapt . . . includ-
institutions around climate adaptation (Pers. Comm. ing expenditure-tracking initiatives, budget-tagging
2023b). However, as noted in the previous section, efforts, and special funds governments establish to
the university and wider academic community face a support mainstreaming.”
degree of fragmentation, much like the government
(Pers. Comm. 2023b).
South Africa has taken action to foster financial pro-
Climate services have been developed to provide cesses that enable the proactive management of climate
decision-makers at different scales with the scientific risks and tracking of adaptation efforts. In 2022, South
data and information required to manage climate Africa became the first and only African country to
risks. These include the National Climate Change have developed a green finance taxonomy that provides
Information System, which offers a range of climate a standardised framework to classify assets and projects
information and datasets to support decision-making that contribute to climate adaptation as well as miti-
(DFFE 2021). These datasets span different sectors gation (Fallasch et al. 2023; National Treasury 2022).
and geographic areas, including an agrohydrological With support from the World Bank, the National
atlas, climate change projections, and a coastal risk Treasury has also conducted 11 climate budget tag-
atlas, among others (DFFE 2021). Another example ging pilots across government spheres and sectors to
is the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research’s create and facilitate the uptake of a country-specific
GreenBook. This online planning support tool pro- methodology for tracking adaptation and mitigation
vides local governments with scientific evidence around finance flows (National Treasury 2021a, 2022; OECD
the expected impacts of climate change on South 2022). Both are examples of important steps toward
mainstreaming climate adaptation into annual planning
and budget processes and an improved understanding
of the volume and uses of adaptation finance, which
are necessary to scale public adaptation investments in
alignment with national development goals.
Despite positive developments, more work is needed.

Public and private financial actors should continue
coordinating, including through the Climate Risk
Forum’s Capacity Building Working Group to address
knowledge gaps and improve uptake of climate risk
management tools and guidance (Fallasch et al. 2023).
Additionally, only a handful of companies have begun
to disclose environmental, social, and governance
data to the Task Force on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures (Fallasch et al. 2023). Monitoring and
evaluation of climate-related investments also needs to
be improved (WBG 2022); and although 80 percent
of private firms outside the financial sector are aware
of climate risks, an estimated 60 percent have not yet
developed plans for climate action (WBG 2022).
Adaptation finance must also increase in volume and

flow more equitably to close the implementation gap
without worsening South Africa’s debt burden. The
estimated cost of South Africa’s adaptation response
through 2030 ranges from R4.2 billion to R308 bil-
lion, depending on mitigation scenarios (DFFE 2019).
Tracked adaptation finance flows in South Africa from
2019–21 increased by five percentage points from
the 2017–18 period, but this amounted to just R16
billion or 12 percent of total tracked climate finance,
which still heavily favours mitigation (de Aragão Fer-
nandes et al. 2023). Grant financing and concessional
debt—lending with interest below the market rate—
decreased, and the average cost of borrowed capital Finally, constrained municipal budgets impede the
ranged between 10 percent and 12 percent over the implementation of adaptation and resilience-building
same period (de Aragão Fernandes et al. 2023). The initiatives at the local level. Beyond limited technical
volume of public and private finance, both domestic capacity and political will on the part of municipal
and international, supporting adaptation and activities officials to address physical climate risks (see Sections
with cobenefits must therefore continue to increase 4.3.1 and 4.3.2), municipalities, especially in rural
for South Africa to meet its adaptation needs. Adap- areas (WBG 2022), lack the budget to support cli-
tation finance must also be mobilised from diverse mate adaptation: 163 of South Africa’s municipalities
sources with instruments that do not further exacer- were in financial distress in 2021 (Mboweni 2021). Of
bate South Africa’s already high national debt, which these, 40 struggled to deliver basic services and 102
currently accounts for 72.7 percent of its GDP (CEIC adopted budgets that exceeded their financial resources
Data 2023). Without access to affordable capital to (Mboweni 2021). Local governments receive inter-
build climate resilience, South Africa is vulnerable to governmental transfers, but channelling them through
the climate debt trap. At the national level, the newly national and provincial governments erodes the total
established Climate Change Response Fund aims to amount received (Keen et al. 2022). Kenya’s County
better coordinate the mobilisation of private and public Climate Change Funds (Murphy and Orindi 2017)
finance for both adaptation and mitigation efforts offer one potential model for municipalities to establish
(SA News 2024b). funds that mobilise and blend finance from interna-
tional and domestic sources in alignment with national
adaptation goals.

CHAPTER 5.
A MORE EQUAL, CLIMATE-RESILIENT

AGRICULTURE SECTOR
Overview
South Africa’s agriculture sector both contributes to are the primary decision-makers or breadwinners—and
climate change and is highly vulnerable to it. Small- those without an employed member are more likely
scale farmers are particularly vulnerable because poverty to have inadequate or severely inadequate access to
and structural inequalities hinder their ability to adapt. food (Stats SA 2023a). In the case of female-headed
Driving a well-planned shift toward more climate-re- households, this is despite their tendency to engage
silient agriculture could simultaneously address in agricultural activities more than their male-headed
both climate mitigation and adaptation goals while counterparts (Stats SA 2023a).
improving food and nutrition security and enhancing
In addition to contributing to rural livelihoods, agri-
rural livelihoods—but only if significant inequali-
culture can significantly contribute to household food
ties are addressed.
security (Stats SA 2023a). The need to secure either
Despite its limited contribution to South Africa’s a primary or secondary source of food motivates the
national economy, agriculture is the primary eco- vast majority (86 percent) of the roughly 16 percent of
nomic activity in rural areas. In comparison to other South African households that are involved in agri-
upper-middle-income countries, agriculture composes cultural activities (Stats SA 2023c). Most households
a relatively small component of South Africa’s national involved in agriculture activities produce fruit and
economy (DALRRD 2020; ITA 2023; NPC 2013): vegetable crops, followed by grains and food crops,
just 2.83 percent of its GDP, when forestry and fishing poultry, and livestock (Stats SA 2023b).
are included (World Bank 2023c); and roughly 6
Climate change is magnifying the challenges faced by
percent of employed South Africans (Stats SA 2023e).
farmers, particularly those operating on a small scale.
Agriculture remains the primary economic activity
The impacts of climate change have caused overall
for rural South Africans, who account for 60 percent
agricultural productivity in South Africa to fluctuate
of those facing poverty despite representing only 30
over the past decade (PCC 2022b). A 2019 report
percent of the population (DALRRD 2020), and it can
by the South African Insurance Association showed
play a significant role in promoting employment and
that 42 percent of farmers had experienced losses due
rural development (Kapari et al. 2023; Sihlobo and
to drought, 29 percent because of storms, and 28
Qobo 2021). There are an estimated 2 million small-
percent from floods (WBG 2022). In the future, the
scale farmers across South Africa (Mazenda and Masiya
availability of water resources will largely determine
2022), who are among the most vulnerable to climate
the suitability of different regions to produce certain
change and have the least access to the resources
crops (PCC 2022b) due to a high reliance on rain-fed
needed to adapt and build resilience. Within the com-
agriculture and limited availability of water resources
mercial agriculture industry, small-scale farms represent
for irrigation (WBG 2022). Small-scale farms are often
18.5 percent of income and 26 percent of employment
in unfavourable locations, so their capacity for even
(Stats SA 2020).
subsistence production is low (Stats SA 2023a); thus,
Many South Africans rely on subsistence or small- small-scale farmers are particularly vulnerable to climate
scale agriculture to combat household food insecurity. impacts like rising temperatures, varied rainfall patterns
Profits from South Africa’s agricultural exports balance and more frequent droughts, heat waves, floods, and
the cost of imported food (NPC 2013), making it outbreaks of pests and diseases (DALRRD 2020). Yet
food secure at the national level. However, one-fifth of high rates of poverty often limit their access to adaptive
South African households face food insecurity (Stats measures like more resilient seeds, the ability to change
SA 2023a), meaning that their economic and physical planting times based on early warnings and weather
accessibility of food remains unstable (USAID n.d.). alerts, small-scale irrigation, and improved cultivation
Female-headed households—those for which women techniques. Unless effective action is taken, small-scale
farmers will continue to bear the brunt of climate people depend on and contribute to South Africa’s
change impacts while having the fewest resources with food systems, which encompass a range of interlinked
which to manage the increasing risks they face. activities and actors involved in not only production
but also processing, distribution, consumption, and dis-
The capacity of many of South Africa’s small-scale
posal (Nguyen 2018). Although industrial agriculture
farmers to mitigate and manage the impacts of climate
plays an important role in South Africa’s national food
change is constrained by entrenched spatial, gender,
security, small-scale farming is enshrined in South Afri-
and racial inequality. The deregulation and liberalisa-
ca’s climate and development policy framework as a key
tion of South Africa’s economy postindependence has
entry point for action that furthers climate resilience,
enabled a highly concentrated, vertically integrated,
rural development, and household food security. The
and corporatised agriculture sector that is dispropor-
next section therefore examines the major actions that
tionately influenced by a small number of large-scale
the South African government has taken to address the
agribusinesses (DALRRD 2020). Around 70 percent
climate challenge and reduce the risks to its agriculture
of all agricultural income, for example, is earned by
sector, with a focus on how it is working to reduce the
less than 7 percent of farmers (PCC 2022b). Rural
vulnerability of small-scale farmers.
communities face limited participation and ownership
throughout South Africa’s agriculture value chain,
including limited access to land (DALRRD 2020). Major policies
Primary agriculture producers are also predominantly
white (DALRRD 2020) and black South Africans are Agriculture and food security are central to South
estimated to represent just a quarter of all formal farm Africa’s overall development and climate policy frame-
owners (PCC 2022b). As a result, farming improve- work. The National Development Plan 2030 (NDP)
ments are difficult for most South Africans engaged enshrines agricultural development as an engine to
in agriculture (DALRRD 2020). Whereas commercial achieve a more integrated and inclusive rural economy
farmers have invested in drip irrigation, more resil- based on successful land reform, employment creation,
ient crop varieties, and other technologies to adapt and strong environmental safeguards (NPC 2013).
to climate change, small-scale farmers largely require Public investment in agricultural technologies; the
government support and financial incentives to do development of resilient, environmentally sustainable
so (PCC 2022b). strategies; and support services for small-scale and rural
farmers are also included in the NDP as key to South
Beyond the vulnerabilities faced by small-scale farm- Africa’s transition to a sustainable, climate-resilient,
ers, South Africa’s agricultural sector as a whole is also and low-carbon economy (NPC 2013). The “National
vulnerable to climate change, and current production Climate Change Response White Paper” and NCCAS
practices contribute to the challenge. The majority (68 also both identify agriculture as a priority sector for
percent) of agricultural emissions come from livestock, adaptation, with the latter including gender-responsive
due primarily to enteric fermentation by nondairy cat- support for vulnerable farmers to implement more
tle (DFFE 2024). Consecutive droughts have led to a efficient CSA practices (DFFE 2019).
decline in cattle populations and have resulted in lower
related emissions since 2000 (DFFE 2024). This has Agriculture policies, however, are misaligned with
contributed to a 9 percent decrease in GHG emissions climate adaptation policies and local institutional frame-
from agriculture since 2000. However, agriculture works (SWITCH Africa Green 2020). Subsequently,
still accounts for 11 percent of South Africa’s total limited coordination across agencies and spheres of
emissions (DFFE 2024). Improved livestock health, government have hindered agricultural outcomes and
feed, manure, and breeding management could reduce improvements for small-scale farmers (WBG 2022).
related emissions (NBI 2021a). Poor soil management Additionally, related policies could better emphasise
and biomass burning also contribute to agricultural and integrate social and ecological justice to ensure that
emissions in South Africa (DFFE 2024) but could be food is produced in a way that improves the resilience
reduced through improved practices. of food and ecological systems, strengthens adaptative
capacities, reduces GHG emissions, enhances biodiver-
A transformative shift toward a more resilient, low-car- sity, and contributes to landscape restoration.
bon, equitable food system would need to reach
beyond the farm gate. A sustainable food system is one
that enables food security and nutrition in a profitable,
socially beneficial, and environmentally friendly way
(Nguyen 2018). In addition to farmers, many more

Required shifts
The Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and landholding patterns (DALRRD 2020). Restitution
Rural Development (DALRRD) is the designated cus- efforts, for example, have largely prioritised urban
todian of related issues. Its Strategic Plan 2020–2025 cases rather than those regarding rural or agricultural
identifies land reform, CSA, and water as directly land (DALRRD 2020). Financial support previously
influencing South Africa’s realisation of sustainable provided by the state to poor households through
agriculture and food security (DALRRD 2020). This settlement/land acquisition grants did not match
section evaluates related efforts and the required shifts market prices and therefore largely failed to enable
for success, leaving water to be discussed in its respec- black farmers to purchase productive land (DALRRD
tive chapter of this report. 2020). As a result, white South Africans are estimated
to still own around 72 percent of agricultural land
(DALRRD 2020). Despite the constitution’s pro-
Accelerating land reform motion of equal land rights for women, most tribal
In addition to redressing the historical dispossession of authorities in rural South Africa still require women to
land from black South Africans, equitable land reform acquire land through their husbands or male relatives
can also improve the productivity and climate resilience (Masuku et al. 2023).
of small-scale agriculture. By mitigating the potential
The effects of land reform on agricultural productiv-
for expropriation and serving as a source of collateral
ity in South Africa have also varied due to insufficient
(Murken and Gornott 2022), secure landownership can
access to other productive inputs and technical support.
positively influence agricultural investments (Higgins
Many beneficiaries of land reform, primarily from res-
et al. 2018) and subsequently agricultural productivity
titution, are not able to productively use the land they
(Lawry et al. 2017; Mbudzya et al. 2022). Additionally,
have received, due in part to a lack of infrastructure,
lack of tenure security affects the ability of an individual
inputs, and technical support (NPC 2013). Addition-
to make improvements to land that advance both cli-
ally, only a small number of black farmers who received
mate adaptation and mitigation (IPCC 2019). Securing
land through reform have successfully commercial-
land tenure for small-scale and emerging farmers could
ised (OECD 2021); black South Africans account for
therefore increase opportunities for their ownership
only an estimated 12.5 percent of commercial farmers
of productive assets and incentivise their investment
(DALRRD 2020). In 2018, women owned just 20
in infrastructure, sustainable land management, and
percent of commercial farms in South Africa (Stats SA
climate-smart measures (WBG 2022).
2020). In many cases, farming enterprises operating
The historical reliance of South Africa’s land reform on transferred landholdings go under, leaving large
programme on both restitution and market-based tracts unused and difficult to return to an economically
redistribution has, however, not sufficiently changed productive state (Pers. Comm. 2023c).
Land reform will therefore only prove to be an effective cess stories of smallholder farmers across South Africa
lever to address climate, development, and agricultural adopting CSA technologies to improve the sustainabil-
challenges if more transparent, efficient, and equitable ity and resilience of their farms. In the Mpumalanga
processes are adopted. For example, more must be province, for example, smallholder farmers use mixed
done to improve land transfer mechanisms and land cropping, rainwater harvesting, and crop rotation to
administration (WBG 2022). Likewise, land markets adapt to climate risks (Magagula and Ndoro 2023). Yet
must be protected from opportunism, corruption, and uptake varies across the country and among differ-
speculation by strengthened monitoring institutions ent groups of farmers (UN South Africa 2022, 20).
and practices (NPC 2013). In an effort to accelerate Whereas large-scale commercial farmers have access
land reform efforts, President Ramaphosa’s 2022 State to high-quality advisory services, small-scale farmers
of the Nation address prioritised the approval of the rely heavily on extension officers for CSA information
Expropriation Bill to create a clear legal framework, (Magagula and Ndoro 2023; Pers. Comm. 2023c).
establish the Agriculture and Land Reform Develop- Many of these extension agents, however, are not
ment Agency to support emerging farmers, distribute sufficiently equipped with practical information to
input vouchers to 250 small-scale farmers, and transfer support small-scale farmers to address climate change—
14,000 hectares of public land to the Housing Devel- nor to navigate language, cultural, and regional
opment Agency (Republic of South Africa 2023). As differences—and few extension agents are women,
of February 2023, however, none of these actions have who might be more effective at providing informa-
yet been completed (Republic of South Africa 2023). tion tailored to female farmers (Pers. Comm. 2023c;
The Expropriation Bill has, however, been approved by Walker et al. 2023).
the National Assembly, and 140,000 small-scale farm-
Uptake of CSA practices could be improved by
ers—7 percent of the roughly 2 million in South Africa
strengthening the capacity and role of agricultural
(Mazenda and Masiya 2022)—have received produc-
extension agents to provide small-scale farmers with
tion input vouchers (Republic of South Africa 2023).
more on-the-ground support to better understand
These are important advancements of land reform
and adapt to climate change (Pers. Comm. 2023c).
efforts in the face of rising input costs and wavering
This is especially true for new landowners who need
support by commercial farmers. Adequately addressing
to learn necessary skills to succeed (NPC 2013; WBG
insecure land tenure, especially for black and female
2022). Agricultural extension agents can catalyse
farmers, is necessary to enable investments in land and
significant improvements by influencing innovation,
increase agricultural productivity (NPC 2013).
technology, and decision-making processes at the
farms they engage; but to do this, they need contin-
Enabling CSA uous training in the latest data on climate risks and
CSA practices enhance the long-term resilience, sus- effective adaptation measures suitable to smallholder
tainability, and profitability of agriculture in the face of farmers (Ncayiyana et al. 2023) as well as the resources
growing climate risks, rising input costs, and fluctuat- required to do their jobs well (Nhamo et al. 2023).
ing productivity. Innovative agricultural technologies These resources can include practical examples of
are increasingly required to minimise climate-related effective CSA technologies for adaptation and mitiga-
losses, increase productivity, conserve natural resources, tion (Walker et al. 2023) as well as physical assets such
and strengthen the adaptive capacity of farming as reliable vehicles and high-quality training materials.
communities (Myeni et al. 2023). Although not an The agents’ effectiveness also reflects their priority and
all-encompassing solution, CSA is one of many effective funding by provincial agriculture departments (NPC
approaches, such as agroecology, that meet these crite- 2013). Increased government investment in infra-
ria while also decreasing GHG emissions (Myeni et al. structure and support services that target small-scale
2023). Released in 2018 for public comment, the draft farmers is also needed to enhance agricultural devel-
Climate Smart Agriculture Strategic Framework aims to opment (NPC 2013). Improved infrastructure would
enhance the resilience of people, food, and agricultural also improve smallholder farmers’ connectivity to wider
production systems; minimise GHG emissions from the markets for their products (DALRRD 2020), but is
agriculture sector; and safeguard food security (Myeni not currently equitable across all provinces (SWITCH
et al. 2023). (The draft framework has not yet been Africa Green 2020).
finalised and released publicly.)
Stronger partnerships between commercial and small-
However, the uptake of CSA practices by small-scale scale farmers and extension agents could also enhance
farmers has varied across the country (Nhamo et al. knowledge transfers and improve smallholder agricul-
2023; Pers. Comm. 2023c). There are numerous suc- tural productivity (Pers. Comm. 2023c). Commercial

