David Hume's Critique of Inductive Reasoning

Nigerian Journal of Arts and Humanities (NJAH), Volume 3 Number 3, 2023 (ISSN: 2814-3760, E-ISSN: 2955-0343)
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Nigeria, Indexed in Google Scholar (Email:njahjournal@gmail.com)
DAVID HUME’S CRITIQUE OF INDUCTIVE REASONING: IMPLICATIONS FOR

SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION
Bonaventure Chike ANETOH, PhD

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Tansian University Umunya
Email: anetobonaventure@yahoo.com
&
Anthony Uzochukwu UFEAROH, PhD
Department of Philosophy, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka
Email: au.ufearoh@unizik.edu.ng; tonito2006@yahoo.co.uk
ORCID: 0000-0003-2617-6808
ABSTRACT
Inductive reasoning is one of the methods of reasoning, and it is completely opposed to
deductive reasoning. In inductive reasoning, a general conclusion is inferred from observed or
examined particular instances. It is commonly used in scientific investigations. However, some
scholars have criticized inductive method of reasoning, insisting that it can’t always guarantee
true and valid conclusion. Among the scholars that were not comfortable with inductive
reasoning is David Hume. The fundamental questions are: What is inductive reasoning? What
are the problems associated with inductive reasoning? What are the major criticisms Hume
levelled against inductive reasoning? Could it be said that Hume is right in his criticisms of
inductive reasoning? Why does science employ inductive method in its investigation of
phenomena in the universe? What are the implications of Hume’s critique of induction for
scientific investigations? Is there any method that can be better and more efficient than
inductive method in scientific investigations? These and other related issues are the major focus
of this article, and are to be given scholarly and detailed attention. Employing basically
analytical and critical methods of philosophical enquiry, this article examines Hume’s critique
of induction and its implications for scientific investigation. This article argues that despite the
shortcomings of inductive reasoning, it is still the most appropriate method for scientific
investigations. Science has, through inductive reasoning, recorded remarkable progress
especially in the modern and contemporary periods, and has contributed immensely towards
the improvement of the human condition of existence in the universe.
Key Words: Induction, Reasoning, Hume, Science and Investigation
INTRODUCTION
Induction is the method of reasoning in which one infers a general conclusion from observed
or examined particular instances. It is opposed to deductive reasoning that moves from general
statement to particular conclusion. Though induction is widely used in the scientific arena as a
good method of reasoning, it cannot be said to be a perfect tool. It has got some weaknesses.
Hence, some scholars like Karl Popper (2005); David Hume (1748); and others are not
comfortable with induction, and have criticized it in many ways. Karl Popper argues that
deductive inferences are safer than inductive inferences, and maintains that scientists should
employ deduction in their investigations. On his part, David Hume argues that inductive
inferences are not justifiable rationally. However, this article focuses specifically on examining
David Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning and its implications for scientific investigation.
Science attempts to offer explanation of phenomena in the universe and at the same predicts
future occurrences. In such attempt to explain phenomena in the universe, science employs
mainly inductive reasoning. Science investigates phenomena empirically, using the methods of
experimentation and observation. By studying or examining some samples of the entire
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population, science makes inductive generalization. However, David Hume’s critique of

