15.6.3 - People v. Lacson (2003)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO,
petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, Gilbert V. Santos and Floresita C. Gan for
respondent.
SYNOPSIS
This case originated from the brutal killings of eleven suspected

members of a known notorious "Kuratong Baleleng " gang on 18 May 1995.
Relative thereto, respondent Panfilo Lacson together with 25 other police
officers were charged with multiple murder. Respondent filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses. During the hearing of the said motion, seven or eight victims'
next of kin executed affidavits of desistance, while others recanted their
affidavit-complaints. Thus, the trial court provisionally dismissed the case for
lack of probable cause. Two years later, a panel of state prosecutors to
investigate the sworn statement of two new witnesses was constituted.
Consequently, respondent and several of his co-accused filed with RTC-
Manila a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the preliminary
investigation. Notwithstanding, the panel of state prosecutors issued a
resolution finding probable cause to hold respondent and his co-accused for
trial for eleven counts of murder. On the other hand, the RTC-Manila denied
the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order by ruling that
the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one
on the merits and without any recorded arraignment. Herein respondent
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court declared as
null and void all the proceedings conducted by the state prosecutors and
ordered all the criminal informations dismissed. Thus, petitioners seek
refuge to this Court. This Court then issued a resolution dated May 28, 2002
which stated that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the respondent as he
himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses.
However, it ordered to remand the case to the lower court for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently,
petitioners filed the instant motion for reconsideration.
With regard to Section 8, Rule 117 (provisional dismissal) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court ruled that the respondent has
failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of
the new rule were present when the trial judge dismissed those criminal
cases.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or
in writing. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional dismissal. Irrefragably, the prosecution
did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal
cases. The respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses.
The Court also agreed with the petitioners' contention that no notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the
victims at least three days before said hearings as mandated by Rule 15,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes
involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or
parties or heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Accordingly, the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was granted and the Court's
Resolution dated August 24, 2001 was set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; 2000 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;

SECTION 8, RULE 117 (PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL); ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF
THE FIRST PARAGRAPH. — [T]he respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution
with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended
party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the
court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions
sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of
the new rule.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED; RATIONALE.
— The raison d' etre for the requirement of the express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in
double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE GIVEN EITHER VIVA VOCE OR IN
WRITING. — Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva
voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on
the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No
objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of
the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or
silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or
his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express
consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional dismissal.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AND FOR EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES IS
NOT TANTAMOUNT TO CONSENT; CASE AT BAR. — In this case, the
respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution
did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal
cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the
decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a
need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have
the prosecution's witnesses summoned before the court for its examination.
The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have
personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest
should be issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued,
the warrant should be recalled by the trial court.HSTCcD
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ON THE PUBLIC

PROSECUTOR WHO HAS CONTROL OF THE PROSECUTION IS NECESSARY. —
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof
without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of
the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN A PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASE MAY BE
REVIVED. — If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods
provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over
his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the
accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such
revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURES FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE PROVISIONALLY
DISMISSED CASES. — The case may be revived by the State within the time-
bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein.
There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a
case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new
witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must
be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A
new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original
accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the
same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an
accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to
submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, "the fiscal is not called by
the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to
prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in
dispensing that justice."
8. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; ADMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE
OF THE PROCEEDINGS ARE BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE ON THE DECLARANT.
— The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact,
in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that: ". . .
An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his
other co-accused in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner
did not pray for the dismissal of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed
for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial determination of probable
cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that
warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in
the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore,
that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. . .
." During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely
declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did
he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof[.] . . . The respondent's
admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals
are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from
repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making
such admissions.
9. ID.; 2000 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROVISIONAL
DISMISSAL; OFFENDED PARTIES OR THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIMS MUST BE
GIVEN ADEQUATE PRIOR NOTICE OF ANY MOTION THEREFOR; NOT
COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The Court also agrees with the
petitioners' contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing
thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said
hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be
borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires
that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given
adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs
of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the
public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or
the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing
or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be
shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the
new rule will become illusory.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Such notice will enable the offended
party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the
collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due
process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional
dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from
detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the
other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide
opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecution's physical and
other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on
the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of
his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment
against his property.
11. ID.; ID.; SECTION 8, RULE 117; NOT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. —
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of
limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a
surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to
prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to
acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not
be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode
only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused
have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability. The periods fixed
under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the
offenses covered.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AKIN TO SPECIAL PROCEDURAL LIMITATION. — [T]he
time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar
an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the
lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is
but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the
accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to
have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the
accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be
charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included
therein. He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses
in any new indictments. The State may revive a criminal case beyond the
one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for
the delay. By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of
the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the
prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby
diminished. DTEcSa
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; HAS SAME EFFECT AS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
— But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute
of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is
basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held: ". . . This, in
effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of
the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be
punished — to be deprived of his liberty — shall cease. Its terms not only
strike down the right of action which the state had acquired by the offense,
but also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the offender's title
to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil
remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and
that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce,
and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute is
aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offender —
the right to punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred, and
declares that this right and this liability are at an end. . . ."
14. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROCEDURAL LAWS MAY BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY. — The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural
laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law
provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is
to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , this Court held that: "Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy,
and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure."
15. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — It further ruled therein that a procedural
law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would
involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the
Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would
produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is
ample basis for avoiding "the injustice of hardship" by a holding of
nonretroactivity.
16. ID.; STATUTES ARE TO BE CONSTRUED IN LIGHT OF THE PURPOSES
TO BE ACHIEVED AND THE EVILS SOUGHT TO BE REMEDIED. — A
construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will
avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious
consequences. This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute
which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided. Time and again, this Court has decreed that
statutes are to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evils sought to be remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. Remedial legislation, or
procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement
the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied
retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the
history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be
remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of
criminal laws in particular. In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods, the
United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining whether
a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards."
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; TIME-BAR FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES; MUST BE RESPECTED UNLESS IT IS
SHOWN THAT THE PERIOD IS SHORT OR INSUFFICIENT THAT THE RULE
BECOMES A DENIAL OF JUSTICE. — In the new rule in question, as now
construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for
the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The
time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused
for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court
believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive
provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to
the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected
unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the
rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest
shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT. — The new rule was conceptualized by
the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en
banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system
and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the
deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases
on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no
time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such
revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases
were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the
public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused
despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite
criminal proceedings. It is almost a universal experience that the accused
welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly
fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb
the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE STATE AND THE
ACCUSED. — The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases
may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may
have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded.
Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may
become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the
lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more
difficult it is to prove the crime. On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere
provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case.
The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or
reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his
family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion
and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his
witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long
run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system. The time-bar under the new
rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and
the accused; not for the accused only.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE WOULD HAVE TWO YEARS FROM DECEMBER
1, 2000 WITHIN WHICH TO REVIVE CASES WHICH WERE PROVISIONALLY
DISMISSED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY THEREOF. — The Court agrees with
the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor
received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal
cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new
rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar
retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is
short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if
the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from
December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the
cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the
time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the
administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30,
1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because
the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could
not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that
the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or
that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under
the new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix
Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People: "We should not indulge in the fiction that the
law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who
did not avail themselves of it waived their rights. . . ."
EHSAaD
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VALID JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT REVIVING THE
CASE BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE IS NOT REQUIRED. — To require the
State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of
a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is
obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect.
This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of
one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive
the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for
not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in
criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State.
As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
i n Snyder v. State of Massachusetts, "the concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." In
Dimatulac v. Villon, this Court emphasized that "the judge's action must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law. This Court further said: "Indeed, for
justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which
have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not
necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-
handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended
party, on the other."
BELLOSILLO, J., separate concurring opinion:
SECTION 8, RULE 117 (PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL); CONCEPT THEREOF
SUBSUMED IN ART. 91 OF REVISED PENAL CODE. — Article 91 of The Revised
Penal Code distinctly speaks of "prescription . . . shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him." It
can readily be seen therefore that the concept of a provisional dismissal is
subsumed in Art. 91 since in a provisional dismissal, proceedings necessarily
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted. Thus, to
construe and apply Sec. 8 in the manner suggested above would undeniably
result in a direct and irreconcilable conflict with Art. 91.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES; NOT DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY AFFECTED BY ANY AGREEMENT OR CONSENT OF PARTIES, MUCH
LESS HELD HOSTAGE TO ANY PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS. — In a provisional
dismissal, the prosecution, the defense and the offended party, in effect,
enter into a tacit agreement for a temporary cessation of hostilities, i.e ., to
momentarily hold in abeyance the prosecution of the accused. Paragraph 1
of Sec. 8 prescribes the requirements thereto: (a) consent of the accused,
and (b) notice to the offended party. It must be remembered however that
permanent dismissal of a case is but an offshoot of its previous provisional
dismissal and the subsequent failure to revive within the time frames set
forth in Sec. 8. But does the permanent dismissal of the case arising from a
provisional dismissal affect the right of the State to prosecute within the
periods provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Certainly not, for the
prescriptive periods prescribed by law cannot be affected directly or
indirectly by any agreement or consent of the parties, much less be held
hostage to any procedural limitations. Verily, in matters of public crimes
which have a direct bearing on public interest, no agreements or personal
arrangements should be brought to bear upon the penal action.
3. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; SUPREME COURT; RULE-
MAKING POWER; COURTS CANNOT BY ACT OF JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
ABRIDGE, AMEND, ALTER OR NULLIFY STATUTES. — Courts cannot — by an
act of judicial legislation — abridge, amend, alter, or nullify statutes. We do
not sit as councils of revision, empowered to judicially reform or fashion
legislation in accordance with our own notions of prudent public policy.
Certainly, lest we are prepared to ride roughshod over this prerogative of
Congress, we cannot interfere with the power of the legislature to surrender,
as an act of grace, the right of the State to prosecute and to declare the
offense no longer subject to prosecution after certain periods of time as
expressed in the statute.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TO UNDULY LIMIT RIGHT OF STATE TO PROSECUTE
CRIMINALS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — The right of the State to prosecute
criminals is a substantive, nay, inherent right. To unduly limit the exercise of
such right for a short period of one (1) or two (2) years through the
expedient of a procedural rule is unconstitutional, considering the limitation
in our fundamental law on the rule-making power of this Court, that is, its
rules must not "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights."
DISMISSAL; DOES NOT HAVE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL. — Another decisive
factor which militates heavily against the foregoing thesis that Art. 91 and
Sec. 8 operate on "different planes," is the fact that the phrase "amounts to
an acquittal," which appeared in the original draft of what is now Sec. 8, Rule
117, was judiciously rejected by the Supreme Court when it approved the
final draft of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure [.] . . . Had the
intention been to confer on Sec. 8 the effect of acquittal, the Court should
have retained the express provision to that effect in the final draft.
Obviously, the conspicuous absence therein of the phrase "amounts to an
acquittal," or its equivalent, forecloses a speculative approach to the
meaning of Sec. 8. Virtually crossed out, such clause cannot now be incised
from the original draft and grafted into the approved draft of the revised
rules, without doing violence to its intent. . . . Indeed, were we to adhere to
the thesis equating permanent dismissal with "finality" and "acquittal," we
would be ascribing meaning to the provision which is not only at war with the
demands of reason but also contrary to the clear intention of the rule. The
disastrous effect of respondent's interpretation of Sec. 8 upon our criminal
justice system is not difficult to imagine. So construed, it would afford an
accused, endowed with a fertile imagination and creativeness, a plethora of
opportunities to rig his prosecution by silencing witnesses and suppressing
evidence then letting the case hibernate for a much shorter period of one (1)
or two (2) years. To be sure, our procedural laws could not have intended to
sanction such a result. "A system of procedure," intoned Justice Cardozo, "is
perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice
without the warrant of a clear necessity."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEVER MEANT TO MODIFY SETTLED PROVISIONS OF LAW
ON PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES. — It must be stressed that Sec. 8 is nothing
more than a rule of procedure. As part of the adjective law, it is only a
means to an end — an aid to substantive law — and should accordingly be
interpreted and applied in that concept. It was never meant to modify the
settled provisions of law on the matter of prescription of offenses; or to
unduly curtail the right of the State to bring offenders before the bar of
justice. These matters are best left to the wisdom and sound judgment of the
legislature.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE OR REGULATORY IN
CHARACTER. — Clearly, the feverishly contested provision is purely
administrative or regulatory in character. The policy embodied therein is
simply to grant the accused momentary relief from administrative
restrictions occasioned by the filing of a criminal case against him. He is
freed in the meantime of the dire consequences of his having been charged
with a crime, and temporarily restored to his immunities as a citizen, solely
for purposes of government clearances. Section 8 imports no intricate nor
ornate legal signification that we need not discern from it a meaning that too
far deviates from what it actually purports to convey.
8. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CONCEPT. — It bears recalling that since
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence on double jeopardy was swept into the shores of
Philippine constitutional and statutory history, our concept of double
jeopardy has faithfully adhered to the pronouncements first made by Kepner
v. United States that ". . . (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former
jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered,
although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a
defective indictment. The protection is not . . . against the peril of second
punishment, but against being tried again for the second offense." The
fundamental philosophy that underlies the finality of an acquittal is the
recognition of the fact that the state with its infinite resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
and expose him to a state of perpetual anxiety and embarrassment as well
as enhancing the possibility that although innocent, he may be found guilty.
EHSCcT
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. — The 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure is explicit in its prescription of the requisites for the invocation of
double jeopardy and the resultant effect thereon on acquittals. . . .
Ensconced in the . . . procedural tenet are the imperatives for invoking
double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a court of
competent jurisdiction; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d)
the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED FROM PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL. — In
contrast, provisional dismissal under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 requires only the
twin requirements of consent of the accused and notice to the offended
party. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed upon the express
application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case
dismissed is a waiver of his constitutional prerogative of double jeopardy as
he, in a manner of speaking, throws a monkey wrench to the judicial process
and prevents the court from rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
Jurisprudence has emphatically enunciated that double jeopardy cannot be
properly invoked where the case was dismissed with the express conformity
of the accused. This much is given as one of the requisites of double
jeopardy, i.e ., where the accused is acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
This assent by the accused to the dismissal is the operative act that
precludes the effects of double jeopardy from setting in, so that despite the
permanency of the dismissal due to the lapse of the periods set forth in Sec.
8 of Rule 117, the refiling of a case under a new information does not
trample upon this venerable doctrine. The permanence of the dismissal
should not be understood as the harbinger of final and absolute liberation of
the accused from future prosecution. It merely augurs the demise of the
unrevived cases but it does not prevent the state from exercising the right to
re-prosecute the accused within the prescriptive period provided in Art. 90 of
t h e Revised Penal Code. With more weighty reason can we not
accommodate respondent in his plea to avail of the graces afforded by the
doctrine since the records would show that he has yet to enter his plea to
the charges or that the trial on the merits has as yet to commence.
11. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; CASES CAN BE REVIVED AND
REFILED. — A survey of jurisprudential antecedents reveal the distinction
between the revival and refiling of a new information. The authorities are
unanimous in their recognition of the fact that a provisionally dismissed case
can be revived as it does not call for the operation of the rule on double
jeopardy and that cases can also be refiled under a new complaint or
information for the same offense.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONCE A CASE IS PERMANENTLY DISMISSED AFTER A
LAPSE OF PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD, THE CASE IS DEAD AND, FOR ALL INTENTS
AND PURPOSES BEYOND RESUSCITATION. — While I agree however that the
filing of Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102—01-101112 is NOT a revival of the
earlier dismissed cases, I wish to emphasize, lest I be misconstrued, that the
"New Informations" in the subsequently refiled cases are new not because
the respondent is charged thereunder as a co-principal, instead of as a mere
accessory, or that the number of the accused has been increased from 26 to
34; rather, the new Informations which are the bases for the prosecution of
the respondent again under the same offense, are new for the singular
reason that they are separate and distinct from those in the previously
dismissed cases. Simply stated, it is not of consequence whether the
allegations in the two (2) sets of Informations are quintessentially identical or
different in form and substance insofar as concerns the right of the state to
prosecute the respondent anew after the provisional dismissal became
permanent. A question may be asked: Suppose that the new information is a
verbatim reproduction of the information in the permanently dismissed case,
can we not now say that the newly filed case is a mere revival of the case
previously dismissed? After all, stripped of semantic finery, their being
identical would lead to the impression, although erroneous, that one is but a
revival of the other. On the surface one may see no apparent difference
between the two (2) sets of Informations, but a subtle yet significant
functional distinction in fact exists. Once a case is permanently dismissed
after the lapse of the prescriptive periods set forth in Sec. 8, the case is dead
and, for all intents and purposes, beyond resuscitation. All the on-going
proceedings and those still to be had, e.g., preliminary investigation,
arraignment, trial, etc., shall cease and be terminated. In the event however
that the accused is prosecuted anew with the same offense, albeit under an
identical information, the previously terminated proceedings will not be
reactivated, the previous case having been set at rest; instead, new
proceedings will be conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh. To
my mind, the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 8, Rule 117 has in its favor the
soundest policy considerations based no less on the fundamental objectives
of procedural rules.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL MUST BE WITH NOTICE TO OFFENDED
PARTY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Incidentally, I find it particularly
disturbing that the Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 were dismissed by the trial judge without complying with one of the
requirements of the first paragraph of Sec. 8, i.e ., the dismissal must be with
notice to the offended party. There is nothing in the records which would
show that all the offended parties were ever notified that the cases against
respondent and his co-accused would be dismissed. Even if we proceed on
the assumption that the filing of affidavits of desistance by the offended
parties may be considered a substantial equivalent of notice, still the
dismissal appears to be procedurally infirm since only seven (7) of the
offended parties representing eight (8) of the eleven (11) victims, executed
affidavits of desistance. No similar affidavits were submitted for the three (3)
remaining victims. Cannot the next of kin of these three (3) remaining
victims, who were not even notified of the provisional dismissal of the cases,
prosecute those responsible for killing them within the prescriptive period
provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Are they now without any
remedy in law if witnesses belatedly surface, they who cowered in fear at the
time because of the positions of power held by those perceived to be
responsible therefor?
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "ISSUANCE"; CONSTRUED. — Significantly also, I
am at a loss as to why the Court of Appeals reckoned the two (2)-year period
from 29 March 1999 as the date of issuance of the resolution of dismissal.
When Sec. 8 speaks of "issuance" it should be construed not with reference
to the date as appearing in the resolution of dismissal but on the date it was
actually delivered to the proper person and received by him. Otherwise, how
would the offended parties know that such resolution was issued as to
reckon with the two (2)-year period after which the provisional dismissal
would be considered permanent?
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE REQUIREMENT TO OFFENDED PARTY AS WELL
AS NOTICE OF DISMISSAL ARE MEANINGFUL AND SIGNIFICANT. — The notice
requirement in the first paragraph of Sec. 8 as well as the notice of the order
of dismissal are by no means trivial formalities; they are meaningful and
significant. The offended parties, seeking justice and vindication for the
wrong done, would naturally be keenly interested in the progress and
outcome of the criminal prosecution. Hence, it is but proper that all of them
be notified of the termination of the cases and given an equal opportunity to
object to the dismissal.
16. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL AND RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; SIMILAR IN
NATURE AND LEGAL EFFECTS. — The right to speedy trial under Sec. 14 and
the right to speedy disposition of cases in Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of the 1987
Constitution, are kindred constitutional norms similar in nature and legal
effects, sharing common operational principles, and subject to the same test
for purposes of determining violations thereof. Thus, the cornerstone of both
rights is to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring
tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial and disposition of
cases.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED INTO SPECIFIED NUMBER
OF DAYS OR MONTHS. — Speedy disposition of cases, like the constitutional
guarantee of speedy trial, is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. Verily, these rights
are more indistinct concepts than other constitutional rights. It is, for
example, impossible to determine with precision when the rights have been
denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where
justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, these rights
cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months. There is no
fixed point in the proceeding when a party may exercise or be deemed to
have waived these rights. Finally, the amorphous quality of the rights
sometimes lead to the drastic remedy of dismissal of a case when the rights
have been infringed. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means
that an accused who may be guilty of a grave offense will go scot-free
without being tried and held responsible therefor. Such a remedy is more
radical than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial.
DcHaET
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED. — At any rate, the framers of the
Constitution recognized the right to speedy disposition of cases distinctly
from the right to speedy trial in criminal cases. It should be noted that Sec.
16 covers all phases before, during and after trial, and extends protection to
all parties in all types of cases: civil, criminal and administrative. In this
respect, it affords a broader protection than Sec. 14 (2) which guarantees
merely the right to a speedy trial in criminal cases.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; TO INCLUDE
PERIOD OF DELAY FROM PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL TO ITS REVIVAL OR
REFILING DOES NOT SEEM TO BE IN CONSONANCE WITH LANGUAGE AND
INTENT OF LAW. — A criminal prosecution has many stages, and delay may
occur during or between any of them. As applied in the instant case, it
appears that the speedy disposition guarantee of the Bill of Rights is
asserted to include the period of delay from the provisional dismissal of the
case to its revival or refiling since "respondent is as much entitled to a
speedy reinvestigation and refiling of the provisionally dismissed cases
against him." Such interpretation, however, does not seem to be in
consonance with the unmistakable language, nor by the obvious intent, of
Sec. 16. The provision speaks of "speedy disposition of cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." It clearly and logically
contemplates a situation wherein there exists an outstanding case,
proceeding or some incident upon which the assertion of the right may be
predicated. Evidently, it would be idle, not to say anomalous, to speak of
"speedy disposition of cases" in the absence of anything to dispose of in the
first place.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE MUST BE A PENDING CASE, PROCEEDING OR
SOME INCIDENT BEFORE IT CAN BE INVOKED. — A review of pertinent
jurisprudence attests abundantly to the indispensable requirement of a
"pending case, proceeding or some incident," as sine qua non before the
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked. . . . [T]he
broad protective cloak of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases becomes available only in instances where preliminary proceedings
have been initiated, or a case has already been filed or any other incident
pertaining thereto already had. As we succinctly stated in Binay v.
Sandiganbayan — "The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or unjustifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried." It goes without saying therefore that the right to
speedy disposition of cases is unavailing in the absence of any proceedings
conducted before, during, or after, trial. Significantly, there is no precedent,
for indeed there is none, to support the novel conclusion that even after the
dismissal of the cases, an accused may still invoke the constitutional
guarantee.
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF ORIGINAL CRIMINAL
CASES, IMMATERIAL. — The provisional nature of the dismissal of the original
criminal cases is quite immaterial. The fact that the cases were dismissed
conditionally or "without prejudice" to the subsequent filing of new cases,
does not make the order of dismissal any less a disposition of the cases.
Although provisional, it nonetheless terminated all proceedings against
respondent such that there remained in the meantime no pending case
which the court could act upon and resolve, and which could be made the
basis for the application of the right to speedy disposition of respondent's
cases.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REINVESTIGATION AND REFILING OF CASES AT
SOME FUTURE TIME ARE NOT BY THEMSELVES "PENDING INCIDENTS
RELATED TO DISMISSED CASES." — Clearly, we would be reinventing the
wheel, so to speak, if we are to include within the protective shield of the
right to speedy disposition of cases the reinvestigation and refiling of the
provisionally dismissed cases. The matter of reinvestigation and refiling of
cases at some future time are not by themselves "pending incidents related
to the dismissed cases"; they are mere possibilities or expectancies. The
State has no definite decision yet on whether to really commence a
reinvestigation and refiling of the cases, and only indicates, at the most, a
probable action at some future time. Until such time that the State decided
to exercise these rights, they cannot ripen into a pending case, proceeding
or incident for purposes of the speedy disposition safeguard. Certainly, the
constitutional pledge mandates merely the swift resolution or termination of
a pending case or proceeding, and not the initiation o r institution of a new
case or proceeding. It has no application to inexistent proceedings but only
to those currently being undertaken. Were we to hold otherwise, we would in
effect be granting to every accused an unbridled license to impose his will
upon the State and demand that he be immediately reinvestigated and a
case filed against him. The determination of whether to file or when to file a
case lies within the sole discretion of the prosecution depending upon the
availability of his evidence and provided that it is filed within the prescriptive
period.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTACHED ONLY AT PRECISE MOMENT
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSTITUTED PANEL OF PROSECUTORS AND
CONDUCTED NEW PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT
BAR. — [R]espondent's right to speedy disposition of his criminal cases
attached only at that precise moment the Department of Justice constituted
a panel of prosecutors and conducted a new preliminary investigation. Even
then, the conduct of the prosecutors cannot be assailed as violative of the
speedy disposition guarantee. As shown by the records, the government can
hardly be accused of foot-dragging for, in fact, they lost no time in
commencing the new preliminary investigation and thereafter filing the
corresponding Informations in court upon the appearance of new witnesses
against respondent and his co-accused. The expeditious action of the
government in the instant case certainly cannot be viewed with suspicion. In
fairness to petitioners, they cannot be faulted in demonstrating alacrity in
performing their mandate, nor can they be castigated for the so-called
"unusual haste" in reopening the cases against respondent. No impure
motive should be imputed to them other than the fact that they regularly
performed their duty in their apparent desire to unravel the Kuratong
Baleleng mystery. For the petitioners, this is a classic case of "damn-if-you-
do-and-damn-if-you-don't" situation. Petitioners are being put to task for
their alleged negligence and delay in reviving the cases, but then again,
they are also being pilloried for persecuting the respondent because of the
supposed "unusual haste" and "uncharacteristic vigor" in pursuing the
criminal cases against him and his co-accused. For the reasons stated, I
decline to extend to respondent the protection guaranteed by Sec. 16. Plain
common sense dictates that the provision cannot be applied to situations not
contemplated by it. Verily, we cannot expand the letter and spirit of the
provision and read into it a meaning that is not there.
24. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES; ELUCIDATED. — [T]here
are other constitutional and statutory mechanisms to guard against possible
and actual prejudice to the accused, resulting from the passage of time.
Primarily, the statute of limitations under Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code
is the principal safeguard against prosecuting overly stale criminal charges.
The statute represents legislative assessments of relative interests of the
State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; it protects
not only the accused from prejudice to his defense, but also balances his
interest in repose against society's interest in the apprehension and
punishment of criminals. This statute provides predictability by specifying a
limit beyond which there is an irrefutable presumption that the rights of an
accused to a fair trial would be prejudiced.
25. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — The purpose of a statute of limitations is to
limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time
following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish
by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals
from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may
have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger
of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time
limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement
officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.
26. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE; PROTECTS DEFENDANTS AGAINST UNFAIR TREATMENT BY
GOVERNMENT IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. — The sweeping command of the
Due Process Clause always protects defendants against fundamentally unfair
treatment by the government in criminal proceedings. Procedural fairness
required by due process decrees the dismissal of an indictment if it be
shown that delay caused substantial prejudice to the rights of an accused to
a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical
advantage over the accused. cAISTC
27. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; FOUR-