farmers, agribusinesses, and organised agricultural strongly on the differentiated needs and experiences
industry bodies need to better engage with one another of people most vulnerable to climate change (Carter
to reverse the declining productivity of South Africa’s et al. 2021). CSA technologies, for example, should
agriculture sector, promote food production, and raise be designed and implemented with intentional con-
rural income and employment (NPC 2013). Blended sideration of gender and social inequalities to avoid
finance structures, as well as market linkages and their further entrenchment and enhance outcomes
farming training, have shown to be key components of (Chakraborty et al. 2023). This requires that vulnerable
successful partnerships aimed at driving inclusive trans- groups have the opportunity to highlight what adapta-
formation in the agriculture sector (Sihlobo and Qobo tion measures work best in their particular communities
2021) and could help incentivise such collaboration. (Carter et al. 2021) and to share them with others in
South Africa’s commercial farming sector offers many similar situations.
examples of major investments that have resulted in
Other innovative approaches also have roles to play. For
growth and job opportunities, including the expansion
example, carbon credits may offer an innovative means
of the table grape industry along the Orange River and
of revenue generation to farmers. A system to maximise
expanding the sugar industry into Mpumalanga (NPC
their potential benefits could be established that would
2013). Regions with untapped potential and underused
require farmers to adopt green standards and guidelines
land include the Eastern Cape, KZN, and Limpopo
and a credible monitoring, reporting, and verification
provinces (NPC 2013; Sihlobo and Qobo 2021).
mechanism. The government could collaborate with
Black smallholder and other emerging farmers also communities and academia to identify a set of CSA
need improved access to the capital required to invest measures and practices and link them to carbon credits,
in CSA technology. For example, land is necessary which could then become a source of income for
collateral to access capital; but the continuing chal- local rural communities through a transparent trading
lenges with land reform may hinder small-scale farmers system (WBG 2022). In addition, the Conservation
from making necessary investments in CSA and other Agriculture Farmer Innovation Programme, which
approaches to adaptation (Pers. Comm. 2023c). has been implemented across multiple provinces in
Highly vulnerable farmers should also have improved South Africa over the past decade, is another instructive
access to inclusive insurance programmes to protect example. This programme succeeded in supporting
their assets when climate extremes such as droughts commercial and smallholder farmers in climate-adap-
or floods lead to lost revenue. Such programmes tive innovation and adoption of new techniques and
could also serve as a proxy for collateral for farmers technologies. This was accomplished through effective
to access credit while protecting them against climate collaboration between farmers and researchers via par-
catastrophes. Making this shift would require improved ticipatory systems research approaches that recognised,
data and statistical information to develop adequate rewarded, and utilised farmers as key innovators in
insurance products that are priced accessibly, backed building context-specific, climate-resilient farming sys-
by enhanced ability to collect real-time data with tems (Smith 2023).
automated weather stations and upgraded agricultural
In addition to the approaches outlined above, con-
statistics portals (WBG 2022).
current transformative shifts are needed to ensure that
More collaborative research between government farmers are prepared to withstand the more severe
entities and extension agents, the private sector, and climate impacts that are projected over the coming
small-scale farmers could also help to improve the decades. Anticipated changes in the availability of
design and uptake of CSA technology. Growth in agri- water resources will play a central role in determining
cultural production in South Africa has historically been what can be sustainably produced in different regions
fuelled by technology and the returns on investment in of the country. Farmers could be encouraged and
agricultural research and development have been high supported to diversify away from water-intensive crop
(NPC 2013). Evidenced-based policies and inter- varieties to those that can better withstand hotter and
ventions require more robust research into plausible drier conditions (Carter et al. 2021). This would help
climate and adaptation scenarios at different implemen- reduce the overall risk of water stress for farmers (WBG
tation scales to identify specific adaptation needs for 2022). Importantly, this diversification should prioritise
different agricultural activities at the local level (DEA varieties that are naturally adapted, indigenous, and
2013). For example, investments in improved climate culturally appropriate.
advisory services would make the latest climate science
more accessible to government, agribusiness, extension
services and farmers (DEA 2013). Efforts should focus
CHAPTER 6.
SECURING WATER
As defined in the Just Transition Framework, equitable by transboundary water considerations because 45
access to water and a healthy environment are essential percent of South Africa’s river flow is shared through
components of the just transition. The water sector is international river basins with neighbouring countries
not directly a large driver of South Africa’s GHG emis- (DWS 2023d; Le Maitre et al. 2018).
sions—wastewater treatment accounted for roughly 45
The country mainly relies on surface water, which is
percent of the waste sector’s emissions or less than 2
particularly vulnerable to climate change as tempera-
percent of total emissions in 2022. However, the sector
ture increases lead to higher rates of evapotranspiration.
is extremely sensitive to climate change and essential to
Many of the country’s large dams are already fully
climate action because it serves as a critical input to all
allocated (or overallocated) to existing water users, and
economic sectors (DFFE 2024). This chapter presents
recent reports are showing a decrease in some dam
an overview of the water sector, as it relates to climate
yields (DWS 2018, 2022b). The Western Cape Water
action and the just transition, and the shifts that will
Supply System, one of the national integrated systems
be needed to ensure equitable access to adequate water
of large dams, is projected to face up to a 25 percent
and sanitation for all South Africans.
reduction in yield due to climate change (City of Cape
Town 2020). At the country level, the National Water
Overview and Sanitation Master Plan projects water shortages
of up to 30 percent by 2030 (DWS 2018). Increased
Impacts of climate change on temperatures and drought conditions also bring higher
South Africa’s water sector water demand, adding further stress to the water sup-
ply. Therefore, building water resilience in the face of
South Africa is already experiencing climate change anticipated declining water availability is critical.
impacts in its water sector, and these impacts are pro-
jected to grow. Evidence suggests that recent droughts
and floods (see Chapter 2) could be attributed to
Water and sanitation service
climate change and that more events of this type can be provision
expected in the future, with climate change contribut- To achieve a just transition, all South Africans must
ing to changes in the frequency and intensity of these have access to high-quality, reliable, and affordable
events (Douville et al. 2021; Pinto et al. 2022; Schi- water, sanitation, and hygiene. For water supply, this
ermeier 2018). In fact, the Sixth Assessment Report means having water that is healthy and safe to drink, in
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change adequate quantities, easy to access, and resilient in the
(IPCC) found that climate change made the 2015–17 face of climate change.6
Cape Town drought three to six times more likely to
occur. Recent analysis has shown climate change exac- Nationally, access to piped water increased by 4.1
erbated the heavy rainfall that led to the 2022 KZN percent from 2002 to 2022, but progress was uneven
floods (Douville et al. 2021; Pinto et al. 2022). These and access declined in six provinces (Stats SA 2023c).
events impact the quantity and quality of water that is Nearly 9 in 10 South African households (88.5 per-
available for human consumption and economic activi- cent) have access to piped water—roughly 46 percent
ties and can also damage water-related infrastructure. of households have piped water inside the house,
another 30 percent rely on piped water on-site (e.g., in
Climate change–induced changes to rainfall and tem- the yard), 2 percent use a neighbour’s tap, and about
perature patterns may increase water scarcity (Cullis 11 percent rely on a communal tap (Stats SA 2023c).
and Phillips 2019; Petja 2022). The country is gener- Three percent of households get water from open
ally classified as being water scarce, with annual average surface water sources, which are generally not safe to
precipitation roughly 52 percent of the global average. drink (Stats SA 2023c). In terms of reliability, nearly 35
Varying regional climate conditions—rainfall ranges percent of households receiving water from municipal
from 100 to 500 mm/year in different regions—and services (81 percent of all households) reported having
growing water demand contributes to the scarcity. Just disruptions in water supply service lasting more than
8 percent of South Africa’s land accounts for 39 percent two days at a time (Stats SA 2023c). Increased water
of its water flow, and water management is complicated

scarcity linked to climate change and demand could piped water on their property, over 55 percent used a
increase the frequency and duration of such disruptions public tap (15 percent of which were far away), and 8
if not properly managed. percent did not have access to any piped water (Oskam
et al. 2021). Poorer households were more likely to be
The country’s system of interconnected dams and bulk
using untreated and/or distant water sources (Oskam
water supply infrastructure enable greater flexibility in
et al. 2021). Furthermore, a survey of households
the water system and increase adaptive capacity (Cullis
in three rural communities in Limpopo found that
and Phillips 2019). This integrated system allows for
85 percent of respondents walk over four kilometres
interbasin transfers of water to help proactively man-
(km) to access drinking water, and the responsibility
age supply and demand, informed by complex water
for fetching water disproportionately fell on women
resource system models (Cullis and Phillips 2019).
and children (Bazaanah and Mothapo 2023). These
Having this system in place, including the profession-
findings are consistent with other studies showing
als with experience managing water resources in the
lower levels of water access in rural areas of South
context of high temperature and rainfall variability,
Africa (Bazaanah and Mothapo 2023). The persistent
can help to manage some of the projected impacts of
gaps in access to basic services and infrastructure in
climate change on the sector and reduce the chances
rural areas and informal settlements are rooted in
of water supply disruption (Cullis and Phillips 2019).
South Africa’s history of segregated service delivery
However, smaller cities, towns, and rural areas that fall
under colonial rule and the apartheid system, which
outside of bulk water distribution systems often rely on
makes addressing this gap a matter of restorative justice
a single source of water, making them more vulnerable
(Abrams et al. 2021).
to climate change impacts without the ability to rely on
interbasin transfers (Cullis and Phillips 2019). This will National access to improved sanitation has increased
exacerbate existing inequities in access to sustainable but lags water supply access. Over 83 percent of
water supply between urban and rural areas as well as in households have access to improved sanitation,8 a
informal settlements. 21.5 percent improvement from 2002. Nearly two-
thirds of households have flush toilets connected to
National progress on increasing access to piped water
the public sewer system or a septic tank, and roughly
obscures the challenges that remain in informal set-
68 percent have access to handwashing facilities (Stats
tlements and rural areas. A study of water access in
SA 2023c). Female-headed households, black Afri-
informal settlements7 spanning all provinces found that
cans, and people living in traditional/rural areas and
just 36 percent of surveyed households had access to
informal settlements are more likely to lack access to
basic sanitation (Bazaanah and Mothapo 2023; Pan et received higher marks for major urban areas, C+ and
al. 2018). Climate change–induced increases in water C- (satisfactory for now) for water supply and sani-
scarcity may make it harder for households reliant on tation, respectively. Bulk water resources and water
water sources outside the home to collect sufficient supply outside major urban areas both received a D- (at
water for handwashing and hygiene purposes (DWS risk of failure), and sanitation infrastructure outside
2022b). Additionally, both wetter and drier condi- major urban areas received the lowest possible grade of
tions, which are expected to become more extreme E (SAICE 2022). Some of the cited factors for the low
as climate change advances, can impact sanitation; scores include insufficient data to assess safety, age of
reduced water availability can impact the operation the infrastructure, significant need for improved main-
of waterborne sanitation systems, and flooding and tenance and investment, and inability to properly treat
extreme rain can cause overflows and damage infra- water and wastewater (SAICE 2022). The DWS’s most
structure (DWS 2022b). recent assessments of water and wastewater service pro-
viders validate SAICE’s analysis (DWS 2023b, 2023c).
Although South Africa has made important progress
across water, sanitation, and hygiene access over the Climate change will exacerbate these existing infra-
past 20 years, there are still millions in the coun- structure challenges. The 2022 KZN floods caused
try whose basic needs are not being met. The most significant damage to water and sanitation infrastruc-
recent assessments of South Africa’s water and sanita- ture, which resulted in disruption to services and
tion (wastewater) service providers reveal a sector in led to water rationing in some areas (PCC 2023a).
crisis. DWS’s 2023 assessment of water supply sys- Increased temperatures can also damage water and
tems (WSSs)9 found that less than 3 percent achieved sanitation infrastructure through higher rates of corro-
the highest grade, and 29 percent were classified as sion (Petja 2022).
being in a critical state (DWS 2023b). The assessment
reported that “the most vulnerable and concerning area Water quality and environmental
is the overall sub-standard quality of drinking water
to the receiving population” (DWS 2023b, ix). More
considerations
specifically, 71 percent of systems were not meeting Many of South Africa’s water bodies do not meet
standards for water quality compliance monitoring, established standards for health and safety; poor water
and over 40 percent of systems were rated as having quality has environmental and economic effects, with
unacceptable microbiological water quality or chemical implications for adaptive capacity and the just transi-
acute health compliance issues (DWS 2023b). Non- tion. The National State of Water Report 2022 notes
compliance, however, does not necessarily indicate that that there is severe microbial contamination in rivers
a system is providing unsafe water; many WSSs are not and dams, with over half of the sites sampled repre-
collecting and/or reporting sufficient data to confirm senting a high health risk if used for recreation or to
that they are providing safe water. The assessment of irrigate crops that are eaten raw (DWS 2022a). Cli-
wastewater treatment works (WWTW) found that over mate change is likely to exacerbate water quality issues
two-thirds fall into the high- or critical-risk categories because higher evapotranspiration caused by warmer
(DWS 2023c). The assessment grades for WSSs and temperatures can increase pollutant concentrations
WWTW have shown a downward trend over the last 10 and decrease oxygen levels in water (DWS 2022b).
years (DWS 2023b, 2023c). Climate change will make This, in turn, makes water more difficult and expensive
it even more challenging to improve overall service to treat for both human consumption and economic
because larger amounts of already scarce funding will uses. According to the DWS’s latest annual report,
be needed to not only fix these existing issues but also the largest sources of water pollution in South Africa
make systems more resilient to climate change. are “uncontrolled discharge of mine-affected water,
dysfunctional wastewater treatment systems, runoff
The National Water Security Framework for South
from agricultural lands, and runoff from settlements
Africa cites poor maintenance and lack of investment in
lacking sanitation or proper refuse management”
water infrastructure as significant contributing factors
(DWS 2023a, 8).
to the sector’s critical state (NPC 2020). The South
African Institution of Civil Engineering (SAICE) South Africa’s water quality challenges may be exac-
publishes a report card for the country’s infrastruc- erbated by climate change. For example, climate
ture, with an overall grade as well as ones for several change–induced changes in rainfall and flooding could
subsectors, ranging from A (world class) to E (unfit increase the risk of acid-mine drainage (AMD) due
for purpose) (SAICE 2022). In the most recent report to increased runoff from mining sites. Coal and gold
card, South Africa’s water and sanitation infrastructure mines are the major sources of AMD in South Africa

