Stream: Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

RFC: 9468
Category: Standards Track
Published: August 2023
ISSN: 2070-1721
Authors: E. Chen N. Shen R. Raszuk R. Rahman
Palo Alto Networks Zededa Arrcus Equinix

RFC 9468
Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for Sessionless Applications

Abstract
For operational simplification of "sessionless" applications using Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD), in this document, we present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that allow a BFD
session to be initiated by only one side and established without explicit per-session configuration
or registration by the other side (subject to certain per-interface or global policies).

We also introduce a new YANG module to configure and manage "unsolicited BFD". The YANG
module in this document is based on YANG 1.1, as defined in RFC 7950, and conforms to the
Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA), as described in RFC 8342. This document
augments RFC 9314.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the
consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for
publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet
Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback
on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9468.

Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights
reserved.

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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF
Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this
document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions
with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include
Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2

1.1. Requirements Language 4

2. Procedures for Unsolicited BFD 4

3. State Variables 5

4. YANG Data Model 5

4.1. Unsolicited BFD Hierarchy 5

4.2. Unsolicited BFD Module 6

4.3. Data Model Example 10

5. IANA Considerations 11

6. Security Considerations 12

6.1. BFD Protocol Security Considerations 12

6.2. BFD Protocol Authentication Considerations 12

6.3. YANG Module Security Considerations 12

7. References 13

7.1. Normative References 13

7.2. Informative References 14

Acknowledgments 15

Authors' Addresses 15

1. Introduction
The current implementation and deployment practice for BFD ([RFC5880] and [RFC5881]) usually
requires that BFD sessions be explicitly configured or registered on both sides. This requirement
is not an issue when an application like BGP [RFC4271] has the concept of a "session" that

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RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

involves both sides for its establishment. However, this requirement can be operationally
challenging when the prerequisite "session" does not naturally exist between two endpoints in an
application. Simultaneous configuration and coordination may be required on both sides for BFD
to take effect. For example:

• When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the next hop of static routes. Although
only one side may need the BFD functionality, currently, both sides need to be involved in
specific configuration and coordination, and in some cases, static routes are created
unnecessarily just for BFD.
• When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the third-party next hop of BGP routes
received from the Route Server [RFC7947] at an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). As the third-
party next hop is different from the peering address of the Route Server, for BFD to work,
currently, two routers peering with the Route Server need to have routes and next hops from
each other (although indirectly via the Route Server).

Clearly, it is beneficial and desirable to reduce or eliminate unnecessary configurations and

coordination in these "sessionless" applications using BFD.

In this document, we present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that allow a BFD session to be
initiated by only one side and established without explicit per-session configuration or
registration by the other side (subject to certain per-interface or global policies).

Unsolicited BFD impacts only the initiation of BFD sessions. There is no change to all the other
procedures specified in [RFC5880], such as, but not limited to, the Echo function and Demand
mode.

With "unsolicited BFD", there is potential risk for excessive resource usage by BFD from
"unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate such risks, several mechanisms are recommended in
the Security Considerations section.

The procedure described in this document could be applied to BFD for multihop paths [RFC5883].
However, because of security risks, this document applies only to BFD for single IP hops
[RFC5881].

Compared to the "Seamless BFD" [RFC7880], this proposal involves only minor procedural
enhancements to the widely deployed BFD itself. Thus, we believe that this proposal is inherently
simpler in the protocol itself and deployment. As an example, it does not require the exchange of
BFD discriminators over an out-of-band channel before BFD session bring-up.

When BGP ADD-PATH [RFC7911] is deployed at an IXP using a Route Server, multiple BGP paths
(when they exist) can be made available to the clients of the Route Server, as described in
[RFC7947]. Unsolicited BFD can be used by BGP route selection's route resolvability condition
(Section 9.1.2.1 of [RFC4271]) to exclude routes where the NEXT_HOP is not reachable using the
procedures specified in this document.

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1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to
be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in
all capitals, as shown here.

2. Procedures for Unsolicited BFD

With "unsolicited BFD", one side takes the "Active role" and the other side takes the "Passive role",
as described in [RFC5880], Section 6.1.

Passive unsolicited BFD support MUST be disabled by default and MUST require explicit
configuration to be enabled. On the passive side, the following BFD parameters, from [RFC5880],
Section 6.8.1, SHOULD be configurable:

• bfd.DesiredMinTxInterval
• bfd.RequiredMinRxInterval
• bfd.DetectMult

The passive side MAY also choose to use the values of the parameters listed above that the active
side uses in its BFD Control packets. However, the bfd.LocalDiscr value MUST be selected by the
passive side to allow multiple unsolicited BFD sessions.