FACTOR BALANCING TEST. — In Caballero v. Alfonso we adopted a four-
factor Balancing Test to determine whether an accused has been denied the
constitutional right to speedy disposition of his case, i.e ., (a) length of the
delay, (b) reason for the delay, (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it,
and, (d) prejudice caused by the delay.
28. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIBES FLEXIBLE STANDARDS. — With
these relevant factors, the otherwise abstract concept of speedy disposition
of cases is provided with at least a modicum of structure. The Balancing Test,
in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are considered,
prescribes flexible standards based on practical considerations. It
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy disposition cases on an ad
hoc basis. No single factor in the Balancing Test is definitive because all four
(4) must be weighed against the others in determining whether a violation of
the right to speedy disposition of cases occurred. In other words, these
factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult
and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a
fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out in full
recognition of the accused's interest in the speedy disposition of his case as
specifically affirmed in the Constitution.
29. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LENGTH OF DELAY; TWO YEARS AND THREE
MONTHS LAG BETWEEN PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF FIRST CRIMINAL CASES
AND FILING OF NEW INFORMATIONS SKETCHES BELOW BARE MINIMUM
NEEDED TO PROVOKE SUCH INQUIRY; CASE AT BAR. — I proceed to consider
the four (4) factors in the Balancing Test in seriatim. The length of delay is to
some extent a triggering mechanism. Until it is shown that the delay has
crossed the threshold dividing ordinary delay from presumptively prejudicial
delay, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the
balance. Considering the serious nature of the charges against respondent,
and more importantly, the criminal cases sought to be filed being deeply
impressed with public interest, involving as they do high ranking police
officers, I am of the view that the claimed two (2) years and three (3) months
lag between the provisional dismissal of the first criminal cases on 29 March
1999 and the filing of new Informations on 6 June 2001 sketches below the
bare minimum needed to provoke such an inquiry. At any rate, I will assume,
without conceding, that it is sufficiently long for purposes of triggering a full
analysis under the three (3) remaining factors.
30. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS FOR DELAY; DIFFERENT WEIGHTS
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO DIFFERENT REASONS. — The banner the litigants
seek to capture is the second factor — the reason the government assigns to
justify the delay. Here too, different weights should be assigned to different
reasons. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighed less heavily. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay.
31. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT MAY DELAY FOR VARIETY OF
REASONS. — The government may delay for a variety of reasons such as to
gain time in which to strengthen and document its case. The government
may also delay, not with the view of ensuring conviction of the accused, but
because the government lacks sufficient resources to move quickly. The
species of governmental delay that are anathema to the right to speedy
disposition of cases are those which are purposely or negligently employed
to harm or gain impermissible advantage over the accused at the trial. The
reason is that, in such circumstance, the fair administration of justice is
imperiled. . . . Neither can we safely conclude that the public prosecutors are
guilty of negligent omission. Insufficiency of evidence is a legitimate reason
for delay. The government is naturally not expected to go forward with the
trial and incur costs unless it is convinced it has an iron-clad case to make a
worthwhile indictment. Verily, it needs time to gather evidence, track down
and collect witnesses, as well as document its case. As to how much time it
needs depends on such other factors as the availability of witnesses and
resources to enable it to move quickly. In U.S. v. Lovasco it was held — ". . .
investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the
Government solely "to gain tactical advantage over the accused," precisely
because investigative delay is not so one-sided. Rather than deviating from
elementary standards of "fair play and decency," a prosecutor abides by
them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that
he should prosecute and will be able to promptly to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for these reasons
would subordinate the goal of "orderly expedition" to that of "mere speed."
32. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In
the present recourse, there is nothing to demonstrate that the delay in
reviving the cases against respondent was deliberately availed of for an
impermissible purpose. It was not explained what improper tactical
advantage was gained or sought by the government; nor can I discern any
such advantage from the records. To be sure, if as claimed by respondent
this whole mess is nothing more than a pure and simple political vendetta,
carried out by a possè bent on lynching him politically and personally —
which I am not inclined to acknowledge at this stage — the government
could have moved against respondent with deliberate haste, for delay is not
exactly to its best interest.
33. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNAVAILABILITY OF WITNESSES FOR
PROSECUTION MAY BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO CONVENTIONAL TENDENCY OF
PEOPLE NEVER TO ANTAGONIZE THE POWERFUL AND INFLUENTIAL. — In no
mean measure, the many constitutional and procedural safeguards provided
an accused can also present obstacles. It is doubly difficult in this particular
case considering the recantation and disappearance of all available vital
witnesses for the prosecution. If we were to turn the tables against the
respondent, we say that the unavailability of the witnesses for the
prosecution may be attributed to the conventional tendency of our people
never to antagonize the powerful and the influential. We are not insinuating
that respondent had a hand in the recantation or desistance of the
complainants, or the non-appearance or the shortage of witnesses for the
prosecution; what we are simply saying is that accusing an individual of
respondent's stature naturally engenders fear of physical harm, real or
imagined, and can intimidate even the most stout-hearted and temerarious
individuals. This circumstance should have been given weight in resolving
the present controversy.
34. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AND HOW DEFENDANT ASSERTS HIS
RIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN STRONG EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT. — The third factor
— the extent to which respondent has asserted his right to speedy
disposition of his case — further weakens his position. When and how a
defendant asserts his right should be given strong evidentiary weight in
determining whether the accused is being deprived of the right. The more
serious the deprivation, the more likely an accused is to complain. But the
failure to invoke the right will make it difficult for an accused to prove that
he was denied thereof.
35. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURAL FOR ACCUSED TO EXERT EVERY
EFFORT WITHIN HIS CAPACITY TO RESIST PROSECUTION. — I do not think
that the vigor with which respondent defended himself in the original cases
against him, and the vigilance with which he assailed the filing of the new
Informations now subject of the instant petition, is the equivalent to an
assertion of his right to speedy disposition. The trouble with this observation
is that every accused in a criminal case has the intense desire to seek
acquittal, or at least to see the swift end of the accusation against him. To
this end, it is natural for him to exert every effort within his capacity to resist
prosecution. But is it correct to assume that, in every instance, the accused
in resisting his criminal prosecution is also asserting his right to speedy
disposition?
36. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT'S TARDY, INEXPLICIT AND
VAGUE INVOCATION OF RIGHT MAKES IT SERIOUSLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO
PROVE DENIAL THEREOF. — Respondent's reliance on Sec. 8, Rule 117, of
t h e 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which some have said is
based on the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, cannot be
equated with a positive assertion of the right to speedy disposition. A perusal
of the records would reveal that the issue of applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117,
was raised by respondent for the first time before the Court of Appeals, in his
Second Amended Petition — undoubtedly a mere afterthought. It was not his
original position before the trial court, which centered on the "lack of valid
'complaints' to justify a preliminary investigation of cases which had long
been dismissed." It was not even his initial position in the early stages of the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Within the context of the Balancing
Test, respondent's tardy, inexplicit and vague invocation of this right makes
it seriously difficult for him to prove the denial thereof.
STHDAc
37. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PREJUDICE SHOULD BE ASSESSED IN LIGHT OF
INTERESTS OF ACCUSED. — Finally, the fourth factor is prejudice to the
accused. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests
of accused which the speedy disposition right as well as the speedy trial
right are designed to protect. There are three (3) of such interests: (a) to
prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (b) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and, (c) to limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired. Of the three (3), the most significant is the last because the
inability of the defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system.
38. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ANXIETY TYPICALLY ACCOMPANIES
CRIMINAL CHARGE. — Concededly, anxiety typically accompanies a criminal
charge. But not every claim of anxiety affords the accused a ground to decry
a violation of the rights to speedy disposition of cases and to speedy trial.
The anxiety must be of such nature and degree that it becomes oppressive,
unnecessary and notoriously disproportionate to the nature of the criminal
charge. To illustrate, a prosecution for the serious crime of multiple murder
naturally generates greater degree of anxiety, than an indictment for, say,
simple estafa. The anxiety and the tarnished "reputation and image of
respondent who is, after all, presently and newly elected member of the
Senate," does not amount to that degree that would justify a nullification of
the appropriate and regular steps that must be taken to assure that while
the innocent should go unpunished, those guilty must expiate for their
offense. Verily, they pale in importance to the gravity of the charges and the
paramount considerations of seeking justice for the victims as well as
redeeming the sullied integrity and reputation of the Philippine National
Police for their alleged involvement in the perpetration of the ghastly crimes.
39. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELAY SIMPLY DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE SEVERE
REMEDY OF DISMISSING INDICTMENTS. — We cannot therefore hold, on the
facts before us, that the delay in the reinvestigation and refiling of the
criminal cases weighed sufficiently in support of the view that respondent's
right to speedy disposition of his cases has been violated. The delay simply
does not justify the severe remedy of dismissing the indictments.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:

SECTION 8, RULE 117 (PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL); A FINE BALANCE BETWEEN
THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROSECUTE CRIMES AND THE
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PROTECTED FROM THE UNNECESSARY
BURDENS OF CRIMINAL LITIGATION. — It was this undesirable situation that
the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court addressed when it designed
Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Court en banc found no difficulty appreciating the rationale of the new rule
for it approved the rule with but a minor amendment. The amendment
lengthened the time within which the prosecution can revive the
provisionally dismissed case in offenses punishable by more than six (6)
years of imprisonment. The time to revive was stretched to two (2) years
after a survey was made of offenses punishable by imprisonment of six (6)
years or more and a study of its probable adverse impact on the government
campaign against crimes. In promulgating the new rule, the Court en banc
struck a fine balance between the sovereign right of the State to prosecute
crimes and the inherent right of the accused to be protected from the
unnecessary burdens of criminal litigation. The timeline within which
provisionally dismissed cases can be revived forms the crux of the delicate
balance.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GIVES AN ACCUSED A NEW RIGHT DISTINCT FROM THE
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. —
Section 8, Rule 117 is a rule that gives an accused a new right that is distinct
from, among others, the right to speedy trial and the right against double
jeopardy. The resistance to recognize this new right and the effort to
unnecessarily link it with other rights of the accused are the main causes of
its misunderstanding. Thus, Section 8, Rule 117 should not be confused with
Rule 119 which is the rule of procedure that implements the constitutional
right of an accused to speedy trial. The confusion can obliterate the
difference in the time requirements in the two rules. The right to speedy trial
is determined by a flexible time standard. We resolve claims of denial of the
right to speedy trial by balancing the following factors: (1) the duration of
the delay, (2) the reason thereof, (3) the assertion of the right or failure to
assert it by the accused, and (4) the prejudice caused by such delay. On the
other hand, the timeline that restricts the right of the State to revive a case
in a Section 8, Rule 117 situation is inflexible if it is shown that it has slept
on its right without reason. Section 8, Rule 117 should not also be confused
with Section 3(i), Rule 117 which is the rule of procedure that protects the
constitutional right of an accused against double jeopardy. Again, the two
rules are distinct, hence, it is not proper to require the element of prior plea
in double jeopardy cases in a Section 8, Rule 117 situation. In fine, Section 8,
Rule 117 is a new rule that is complete by itself and should not be construed
in light of rules implementing other rights of an accused.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; BECOMES PERMANENT AFTER THE LAPSE OF ONE OR
TWO YEARS DEPENDING ON THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE INVOLVED. —
The provisional dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 117 becomes permanent
after the lapse of one or two years depending on the gravity of the offense
involved. There can be no hedging on the meaning of the word permanent
for the new rule used the word without a bit of embroidery. To be emphatic,
the lapse of the one (1) or two (2) years time puts a period to the
provisionally dismissed case and not a mere comma. It is true that during
the deliberations of the Committee, the provision was originally worded as
follows: "The corresponding order shall state that the provisional dismissal
shall become permanent and amount to acquittal one (1) year after its
issuance without the case having been revived." In the final version of the
provision, however, the phrase "amount to acquittal" was deleted. The
deletion was dictated by the belief that the phrase was a redundancy in light
of the clear and unequivocal import of the word "permanent." The deletion
cannot be distorted to mean that a case permanently dismissed can still be
revived. For if that were the intent, the rule could have easily stated that the
accused whose case has been permanently dismissed could nevertheless be
prosecuted for the same offense.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERELY REGULATES THE CONDUCT OF THE
PROSECUTION OF AN OFFENSE ONCE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT. — The
permanent dismissal of an unrevived case under Section 8, Rule 117 does
not unduly shorten the prescriptive period of offenses provided for in Articles
90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The new rule merely regulates the
conduct of the prosecution of an offense once the case is filed in court . It
cannot be doubted that after a case is filed in court, its conduct by the
prosecution can be regulated by rules of procedure which are within the
exclusive power of this Court to promulgate. More specifically, the new rule
regulates the time when the State must complete the prosecution of a
pending case after its provisional dismissal. It provides the consequence
when the State sleeps on its duty to revive a provisionally dismissed case. If
the State loses the right to continue the prosecution of an offense already
filed in court, it is not because the rule has amended the prescriptive period
of the crime provided by our substantive law. Rather, it is a simple case
where the State forfeited its right to prosecute by its own inaction, an
inaction that unless justified cannot be allowed to further impair the rights of
an accused .
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERMANENT DISMISSAL PRECLUDES THE PROSECUTION
OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE UNDER A NEW INFORMATION. —
The permanent dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 precludes the
prosecution of the accused for the same offense under a new information.
Again, it is true that we have rulings to the effect that a trial court may, in
the interest of justice, dismiss a case provisionally but without prejudice to
reinstating it before the order of dismissal becomes final or without prejudice
to the subsequent filing of a new information for the same offense. But note
should be taken of the important fact that these rulings were handed down
before Section 8, Rule 117 came into being. Section 8, Rule 117 changed the
old rule that dismissals which are provisional in character lack the
imprimatur of finality, hence, they do not bar the revival of the offense
charged or the filing of a new information for the same offense. The old rule
was precisely jettisoned by the Committee and by this Court because of its
unfairness to the accused. Again, I respectfully submit that the new rule
would be useless if it would leave unfettered the discretion of the prosecutor
in reviving the same offense under the fig leaf of a new information.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITS THE REVIVAL OF THE CASE AGAINST AN
ACCUSED WHICH HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE OF
THE STATE TO CONTINUE ITS PROSECUTION. — I respectfully submit that the
test to determine whether a case can be revived is not whether a new
preliminary investigation has been conducted by the prosecution. That test,
if allowed, would torture out of context the intent of Section 8, Rule 117. The
new rule speaks of "case" and "offenses." It clearly prohibits the revival of
the case against an accused which has been provisionally dismissed for
failure of the State to continue its prosecution without any justification. I like
to underscore that the prohibition against revival is not a free gift by the
State to an accused. The right against revival is the result of a trade-off of
valuable rights for the accused can exercise it only if he surrenders his right
to an early permanent dismissal of the case against him due to the inability
of the State to prosecute. In so doing, the accused suffers a detriment for he
gives the State one to two years to revive a case which has already been
frozen for failure to prosecute. During this waiting period, the accused
cannot move to dismiss the charge against him while the State can locate its
missing witnesses, secure them if they are threatened and even gather new
evidence. In exchange for this period of grace given to the State, the rule
sets a timeline for the prosecutors to revive the case against the accused.
The timeline is fixed for the accused has suffered an indubitable detriment
and the trade-off for this detriment is the duty imposed on the prosecution
either to continue or discontinue with the case within the 1 or 2-year grace
period. We cannot allow the undue extension of this detriment unless the
State can show compelling reasons to justify its failure to prosecute. The
open-ended practice under the old rule which makes provisional dismissal
permanently provisional is precisely the evil sought to be extirpated by
Section 8, Rule 117. THCASc
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REFILING OF CASE HAS SAME EFFECT WITH REVIVAL
OF CASE. — I do not share the thesis that the re-filing of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 is not a revival of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689. There cannot be any dispute on the meaning of the
word revival in Section 8, Rule 117. Revival means reanimating or renewing
the case that has become dormant because of its provisional dismissal. The
cases that were provisionally dismissed for lack of probable cause refer to
the eleven (11) Informations for murder filed against the respondent, et al.,
allegedly for the summary execution of some members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang. Without doubt, these are the same cases re-filed against the
respondent after another preliminary investigation with the principal
difference that respondent is now charged as a principal and no longer as an
accessory.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE BURDENS OF
ACCUSATIONS AND LITIGATION. — The new rule does enhance the
constitutional rights of an accused to speedy trial and speedy disposition of
the case(s) against him but it is much more than that. More broadly, the new
rule was designed to achieve one of the end-goals of the criminal process —
to minimize the burdens of accusation and litigation. . . . This end-goal is by
no means novel. We have various rules of criminal procedure to minimize
the burdens of litigation. Our rules on bail, venue, double jeopardy, speedy
trial, speedy disposition of cases, etc., are among them. In fine, we have
been promulgating rules to minimize the burdens of litigation for a long, long
time.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROMULGATED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE EXPANDED
RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT. — Let me also underscore
that Section 8, Rule 117 was promulgated in the exercise of the expanded
power of this Court to enact rules of procedure under Section 5(5) of the
1987 Constitution[.] . . . This provision expanded the rule-making power of
this Court for (1) it extended its power not only to cover pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar but also to encompass the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights and legal assistance to the underprivileged, and (2) it
no longer contained the restriction that said rules "may be repealed, altered
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa." As aforediscussed, Section 8,
Rule 117 was designed to diminish the burdens of litigation by fixing a
timeline on provisional dismissal of cases beyond which they cannot be
revived. The regulation of the conduct of a criminal case once filed in court,
including the time within which it must be terminated, is inherent in judicial
power . Section 8, Rule 117 is an exercise of this power, a power that this
Court has exercised without any question since the 1935 Constitution.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPRESS CONSENT; MOTION FOR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE TREATED AS A MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE. — In ruling that the dismissal of
the cases against respondent Lacson did not bear his consent, the ponencia
states that ". . . respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination
of probable cause . . . ." It emphasizes that no motion for provisional
dismissal of the cases was filed. With due respect, the effort to distinguish
the two motions is futile for it is seeking a distinction when there is no
difference. The essence of both motions is the lack of probable cause of the
Informations. If the motions succeed, there is only one course of action for
the judge to take — to dismiss the Informations. For all intents and purposes,
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause can be treated as a
motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.
11. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL BY OPERATION OF OUR RULES;
CASE AT BAR. — To justify his ruling, the ponente insists that "respondent
did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the case." With due respect, the
specific prayer demanded by the ponente is unnecessary. Under Rule 112,
Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge may
"immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause." Likewise, the motion for judicial determination of
probable cause prayed for "other equitable reliefs." Similarly, there need not
be any agreement on the provisional character of the dismissal of the said
cases. The cases were dismissed not on the merits but for lack of probable
cause and before the arraignment of respondent Lacson. Their dismissal was
provisional by operation of our rules.
12. ID.; ID.; ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR
LAWS AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES. — The
ponencia then cites certain judicial "admissions" by the counsel of
respondent Lacson to the effect that they did not move to dismiss the
Informations against said respondent nor agree to their provisional dismissal.
Again with due respect, these so called "admissions" should be taken in their
proper context. These "admissions" were made in the course of the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals. The parties then were arguing that
the re-filing of the cases will violate the rule on double jeopardy. Naturally,
respondent Lacson took the position that his right against double jeopardy
would be violated, hence, he was insisting that the dismissal of the cases
was without his express consent. Naturally too, the petitioner took the
opposite view that the rule on double jeopardy would not be breached
because respondent consented to their dismissal. If the ponencia will hold
respondent Lacson to his "admission" that he did not consent to the
dismissal of his cases, it should similarly hold petitioner to its "admission"
that respondent consented to the dismissal of the cases against him. In
truth, the evidentiary rule on admission governs the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact and should not be applied on
arguments of parties. The issue in the case at bar is the nature and effect of
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause — i.e., whether or not
it can be treated by a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of probable
cause. The issue is basically legal, and should be resolved in accordance
with our laws and not on the basis of the arguments of parties which are
often twisted to serve their peculiar interests.
13. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; OFFENDED PARTIES MAY HAVE
KNOWLEDGE DESPITE LACK OF FORMAL NOTICE FROM THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PROSECUTORS. — The ponencia cites the records of the cases to
justify its conclusion that notices were not sent to the offended parties. I
cannot be as dogmatic as the ponente. As stated in our Resolution, Section
8, Rule 117 was not yet in existence when then Judge Agnir, Jr. resolved
respondent Lacson's motion for judicial determination of probable cause. It
is, therefore, unrealistic to look only at the records of the cases to determine
compliance with yet an inexistent rule. To my mind, what ought to be done
is to determine whether the offended parties had knowledge of respondent
Lacson's motion for judicial determination of probable cause. They may have
such knowledge despite lack of formal notice from the court or notice from
the public and private prosecutors. It ought to be beyond argument that
such a formal notice is only one source of knowledge of the offended parties.
Moreover, there is the unresolved question of who are the "offended" parties
in the case at bar. It will be noted that in some of the criminal cases
dismissed by then Judge Agnir, Jr., those who executed affidavits of
desistance were the wives, or the mothers of the victims. Are they the only
"offended" parties or should the other "heirs" be included? Should all of
them be notified? These and other questions should first be resolved by the
trial court, hence, our resolution to remand.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL PROCEDURAL RULE QUALIFYING THE RIGHT
OF THE STATE TO PROSECUTE CASES ALREADY FILED IN COURT. — The
ponencia correctly holds that Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not a statute of limitations. As postulated in the precis,
the one-year or two-year bar is a special procedural rule qualifying the right
of the State to prosecute cases already filed in court. The time-bar under the
new rule does not curtail the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. The State retains the full period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code within which to secure the necessary evidence and file the appropriate
criminal cases against the accused. But once the State files a criminal case
and involves the courts, the constitutional power of this Court to set the rules
of procedure for the prosecution of cases cannot be doubted. The power
belongs to this Court alone and there are no uncertain umbras and
penumbras in its parameters which other branches of the government can
claim. TDAcCa
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIME-BAR FOR THE REVIVAL OF PROVISIONALLY