and have been linked to surface and groundwater a more just and resilient water sector should con-
contamination (Baloyi et al. 2023). Eutrophication,10 sider both equity and efficiency in how limited water
which is linked to agriculture pollution, can be wors- resources are allocated.
ened by warmer temperatures and more frequent
Despite using the most water of any sector, agricultural
droughts (DWS 2021). Furthermore, the risk of con-
users (particularly large-scale commercial farmers) also
taminated urban water runoff, especially from informal
pay the lowest raw water tariffs (DWS 2018). These
settlements without access to proper water and sanita-
low tariffs provide little incentive to improve water use
tion, increases with frequent and severe flood events.
efficiency (DWS 2023d). Although there is a lack of
Informal settlements typically have inadequate water
comprehensive monitoring data for the sector, avail-
and sanitation infrastructure, if any. For example, an
able data suggests that many operations lose nearly
investigation of an informal settlement in Cape Town
one-third of their water (DWS 2023d). Additionally,
found that just 380 communal toilets were provided
distribution of water within the sector and for other
for 20,000 inhabitants (Totaro 2016). Without appro-
productive uses is highly unequal, with most water
priate facilities, untreated excrement can easily end up
allocated to white users (Hydrosoft Institute 2021).
in the water sources (Gqomfa et al. 2023).
Analysis supported by the Water Research Commis-
Unsatisfactory performance of wastewater treatment sion (WRC) on water allocated to individual users
plants continues to be a challenge in South Africa. found that over 98 percent of recorded use went to
Given that South Africa is a water-scare country, and is white users (Hydrosoft Institute 2021). Race-disag-
projected to become more so due to climate change, gregated information is not available for businesses,
wastewater return flows to the environment compose but the WRC report states that these businesses
a significant portion of the country’s water budget “are predominantly white owned due to their racial
(DWS 2021). In the latest Green Drop report, only 15 historical origins” (Hydrosoft Institute 2021, 60).
percent of WWTW were found to comply with micro- Additionally, agricultural water use is disproportion-
bial limits, and 10 percent with chemical compliance ately allocated by gender, with women accounting for
(DWS 2023c). Additionally, climate change–induced 10.5 percent of existing agricultural water use licences
changes in rainfall and runoff can cause issues at water and nonwhite women just 4.5 percent of this (Tekwa
and wastewater management plants; smaller volumes and Adesina 2023).
of water can carry higher concentrations of pollution,
The average per capita water consumption in South
which are harder to treat, and higher flows can over-
Africa was 218 litres per day in 2023 compared to
whelm systems and result in the discharge of untreated
a global average of 173 litres per day (DWS 2023d,
water and wastewater (DWS 2022b; Petja 2022).
2023e). A significant amount of this is nonrevenue
A just transition will require healthy water resources water (NRW), which is lost through leaks or theft and
and ecosystems to meet environmental, human, and does not generate revenue. The DWS’s 2023 No Drop
economic needs. Polluted water can cause both acute report found that 47.4 percent of water provided by
and chronic illness and threatens the health of water WSSs was considered NRW, which can be unfavourably
ecosystems, aquatic species, and those who depend compared to a global best practice value of 15 per-
on these for their lives and livelihoods (DWS 2023d). cent (DWS 2023e).
Water pollution can have significant economic impacts
Industry, mining, and power generation use about 7
because it results in increased treatment costs for water
percent of South Africa’s water resources. Although this
boards, municipalities, and industry and can lead to
is small compared to other uses, these sectors have an
reduced crop yields in agriculture (DWS 2023d).
outsized impact on water quality.
Breakdown of water
allocations between sectors Major policies
and water use trends The national government of South Africa has, over
the past 30 years, implemented key national water
Ninety-eight percent of South Africa’s freshwater
and environmental policies that drive and encourage
resources are allocated, which leaves little flexibility for
climate action as well as aim to improve water access
accommodating growing demand across sectors (DWS
and quality. Cities have also been making strides
2022a). The agricultural sector is by far the largest
toward developing and implementing climate-resil-
user of water (61 percent for irrigation11), followed
ient strategies.
by the municipal sector (27 percent). The vision for
National policies
The National Water Act (NWA) of 1998 is the main The DWS has identified several strategic actions under
statute governing the management of water resources each objective to support achieving these goals. NWRS
in South Africa. The act is underpinned by three III also emphasises the importance of protecting strate-
fundamental principles for managing water resources: gic water source areas (SWSAs) and aquatic ecosystems
equity, (environmental) sustainability, and efficiency and maintaining and restoring ecological infrastructure.
(Republic of South Africa 1998). The NWA established These strategies are key to building climate resilience
the basic principles for water allocation in South Africa within the water sector as well as more broadly.
and called for the establishment of catchment manage-
The 2017 Water and Sanitation Sector Policy on Cli-
ment agencies (CMAs) to take over water management
mate Change report aims to provide a framework for
responsibilities in the country. Both the NWA and the
implementing the Climate Change Response Strategy
National Water Policy are founded on the principles
within the sector as well as to strengthen regulations
of integrated water resources management (IWRM),
that have implications for climate change (DWS
which “promotes the co-ordinated planning, devel-
2017). It sets forth four policy positions. The first
opment and management of water, land and related
policy position is on adaptation and outlines strategic
resources to maximise the resultant economic and
actions to build resilience and reduce vulnerability in
social welfare in an equitable manner without com-
the sector through water and sanitation governance,
promising the sustainability of vital ecosystems”
infrastructure development, and water and sanitation
(DWA 2016, 68).
management. The second policy position focuses on
The first National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) the role of water and sanitation in mitigation, and the
sets out the vision and strategic actions for effective third concentrates on mainstreaming climate change
water management to support equitable and sustain- into the sector through policy review, partnerships,
able water access and use for social and economic and coordination. The fourth and final policy position
transformation and development (DWAF 2004). focuses on costs and subsidies and states that climate
NWRS II builds on this vision and includes a chapter change resilience must be factored into water pricing
on managing water resources for climate change; it (DWS 2017). The DWS is in the process of updating
also operationalises the establishment of CMAs with a the response strategy for the sector, and a draft of the
framework for water allocation and taxes. updated strategy was released for stakeholder input in
2023 (SA News 2023).
NWRS III expands the climate change management
focus to include both water and sanitation (DWS The implementation of national policies has been
2023d). The chapter on managing water and sanitation complicated by a lack of institutional stability at the
in a changing climate outlines six strategic objec- local level. The NWA called for the establishment of
tives (DWS 2023d): 19 CMAs, expecting these to be set up by the year
2000 (Munnik 2020). By 2012, only 2 had been
• Improve water management and sanitation for
advanced adaptive capacity.
• Integrate climate change considerations in water and
sanitation planning processes across time horizons.
• Develop adaptation measures to maximise water
security and resource protection as climate
conditions change.
• Improve internal capacity and provide resources to
increase resilience to the impacts of climate change.
• Enhance awareness and capacity on issues related to
climate change.
• Interlink climate and hydrological scenario projec-
tions and ensure they represent complex interrelated
natural systems.
established and thus the planned CMAs were consoli-
dated into nine areas (Munnik 2020). Then, in 2017,
Required shifts
the Minister of Water and Sanitation announced plans A just transition for the water sector will require
for the creation of a single CMA, a decision that was building resilience to climate change, ensuring univer-
then overturned in 2018 by the subsequent minister sal access to water and sanitation, and balancing water
(Munnik 2020). As of 2023, there are still just 2 CMAs demand across users in an equitable manner. This
established, and the DWS has decided to further con- section details the actions and investments necessary to
solidate the catchment management areas from nine to achieve these shifts.
six (DWS 2023d).
Fostering flexible planning
Subnational policies and stable governance
South Africa is urbanising rapidly, and both people
One key shift will be the transition from conventional
and economic activity are increasingly concentrated
planning and engineering solutions to adaptive and
in the cities, which are also facing increasing water
flexible planning that emphasises cobenefits while pro-
security risks (WBG 2022). Metropolitan cities account
viding institutional stability.
for approximately 57 percent of the country’s gross
value added and a similar proportion of jobs. Fortu- There is a growing concern that water institutions face
nately, some cities are leading the way when it comes challenges that limit their ability to provide adequate
to building urban water resilience. For example, Cape water and sanitation services in the face of current
Town has developed and begun to implement several and anticipated climate changes. Building resilience
strategies to address its water risks, driven partly by to climate change is a priority not just for water and
the 2015–18 drought. The Cape Town Water Strategy sanitation provision but also for the protection of
guides implementation of actions for building climate infrastructure, livelihoods, and the economy. It will
resilience, including diversifying water sources; improv- require holistic long-term planning, political will, and
ing management of shared water sources with other a greater level of coordination to enable the integra-
water user groups; developing and introducing water tion of climate adaptation into all types of planning
reuse; improving management of ecosystems, particu- and to integrate spare capacity to be better prepared
larly removal of alien invasive plants that reduce water for times of disruption. In South Africa, conventional
runoff; and transitioning into a water-sensitive city engineering solutions, such a grey infrastructure,
(City of Cape Town 2020). dominate in the water sector. This type of infrastruc-
ture, such as concrete dams or stormwater drainage,
Johannesburg is also taking steps to mitigate the
tends to be resource intensive to build, has a long
climate risks affecting its water supply. Johannesburg
lifespan, and can produce significant GHG emissions
is one of the few major global cities that does not lie
(Conservation International n.d.). There are elements
on a significant water source and relies heavily on a
of the traditional approach and infrastructure that will
national integrated water supply. In 2021, the city
still be needed but could be strengthened by inte-
developed its Climate Action Plan (CAP) which aligns
grating climate resilience and adaptive management,
with the Paris Agreement and the city’s long-term
for example, by integrating grey and green infrastruc-
strategy. Water is a key target area within the CAP, and
ture. These types of strategies offer the potential for
it includes actions such as diversifying water sources,
adaptation and mitigation cobenefits (Conservation
reducing water demand, and limiting physical water
International n.d.).
losses (City of Johannesburg 2021). The city’s Water
Resilience Action Plan (2022) identifies and develops Municipalities, and national governments, tend to
short- to long-term water resilience actions. The plan develop long-term water security strategies that limit
was developed through an interactive process with city flexibility and lag on implementation. Long-term plans
stakeholders where pathways for change were identi- quickly become outdated, and moving targets make
fied and corresponding priority actions set. Among the it difficult to stick to plans. In the face of increasingly
priority actions are nature-based solutions and green unpredictable climate and weather patterns, long-term
infrastructure,12 diversification of water sources, knowl- plans that embrace climate resilience and utilise “no
edge exchange, and water-sensitive planning. regrets” options, which yield benefits regardless of the
future climate scenario, should be a priority. Examples
of no regrets strategies include establishing mutual
aid agreements with neighbouring communities to
provide services in times of disruption or hydrologi- enhancement (DWS 2023d). SWSAs are part of the
cal modelling to project future water flows and plan ecological infrastructure and are areas that contribute a
accordingly (EPA 2013). disproportionately high amount to the country’s water
supply (DWS 2023d). Ecological infrastructure and
Flexible and adaptive management plans should be
SWSAs do not always fall neatly within the boundaries
underpinned by stable institutions. The slow rollout
of one province or city and thus require a higher-level
of the CMAs as well as repeated changes to the insti-
integrated approach to effectively manage, such as
tutional arrangements creates confusion and make
IWRM. Examples of strategies to restore ecological
it more challenging to tackle large-scale issues like
infrastructure and protect SWSAs include removing
climate change and water allocation reform in a holistic
invasive alien species and replacing them with native
manner (Munnik 2020). Finalising the establishment
vegetation to build a buffer around water ecosystems
of the currently planned six CMAs and ensuring they
(DWS 2023d). Ecological infrastructure also supports
are properly resourced is essential. Other institutional
climate resilience because healthy ecosystems are better
arrangement matters that also need to be finalised
able to adapt to and absorb shocks.
include the creation of the National Water Resources
Infrastructure Agency and the conversion of irrigation An integrated management approach can also help
boards to water user associations (DWS 2023d). address the country’s infrastructure challenges. South
Africa’s water and sanitation infrastructure is aging
Transforming management of and in dire need of repairs and replacement; using
an integrated management approach can enable the
water resources and infrastructure adoption of adaptation and resilience strategies and
Shifts are also required in the way water resources and green infrastructure into existing and planned infra-
infrastructure are managed; fostering an integrated structure. Repairs to fix leaks in water pipes will help
management approach can improve resilience and reduce NRW loss and the potential for contamination
ecosystem health. and pollution while also building resilience to water
scarcity. Prioritising the funding of routine mainte-
South African water policy is underpinned by IWRM
nance of infrastructure will also help prevent further
strategies, but the country has struggled to imple-
degradation, particularly in the face of climate change
ment an integrated and holistic approach to water
(DWS 2023b). Changes in the climate and water
resources management on the ground (DWA 2016;
demand may result in having to treat different volumes
Palmer and Munnik 2018). Adopting an integrated
of water and wastewater than systems were originally
approach requires breaking down management silos
designed for; improvements in the monitoring of water
and fostering coordination across levels of gover-
quality and flows, along with predictive modelling,
nance and different water users. Given the historical
can be used to project future demand and ensure that
challenges in implementing IWRM, a study commis-
infrastructure is designed with climate change in mind
sioned by the WRC recommends adopting an adaptive
(DWS 2023c). Additionally, green infrastructure, such
IWRM approach (Palmer and Munnik 2018). The
as green roofs or permeable sidewalks, can be used to
study adopted the following definition of adaptive
capture water, which helps to reduce flood risks and
IWRM: “Using adaptive, systemic, processes and an
store water for times of drought (Gulati 2020). Taking
understanding of complex social-ecological systems to
a holistic, integrated approach can help maximise the
coordinate conservation, manage and develop water,
benefits of using green infrastructure alongside existing
land, and related resources across sectors within a given
grey infrastructure.
river basin, in order to maximise the economic and
social benefits derived from water resources in an equi-
table manner while preserving and, where necessary,
Achieving universal access
restoring freshwater ecosystems” (Palmer and Munnik to water and sanitation
2018, 1). This approach emphasises not only the com-
Achieving the goal of universal water and sanitation
plex interrelated nature of water ecosystems but also
access will require building the human resource, finan-
the importance of placing these within the context of
cial, and technical capacity of service providers while
social systems.
also looking for innovative solutions for areas that are
IWRM can support the restoration of ecological hard to reach with traditional, centralised water and
infrastructure and protection of SWSAs. Ecological sanitation. Reaching this goal will require both improv-
infrastructure refers to the natural ecosystem (e.g., ing and maintaining existing services by addressing the
rivers, wetlands, etc.), which provides valuable services challenges currently facing water and sanitation service
to humans, such as flood protection or water quality

providers and extending service provision to places figures and proof that water loss is being properly
that currently lack adequate service, especially informal managed before they can receive funding for new infra-
settlements and rural/traditional areas. structure projects (DWS 2023e).
Human resource and financial gaps in the water sector Addressing disparities in water and sanitation service
must be addressed. The DWS’s assessments show that provision in rural areas and informal settlements will
there is a significant shortfall in staff at all levels within likely require additional and/or alternative shifts.
WSSs and WWTW (DWS 2023b, 2023c). As such, the For example, small-scale decentralised wastewater
water sector represents an important opportunity for treatment systems might be more effective in these
job creation in the transition. locations where connection to a larger sanitation grid
is not feasible (Schaub-Jones 2022). In recent years,
Water and sanitation providers also need greater finan-
the South African government has tried to adopt the
cial sustainability to address their infrastructure and
approach of upgrading informal settlements, where
human resource challenges. The high levels of NRW
possible, as opposed to clearing them. The provision
loss mean a large portion of treated water is not paid
of basic water and sanitation services is fundamental to
for, and tariffs often do not reflect the true costs of ser-
upgrading efforts.
vice; the National Treasury is working with providers
to revise this (DWS 2023b). Installing water meters at
all points of water use can help providers collect greater
Ensuring efficient and equitable
revenues. However, tariff reform and more compre- water use
hensive tariff collection will likely not be sufficient to
Shifts are needed to ensure that water is allocated in the
address the financial issues plaguing the water sector
most efficient and equitable manner while also building
and municipalities more generally.13 To help address
resilience to climate change. Water conservation and
some of these challenges, the DWS is partnering with
demand management (WC/WDM), water supply aug-
the Development Bank of South Africa and SALGA to
mentation, and reallocation among users are tools that
establish a Water Partnership Office, which will support
can be leveraged for this shift.
municipalities in creating public-private partnerships
(PPPs) to fund water projects (DWS 2023f). Shifting to technologies and behaviours that promote
WC/WDM can support more efficient use of water
Full implementation of existing regulations is essential.
across sectors. Repairing leaks and conducting rou-
The DWS recommends strengthening the oversight
tine maintenance, as mentioned above, can reduce
role of water service authorities within municipali-
NRW loss. Additionally, universal water metering and
ties and improving their own regulatory functions to
billing and/or licensing for all water users will help
ensure consistency in regulatory actions (DWS 2023b).
ensure that water and sanitation service providers have
There is also a proposal for a policy that would require
accurate usage data, which can be used to create WC/
municipalities to provide actual water consumption
WDM plans and track water balances (DWS 2023d).
Different strategies that could be deployed to support a study of water sector investments needed in South
WDM across sectors include more targeted water Africa through 2050, modelling revealed that reducing
tariffs, targets and incentives for reducing water loss, allocations to the agriculture sector would not yield
water-efficient appliances and hardware, and water con- significant cost savings—a 15 percent reduction would
servation campaigns to encourage behaviour change only reduce total investment needs by 0.9 percent
(DWS 2023d; Fourie et al. 2021; Ziervogel 2019). In (DBSA et al. 2023). Conversely, increasing allocations
the agriculture sector, more efficient irrigation tech- to agriculture did not significantly increase investment
niques and technologies, improved soil management requirements. An increase of 6 percent—the amount
strategies, crop selection, and real-time monitoring estimated as necessary to maintain productivity under
of weather and water usage can also increase water climate change—would increase total investment
use efficiency (Adebiyi Adetoro et al. 2020; DBSA et requirements by just 0.7 percent, and a 15 percent
al. 2023; Mabhaudhi et al. 2019). For the industrial increase in allocations would result in 0.9 percent
sector, water reuse has many potential applications, higher investment costs (DBSA et al. 2023). (See
with several large businesses in South Africa already Chapter 5 for further discussion on supporting agri-
investing in water recovery and reuse (DWA and cultural productivity in the context of climate change).
2030 WRG n.d.). Water could also be reallocated within sectors. For
example, the reallocation of agricultural land and water
Although WC/WDM has the potential to dramat-
to smallholder farmers and historically disadvantaged
ically increase water availability across users, water
groups is a strategy that is already enshrined in South
supply augmentation strategies may still be needed.
African policy but is not currently well implemented
The degree to which these strategies will be needed
(Tekwa and Adesina 2023). Reform or implementation
will depend on climate impacts, population growth,
of related policies with a just transition lens can help
and the success of WC/WDM. Some options for
support the more equitable distribution of water.
increasing South Africa’s water supply include increased
groundwater extraction, water recycling and reuse,
desalination, and rainwater harvesting (DWS 2023d).
Required investments
There are significant trade-offs with many of these Implementing these shifts to achieve a just transition
strategies and potential environmental implications. in the water sector will require significant invest-
Desalination, for example, is expensive and energy ment. However, these investments are likely to yield
intensive (Smit 2021). However, the National Water dividends in terms of resilience-building, equity, and
and Sanitation Master Plan notes that desalination and economic development. Modelling looking at invest-
reuse of effluent are both becoming more effective as ments needed in the water sector through 2050 found
technologies improve (DWS 2018). Improved water that an average of R256 billion per year is needed
monitoring can yield more accurate water balances, between 2023 and 2050, or a total investment of
which municipalities and WSSs can use to determine R7.16 trillion (DBSA et al. 2023). The cost of this base
the extent to which new water sources are needed. case scenario would meet the Sustainable Development
Economic and climate modelling can help determine Goals without implementing any other major policy or
which options are the most cost-effective and equitable operational interventions (DBSA et al. 2023). How-
in each situation. ever, a wetter climate, aggressive WC/WDM, clearing
of invasive alien plants, a successful energy transition,
Reallocation of water resources within and between
use of lower-cost technology options, and efficiency
sectors is the third category of policy options that can
improvements would all decrease costs whereas the
be leveraged to shift toward more equitable water
opposite (e.g., dry climate, no energy transition) would
access. Given the legacy of apartheid in both land
increase investment (DBSA et al. 2023).
and water allocations in South Africa, any shifts will
have equity and political implications (Tekwa and Comparing the base scenario to current investments
Adesina 2023). Although the agriculture sector is the in the water sector, there is a shortfall of R91 billion
largest water user, any reallocation needs to consider per year (DBSA et al. 2023). The report makes recom-
potential impacts on food security and employment, mendations for how to optimise available funding to
particularly in rural areas (DBSA et al. 2023). Climate reduce this gap, which, in total, could reduce invest-
projections show that more water will be needed to ment requirements to R43 billion per year under the
achieve the same level of agricultural productivity in base case. However, new funding sources will still be
the future (DBSA et al. 2023). Therefore, maintain- needed, as well as cost reductions.
ing current allocations would likely mean reduced
yields in the absence of other mitigating strategies. In

SECTION 3.
Mitigation: emissions,
targets, and progress
CHAPTER 7.
EMISSIONS: TRENDS, DRIVERS, AND

MEETING THE MITIGATION NDC
Emissions trends and drivers
South Africa’s relatively high levels of historical GHG the largest emissions source within the sector (DFFE
emissions have not translated directly into socioeco- 2024). The FOLU sector was a net carbon sink in
nomic development, particularly when examined in 2022, absorbing rather than emitting GHG emissions,
the context of poverty, unemployment, and inequal- though this reverses from year to year (DFFE 2024).
ity. South Africa has comparable historical emissions For example, between 2005 and 2010, FOLU was a
(approximately 14,100 million tons of carbon dioxide net-emitting sector, largely due to forest fires.
equivalent [MtCO2e] from 1990 through 2020) to
South Africa’s GHG emissions increased during the
more highly developed countries such as South Korea
2000s and decreased during the 2010s; in 2022, the
(about 15,000 MtCO2e), Italy (13,800 MtCO2e), and
country emitted an estimated 479 MtCO2e (exclud-
France (13,300 MtCO2e) (Climate Watch 2022a).
ing FOLU), slightly lower than the emissions levels
Although South Africa falls within the 20 top-emitting
of 2000 (DFFE 2024) (Figure 7.1). From 2000 to
countries globally, both historically and annually, the
2022, energy sector emissions decreased 2.5 percent
country accounted for a little over 1 percent of total
in total over the entire period, but with years of sharp
global emissions in 2020 (Climate Watch 2022b).
increase and decrease in between. The net decrease was
Within Africa, it is the highest-emitting country
largely driven by emissions declines in the residential
(excluding land-use change and forestry14).
sector, aviation, and petroleum refining (DFFE 2024).
South Africa’s emissions are driven largely by the energy From 2000 to 2009, energy emissions grew steadily to
sector, which accounted for approximately 78 percent reach their peak for the 20-year period in 2009. There
of GHG emissions in 2022 (excluding forest and other was then a sharp decrease in 2010, associated with
land uses [FOLU]) (DFFE 2024). The contribution the global economic crisis. Energy sector emissions
of the energy sector to South Africa’s total emissions rebounded slightly from 2011 to 2013, then mostly
has remained relatively steady from 2000 to 2022, decreased from 2014 to 2020, with a sharp decline in
and overall energy sector emissions declined by 2.5 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic (DFFE 2024).
percent (DFFE 2024). Over half of the energy sector’s Energy sector emissions increased in 2021 and then
emissions (roughly 53 percent in 2022) come from declined again in 2022 (DFFE 2024). In instances
electricity production, the majority of which is pro- where emissions have decreased, this seems to be
duced by Eskom, the national electricity utility. After largely driven by economic and climate factors (e.g.,
Eskom, Sasol (a large petrochemicals conglomerate) is economic crisis, drought-induced livestock death, the
the single-largest emitter of GHG emissions in South pandemic) as well as load shedding, as opposed to miti-
Africa, accounting for just under 13 percent15 of the gation efforts aimed at reducing emissions.
country’s total emissions (excluding FOLU) in 2022
(DFFE 2024; Sasol 2023). The second-largest-emitting
sector after energy is agriculture, which accounted for
Mitigation commitments
just under 12 percent of emissions (livestock emissions South Africa is a Party to the Paris Agreement under
are the largest emissions source within the sector). the UNFCCC and thus ascribes to the global goal of
The industrial process and product use (IPPU) cate- limiting warming to well below 2°C, while making best
gory made nearly 6.5 percent of emissions (these are efforts to meet 1.5°C. At the 28th Conference of the
the nonenergy emissions from industrial processing Parties (COP28) meeting in 2023, all Parties affirmed
plants, which include cement, glass, petrochemical, that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C with no or
and metal production) (DFFE 2024). Over half of the limited overshoot requires deep, rapid, and sustained
IPPU emissions come from the metal industry, which reductions in global GHG emissions. Specifically, a
produces iron, steel, ferroalloy, aluminium, lead, and reduction of 43 percent by 2030 and 60 percent by
zinc. Finally, the waste sector accounted for just over 2035, relative to the 2019 level, is needed to reach
4 percent of emissions, with solid waste disposal being
Section 3. Mitigation: emissions, targets, and progress • 49