The active side starts sending the BFD Control packets, as specified in [RFC5880]. The passive side
does not send BFD Control packets initially; it sends BFD Control packets only after it has
received BFD Control packets from the active side.

When the passive side receives a BFD Control packet from the active side with 0 as "Your
Discriminator" and does not find an existing BFD session, the passive side SHOULD create a
matching BFD session toward the active side, unless not permitted by local configuration or
policy.

When the passive side receives an incoming BFD Control packet on a numbered interface, the
source address of that packet MUST belong to the subnet of the interface on which the BFD packet
is received, else the BFD Control packet MUST NOT be processed.

The passive side MUST then start sending BFD Control packets and perform the necessary
procedure for bringing up, maintaining, and tearing down the BFD session. If the BFD session
fails to get established within a certain amount of time (which is implementation specific but has
to be at least equal to the local failure detection time) or if an established BFD session goes down,
the passive side MUST stop sending BFD Control packets and SHOULD delete the BFD session
created until BFD Control packets are initiated by the active side again.

When an unsolicited BFD session goes down, an implementation may retain the session state for
a period of time. Retaining this state can be useful for operational purposes.

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RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

3. State Variables
This document defines a new state variable called Role:

bfd.Role

This is the role of the local system during BFD session initialization, as per [RFC5880], Section 6.1.
Possible values are Active or Passive.

4. YANG Data Model

This section extends the YANG data model for BFD [RFC9314] to cover unsolicited BFD. The new
module imports the YANG modules described in [RFC8349] since the "bfd" container in [RFC9314]
is under "control-plane-protocol". The YANG module in this document conforms to the Network
Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342].

4.1. Unsolicited BFD Hierarchy

Configuration for unsolicited BFD parameters for IP single-hop sessions can be done at 2 levels:

• globally, i.e., for all interfaces

• for specific interfaces (this requires support for the "unsolicited-params-per-interface"
feature)

If configuration exists at both levels, per-interface configuration takes precedence over global
configuration.

For operational data, a new "role" leaf node has been added for BFD IP single-hop sessions.

The tree diagram below uses the graphical representation of data models, as defined in
[RFC8340].

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module: ietf-bfd-unsolicited

augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh:
+--rw unsolicited?
+--rw local-multiplier? multiplier
+--rw (interval-config-type)?
+--:(tx-rx-intervals)
| +--rw desired-min-tx-interval? uint32
| +--rw required-min-rx-interval? uint32
+--:(single-interval) {single-minimum-interval}?
+--rw min-interval? uint32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh
/bfd-ip-sh:interfaces:
+--rw unsolicited
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw local-multiplier?
bfd-types:multiplier
{bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface}?
+--rw (interval-config-type)?
{bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface}?
+--:(tx-rx-intervals)
| +--rw desired-min-tx-interval? uint32
| +--rw required-min-rx-interval? uint32
+--:(single-interval) {bfd-types:single-minimum-interval}?
+--rw min-interval? uint32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh
/bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session:
+--ro role? bfd-unsol:role

4.2. Unsolicited BFD Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-bfd-unsolicited@2023-08-31.yang"

module ietf-bfd-unsolicited {

yang-version 1.1;

namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited";

prefix bfd-unsol;

import ietf-bfd-types {
prefix bfd-types;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}

import ietf-bfd {
prefix bfd;
reference

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RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding

Detection (BFD)";
}

import ietf-bfd-ip-sh {
prefix bfd-ip-sh;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}

import ietf-routing {
prefix rt;
reference
"RFC 8349: A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA Version)";
}

organization
"IETF BFD Working Group";

contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/bfd/>
WG List: <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>

Editors: Enke Chen (enchen@paloaltonetworks.com),

Naiming Shen (naiming@zededa.com),
Robert Raszuk (robert@raszuk.net),
Reshad Rahman (reshad@yahoo.com)";

description
"This module contains the YANG definition for unsolicited BFD,
as per RFC 9468.

Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons

identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or

without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9468; see

the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

reference
"RFC 9468: Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for Sessionless Applications";

revision 2023-08-31 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC 9468: Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
for Sessionless Applications";
}

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RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

/*
* Feature definitions
*/
feature unsolicited-params-per-interface {
description
"This feature indicates that the server supports per-interface
parameters for unsolicited sessions.";
reference
"RFC 9468: Unsolicited Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
for Sessionless Applications";
}

/*
* Type Definitions
*/

identity role {
description
"Base identity from which all roles are derived.
Role of local system during BFD session initialization.";
}

identity active {
base bfd-unsol:role;
description
"Active role.";
reference
"RFC 5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD),
Section 6.1";
}

identity passive {
base bfd-unsol:role;
description
"Passive role.";
reference
"RFC 5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD),
Section 6.1";
}

/*
* Augments
*/

augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh" {
description
"Augmentation for unsolicited BFD parameters.";
container unsolicited {
description
"BFD IP single-hop unsolicited top-level container.";
uses bfd-types:base-cfg-parms;
}
}

augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/"

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+ "bfd-ip-sh:interfaces" {
description
"Augmentation for unsolicited BFD on IP single-hop
interface.";
container unsolicited {
description
"BFD IP single-hop interface unsolicited top-level
container.";
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description
"Unsolicited BFD is enabled on this interface.";
}
/*
* The following is the same as bfd-types:base-cfg-parms, but
* without default values (for inheritance)
*/
leaf local-multiplier {
if-feature "bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface";
type bfd-types:multiplier;
description
"Multiplier transmitted by the local system. Defaults to
../../unsolicited/local-multiplier.
A multiplier configured under an interface takes
precedence over the multiplier configured at the global
level.";
}
choice interval-config-type {
if-feature "bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface";
description
"Two interval values or one value used for both transmit
and receive. Defaults to
../../unsolicited/interval-config-type. An interval
configured under an interface takes precedence over any
interval configured at the global level.";
case tx-rx-intervals {
leaf desired-min-tx-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Desired minimum transmit interval of control
packets.";
}
leaf required-min-rx-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Required minimum receive interval of control
packets.";
}
}
case single-interval {
if-feature "bfd-types:single-minimum-interval";
leaf min-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description

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"Desired minimum transmit interval and required

minimum receive interval of control packets.";
}
}
}
}
}

augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/"
+ "bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session" {
description
"Augmentation for unsolicited BFD on IP single-hop session.";
leaf role {
type identityref {
base bfd-unsol:role;
}
config false;
description
"Role.";
}
}
}

<CODE ENDS>

4.3. Data Model Example

This section shows an example on how to configure the passive end of unsolicited BFD:

• We have global BFD IP single-hop unsolicited configuration with a local-multiplier of 2 and

min-interval at 50 ms.
• BFD IP single-hop unsolicited is enabled on interface eth0 with a local-multiplier of 3 and
min-interval at 250 ms.
• BFD IP single-hop unsolicited is enabled on interface eth1. Since there is no parameter
configuration for eth1, it inherits from the global configuration.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<interfaces xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces">
<interface>
<name>eth0</name>
<type
xmlns:ianaift="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">
ianaift:ethernetCsmacd</type>
</interface>
<interface>
<name>eth1</name>
<type
xmlns:ianaift="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">
ianaift:ethernetCsmacd</type>
</interface>
</interfaces>
<routing xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-routing">

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<control-plane-protocols>
<control-plane-protocol>
<type xmlns:bfd-types=
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-types">
bfd-types:bfdv1</type>
<name>name:BFD</name>
<bfd xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd">
<ip-sh xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-ip-sh">
<unsolicited>
<local-multiplier>2</local-multiplier>
<min-interval>50000</min-interval>
</unsolicited>
<interfaces>
<interface>eth0</interface>
<unsolicited>
<enabled>true</enabled>
<local-multiplier>3</local-multiplier>
<min-interval>250000</min-interval>
</unsolicited>
</interfaces>
<interfaces>
<interface>eth1</interface>
<unsolicited>
<enabled>true</enabled>
</unsolicited>
</interfaces>
</ip-sh>
</bfd>
</control-plane-protocol>
</control-plane-protocols>
</routing>
</config>

5. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered the following namespace URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML
Registry" [RFC3688]:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry
[RFC6020]:

Name: ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Maintained by IANA: N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Prefix: bfd-unsol
Reference: RFC 9468

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6. Security Considerations
6.1. BFD Protocol Security Considerations
The same security considerations and protection measures as those described in [RFC5880] and
[RFC5881] apply to this document. In addition, with "unsolicited BFD", there is potential risk for
excessive resource usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate such risks,
implementations of unsolicited BFD MUST:

• Limit the feature to specific interfaces and to single-hop BFD sessions using the procedures
from [RFC5082]. See Section 5 of [RFC5881] for the details of these procedures.
• Apply policy to process BFD packets only from certain subnets or hosts.
• Deploy the feature only in an environment that does not offer anonymous participation.
Examples include an IXP, where the IXP operator will have a business relationship with all
IXP participants, or between a provider and its customers.