DISMISSED CASES, PURPOSE. — To emphasize, the time-bar for the revival of
provisionally dismissed cases was adopted for the purpose, among others, of
(1) discouraging hasty and baseless filing of criminal cases; and (2)
penalizing the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already
filed in court.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE HAS RIGHT TO PRESENT COMPELLING
REASONS TO JUSTIFY THE REVIVAL OF THE CASE BEYOND THE PRESCRIBED
PERIOD. — The non-revival of provisionally dismissed cases after the lapse of
the one-year or two-year period creates a disputable presumption of
inexcusable delay on the part of the State in prosecuting the case. But this
does not mean that the mere passage of the one-year or two-year period
bars the State from reviving the provisionally dismissed cases. The State has
the right to present compelling reasons to justify the revival of the cases
beyond the one-year or two-year time bar. The reservation of this right
should remove any charge of unfairness to the State.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENDED TO APPLY TO ALL PROVISIONALLY
DISMISSED CASES BEFORE ITS PASSAGE. — Jurisprudence that has resisted
the tempest of time teaches us that statutes and rules should be construed
in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. The unerring principle that ought to guide any attempt to
construe them should be their intended scope and purpose. In the case at
bar, it is crystal clear that the new rule is intended to apply to all
provisionally dismissed cases before its passage. It is a remedial measure to
check the continuing inaction on the part of the State to prosecute pending
cases in court. Its purpose is to press the State to act on cases it has
inexcusably put in deep slumber in our courts of justice. It provides relief to
the accused who are prejudiced when the cases filed in court against them
remain dormant for an unreasonable length of time. In fine, the new rule is a
remedial rule that looks back even as it looks forward. It reaches both the
past and the future. It is both retrospective and prospective. To be sure,
there is nothing novel in the new rule when it reaches the past. Under the
ruling case law, statutes regulating the procedure of courts are applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. The
retroactive application of procedural rules cannot be challenged as violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor give rise
from, procedural laws. The only conceivable exception to this general rule is
if the retroactive application of the procedural rule "would not be feasible or
would work injustice".
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; WILL NOT IMPAIR THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO
PROSECUTE CRIMINALS. — [T]he new rule will not impair the right of the
State to prosecute criminals. The State is not prejudiced by the time-bar if it
can justify its delay in the prosecution of cases. If it cannot justify its delay, it
cannot complain of unfairness. No government can claim the right to
prosecute at its perpetual pleasure. It cannot file a criminal case and sleep
on it. It is self-evident that inexcusable delays in the prosecution of a case
deny an accused the right to a fair trial.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADDRESSES INEXCUSABLE DELAYS IN THE
PROSECUTION OF CASES ALREADY FILED IN COURT. — To hold that the State
could not be faulted for not reviving the case within two years simply
because the new rule was not yet in effect implies that this Court sanctions
delays in the prosecution of cases, however inexcusable the delays were.
Pushed to the extreme, the majority in effect bars the application of the new
rule to cases provisionally dismissed five or ten years ago on the simple
reason that during the interregnum, the new rule was not yet in effect. Let
us not half pause in applying the new rule for it addresses inexcusable
delays in the prosecution of cases already filed in court. Devoid of legalese,
it tells the State not to sleep on its job. If we cannot tell the prosecution to do
its job within a reasonable time frame, we might as well close shop.
VITUG, J., separate dissenting opinion:

PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS GOVERN THE
INSTITUTION OF THE CASE, THE PROCEDURAL RULES STEP IN THEREAFTER.
— Once a criminal case is instituted, the issue on prescription is addressed
and the rule on prescription as a substantive provision would have then so
served its purpose. Thenceforth, assuming the timely filing of the case, the
rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court must govern. In fine,
while Article 90 and Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fix the period when
the State must file a case against an accused after the discovery of the
crime by the offended party, Section 8, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, however, applies once an action has been instituted. The
substantive provisions govern the institution of the case; the procedural
rules step in thereafter. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution
with the power to "promulgate rules concerning . . . pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts." The 1987 Charter not only has deleted the authority
of the legislature to repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated by the
Court but it also expanded the Court's rule-making power to cover the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. Pursuant to this
Constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has incorporated Section 8, Rule
117, in the Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]
2. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES; EXPLAINED. —
Prescription of crimes pertains to the loss or waiver by the State of its right
to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. It is the policy of the law
that prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing that
promptitude should be maintained, these provisions being not merely acts
of grace but checks imposed by the State upon itself "to exact vigilant
activity from its subalterns and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence
that can be obtained."
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES CANNOT BE

EFFECTIVE TO PLACE ANY LIMITATION ON A PERSON'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT. — Statutes cannot be effective to place any limitation on a person's
constitutional right, and therefore they should not be regarded as a
definition of the constitutional provision. It is thus conceivable that the
constitutional provision is violated although its implementing statute is not.
This is because constitutions are not adopted to control the rights and
procedures of the moment but to establish broad principles of justice and
fair play for all time.
SPEEDY TRIAL; AIMED TO EXPEDITE NOT ONLY THE TRIAL STAGE BUT ALSO
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ITSELF. — Speedy trial is said to constitute
not a privilege, but a right, one that is recognized as fundamental. It is one
of the most basic and inviolable rights. Thus, enshrined in our Constitution is
the mandate that "in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy trial." To expedite not only the trial stage but also the
disposition of the case itself, the framers of our Constitution saw a need to
further provide that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW AND RULES RELATED THERETO. — The crusade
towards a speedy justice did not stop in the Constitution. To supplement it
and to render its guarantee more effective, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) which aims to ensure a speedy trial of
all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. For its part, this
Court promulgated Circular No. 39-98 for the purpose of implementing the
provisions of RA 8493. And when the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure was drafted, substantial portions of RA 8493 and Circular No. 39-
98 were included therein[.] . . . And still, to achieve speedy trial and speedy
disposition of cases, this Court promulgated Section 8, Rule 117. AcICTS
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE CONSTRUED FAIRLY IN VIEW OF THE
RIGHT THEY SEEK TO ENFORCE. — The foregoing laws and rules are merely
tools to enforce the constitutional guarantee. They do not constitute its
"definition." It bears reiterating that just because Section 8, Rule 117 is
found to be inapplicable does not ipso facto indicate that there is no
violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. The
laws and rules, which are just legislative construction or application of the
pervasive constitutional guarantee must be construed fairly in view of the
right they seek to enforce. They cannot be considered to have a limiting
effect on the constitutional guarantee. Significantly, the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is not silent on the matter. Section 10, Rule 119
specifically states: "SEC. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on
speedy trial in the Constitution. — No provision of law on speedy trial and no
rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of
denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by Section 14 (2), Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATED ONLY WHEN THERE IS AN
UNREASONABLE, VEXATIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE DELAY WITHOUT THE
PARTICIPATION OR FAULT OF THE ACCUSED. — Ultimately, whether the
constitutional guarantee of speedy trial has been complied with is still a
judicial question to be answered in the light of the circumstances of each
particular case and guided by the principle that the proceedings were free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Our case law is rich with
doctrines setting the parameters of the right to speedy trial and the right to
speedy disposition of cases. In the recent case of People vs. Leviste, we
reiterated our ruling that the right to speedy trial is violated only where
there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay without the
participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are
sought which prolong the trial for unreasonable length of time.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND RIGHT TO SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF CASES; GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY
THEREOF. — [I]n Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr. we laid down the guidelines in
determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula. There, we
held that speedy disposition of cases is a relative term. Just like the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a
flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. Years of serious
deliberation yield certain factors to be considered in the determination of
whether or not the right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases has
been violated. These are: 1) length of delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and 4) prejudice caused by the
delay. These factors are effective in balancing the interest of the State and
the accused.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; IT WOULD BE LUDICROUS FOR
THE ACCUSED TO ASK FOR THE TRIAL OF HIS CASES WHEN THE SAME HAD
ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED. — While we have ruled that if an accused wants
to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for
the dismissal, but for the trial of the case, however, the same cannot be
expected of respondent. It would be ludicrous for him to ask for the trial of
his cases when the same had already been dismissed. During the interval,
there were no incidents that would prompt him to invoke the right. Indeed,
the delay could only be attributed to the inaction on the part of the
investigating officials.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ANXIETY BROUGHT BY PUBLIC PROSECUTION DOES
NOT DISAPPEAR SIMPLY BECAUSE THE INITIAL CHARGES ARE TEMPORARILY
DISMISSED. — Neither can petitioners argue that the right to speedy trial is
inapplicable since the charges have been dismissed. As explained by Justice
Marshall, the anxiety brought by public prosecution does not disappear
simply because the initial charges are temporarily dismissed. After all, the
government has revealed the seriousness of its threat of prosecution by
initially bringing charges. Consequently, when the government has already
investigated and charged an accused, it is in a much better position and
properly shoulders a greater responsibility to reinvestigate and re-prosecute
him with reasonable promptness. . . . In Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, we
upheld the accused's right to speedy disposition of his case notwithstanding
his alleged failure to take any step to assert his right, thus: "We cannot
accept the Special Prosecutor's ratiocination. It is the duty of the prosecutor
to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes
directly attributable to him."
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE PASSAGE OF TIME IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH A DENIAL THEREOF. — Generally, the question of how much
lapse of time is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial
and speedy disposition of cases varies with the particular circumstances.
There is no constitutional basis for holding that the right to a speedy trial can
be quantified into a specified number of days and months. The mere
passage of time is not sufficient to establish a denial of a right to a speedy
trial, but a lengthy delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, triggers the
examination of other factors to determine whether rights have been
violated. In a case, it has been held that a delay of more than one (1) year is
presumptively prejudicial and shifts the burden to the government to justify
the delay. Certainly, the two-year delay here is prejudicial to respondent and
it should be taken against petitioners, they having failed to show any good
cause or reason for such delay.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND RIGHT TO SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF CASES; PREJUDICE TO THE ACCUSED INCLUDES ANXIETY
AND STIGMA; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Another factor to be considered
in determining whether respondent's right to a speedy trial and disposition of
cases has been violated is the prejudice to him. . . . There is no denying that
the filing of new Informations against respondent had caused him undue
prejudice. Almost eight (8) years have elapsed since November 21, 1995, the
date the original Informations were filed, and more than three (3) years have
passed since Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 were dismissed on
March 29, 1999. It is therefore reasonable for respondent to expect that by
this time, petitioners would finally give him peace of mind. In Licaros vs.
Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the delay in the disposition of the case had
caused "much prejudice, distress and anxiety to petitioner whose career as
bank executive and businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled
to an unresolved criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles'
sword over his head for more than a decade." There, we stressed the
consequences and problems inherent in protracted litigation which include,
among others, the stagnant professional growth, hampered travel
opportunities and a besmirched reputation. It cannot be said that respondent
does not suffer the same consequences now. Prejudice does not only consist
of impairment of the accused's ability to defend himself, it may also include
other sufferings, such as anxiety and stigma. Respondent is not an ordinary
citizen. He is a Senator who has a reputation to protect. The publicity caused
by the refiling of new Informations undoubtedly tainted his name. Moreover,
he has to defend himself constantly from the nagging accusations that
interfere in the performance of his duties as a Senator.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES; COURT CANNOT TOLERATE THE REFILING OF NEW
INFORMATIONS AT THE IMPULSE OF THE OFFICIALS IN COMMAND. — While it
is the policy of this Court not to interfere in the exercise of the prosecutors'
discretion, however, it cannot tolerate a refiling of new Informations, as in
this case, at the impulse of the officials in command. The prosecution of an
accused must not be made to depend on who is perceived as an enemy by
those who sit in power but on the sacrosanct duty of prosecutors to bring to
justice those believed to be offenders of the law while ensuring that their
rights under the Constitution remain inviolable. The sudden over-eagerness
of petitioners to prosecute respondent, to my mind, is not really an indicum
of competence, it is a clear example of persecution. . . . Petitioners ought to
be reminded of the caveat in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan that "prosecutors
should not allow and should avoid giving the impression that their noble
office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends
or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or
favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty." Their undue haste in conducting the preliminary
investigation of the 26 accused and their inordinate interest to re-file the
cases hurriedly raise a quizzical eyebrow. IDSEAH
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; LETTER OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF
COULD NOT BE A BASIS FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. — Not to be
glossed over is the fact that the preliminary investigation which resulted in
the filing of new Informations was initiated only by the letter dated March 27,
2001 of PNP Chief General Mendoza to then DOJ Secretary Hernando B.
Perez. I do not think that the said letter could qualify as a complaint under
Section 3, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
basis for a preliminary investigation. The procedure adopted is a departure
from the usual mode. Again, in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan , we held: "A
painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process in this case. . . ."
13. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; TAKES
PRECEDENCE OVER THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROSECUTE. — One thing
for which this Court must guard itself against is to be used as an instrument
of political manipulation. As the last bulwark of the defenseless and the
accused, our duty is to uphold the law and no other. Certainly, in the
hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the
State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of
justice tilt towards the former.
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AND FOR EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES IS
TANTAMOUNT TO CONSENT. — I am not convinced that the dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 was without the consent of
respondent and that the offended parties were not notified. It appears from
the Resolution dated March 29, 1999 of the trial court that respondent's
prayer was for that court to "(1) make a judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants in the meantime; and (3) dismiss the
cases should the court find probable cause." Clearly, this third plea is a
manifestation that the dismissal of the cases was with respondent's consent.
While it is true that what he filed is a mere motion for the judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses, the same was anchored on the case of Allado vs. Diokno. There,
we ruled that " [I]f upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge,
after reviewing the information and the document attached thereto, finds
that no probable cause exists, he must either call for the complainant and
the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to
hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public
accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists." With this as
respondent's premise, I believe it is safe to conclude that the dismissal was
with his express consent.
15. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF
FACTS. — At any rate, considering the view that there is doubt on whether
respondent gave his express consent to the dismissal of the cases, as
expressed in our challenged Resolution, this incident should be determined
by the trial court. With respect to the requirement of notice to the offended
parties, again the same should be addressed to the trial court which can
hear the parties thereon. We must maintain a hands-off stance on these
matters for a different approach might lead us astray into the field of factual
conflict where our legal pronouncements would not rest on solid grounds.
Time and again we have ruled that this Court is not a trier of facts.
DISMISSAL; SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED FOR BEING
ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ACCUSED. — Settled in our jurisprudence is the
principle that when a new law will be advantageous to the accused, the
same may be given retroactive effect. This is more particularly so when the
law is merely procedural. In several cases, we applied the provisions of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactively. We should take the same
action on Section 8, Rule 117 considering that it is a reinforcement of a
person's constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases.
17. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; ONLY
PRIVATE RIGHTS MAY BECOME VESTED IN A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE. — [I]t
has been held that the constitutional provision barring the passage of
retroactive laws protects only the rights of citizens. Hence, a state may
constitutionally pass a retroactive law that impairs its own rights. Only
private, and not public, rights may become vested in a constitutional sense.
Otherwise stated, there is a distinction between the effect to be given a
retroactive statute when it relates to private rights and when it relates to
public rights. Public rights may always be modified or annulled by
subsequent legislation without contravening the Due Process Clause.
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; RENDERED INEFFECTUAL WHEN PERMANENT
DISMISSAL PROHIBITS ONLY THE REVIVAL OF THE CASE BUT NOT THE
"FILING" OF NEW INFORMATION. — Section 8 of Rule 117 is a new provision.
To reiterate, it draws its life from the constitutional guarantees of speedy
trial and speedy disposition of cases. Its mandate is explicit, i.e., a
provisional dismissal of an offense becomes "permanent" if not revived
within the prescribed periods (or two years in respondent's cases). To say
that this "permanent" dismissal prohibits only the "revival" of the case but
not the "filing" of new Information, is to render the provision ineffectual,
providing only lip service to the accused's constitutional right it seeks to
enforce. Indeed, what difference will the provision make if after the lapse of
two years, the State can still prosecute the accused for the same offense by
merely "filing" a new Information? With the interpretation given, the
dismissal cannot really be considered "permanent." After two years, all the
prosecution has to do is to file a new Information. Thus, whether by "revival"
or by "filing a new Information," the effect is the same, i.e., the prosecution
of the accused for the same offense continues. What is overlooked is that, in
t h e interim, he continues to suffer all the prejudices that come with the
failure of the prosecution to put a real end to his case. We might as well take
heed of the warning against "allowing doctrinaire concepts . . . to submerge
the practical demands of the constitutional right to a speedy trial."
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
HARDLY A SANCTION FOR THE PROSECUTION'S NEGLIGENCE. — What price
does the State have to pay for its lethargy or negligence to prosecute? If I
am to follow petitioners' position, then I can say that the only sanction for
the violation of the periods prescribed in Section 8 is that the State should
conduct the corresponding new preliminary investigation before it can file a
new information. It seems to me that the new preliminary investigation is the
only difference between "filing a new information" and "revival." To my
mind, conducting a preliminary investigation is hardly a sanction for the
prosecution's negligence. While a new preliminary investigation causes
intense inconvenience to the prosecution, the accused suffers as well.
Indeed, considering the additional delay the prosecution incurs in bringing
the case to a conclusion as a result of the filing of a new information and the
anxiety on the part of the accused by a threat of a new prosecution, the
interpretation accorded to Section 8, Rule 117 has not advanced its real
purpose.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST
PROTRACTED PROSECUTION. — Let it be stressed that Section 8 was
introduced not so much for the interest of the State but precisely for the
protection of the accused against protracted prosecution. The measure of
protection consistent with its language is the treatment of the "permanent"
dismissal as a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
21. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO PROSECUTE; A PERSON ONCE DISCHARGED IS
ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM FURTHER PROSECUTION. — The discharge of
an accused for failure of the prosecution to bring him to trial within the
prescribed period is not an entirely new concept. Even prior to the
introduction of Section 8, there were already provisions of similar import in
other jurisdictions. Under certain statutes implementing the constitutional
right of an accused to speedy trial, a discharge granted pursuant to the
statute is held to be a bar to subsequent prosecution, whether under the
same or new indictment. This view has been defended on the ground that
any other construction would open the way for complete evasion of the
statute and that the constitutional provision can only be given its legitimate
effect by holding that a person once discharged is entitled to immunity from
further prosecution for the same offense. DCASEc
22. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; PURPOSE. — To reiterate, Section

8, Rule 117 seeks to implement the constitutional guarantees that a) in all
criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial,
and b) that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The
importance of these rights cannot be overemphasized. They are necessary
and vital because a person should not have to face continued anxiety under
a prolonged threat of criminal prosecution. Postponement of trial for a long
time will ordinarily handicap an accused through the disappearance of
necessary witnesses and loss of documentary evidence. Furthermore, after
many months or years, the memory of those witnesses who are available will
likely be impaired by the passage of time. These rights are protections too
against the harassment of being subjected to accusation, with its harmful
effect on the accused's reputation and business affairs. As aptly observed in
a case, "unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial threatens
to produce more than one sort of harm, including 'oppressive pre-trial
incarceration,' 'anxiety and concern of the accused,' and the 'possibility that
the accused's defense will be impaired' by dimming memories and loss of
exculpatory evidence." Of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the
last because the inability of the accused to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the system.
SPEEDY TRIAL; DENIAL THEREOF AMOUNTS TO ACQUITTAL. — The high
regard attributed by this Court to the accused's right to a speedy trial and to
a speedy disposition of his case is evident from the tradition established by
our case law that the dismissal of a criminal case based on the denial of the
accused's right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal and constitutes a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense. It is on the same light that we
should view Section 8.
24. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
INTENSIFIES OVER TIME. — Prejudice to the rights of the accused intensifies
over time. While it is true that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is insufficient to determine a violation of an accused's right to
speedy trial, we cannot disregard the reality that after the lapse of a certain
period, the reliability of a trial is compromised in ways that neither parry can
prove or, for that matter, identify. It bears stressing that the mere passage
of time impairs memories, causes evidence to be lost, deprives the accused
of witnesses, and interferes with his ability to defend himself. Now, these
nuisances may be avoided if we are to give full effect to Section 8 and
consider the "permanent" dismissal contemplated therein as a bar to a
subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Not only will it
be in consonant with the cardinal principle of justice and fairness, it will also
provide force to the rule.
25. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES MUST
BE PROTECTED AGAINST STATE'S ARBITRARY ASSERTIONS OF POWER. — As
a final word, punishment should be imposed on the accused only if he
violated the law. However, his constitutional privileges and immunities must
be protected against the State's arbitrary assertions of power. Obviously, its
filing of new Informations against respondent for the same crimes after the
lapse of two years contravenes no less than the universal principle of justice
and fairness, the bedrock of every Constitution, law and rule.
26. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A RULE WITH THE FORCE OF LAW
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN THE LIGHT OF THE OBJECT TO BE ACHIEVED AND
THE EVIL OR MISCHIEF TO BE SUPPRESSED. — A rule with the force of law
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed. It should be given such a construction as will
advance the object and secure the benefits intended. This Court's
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court surely saw the prejudice to the
rights of the accused caused by a suspended provisional dismissal of his
case. Apparently, Section 8 was introduced owing to the many instances
where police agencies have refused to issue clearances, for purposes of
employment or travel abroad, to persons having pending cases, on the
ground that the dismissal of such cases by the court was merely provisional,
notwithstanding the fact that such provisional dismissal, more often than
not, had been done five or ten years ago.
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; PERMANENT DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AFTER ITS
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL DIFFERENTIATED FROM PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES.
— The law on prescription of crimes refers to the period during which
criminal charges must be filed. Section 8 of Rule 117 refers to the period
when a provisional dismissal ceases to be temporary and becomes
permanent, thus, no longer subject to be set aside by the revival of criminal
charges. This rule comes into play only after the State has commenced the
prosecution. The twenty-year prescriptive period for a case punishable by
death under Section 90 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to give law
enforcers ample time to apprehend criminals who go into hiding. It also
enables prosecutors to better prepare their cases, look for witnesses, and
insure that correct procedure has been followed. On the other hand, the two-
year period under Section 8, Rule 117 is intended to warn the State that
once it filed a case, it must have the readiness and tenacity to bring it to a
conclusion. The purpose of the period is to encourage promptness in
prosecuting cases.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
Before the Court is the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the