Figure 7.1 • South Africa’s GHG emissions, 2000–2022
600
500
400
MtCO2e
300
200
100
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Source: DFFE 2024.
net zero CO2 emissions by 2050. The Parties also

acknowledged that the decarbonisation pathways are
Meeting the mitigation
subject to the capability, resourcing, and national commitments
circumstances of countries. The conclusions of recent
The future of three major sectors will provide the
IPCC reports continue to underscore that significant
greatest indication of whether South Africa will meet its
and unprecedented changes will be required across all
mitigation commitments: electricity, industry (predom-
sectors of the economy to meet these goals.
inantly Sasol), and transport. Collectively, these sectors
South Africa has set targets for reducing GHG emis- currently account for more than 80 percent of the
sions through 2030, in line with its development country’s GHG emissions. They typically have long-
requirements. The country’s revised NDC, which was lived infrastructure (e.g., coal power plants, vehicle
submitted to the UNFCCC in 2021, sets a commit- internal combustion engines), pointing to the need to
ment for national GHG emissions to be in the range establish effective policies and actions today to ensure a
of 398–510 MtCO2e in 2025 and 350–420 MtCO2e smooth and just transition toward reaching South Afri-
in 2030. According to Climate Action Tracker, the ca’s net zero aspirations. These transitions are discussed
lower end of the mitigation target in 2030 (i.e., 350 in more detail in Chapters 8 and 9.
MtCO2e) is almost aligned with a global trajectory
Recent international studies concur that South Africa
of limiting warming to 1.5°C.16 South Africa has also
is currently on track to meet the 2025 emissions
set an aspirational goal for reaching net zero CO2
reduction target but will likely fall short of reaching
emissions by 2050, as articulated in its Low Emissions
the 2030 target. The detailed methodologies for these
Development Strategy and the national Just Transition
projections are presented in the cited works below,
Framework. Figure 7.2 presents the gap that must be
broadly estimating South Africa’s emissions trajectory
closed between current emissions trends and near-term
by reviewing policies that have been implemented
and long-term climate targets.
and comparing those to the country’s emissions
By April 2025, South Africa, as a Party to the UNF- reduction goals:
CCC, will be required to submit an updated NDC that
includes a new emissions reduction target for 2035. • Nascimento et al. (2022) projects that, under
The sooner and more ambitious the emissions cuts current policies, South Africa’s emissions will
occur in the near term, the easier it will be to reach the likely fall within its NDC range in 2025 but will
long-term aspirational goal of net zero CO2 emissions miss 2030 targets.
by 2050. The PCC will be making recommenda- • The Climate Pledge of the Planbureau voor de
tions to government on the updated NDC before the Leefomgeving (Netherlands Environmental Assess-
end of 2024, based on evidence and input from all ment Agency) also projects that South Africa will
stakeholder groups. miss the 2030 targets based on a review of the
implementation of current policies (PBL 2024).
• The United Nations Environment Programme’s • According to the government’s draft 2024 Sectoral
Emissions Gap Report 2023 projects an 11 per- Emissions Target (SET) Report, the low target of
cent gap17 between South Africa’s projected the 2030 NDC (350 MtCO2e) could be achieved
emissions under current policies and 2030 tar- with more ambitious actions in the electricity and
gets (UNEP 2023). transport sectors. The report cautions, however,
that if key policies—such as the 2019 IRP with its
Recent domestic studies are more ambiguous about prescribed electricity build and decommissioning
whether South Africa will meet the 2030 target: plans—are not achieved, the 2030 target in the
NDC may not be achieved. This is pertinent given
• Modelling work undertaken by the University of Eskom’s recent decision to further delay the decom-
Cape Town (Marquard et al. 2021) for the PCC and missioning of three of its oldest coal-fired power
the DFFE, for example, shows that if the 2019 IRP plants (Camden, Grootvlei, and Hendrina).
and other existing policies were fully implemented
as designed, then emissions in 2030 could be as low These results indicate the need to strengthen the
as 370 MtCO2e; but this also depends on ambi- implementation of mitigation policies in the near term,
tious actions across other sectors. Although power particularly in the energy and transport sectors, as dis-
accounts for the major share of emissions reductions cussed in subsequent chapters.
to 2030, it is not the sole effort required.
Figure 7.2 • South Africa’s historical emissions and targets
Net greenhouse gas emissions (MtCO2e)

398 - 510
2025 target
500
350 - 420
Historical emissions 2030 target
400
Future emissions targets

300
200
100
0
2050 target
0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Note: Although South Africa’s historical emissions and emissions targets for 2025 and 2030 are presented in units of million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e), and include
emissions from non-CO2 greenhouse gases, South Africa’s 2050 net zero target is for net zero CO2 emissions alone. Today, CO2 emissions account for around 80 percent of South
Africa’s total annual CO2e emissions (Climate Watch 2022a).
Sources: Historical data from Climate Watch (2022a); targets from Republic of South Africa (2021) and PCC (2022b).

CHAPTER 8.
DECARBONISING ENERGY SUPPLY

South Africa’s energy supply system is the largest con- South Africa is facing severe electricity security chal-
tributor to the country’s GHG emissions; the country lenges due to the decreasing energy availability factor
cannot achieve its climate commitments without (EAF)18 of the coal fleet and increasing unplanned
decarbonising the sector. To meet the country’s goal of outages (Figure 8.2). The decreased EAF has led to
reducing emissions to net zero CO2 by 2050, signif- a trend of declining electricity generation since 2010
icant and unprecedented changes will be required to (Figure 8.3). An independent assessment of Eskom’s
transform the sector. This chapter examines South Afri- operational situation commissioned by the National
ca’s progress on some of these major transformations. Treasury found that Eskom’s overly complex and
bureaucratic governance structure is the root cause
of the low EAF (VGBE 2023). With the coal fleet
Overview centrally managed, staff at the plant level are unable
More than 40 percent of South Africa’s GHG emissions to implement operations and maintenance strategies
are from the production of electricity (excluding coal in a timely manner, which has led to poor conditions
mining). South Africa’s electricity system is one of the at many plants (VGBE 2023). Complicated procure-
most carbon intensive in the world, due to the predom- ment processes and lack of internal capacity to address
inance of coal in the electricity mix (coal contributed to operations and maintenance challenges further exac-
a little under 80 percent of all electricity generated in erbate these issues (VGBE 2023). As a result of these
2022 (177 terawatt-hours) (Pierce and Le Roux 2023). operational challenges, as well as the general age of
The remaining electricity mix comprises renewable the coal fleet, load shedding has increased year on year
energy, nuclear energy, and diesel (Pierce and Le Roux since 2018, with large increases in 2022 and 2023; for
2023) (Figure 8.1). example, load shedding in 2022 was four times more
than in 2021 (Pierce and Le Roux 2023).
Figure 8.1 • South Africa’s electricity mix, 2022, by generation source
4.8 1.4 8.3

9.7 227.2
TWh 10.8 0.2 -5.9
4.5
200 3.6 3.1
10.1
176.6
150
100
50
0
Coal Nuclear Diesel Hydro Pumped Imports Other Wind Solar PV CSP Pump DSR System
+ gas storage load load
(domestic
and export)
Notes: CSP = concentrated solar power; DSR = demand side response; PV = photovoltaic.
Source: Pierce and Le Roux 2023.
Figure 8.2 • Declining EAF trends of Eskom fleet
Annual average (%)

80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Note: EAF = energy availability factor.

Figure 8.3 • Declining electricity generation in South Africa
Coal Wind Solar PV CSP All other sources

249 250
250 244 241 241 240 241
239 238 239
234 233
227
Annual electricity production (TWh)
200
150
100
50
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Notes: CSP = concentrated solar power; DSR = demand side response; PV = photovoltaic.

Load shedding has devastating impacts on South to reduced coal demand (Presidency of the Republic
African people, businesses, and the economy. Analysis of South Africa 2022). Some of these losses can be
from Nova Economics19 estimates that load shedding at least partially mitigated through local employment
resulted in R43.5 billion in losses for the South African diversification and investment in the renewable energy
economy from 2007 to 2019, which is comparable to and other value chains (CSIR et al. 2021). However,
the impact that the 2008/9 financial crisis had on GDP the coal value chain is heavily concentrated in Mpum-
growth (Walsh et al. 2023). The estimated impacts alanga—with 83 percent of operating coal mines
for 2020 through the first quarter of 2023 are signifi- in the country (Bhorat et al. 2023)—whereas new
cantly larger than the 2007–19 period, with roughly employment and economic opportunities may be less
R224 billion in total losses (Walsh et al. 2023). These concentrated in the region. Indeed, the distributed
economic losses and other operational issues caused nature of renewable power generation means that there
by load shedding—such as the inability for businesses are limited opportunities for centralisation other than
to operate without electricity or the need to rely on in the upstream production elements of the renew-
expensive diesel as a backup source—impact productiv- able value chain.
ity and employment.
Beyond creating employment opportunities for
The electricity system is facing one of the earliest dis- displaced workers, whether through job creation
ruptions in the transition to net zero CO2 emissions by that aligns with transferrable skills or retraining
2050. South Africa typically exports a quarter to a third programmes, another challenge during the energy tran-
of the coal it produces annually (Eskom 2021a; Min- sition is retaining job quality. Coal mining employment
erals Council South Africa 2024). However, exports has offered formal benefits—such as unemployment
account for a higher portion of the value of total coal insurance funds, pensions, collective bargaining rights,
sales given the higher prices internationally compared and leave opportunities—that are difficult to leave
to domestic sales; in 2022, exports accounted for 55 behind and, in many cases, have been seen as more
percent (R136 billion) of total coal sale value and 42 favourable than the quality of other formal sector
percent (R63 million) in 2021 (Minerals Council South employment (Bhorat et al. 2023). Workers in disrupted
Africa 2022, 2023). Although global coal demand industries thus stand to lose more than just income if
rose in recent years because of conflicts, the expected there are minimal social protections in place amid the
longer-term trend is for demand to plateau and even- transition. The Sector Jobs Resilience Plan: Coal Value
tually decline, which means the sector will be impacted Chain (Patel et al. 2020) points to, for example, the
regardless of the pace of the transition domestically need to assess the experience, age, and long-term career
(PCC 2022b). These changes will have significant and plans of workers likely to be affected by downsizing to
far-reaching implications on the coal value chain and inform labour market policies and economic diversifica-
the people and communities that depend on it. These tion strategies.
transitions clearly must be managed carefully, with an
The implications that emerge from the Komati Power
overriding centrality of justice. The risks and opportu-
Station closure reveal the conversations that need
nities associated with transitioning the energy and coal
to take place prior to implementing actions toward
value chains in South Africa have been covered exten-
developing clean energy. In October 2022, Eskom shut
sively in literature,20 but key takeaways from recent
down the last unit of one of its oldest coal-fired power
discussions are highlighted here.
plants, the Komati Power Station. The PCC con-
The coal value chain encompasses between 150,000 sulted with stakeholder groups following the Komati
and 200,000 jobs. Around 94,500 people were directly shutdown about the planned decommissioning and
employed in coal mining in 2023, and roughly 43,000 repurposing project. Consulted groups included rep-
employed between transport, power generation and resentatives from civil society, community leaders and
petrochemical production, and local employment in the members, local business, organised labour, and local
areas surrounding mines and power stations (Bhorat government. Although the full-time Eskom employees
et al. 2023; Hermanus and Montmasson-Clair 2021; working at Komati have either been deployed to other
Makgetla 2021b; PCC 2023c; Minerals Council South Eskom sites or retained with the option of reskill-
Africa 2024; Patel et al. 2020). Analysis conducted for ing toward renewable technologies, many contract
the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) workers did not see any provisions from the Komati
found that meeting the low end of the 2030 NDC closure (PCC 2023b). In terms of the decommis-
would result in 4,500–7,500 new coal mining jobs sioning process, workers and community members
not being created through 2030 and an additional felt that they were only being consulted after the fact
3,000–9,000 job losses between 2020 and 2030 due and emphasised a desire to have more involvement
in decision-making. They felt that there was a lack of link between use of nonelectric fuels and morbidity
transparency in the decommissioning process and that and mortality, particularly in children (Morakinyo and
Eskom had an inadequate plan for retaining employees Mokgobu 2022).
or creating new employment for those who lost jobs.
Energy poverty also tends to disproportionately impact
The PCC recommended that in the future, impacted
women and children. When a household relies on
stakeholders be informed of a power plant closure
nonelectric fuels, it often falls to women and chil-
years ahead of time to ensure the proper protections
dren to collect these fuels (Longe 2021). Time spent
and alternative employment pathways are in place
collecting fuel reduces time available to participate
(Sguazzin 2023).
income-generating activities and can present health and
A just energy transition also requires access to clean, safety risks because women and children may need to
affordable, and reliable energy for all. South Africa has carry heavy loads of fuel (wood, charcoal) over long
one of the highest electrification rates among countries distances (Longe 2021; Mohlakoana and Wolpe 2021).
in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2023a). However, Lack of electricity or adequate lighting at night can also
over 10 percent of households are not connected to the increase the risk of gender-based violence (Mohlakoana
main electricity supply (Stats SA 2023c). Furthermore, and Wolpe 2021). As articulated in the Just Transi-
household connection to the main electricity supply tion Framework, it is essential to consider the gender
fails to capture the fact that many households with a dimension in the transition (PCC 2022b).
connection are still energy poor. One study looking at
A well-managed transition to a zero-carbon energy
both energy accessibility and affordability21 as measures
system has the potential to address energy equity
of energy poverty found that 27 percent of house-
issues while also improving public health. Air pollution
holds are deprived of affordable energy and the same
from coal mining, transport, power generation, and
proportion do not use clean energy for space heating;
industrial coal use has devastating health impacts for
one-fifth of households were energy poor as measured
people living around these industrial activities (HEI
across accessibility and affordability dimensions (Ye
2022; Holland 2017). In particular, the people living
and Koch 2023).
in the airsheds of the 13 operational Eskom coal power
When households do not use electricity, either because stations—as well as the hundreds of coal mines and
they lack access to the grid or cannot afford to pay for coal transport areas in Mpumalanga, Limpopo, and
electricity, they turn to alternative sources of energy KZN—are continuously exposed to poor air quality
that often come with safety risks. For example, use with ongoing exceedances of health-based ambient air
of candles or paraffin in informal settlements—where quality standards (Myllyvirta and Kelly 2023a). Accord-
energy deprivation is concentrated—has been linked to ing to a recent report looking at the health impacts of
deadly fires, burn injuries, and poisonings (Mohlakoana Eskom’s current planned retirement schedule and emis-
and Wolpe 2021; van Niekerk et al. 2022). Nearly a sion control retrofits, emissions from operational plants
quarter of South African households do not use elec- are projected to result in 79,500 air pollution–related
tricity as their main energy source for cooking (Stats deaths from 2025 until each plant’s end of life (Mylly-
SA 2023b). Use of alternative fuels (wood, charcoal, virta and Kelly 2023b). Full compliance with minimum
paraffin) in households is a major source of indoor air emissions standards could help avoid 2.300 deaths per
pollution throughout the country; a review of indoor year and save R42 billion annually from 2025 (Mylly-
air pollution studies in South Africa found a consistent virta and Kelly 2023a, 2023b).

Decarbonising the electricity system will have signif- system. Eskom is currently undergoing an unbun-
icant positive health outcomes for millions of people dling process to separate into three independent
living in affected airsheds. However, delaying the units: transmission, distribution, and generation.
decommissioning of plants that are scheduled under
• The National Energy Regulator of South Africa
the 2019 IRP to begin closing this decade, as Eskom (NERSA) is mandated to regulate electricity, piped
has recently announced it will do, would have serious gas, and petroleum pipeline industries in terms
health and economic implications (Creamer 2024). of various acts. This includes licensing, permit-
Recent analysis shows that delaying the decommis- ting, registration, and pricing of electricity in
sioning of all coal plants such that they only start the country. NERSA is also required to concur
decommissioning in 2030, could result in an estimated with ministerial determinations for the procure-
15,300 excess deaths and R345 billion (Myllyvirta and ment of new generation capacity by the state in
Kelly 2023a). Delays to closures this decade will likely line with the IRP.
have knock-on effects for the closure timelines during
the 2030s and 2040s, which will, in turn, have impacts • The Independent Power Producers Office (IPPO)
of air pollution–related deaths and costs (Myllyvirta was established to provide government with the
and Kelly 2023a) support required to implement the Independent
Power Producer Procurement Programme. Like the
challenges faced by NERSA, the IPPO, as an imple-
Major policies menter of policy and regulation, must contend with
the restrictions of the law and rules as well as the
Several government departments have a role in the
need for a more dynamic, flexible response required
governance of South Africa’s electricity system, with
to transition the electricity sector.
related planning instruments and policies (adapted
from PCC 2023d): • Several other national government departments also
have roles to play in the governance of electricity,
• The DMRE is responsible for energy-related policy through planning or authorisations (e.g., DFFE,
and planning in South Africa, including electricity. Department of Trade, Industry and Competition
It drafts and implements legislation and regulations [dtic]). There are also key platforms within the
governing the electricity sector, including the Elec- Presidency engaged in electricity-related policy and
tricity Regulation Act (ERA). The DMRE is also implementation initiatives (Operation Vulindlela, the
responsible for the drafting and implementation of National Energy Crisis Committee, the PCC, and
the IRP to guide electricity planning and procure- the JET-IP Project Management Unit).
ment for the country. There are several other acts,
regulations, policies, and plans owned by the DMRE
governing the electricity and wider energy sector,
Required shifts
however, the ERA, IRP, and Gas Master Plan To realise South Africa’s goal of achieving net zero
(under development) are the most relevant for the CO2 emissions by 2050, multiple key shifts across the
electricity system. The last IRP was formally adopted electricity system will be required, some of which the
in 2019 as the overriding plan to guide the future IRP acknowledges and plans for, though policy discon-
electricity mix. In early 2024, the cabinet approved nects persist (see Chapter 2). The needed shifts include
the release of an updated IRP for public comment. building new electricity generation plants from variable
The IRP is intended to be a “living plan” that is renewable energy (i.e., wind and solar), increasing
revised regularly, with an overarching goal to pursue storage capacity, and accelerating the pace of fossil
a “diversified energy mix that reduces reliance on a plant phasedown and closure. These transformations
single or a few primary energy sources.” The PCC must be achieved in the context of the just transition,
has provided comments on this draft plan, which are with simultaneous policy priorities to stabilise the grid;
available on the PCC’s website. provide low-cost, reliable electricity to all; and ensure
• Eskom is the state-owned, vertically integrated that workers and communities transitioning from the
(generation, transmission, and some distribution) fossil fuel industry are supported and empowered.
electricity utility. Eskom fits under the Department Using methods outlined in Appendix B, this section
of Public Enterprises and has no mandate for energy examines progress across four key indicators that must
policy and planning; however, as the largest electric- transform to decarbonise the electricity system. The
ity generator and system operator in the country, it scale-up of renewable energy across South Africa is
holds the best information regarding the electricity monitored by Power Indicator 1 (renewable energy
capacity), and Power Indicator 2 (battery storage These indicators do not exhaustively measure all
scale-up) measures an enabling technology that will be progress that will be required to transform the sec-
required to facilitate the needed increase in renewables. tor. Rather, each indicator assesses the gap between
Power Indicator 3 (coal power capacity) and Power historical trends and the future targets that need to
Indicator 4 (natural gas consumption) track progress be achieved in a subset of areas with large mitigation
toward the phasedown22 and phaseout of fossil power potential in South Africa. An overview of how indi-
in South Africa. In future iterations of this report, the cators and targets were selected for inclusion in this
PCC will include additional indicators for transform- report is presented in Appendix B.
ing the energy sector that address the necessary justice
imperatives, such as affordable, consistent electricity Power Indicator 1
access for all; community involvement; and restorative,
procedural, and distributive justice.
RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY
Target: Reach between 190 and 390 gigawatts (GW)
For each indicator that is assessed, we show the gap of renewable energy capacity by 2050 (Figure 8.4),
between historical data and future needed targets. The per the NBI (2022).
targets toward which progress is tracked for all indi-
cators are derived from National Business Initiative The build-out of renewable energy capacity in South
(NBI) studies that model the shifts needed to achieve Africa has risen over the last years, but a large gap
South Africa’s net zero CO2 target23 (NBI 2022) but persists between today’s capacity and the capacity
will be updated after the PCC develops its own sec- required to meet the country’s long-term climate
toral benchmarks for assessing progress. We also note commitments (Figure 8.4). Renewable energy capacity
instances in which the indicators that are assessed are reached 10.4 GW in 2022, growing from just 3.4 GW
likely to follow a rapid, nonlinear growth trajectory in 2015 (IRENA 2023a) by an average of about 1 GW
sometimes known as an S-curve. per year. This growth over the last decade has primar-
ily been driven by a more than quadrupling of solar
capacity between 2015 and 2022 and a near tripling
Figure 8.4 • Historical progress and future targets for renewable energy capacity
Capacity (GW)
400
300
Historical data zoom-in Illustrative