induction has devastating implications for scientific investigation. The basic questions that are
scholarly very pertinent in this article are: What actually is inductive reasoning? Does the
premise of inductive argument guarantee a valid conclusion? What are the problems associated
with inductive reasoning? What are the major criticisms David Hume levelled against inductive
reasoning? Could it be said that Hume is right in his criticisms of inductive reasoning? How
and why does science employ inductive method in its investigation of phenomena in the
universe? Has inductive reasoning been beneficial to science? What are the implications of
Hume’s critique of induction for scientific investigations? Is there any method that can be better
and more effective than inductive method in scientific investigations? These questions and
other related ones are very necessary in this discourse, and are to be given detailed as well as
scholarly attention. This study employs mainly analytical and critical methods of philosophical
investigation to examine Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning and its implications for
scientific investigation.
This article is partitioned into four sections. The first section clarifies the concept of inductive
reasoning. The second section discusses Hume’s critique of induction. The third section
examines the implications of Hume’s critique of induction for scientific investigation. The
fourth section is the evaluation as well as the conclusion of the article.
INDUCTIVE REASONING: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning are opposed to each other. While deductive
reasoning moves from general premise(s) to particular conclusion, inductive reasoning moves
from particular instances (premises) to general conclusion. However, the major concern of this
article is inductive reasoning or induction.
Etymologically, the term ‘induction’ is derived from the Latin word ‘inducere’ which means
‘to lead into’. Hence, from etymological perspective, induction means to lead one into
something. Max Black as cited by Ogbozo (2014) notes that the Latin word ‘inducere’ was
derived from the Greek word ‘epagoge’ (pp.232-233). Explaining what the Greek word
‘epagoge’ means, Ogbozo (2014) states that:
The word “epagoge” is the noun-form of the Greek verb, “epagein”
meaning “to lead on”. In philosophical parlance, as was the case with
Aristotle’s use, the term epagoge refers to ‘the act of leading oneself
or others to some general concepts or some universal truth from less
general or particular cases falling under them.(p.233)
Induction has to do with the process of leading one from something or particular things into
another thing or something else. It entails the movement from things that have been examined
or observed to things that have not been examined or observed. In inductive reasoning, one
infers a general conclusion from particular premises. In the attempt to define induction from
its etymological perspective, Black (1967) states thus:
The name ‘induction’, derived from the Latin translation of
Aristotle’s epagoge, will be used here to cover all cases of non-
demonstrative argument, in which the truth of the premises, while
not entailing the truth of the conclusion, purports to be a good
reason for belief in it. Such arguments may also be called
“ampliative”, as C.S. Peirce called them, because the conclusion
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may presuppose the existence of individuals whose existence is

presupposed by the premises (p.169).
Inductive reasoning is based on the presumption that the observation of some particular
members of a group gives one the knowledge of all the members of the group. It is also based
on the assumption that the unobserved things will definitely behave like the observed ones or
be similar to them given the same or similar circumstances.
Inductive reasoning has been the major concern of many scholars. Hence, many scholars have
described induction in different but related ways. Skyrms (1995) describes induction in two
senses. He distinguishes between two different, but related senses of induction, viz., narrow
sense and broad sense. According to him:
Induction, (1) in the narrow sense, inference to a generalization
from its instances; (2) in the broad sense, any ampliative inference-
that is, any inference where the claim made by the conclusion goes
beyond the claim jointly made by the premises. Induction in the
broad sense includes, as cases of particular interest: argument by
analogy, predictive inference, inference to causes from signs and
symptoms, and confirmation of scientific laws and theories (p.368)
Though these two senses of induction are slightly different, they point at the same thing, that
is, the conclusion of an inductive argument is not explicitly contained in the premises. The
conclusion of inductive argument gives new information, and this brings out the ampliative
nature of inductive reasoning. In agreement with Skyrms’ (1995) description, Ogbozo (2014)
defines induction thus: “For the moment and in a very broad sense, we can explain induction
as ‘an inference from particular instances in sensible experience to some general or universal
conclusions or laws” (p.233). This definition demonstrates the empirical nature of induction.
In inductive reasoning, the premises provide evidence for the conclusion, but such is not
conclusive. The conclusion of inductive reasoning is quite probable. This stems from the fact
that it is based on the examined limited data samples.
Furthermore, Okasha (2002) is one of the scholars that gave detailed attention to inductive
reasoning. According to him, “In inductive inference, or inductive reasoning, we move from
premises about objects we have examined to conclusions about objects we haven’t
examined…” (p.19). This is rooted on the presumption that the unexamined objects will not be
different from the examined ones. However, one should not forget the fact that there is
possibility that the unexamined objects may not be the same with the examined objects. Hence,
in inductive reasoning, even if the premises are true, the conclusion may not be true. Hawthrone
(2021) argues that “In a good inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some
degree of support for the truth of the conclusion, where this degree-of-support might be
measured via some numerical scale” (para. 1). It becomes obvious from the foregoing that the
evidence provided by the premises of an inductive reasoning is not conclusive. Consequently,
the truth or falsity of the premises may not guarantee the truth or falsity of the conclusion.
TYPES OF INDUCTION
There are different types of induction as identified by some scholars. These different types are
just variations or nuances of induction. Despite the variations, they share the common features
of inductive reasoning, which differentiate them from deductive reasoning. Max Black as cited
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by Ogbozo (2014) identifies the following types of induction, viz.: Elaborated induction and
Proportional induction. Explaining the meaning of Elaborated induction, Ogbozo (2014) states:
This kind of inference “consists of more or less sophisticated variations
of induction by simple enumeration”. It would involve positive and
negative information on instances pertaining to the subject matter.
Since its credibility lies on quantity of evidence collected, Francis
Bacon accuses Aristotle (known to have used this method of simple
enumeration) of failing to distinguish the essential data from the
accidental in scientific investigation. This kind represents the oldest
form of induction which goes back to Aristotle… (p.242)
Elaborated induction, which is attributed to Aristotle, could be said to be induction by simple