Resolution 2 dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several
factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused
with the said court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his
co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
eleven male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the
Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray
Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren
Sorronda, who was 14 years old, 3 Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the
Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. 4
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were
with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said
provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein
that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether
the requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus
directed to resolve the following:
. . . (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the
express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the
court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period
to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for
the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to
the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson
were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits
of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims;
(7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are
being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had
to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by
the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule.
According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year bar,
the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with
the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to
penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed
in court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling
reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend
that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the
time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999.
Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir,
Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent
allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during
the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or
even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the
victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said
cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondent's
express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all
the heirs of the victims of the respondent's motion and the hearing thereon
are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be
remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants were
notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the respondent's motion for
judicial determination of the existence of probable cause. The records
allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was
furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly
no evidence that private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly
retained and authorized by all the private complainants to represent them at
said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the
purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of
the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court
in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself
moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other
accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal
cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through
the public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the
hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor
was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal actions
are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private
complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of
the petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors

and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the

application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The
raison d' etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double
jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
5
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof
without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of
the prosecution 6 without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal. HDcaAI
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or

in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference
or implication to supply its meaning. 7 Where the accused writes on the
motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or
With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused
to a provisional dismissal of the case. 8 The mere inaction or silence of the
accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case 9 or his failure to
object to a provisional dismissal 10 does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional dismissal. 11 If a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case
may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the
other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express
consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply.
The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods
subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of
double jeopardy 12 or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations. 13
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same
offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need
of a new preliminary investigation. 14 However, in a case wherein after the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may
have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State
have emerged, a new preliminary investigation 15 must be conducted before
an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other
persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that
as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-
affidavits and evidence. After all, "the fiscal is not called by the Rules of
Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but
essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing
that justice." 16
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and
second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, 17 among
other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecution's witnesses summoned
before the court for its examination. The respondent contended therein that
until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of
probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against the
respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be
recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section
2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court,
and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing
scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld,
or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this
incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for. 18
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise,
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever
agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In
fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized
that:
. . . An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by
the petitioner and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases would
show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case. On
the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a
judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the
accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime until the
resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal
of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the
aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex "A." 19

During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely
declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did
he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was
provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they
wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of
probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir,
upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses,
particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one
further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable
cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it
did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not
be provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express
conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any
order, or any statement, which would normally be required by
the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other
provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts,
Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on
this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused
to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the
implications of a provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito.
Puwede bang pumirma ka ?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort
which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in
criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the
matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the
case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion
for a judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. DTIcSH
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there
is no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only
prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular
motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said:
"Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order
be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for
that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused
be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until
resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Don't you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court,
precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to
dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice,
but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal,
neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional
dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file
any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that
the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that
my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was
valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by
Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take
any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the
matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of
my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue. 20
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of
Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision
declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The
records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case was
assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He
asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for
the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG's claim.
21
The respondent's admissions made in the course of the proceedings in

the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is
barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake
in making such admissions. 22
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are
not expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and should
not do. 23
The Court also agrees with the petitioners' contention that no notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the
victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes
involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or
parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice
may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the
private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in
turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to
enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during
the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on
the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory.
Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution
and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to
threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or
flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or
loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the
rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by
his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent
lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondent's motion for a determination
of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the
nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified
thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be
stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set
it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof.
Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the
records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs
of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them,
including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were
residents of Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.
24 There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified
the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22,
1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,
25 he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely,
Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita
Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)
26 executed their respective affidavits of desistance. 27 There was no
appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren
Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were
served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said
cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the
public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the
victims of the respondent’s motion and the hearing thereon and of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus
deprived of their right to be heard on the respondent’s motion and to protect
their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule
were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not
barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus
revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8,

RULE 117 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the
respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified
of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were served with
copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the
two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the
State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the
respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due
process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State's substantive
right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They posit that under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within
which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under
the new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public
prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took
effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months
within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the
State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit
that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule,
the former should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently
relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond
the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule. 28
Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be
impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since '[t]he
State's witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but
the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically
expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.' 29 According to the respondent,
penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so
long as they favor the accused. 30 He asserts that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was
more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him. 31 In any
event, the State is given the right under the Court's assailed Resolution to
justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double
jeopardy to the prejudice of the State because the prohibition against the
revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided therein
is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of a
provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule
117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under
said rule do not modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised
Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8,
Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already been filed against
the accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under
Article 90. 32
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute
of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a
surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to
prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to
acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not
be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode
only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused
have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability. 33 The periods fixed
under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the
offenses covered. 34
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to
a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute
making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of
the State to prosecute the accused. 35
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. 36 It is but a
limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the
accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to
have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the
accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be
charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included
therein. 37 He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the
expenses in any new indictments. 38 The State may revive a criminal case
beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable
necessity for the delay. 39 By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed
on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period
therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not
thereby diminished. 40 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is
barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the
new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of
Illinois held:
. . . This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall
have arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the
liability of the offender to be punished — to be deprived of his liberty —
shall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the
state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the
crime had created in the offender's title to liberty. In this respect, its
language goes deeper than statutes barring civil remedies usually do.
They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that
inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would
enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this
statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against
the offender — the right to punish, as the only liability which the
offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are
at an end. . . . 41
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or
regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be
punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been
held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied

retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In a per
curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 43 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce substantial
inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding
"the injustice of hardship" by a holding of nonretroactivity. 44 A construction
of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious
consequences. 45 This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute
which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided. 46 Time and again, this Court has decreed
that statutes are to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. 47
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court
designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in
criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively
depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its
purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its
operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect
thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular. 48
In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods, 49 the United States Supreme
Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine
enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective or prospective
effect:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards."
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of
two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the
State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed
a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a
priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of
the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with
the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar
fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. 50
The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the
time-bar. EHITaS
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of

the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of
the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial
courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the
prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public
prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer
revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor
or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public
prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings. 51
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as
it usually operates in his favor, 52 especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed
inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire. 53
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may
impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may
have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded.
Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. 54 The accused may
become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the
lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more
difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the
case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the
chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him
to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to
lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the
presumption of innocence. 55 He may also lose his witnesses or their
memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may
diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the
entire criminal justice system. 56
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for
the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31,
1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of
the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.
Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If
the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only
one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive
these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under
the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively,
the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1,
2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice
to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and
wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be
excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule
prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be
expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the
State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that
it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the
new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix
Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People: 57
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced
has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail
themselves of it waived their rights . . . .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to
benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to
the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua
non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the
State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took
effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a
period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000
to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid
justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new
rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and
fairness, so is the State. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of Massachusetts, 58 "the
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We
are to keep the balance true." In Dimatulac v. Villon, 59 this Court
emphasized that "the judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of
law. This Court further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is
not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and
the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to
the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102

to 01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well
within the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28,
2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24,
2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent
with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, Panganiban, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., in the result, concurs with J. Bellosillo's opinion.
Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., see separate dissenting
opinions.
Yñarez-Santiago, J,. joins the dissent of JJ. Puno and Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Carpio, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., separate opinion, concurring :
If we make a mistake, we can only pray that their ghosts will not
haunt us for the rest of our days . . .
"Amen!" I say to the clear and concise ponencia of our colleague, Mr.
Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr., who touched the issues head on and resolved
them with the calm deliberation of a dedicated jurist. Let me just add a few
more thoughts in the effort to reveal and rectify the hazards and
uncertainties ordinarily concealed by the glib use of formal illogic.
This case springs from the brutal slaughter of suspected members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang on 18 May 1995. Eleven (11) restless souls —
who perished in a shroud of mystery — remain shackled for more than half a
decade by the bondage of popular apathy and neglect, and condemned to an
ignominious fall by their infamy. Stigmatized and denounced, their demise
must have been hailed by many as the triumph of retributive justice —
. . . Gifted with the liberty they know not how to use; with a
power and energy they know not how to apply; with a life whose
purpose and aim they comprehend not; they drag through their useless
and convulsed existence. Byron destroys them one after the other, as if
he were the executioner of a sentence decreed in heaven. They fall
unwept, like a withered leaf into the stream of time . . . . They die, as
they have lived, alone; and a popular malediction hovers round their
solitary tombs. 1
The dictates of prudence however would counsel us at this time to

reserve judgment on their sins and transgressions. The overriding
consideration is the need to unveil the truth, for truth alone is the veritable
touchstone of justice. The rights of the eleven (11) victims, as much as those
of the respondent and his co-accused, deserve full recognition and
protection. Only then can we say that we are truly civilized — a breed apart
from savages.
But the manner by which the carnage of 18 May 1995 was carried out
sparked a public indignation that prompted the Senate Committees on
Justice and Human Rights, Crimes and National Defense and Security to
conduct a joint investigation on possible human rights violations involving
police officers. The inquiry focused on the issue of whether the death of the
eleven (11) victims was the result of a "rub-out" or summary killing, or a
"shoot-out" or with exchange of gunfire, between the victims and the police
considering that the principal antagonists were policemen and civilians. On
21 June 1995 the aforesaid Senate Committees, in Joint Committee Report
No. 1021, found thus —
There is no clarity as to whether the bodies were handcuffed or
hogtied with ropes when they were killed. The evidence, however,
establishes that those who died were defenseless and that except for
Soronda, none of them fired a gun. The forensic report and testimonies
of De los Santos and De la Cruz show that eleven (11) persons were
killed in coldblood while in the custody of the law enforcers in the early
morning of May 18 in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City (emphasis
supplied),
concluded that the killings were done in cold blood and recommended the
filing of the appropriate charges against the police officers. 2
Thereafter multiple murder charges were filed by the Ombudsman
before the Sandiganbayan against respondent and twenty-five (25) other
police officers, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 23047–23057. On motion of the
accused, the Ombudsman conducted a reinvestigation of the cases resulting
in the filing of Amended Informations, this time charging respondent, among
other officers, as a mere accessory after-the-fact. Arraignment followed and
respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
contending in the main that the highest ranking principal accused under the
Amended Informations held the position of Chief Inspector with a salary
below that for Grade 27, for which reason, jurisdiction properly belonged to
the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan. The issue of jurisdiction
eventually reached the Supreme Court, which ordered the transfer of the
cases to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not because the highest
ranking principal accused was receiving a salary below Grade 27 but
because the Amended Informations did not show that the offenses charged
were committed in relation to, or in the discharge of, official functions of the
accused.
The criminal cases were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689, and raffled to RTC-Br. 81 then presided over by Judge
Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. Respondent and the other accused filed separate but
identical motions praying for a judicial determination of probable cause, to
hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest in the meantime, and to
dismiss the cases should the court find no probable cause.
During the hearing on the motions, the seven (7) or eight (8) victims'
next of kin executed affidavits of desistance while others recanted their
affidavit-complaints. With this development, the trial court in its Resolution
of 29 March 1999 dismissed the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the
accused for trial, holding that "there is no more evidence to show that the
crime(s) have been committed and that the accused are probably guilty
thereof." 3
Two (2) years later, or on 29 March 2001, Secretary Hernando B. Perez
of the Department of Justice received a letter from PNP Director General
Leandro R. Mendoza indorsing for preliminary investigation the sworn
affidavits of two (2) new witnesses relative to the Kuratong Baleleng
incident. Secretary Perez constituted a panel of State Prosecutors to
investigate the matter. The panel issued several subpoenas to all the
accused in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, including
respondent Lacson, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and to
appear at the preliminary conference.
Consequently, on 28 May 2001, respondent and several of his co-
accused filed a petition for prohibition with application for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the RTC-Manila, seeking
to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and the State Prosecutors from further
conducting a preliminary investigation. The prohibition case was raffled to
RTC-Br. 40, Manila, presided over by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba. The filing
of this petition notwithstanding, the Panel of State Prosecutors proceeded to
issue a Resolution finding probable cause to hold respondent and his co-
accused for trial, for eleven (11) counts of murder. Accordingly, Informations
were filed before the RTC, Quezon City, and docketed as Crim. Cases Nos.
01-101102 to 01-101112.
Deviating from the normal procedure, the Executive Judge, Vice-
Executive Judges and Presiding Judges of Quezon City dispensed with the
customary raffle; instead, assigned the cases to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao
of RTC-Br. 81, Quezon City, presumably as the successor of Judge Agnir in
the same branch. HIEAcC
Meanwhile, in the prohibition case before RTC-Br. 40, Manila, Judge

Pasamba denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
thus —
After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and
without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the
herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the
finding of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court that no probable cause
exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner herein
and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with the
Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since
the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try
the cases. 4
Dissatisfied, respondent elevated the case on a petition for certiorari to

the Court of Appeals which thereafter rendered the assailed Decision of 24
August 2001 granting the petition, declaring null and void all the proceedings
conducted by the State Prosecutors, and ordering all the criminal
Informations dismissed —
The present controversy, being one involving "provisional
dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the
prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said
provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical words. It
mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. It should be noted that the
revival of the subject criminal cases . . . was commenced only on April
19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March
29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City's Resolution . . . 5
Hence, the present recourse. The bone of contention, which crystallizes

all the arguments of the parties into a single point of inquiry, bears upon the
nature and effects of a provisional dismissal which has become permanent
after the lapse of the periods provided in Sec. 8, Rule 117, 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure . For facility of reference, the controversial
provision of Sec. 8 quoted hereunder —
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
. . . of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived (italics supplied ).
Assuming that Sec. 8, Rule 117, is available to respondent although it

is my position that it is not, the question that should be asked is: Does the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case which has become permanent under
Sec. 8 effectively foreclose the right of the State to prosecute an accused? I
have taken great pains analyzing the position of respondent; regretfully, I
am unable to agree for my conscience shivers at its debilitating, crippling if
not crushing, impact upon our criminal justice system. DTIcSH
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Arts. 90 and

91 of The Revised Penal Code, which are quoted hereunder —
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. — Crimes punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten

years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which
shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one

year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall
prescribe in six months.
Light offenses shall prescribe in two months
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest
penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules
contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
Evidently, respondent's concept of a provisional dismissal that has

become permanent under Sec. 8, Rule 117, emasculates and renders illusory
its very purpose. It effectively obliterates the different prescriptive periods
under Art. 90, which are fixed on the basis of the gravity of the penalty
prescribed for the offense, and supplants it with a uniform period of one (1)
year or two (2) years, as the case may be. It likewise substantially modifies
the manner of computing the period of prescription in Art. 91 since the
reckoning of the one (1) or two (2)-year prescriptive period under Sec. 8 is
constant and invariable, and without regard to the number of interruptions.
Regardless of the number of times the case against an accused is
provisionally dismissed, the prosecution would always have a full grace
period of two (2) years within which to revive the case; much unlike Art. 91
wherein the period consumed prior to the filing of the complaint or
information is tacked to the period consumed after the dismissal of the case
for purposes of determining whether the crime has prescribed.
Interestingly, a dividing line is drawn in the application of Arts. 90 and
91 of The Revised Penal Code , and Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure , obviously in an attempt to lend a delusive
semblance of plausibility to its construction of Sec. 8. It is posited that Art.
91 and Sec. 8 operate on "different planes," so to speak, the vital distinction
being that Sec. 8, Rule 117, contemplates a situation where a case had
already been filed and was provisionally dismissed.
I do not agree. Article 91 of The Revised Penal Code distinctly speaks
of "prescription . . . shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him." It can readily be seen
therefore that the concept of a provisional dismissal is subsumed in Art. 91
since in a provisional dismissal, proceedings necessarily terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted. Thus, to construe and apply Sec. 8
in the manner suggested above would undeniably result in a direct and
irreconcilable conflict with Art. 91.
In a provisional dismissal, the prosecution, the defense and the
offended party, in effect, enter into a tacit agreement for a temporary
cessation of hostilities, i.e., to momentarily hold in abeyance the prosecution
of the accused. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8 prescribes the requirements thereto:
(a) consent of the accused, and (b) notice to the offended party. It must be
remembered however that permanent dismissal of a case is but an offshoot
of its previous provisional dismissal and the subsequent failure to revive
within the time frames set forth in Sec. 8. But does the permanent dismissal
of the case arising from a provisional dismissal affect the right of the State to
prosecute within the periods provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code ?
Certainly not, for the prescriptive periods prescribed by law cannot be
affected directly or indirectly by any agreement or consent of the parties,
much less be held hostage to any procedural limitations. Verily, in matters of
public crimes which have a direct bearing on public interest, no agreements
or personal arrangements should be brought to bear upon the penal action.
Courts cannot — by an act of judicial legislation — abridge, amend,
alter, or nullify statutes. We do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to
judicially reform or fashion legislation in accordance with our own notions of
prudent public policy. Certainly, lest we are prepared to ride roughshod over
this prerogative of Congress, we cannot interfere with the power of the
legislature to surrender, as an act of grace, the right of the State to
prosecute and to declare the offense no longer subject to prosecution after
certain periods of time as expressed in the statute. aAHTDS
Furthermore, the right of the State to prosecute criminals is a

substantive, nay, inherent right. To unduly limit the exercise of such right for
a short period of one (1) or two (2) years through the expedient of a
procedural rule is unconstitutional, considering the limitation in our
fundamental law on the rule-making power of this Court, that is, its rules
must not "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." 6
Another decisive factor which militates heavily against the foregoing
thesis that Art. 91 and Sec. 8 operate on "different planes," is the fact that
the phrase "amounts to an acquittal," which appeared in the original draft of
what is now Sec. 8, Rule 117, was judiciously rejected by the Supreme Court
when it approved the final draft of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure —
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You know that prior to the wordings at
present of Sec. 8, Rule 117, there was a final committee draft that said
and I quote: "the corresponding order shall state that the provisional
dismissal shall become permanent and amount to an acquittal one
year after the issuance without the case having been revived." What I
am trying to point out is that, as originally worded, Section 8 expressly
stated that the dismissal would amount to an acquittal. But the final
wording eliminated the words "amount to an acquittal," isn't it?
ATTY. FORTUN: I would not know that, Your Honor. I have not
seen that revised (interrupted) . . . .
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Well, that is true that those words were
eliminated precisely because we wanted to avoid making invocation of
that rule equivalent to an acquittal. All right, (interrupted) . . .. 7
Had the intention been to confer on Sec. 8 the effect of acquittal, the
Court should have retained the express provision to that effect in the final
draft. Obviously, the conspicuous absence therein of the phrase "amounts to
an acquittal," or its equivalent, forecloses a speculative approach to the
meaning of Sec. 8. Virtually crossed out, such clause cannot now be incised
from the original draft and grafted into the approved draft of the revised
rules, without doing violence to its intent.
It must be stressed that Sec. 8 is nothing more than a rule of
procedure. As part of the adjective law, it is only a means to an end — an aid
to substantive law — and should accordingly be interpreted and applied in
that concept. It was never meant to modify the settled provisions of law on
the matter of prescription of offenses; or to unduly curtail the right of the
State to bring offenders before the bar of justice. These matters are best left
to the wisdom and sound judgment of the legislature.
Section 8 is very limited in scope and application. Justice Oscar M.
Herrera, Consultant, Committee on Revision of the Rules, in his Treatise on
Historical Development and Highlights of Amendments of Rules on Criminal
Procedure (Rationale of Amendments of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure), made the following commentaries on the import of the provision
—
There had been so many instances where the National Bureau of
Investigation or other police agencies have refused to issue clearances
for purposes of employment or travel abroad, to persons who have
pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of their cases by the
court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that such
provisional dismissals, more often than not, had been done five or ten
years ago. This causes prejudice to the persons concerned.
Accordingly, a rule was provided that the provisional dismissal of
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
8
Clearly, the feverishly contested provision is purely administrative or

regulatory in character. The policy embodied therein is simply to grant the
accused momentary relief from administrative restrictions occasioned by the
filing of a criminal case against him. He is freed in the meantime of the dire
consequences of his having been charged with a crime, and temporarily
restored to his immunities as a citizen, solely for purposes of government
clearances. Section 8 imports no intricate nor ornate legal signification that
we need not discern from it a meaning that too far deviates from what it
actually purports to convey.
Indeed, were we to adhere to the thesis equating permanent dismissal
with "finality" and "acquittal," we would be ascribing meaning to the
provision which is not only at war with the demands of reason but also
contrary to the clear intention of the rule. The disastrous effect of
respondent's interpretation of Sec. 8 upon our criminal justice system is not
difficult to imagine. So construed, it would afford an accused, endowed with
a fertile imagination and creativeness, a plethora of opportunities to rig his
prosecution by silencing witnesses and suppressing evidence then letting the
case hibernate for a much shorter period of one (1) or two (2) years. To be
sure, our procedural laws could not have intended to sanction such a result.
"A system of procedure," intoned Justice Cardozo, "is perverted from its
proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant
of a clear necessity." 9
Respondent conjures up the ingenious hypothesis that although Sec. 8
of Rule 117 and the "double jeopardy" principle have different requisites,
they are nonetheless cognate rules since Sec. 8 of Rule 117 affords the
accused benefits analogous to that bestowed under the "double jeopardy"
principle. 10 Implacable and unyielding is he in the position that a provisional
dismissal that attains the character of permanency produces the effect of a
sui generis acquittal. In this respect, according to him, Sec. 8 of Rule 117 is
not in that Sec. 17 (Discharge of Accused to be State Witness) unique and
Sec. 18 unique and Sec. 18 (Discharge of Accused Operates as Acquittal) of
Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is also invested
with the benefits of double jeopardy when it grants the accused state
witness a discharge tantamount to an acquittal. In both instances, the
absence of any or all of the essential requisites of double jeopardy does not
preclude the discharge of the accused state witness or one whose case has
attained permanent dismissal.
It bears recalling that since Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence on double
jeopardy was swept into the shores of Philippine constitutional and statutory
history, our concept of double jeopardy has faithfully adhered to the
pronouncements first made by Kepner v. United States 11 that ". . . (I)t is
then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has
been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered
on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection
is not . . . against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried
again for the second offense." The fundamental philosophy that underlies
the finality of an acquittal is the recognition of the fact that the state with its
infinite resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual and expose him to a state of perpetual
anxiety and embarrassment as well as enhancing the possibility that
although innocent, he may be found guilty.
Presently, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit in
its prescription of the requisites for the invocation of double jeopardy and
the resultant effect thereon on acquittals. Section 7, Rule 117, states —
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Ensconced in the foregoing procedural tenet are the imperatives for

invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a
court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge;
and, (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In contrast, provisional dismissal under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 requires only
the twin requirements of consent of the accused and notice to the offended
party. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed upon the express
application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case
dismissed is a waiver of his constitutional prerogative of double jeopardy as
he, in a manner of speaking, throws a monkey wrench to the judicial process
and prevents the court from rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
Jurisprudence has emphatically enunciated that double jeopardy cannot be
properly invoked where the case was dismissed with the express conformity
of the accused. This much is given as one of the requisites of double
jeopardy, i.e., where the accused is acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
This assent by the accused to the dismissal is the operative act that
precludes the effects of double jeopardy from setting in, so that despite the
permanency of the dismissal due to the lapse of the periods set forth in Sec.
8 of Rule 117, the refiling of a case under a new information does not
trample upon this venerable doctrine.
The permanence of the dismissal should not be understood as the
harbinger of final and absolute liberation of the accused from future
prosecution. It merely augurs the demise of the unrevived cases but it does
not prevent the state from exercising the right to re-prosecute the accused
within the prescriptive period provided in Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code .
With more weighty reason can we not accommodate respondent in his plea
to avail of the graces afforded by the doctrine since the records would show
that he has yet to enter his plea to the charges or that the trial on the merits
has as yet to commence.
Respondent also fires a shot in the dark when he suggests that there
exists no marked difference between revival and refiling of a criminal case
as in fact, according to him, the two (2) concepts are synonymous and
interchangeable. A survey of jurisprudential antecedents reveal the
distinction between the revival and refiling of a new information. The
authorities are unanimous in their recognition of the fact that a provisionally
dismissed case can be revived as it does not call for the operation of the rule
on double jeopardy and that cases can also be refiled under a new complaint
or information for the same offense. 12
While I agree however that the filing of Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102–
01-101112 is NOT a revival of the earlier dismissed cases, I wish to
emphasize, lest I be misconstrued, that the "New Informations" in the
subsequently refiled cases are new not because the respondent is charged
thereunder as a co-principal, instead of as a mere accessory, or that the
number of the accused has been increased from 26 to 34; rather, the new
Informations which are the bases for the prosecution of the respondent again
under the same offense, are new for the singular reason that they are
separate and distinct from those in the previously dismissed cases. Simply
stated, it is not of consequence whether the allegations in the two (2) sets of
Informations are quintessentially identical or different in form and substance
insofar as concerns the right of the state to prosecute the respondent anew
after the provisional dismissal became permanent.
A question may be asked: Suppose that the new information is a
verbatim reproduction of the information in the permanently dismissed case,
can we not now say that the newly filed case is a mere revival of the case
previously dismissed? After all, stripped of semantic finery, their being
identical would lead to the impression, although erroneous, that one is but a
revival of the other. On the surface one may see no apparent difference
between the two (2) sets of Informations, but a subtle yet significant
functional distinction in fact exists. Once a case is permanently dismissed
after the lapse of the prescriptive periods set forth in Sec. 8, the case is dead
and, for all intents and purposes, beyond resuscitation. All the on-going
proceedings and those still to be had, e.g., preliminary investigation,
arraignment, trial, etc., shall cease and be terminated. In the event however
that the accused is prosecuted anew with the same offense, albeit under an
identical information, the previously terminated proceedings will not be
reactivated, the previous case having been set at rest; instead, new
proceedings will be conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh. To
my mind, the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 8, Rule 117 has in its favor the
soundest policy considerations based no less on the fundamental objectives
of procedural rules.
Incidentally, I find it particularly disturbing that the Informations in
Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were dismissed by the trial
judge without complying with one of the requirements of the first paragraph
of Sec. 8, i.e., the dismissal must be with notice to the offended party. There
is nothing in the records which would show that all the offended parties were
ever notified that the cases against respondent and his co-accused would be
dismissed. Even if we proceed on the assumption that the filing of affidavits
of desistance by the offended parties may be considered a substantial
equivalent of notice, still the dismissal appears to be procedurally infirm
since only seven (7) of the offended parties representing eight (8) of the
eleven (11) victims, executed affidavits of desistance. 13 No similar affidavits
were submitted for the three (3) remaining victims. 14 Cannot the next of kin
of these three (3) remaining victims, who were not even notified of the
provisional dismissal of the cases, prosecute those responsible for killing
them within the prescriptive period provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal
Code? Are they now without any remedy in law if witnesses belatedly
surface, they who cowered in fear at the time because of the positions of
power held by those perceived to be responsible therefor?
Significantly also, I am at a loss as to why the Court of Appeals
reckoned the two (2)-year period from 29 March 1999 as the date of
issuance of the resolution of dismissal. When Sec. 8 speaks of "issuance" it
should be construed not with reference to the date as appearing in the
resolution of dismissal but on the date it was actually delivered to the proper
person and received by him. Otherwise, how would the offended parties
know that such resolution was issued as to reckon with the two (2)-year
period after which the provisional dismissal would be considered permanent?
In the instant case, the records do not clearly identify who the offended
parties are, or whether they were all notified of Judge Agnir's order of
dismissal dated 29 March 1999 as they do not even appear to have been
properly named. In the absence of such evidence, the reckoning point for
computing the two (2)-year period under Sec. 8 becomes indeterminable.
Assuming that Sec. 8 is available to respondent, to which we do not even
agree, still respondent has failed to discharge his burden of proving that the
two (2)-year period has indeed elapsed to make the provisional dismissal
permanent.
These circumstances cast a heavy pall of doubt on whether the
dismissal of the eleven (11) Informations has indeed attained the status of
permanence as to prevent the prosecution from refiling them. The notice
requirement in the first paragraph of Sec. 8 as well as the notice of the order
of dismissal are by no means trivial formalities; they are meaningful and
significant. The offended parties, seeking justice and vindication for the
wrong done, would naturally be keenly interested in the progress and
outcome of the criminal prosecution. Hence, it is but proper that all of them
be notified of the termination of the cases and given an equal opportunity to
object to the dismissal.
A view has been expressed that respondent's rights to speedy trial and
to speedy disposition of his cases were violated; this despite the fact that the
right was not invoked by respondent before us. Accordingly, the twenty-six
(26) month delay in the refiling of cases relative to the Kuratong Baleleng
killings is claimed to be vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and hence
sufficient to activate the protection of the Bill of Rights, specifically, on the
rights to speedy trial and to speedy disposition of his cases. Sections 14 (2)
and 16, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution respectively provides —
Sec. 14. . . . (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall
enjoy the right . . . to have a speedy, impartial and public trial . . . .
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
These provisions uphold the time-honored tradition of speedy justice

for, as stated in the oft-repeated dictum, "justice delayed is justice denied."
Their express inclusion in the present Constitution was in response to the
common charge against perennial delays in the administration of justice
which have plagued our judicial system. 15
The right to speedy trial under Sec. 14 and the right to speedy
disposition of cases in Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, are
kindred constitutional norms similar in nature and legal effects, sharing
common operational principles, and subject to the same test for purposes of
determining violations thereof. Thus, the cornerstone of both rights is to
prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring tribunals to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial and disposition of cases.
Speedy disposition of cases, like the constitutional guarantee of speedy
trial, is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances of a particular case. 16 Verily, these rights are more
indistinct concepts than other constitutional rights. It is, for example,
impossible to determine with precision when the rights have been denied.
We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, these rights cannot
be quantified into a specified number of days or months. There is no fixed
point in the proceeding when a party may exercise or be deemed to have
waived these rights. Finally, the amorphous quality of the rights sometimes
lead to the drastic remedy of dismissal of a case when the rights have been
infringed. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that an
accused who may be guilty of a grave offense will go scot-free without being
tried and held responsible therefor. Such a remedy is more radical than an
exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial.
At any rate, the framers of the Constitution recognized the right to
speedy disposition of cases distinctly from the right to speedy trial in
criminal cases. It should be noted that Sec. 16 covers all phases before,
during and after trial, and extends protection to all parties in all types of
cases: civil, criminal and administrative. In this respect, it affords a broader
protection than Sec. 14 (2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy
trial in criminal cases. 17
Against this backdrop, I turn to inquire into the parameters of the right
to speedy disposition of cases. Just how broad is its mantle of protection as
applied in criminal cases? When does the right attach during the criminal
process, and when may it be properly asserted by a party? A criminal
prosecution has many stages, and delay may occur during or between any of
them. As applied in the instant case, it appears that the speedy disposition
guarantee of the Bill of Rights is asserted to include the period of delay from
the provisional dismissal of the case to its revival or refiling since
"respondent is as much entitled to a speedy reinvestigation and refiling of
the provisionally dismissed cases against him." 18
Such interpretation, however, does not seem to be in consonance with
the unmistakable language, nor by the obvious intent, of Sec. 16. The
provision speaks of "speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies." It clearly and logically contemplates a
situation wherein there exists an outstanding case, proceeding or some
incident upon which the assertion of the right may be predicated. Evidently,
it would be idle, not to say anomalous, to speak of "speedy disposition of
cases" in the absence of anything to dispose of in the first place.
A review of pertinent jurisprudence attests abundantly to the
indispensable requirement of a "pending case, proceeding or some
incident," as sine qua non before the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases may be invoked. Thus, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 19 we
held that the long delay of three (3) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was violative of the
Constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases because political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process in this case. Similarly in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan 20 involving an
inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation, we ruled that
such unjustified delay infringes upon the right to speedy disposition of cases.
In Binay v. Sandiganbayan 21 we ruled out any violation of petitioner's
right to speedy disposition of cases despite a six-year delay from the filing of
the charges in the Office of the Ombudsman to the time the Informations
were filed in the Sandiganbayan. Then in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr. 22 we
rejected the allegation of inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation. Finally, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan 23 we held that the
inordinate delay of six (6) years by the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the
Tanodbayan) in the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file
an Information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan violated petitioner's
constitutional guaranty to speedy disposition of the case.
Invariably, the foregoing cases demonstrate that the broad protective
cloak of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases becomes
available only in instances where preliminary proceedings have been
initiated, or a case has already been filed or any other incident pertaining
thereto already had. As we succinctly stated in Binay v. Sandiganbayan 24 —
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or unjustifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried (italics supplied ).
It goes without saying therefore that the right to speedy disposition of cases
is unavailing in the absence of any proceedings conducted before, during, or
after, trial. Significantly, there is no precedent, for indeed there is none, to
support the novel conclusion that even after the dismissal of the cases, an
accused may still invoke the constitutional guarantee.
In the case before us, nothing was left to be done after the issuance of
the 29 March 1999 Order of Judge Agnir dismissing all criminal charges
against respondent relative to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. During the
hiatus following the dismissal of the criminal charges, no formal proceeding
remained outstanding. Not even court processes were issued to restrain
respondent's liberty or subject him to any form of public accusation; he was
free to go about his affairs, to practice his profession, and to continue on
with his life. Respondent was legally and constitutionally in the same posture
as though no charges had been made. Hence, it was only at the time when
he was subjected to another pre-indictment investigation and accused anew
that respondent may invoke his right to speedy disposition of his cases. The
delay after the charges against him were dismissed, like any delay before
those charges were filed, should not be included in reckoning the time and
determining whether he was denied his right to a speedy disposition of his
cases.
The provisional nature of the dismissal of the original criminal cases is
quite immaterial. The fact that the cases were dismissed conditionally or
"without prejudice" to the subsequent filing of new cases, does not make the
order of dismissal any less a disposition of the cases. Although provisional, it
nonetheless terminated all proceedings against respondent such that there
remained in the meantime no pending case which the court could act upon
and resolve, and which could be made the basis for the application of the
right to speedy disposition of respondent's cases. 25
Clearly, we would be reinventing the wheel, so to speak, if we are to
include within the protective shield of the right to speedy disposition of
cases the reinvestigation and refiling of the provisionally dismissed cases.
The matter of reinvestigation and refiling of cases at some future time are
not by themselves “pending incidents related to the dismissed cases;” they
are mere possibilities or expectancies. The State has no definite decision yet
on whether to really commence a reinvestigation and refiling of the cases,
and only indicates, at the most, a probable action at some future time. Until
such time that the State decided to exercise these rights, they cannot ripen
into a pending case, proceeding or incident for purposes of the speedy
disposition safeguard.
Certainly, the constitutional pledge mandates merely the swift
resolution or termination of a pending case or proceeding, and not the
initiation or institution of a new case or proceeding. It has no application to
inexistent proceedings but only to those currently being undertaken. Were
we to hold otherwise, we would in effect be granting to every accused an
unbridled license to impose his will upon the State and demand that he be
immediately reinvestigated and a case filed against him. The determination
of whether to file or when to file a case lies within the sole discretion of the
prosecution depending upon the availability of his evidence and provided
that it is filed within the prescriptive period. As American Jurisprudence
would hold —
It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors
do not deviate from "fundamental conceptions of justice" when they
defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an
accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor
to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. It should be
equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as
soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be
able to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To
impose such a duty "would have a deleterious effect both upon the
rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself."
From the perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to
commence when probable cause is established is undesirable because
it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed,
and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but
untried . . . . From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a
requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is equally
unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources of
information to evaporate before they are fully exploited. And from the
standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because it
would cause scarce resources to be consumed on cases that prove to
be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible parties or
some of the criminal acts. 26
To reiterate, respondent's right to speedy disposition of his criminal

cases attached only at that precise moment the Department of Justice
constituted a panel of prosecutors and conducted a new preliminary
investigation. Even then, the conduct of the prosecutors cannot be assailed
as violative of the speedy disposition guarantee. As shown by the records,
the government can hardly be accused of foot-dragging for, in fact, they lost
no time in commencing the new preliminary investigation and thereafter
filing the corresponding Informations in court upon the appearance of new
witnesses against respondent and his co-accused. The expeditious action of
the government in the instant case certainly cannot be viewed with
suspicion.
In fairness to petitioners, they cannot be faulted in demonstrating
alacrity in performing their mandate, nor can they be castigated for the so-
called "unusual haste" in reopening the cases against respondent. No impure
motive should be imputed to them other than the fact that they regularly
performed their duty in their apparent desire to unravel the Kuratong
Baleleng mystery.

For the petitioners, this is a classic case of "damn-if-you-do-and-damn-
if-you-don't" situation. Petitioners are being put to task for their alleged
negligence and delay in reviving the cases, but then again, they are also
being pilloried for persecuting the respondent because of the supposed
"unusual haste" and "uncharacteristic vigor" in pursuing the criminal cases
against him and his co-accused.
For the reasons stated, I decline to extend to respondent the protection
guaranteed by Sec. 16. Plain common sense dictates that the provision
cannot be applied to situations not contemplated by it. Verily, we cannot
expand the letter and spirit of the provision and read into it a meaning that
is not there.
This does not, of course, mean that respondent is utterly unprotected
in this regard. On the contrary, there are other constitutional and statutory
mechanisms to guard against possible and actual prejudice to the accused,
resulting from the passage of time. Primarily, the statute of limitations under
Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code is the principal safeguard against
prosecuting overly stale criminal charges. The statute represents legislative
assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in
administering and receiving justice; it protects not only the accused from
prejudice to his defense, but also balances his interest in repose against
society's interest in the apprehension and punishment of criminals. 27 This
statute provides predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an
irrefutable presumption that the rights of an accused to a fair trial would be
prejudiced. 28
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of
those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such
a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend
themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become
obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official
punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may
also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials
promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. 29
Moreover, the sweeping command of the Due Process Clause always
protects defendants against fundamentally unfair treatment by the
government in criminal proceedings. Procedural fairness required by due
process decrees the dismissal of an indictment if it be shown that delay
caused substantial prejudice to the rights of an accused to a fair trial and
that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the
accused.
But even if we proceed on the assumption that respondent may
rightfully invoke the speedy disposition clause for the respondent, still I find
that the circumstances of this case fail to measure up to the criteria set forth
under the Balancing Test.
I n Caballero v. Alfonso 30 we adopted a four-factor Balancing Test to
determine whether an accused has been denied the constitutional right to
speedy disposition of his case, i.e., (a) length of the delay, (b) reason for the
delay, (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and, (d) prejudice
caused by the delay.
With these relevant factors, the otherwise abstract concept of speedy
disposition of cases is provided with at least a modicum of structure. The
Balancing Test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense
are considered, prescribes flexible standards based on practical
considerations. It necessarily compels courts to approach speedy disposition
cases on an ad hoc basis. No single factor in the Balancing Test is definitive
because all four (4) must be weighed against the others in determining
whether a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases occurred. In
other words, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still
engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are
dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be
carried out in full recognition of the accused's interest in the speedy
disposition of his case as specifically affirmed in the Constitution. 31
I proceed to consider the four (4) factors in the Balancing Test in
seriatim. The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until
it is shown that the delay has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary delay
from presumptively prejudicial delay, there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors that go into the balance. 32 Considering the serious nature
of the charges against respondent, and more importantly, the criminal cases
sought to be filed being deeply impressed with public interest, involving as
they do high ranking police officers, I am of the view that the claimed two (2)
years and three (3) months lag between the provisional dismissal of the first
criminal cases on 29 March 1999 and the filing of new Informations on 6 June
2001 sketches below the bare minimum needed to provoke such an inquiry.
At any rate, I will assume, without conceding, that it is sufficiently long for
purposes of triggering a full analysis under the three (3) remaining factors.
aCTcDH
The banner the litigants seek to capture is the second factor — the
reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here too, different
weights should be assigned to different reasons. For instance, a deliberate
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed
heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence
or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily. Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
33
I find it hard to accept that in the criminal cases against respondent the
government is on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and
unacceptable reasons for delaying the prosecution of respondent. It
simplistically and unrealistically assumes that the availability of witnesses Yu
and Enad prior to 2001 renders the seeming lethargy of the government
unjustifiable. It completely disregards other considerations affecting the
decision of the government to stay its entire prosecutorial machinery.
The government may delay for a variety of reasons such as to gain
time in which to strengthen and document its case. The government may
also delay, not with the view of ensuring conviction of the accused, but
because the government lacks sufficient resources to move quickly. The
species of governmental delay that are anathema to the right to speedy
disposition of cases are those which are purposely or negligently employed
to harm or gain impermissible advantage over the accused at the trial. The
reason is that, in such circumstance, the fair administration of justice is
imperiled.
In the present recourse, there is nothing to demonstrate that the delay
in reviving the cases against respondent was deliberately availed of for an
impermissible purpose. It was not explained what improper tactical
advantage was gained or sought by the government; nor can I discern any
such advantage from the records. To be sure, if as claimed by respondent
this whole mess is nothing more than a pure and simple political vendetta,
carried out by a possè bent on lynching him politically and personally —
which I am not inclined to acknowledge at this stage — the government
could have moved against respondent with deliberate haste, for delay is not
exactly to its best interest.
Neither can we safely conclude that the public prosecutors are guilty of
negligent omission. Insufficiency of evidence is a legitimate reason for delay.
The government is naturally not expected to go forward with the trial and
incur costs unless it is convinced it has an iron-clad case to make a
worthwhile indictment. Verily, it needs time to gather evidence, track down
and collect witnesses, as well as document its case. As to how much time it
needs depends on such other factors as the availability of witnesses and
resources to enable it to move quickly. In U.S. v. Lovasco 34 it was held —
. . . investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay under taken
by the Government solely "to gain tactical advantage over the
accused," precisely because investigative delay is not so one-sided.
Rather than deviating from elementary standards of "fair play and
decency," a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek
indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute
and will be able to promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for these reasons would
subordinate the goal of "orderly expedition" to that of "mere speed."
In no mean measure, the many constitutional and procedural

safeguards provided an accused can also present obstacles. It is doubly
difficult in this particular case considering the recantation and disappearance
of all available vital witnesses for the prosecution.
If we were to turn the tables against the respondent, we say that the
unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution may be attributed to the
conventional tendency of our people never to antagonize the powerful and
the influential. We are not insinuating that respondent had a hand in the
recantation or desistance of the complainants, or the non-appearance or the
shortage of witnesses for the prosecution; what we are simply saying is that
accusing an individual of respondent's stature naturally engenders fear of
physical harm, real or imagined, and can intimidate even the most stout-
hearted and temerarious individuals. This circumstance should have been
given weight in resolving the present controversy.
The third factor — the extent to which respondent has asserted his
right to speedy disposition of his case — further weakens his position. When
and how a defendant asserts his right should be given strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the accused is being deprived of the right.
The more serious the deprivation, the more likely an accused is to complain.
But the failure to invoke the right will make it difficult for an accused to
prove that he was denied thereof. 35
I do not think that the vigor with which respondent defended himself in
the original cases against him, and the vigilance with which he assailed the
filing of the new Informations now subject of the instant petition, is the
equivalent to an assertion of his right to speedy disposition. The trouble with
this observation is that every accused in a criminal case has the intense
desire to seek acquittal, or at least to see the swift end of the accusation
against him. To this end, it is natural for him to exert every effort within his
capacity to resist prosecution. But is it correct to assume that, in every
instance, the accused in resisting his criminal prosecution is also asserting
his right to speedy disposition?
Respondent's reliance on Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which some have said is based on the constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases, cannot be equated with a positive
assertion of the right to speedy disposition. A perusal of the records would
reveal that the issue of applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117, was raised by
respondent for the first time before the Court of Appeals, in his Second
Amended Petition — undoubtedly a mere afterthought. It was not his original
position before the trial court, which centered on the "lack of valid
'complaints' to justify a preliminary investigation of cases which had long
been dismissed." It was not even his initial position in the early stages of the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Within the context of the Balancing
Test, respondent's tardy, inexplicit and vague invocation of this right makes
it seriously difficult for him to prove the denial thereof.
Finally, the fourth factor is prejudice to the accused. Prejudice, of
course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of accused which the
speedy disposition right as well as the speedy trial right are designed to
protect. There are three (3) of such interests: (a) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (b) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and, (c) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. 36 Of the
three (3), the most significant is the last because the inability of the
defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. 37
Needless to say, respondent was never arrested or taken into custody,
or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any manner. These render the first
criterion inapplicable. Thus, the only conceivable harm to respondent from
the lapse of time may arise from anxiety and the potential prejudice to his
ability to defend his case. Even then, the harm suffered by respondent
occasioned by the filing of the criminal cases against him is too minimal and
insubstantial to tip the scales in his favor.
Concededly, anxiety typically accompanies a criminal charge. But not
every claim of anxiety affords the accused a ground to decry a violation of
the rights to speedy disposition of cases and to speedy trial. The anxiety
must be of such nature and degree that it becomes oppressive, unnecessary
and notoriously disproportionate to the nature of the criminal charge. To
illustrate, a prosecution for the serious crime of multiple murder naturally
generates greater degree of anxiety, than an indictment for, say, simple
estafa. The anxiety and the tarnished "reputation and image of respondent
who is, after all, presently and newly elected member of the Senate," does
not amount to that degree that would justify a nullification of the appropriate
and regular steps that must be taken to assure that while the innocent
should go unpunished, those guilty must expiate for their offense. Verily,
they pale in importance to the gravity of the charges and the paramount
considerations of seeking justice for the victims as well as redeeming the
sullied integrity and reputation of the Philippine National Police for their
alleged involvement in the perpetration of the ghastly crimes.
We cannot therefore hold, on the facts before us, that the delay in the
reinvestigation and refiling of the criminal cases weighed sufficiently in
support of the view that respondent's right to speedy disposition of his cases
has been violated. The delay simply does not justify the severe remedy of
dismissing the indictments. TCDHIc
Consistent with the views expressed above, I hold that no