GW future
10 pathways
200
190-390
2050 target
0
2015 2022
100
2022 data
10.4
0
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Notes: Technology adoption typically follows a nonlinear, S-curve trajectory. Renewable energy is still in the emergence stage of an S-curve in South Africa but could accelerate with
the right policy support. The illustrative S-curves shown here depict the type of S-curve pathways that the indicator would need to take to reach its targets. They are not forecasts for the
future and are not the only possible pathways to reach the targets.
Sources: Historical data from IRENA (2023a); targets from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).

in wind energy capacity from that same year (IRENA NBI projections demonstrate that capacity will need to
2023a). However, much of the recent progress in reach at least 190 GW by 2050 to decarbonise South
building new renewable energy capacity has been in Africa’s power sector in line with its midcentury climate
“behind the meter” household and corporate rooftop target and up to 390 GW by the same year to support
solar (i.e., individuals and companies procuring renew- anticipated demand for green hydrogen production
able energy technologies for their own use) (Eskom (NBI 2022). Between now and 2050, this will require
2023b; Ferris 2023). This has the important implica- an average growth rate of between 6 and 14 GW24 per
tion that this growth in renewable energy takes place year, as compared to the current growth rate of 1 GW
outside of the formal government-led just transition per year. Thus, achieving this target range will require
and may not lead to an equitable and wide sharing of an enormous acceleration of new renewable capacity
benefits, as envisaged in the South African Renewable installation across the economy. To enable the rapid
Energy Masterplan. rollout of renewables that is required to achieve South
Africa’s climate targets while ensuring energy security,
South Africa is falling behind on established targets
power grid infrastructure will also need to be equipped
for the electricity sector. Based on the latest capacity
to meet rising supply.
data provided by Eskom, the country is not meeting
its targets for coal capacity phaseout or for building Fortunately, a large body of literature has emerged in
on-grid renewable energy capacity as measured against recent years demonstrating how certain technological
the targets set under the 2019 IRP (see Table 8.1). innovations, including renewables like solar and wind
Eskom reported that it had approximately 44.6 GW of power and storage technologies like batteries, have the
installed coal capacity and 39.1 GW of nominal (avail- potential to follow S-curve growth trajectories. This
able) capacity in 2023, which is not on pace with the means they may grow much more rapidly than histor-
decommissioning proposed in the 2019 IRP (Eskom ically projected when nurtured by supportive enabling
2024). Renewable energy build is 5.2 GW behind environments and infrastructure (see more in Box 2).
schedule. Experts in the field have attributed the slow Targeted policy interventions and financing that sup-
renewable energy build to delays in bidding windows port rapid uptake of renewable power can enable such
under the Renewable Energy Independent Power growth trajectories.
Producers Programme, inconsistent political support,
and limited grid access and capacity (Evans and Ngcuka
2023; Parker 2022).
Table 8.1 • Annual coal and renewable energy on-grid installation targets from 2019 IRP compared to
actual achieved
COAL COAL TO BE PV WIND CSP TOTAL

DECOMMISSIONED PLANNED RE
Baseline installed capacity 37,149 1,474 1,980 300 3,754
2019 2,155 -2,373 244 300 4,298
2020 1,433 -557 114 300 4,712
2021 1,433 -1,403 300 818 5,830
2022 711 -844 1,400 1,600 8,830
2023 750 -555 1,000 1,600 11,430
Targeted total installed on- 37,899 4,288 6,542 600 11,430

grid capacity by 2023 (MW)
Actual Installed on-grid 44,598a 2,287 3,443 500 6,230

capacity by 2023 (MW)
Difference between planned 6,699 -2,001 -3,099 -100 -5,200

and actual
Notes: a. Nominal capacity in 2023 was 39,099 MW. CSP = concentrated solar power; PV = photovoltaic; RE = renewable energy.
Sources: DMRE 2019; Eskom 2023b, 2024.
Box 2 • Potential for technologies to follow exponential growth trajectories
Historically, projections for future adoption of zero-carbon technologies such as wind, solar, and electric vehicles have been
linear in nature, with modellers predicting a gradual increase over time. However, there is emerging evidence to suggest that
these projections have actually underestimated the rates of uptake that have unfolded for many technologies.a For instance, the
International Energy Agency has repeatedly needed to update its linear forecasts for solar growth because this market diffusion
has accelerated more quickly than projected year after year. In one stark example, 2012 projections for the amount of solar
capacity that would be installed across the world by 2030 were actually surpassed by 2018.b
An emerging body of literature points to the possibility that certain technologies are more likely to follow nonlinear growth
trajectories, sometimes referred to as S-curves, wherein growth rates of a technology increases exponentially until saturating
the market and then slowing back down toward zero.c The different stages of this S-curve trajectory are demonstrated in Figure
B2-1, which show how a technology can move from early emergence to breakthrough within a market to large-scale diffusion
and finally to eventual market saturation, or reconfiguration.d There is evidence that technology adoption follows this S-curve
trajectory after crossing a particular tipping point, such as reaching price parity with an incumbent technology, after which
demand skyrockets, prices continue to fall, and rapid and nonlinear growth takes off. Supportive policy and financing interven-
tions such as green technology incentives, carbon pricing programmes, research and development investments, and more are
often critical for unlocking this S-curve type of growth trajectory.
The shift away from coal power electricity to renewables, including as envisaged in the draft 2023 integrated resource plan
(IRP), will create job fluctuations and could lead to a reduction in jobs if not properly managed. With appropriate planning and
support, some of the job losses in the coal value chain can be offset by further development of the domestic renewable energy
manufacturing industry. The South African Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM) outlines some of the potential benefits that
can be realised by industrialising the renewable energy value chain, including targeted job creation in areas where former coal
sector employees live.e As SAREM aligns with the IRP, any updates to the IRP that increase the renewable energy targets for
2030 or beyond would likely result in increases to the projected job and gross domestic product growth potential of the plan.
Figure B2-1 • Illustration of an S-curve
100%
Emergence Breakthrough Diffusion Reconfiguration
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Time
Exponential growth Exponential growth Exponential growth Logarithmic growth

Although annual growth The S-curve becomes transitioning into Growth rates gradually
logarithmic growth
rates are high, the S-curve evident. The absolute approach zero until the S-curve
appears flat since its starting amount of growth Absolute growth once again appears flat.
point for technology each year increases, increases, and the S-curve
adoption is so low. but the growth rate reaches its maximum
starts to decay. steepness. The growth rate
continues to decay.
Source: Adapted from Boehm et al. 2023.

Box 2 • Potential for technologies to follow exponential growth trajectories (cont.)
Throughout the 20th century, and across many different geographies, we can observe how popular technologies, including the
automobile, telephones, and the internet have followed this S-curve trajectory of growth.f We also see evidence that, in recent
years, renewable technologies such as solar and electric vehicles have grown exponentially in leading countries with support-
ive enabling environments (e.g., policy regimes, prerequisite infrastructure).g Other zero-carbon technologies, including wind,
green hydrogen, and alternative fuels for shipping and aviation, may soon follow suit.h
The implications of these trends for South Africa are significant: to nurture this type of exponential growth, it is paramount that
government prioritise interventions that continue to bring costs down and improve each technology’s enabling environment
and supporting infrastructure. Exponential growth is not guaranteed, and the steepness of the S-curve depends on what the gov-
ernment does. But with the right support, the large gaps between levels of green technology uptake today and levels that are
needed over the next decade(s) can shrink.
Sources: a. Jaeger et al. 2023; Lenton et al. 2023; b. Jaeger et al. 2023; c. Boehm et al. 2023; Jaeger et al. 2023; d. Boehm et al. 2023; Jaeger et al.
2023; e. DMRE et al. 2022; f. Systemiq 2023; g. Jaeger 2023a, 2023b; h. Boehm et al. 2023
Power Indicator 2 Power Indicator 3

BATTERY STORAGE CAPACITY COAL POWER CAPACITY
Target: Scale up battery storage to reach about 70 GW Target: Take 6 GW of coal offline by 2030 and retire
of capacity by 2050 (Figure 8.5), per the NBI (2022). the last coal power stations by 2042 (Figure 8.6), per
the NBI (2022).
Battery storage technologies that can store excess elec-
tricity generated by variable renewable energy sources In 2022, nominal coal capacity in South Africa was a
like wind and solar and release it when needed to meet little under 40 GW (Eskom 2015–22; NBI 2022). The
future demand will also need to be developed rapidly overall percentage share of coal generation in South
to enable South Africa’s power sector decarbonisation.25 Africa’s electricity mix, however, is dropping due to an
Indeed, to achieve South Africa’s net zero CO2 target, aging coal fleet and reduced availability factors. For
estimates project that battery storage capacity will example, 2022 was the first year that coal generation
need to reach a total of around 70 GW of capacity by dropped below 80 percent (Pierce and Le Roux 2023).
2050 (NBI 2022). Despite this substantial need, South
To remain consistent with achievement of South
Africa’s first battery plant facility began operations in
Africa’s national climate goals, NBI projections demon-
December 2023, and it is providing around 60 mega-
strate that at least 6 GW of coal power must be taken
watts (MW) (0.06 GW) of capacity to date (Eskom
offline by 2030, and that all coal power stations must
2023a), with up to 360 MW (0.36 GW) planned over
be retired by 2042, reversing today’s trends of increas-
the next several years (Eskom n.d.).
ing capacity entirely (NBI 2022). To date, 72 percent
Fortunately, these technologies may also follow S-curve of South Africa’s coal capacity is already more than 30
growth trajectories when supported by government years old (GEM 2024). The retention of coal in South
interventions and nurtured under the right conditions Africa’s electricity mix is under active debate, with the
(see Box 2). To achieve the targets for battery storage draft IRP (2023) proposing to delay shutting down
capacity and support rapid uptake of variable renew- coal-fired power plants to retain dispatchable capacity
ables across South Africa, strategic policy and financing “where technically and commercially feasible.” The
can be directed toward rapidly building up this bur- PCC recommendations to government in 2023 stand
geoning industry. Battery manufacturing is also one in contrast with this, stating, “South Africa should
of the many ways that South Africa can build its green adopt a least cost electricity pathway and seek oppor-
economic competitiveness and create new jobs in this tunities to close coal faster, predicated on achieving
labour-intensive industry. energy security” (PCC 2023d).
The reduction in coal use for electricity generation will

have significant implications on the workers in the coal
value chain and the surrounding communities. From
the 1980s to early 2000s, employment in the sector
declined from its peak of roughly 130,000 jobs to its
Figure 8.5 • Historical progress and future targets for battery storage capacity
Capacity (GW)
70
70
60
2050 target
50
40 Illustrative
future
pathways
30
20
2022 data
10
0.06
Historical data
0
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Note: Technology adoption typically follows a nonlinear, S-curve trajectory. Battery storage capacity is still in the emergence stage of an S-curve in South Africa, but it could accelerate
with the right policy support. The illustrative S-curves shown here depict the type of S-curve pathways that the indicator would need to take to reach its targets. They are not forecasts for
the future and are not the only possible pathways to reach the targets.
Sources: Historical data from Eskom (2023a); target from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).
Figure 8.6 • Historical progress and future targets for nominal coal power capacity
Capacity (GW)
40
Needed pace
39.5
Historical data 2022 data
30
33.5
2030 target
20
10
0
2042 target
0
2016 2020 2024 2028 2032 2036 2040 2042
Note: Current rates of progress are headed in the wrong direction and require a U-turn to achieve the targets for 2030 and 2042. If rapid, nonlinear growth in renewable energy
occurs, it may enable coal power to also decline in a nonlinear fashion.
Sources: Historical data from Eskom (2015–22); targets from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).

lowest point of around 50,000 jobs before rising to
90,000 during the 2010s (Makgetla 2021b). Most
Power Indicator 4
miners have matric qualifications yet earn around 50 NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION FOR POWER
percent more than the median for the formal sector. Target: Phase out natural gas by 2050 (Figure 8.7),
This makes it harder to find equivalent livelihoods out- per the NBI (2022).
side of mining (Makgetla 2021b).
Natural gas consumption in South Africa has fluctuated
Coal production is geographically concentrated, with over the last decade, with consumption reaching about
80 percent occurring in Mpumalanga and over 70 88,000 terajoules in 2021 (IEA 2022).26 But, accord-
percent of South Africa’s total value added from coal ing to the NBI, consumption of natural gas will need
coming from just four towns: eMalahleni (Witbank), to be entirely phased out by 2050 as renewables grow
Steve Tshwete (Middelburg), Govan Mbeki, and to replace it (NBI 2022).27 It is important to note here
Msukaligwa (Ermelo) (Makgetla 2021b; Patel et al. that any gas turbines that continue to remain opera-
2020). Around 1.1 million people live in these districts tional during this peaking and declining period should
(Stats SA 2011). Besides the direct employment effects, be “green hydrogen ready,” such that these turbines
the downsizing in coal will affect a range of businesses can be quickly switched over to green hydrogen once
and informal sector work that support the mines’ this critical technology becomes market ready at scale
labour force. Moreover, the municipalities depend (see Box 3 for more information about green hydrogen
on Eskom and the mines to provide some infrastruc- needs in South Africa).
ture and services (Patel et al. 2020). This speaks to
the just transition imperative—ensuring that workers
and communities are supported and empowered to
define new livelihoods and decent work in the con-
text of transition.
Figure 8.7 • Historical progress and future targets for natural gas consumption for power
Consumption (TJ)
200,000
Illustrative peaking
value and year
150,000
2022 data
Needed pace
88,000
100,000
Historical data
50,000
0
2050 target
0
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Sources: Historical data from IEA (2022); targets from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).
Box 3 • Scaling up green hydrogen capacity in South Africa
Scaling up green hydrogen, or hydrogen that is produced using zero-carbon electricity that splits water into hydrogen and
oxygen with an electrolyser, will be critical for enabling South Africa’s transition to net zero.a Within the power sector, green
hydrogen has a role to play in providing seasonal balancing of variable renewables and replacing natural gas in gas-peaking
plants.b Additionally, green hydrogen will also be needed to support decarbonisation of South Africa’s industry and transport
sectors, where it can be used as a net zero energy carrier in high-heat industrial processes such as steel, cement, glass, and
chemical production, deployed as an alternative transport fuel for heavy-duty fuel cell electric vehicles, and utilised as a feed-
stock for synthetic fuel production such as for sustainable aviation fuel.c
GREEN HYDROGEN INDICATOR • Green hydrogen capacity

Target: Increase green hydrogen capacity to 9.5 million tons (Mt) by 2050 (Figure B3-1), per the National Business Initia-
tive (NBI) (2022).
Figure B3-1 • Historical progress and future targets for green hydrogen capacity
Capacity (Mt/year)
10
9.5
8
2050 target
6
Illustrative
future
pathways
4
2
2022 data
0
Historical data
0
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Note: Technology adoption typically follows a nonlinear, S-curve trajectory. Green hydrogen capacity is still in the emergence stage of an S-curve in
South Africa but could accelerate with the right policy support. The illustrative S-curves shown here depict the type of S-curve pathways that the indica-
tor would need to take to reach its targets. They are not forecasts for the future and are not the only possible pathways to reach the targets.
Sources: Targets from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).
Although the country is not currently producing any green hydrogen at commercial scale, the NBI estimates that by 2050 South
Africa will be able to deliver 9.5 Mt of green hydrogen per year to achieve these multiple decarbonisation opportunities.d Sup-
portive policy can put green hydrogen on a path toward exponential growth.
Sources: a–d. NBI 2022.

CHAPTER 9.
IMPROVING PUBLIC TRANSPORT

AND SHIFTING TO NEW ENERGY
VEHICLES
The transport sector accounts for approximately 11
percent of South Africa’s total GHG emissions and 14
Public transportation
percent of energy sector emissions (DFFE 2024).28 Less than one-third (31 percent) of South African
Most of these emissions (97 percent) come from road households own a working vehicle (Stats SA 2023b).
transportation. Transport demand is projected to grow Accordingly, most South Africans rely on walking,
significantly in the coming years, potentially dou- public transit, or taxis to reach their destinations (Stats
bling by 2050 (NBI 2023). Sectoral emissions will, in SA 2022a) (Figure 9.1).29 At the household level,
turn, also grow unless the sector can be decarbonised transport is dominated by taxi use, particularly minibus
through electrification, shifts to public transport, and taxis (MBTs) (Stats SA 2022a). Less than 10 percent
other greener transport modes. of households reported using the bus as the main travel
mode, and just over 2 percent reported using the train
(Stats SA 2022a).
Overview
MBTs offer the benefit of greater flexibility in terms of
The transport sector, and its workers, are particularly routes and schedules; however, they are more costly
exposed to climate and extreme weather events (ITF than public transit (NBI 2023). The MBT industry
2022). As frontline workers, those in the transport evolved in response to apartheid transportation policies
sector are relied upon to continue moving people and that made it difficult for black South Africans to access
goods even in the face of extreme heat, storms, and so formal public transportation (Walters and Pisa 2023).
on. Interviews of transport workers in Johannesburg MBTs are responsible for 15 million commuter jour-
revealed that heavy rains and storms have caused dam- neys daily, and the industry generates over R40 billion
age to rail tracks and vehicles and left both workers and in revenue annually (DoT 2023). Although the indus-
users stranded (C40 and ITF 2021). In addition to the try fills a critical gap in the sector and is economically
significant risk posed by extreme weather events, lon- important, it is not well regulated, which has resulted
ger-term climate impacts can also threaten the sector. in poorly maintained and unsafe vehicles in operation,
For instance, sea level rise can damage or make port reports of reckless driving, and conflict and violence
infrastructure inaccessible, and increased temperatures within the industry due to intense competition (Walters
and drought can cause deformation of rail tracks and and Pisa 2023).
roadways (Greenham et al. 2022).
Public buses are the most utilised form of formal public
A just transition to a low-carbon transport and auto- transportation. Bus fares are subsidised by the govern-
motive sector must address the current challenges ment, but they are nevertheless struggling to compete
facing the sector as well as the climate and transi- with MBTs (Walters and Pisa 2023). South Africans
tion-related risks. Current notable challenges include cited lack of availability and other service-related issues
poor public transportation and road infrastructure; a as the primary reasons for not using buses (Stats SA
public transportation system plagued by accessibility, 2022a). Insufficient funding, policy uncertainty, and
reliability, safety, and affordability concerns; and the noncompetitive procurements for short-term con-
legacy of apartheid, in which spatial planning was used tracts have made it difficult to invest in improvements
to implement and enforce racial segregation, thereby that could increase ridership (Walters and Pisa 2023).
creating an inefficient and inequitable transport system Furthermore, the commuter bus industry has been
(Ahjum et al. 2020; NBI 2023). Additionally, the auto- unable to effectively adapt to changing passenger
motive industry faces significant transition risks given demand since the introduction of the Public Transport
its reliance on exports of internal combustion engines Operations Grant came into effect in 2009, which
(ICEs) to markets that are set to ban the sale of ICEs changed the subsidy system from a passenger-based to
in the 2030s (dtic 2023).
Figure 9.1 • Main travel method used by households in 2013 and 2020
2013 2020
60
50
Percentage of household
40
30
20
10
0
Taxi Walk all the way Car/truck driver Bus Car/truck passenger Train Other
Source: Stats SA 2022a.
a kilometre-based system (Walters and Pisa 2023). This over the last several decades (Walters and Pisa 2023).
change meant that increased ridership does not result For example, in 2023 the highest month for metrorail
in increased subsidies to fund new routes or frequencies travel was August, with 3.9 million journeys; in com-
(Walters and Pisa 2023). parison, August 2013 saw 50.1 million journeys (Stats
SA 2013, 2023d). In the 2020 National Household
To help increase transportation access in metropoli-
Travel Survey, the most popular response to “reasons
tan areas and formalise the MBT industry, a bus rapid
for not having used trains” across every province was
transit (BRT) system was proposed by the Department
that trains were simply not available (Stats SA 2022a).
of Transportation (DoT) in 2007 (Walters and Pisa
2023). With respect to the MBT industry, the idea was The transport sector is a large employment and eco-
to incorporate existing taxis and bus operators into new nomic contributor for South Africa. The most recent
vehicle operating companies established to manage the labour force statistics show 966,000 people are cur-
BRTs (Walters and Pisa 2023). Despite these efforts, rently employed in the sector, accounting for just
a significant portion (30 percent) of MBTs continue under 6 percent of total jobs (Stats SA 2023f). Nearly
to operate without a licence (Walters and Pisa 2023). half of these jobs are from MBTs, followed by the
The initial BRT rollout in Johannesburg and Cape freight sector (handling and road transport) as the next
Town was promising, thanks in part to the need to largest contributor. Women make up a small share of
rapidly roll out transit for the 2010 World Cup (Hook sectoral employment, accounting for just 3 percent of
and Weinstock 2021). However, progress since then taxi drivers and 14 percent of other transport workers
has been slow, with just 88 km built throughout the (Maseko et al. 2020).
country, limited success in integrating MBTs into the
The just transition should consider strategies to
system, and decreasing political support for funding
increase women’s participation in the sector and to
and expansion (Hook and Weinstock 2021; Walters
determine what protections workers will need from
and Pisa 2023).
both transition and climate risks. The International
The railway system is currently the least utilised form Transport Workers’ Federation has made recommen-
of public transit in South Africa. The public rail sys- dations for how to ensure a just transition for urban
tem (which does not include the Gautrain system) is transport, though they are relevant for the broader sec-
managed by the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa tor (ITF 2022). Some of the recommendations include
(PRASA) and includes 585 stations covering 2,280 worker-led formalisation, hazard pay during extreme
km concentrated in main metropolitan areas (Walters weather events, pension support for retiring workers,
and Pisa 2023). Currently, about 60 percent of the and democratic control of transport (IFT 2022).
rail system is electric, and the rest runs on diesel (NBI
2023). The rail system faces issues related to safety,
reliability, frequency, corruption, and crime, which
has led to massive and continual decline in ridership