enumeration. This entails getting sizeable evidence by gathering information from a big
number of instances of the phenomenon under investigation. Elaborated induction may be said
to be the main type of inductive reasoning. It is different from Proportional induction which
argues from the perspective of frequency of occurrence of things. Articulating what
proportional induction is all about, Ogbozo (2014) states:
This refers to an “inference from the frequency of occurrence of
some character in a sample to the frequency of the same character
in the parent population”. The thesis of this kind of induction can
be illustrated with an example like this: if in every ten years within
a period of thirty years in a particular family, one person was insane,
it means that there were three insane persons throughout the thirty
years’ period. From here, it could be inferred that a closer frequency
of five years interval of insanity happened in the parent population
(i.e. counting backwards). The way that the closer frequency of five
years was calculated was based on the logic that the more frequent
parents give birth to offspring, the more their genes in the offspring
get weaker. (pp. 242-243)
Be that as it may, proportional induction draws conclusion on the unobserved things based on
the examined things in the same area.
Outside the above listed types of induction, there are still other different, but related kinds of
induction. In this direction, Brian Skyrms (1995) identifies two other kinds of induction, viz.,
a narrow sense induction and a broad sense induction (ampliative induction). Let us at this
juncture examine them one after the other. A ‘narrow sense induction’ could be said to be a
restricted kind of induction. It is also known as ‘mathematical induction’. This infers general
conclusion from particular instances. According to Ogbozo (2014):
The narrow sense induction is a kind of inference from particular
instances to a general law. According to Skyrms, this kind of induction
concerns one extreme case that is not ampliative, namely mathematical
induction… Explaining further, Skyrms maintains that mathematical
induction involves two basic aspects: methods of definition and of
proof. By method of definition is when a collection of objects is made
and defined inductively, whereas the method of proof refers to a
situation where ‘all members of the objects collected are shown to have
a particular property’ (p. 244).
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A narrow sense induction is different from a broad sense induction, though they are related.
Such relationship stems from the fact that they are two different sides of a particular coin.
Certainly, a broad sense induction is not restricted as the narrow sense induction. In a broad
sense induction, the conclusion gives new information that is not contained in the premises.
Skyrms as cited by Ogbozo (2014) explains broad sense induction thus:
Skyrms explains this second form of induction as follows: “any
inference where the claim made by the conclusion goes beyond the
claim jointly made by the premises”. According to him the argument
by analogy, predictive inference, inferences from signs or symptoms
to causes, confirmation of scientific laws and theories are all examples
of the ampliative kind of induction (p.245).
He brings out very clearly the synthetic and ampliative nature of inductive reasoning.
Furthermore, in his book Choice and Chance, Skyrms distinguishes between strong induction
and weak induction. He averres that, “An argument is inductively strong [considering
the evidential relation between its premises and its conclusion] if and only if:
a. Its inductive probability is high.
b. b. It is not deductively valid.” (21)
It ought to be noted that the different types of induction do not contradict one another, rather
they complement one another. Each of them throws light, from its own perspective, on what
inductive reasoning is generally all about. Hence, each of them contributes, from its own
perspective, to the general understanding of the meaning of inductive reasoning.
DAVID HUME’S CRITIQUE OF INDUCTIVE REASONING