constitutional, statutory and procedural impediments exist against the
subsequent re-indictment of respondent. Although we are dealing here with
alleged members of the notorious Kuratong Baleleng Gang, against whom
society must be protected, we must bear in mind that they too were human
beings with human rights. Indeed, life is so precious that its loss cannot
simply be consigned to oblivion in so short a time. Withal, the seriousness of
the accusations against respondent and other high-ranking officers of the
PNP goes into the very foundation of our law enforcement institutions. We
must ferret out the truth: Is the Philippine National Police so contaminated to
the core with corrupt and murderous police officers, worse than the criminal
elements they are trained to exterminate? Let us give the courts a chance to
find out — and more importantly — to absolve respondent and erase any
taint in his name, if innocent. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.
I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:
I
PRECIS
Our Resolution of May 28, 2002 was the result of a long and
exhaustive, nay, exhausting discussion of the meaning of Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As summed up in the new
ponencia of Mr. Justice Callejo, the Court ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is
applicable to the case at bar. Nonetheless evidence has to be adduced by
the parties to prove certain facts which shall determine whether said section
can be beneficially invoked by respondent Lacson. These vital facts, to quote
the new ponencia, are (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had
the express consent of the accused; (2) whether notices to the offended
parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by
then Judge Agnir, Jr.; (3) whether there were affidavits of desistance
executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (4) whether the 2-
year period to revive the cases has already lapsed; (5) whether there is any
justification for the re-filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (6)
whether the reckoning date of the 2-year bar shall be from the date of the
order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of
receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of
effectivity of the new rule; and (7) if the cases were revived only after the 2-
year bar, the State must justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar.
Thus, the case at bar was remanded to the RTC-Quezon City, Branch 81 to
enable the parties to adduce evidence on these factual issues. On the basis
of the evidence to be presented, the trial court will rule on the applicability of
section 8, Rule 117 to respondent Lacson. STcAIa
It is noteworthy that except for JJ. Melo and Carpio, who inhibited
themselves, the resolution was a unanimous one. The new ponencia now
seeks to reverse the unanimous resolution of this Court. The Court has four
new members and the passage of time has put a mist on some of the
themes and sub-themes considered in the discussion of Section 8, Rule 117.
I wish therefore to restate my humble understanding of Section 8, Rule 117,
as chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted
the said rule.
I start with the statement that the Committee was confronted with the
following problem:
1. A complaint or information has been filed with a court of
competent jurisdiction;
2. The prosecution after a number of settings cannot proceed with

the case for some reasons but usually due to the
unavailability of the complainant or witnesses to testify;
3. The accused is ready to proceed but cannot move to dismiss the
case and invoke his right to speedy trial because the delay of
the prosecution is not yet unreasonable;
4. As a half-way measure and to relieve himself of the heavy
burden of a pending criminal case, the accused agrees to a
provisional dismissal of the complaint or information against
him;
5. Under the rules and case-law prior to year 2000, the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case is open-ended. The case can be
revived by the prosecution without any time limit except
when it is already barred by prescription. It is not unusual for
the case to be frozen for an unreasonable length of time. It
remains in the docket of the court and contributes to its
clogging. Worse, it hangs like a sword of Damocles over the
head of the accused. It can fall principally depending on the
predilection and prejudice of the prosecutor.
First. It was this undesirable situation that the Committee on Revision
of the Rules of Court addressed when it designed Section 8, Rule 117 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court en banc found no
difficulty appreciating the rationale of the new rule for it approved the rule
with but a minor amendment. The amendment lengthened the time within
which the prosecution can revive the provisionally dismissed case in offenses
punishable by more than six (6) years of imprisonment. The time to revive
was stretched to two (2) years after a survey was made of offenses
punishable by imprisonment of six (6) years or more and a study of its
probable adverse impact on the government campaign against crimes. In
promulgating the new rule, the Court en banc struck a fine balance between
the sovereign right of the State to prosecute crimes and the inherent right of
the accused to be protected from the unnecessary burdens of criminal
litigation. The timeline within which provisionally dismissed cases can be
revived forms the crux of the delicate balance.
Second. Section 8, Rule 117 is a rule that gives an accused a new right
that is distinct from, among others, the right to speedy trial and the right
against double jeopardy. The resistance to recognize this new right and the
effort to unnecessarily link it with other rights of the accused are the main
causes of its misunderstanding. Thus, Section 8, Rule 117 should not be
confused with Rule 119 1 which is the rule of procedure that implements the
constitutional right of an accused to speedy trial. The confusion can
obliterate the difference in the time requirements in the two rules. The right
to speedy trial is determined by a flexible time standard. We resolve claims
of denial of the right to speedy trial by balancing the following factors: (1)
the duration of the delay, (2) the reason thereof, (3) the assertion of the right
or failure to assert it by the accused, and (4) the prejudice caused by such
delay. On the other hand, the timeline that restricts the right of the State to
revive a case in a Section 8, Rule 117 situation is inflexible if it is shown that
it has slept on its right without reason. Section 8, Rule 117 should not also
be confused with section 3(i), Rule 117 which is the rule of procedure that
protects the constitutional right of an accused against double jeopardy.
Again, the two rules are distinct, hence, it is not proper to require the
element of prior plea in double jeopardy cases in a Section 8, Rule 117
situation. In fine, Section 8, Rule 117 is a new rule that is complete by itself
and should not be construed in light of rules implementing other rights of an
accused.
Third. The provisional dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 119 becomes
permanent after the lapse of one or two years depending on the gravity of
the offense involved. There can be no hedging on the meaning of the word
permanent for the new rule used the word without a bit of embroidery. To be
emphatic, the lapse of the one (1) or two (2) years time puts a period to the
provisionally dismissed case and not a mere comma. It is true that during
the deliberations of the Committee, the provision was originally worded as
follows: "The corresponding order shall state that the provisional dismissal
shall become permanent and amount to acquittal one (1) year after its
issuance without the case having been revived." In the final version of the
provision, however, the phrase "amount to acquittal" was deleted. The
deletion was dictated by the belief that the phrase was a redundancy in light
of the clear and unequivocal import of the word "permanent." The deletion
cannot be distorted to mean that a case permanently dismissed can still be
revived. For if that were the intent, the rule could have easily stated that the
accused whose case has been permanently dismissed could nevertheless be
prosecuted for the same offense.
Fourth. The permanent dismissal of an unrevived case under Section 8,
Rule 117 does not unduly shorten the prescriptive period of offenses
provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The new rule
merely regulates the conduct of the prosecution of an offense once the case
is filed in court. It cannot be doubted that after a case is filed in court, its
conduct by the prosecution can be regulated by rules of procedure which are
within the exclusive power of this Court to promulgate. More specifically, the
new rule regulates the time when the State must complete the prosecution
of a pending case after its provisional dismissal. It provides the consequence
when the State sleeps on its duty to revive a provisionally dismissed case. If
the State loses the right to continue the prosecution of an offense already
filed in court, it is not because the rule has amended the prescriptive period
of the crime provided by our substantive law. Rather, it is a simple case
where the State forfeited its right to prosecute by its own inaction, an
inaction that unless justified cannot be allowed to further impair the rights of
an accused.
Fifth. The permanent dismissal under section 8, Rule 117 precludes the
prosecution of the accused for the same offense under a new information.
Again, it is true that we have rulings to the effect that a trial court may, in
the interest of justice, dismiss a case provisionally but without prejudice to
reinstating it before the order of dismissal becomes final or without prejudice
to the subsequent filing of a new information for the same offense. But note
should be taken of the important fact that these rulings were handed down
before Section 8, Rule 117 came into being. Section 8, Rule 117 changed the
old rule that dismissals which are provisional in character lack the
imprimatur of finality, hence, they do not bar the revival of the offense
charged or the filing of a new information for the same offense. The old rule
was precisely jettisoned by the Committee and by this Court because of its
unfairness to the accused. Again, I respectfully submit that the new rule
would be useless if it would leave unfettered the discretion of the prosecutor
in reviving the same offense under the fig leaf of a new information.
Sixth. I do not share the thesis that the re-filing of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 is not a revival of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689. There cannot be any dispute on the meaning of the
word revival in Section 8, Rule 117. Revival means reanimating or renewing
the case that has become dormant because of its provisional dismissal. The
cases that were provisionally dismissed for lack of probable cause refer to
the eleven (11) Informations for murder filed against the respondent, et al.,
allegedly for the summary execution of some members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang. Without doubt, these are the same cases re-filed against the
respondent after another preliminary investigation with the principal
difference that respondent is now charged as a principal and no longer as an
accessory.
I respectfully submit that the test to determine whether a case can be
revived is not whether a new preliminary investigation has been conducted
by the prosecution. That test, if allowed, would torture out of context the
intent of Section 8, Rule 117. The new rule speaks of "case" and "offenses."
It clearly prohibits the revival of the case against an accused which has been
provisionally dismissed for failure of the State to continue its prosecution
without any justification. I like to underscore that the prohibition against
revival is not a free gift by the State to an accused. The right against revival
is the result of a trade-off of valuable rights for the accused can exercise it
only if he surrenders his right to an early permanent dismissal of the case
against him due to the inability of the State to prosecute. In so doing, the
accused suffers a detriment for he gives the State one to two years to revive
a case which has already been frozen for failure to prosecute. During this
waiting period, the accused cannot move to dismiss the charge against him
while the State can locate its missing witnesses, secure them if they are
threatened and even gather new evidence. In exchange for this period of
grace given to the State, the rule sets a timeline for the prosecutors to revive
the case against the accused. The timeline is fixed for the accused has
suffered an indubitable detriment and the trade-off for this detriment is the
duty imposed on the prosecution either to continue or discontinue with the
case within the 1 or 2-year grace period. We cannot allow the undue
extension of this detriment unless the State can show compelling reasons to
justify its failure to prosecute. The open-ended practice under the old rule
which makes provisional dismissal permanently provisional is precisely the
evil sought to be extirpated by Section 8, Rule 117. HCaDIS
Seventh, I wish to stress the bigger reason for Section 8, Rule 117. The
new rule does enhance the constitutional rights of an accused to speedy trial
and speedy disposition of the case(s) against him but it is much more than
that. More broadly, the new rule was designed to achieve one of the end-
goals of the criminal process — to minimize the burdens of accusation and
litigation . This end-goal is well explained by La Fave and Israel, conceded
authorities in Criminal Procedure, viz: 2
"(d) Minimizing the Burdens of Accusation and Litigation. Even
though eventually acquitted, an innocent person charged with a crime
suffers substantial burdens. The accusation casts a doubt on the
person's reputation that is not easily erased. Frequently, the public
remembers the accusation and still suspects guilt even after an
acquittal. Moreover, even where an acquittal is accepted as fully
vindicating the accused, it hardly remedies other costs suffered in the
course of gaining that verdict. The period spent by the accused
awaiting trial commonly is filled with a substantial degree of anxiety
and insecurity that disrupts the daily flow of his life. That disruption is,
of course, even greater if he is incarcerated pending trial. The accused
also must bear the expense and ordeal of the litigation process itself."
This end-goal is by no means novel. We have various rules of criminal

procedure to minimize the burdens of litigation. Our rules on bail, venue,
double jeopardy, speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases, etc., are among
them. In fine, we have been promulgating rules to minimize the burdens of
litigation for a long, long time.
Let me also underscore that Section 8, Rule 117 was promulgated in
the exercise of the expanded power of this Court to enact rules of procedure
under Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court."
This provision 3 expanded the rule making power of this Court for (1) it
extended its power not only to cover pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar but
also to encompass the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
and legal assistance to the underprivileged, and (2) it no longer contained
the restriction that said rules "may be repealed, altered or supplemented by
the Batasang Pambansa." 4 As aforediscussed, Section 8, Rule 117 was
designed to diminish the burdens of litigation by fixing a timeline on
provisional dismissal of cases beyond which they cannot be revived. The
regulation of the conduct of a criminal case once filed in court, including the
time within which it must be terminated, is inherent in judicial power.
Section 8, Rule 117 is an exercise of this power, a power that this Court has
exercised without any question since the 1935 Constitution.
II
The dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express
consent
This Court did not err when it ruled "that the provisional dismissal of
the case against respondent Lacson bears his express consent."
The records will show that respondent Lacson filed before then Judge
Agnir, Jr. who was to try Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause. The motion contained
the following prayer:
"xxx xxx xxx
(1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to section
2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court,
and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing
scheduled therefore; and
(2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld,
or, if issued recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this
incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for." 5
In ruling that the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson did
not bear his consent, the ponencia states that ". . . respondent merely filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause . . .." 6 It emphasizes that
no motion for provisional dismissal of the cases was filed. With due respect,
the effort to distinguish the two motions is futile for it is seeking a distinction
when there is no difference. The essence of both motions is the lack of
probable cause of the Informations. If the motions succeed, there is only one
course of action for the judge to take — to dismiss the Informations. For all
intents and purposes, a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
can be treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. Thus,
Judge Agnir, Jr. prefaced the resolution of respondent Lacson's motion in this
wise:
"Before the Court are five (5) separate but identical motions filed
thru their respective counsel by the twenty-six (26) accused in the
above numbered cases, praying the Court to (1) make a judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest, (2) to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants in
the meantime, and (3) to dismiss the cases should the court find lack of
probable cause."
Prescinding from this understanding, then Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his
Resolution dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, viz:
"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in
support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with
the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to
show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are
probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-cited, there is no
more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose them to
an open and public accusation. It is time to write finis to these cases
and lay to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all
those involved — the accused, the prosecution witnesses and the
private complainants alike — may get on with their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case
o f People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999)
where the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that 'if the
Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public
prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because
evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial',
and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno 'is an exception to the general
rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly
shown to exist.'
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench
clearly make an exception to the general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no
probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the
accused or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the Informations in the
above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed."
SO ORDERED.” (italics supplied )
To justify his ruling, the ponente insists that "respondent did not pray
for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689, neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a
mere provisional dismissal of the case." 7 With due respect, the specific
prayer demanded by the ponente is unnecessary. Under Rule 112, Section 6
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge may "immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause." Likewise, the motion for judicial determination of probable cause
prayed for "other equitable reliefs." Similarly, there need not be any
agreement on the provisional character of the dismissal of the said cases.
The cases were dismissed not on the merits but for lack of probable cause
and before the arraignment of respondent Lacson. Their dismissal was
provisional by operation of our rules.
The ponencia then cites certain judicial "admissions" by the counsel of
respondent Lacson to the effect that they did not move to dismiss the
Informations against said respondent nor agree to their provisional dismissal.
Again with due respect, these so called "admissions" should be taken in their
proper context. These "admissions" were made in the course of the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals. The parties then were arguing that
the re-filing of the cases will violate the rule on double jeopardy. Naturally,
respondent Lacson took the position that his right against double jeopardy
would be violated, hence, he was insisting that the dismissal of the cases
was without his express consent. Naturally too, the petitioner took the
opposite view that the rule on double jeopardy would not be breached
because respondent consented to their dismissal. If the ponencia will hold
respondent Lacson to his "admission" that he did not consent to the
dismissal of his cases, it should similarly hold petitioner to its "admission"
that respondent consented to the dismissal of the cases against him. In truth,
the evidentiary rule on admission governs the act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact and should not be applied on arguments of
parties. The issue in the case at bar is the nature and effect of a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause — i.e., whether or not it can be
treated by a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of probable cause. The
issue is basically legal, and should be resolved in accordance with our laws
and not on the basis of the arguments of parties which are often twisted to
serve their peculiar interests.
III
It is not clear whether the offended parties had knowledge of the dismissal of
their Informations against respondent Lacson
In our resolution under reconsideration, we explained why there is
uncertainty on the factual issue of whether notices were sent to the offended
parties, viz:
"xxx xxx xxx
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with
conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given
before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by
Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of Judge Agnir that the
relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing.
Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin
Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in
preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also
appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of
desistance, namely:
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey
Abalora;
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;

f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
g. Rolando Siplon
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined
whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives
of the three (3) other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico
Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether
they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure,
it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then
Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in
the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the
RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba , to enjoin the prosecutors
from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question
raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the
right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of
whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was
not tackled by the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of
proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent
Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided
by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the
case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in
the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge
Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against
him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule
117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of
Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the
argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple
murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not
require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices
were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the
dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be
sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the
effect that "records show that the prosecution and the private offended
parties were notified of the hearing . . . ." It is doubtful whether this
finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be
contrary to Judge Agnir's finding that only seven (7) of the
complainants submitted affidavits of desistance." (italics supplied )
The ponencia will reverse this ruling on the following ratiocination:

“In the case at bar, even if the respondent's motion for a
determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be
considered for the nonce, as his motion for a provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of
the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said
motion on May 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed
his motion only on May 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on May 22,
1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public
prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not
show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the
victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them
including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were
residents of Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon,
Leyte. There is as well no proof in the records that the public
prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the
hearing thereof on May 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, he did so only for some but not all
the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero,
Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora,
and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon) executed their
respective affidavits of desistance. There was no appearance for the
heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr. and Meleubren Sorronda. In fine,
there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public
prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the
victims of the respondent's motion and the hearing thereon. The said
heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondent's
motion and to protect their interests." (italics supplied )
Again, I beg to disagree. The ponencia cites the records of the cases to
justify its conclusion that notices were not sent to the offended parties. I
cannot be as dogmatic as the ponente. As stated in our Resolution, Section
8, Rule 117 was not yet in existence when then Judge Agnir, Jr. resolved
respondent Lacson's motion for judicial determination of probable cause. It
is, therefore, unrealistic to look only at the records of the cases to determine
compliance with yet an inexistent rule. To my mind, what ought to be done
is to determine whether the offended parties had knowledge of respondent
Lacson's motion for judicial determination of probable cause. They may have
such knowledge despite lack of formal notice from the court or notice from
the public and private prosecutors. It ought to be beyond argument that
such a formal notice is only one source of knowledge of the offended parties.
Moreover, there is the unresolved question of who are the "offended" parties
in the case at bar. It will be noted that in some of the criminal cases
dismissed by then Judge Agnir, Jr., those who executed affidavits of
desistance were the wives, or the mothers of the victims. Are they the only
"offended" parties or should the other "heirs" be included? Should all of
them be notified? These and other questions should first be resolved by the
trial court, hence, our resolution to remand.
IV
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies retroactively
T h e ponencia correctly holds that Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not a statute of limitations. As postulated in
the précis, the one-year or two-year bar is a special procedural rule
qualifying the right of the State to prosecute cases already filed in court. The
time-bar under the new rule does not curtail the periods under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code. The State retains the full period under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code within which to secure the necessary evidence and
file the appropriate criminal cases against the accused. But once the State
files a criminal case and involves the courts, the constitutional power of this
Court to set the rules of procedure for the prosecution of cases cannot be
doubted. The power belongs to this Court alone and there are no uncertain
umbras and penumbras in its parameters which other branches of the
government can claim.
To emphasize, the time-bar for the revival of provisionally dismissed
cases was adopted for the purpose, among others, of (1) discouraging hasty
and baseless filing of criminal cases; and (2) penalizing the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. The non-revival
of provisionally dismissed cases after the lapse of the one-year or two-year
period creates a disputable presumption of inexcusable delay on the part of
the State in prosecuting the case. But this does not mean that the mere
passage of the one-year or two-year period bars the State from reviving the
provisionally dismissed cases. The State has the right to present compelling
reasons to justify the revival of the cases beyond the one-year or two-year
time bar. The reservation of this right should remove any charge of
unfairness to the State.
Regrettably, the ponencia concedes that Section 8, Rule 117 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is a procedural rule but holds that it could
not be applied retroactively. It is unreasonably struck by the fear that its
retroactive application would cause "injustice or hardship to the State and
adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws
in particular." It contends that the period from March 30, 1999 to November
30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period
because the new rule prescribing it was then not yet in effect.
Again, I beg to disagree. Jurisprudence that has resisted the tempest of
time teaches us that statutes and rules should be construed in the light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The
unerring principle that ought to guide any attempt to construe them should
be their intended scope and purpose. 8 In the case at bar, it is crystal clear
that the new rule is intended to apply to all provisionally dismissed cases
before its passage. It is a remedial measure to check the continuing inaction
on the part of the State to prosecute pending cases in court. Its purpose is to
press the State to act on cases it has inexcusably put in deep slumber in our
courts of justice. It provides relief to the accused who are prejudiced when
the cases filed in court against them remain dormant for an unreasonable
length of time. In fine, the new rule is a remedial rule that looks back even
as it looks forward. It reaches both the past and the future. It is both
retrospective and prospective.
To be sure, there is nothing novel in the new rule when it reaches the
past. Under the ruling case law, statutes regulating the procedure of courts
are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its
passage. 9 The retroactive application of procedural rules cannot be
challenged as violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor give rise from, procedural laws. 10
The only conceivable exception to this general rule is if the retroactive
application of the procedural rule "would not be feasible or would work
injustice. 11 As amply demonstrated, however, the new rule will not impair
the right of the State to prosecute criminals. The State is not prejudiced by
the time-bar if it can justify its delay in the prosecution of cases. If it cannot
justify its delay, it cannot complain of unfairness. No government can claim
the right to prosecute at its perpetual pleasure. It cannot file a criminal case
and sleep on it. It is self-evident that inexcusable delays in the prosecution
of a case deny an accused the right to a fair trial.
With due respect, I submit that the ponencia sends a wrong message in
batting only for the prospective application of the new rule. To hold that the
State could not be faulted for not reviving the case within two years simply
because the new rule was not yet in effect implies that this Court sanctions
delays in the prosecution of cases, however inexcusable the delays were.
Pushed to the extreme, the majority in effect bars the application of the new
rule to cases provisionally dismissed five or ten years ago on the simple
reason that during the interregnum, the new rule was not yet in effect. Let
us not half pause in applying the new rule for it addresses inexcusable
delays in the prosecution of cases already filed in court. Devoid of legalese,
it tells the State not to sleep on its job. If we cannot tell the prosecution to do
its job within a reasonable time frame, we might as well close shop.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DENY petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. HAICTD
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
Petitioners argue that while Section 8, Rule 117, of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure bars the revival of a case upon the lapse of the one-year
period or the two-year period, as the case may be, after its provisional
dismissal, the rule, however, does not contain any proscription against the
filing of a new information involving the same incident so long as it is done
within prescriptive period of the offense provided in Article 90 and Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code or such as may otherwise be expressed by
statute.
Prescription of crimes pertains to the loss or waiver by the State of its
right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. 1 It is the policy of
the law that prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing that
promptitude should be maintained, these provisions being not merely acts
of grace but checks imposed by the State upon itself "to exact vigilant
activity from its subalterns and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence
that can be obtained." 2 Once a criminal case is instituted, the issue on
prescription is addressed and the rule on prescription as a substantive
provision would have then so served its purpose. Thenceforth, assuming the
timely filing of the case, the rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme
Court must govern. In fine, while Article 90 and Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code fix the period when the State must file a case against an accused
after the discovery of the crime by the offended party, Section 8, Rule 117,
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, applies once an action has been
instituted. The substantive provisions govern the institution of the case; the
procedural rules steps in thereafter. The Supreme Court is vested by the
Constitution with the power to "promulgate rules concerning . . . pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts." 3 The 1987 Charter not only has
deleted the authority of the legislature to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules promulgated by the Court but it also expanded the Court's rule-making
power to cover the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. 4
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has incorporated
Section 8, Rule 117, in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz:
"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally

"The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived."
In this regard, I share the conclusions reached by my esteemed

colleague, Justice Reynato S. Puno, that there are yet a number of factors
that must first be established and considered mainly evidentiary, before this
Court can appropriately rule on the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
I find petitioners' motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated

May 28, 2002 bereft of merit. The cases filed against respondent Senator
Panfilo M. Lacson should be DISMISSED on the grounds that his
constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases has been
violated and that the filing of new Informations against him constitutes
persecution.
Also, I maintain that Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, an implementing Rule of the right to speedy trial and
speedy disposition of cases, applies to respondent's cases upon a showing
before the trial court that its requirements have been complied with.
I. Respondent's constitutional
right to speedy trial and
speedy disposition of his cases
has been violated.
Statutes cannot be effective to place any limitation on a person's
constitutional right, 1 and therefore they should not be regarded as a
definition of the constitutional provision. 2 It is thus conceivable that the
constitutional provision is violated although its implementing statute is not. 3
This is because constitutions are not adopted to control the rights and
procedures of the moment but to establish broad principles of justice and
fair play for all time. 4
The present controversy brings into focus the novel provision, Section
8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
"Sec. 8. Provisional Dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally
"The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two years after issuance
of the order without the case having been revived." (Italics supplied)
In our Resolution now being challenged by petitioners in their Motion
for Reconsideration, we held that the above Rule is inapplicable to the cases
of respondent because the records fail to show that its requirements have
been complied with. These requirements as applied to his cases are: the
provisional dismissal by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 against respondent must have been
with his express consent and with notice to the offended parties; and the
reckoning date of the two-year period within which to revive the cases
should have been properly determined. Consequently, in the same
Resolution, we remanded the case at bar to the trial court to enable the
parties to adduce evidence on whether the said requirements have been
complied with on the basis of which the trial court should rule on whether
the newly filed Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 against
respondent should be dismissed or not.
In petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, they contend that the
retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 117 violates the people's right to
due process; and that for lack of express consent of respondent and prior
notice to the offended parties, the Rule does not apply to his cases.
The novelty of Section 8, Rule 117 somehow shades the more
important issue of whether respondent's constitutional right to speedy trial
and disposition of cases has been violated.
Section 8 of Rule 117 was promulgated pursuant to the constitutional
guarantee of speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. Clearly, there can
be no automatic inference that because Section 8 was found to be
inapplicable, as claimed by petitioners, respondent's right to speedy trial and
speedy disposition of his cases was not violated. Lest we miss the forest for
the trees, extreme caution should be exercised so that the general terms of
the constitutional guarantee would not be lost in the specific and detailed
provisions of the rules promulgated for its enforcement.
Speedy trial is said to constitute not a privilege, 5 but a right, one that
is recognized as fundamental. It is one of the most basic and inviolable
rights. 6 Thus, enshrined in our Constitution is the mandate that "in all
criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial." 7 To
expedite not only the trial stage but also the disposition of the case itself,
the framers of our Constitution saw the need to further provide that "all
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." 8
The crusade towards a speedy justice did not stop in the Constitution.
To supplement it and to render its guarantee more effective, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) which aims to
ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. For its part, this Court promulgated Circular No. 39-98 for the
purpose of implementing the provisions of RA 8493. And when the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure was drafted, substantial portions of RA
8493 and Circular No. 39-98 were included therein, thus:
Section 1 (g) of Rule 116 — Unless a shorter period is provided
by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency or a motion
to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension
of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.
Section 1 of Rule 119 — After a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The
trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial
order.
Section 2 of Rule 119 — Trial once commenced shall continue
from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.
The Court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and
defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Supreme Court.
And still, to achieve speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases, this
Court promulgated Section 8, Rule 117.
The foregoing laws and rules are merely tools to enforce the
constitutional guarantee. They do not constitute its "definition." It bears
reiterating that just because Section 8, Rule 117 is found to be inapplicable
does not ipso facto indicate that there is no violation of the right to speedy
trial and speedy disposition of cases. The laws and rules, which are just
legislative construction or application of the pervasive constitutional
guarantee must be construed fairly in view of the right they seek to enforce.
They cannot be considered to have a limiting effect on the constitutional
guarantee. Significantly, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
silent on the matter. Section 10, Rule 119 specifically states:
SEC. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy
trial in the Constitution. — No provision of law on speedy trial and no
rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge
of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by section 14 (2),
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ultimately, whether the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial has

been complied with is still a judicial question to be answered in the light of
the circumstances of each particular case and guided by the principle that
the proceedings were free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
9 Our case law is rich with doctrines setting the parameters of the right to
speedy trial and the right to speedy disposition of cases. In the recent case
of People vs. Leviste, 10 we reiterated our ruling that the right to speedy trial
is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive
delay without the participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified
postponements are sought which prolong the trial for unreasonable length of
time.
On the other hand, in Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr. 11 we laid down the
guidelines in determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition"
formula. There, we held that speedy disposition of cases is a relative term.
Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of
cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Years of serious deliberation yield certain factors to be considered in
the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial and speedy
disposition of cases has been violated. These are: 1) length of delay; 2)
reason for the delay; 3) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and 4)
prejudice caused by the delay. 12 These factors are effective in balancing the
interest of the State and the accused.
Records show that the period between the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 and the refiling of the new Informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, is two (2) years and two (2)
months. It may be recalled that Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 were
dismissed on March 29, 1999. 13 The Department of Justice (DOJ) re-
investigated the cases only upon its receipt on March 29, 2001 of General
Leandro Mendoza's letter indorsing the affidavits of P/S Ins. Abelardo Ramos
and P/Ins. Ysmael Yu. On June 6, 2001, new Informations were filed against
respondent. Petitioners justify the belated re-investigation on the ground
that prior to the appearance of Ramos and Yu, the government had no
evidence to sustain the refiling of the cases. 14 They also claim that due to
respondent's close association with Former President Joseph Estrada and his
position then as PNP Chief, the witnesses were deterred from coming out
with the truth. 15
The justifications raised by petitioners are contrary to the records. As
early as July 1999, Yu executed an affidavit attesting to the very same facts
contained in his March 24, 2001 affidavit. 16 Another witness, Mario Enad,
also executed his affidavit as early as August 8, 1995. 17 Petitioners have
never claimed that these two were unwilling to testify on earlier dates. Also,
nowhere in their affidavits is a statement that they were afraid of testifying
against respondent because he is a friend of the Former President or was a
PNP Chief. The two even mentioned the names of other witnesses whom
petitioners could have utilized in an earlier re-investigation. Clearly, what
glares from the records is that from the time of the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89, there was an unjustified interval of inactivity
of more than two (2) years on the part of the prosecution. HScaCT
Petitioners cannot argue that respondent failed to assert his right to

speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. While we have ruled that if an
accused wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should
ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case, 18 however, the same
cannot be expected of respondent. It would be ludicrous for him to ask for
the trial of his cases when the same had already been dismissed. During the
interval, there were no incidents that would prompt him to invoke the right.
Indeed, the delay could only be attributed to the inaction on the part of the
investigating officials. 19
Neither can petitioners argue that the right to speedy trial is
inapplicable since the charges have been dismissed. As explained by Justice
Marshall, the anxiety brought by public prosecution does not disappear
simply because the initial charges are temporarily dismissed. After all, the
government has revealed the seriousness of its threat of prosecution by
initially bringing charges. 20 Consequently, when the government has
already investigated and charged an accused, it is in a much better position
and properly shoulders a greater responsibility to reinvestigate and re-
prosecute him with reasonable promptness. Sadly, this was not done in this
case. In Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan 21 we upheld the accused's right to
speedy disposition of his case notwithstanding his alleged failure to take any
step to assert his right, thus:
"We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor's ratiocination. It is the
duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated
by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object
to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that
it was not due to causes directly attributable to him ."
Generally, the question of how much lapse of time is consistent with
the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases
varies with the particular circumstances. There is no constitutional basis for
holding that the right to a speedy trial can be quantified into a specified
number of days and months. 22 The mere passage of time is not sufficient to
establish a denial of a right to a speedy trial, but a lengthy delay, which is
presumptively prejudicial, triggers the examination of other factors to
determine whether rights have been violated. 23 In a case, it has been held
that a delay of more than one (1) year is presumptively prejudicial and shifts
the burden to the government to justify the delay. 24 Certainly, the two-year
delay here is prejudicial to respondent and it should be taken against
petitioners, they having failed to show any good cause or reason for such
delay.
Another factor to be considered in determining whether respondent's
right to a speedy trial and disposition of cases has been violated is the
prejudice to him. In his comment, he states:
". . . (i) he had every reason to believe that the sword of
Damocles which had hang atop his head by virtue of the filing of the
original charges in 1995 had been obliterated by their dismissal in
1999 as he has the right to Due Process and to be rid of the paranoia of
being harassed for charges by the Republic and to indict him for
heinous offenses and subject him to a non-bailable action
disenfranchises eight (8) Million or so voters who had put him in office
as their representative, (ii) it smacks of oppression as petitioner DOJ
Secretary had filed or instigated new cases against him for an
undisclosed political agenda, (iii) his detractors, including petitioner
DOJ Secretary, have the capacity to influence the litigation including
the investigation and prosecution thereof, (iv) it is plainly a vindictive
action perpetrated by a PNP Senior Superintendent whom petitioner
had accused of kidnapping for which he was punished and sent to the
National Penitentiary until he was recently released and re-assumed a
post as Intelligence Chief under the current administration, and (v)
respondent is now the subject of persecution and not prosecution." 25
There is no denying that the filing of new Informations against

respondent had caused him undue prejudice. Almost eight (8) years have
elapsed since November 21, 1995, 26 the date the original Informations were
filed, and more than three (3) years have passed since Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to 89 were dismissed on March 29, 1999. It is therefore
reasonable for respondent to expect that by this time, petitioners would
finally give him peace of mind. In Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan, 27 we ruled
that the delay in the disposition of the case had caused "much prejudice,
distress and anxiety to petitioner whose career as bank executive and
businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved
criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles' sword over his head
for more than a decade." There, we stressed the consequences and
problems inherent in protracted litigation which include, among others, the
stagnant professional growth, hampered travel opportunities and a
besmirched reputation. It cannot be said that respondent does not suffer the
same consequences now.
Prejudice does not only consist of impairment of the accused's 'ability
to defend himself, it may also include other sufferings, such as anxiety and
stigma. 28 Respondent is not an ordinary citizen. He is a Senator who has a
reputation to protect. The publicity caused by the refiling of new
Informations undoubtedly tainted his name. Moreover, he has to defend
himself constantly from the nagging accusations that interfere in the
performance of his duties as a Senator.
I believe that the prosecution now of respondent is tantamount to
persecution.
While it is the policy of this Court not to interfere in the exercise of the
prosecutors' discretion, however, it cannot tolerate a refiling of new
Informations, as in this case, at the impulse of the officials in command. The
prosecution of an accused must not be made to depend on who is perceived
as an enemy by those who sit in power but on the sacrosanct duty of
prosecutors to bring to justice those believed to be offenders of the law while
ensuring that their rights under the Constitution remain inviolable.
The sudden over-eagerness of petitioners to prosecute respondent, to
my mind, is not really an indicum of competence, it is a clear example of
persecution. This was not overlooked by the Court of Appeals which held:
". . . Apparently, hints of persecution are manifest in the case of
petitioner. For one, though earlier accused as an accessory in the
original multiple murder cases, petitioner is now charged as a principal
in the recent revival of the criminal cases — obviously to preclude any
opportunity on his part to evade incarceration by seeking bail.
Persecution is likewise apparent in the hurried pace at which the
preliminary investigation of the subject criminal cases was completed
by respondent prosecutors and in the immediate and abrupt filing of
the Informations against petitioners in only a matter of days after the
original petition had been filed in this Court." 29
Petitioners ought to be reminded of the caveat in Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan 30 that "prosecutors should not allow and should avoid
giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of
justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike,
whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty." Their undue
haste in conducting the preliminary investigation of the 26 accused and their
inordinate interest to re-file the cases hurriedly raise a quizzical eyebrow.
Not to be glossed over is the fact that the preliminary investigation
which resulted in the filing of new Informations was initiated only by the
letter dated March 27, 2001 of PNP Chief General Mendoza to then DOJ
Secretary Hernando B. Perez. I do not think that the said letter could qualify
as a complaint under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 31 the basis for a preliminary investigation. The
procedure adopted is a departure from the usual mode. Again, in Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, 32 we held:
"A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the
impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly , the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after Tatad had a falling out
with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-
finding investigation and report."
Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the new

Informations against respondent are indicative of persecution and not
prosecution. HaIATC
One thing for which this Court must guard itself against is to be used
as an instrument of political manipulation. As the last bulwark of the
defenseless and the accused, our duty is to uphold the law and no other.
Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over
the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other,
the scales of justice tilt towards the former. 33
II. Section 8, Rule 117 applies
to respondent's cases upon
compliance with its
requirements.
Going back to Section 8, Rule 117, the remand of this case to the trial
court for the determination of whether or not the requirements of this
provision have been complied with is imperative.
I am not convinced that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to 89 was without the consent of respondent and that the offended
parties were not notified. It appears from the Resolution 34 dated March 29,
1999 of the trial court that respondent's prayer was for that court to "(1)
make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants
in the meantime; and (3) dismiss the cases should the court find probable
cause." Clearly, this third plea is a manifestation that the dismissal of the
cases was with respondent's consent. While it is true that what he filed is a
mere motion for the judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses, the same was anchored on the case
o f Allado vs. Diokno. 35 There, we ruled that "[I]f upon the filing of the
information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the
document attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists, he must
either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply
dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further
expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable
cause exists." With this as respondent's premise, I believe it is safe to
conclude that the dismissal was with his express consent.
At any rate, considering the view that there is doubt on whether
respondent gave his express consent to the dismissal of the cases, as
expressed in our challenged Resolution, this incident should be determined
by the trial court. With respect to the requirement of notice to the offended
parties, again the same should be addressed to the trial court which can
hear the parties thereon. We must maintain a hands-off stance on these
matters for a different approach might lead us astray into the field of factual
conflict where our legal pronouncements would not rest on solid grounds.
Time and again we have ruled that this Court is not a trier of facts. 36
The petitioners maintain that Section 8, Rule 117 cannot be applied
retroactively for to do so would work injustice to the People. Settled in our
jurisprudence is the principle that when a new law will be advantageous to
the accused, the same may be given retroactive effect. 37 This is more
particularly so when the law is merely procedural. In several cases, we
applied the provisions of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactively.
38 We should take the same action on Section 8, Rule 117 considering that it
is a reinforcement of a person's constitutional right to speedy trial and

speedy disposition of cases.
Moreover, it has been held that the constitutional provision barring the
passage of retroactive laws protects only the rights of citizens. Hence, a
state may constitutionally pass a retroactive law that impairs its own rights.
39 Only private, and not public, rights may become vested in a constitutional
sense. 40 Otherwise stated, there is a distinction between the effect to be
given a retroactive statute when it relates to private rights and when it
relates to public rights. Public rights may always be modified or annulled by
subsequent legislation without contravening the Due Process Clause. 41
While I concurred in our challenged Resolution that this case should be
remanded to the trial court to enable it to determine whether the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with, however, I
still believe that we should settle now once and for all the most crucial issue,
i.e., whether or not the provisional dismissal contemplated in the Rule shall
become permanent two years after the issuance of the order and thus
constitutes a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. To
evade it now is to delay the day of reckoning and to put the legal community
in a quandary.
The principle adhered to by petitioners is that the rule "prohibits only a
revival of a criminal case after the lapse of the periods prescribed therein
and does not impinge on the right of the State to prosecute an offender for
the same offense under a new Information." 42 Thus, there arises the
distinction between "revival" and "filing of a new Information."
Section 8 of Rule 117 is a new provision. To reiterate, it draws its life
from the constitutional guarantees of speedy trial 43 and speedy disposition
of cases. Its mandate is explicit, i.e., a provisional dismissal of an offense
becomes "permanent" if not revive within the prescribed periods (or two
years in respondent's cases). To say that this "permanent" dismissal
prohibits only the "revival" of the case but not the "filing" of new
Information, is to render the provision ineffectual, providing only lip service
to the accused's constitutional right it seeks to enforce. Indeed, what
difference will the provision make if after the lapse of two years, the State
can still prosecute the accused for the same offense by merely "filing" a new
Information? With the interpretation given, the dismissal cannot really be
considered "permanent." After two years, all the prosecution has to do is to
file a new Information. Thus, whether by "revival" or by "filing a new
Information," the effect is the same, i.e., the prosecution of the accused for
the same offense continues. What is overlooked is that, in the interim, he
continues to suffer all the prejudices that come with the failure of the
prosecution to put a real end to his case. We might as well take heed of the
warning against "allowing doctrinaire concepts . . . to submerge the practical
demands of the constitutional right to a speedy trial." 44
What price does the State have to pay for its lethargy or negligence to
prosecute? If I am to follow petitioners' position, then I can say that the only
sanction for the violation of the periods prescribed in Section 8 is that the
State should conduct the corresponding new preliminary investigation before
it can file a new information. It seems to me that the new preliminary
investigation is the only difference between "filing a new information" and
"revival." To my mind, conducting a preliminary investigation is hardly a
sanction for the prosecution's negligence. While a new preliminary
investigation causes intense inconvenience to the prosecution, the accused
suffers as well. Indeed, considering the additional delay the prosecution
incurs in bringing the case to a conclusion as a result of the filing of a new
information and the anxiety on the part of the accused by a threat of a new
prosecution, the interpretation accorded to Section 8, Rule 117 has not
advanced its real purpose.
Let it be stressed that Section 8 was introduced not so much for the
interest of the State but precisely for the protection of the accused against
protracted prosecution. The measure of protection consistent with its
language is the treatment of the "permanent" dismissal as a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
The discharge of an accused for failure of the prosecution to bring him
to trial within the prescribed period is not an entirely new concept. Even
prior to the introduction of Section 8, there were already provisions of similar
import in other jurisdictions. Under certain statutes implementing the
constitutional right of an accused to speedy trial, a discharge granted
pursuant to the statute is held to be a bar to subsequent prosecution,
whether under the same or new indictment. This view has been defended on
the ground that any other construction would open the way for complete
evasion of the statute and that the constitutional provision can only be given
its legitimate effect by holding that a person once discharged is entitled to
immunity from further prosecution for the same offense. 45
In State vs. Crawford 46 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
entered a judgment forever discharging the accused from prosecution for
the offense on the basis of a rule requiring that "every person charged with
felony, and remanded to a circuit court for trial, shall be forever discharged
from prosecution for the offense, if there be three regular terms of such
court, after the indictment is found against him without a trial." The
discharge was decreed notwithstanding the fact that it was within the third
term that the State entered a nolle prosequi and at the same time reindict
for the same offense. The court ratiocinated:
"When a prisoner has stood ready for trial through two full terms
and substantially through the third one, and, no doubt, until the jury
has been discharged and the opportunity for trial at that term
annihilated, he has substantially performed all the statutory conditions
required to his right of discharge. Although such a discharge is not the
moral equivalent of an acquittal, and he may be guilty, his
constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence determined by a trial
within a reasonable time cannot be frittered away upon purely
technical and unsubstantial ground. Nor is the legislative act designed
to enforce such right to be interpreted otherwise than in accordance
with the recognized rules of construction. To permit the state to enter a
nolle prosequi within the third term and reindict for the same offense,
and thus deprive the prisoner of the terms fully elapsed as well as the
term about to end, would make it possible to keep the prisoner in
custody or under recognizance for an indefinite period of time, on
charges of a single offense, unless perhaps, he could enforce a trial by
the writ of mandamus. Such a construction as substantially tends to
the defeat or undue limitation of the purpose of a statute is not
permissible in any jurisdiction.
"[4] That statutes shall be so construed as to effectuate the
legislative purpose, not defeat it, is fundamental and all-pervasive in
statutory construction. The remedy given by law for failure to accord a
prompt trial to one charged with felony is right to be discharged, not
mandamus to obtain such trial. . . .."
I n People vs. Allen, 47 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a
discharge of the accused for failure of the prosecution to try him within four
months after written demand, renders him immune from trial for the same
offense whether under the same or a new indictment. In Newlin vs. People, 48
the same court ruled that where a defendant, indicted and committed for
crime, is entitled, under the statute, to a discharge for delay in not bringing
him to trial while being held under the indictment, the fact that a second
indictment is found for the same offense and a nolle prosequi entered as to
the first indictment, does not defeat his right to be discharged. Again, in
People vs. Heider 49 the same court held that an accused who has obtained
his discharge owing to the failure of the People to bring his case to trial
within the time prescribed by the statute enacted to carry into effect the
constitutional guaranty of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be committed or
held for the same offense under a new indictment.
Clearly, there is a catena of jurisprudence supporting the principle that
the first discharge of the accused under a statute implementing the
constitutional right to speedy trial constitutes a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. I see no reason why we cannot adopt the
same principle.
To reiterate, Section 8, Rule 117 seeks to implement the constitutional
guarantees that a) in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have a speedy trial, 50 and b) that all persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. 51 The importance of these rights cannot be
overemphasized. They are necessary and vital because a person should not
have to face continued anxiety under a prolonged threat of criminal
prosecution. Postponement of trial for a long time will ordinarily handicap an
accused through the disappearance of necessary witnesses and loss of
documentary evidence. Furthermore, after many months or years, the
memory of those witnesses who are available will likely be impaired by the
passage of time. These rights are protections too against the harassment of
being subjected to accusation, with its harmful effect on the accused's
reputation and business affairs. 52 As aptly observed in a case,
"unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial threatens to
produce more than one sort of harm, including 'oppressive pre-trial
incarceration,' 'anxiety and concern of the accused,' and the 'possibility that
the accused's defense will be impaired' by dimming memories and loss of
exculpatory evidence." Of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the
last because the inability of the accused to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the system. 53
The high regard attributed by this Court to the accused's right to a
speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of his case is evident from the
tradition established by our case law that the dismissal of a criminal case
based on the denial of the accused's right to speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal and constitutes a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
54 It is on the same light that we should view Section 8.
A rule with the force of law should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed. 55 It should
be given such a construction as will advance the object and secure the
benefits intended. 56 This Court's Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court surely saw the prejudice to the rights of the accused caused by a
suspended provisional dismissal of his case. Apparently, Section 8 was
introduced owing to the many instances where police agencies have refused
to issue clearances, for purposes of employment or travel abroad, to persons
having pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of such cases by the
court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that such provisional
dismissal, more often than not, had been done five or ten years ago. 57
In addition to the prejudice on the part of the accused, perceived by
the Committee, we cannot disregard the anxiety that he suffers because of a
public accusation.
Petitioners attempt to create a conflict between the law on prescription
of crimes and the rule on provisional dismissal. They argue that substantive
law should override or prevail over procedural law. The conflict is non-
existent. The law on prescription of crimes refers to the period during which
criminal charges must be filed. 58 Section 8 of Rule 117 refers to the period
when a provisional dismissal ceases to be temporary and becomes
permanent, thus, no longer subject to be set aside by the revival of criminal
charges. This rule comes into play only after the State has commenced the
prosecution.
The twenty-year prescriptive period for a case punishable by death
under Section 90 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to give law enforcers
ample time to apprehend criminals who go into hiding. It also enables
prosecutors to better prepare their cases, look for witnesses, and insure that
correct procedure has been followed. On the other hand, the two-year period
under Section 8, Rule 117 is intended to warn the State that once it filed a
case, it must have the readiness and tenacity to bring it to a conclusion. The
purpose of the period is to encourage promptness in prosecuting cases.
Prejudice to the rights of the accused intensifies over time. While it is
true that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is insufficient
to determine a violation of an accused's right to speedy trial, we cannot
disregard the reality that after the lapse of a certain period, the reliability of
a trial is compromised in ways that neither parry can prove or, for that
matter, identify. It bears stressing that the mere passage of time impairs
memories, causes evidence to be lost, deprives the accused of witnesses,
and interferes with his ability to defend himself. Now, these nuisances may
be avoided if we are to give full effect to Section 8 and consider the
"permanent" dismissal contemplated therein as a bar to a subsequent
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Not only will it be in
consonant with the cardinal principle of justice and fairness, it will also
provide force to the rule.
Let it be stated anew that this Court cannot and will not allow itself to
be made an instrument of politics nor be privy to any attempt at the
perpetration of injustice. 59
In resumè, I reiterate that petitioners' undue delay in conducting a new
preliminary investigation and refiling of new Informations against respondent
violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of
his cases. Respondent correctly invoked the implementing Rule, Section 8,
Rule 117. But as we held in our questioned Resolution, it must first be shown
before the trial court that its requirements have been complied with. And I
venture to add that should the trial court find that these requirements have
been complied with, then the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to 89 becomes permanent and thus constitutes a bar to a
subsequent prosecution of respondent for the same crimes.
As a final word, punishment should be imposed on the accused only if
he violated the law. However, his constitutional privileges and immunities
must be protected against the State's arbitrary assertions of power.
Obviously, its filing of new Informations against respondent for the same
crimes after the lapse of two years contravenes no less than the universal
principle of justice and fairness, the bedrock of every Constitution, law and
rule. ADSTCI
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , Vol. II, pp. 1203–1228.
2. Id. at 1183–1200.
3. NBI Report, pp. 309 and 311.
4. Rollo , Vol. II, pp. 1237–1267.
5. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 9th Revised Edition, p. 442;
People v. Bellosillo , 9 SCRA 835 (1963).
6. Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7. People v. Hon. Vergara , 221 SCRA 561 (1993).
8. People v. Hinaut , 105 Phil. 303 (1959).
9. Pendatum v. Aragon, 93 Phil. 798 (1953); Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
179 SCRA 54 (1989).
10. People v. Ylagan , 58 Phil. 851 (1933).
11. Baesa v. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur , 37 SCRA 437 (1971).
12. Rule 117, Section 3(i) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
13. Benes v. United States of America, 276 F.2d 99 (1960).
14. Sy v. Court of Appeals , 113 SCRA 335 (1982); Lava v. Gonzales, 11 SCRA 650
(1964); Bandiala v. CFI of Misamis Occidental, 35 SCRA 237 (1970); Luciano
v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 (1971); Teehankee v. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134
(1992).
15. SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. — Preliminary

investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial.
Except as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is

required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for
an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. (Section 1, Rule 112,
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure).
16. Bandiala v. Court, supra.

17. 232 SCRA 192 (1994).
18. RTC Records, Vol. 10, p. 232.
19. CA Rollo , p. 355.
20. TSN, CA-G.R. SP No. 65034, July 31, 2001, pp. 13–18 (italics ours).
21. CA Rollo , p. 378 (italics by respondent).
22. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
23. Vari v. Food Fair Stores , 13 A.L.R.3d 844 (1964).
24. Victims Address (per Medico Legal Report)
Manuel Montero Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Rolando Siplon Miputak, Dipolog City
Sherwin Abalora Miputak, Dipolog City
Ray Abalora Miputak, Dipolog City
Joel Amora Osmina St., Dipolog City

Jevy Redillas Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Welbor Elcamel Bgy. Barra, Dipolog City
Carlito Alap-ap Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Pacifico Montero, Jr. Bo. Tinago, Palumpon, Leyte
Meleubren Sorronda Miputak, Dipolog City
Alex Neri No address
(Unidentified Male in
Medico Legal Report)

25. RTC Records, Vol. IX, p. 9.
26. Rufino Siplon did not affix his signature on the Joint Affidavit of Desistance.
27. Affiants Address (per Affidavit of Desistance)
Myra Abalora UST Abono Estaca, Dipolog City
(Mother of Sherwin Abalora
and Ray Abalora)
Leonora Amora Bgy. Sentral, Dipolog City
(Mother of Joel Amora)
Nenita Alap-ap 338 Sagin St. cor. Amaga St., Poblacio Santa,
(Wife of Carlito Alap-ap) Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
Imelda Montero Poblacion Norte, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
(Wife of Manuel Montero)
Carmelita Elcamel Upper Dicayas, Dipolog City
(Wife of Welbor Elcamel)

Margarita Redillas Bgy. Poblacion South, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte
(Mother of Jevy Redillas)
28. Rollo , Vol. 2, pp. 1205–1214.
29. Id. at 1240.
30. Id. at 1241–1247.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1250–1251.
33. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 223, p. 574; United States v. Eliopoulos , 45 F. Supp.
777 (1942).
34. People v. Allen , 118 P.2d 927, 47 C.A.2d. 735.
35. Carpenter v. Cox, 182 So. 813 (1939).
36. ART. 90. Prescription of crime.— Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen
years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with
the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in
five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six
months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall
be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first,
second, and third paragraph of this article.
37. People v. Allen , 14 NE2d 397; State v. Crawford, 98 SE 615.

38. Republic v. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579 (1971).
39. State of Kansas v. Ransom, 39 ALR 4th 892.
40. 22 C.J.S., supra at 575, citing People v. Di Franco , 184 N.Y.S.2d, p. 974, 17
Misc. 2d 177.
41. People v. Ross , 156 N.E. 303 (1927).
42. G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002, p. 13.
43. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
44. Id.
45. Ursua v. Court of Appeals , 256 SCRA 147 (1996).
46. City and County of Denver v. Holmes, 400 P.2d 1 (1965).
47. Paat v. Court of Appeals , 266 SCRA 167 (1997).
48. Linkletter v. Victor Walker , 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
49. 393 U.S. 630 (1968).
50. Glen Livestock Company v. Colwell, 185 U.S. 54 (1902).
51. United States v. Mann , 201 F. Supp. 208 (1968); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972).
52. United States v. Fay , 313 F.2d 620 (1963).
53. United States v. Mann, supra.
54. Dickey v. State of Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
55. Ibid.
56. Barker v. Winggo, supra.
57. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

58. 291 U.S. 97 (1933).
59. 297 SCRA 679 (1998).
BELLOSILLO, J.:
1. Guiseppe Mazzini, "Byron and Goethe."
2. P/C Supts. Jewel F. Canson, herein respondent Panfilo Lacson, and Romeo Acop,
P/Sr. Supt. Francisco Subia, Romulo Sales, Supts. Almario Hilario, Luizo
Ticman, Zozorabel Laureles, P/C Insps. Michael Ray Aquino, Gil Meneses,
Cesar Mancao, Jose Erwin Villacorte, P/Sr. Insps. Rolando Anduyan, Glenn
Dumlao, Sotero Ramos, P/Insp. Ricardo Dandan, SPO4 Vicente Arnado, SPO1
Wilfredo Cuantero and SPO1 Wilfredo Angeles.
3. See Annex "A" of the Petition.
4. Order dated 5 June 2001.

5. Decision penned by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., concurred in by
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., Hilarion L. Aquino, and Josefina
Guevara-Salonga. Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, dissenting.
6. Art. VIII, 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall
have the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights . . . .
7. TSN, 19 February 2002, pp. 292–293; see also, Minutes of the Revision
Committee Meetings, 11 October 1999, 2:30 pm; id., 8 November 1999, 2:00
pm.
8. See also Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV, 2001 Ed., at 660.
9. Reed v. Allen , 286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932).
10. See Respondents Memorandum, at pp. 49–53.
11. 195 US 100.
12. One of the earliest declarations by this Court on the matter is enshrined in
Republic v. Agoncillo (L-27257, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 579.) where Chief
Justice Fernando, then an Associate Justice of the Court, articulated the
doctrine that the institution of a case after having been dismissed without
prejudice cannot be the basis of the claim of twice being put in jeopardy.
Citing the case of Jaca v. Blanco (86 Phil. 452 [1950]) Agoncillo unequivocally
pointed out that ". . . (I)n the absence of any statutory provision to the
contrary, we find no reason why the court may not, in the interest of justice,
dismiss a case provisionally, i.e., without prejudice to reinstating it before the
order becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
same offense." Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco (G.R. No.
109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455) made the clarification that a dismissal
of a case, even if made without prejudice, and the lapse of the reglementary
period within which to set aside the dismissal operates to remove the case
from the Court's docket; in which event, the case can no longer be reinstated
by mere motion in the original docket action, but only by the filing of a new
complaint. This ruling was reiterated in Banares II v. Balising (G.R. No.
132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36) which declared that since a final
order of dismissal is beyond the power of the court to modify or alter, a party
who wishes to reinstate the case has no other option but to file a new
complaint.
13. The following executed affidavits of desistance: Myrna Abalora, mother of
victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora; Rufino Siplon, father of victim
Rolando Siplon; Carmelita Elcamel, wife of victim Wilbur Elcamel; Leonora
Soronda Amora, mother of victim Joel Soronda Amora; Nenita Alap-ap, wife of
victim Carlito Alap-ap; Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero; and
Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas
14. Namely, Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri.
15. De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, 1999 Ed., at p. 877.

16. Caballero v. Alfonso, G.R. No. L-45647, 21 August 1987, 153 SCRA 153.
17. See Abadia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105597, 23 September 1994, 236
SCRA 676.
18. Decision, at p. 14
19. G.R. Nos. 72335-39, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 70.
20. G.R. No. 130191, 27 April 1998, 289 SCRA 725.
21. G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October 1999, 316 SCRA 65.
22. G.R. No. 126814, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 145.
23. G.R. No. 108595, 18 May 1999, 302 SCRA 149.
24. Supra.
25. See also Bañares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36,
citing Olympia International v. Court of Appeals, No. L-43236, 20 December
1989, 180 SCRA 353, 361, wherein we held "that dismissal without prejudice
of a complaint does not however mean that the dismissal order was any less
final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without
prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an
interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint." And in Ortigas &
Company, Ltd. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1995, 234 SCRA 455,
486, "the dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to
reconsider and set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the
case from the Court's docket." These doctrinal principles may be applied to
provisional dismissals in criminal cases.
26. United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783, 97 (1977).
27. United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
28. Ibid.
29. Toussie v. United States , 397 U.S. 112, 114–115 (1970).
30. Supra. See also Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October 1999;
Dansal v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 126814, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 145; and,
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. Nos. 116259-60, 253 SCRA 773. In all these
cases, the Court applied the four factors in the Balancing Test for purposes of
determining whether the accused was deprived of his right to speedy
disposition of cases.

31. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. See Note 28.
35. Ibid.
36. Smith v. Hooey , 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
37. Barker v. Wingo, supra.
PUNO, J:
1. Rule 119 was taken from RA No. 8493 entitled "An Act to Insure a Speedy Trial
of All Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court" which became effective on September 15, 1998.
2. Criminal Procedure, Hornbook Series, p. 27, 1988 edition.
3. Section 5 (5) of The 1973 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
4. Commenting on the change, author Nolledo observed:
"The rule-making power of the Supreme Court has been made exclusive to it.
The power of the Congress to alter the rules promulgated by the Highest
Court has been removed. For the Congress to interfere with the Supreme
Court promulgated within the competence of the Highest Tribunal is
unconstitutional and now violative of the separation of powers. Even the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be enlarged without the consent of
the latter."
(The New Constitution of the Philippines
Annotated 690 [1990])
5. RTC Records, Vol. X, p. 232.
6. Resolution, p. 8.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Paat v. Court of Appeals , 266 SCRA 167 (1997).

9. Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.
10. Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674, 681 (1965).
11. Gregoria v. CA , 26 SCRA 229 (1968).
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
1. People vs. Montenegro, 68 Phil 659; People vs. Moran, 44 Phil 405.
2. Wharton on Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., 1889, sec. 316, p. 215, cited
in People vs. Moran, supra.
3. Section 5, par. 5, 1987 Constitution.
"SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."
4. Id.

1. 21 Am Jur 2d § 1031 citing Ex parte State ex rel. Atty. Gen., 255 Ala. 443, 52 So.
2d 158 (1951); Hicks vs. People , 148 Colo. 26, 364 P. 2d 877 (1961); State
vs. Strong, 8 Kan. App. 2d 589, 663 P. 2d 668 (1983); State vs. Stimson, 41
Was. App. 385, 704 P. 2d 1220 (Div. 3 1985).
2. State vs. Kuhnhausen, 201 Or. 478, 272 P. 2d 225 (1954).
3. Barela vs. People, 826 P. 2d 1249 (Colo. 1992) State vs. Russel, 108 Idaho 58,
696 P. 2d 909 (1985); State vs. Strong, supra.
4. State vs. Kuhnhausen, supra.
5. State vs. Brockelman, 173 Kan. 469, 249 P. 2d 692 (1952).
6. State vs. Strong, supra.
7. Section 14 (2), Article III.
8. Section 16, Article III.
9. State vs. Kuhnhausen, 272 P. 2d 225 (1954).
10. G.R. No. 104386, March 28, 1996, 255 SCRA 238 (1996), citing People vs.
Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995).
11. G.R. No. L-45647, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 153 (1987).
12. Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107211, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 703;
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134307, December 21, 1998, 300
SCRA 367.
13. Rollo at 93–102.
14. Id. at 62.
15. Id. at 1082.
16. Id. at 626.
17. Id. at 389.

18. Esmena vs. Pogoy, G.R. No. 541110, February 20, 1981, 102 SCRA 861; People
v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 171 (1954).
19. See Lopez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529, September 6, 2001.
20. United States vs. Macdonald , 456 U.S. 1 (1982), see Dissenting Opinion.
21. G.R. No. 108595, May 18, 1999, 307 SCRA 149.
22. 21A Am Jur 2d § 1036.
23. U.S. vs. Villete, 688 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mer 1988); Hutchison vs. Marshall, 573 f
Supp. 496, 9 Media 1. Rep. BNA) 2443 (S.D. Ohio 1983), judgment aff' d, 744
F. 2d 44 (6th Cir. 1984); Dykes vs. State, 452 So. 2d, 1377 (Ala. Crim. App.
1984); State vs. Johnson, 190 Conn. 541, 461 A. 2d 981 (1983) (16-month
delay triggers judicial scrutiny); State vs. Johnson, 564 A. 2d 364 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1989); State vs. Russel, supra (23-month delay triggers judicial scrutiny);
State vs. Strong, supra; Skaggs vs. State, 676 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1996) (delay
of eight months or more is presumptively prejudicial); State vs. Powers, 612
S.W. 2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1980); State vs. Sanderson, 214 Mont. 437, 692
P. 2d 479 (1985) (390 day delay triggers speedy trial inquiry).
24. Graves vs. U.S., 490 A 2d 1086 (D.C. 1984).
25. Rollo at 504.
26. Id. at 96.

27. G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001.
28. In U.S. vs. Dreyer, it was held that the factor of prejudice is not limited
impairment of defense, it includes mental suffering.
29. Rollo at 159.
30. Supra.
31. "(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well
as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two copies for the
official file. The Affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public; each of whom must certify
that he is personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits."
32. Supra.
33. Allado vs. Diokno , G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 192.
34. Rollo at 93–103.
35. Supra.
36. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, 208 Phil. 597 (1983); National Food Authority vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 96453, August 4, 1999, 311 SCRA 700.
37. Article 22, Revised Penal Code.
38. People vs. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA 679.
39. 16B Am Jur 2d §697 citing Rousselle vs. Plaquemines Parish School Bd., 633 So.
2d 1235, 90 Ed. Law Rep. 519 (La. 1994) reh'g denied, (Apr. 21, 1994); Town
of Nottingham vs. Harvey, 120 N.H. 889, 424 A 2d 1125 (1980).
40. Bradford vs. Suffolk Country , 257 A.D. 777 15 N.Y. S. 2d 353 (2d Dep't 1939),
judgment affirmed as modified, 283 N.Y. 503, 28 N.E. 2d 932 (1940).
41. Holen vs. Minneapolis-St. Apul Metropolitan Airports Commission, 250 Minn.
42. Decision at 33.
43. While there are jurisprudence to the effect that once charges are dismissed,
the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable, (State vs. Marion, 404 U.S.
307; Dillingham vs. United States , 423 U.S. 64; Barker vs. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514), however, I am convinced that the peculiar facts of the present case
render said jurisprudence inappropriate. On its face, the Constitutional
provision seems to apply to one who has been publicly accused, has obtained
dismissal of those charges, and has then been charged once again with the
same crime by the same sovereign. Nothing therein suggests that an
accused must be continuously charged in order to obtain the benefits of the
speedy trial right. A natural reading of the language is that the Speedy Trial
Clause continues to protect one who has been accused of a crime until the
government has completed its attempts to try him for that crime. In Klopfer
vs. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, the prosecutor entered a "nolle prosequi
with leave" after the first trial ended in a mistrial. Under that procedure, the
defendant was discharged from custody and subjected to no obligation to
report to the court. It was held that the indefinite postponement of the
prosecution, over defendant's objection "clearly" denied the defendant the
right to a speedy trial. The Court reasoned that the defendant "may be
denied an opportunity to exonerate himself in the discretion of the solicitor
and held subject to trial, over his objection, throughout the unlimited period
in which the solicitor may restore the case to the calendar. During that
period, there is no means by which he can obtain a dismissal or have the
case restored to the calendar trial. The prosecutor was required to take
affirmative steps to reinstate the prosecution; no charges were "actively"
pending against Klopfer, nevertheless, the court held that the speedy trial
right applied.
44. Smith vs. Hooey , 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
45. 21 A Am Jur 2d §1053.
46. 98 S.E. 615.
47. 14 N.E. 2d 397.
48. 221 Ill. 166, 77 N.E. 529.

49. 225 Ill. 347, 80 N.E. 291.
50. Section 14 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
51. Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
52. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, 1969 at 336.
53. Doggett vs. United States , 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
54. People vs. Abano , 97 Phil. 28 (1955); People vs. Tacneng , 105 Phil. 1298
(1959); People vs. Robles , 105 Phil. 1016 (1959); Salcedo vs. Mendoza, G.R.
No. L-49375, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 811.
55. Agpalo, Statutory Construction at 100 to 101, citing LVN Pictures vs. Philippine
Musician's Guild, 110 Phil. 225 (1961); People vs. Purisima, G.R. No. L-42050,
November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Filipinas Compania de Seguros; 107 Phil. 1055 (1960.).
56. Rivera vs. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 (1916).
57. Herrera, Remedial, Law, Vol. IV, 2001 Ed. at 660.
58. Under Article 90, the Revised Penal Code, crimes punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years.
59. Constantino vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 127457, April 13, 1998, 288 SCRA 654.

15.6.3 - People v. Lacson (2003)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

15.6.3 - People v. Lacson (2003)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

15.6.3 - People v. Lacson (2003)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

This case originated from the brutal killings of eleven suspected

1. REMEDIAL LAW; 2000 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ON THE PUBLIC

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. — The 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal

27. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; FOUR-

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIME-BAR FOR THE REVIVAL OF PROVISIONALLY

1. REMEDIAL LAW; 2000 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES CANNOT BE

22. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; PURPOSE. — To reiterate, Section

Before the Court is the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the

Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or

Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for. 18

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com

That is correct, Your Honor.

Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

You represented the petitioner in this case?

The respondent's admissions made in the course of the proceedings in

II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8,

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of

In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102

The dictates of prudence however would counsel us at this time to

Meanwhile, in the prohibition case before RTC-Br. 40, Manila, Judge

Dissatisﬁed, respondent elevated the case on a petition for certiorari to

Hence, the present recourse. The bone of contention, which crystallizes

Assuming that Sec. 8, Rule 117, is available to respondent although it

The basic substantive laws on prescription of oﬀenses are Arts. 90 and

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten

The crime of libel or other similar oﬀenses shall prescribe in one

Evidently, respondent's concept of a provisional dismissal that has

Furthermore, the right of the State to prosecute criminals is a

Clearly, the feverishly contested provision is purely administrative or

Ensconced in the foregoing procedural tenet are the imperatives for

These provisions uphold the time-honored tradition of speedy justice

To reiterate, respondent's right to speedy disposition of his criminal

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com

In no mean measure, the many constitutional and procedural

Consistent with the views expressed above, I hold that no

2. The prosecution after a number of settings cannot proceed with

This end-goal is by no means novel. We have various rules of criminal

e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;

The ponencia will reverse this ruling on the following ratiocination:

VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:

Petitioners argue that while Section 8, Rule 117, of the Rules of

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com

In this regard, I share the conclusions reached by my esteemed

I ﬁnd petitioners' motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated

Ultimately, whether the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial has

Petitioners cannot argue that respondent failed to assert his right to

There is no denying that the ﬁling of new Informations against

Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the ﬁling of the new

is a reinforcement of a person's constitutional right to speedy trial and