The automotive industry
The automotive industry is another important compo- more, both the automotive and wider transport sector
nent of the transport sector. It encompasses automotive include many small businesses and relatively large
manufacturing as well as related support services informal employment outside of vehicle manufactur-
such as forecourt attendants, auto mechanics, and car ing (Maseko et al. 2020). As with the public transport
salespersons. South Africa has the largest automotive sector, the automotive industry is male dominated; just
manufacturing sector on the continent and accounts 8 percent of mechanics and between 22 percent and
for over half of all vehicles produced in Africa (dtic 33 percent of transport equipment manufacturing and
2023; Lamprecht 2023b). It is the only manufacturing petrol retail workers are women (Maseko et al. 2020).
industry outside of mining with products ranking in
the top five exports for the country, and it contributed
4.9 percent to GDP in 2022 (Maseko et al. 2020; Major policies
Lamprecht 2023b). Since the establishment of South African democracy
The automotive manufacturing industry is particularly in 1994, the country has developed numerous policies
exposed to transition risks. There were nearly 556,000 and frameworks to guide the country toward more
vehicles produced in the country last year, and over 60 reliable, energy-efficient, sustainable, and accessible
percent of those were exported (Lamprecht 2023b). transportation. Prior to 1994, public transport services,
The United Kingdom and European Union serve as specifically segregated commuter bus services, were
the largest export markets, and both have commit- used to further enable the apartheid system by divid-
ments to ban the sale of ICEs by 2035 (Presidency of ing communities and maintaining physical separation
the Republic of South Africa 2022). This represents a between residencies and places of work (DoT 2024).
significant transition risk because South Africa cur- The apartheid government heavily subsidised the com-
rently does not have a new energy vehicle (NEV)30 muter industry to enable this inefficient system (DoT
value chain or manufacturing capabilities (dtic 2023). 2024). This is just one example of apartheid-era policy
Although demand for NEVs has grown exponentially in transport and spatial planning that continues to have
in some countries, it remains extremely small in South negative impacts today. Policies put in place after 1994
Africa. In 2022, just 502 battery-powered EVs were have sought to address these historical inequities, and
sold in the entire country, representing less than one- the country is making strong progress to design more
tenth of 1 percent of total sales (Lamprecht 2023a). equitable transport policies.
This is important because the sector relies on domestic The Green Transport Strategy (GTS) is a 2018–50
demand as well as exports. Key barriers preventing the road map outlining policy and general recommen-
growth of the domestic market include cost, lack of dations to cultivate a transformative shift in South
public charging infrastructure, and load shedding (dtic Africa’s transport system to reduce GHG emissions and
2023; NBI 2023). negative environmental and human health impacts.
The industry accounts for over 497,000 formal jobs The GTS sets a target to reduce emissions by 5 percent
(about 23 percent in manufacturing and the rest in below business-as-usual projected emissions for the
sales, repairs, and maintenance), or just under 3 percent transportation sector by 2050. It is organised across
of total employment (Lamprecht 2023b). Manufactur- five central implementation themes: green transport
ing is geographically concentrated in Nelson Mandela technologies, climate change response norms and stan-
Bay, eThekwini, Gauteng, and Buffalo City (Maseko et dards, green rails, green fuel economy standards, and
al. 2020). Workers along the automotive value chain green roads. Although the GTS reviews all transport
face significant transition risks because manufacturing modes across South Africa, it particularly focuses on
and maintenance of NEVs require a new skill set, as critical shifts from road transport and freight to rail and
does maintenance of charging infrastructure. Addi- from private vehicle use to public transportation (buses
tionally, manufacturing NEVs is less labour intensive and rail), and it promotes cleaner vehicle technolo-
than ICEs and the vehicles require less maintenance, gies (DoT 2018). The GTS proposes the following
so fewer workers may be needed (Maseko et al. 2020). initiatives to support these shifts: integrated transport
Compared to formal employees in other sectors, auto planning, taxation schemes, cleaner alternative fuels
mechanics were less likely to have a retirement fund, research, sustainable urban planning, conversion of
which may indicate that workers in the industry have public and national fleets to cleaner fuels or efficient
less adaptive capacity (Maseko et al. 2020). Further- technology vehicles, energy storage research, bus
transit system expansion, smart tags, operation system
reviews, and more (DoT 2018). The strategy demon- cost and effective method of bridging public budget
strates South Africa’s vision for a more efficient and deficits on transport infrastructure with private cap-
sustainable, integrated transport system. ital (PCC 2023b; Sebitlo et al. 2022). Other studies
have found the lack of proliferation of transport PPP
The transport sector requires a more comprehensive
projects in South Africa, especially as compared to its
policy implementation system, particularly a stron-
BRICS counterparts, is due to a lack of political com-
ger monitoring and evaluation system with identified
mitment, cooperative decision-making, public official
responsible parties to better coordinate and track
capacity, long-term financing instruments, and more
progress. The GTS, the 2021 revised “White Paper
(Sebitlo et al. 2022). Ultimately, there is a clear need to
on National Transport Policy” (DoT 2022b), and
strengthen PPP frameworks to streamline existing and
the South African Automotive Industry Master Plan
enable new transport-focused PPPs. The South African
2035 all highlight the need for development of agreed-
government recognises this need and is in the process
upon key performance indicators for monitoring and
of finalising amendments to existing PPP legislation
enabling stronger cross-entity coordinated transport
that promise to address gaps and shortcomings of cur-
systems. Other strategies for improving transport policy
rent PPP frameworks (National Treasury 2024).
implementation could include more cohesive time-
lines, the introduction of transport authorities at the The decline of the formal public transport sector is
metropolitan level, integrated ticketing systems, and largely attributed to government policy and implemen-
more (Walters and Pisa 2023). Ultimately, stronger tation failures that lead to underfunding, corruption,
implementation systems can serve as a tool to attract poor security management, limited operational over-
investments for more sustainable and equitable trans- sight, inefficient management, inconsistent contract
port from the private sector, multilateral development timelines and award systems, and myriad other prob-
banks, and other international financing mechanisms lems (Walters and Pisa 2023). The DoT recognised the
to fund the just transition. The DoT’s Revised Strate- shortcomings of current passenger and freight rail and
gic Plan (2020–25) is one of the few documents that in 2022 published a new “White Paper on National
provides a detailed approach with clear outcomes, out- Rail Policy,” building on a 2017 draft white paper out-
come indicators, baselines, and five-year targets across lining a multidecade vision to revitalise rail networks to
its priority focus areas (DoT 2021). “play a meaningful role as a backbone of a seamlessly
integrated transport value chain.” The paper highlights
Although transport policies mention the importance
the DoT’s intent to develop a private sector participa-
and potential roles the private sector can play, PPPs
tion framework for the rail industry as well as develop
remain minimal. Overall, the approach to regulation,
a devolution strategy with the integrated urban devel-
management, and funding of public transport systems
opment framework to assign commuter rail function to
continues to be segmented across departments and
municipal governments when appropriate (DoT 2022a,
different spheres of government; this creates unco-
9). To date, there has been some revised rail policy
ordinated responses to issues that fail South Africa’s
implementation success; as of early 2024, PRASA has
policy goals of developing an integrated public transit
brought 31 of 40 passenger rail lines back into partial
system (Walters and Pisa 2023). This lack of centralised
operation, and ridership is increasing; however, passen-
decision-making and coordination makes it difficult to
ger rail still has a long way to go to return to former
attract and implement transport-related PPPs, a low-
peak-use levels (SA News 2024a).

There have been some initial efforts to formalise the ensuring the automotive industry is not left behind in
MBT industry through the National Land Transport the global transition away from ICE vehicles (Presi-
Act 5 of 2009 and, more recently, the National Land dency of the Republic of South Africa 2022).
Transport Strategic Framework 2023–2028. The latter
aims to integrate MBTs into the national public trans-
port suite of offerings, proposing formal bus operations Required shifts
to replace informal MBT operations (DoT 2023). Due Decarbonising South Africa’s transport sector will
to the aforementioned funding, monitoring, implemen- require a combination of key shifts that together
tation, and evaluation gaps, it is difficult to sufficiently result in reduced emissions, increased mobility access
or accurately analyse the impact of current policies or across the country, and improvements in public health.
determine what reforms are needed to improve rid- Broadly, the needed shifts can be categorised into those
ership and other aspects of the public transportation that increase collective and shared transit modes, such
sector. Ultimately, revitalising public transport services as public transportation, walking, and cycling, and
to increase accessibility, reliability, and affordability— shifts that enable decarbonisation of carbon-intensive
especially for passenger rail—while also formalising the modes of transport through electrification or switching
MBT industry will be important steps in achieving a to zero-emissions fuels (Boehm et al. 2023). Planning
just transition for all in the transport sector. efforts that bring jobs, services, and goods closer to
Recent policies are promoting NEV production to where South Africans live may also help to decrease the
reduce domestic transport emissions, retain jobs, need for some motorised travel altogether.
support black South African businesses, and boost These shifts must also take into consideration what is
competitiveness in domestic and global auto markets. needed to build climate resilience in the sector. This
Since 2018, South Africa has produced several pol- will require a mix of hard (infrastructure) and soft
icy directives targeting NEV production as a priority, (operational/logistical) adaptations as well as nature-
including the South African Automotive Master Plan based solutions (Greenham et al. 2022). Examples
(dtic 2018), the Just Energy Transition Investment include elevating infrastructure to limit exposure
Plan (Presidency of the Republic of South Africa to flooding or sea level rise, adjusting maintenance
2022), the dtic’s green paper on NEVs (dtic 2021), schedules, and enhancing soil stability to reduce road
and the dtic’s white paper on EVs (dtic 2023). This maintenance needs and improve road safety. Although
latest EV white paper summarises the industrialisation there are no resilience-specific indicators captured in
opportunity for South Africa to work nationally and this section, many of the shifts needed to decarbonise
with regional partners to develop critical minerals for the sector will yield mitigation and adaption cobenefits.
the batteries value chain, bolstering Africa’s ability
to move beyond serving as only a source for critical Using methods outlined in Appendix B, this section
minerals by also becoming an industrial producer of examines historical trends as compared to future targets
batteries and other automotive components. The paper for five indicators of progress across the shifts that are
describes 16 unique policy actions for EVs between needed to decarbonise the sector.
2023 and 2035 to increase manufacturing capacity as Transport Indicator 1 (number of public road transport
well as expand market development, including, but vehicles) and Transport Indicator 2 (private ownership
not limited to, reducing import duties for domesti- of vehicles) monitor progress toward improved pub-
cally produced and sold batteries, commercialising lic transport outcomes across the country. Although
green hydrogen production, developing an electric public transit modes are improved, decarbonisation of
battery regional value chain, refurbishing critical rail emissions-intensive vehicles must also be prioritised.
lines, creating an EV certification programme for skills As road transport composes the bulk of South Africa’s
development, establishing energy reforms, and more transport sector emissions, Transport Indicator 3 (share
(dtic 2023). Directly related to the just transition, of NEVs in light-duty vehicle sales), Transport Indi-
several transport-related policies explicitly mention the cator 4 (share of NEVs in the light-duty vehicle fleet),
upskilling of black South Africans and empowerment of and Transport Indicator 5 (number of public charging
black-owned dealerships, repair facilities, and manu- stations) hone in on the needed scaleup of NEVs on
facturers as an opportunity within NEV production roads, in particular.
(DoT 2021; dtic 2018). Ultimately, it is the view of the
South African government that increasing production For each indicator that is assessed, we show the gap
capabilities of NEVs in-country can generate sector between historical data and future needed targets. The
stability as well as new economic and jobs growth, targets toward which progress is tracked for all indica-
tors are derived from NBI studies, which are aligned
with achieving South Africa’s net zero CO2 target but Simultaneously, improved public transit leads to fewer
will be updated after the PCC develops its own sectoral traffic fatalities, less urban congestion, better air quality,
benchmarks for assessing progress (NBI 2022). We also and more active lifestyles, all critical for improved
note whether the indicators that are assessed are likely public health and development outcomes (Welle et
to follow a linear growth trajectory or a rapid, nonlin- al. 2022). Research has also shown that investments
ear growth trajectory sometimes known as an S-curve in public transit can yield significant jobs benefits.
(see Box 2 for more details). One study found that ensuring South Africa’s public
transit system is aligned with the Paris Agreement
As in Chapter 8, these indicators do not exhaustively
would create an additional 127,100 public transit jobs
measure all progress that will be required to transform
(C40 and ITF 2021).
South Africa’s transport sector. For instance, the coun-
try must also work to deploy solutions that improve rail Estimates project that to achieve South Africa’s climate
services and decarbonise heavy freight, shipping, and targets while unlocking these cobenefits, the number
aviation. Appendix B provides more information about of public road transport vehicles in operation today—
how indicators and targets were selected for inclusion some 420,000 vehicles—will need to double by 2050
in this report. (NaTIS 2017–23; NBI 2022). To achieve this target
and get on track for 2050, rates of change over the last
Transport Indicator 1 five years will need to accelerate by 1.9 times. Simul-
taneously, although not measured by this indicator,
NUMBER OF PUBLIC ROAD TRANSPORT commercial rail needs to increase from 20 percent to
VEHICLES 40 percent of commercial demand and passenger rail
Target: Double the number of public road transport from 5 percent to 20 percent of passenger demand by
vehicles by 2050 (Figure 9.2), per the NBI (2022). 2050 to keep climate and mobility goals in reach (NBI
2022).31 As this critical shift from private vehicle use to
To transition to a net zero transportation sector that
public transit scaleup takes place, it is paramount that
serves all South Africans, a much-improved public
policy and financing measures are in place to allow for
transit system will be required. Indeed, estimates show
increased uptake of zero-carbon public transit vehicles
that public road transport vehicles such as buses release
such that the emissions reductions achieved by this shift
fewer emissions per passenger-kilometre as compared
are expanded even further.
to private vehicles (Systems Change Lab 2023).
Figure 9.2 • Historical progress and future targets for number of public road transport vehicles
Number of public road transport vehicles (millions)
0.8
0.84
2050 target
0.6
2023 data
Needed pace
0.42
0.4
Historical data
0.2
0
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Note: Compared to the linear trend from the past five years, the rates of progress would need to accelerate by 1.9 times to achieve the above target for 2050, meaning that the indica-
tor is heading in the right direction, but is off track to achieve its target.
Sources: Historical data from NaTIS (2017–23); targets from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).

In addition to scaling up the number of public transit Programme and other interventions to improve the
vehicles, just transition policies must also enable the efficiency and effectiveness of transport subsidies more
efficient operation and management of the system while broadly (DoT 2024). Simultaneously, continued policy
considering the affordability, accessibility, and equity of incentives to ensure that bus travel is accessible and
public transportation. Poor households in South Africa affordable to commuters will be critical.
often spend significant portions of their income on
Accessibility of transport is another critical factor to
transportation (NBI 2023). Roughly half of all house-
consider in creating a just, low-carbon transportation
holds spend R500 monthly on transportation, which
system. As noted earlier, the legacy of apartheid-era
is one-third of the upper-bound poverty line (R1,558
spatial planning has resulted in poor access to public
in May 2023 prices) and half of the lower bound
transportation in rural areas and highly segregated
(R1,058) (DoT 2023; Stats SA 2023e). According to
access in urban areas. The time required to walk to
the DoT (2023), low mobility exacerbates poverty,
public transit is a central measure of accessibility. In
whereby “unaffordable public transport would restrict
2020, roughly 52 percent of South Africans lived
entire households from economic opportunities.”
within a 5-minute walk of public transport, a 4 per-
As it stands, rail and bus transit are highly subsidised, cent decline from the rate in 2003 (DoT 2023). The
but the MBT industry receives little direct govern- number of people living more than a 15-minute walk
ment funding, despite its status as South Africa’s most away from public transit increased between 2003 and
utilised form of transit (DoT 2024). Rail is the least 2011 (DoT 2023). These statistics point to a decline in
utilised form of public transit, but two-thirds of public transit accessibility over time. Fortunately, rural house-
expenditure on urban transit goes to the PRASA (NPC holds experienced an improvement in accessibility from
2022). Providing additional subsidies for MBT transit 2013 to 2020, with access times reducing. However,
while much-needed improvements are made to the travel in rural areas is still more time consuming than
rail system could help improve affordability in the near in urban areas (DoT 2023). Improved spatial planning
term before transport demand is shifted from road and expansion of transit routes and infrastructure to
to rail in the longer term. The draft Public Transport situate housing closer to transit could help improve
Subsidy Policy proposes evaluating additional capital these trends. Increased funding and policy support
subsidies for MBTs through the Taxi Recapitalisation to expand commuter bus services is also essential,
and greater private sector involvement could also
help in closing urban-rural transportation access gaps
Transport Indicator 2
(Pettersson 2019). PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF VEHICLES
Target: Peak private ownership of vehicles at 10 mil-
It is also important to consider characteristics that
lion in 2035 and decrease to 6 million by 2050 (Figure
impact the accessibility and safety of public transit for
9.3), per the NBI (2022).
different groups, such as women and persons with
disabilities. Research has shown that women use public Across the world, cars emit more CO2 per passenger-ki-
transit differently from men and often have more lometre travelled than all other urban land transport
complex travel patterns due to the domestic and work modes (Boehm et al. 2023; Cazzola and Crist 2020).
tasks they handle (ADB 2013). Furthermore, South Accordingly, as public transit options that are clean,
African women are more likely than men to rely on affordable, reliable, safe, and accessible to all are scaled,
public transit to get to work (Stats SA 2021). Despite private ownership of vehicles will need to peak and
women’s reliance on public transit, recent research eventually decline to keep South Africa’s climate targets
has shown that South Africa’s public transportation in reach. Critically, this transition from private to public
system largely does not meet the safety and accessibil- transport hinges on substantially greater funds being
ity needs of women (Moghayedi et al. 2023). A large made available to support bus and rail services as well
survey of female transit (train, bus, and minibus) users as migration of a significant portion of MBTs to bus
in Gauteng conducted in October 2021 found that travel, which emit less per passenger-kilometre. There is
the majority experience some form of gender-based also a need to better plan, coordinate, and implement
violence (verbal or physical assault, stalking, mugging, integrated transport plans across the country.
and/or pickpocketing) when using public transit and
often experience it repeatedly (Moghayedi et al. 2023). Today, there are around 8.2 million private vehicles on
Alarmingly, very few women reported never experi- the road across the country (NaTIS 2017–23). Esti-
encing any form of violence on public transit. A just mates aligned with achieving South Africa’s near- and
transition for the transport sector must address these long-term emissions targets project that private vehicle
issues and consider how to make transit safe and acces- ownership should peak at no more than 10 million
sible for all users. private vehicles by 2035 and decline to no more than 6
million by 2050 (NBI 2022).
Figure 9.3 • Historical progress and future targets for private ownership of vehicles
Number of private vehicles (millions)

10
10 Needed pace
Historical data
2035 target
8
8.15
2023 data
6
6
2050 target
4
0
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Sources: Historical data from NaTIS (2017–23); targets from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).