6.2. BFD Protocol Authentication Considerations

Implementations of unsolicited BFD are RECOMMENDED to use BFD authentication; see
[RFC5880]. If BFD authentication is used, the strongest BFD authentication mechanism that is
supported MUST be used.

In some environments, such as IXPs, BFD authentication cannot be used because of the lack of
coordination for the operation of the two endpoints of the BFD session.

In other environments, such as when BFD is used to track the next hop of static routes, it is
possible to use BFD authentication. This comes with the extra cost of configuring matching key
chains between the two endpoints.

6.3. YANG Module Security Considerations

The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data that is designed to be
accessed via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF
[RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-
implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is
HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].

The Network Configuration Access Control Mode (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to
restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all
available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.

There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/
deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or
vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data
nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the
subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

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RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh /unsolicited:
• Data node "enabled" enables creation of unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions globally,
i.e., on all interfaces. See Section 6.1.
• Data nodes "local-multiplier", "desired-min-tx-interval", "required-min-rx-interval", and
"min-interval" all impact the parameters of the unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions.
Write operations to these nodes change the rates of BFD packet generation and detection
time of the failures of a BFD session.

/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh /interfaces/interface/
unsolicited:
• Data node "enabled" enables the creation of unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions on a
specific interface. See Section 6.1.
• Data nodes "local-multiplier", "desired-min-tx-interval", "required-min-rx-interval", and
"min-interval" all impact the parameters of the unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions on
the interface.

Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-
config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their
sensitivity/vulnerability:

/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh /sessions/session/role:
Access to this information discloses the role of the local system in the creation of the
unsolicited BFD session.

7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/
rfc2119>.

[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688,
January 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

[RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C. Pignataro, "The Generalized
TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5082>.

[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI
10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.

[RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and
IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881, DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010, <https://
www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881>.

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RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network
Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed.,
"Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241,
June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC
6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/
rfc6242>.

[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI
10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP
14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/
rfc8174>.

[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI
10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model",

STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8341>.

[RFC8349] Lhotka, L., Lindem, A., and Y. Qu, "A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA Version)", RFC 8349, DOI 10.17487/RFC8349, March 2018, <https://
www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8349>.

[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

[RFC9314] Jethanandani, M., Ed., Rahman, R., Ed., Zheng, L., Ed., Pallagatti, S., and G.
Mirsky, "YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC
9314, DOI 10.17487/RFC9314, September 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/
rfc9314>.

7.2. Informative References

[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

[RFC5883] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Multihop
Paths", RFC 5883, DOI 10.17487/RFC5883, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/
info/rfc5883>.

Chen, et al. Standards Track Page 14

RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

[RFC7880] Pignataro, C., Ward, D., Akiya, N., Bhatia, M., and S. Pallagatti, "Seamless
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (S-BFD)", RFC 7880, DOI 10.17487/RFC7880,
July 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7880>.

[RFC7911] Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder, "Advertisement of Multiple Paths
in BGP", RFC 7911, DOI 10.17487/RFC7911, July 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/
info/rfc7911>.

[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, "Internet Exchange BGP
Route Server", RFC 7947, DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016, <https://
www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.

[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "Network
Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342,
March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Acee Lindem, Alvaro Retana, Dan Romascanu, Derek Atkins,
Greg Mirsky, Gyan Mishra, Henning Rogge, Jeffrey Haas, John Scudder, Lars Eggert, Magnus
Westerlund, Mahesh Jethanandani, Murray Kucherawy, Raj Chetan, Robert Wilton, Roman
Danyliw, Tom Petch, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker for their reviews and valuable input.

Authors' Addresses
Enke Chen
Palo Alto Networks
3000 Tannery Way
Santa Clara, CA 95054
United States of America
Email: enchen@paloaltonetworks.com

Naiming Shen
Zededa
160 W Santa Clara Street
San Jose, CA 95113
United States of America
Email: naiming@zededa.com

Robert Raszuk
Arrcus
2077 Gateway Place
San Jose, CA 95110
United States of America
Email: robert@raszuk.net

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RFC 9468 Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications August 2023

Reshad Rahman
Equinix
Canada
Email: reshad@yahoo.com

Chen, et al. Standards Track Page 16