Inductive reasoning or induction is a controversial method of reasoning, and has attracted
barrage of criticisms from some scholars like David Hume, Karl Popper, Carl Hempel etc. It
becomes very obvious that some scholars are not comfortable with induction. According to
Skyrms, “the Scottish philosopher David Hume first raised this problem, which we shall call
the traditional problem of induction, in full force. Hume gave the problem a cutting edge.” This
section focuses specifically on David Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning.
David Hume articulated the problems associated with induction in the context of his discussion
on cause and effects. Initially, he made a distinction between impression and ideas, and argued
that ideas are copies of impressions which are vivid as well as original perception. Hence,
Hume denied the authenticity of ideas that do not have corresponding impression. Based on
this, he examined the relationship between cause and effect. Consequently, he denied the idea
of necessary connection between cause and effect because such idea does not have any
corresponding impression.
Hume questioned the use of inductive reasoning, and argued that induction is based on the
principle of ‘Uniformity of Nature’. This is based on the assumption that nature will not
change, but must behave uniformly. Hume’s dissatisfaction with inductive inference is very
remarkable in the philosophical domain, and it is commonly known as Hume’s problem of
induction. Ogbozo (2014) articulates David Hume’s problem of induction thus: “…it is still
part of the central problem of induction to inquire as follows: to what extent is nature constant
or regular such we can comfortably use the incident that happened a couple of times in the
past to infer the similar happening in the future” (p.241). In his major books, A Treatise of
Human Nature and An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume devoted detailed
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attention to the critique of inductive reasoning. This demonstrates his dissatisfaction with
induction. In the words of Hume (1888):
Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there
can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of
which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have
had experience. We can at least conceive a change in the course of
nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely
impossible. To form a clear idea of anything, is an undeniable
argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended
demonstration against it (p.89).
Hence, Hume condemns the inductive method of inferring conclusion on the

unobserved or unexamined phenomena based on the examined or observed ones.
Consequently, he argues that one is not justified in any way to make conclusion
about objects one has not observed or examined. This implies that one can make
valid conclusion only on objects one has examined or observed. Elaborating on
this, Hume (1888) states:
Let men be once fully persuaded of these two principles,
That there is nothing in any object, considered in itself,
which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion
beyond it; and, That even after the observation of the
frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no
reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond
those of which we have had experience; I say, let men be
once fully convinced of these two principles, and this will
throw them so loose from all common systems, that they
will make no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear
the most extraordinary. (p.139)
With this argument, Hume attempts to destroy the foundation of inductive
reasoning, and at the same time tries to prove that inductive inferences are not
justifiable.
Furthermore, Hume argues that the course of nature is not as uniform as inductive
reasoning presupposes. He insists that change in the course of nature is quite
conceivable. This demonstrates the claim that the future will not always resemble
the past as inductive reasoning presumes. According to Hume (1888):
Here then are two things to be considered, viz. the reasons
which determine us to make the past a standard for the
future, and the manner how we extract a single judgment
from a contrariety of past events. First we may observe, that
the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not
founded on arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely
from habit, by which we are determined to expect for the
future the same train of objects, to which we have been
accustomed. This habit or determination to transfer the past
to the future is full and perfect; and consequently the first
impulse of the imagination in this species of reasoning is
endowed with the same qualities. But, secondly, when in
considering past experiments we find them of a contrary
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nature, this determination, though full and perfect in itself,

presents us with no steady object, but offers us a number of
disagreeing images in a certain order and proportion.
(pp.133-134)
It is obvious that inductive reasoning is based on the presumption that the future will resemble
the past, which for Hume, is unjustifiable and is not founded on any argument. It is rather
rooted on our habit of expectation that the future will not be different from the past. Hume
maintains that such habit of expectation has no rational foundation.
In An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume (1748) argues strongly that inductive
reasoning must be probable. Inductive inference has likelihood of being either true or false.
The truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Hence, if the premise
of an inductive argument is true, the conclusion may or may not be true. This is as a result of
the circumstances that surround it. This implies that inductive inferences are not certain.
According to Hume (1748):
If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past
experience and make it the standard of our future judgment, these
arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact
and real existence, according to the division above mentioned. But
that there is no argument of this kind must appear if our
explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and
satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence
are founded on the relation of cause and effect, that our knowledge
of that relation is derived entirely from experience, and that all our
experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the
future will be conformable to the past. To endeavor, therefore, the
proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments
regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle and taking
that for granted which is the very point in question. (pp. 49-50)
Inductive inference is probabilistic because it draws conclusion about a population based on