SHARE OF NEVS IN LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE SALES
Target: Ensure 30 percent of all new light-duty vehicle Although a large gap persists between today’s sales
sales are for NEVs between today and 2030 and that and the sales required to achieve a 100 percent share,
100 percent of all new light-duty vehicles sales are for evidence supports the strong potential for S-curve
NEVs by 2035 (Figure 9.4), per the NBI (2022). growth of new energy passenger vehicles (see Box 2).
This indicates the potential for rapid closure of this
Although public transit infrastructure across South
gap with the appropriate resources devoted to scaleup.
Africa is improved, this decade also needs to see a
Closing this gap will require targeted policies to ensure
massive scaleup of the share of NEVs in light-duty
that NEVs are more affordable than ICE vehicles for
vehicle sales. Although increasing attention to compact
South African households. As it stands, less than one-
urban design, buildup of rail, and other investments
third of South African households currently own a
in nonmotorised mobility will eliminate the need for
working vehicle, and car ownership is concentrated in
some road vehicle travel in South Africa, many South
wealthier households; over 75 percent of households
Africans will continue to depend on road transport via
in the highest income quantile own a vehicle, whereas
private passenger vehicles to meet at least some of their
only 6 percent of households in the lowest quintile
transport needs. In 2022, this share hit just over 0.15
do (Stats SA 2022b). Although the longer-term trend
percent of sales, but projections in line with achieving
should move toward reduced private vehicle ownership,
South Africa’s climate targets show that it must reach
it is important to consider how to ensure that every-
30 percent by 2030 (IEA 2023; NBI 2022). This share
one has access to the right type of transportation to
should then ramp up during the 2030s to reach 100
meet their needs.
percent by 2035 (NBI 2022). This indicator measures
private passenger vehicles, including cars and sport
utility vehicles only.
Figure 9.4 • Historical progress and future targets for share of NEVs in light-duty vehicle sales
Share (%)
100 100
2035 target
Historical data zoom-in

80 %
0.1
60
Illustrative
0 30
40 2015 2022 future
2023 target pathways
30
20
2030 target
2022 data
0.1
0
2016 2020 2024 2028 2032 2035
Note: Technology adoption typically follows a nonlinear, S-curve trajectory. New energy vehicle sales are still in the emergence stage of an S-curve in South Africa, but they could
accelerate with the right policy support. The illustrative S-curves shown here depict the type of S-curve pathways that the indicator would need to take to reach its targets. They are not
forecasts for the future and are not the only possible pathways to reach the targets.
Sources: Historical data from Lamprecht (2020, 2023a); targets from NBI (2022). Data visualisation adapted from Boehm et al. (2023), following methods from Jaeger et al. (2023).
SHARE OF NEVS IN THE LIGHT-DUTY
VEHICLE FLEET
Target: Ensure NEVs reach 100 percent adoption in tariffs can help increase the affordability of imported
the light-duty vehicle fleet by 2050 (Figure 9.5), per EVs while domestic capacity is built to manufacture
the NBI (2022). more affordable EVs locally. Government efforts to for-
malise and regulate the MBT sector can help facilitate
The share of NEVs in the light-duty vehicle fleet will
the distribution of subsidies and other resources that
grow as NEVs replace older ICE vehicles. Although
will be needed to help transition the industry. How-
this share sat at just 0.032 percent of all light-duty
ever, more passenger demand will still need to shift
vehicles in 2022, estimates project that it will need
toward higher-density public transport (bus, rail) in the
to reach 6 percent by 2030 and 100 percent by 2050
longer term to enable decarbonisation. As with other
to keep South Africa’s climate targets in reach (IEA
industries facing transition risks, workers in the MBT
2023; NBI 2022). If South Africa implements the right
industry will require support—such as reskilling or
policies to promote exponential growth in NEV sales,
early retirement assistance—as demand shifts.
exponential growth is likely to occur in the NEV fleet,
albeit on a delayed timescale given the amount of time Simultaneously, policy support, funding, and other
it takes for the fleet to turn over. interventions will be needed to decarbonise the bus
industry. According to the NBI, one of the top pri-
This indicator does not measure progress toward decar-
orities should be investing in a green BRT system for
bonisation of public transport road vehicles, although
major cities, which could be initiated through pilot
new energy MBTs and buses should both reach 100
programmes deploying NEV buses in Cape Town,
percent share of the total fleet by 2050 (NBI 2022).
Durban, and/or Johannesburg (NBI 2023). A recapi-
Given that such a large share of transportation demand
talisation programme for the bus fleet can help support
is currently met by MBTs, ensuring the transition to
the financing of NEVs, and government procurement
NEVs in the industry will be critical to decarbonisation.
targets can be leveraged to stimulate initial demand
Targeted subsidies, tax incentives, and reduced import
Figure 9.5 • Historical progress and future targets for share of NEVs in the light-duty vehicle fleet
Share (%)
100
100
2050 target
80
Historical data zoom-in
%
0.03 Illustrative
60
future
pathways
40
0
2015 2022
20 6
2022 data
2030 target
0.03
0
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Note: Technology adoption typically follows a nonlinear, S-curve trajectory. The new energy vehicle fleet is still in the emergence stage of an S-curve in South Africa, but it could
accelerate with the right policy support. The illustrative S-curves shown here depict the type of S-curve pathways that the indicator would need to take to reach its targets. They are not
forecasts for the future and are not the only possible pathways to reach the targets.

(NBI 2023). Additionally, reforming public transport will be able to deliver reliable, clean, and fast power for
funding and subsidies to better align with consumer both long- and short-range NEV trips (NBI 2023). In
demand and prioritise cost recovery can help increase 2022, approximately 300 public charging stations were
available funding for NEVs and related support infra- installed across the country (IEA 2023). However,
structure. These interventions could all fall under a estimates aligned with achieving South Africa’s cli-
comprehensive strategy for the introduction of NEVs mate targets indicate that the country will require the
in the public transport industry, which the government installation of between 30,000–45,000 public charging
currently lacks. stations by 2035 to support the growing NEV econ-
omy (NBI 2022). It is important to note here that
Transport Indicator 5 although there exists significant potential for off-grid
charging stations with captive renewable energy along
NUMBER OF NEW PUBLIC CHARGING national routes, the majority will need to be powered
STATIONS by a reliable—and decarbonised—electricity supply that
Target: Install 30,000–45,000 public charging stations hinges on the power sector transformation outlined in
by 2035 (Figure 9.6), per the NBI (2022). Power Indicators 1–4.
The massive scaleup of NEVs in South Africa that
must take place over the next years and decades will
only be achieved if accompanied by a simultaneous
scaleup of key enabling infrastructure. Chief among
these critical enablers are public charging stations that
Figure 9.6 • Historical progress and future targets for number of public charging stations
Number of public charging stations
40,000
Historical data zoom-in Illustrative

ustrative
trativ
i
30,000
300
30,000 - 45,000
2035 target
20,000
0
2017 2022
10,000
2022 data
300
0
2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2035
Note: Technology adoption typically follows a nonlinear, S-curve trajectory. The number of public charging stations is still in the emergence stage of an S-curve in South Africa, but it
could accelerate with the right policy support. The illustrative S-curves shown here depict the type of S-curve pathways that the indicator would need to take to reach its target range.
They are not forecasts for the future and are not the only possible pathways to reach the targets.
CONCLUSION
This report has presented the PCC’s first indepen- Looking ahead, the PCC will continue to scrutinise and
dent and evidence-based assessment of climate action monitor implementation progress in detail—focusing
in South Africa. on what is working, what is not, for whom, and why.
The intention is to produce a biennial State of Climate
The key message from the report is that South Africa
Action in South Africa report so that all social part-
has strong commitments toward tackling climate
ners—government, business, civil society, and labour,
change and facilitating a just transition, but incoher-
among others—have the most comprehensive, accurate,
ent policies, weak governance structures, and mixed
and up-to-date information to enable change.
actions by social partners are hindering progress at
the pace and scale required. From these analyses, we The PCC is currently developing a monitoring, evalu-
are beginning to identify the immediate actions that ation, and learning framework to track early indicators
must be affected to realise South Africa’s vision for the of progress on the just transition for publication in late
just transition. 2024. Accordingly, our next reports aim to include the
PCC’s own benchmarks for assessing progress toward
Our learning from this exercise shows that we must
key sectoral and regional transitions as well as a deeper
measure what is important, not just what is easy to
examination of the progress on key facets of the just
measure. And we must consider how external changes
transition: progress on economic diversification, indus-
affect progress across all stakeholder groups, such as
trial development, innovation, education and skilling,
global trade, energy security, and increases in the cost
and social support mechanisms.
of living. Further, as this report illustrates, we must
collect a range of information and data, both qualita-
tive and quantitative. Indeed, people’s perception on
“how goes the battle on climate change and the just
transition?” could be arguably seen as just as important
as the data that can be measured.
APPENDICES
Appendix A: List of stakeholders

relevant to climate action and the
transition
Table A-1 • List of relevant (but nonexhaustive) stakeholders for South Africa’s climate and just
transition development
STAKEHOLDER GROUP SUBCATEGORY ORGANISATION/INSTITUTION

Government National Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA)
Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development (DALRRD)
Department of Employment and Labour
Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE)
Department of Health
Department of Higher Education and Training
Department of Human Settlements (DHS)
Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE)
Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME)
Department of Public Enterprises (DPE)
Department of Science and Innovation (DSI)
Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (dtic)
Department of Transportation
Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS)
Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities
JET-IP Project Management Unit (PMU), the Presidency
Ministry of Electricity
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)
National Empowerment Fund (NEF)
National Energy Crisis Committee (NECOM)
transition development (cont.)

Government (cont.) National (cont.) National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA)
National Planning Commission
National Treasury (NT)
The Presidency
Presidential Climate Commission (PCC)
Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)
South African National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI)
Provincial Eastern Cape
Mpumalanga
Northern Cape
Western Cape
Local/municipal City of Cape Town
City of Johannesburg
eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality
South African Local Government Association (SALGA)
Intergovernmental African Union
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Research University/academia Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT)
Mpumulanga University
Nelson Mandela University (NMU)
North-West University
Rhodes University
Stellenbosch University
University of Cape Town (UCT)
University of Pretoria
University of Western Cape
University of the Witwatersrand (Wits)
Research institutes/ Academy of Science South Africa (AASAf)

think tanks
Agora Energiewende
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
Gauteng City Region Observatory
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)
Labour Research Service (LRS)
Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA)
Meridian Economics
Appendices • 77

Research (cont.) Research institutes/ National Cleaner Production Centre (NCPC)
think tanks (cont.)
Sam Tabani Research Institute (SATRI)
South African Institute of Electrical Engineers (SAEIE)
South African National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI)
Southern Centre for Inequality Studies
Stockholm Environmental Institute
Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS)
Water Research Commission
Nongovernment Environmental 350 Africa

organisations
Alternative Information & Development Centre (AIDC)
Earthlife Africa Johannesburg
Federation of Sustainable Environment (FSE)
Fossil Free South Africa
GreenCape
Green Connection
GreenPeace
groundWork
Highveld Environmental Justice Network (HEJN)
Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ)
Just Share
Just Urban Transitions
Khuthala Environmental Care Group / Khuthala Women’s Movement
Life After Coal Campaign
MANSA Advisory with Adapt
OneWorld
Project 90 by 2030
SA Faith Communities Environment Initiative (SAFCEI)
SouthSouthNorth (SSN)
Sustainable Energy Africa (SEA)
Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance (VEJA)
Vukani Environmental Movement (VEM)
WWF SA
Transparency/ amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism

democracy
Defend our Democracy
Just Share

Nongovernment Transparency/ My Vote Counts (MVC)
organisations (cont.) democracy (cont.)
Open Secrets
Oxpeckers Investigative Environmental Journalism
Legal services/ All Rise Attorneys

advocacy
Natural Justice, Biodiversity Law Centre
Lawyers for Human Rights
Legal services/ Centre for Applied Legal Studies

advocacy (cont.)
Centre for Environmental Rights (CER)
Cullinan & Associates
Legal Resources Centre (LRC)
Webber Wentzel
Advocacy coalitions Coalition Adaptation Network

and networks
African Climate Alliance (ACA)
Network African Women in Energy and Power (AWiEP)
African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)
C40 Cities South Africa
Climate Justice Coalition
Energy Governance SA
Fair Finance Coalition of Southern Africa (FFCSA)
Fossil Fuel Foundation
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) Africa
Mining Affected Communities United in Action (MACUA)
Muslim Judicial Council of South Africa
South Africa Climate Action Network (SACAN)
South African Cities Network (SACN)
South African Council of Churches (SACC)
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
South African Youth Climate Action Plan (SAYCAP)
South African Youth Economic Council (SAYEC)
Women for Climate Justice Southern Africa
Women in Energy and Climate Change Forum (WECCF)
Women in Extractive Mining South Africa
Private sector Organised business AgriSA
Banking Association South Africa (BASA)
Black Energy Professionals Association (BEPA)
Appendices • 79

Private sector (cont.) Organised business (cont.) Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)
Ducat Energy Trading
Impact Catalyst
Liquified Petroleum Gas South Africa (LPGSA)
Minerals Council
National Business Initiative (NBI)
South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO)
Industry association African Association of Automotive Manufacturers (AAAM)
National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa

(NAAMSA)
National Association of Automotive Component and Allied Manufacturers

(NAACAM)
National Automobile Dealers’ Association (NADA)
South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA)
South African Photovoltaic Industry Association (SAPVIA)
South African Power Producers Association (SAIPPA)
South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA)
Southern African Gas Association (SAGA)
Business-led coalition Eastern Cape Automotive Industry Forum (ECSIF)
South African Energy Forum (SAEF)
South African Energy Storage Association (SAESA)
South African National Energy Association (SANEA)
Private business Anglo American
Automotive Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC)
EBOR Automotive Systems
Electric Mission (E-Mission)
Exxaro
Sasol
Seriti
Retail Motor Industry (RMI)
VM Automotive State of the Art
State-owned enterprises Eskom
Transnet
Development financial DFIs African Development Bank (AfDB)

institutions (DFIs), banks,
and funds China Development Bank (CDB)
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA)

Development financial DFIs (cont.) European Investment Bank (EIB)
and funds (cont.) Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
World Bank Group
Banks ABSA Corporate Investment Banking
FNB
Development financial Banks (cont.) Nedbank Capital Corporate and Investment Banking
and funds (cont.) Standard Bank
Rand Merchant Bank (RMB)
Funds Adaptation Fund
Automotive Industry Transformation Fund (AITF)
Climate Fund Managers: SA-H2 Fund
Climate Investment Funds (CIF)
Green Climate Fund
International France: Agence Française de Développement (AfD)

development aid
Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Germany: International Climate

Initiative (IKI)
Germany: International Climate Initiative (IKI)
Germany: Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
United Kingdom: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)
United States: United States Agency for International Development

(USAID; with Power Africa)
Organised labour n/a Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union
(CEEPPWAWU)
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
Democratised Transport Logistics and Allied Workers’ Union (Detawu)
Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA)
Fuel Retailers Association (FRA)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council (MEIBC)
Motor Industry Bargaining Council (MIBCO)
Motor Industry Combined Workers’ Union (MICWU)
National Automobile and Allied Workers’ Union (NAAWU)
National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI)
National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA)
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
Appendices • 81

Organised labour (cont.) n/a National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW)
South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU)
Tirisano Transport and Services Workers Union (TASWU)
Transport, Retail & General Workers Union (THORN)
United National Transport Union (UNTU)
Private donors n/a African Climate Foundation (ACF)

and agencies
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF)
ClimateWorks
European Climate Foundation (ECF)
Ford Foundation (United States)
Frederich-Ebert-Stufting (FES)
Global Energy Alliance for People & Planet (GEAPP)
Heinrich Bohl Foundation (HBF)
Konrad-Adenauer-Stufting (KAS)
Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA)
Other n/a Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa)
Disabled People in South Africa
Global Strategic Communications Council (GSCC)
LGBT+ Forum
OUT LGBT Well-being
Source: Authors, based on Climate Investment Funds and Presidential Climate Commission consultations.
Appendix B: Methodological approach

Conceptual model for the 2023 nationally
representative survey on climate change and
the just transition
Chapter 5 presents the results from the PCC/HSRC nationally addressed critical components of the social transformation to
representative survey on climate change and the just transition. a low-carbon Europe (Poortinga et al. 2004).
The conceptual model for the national survey has been tested
These surveys and questionnaire modules conform to a high
and proven through previous research. The HSRC has been
standard of rigour and contain questions that are the best
working with the European Social Survey (ESS) on issues
effective, direct measures of the topics and concepts being
related to climate change since 2016. The ESS is a cross-na-
examined. As such, some of the questions designed for this
tional European Research Infrastructure Consortium consisting
project replicated some of the items from the ESS Round 8.
of 18 European members and has undertaken extensive
In addition, the conceptual framework used by the ESS also
survey work on climate change and energy transition, with the
formed the foundation of this study. In line with the concep-
last one fielded in the ESS 2016 round.32 The ESS undertook
tual framework used by the ESS, the current survey used the
a systematic and detailed comparison of public attitudes to
value-belief-norm (VBN) model by Stern (2000) as a general
climate change, energy security, and energy preferences and
framework, covering the four broad areas of beliefs about
climate change and the energy transition; concerns about Methodology for tracking
climate change and the energy transition; personal norms, effi-
cacy and trust; and policy preferences (Figure B-1). The VBN
mitigation progress
theory of environmentalism suggests that pro-environmental Chapters 8 and 9 of this report track historical progress
personal norms are influenced by the belief that environmental toward achieving future targets aligned with the shifts needed
conditions pose a threat to the things that an individual values, to realise South Africa’s 2050 net zero CO2 target across the
and that an individual could reduce the threat. These personal country’s power and transport sectors. Tracking mitigation
norms influence an individual’s behaviour. Behaviour-specific progress for these two sectors is prioritised in this report due
personal norms and other social-psychological factors, such to their role as the largest contributors to South Africa’s annual
as the perceived personal costs and benefits of an individual’s economy-wide emissions. Future work, however, is merited in
action and beliefs about the efficacy of actions, may affect tracking mitigation progress across other emissions-generating
pro-environmental behaviours (Stern 2000). According to sectors, including, but not limited to, buildings, industry, forests
the VBN model, “pro-environmental personal (moral) norms and land, and food and agriculture.
are at the core of linking climate change concerns to energy
This section describes the methodology used to track mit-
preferences” (ESS 2016).
igation progress in the power and transport sectors. The
This current survey explored individual awareness of climate approach is adapted from the State of Climate Action 2023
change and exposure to climatic shocks, and it examined how report (Boehm et al. 2023) and its accompanying method-
these shape beliefs focusing on the reality of climate change ological document, “Methodology Underpinning the State
and perceived causes. It then examined the degree to which of Climate Action Series” (Jaeger et al. 2023). Although
these beliefs, in turn, shaped concern about climate change. these reports track mitigation progress toward 1.5°C-aligned
This study also assessed whether these constructs influenced targets for a variety of global indicators, this report tracks
how South Africans feel about personal responsibility to take mitigation progress at the national level in South Africa alone.
action to address climate change. The VBN model consid-
ers these factors to be important for understanding climate SELECTION OF INDICATORS AND TARGETS
change and just transition perceptions, and they are seen Throughout this report, indicators and targets for tracking
as key variables that may subsequently motivate personal mitigation progress were derived from the NBI’s Climate
climate action in practice. Pathways and a Just Transition for South Africa project,
Figure B-1 • Conceptual framework for measuring public attitudes to climate change, energy security,
and energy preferences
(National) Socio-political
context
Climate policies
Energy infrastructures Personal norms, efficacy
State of economy and trust
Media
Elite cues Personal norms
Political party policy positions Efficacy beliefs
Education Social and institutional trust
Concerns Energy preferences
Socio-political values and Energy security Energy supply

engagement sources
Human values
Social-political values
Political engagement
Climate change Energy demand
measures
Climate change beliefs

(Individual) Socio-economic Reality of climate change
circumstances Causes of climate change
Socio-economic status Seriousness of climate change
Household composition Saliency of climate change
Education, religion
Parental status
Social exclusion
Sources: ESS 2016; Roberts et al. 2023.
Appendices • 83
produced in partnership with Business Unity South Africa series (Boehm et al. 2023; Jaeger et al. 2023), we selected
and Boston Consulting Group (NBI n.d.). With a goal to datasets that met the following criteria, as originally defined in
“collectively develop a view of what the decarbonisation Jaeger et al. (2023):
pathways could look like for the South African economy
together with the South African private sector and other • Relevance: Datasets are directly relevant to each indica-
relevant stakeholders from government, labour and civil tor and were created following a methodology that allows
society,” this project produced decarbonisation pathways them to measure progress toward their respective targets.
for multiple emissions-intensive sectors across the economy, • Accessibility: Datasets prioritised for inclusion are
which are described across a set of 11 reports (NBI n.d.). The readily accessible to the public. They are not hidden
targets derived from this particular decarbonisation pathway behind paywalls.
modelling exercise were selected for inclusion in this report
• Accuracy: Datasets are from reputable, trustworthy
because of the multistakeholder and domestically led nature
sources, with well-documented, openly accessible, and
of the Climate Pathways and a Just Transition for South Africa
peer-reviewed methodologies that clearly note limitations.
project and because it is the only complete domestically led
They are taken from data providers, including both authors
model describing the sectoral shifts required to meet South
of articles and organisations hosting datasets, that are well
Africa’s net zero goal.
recognised as either core data providers or known experts
After mapping all targets for the years between 2030 and in their fields as suggested by authors and reviewers.
2050 presented in the project’s summary report, South • Completeness: Datasets have sufficient temporal and
Africa’s Net-Zero Transition (NBI 2022), we selected all spatial coverage, and each report notes where the best
targets in the power and transport sectors for which robust available data are not globally available or not pub-
historical datasets that met several criteria, described below, lished annually.
were available. We then assigned corresponding indicators to
each target. For instance, the modelling study includes targets • Timeliness: Datasets selected represent the most up-to-
to take 6 GW of coal offline by 2030 and to retire the last date data available to reflect recent developments,
coal power stations in South Africa by 2042. In this report, and there is evidence that data have been and will be
we group these targets under a corresponding indicator that updated regularly.
tracks “coal power capacity.” This approach of assigning • Ease of collection: Datasets prioritised for each indicator
indicators to derived targets matches the approach used in are relatively easy to collect (e.g., those that require minimal
the global State of Climate Action report series (Boehm et al. processing or that are directly downloadable).
2023; Jaeger 2023b; Jaeger et al. 2023).
ASSESSING PROGRESS TOWARD FUTURE TARGETS
Critically, the mitigation indicators derived from the NBI proj-
ect that are tracked in this report do not exhaustively measure After determining both future targets and historical trends for
all shifts that will be required to decarbonise South Africa’s selected indicators across South Africa’s power and transport
power and transport sectors. Rather, each indicator assesses sectors, we adapt methods from the global State of Climate
the gap between historical trends and the future targets that Action series (Boehm et al. 2023; Jaeger 2023b; Jaeger et
need to be achieved in a subset of areas with large mitigation al. 2023) to design indicator figures that portray the gap
potential in South Africa. between historical trajectory and future need. These figures
exemplify the scale of the existent gap and are intended to
It is also important to note here that the targets for each indi- galvanise action by illustrating the work that lies ahead.
cator tracked in this report represent just one set of illustrative
benchmarks that, if achieved, align with South Africa’s goal to As noted in Box 2 (Chapter 8), future growth of clean technol-
reach net zero CO2 by 2050. However, different modelling ogies may not follow linear trajectories, marked by constant
assumptions yield different potential futures and trajectories, rates of annual growth. Rather, technological adoption is
and targets for the indicators measured in this report vary more likely to follow rapid, nonlinear growth in the shape
across other modelling studies (e.g., Climate Analytics 2022). of an S-curve trajectory. To account for the likelihood of
As such, the targets that are presented for each indicator in such growth, we categorise indicators that track technology
this report illustrate the direction and scale of the change adoption in the power and transport chapters as “S-curve
that is required, but they do not exclusively portray the only likely.” This categorisation is noted in the figure notes for each
future pathway that will enable achievement of South Africa’s relevant indicator. The list of “S-curve likely” indicators that
climate targets. are tracked in this report includes the following:
SELECTION OF HISTORICAL DATASETS

• Renewable energy capacity
Upon establishing indicators and targets to track future • Battery storage capacity
objectives for South Africa’s power and transport sectors, we • Green hydrogen capacity
collected historical data for each indicator to portray past and • Share of NEVs in light-duty vehicle sales
current trends. Drawing on the global State of Climate Action
• Share of NEVs in the light-duty vehicle fleet
• Number of public charging stations
For each “S-curve likely” indicator, we sketch several illustra- target(s) by the average annual rate of change that occurred
tive S-curves that demonstrate potential growth trajectories over the most recent five years of historical data obtained in
between the current historical data point and the future targets the step above.
toward which we are tracking progress. We show multiple
If the acceleration factor is between 0 and 1, the histori-
potential S-curve trajectories to emphasise that we are neither
cal rate of change is equal to or above the rate of change
predicting the exact future pathway that the indicator will
needed to achieve the future target(s), and we categorise the
follow nor prescribing exactly what that pathway should be.
indicator’s progress as “on track” accordingly. If the acceler-
Rather, the purpose of these illustrative S-curves is to demon-
ation factor is between 1 and 2, the historical rate of change
strate the likelihood that the technology adoption that is being
is heading in the right direction at a promising yet insufficient
measured by the “S-curve likely” indicator follows a rapid,
pace, and we categorise the indicator’s progress as “right
nonlinear trajectory of growth.
direction, off track.” If the acceleration factor is greater than
To track needed progress between the most recent historical or equal to 2, the historical rate of change is heading in the
data point and future targets for indicators not categorised right direction but well below the pace required to achieve
as “S-curve likely,” we use the most recent five years of data the future target(s), and we categorise the indicator as “right
to construct a linear trend line and then extend this trend line direction, well off track.” Finally, if the acceleration factor
from the most recent historical data point to the target. This that is calculated is negative, the historical rate of change is
trajectory is positive sloping if the most recent historical data heading in the wrong direction entirely, and we categorise the
point must increase to achieve future targets (e.g., for total indicator as “wrong direction, U-turn needed.” For indicators
power grid capacity), and it is negative sloping if the most falling into this last category, we do not present the negative
recent historical data point must decrease to achieve future acceleration factor because a reversal of the current trend is
targets (e.g., for coal power capacity). needed rather than an acceleration.
Following methods outlined in the global State of Climate The results of this analysis are presented with the correspond-
Action series (Boehm et al. 2023; Jaeger et al. 2023), we ing indicators in the report body and are summarised in
also assign “acceleration factors” for indicators that are Table B-1.
classified as “S-curve unlikely” that measure the amount by
In future iterations of this report, there may be scope to extend
which historical rates of change over the last five years of data
this analysis to cover further indicators in the power and
would need to increase to achieve the indicator’s targets. To
transport sectors as well as indicators across other sectors
calculate these acceleration factors, we divide the average
that must also decarbonise to achieve South Africa’s long-
annual rate of change needed to achieve the indicator’s future
term climate goals.
Table B-1 • Summary of acceleration factors and categories of progress for indicators that are not
“S-curve likely”
INDICATOR ACCELERATION FACTOR CATEGORY OF PROGRESS

Coal power capacity N/A Wrong direction, U-turn needed
Natural gas consumption N/A Targets have been set to allow for continuation of historical trends in the
wrong direction until a peaking date is reached and a reversal of trends
into the right direction begins
Number of public road 1.9 Right direction, off track

transport vehicles
Private ownership of vehicles N/A Targets have been set to allow for continuation of historical trends in the
wrong direction until a peaking date is reached and a reversal of trends
into the right direction begins
Note: N/A = not applicable.
Appendices • 85
Abbreviations
AMD acid-mine drainage JETP Just Energy Transition Partnership
BAU business as usual KZN KwaZulu-Natal
BRT bus rapid transit MBT minibus taxi
BUSA Business Unity South Africa MEC minerals-energy complex
CAP Climate Action Plan NBI National Business Initiative
CIF Climate Investment Funds NCCAS ational Climate Change Adaptation
N
Strategy
CMA catchment management agency
NDC nationally determined contribution
CSA climate-smart agriculture
ND-GAIN Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
CSO civil society organisation
NDP National Development Plan 2030
CSP concentrated solar power
NERSA National Energy Regulator of South Africa
DFFE epartment of Forestry, Fisheries and the
D
Environment NEV new energy vehicle
DFI development financial institution NGO nongovernmental organisation
DMRE epartment of Mineral Resources and
D NRW nonrevenue water
Energy
NWA National Water Act
DoT Department of Transportation
NWRS National Water Resource Strategy
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
RE renewable energy
DSR demand side response
PCC Presidential Climate Commission
dtic epartment of Trade, Industry and
D
PPP public-private partnership
Competition
PRASA Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
DWS Department of Water and Sanitation
PV photovoltaic
EAF energy availability factor
SAICE outh African Institution of Civil
S
ERA Electricity Regulation Act
Engineering
ESS European Social Survey
SALGA outh African Local Government
S
EV electric vehicle Association
FOLU forest and other land uses SASAS South African Social Attitudes Survey
GDP gross domestic product SAREM outh African Renewable Energy
S
Masterplan
GHG greenhouse gas
SWSA strategic water source area
GTS Green Transport Strategy
UNFCCC nited Nations Framework Convention on
U
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council
Climate Change
ICE internal combustion engine
VBN value-belief-norm
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
WC/WDM ater conservation and demand
w
Change
management
IPPO Independent Power Producers Office
WRC Water Research Commission
IPPU industrial process and product use
WSS water supply system
IRP integrated resource plan
WWTW wastewater treatment works
IWRM of integrated water resources management
JET-IP Just Energy Transition Investment Plan
Endnotes
1. The South African Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State 12. The DWS defines green infrastructure as “any infrastructure that
Capture defines state capture as “a network of relationships, is good for the environment and promotes sustainable develop-
both inside and outside government, whose objective is to ment” (DWS 2023d, 102).
ensure the exercise of undue influence over decision-making in
government and organs of the state, for private and unlawful 13. For more information on the latter, see Bureau for Economic
gain” (Zondo 2022). Research (2021).
2. Cadre deployment is the appointment of individuals by a gov- 14. South Africa is the second-highest-emitting country after the
ernment’s governing party that are loyal to that party, for various Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) when land-use change
reasons, including ensuring buy-in by individuals or institutions to and forestry are included due to deforestation-related emis-
the mandate of that party. sions in the DRC.
3. Based on the HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Sur- 15. This includes Sasol’s scope 1 (direct) and 2 (indirect from use of
vey for 2003–23. energy in operations) emissions from its Secunda and Sasolburg
plants, Natref refinery, and its mining activities (Sasol 2023).
4. The Cramer’s V coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means no
association between the variables being tested and 1 signifies 16. It is important to note that, according to Climate Action Tracker,
perfect association. As a rule of thumb, values of less than 0.2 South Africa’s updated 2030 NDC target is “almost sufficient”
represent a weak association, values of between 0.2 and 0.6 a when compared to modelled domestic pathways (the “almost
moderate association, and greater than 0.6 a strong association. sufficient” rating indicates that a country’s climate policies and
commitments are not yet consistent with the Paris Agreement’s
5. The ND-GAIN Index measures a country’s vulnerability to and 1.5°C temperature limit but could be with moderate improve-
readiness for climate change. The first component, vulnerability, is ments), and “insufficient” when compared with its fair share
defined as the predisposition of human societies to be impacted contribution to climate action (the “insufficient” rating indicates
negatively by climate hazards and is evaluated across six key that a country’s climate policies and commitments need substan-
sectors: food, water, health, ecosystem services, human habitat, tial improvements to be consistent with the Paris Agreement’s
and infrastructure (Chen et al. 2023). The vulnerability of each 1.5°C temperature limit) (Climate Action Tracker 2024). Per this
sector is scored based on its exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive analysis, South Africa’s targets and policies are not stringent
capacity (Chen et al. 2023). The second component of the index, enough to limit warming to 1.5°C. If fully implemented, current
readiness, refers a country’s ability to effectively use investments policies would result in emissions reductions only in line with
for adaptation action and is evaluated using economic, gover- holding global warming at—but not well below—2°C. The Cli-
nance, and social indicators (Chen et al. 2023). See ND-GAIN mate Equity Reference Project finds that the entire NDC range for
(2021) for more detailed information about South Africa’s scores 2030 does not satisfy the fair share target range for the 1.5°C
across vulnerability and readiness subindicators. pathway and that most of the NDC range for 2030 fails to satisfy
the fair share target range for the 2.0°C pathway (CERP 2021).
6. A basic water supply facility, as defined by the Strategic
Framework for Water Services, should be within 200 metres of 17. Plus a range of uncertainty that reflects model variations as well
the household and provide at least 25 litres of potable water per as interpretation of policies and targets.
person daily with minimal interruptions (DWAF 2003).
18. EAF refers to the percentage of maximum energy generation over
7. According to the latest census, 8.1 percent of South African time that a plant is capable of supplying to the electrical grid.
households are characterised as informal dwellings (Stats SA
2023b). In urban areas, nearly a quarter of the population was 19. Nova Economics was commissioned by Eskom in 2020 to
living in an informal settlement in 2020 (UN-HABITAT 2020). quantify the economic impacts of load shedding. It subsequently
updated its analysis in 2023.
8. Defined as “flush toilets connected to a public sewerage
system or a septic tank, or a pit toilet with a ventilation pipe” 20. For more detailed discussions on this topic, see CSIR et al.
(Stats SA 2023c, 39). (2021); Hallowes and Munnik (2022); IRENA (2023b);
Nel, Marais, and Mqotyana (2023); Patel et al. (2020);
9. The Blue Drop reports cover water supply providers, and and PCC (2022c).
assessments are based on a range of criteria looking at capacity,
financial and technical management, and drinking water quality 21. Energy was deemed unaffordable if it accounted for more than
risk management and compliance. The Green Drop Reports 10 percent of total household expenditure (Ye and Koch 2023).
cover wastewater service providers, and criteria look at design 22. A temporary increase in gas is expected to be required in the
and operational capacity, effluent quality compliance (e.g., near term as a constant supply of power to balance out variable
whether wastewater is being treated to regulatory standards), renewables on the grid (NBI 2022).
and technical skills.
10. Eutrophication occurs when excess nutrients in water (e.g., from
fertiliser runoff) cause excessive plant growth, eventually leading
to depleted oxygen levels in the water, which can kill animals
(NOAA n.d.; Van Der Laan and Franke 2019).
11. Although high, this is below the global average; roughly 70 per-
cent of freshwater worldwide is used for agriculture (FAO 2020).
Appendices • 87
23. Throughout this report, indicators and targets for tracking mitiga-
tion progress were derived from the NBI’s Climate Pathways and
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Appendices • 99
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July 2024

The State of Climate Action

Section 2. The race to build climate resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Section 3. Mitigation: emissions, targets, and progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Appendix A: L ist of stakeholders relevant to climate action and

The President formed the Presidential Climate

South Africa is on track to meet its 2025 GHG

over the past decade due in part to increasing climate

The environment for

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY

Box 1 • Defining a just transition for South Africa

Section 1. The environment for climate action • 9

CLIMATE JUST TRANSITION

South Africa shows unequivocal commitment to the environ-

South Africa ratifies the UNFCCC. 1997

South Africa ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. 2002

South Africa adopts a National Development Plan (NDP)

South Africa submits its long-term low-GHG emission devel-

Section 1. The environment for climate action • 11

Section 1. The environment for climate action • 13

Section 1. The environment for climate action • 15

Finance Equity 18%

Finance for climate change and a just transition cur-

Climate finance flows have grown significantly in

The overwhelming majority of funding was allocated to

Most private and public sector spending was directed

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND

Section 1. The environment for climate action • 17

Section 1. The environment for climate action • 19

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Figure 3.5 • Perceived positive impacts of energy transition

Load shedding will reduce or end 51%

Source: HSRC SASAS 2023 PCC just transition module.

Section 1. The environment for climate action • 21

Having to pay more for electricity 33%

Loss of a job or a source of income 32%

Damage to the local environment 19%

Negative impacts on my health or that of my family 17%

I am worried about some other consequence 2%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

Percent of respondents selecting each option

Source: HSRC SASAS 2023 PCC just transition module.

Source: HSRC SASAS 2023 PCC just transition module.

These results will also feed into the PCC’s communi-

The race to build climate

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND

34% 60% Gauteng

33% 38% 47%

Source: HSRC 2023.

Section 2. The race to build climate resilience • 25

for climate adaptation nents—vulnerability and readiness—inform South

Figure 4.2 • South Africa’s ND-GAIN score

Note: ND-GAIN = Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative.

Section 2. The race to build climate resilience • 27

South Africa has mainstreamed adaptation into its

Source: Mogelgaard et al. 2018.

Section 2. The race to build climate resilience • 29

Section 2. The race to build climate resilience • 31

Despite positive developments, more work is needed.

Appendix A: L ist of stakeholders relevant to climate action and

Box 1 • Defining a just transition for South Africa