few instances. It is certain that probability is opposed to certainty. Anything that is probable
cannot be certain at the same time. Obviously, the probabilistic nature of inductive inference
questions our confidence in inductive reasoning. Furthermore, Hume (1748) argues thus:
Now, where is that process of reasoning which, from one instance,
draws a conclusion so different from that which it infers from a
hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one?
This question I propose as much for the sake of information as with
an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine
any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction if
anyone will vouchsafe to bestow it on me. (p.50)
After series of argument against induction, Hume concludes that inductive reasoning cannot be
separated from our belief in the principle of ‘Uniformity of Nature’ (UN). This is the
presumption that things in nature appear and behave in a uniform manner. In the words of
Hume (1748): “Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the
uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly
conjoined together, and the mind is determined by a custom to infer the one from the
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appearance of the other.” (p.92) Hume is not comfortable with such presumption that things in
nature must always behave uniformly. Hence, he argues thus:
We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions
should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same
circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without
making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and
opinions. Such a uniformity, in every particular, is found in no part of
nature. (Hume: 1748, p.95)
Hume insists that we cannot prove the veracity of ‘Uniformity of Nature’ (UN) assumption. It
is just a matter of habit. The inability to prove the veracity of ‘Uniformity of Nature’ (UN)
principle renders invalid and unjustifiable any argument that is based on it. Analyzing Hume’s
argument on this, Okasha (2002) states:
But how do we know that the UN assumption is actually true, Hume asks?
Can we perhaps prove its truth somehow (in the strict sense of proof)?
No, says Hume, we cannot. For it is easy to imagine a universe where
nature is not uniform, but changes its course randomly from day to day.
In such a universe, computers might sometimes explode for no reason,
water might sometimes intoxicate us without warning, billiard balls might
sometimes stop dead on colliding, and so on. Since such a ‘non-uniform’
universe is conceivable, it follows that we cannot strictly prove the truth
of UN. (pp.25)
However, even if it is possible to imagine a non-uniform nature, one can easily observe that
many things seem to behave uniformly in the universe. It is obvious that we have morning,
afternoon, evening and night every day. One also observes that the seasons of the year come
up at their appropriate times. In fact, many things seem to be regular in the course of natural
occurrences. From this perspective, Uniformity of Nature (UN) argument seems to be true
judging from physical occurrences. Nevertheless, Hume is dissatisfied with this method of
reasoning. Hence, he argues that such argument begs the question, and it is a circular argument.
Re-echoing Hume’s argument against ‘Uniformity of Nature’ principle, Okasha (2002) states:
To put the point another way, it is certainly an established fact that
nature has behaved largely uniformly up to now. But we cannot appeal
to this fact to argue that nature will continue to be uniform, because this
assumes that what has happened in the past is a reliable guide to what
will happen in the future- which is the uniformity of nature assumption.
If we try to argue for UN on empirical grounds, we end up reasoning in
a circle. (p.25)
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that David Hume is not comfortable with inductive
reasoning. This has necessitated his strong critique of induction. His critique of induction is
very popular in philosophy, and has attracted a lot of philosophical attentions. Henderson
(2022) summarizes Hume’s critique of induction thus:
Hume asks on what grounds we come to our beliefs about the
unobserved on the basis of inductive inferences. He presents an
argument in the form of a dilemma which appears to rule out the
possibility of any reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of an
inductive inference. There are, he says, two possible types of
arguments, “demonstrative” and “probable”, but neither will serve. A
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demonstrative argument produces the wrong kind of conclusion, and a

probable argument would be circular. Therefore, for Hume, the
problem remains of how to explain why we form any conclusions that
go beyond the past instances of which we have had experience (T.
1.3.6.10). Hume stresses that he is not disputing that we do draw such
inferences. The challenge, as he sees it, is to understand the
“foundation” of the inference—the “logic” or “process of argument”
that it is based upon… (para. 3)
It ought to be noted that Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning has a lot of implications for
scientific investigation. This stems from the fact that inductive reasoning is used in scientific
research and generally, “to frame our expectations of the future on the basis of our knowledge
of the past and present” (Skyrms, 1995, p. 28). It is good at this point of the discourse to give
scholarly attention to such implications.
IMPLICATIONS OF DAVID HUME’S CRITIQUE OF INDUCTIVE REASONING

FOR SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION
Scientists make use of inductive reasoning in their investigation of phenomena in the universe,
and they believe that they can attain objective knowledge of phenomena in the universe through
inductive inferences. Science is empirical in nature, and it studies phenomena through
experimentation as well as observation. Scientists make general conclusions based on the
limited samples they have studied or observed. Elaborating on the use of inductive reasoning
in scientific investigations, Okasha (2002) averres:
In effect, scientists use inductive reasoning whenever they move
from limited data to a more general conclusion, which they do all
the time. Consider, for example, Newton’s principle of universal
gravitation…which says that everybody in the universe exerts a
gravitational attraction on every other body. Now obviously,
Newton did not arrive at this principle by examining every single
body in the whole universe- he couldn’t possibly have. Rather, he
saw that the principle held true for the planets and the sun, and for
objects of various sorts moving near the earth’s surface. From this
data, he inferred that the principle held true for all bodies. Again,
this inference was obviously an inductive one: the fact that
Newton’s principle holds true for some bodies doesn’t guarantee
that it holds true for all bodies. (p. 22)
Certainly, most scientific laws or theories were arrived at inductively. Inductive generalization
is at the core of scientific research, and it plays significant role in scientific investigation. This
stems from the fact that it may not be easy to study all the objects under consideration.
As it is obvious in this article, Hume was completely uncomfortable with induction. Such
uncomfortability necessitated his critique of inductive reasoning. Hume’s critique of induction
has devastating implications for scientific investigation. In fact, it questions scientific
investigations and scientific conclusions. Hume’s critique of induction casts doubt on scientific
conclusions as well as scientific knowledge in general. Judging from Hume’s critique of
induction, scientific conclusions may not be rationally justifiable. This stems from the fact that
they are based on inductive reasoning, which for Hume, is not rationally justifiable. According
to Okasha (2002), “If Hume is right, the foundation on which science is built does not look as
solid as we might have hoped” (p.27). This stems from the fact that Hume questions the basic
method of scientific investigation.
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EVALUATION
Inductive reasoning makes conclusions on the unexamined objects based on the examined ones.
It is obvious from the discourse above that inductive reasoning is not a perfect method of
reasoning. There are problems associated with it. Black (1967) articulates three problems of
induction thus:
(1) The general problem of justification: Why, if at all, is it
reasonable to accept the conclusions of certain inductive
arguments as true- or at least probably true? Why, if at all, is it
reasonable to employ certain rules of inductive inference?
(2) The comparative problem: Why is one inductive conclusion
preferable to another as better supported? Why is one rule of
inductive inference preferable to another as more reliable or more
deserving of rational trust?
(3) The analytical problem: What is it that renders some inductive
arguments rationally acceptable? What are the criteria for
deciding that one rule of inductive inference is superior to
another? (p.170)
Inductive reasoning leads to conclusions that are not certain, but rather probable. Obviously,
this questions inductive inferences and the reliability on inductive conclusions. It is obvious in
this article that David Hume is not comfortable with the use of inductive reasoning, and has
formulated scholarly argument against induction. Certainly, Hume’s argument against
induction is very interesting, and it is quite popular in the philosophical world. In the words of
Henderson (2022):
Hume’s argument is one of the most famous in philosophy. A number
of philosophers have attempted solutions to the problem, but a
significant number have embraced his conclusion that it is insoluble.
There is also a wide spectrum of opinion on the significance of the
problem. Some have argued that Hume’s argument does not establish
any far-reaching skeptical conclusion, either because it was never
intended to, or because the argument is in some way misformulated.
Yet many have regarded it as one of the most profound philosophical
challenges imaginable since it seems to call into question the
justification of one of the most fundamental ways in which we form
knowledge. (para. 4)
Though there are problems associated with inductive reasoning, it seems to the present
researchers that Hume went to the extreme in his critique of induction. Despite the fact that
things in nature may not perfectly behave in a regular manner, they tend to behave more
regularly or uniformly than Hume thought.
Also, Hume argues that one is not justified to make conclusion about objects one has not
examined. It could be said that he is right to some extent with regard to this, but the problem
lies in the impossibility of examining all the objects in a particular group. The point is that the
examined objects can provide insight on the unexamined ones, all things being equal. But the
problem lies on the degree of certainty. If few members of a certain group fail to share the
characteristics of the entire population, such is not enough to deny all the members of the group
such characteristics. According to Okasha (2002):
Some people believe the key lies in the concept of probability. This
suggestion is quite plausible. For it is natural to think that although the
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premises of an inductive inference do not guarantee the truth of the

conclusion, they do make it quite probable. So even if scientific
knowledge cannot be certain, it may nonetheless be highly probable. But
this response to Hume’s problem generates difficulties of its own, and is
by no means universally accepted… (pp.27-28).
Be that as it may, Hume’s critique of induction has devastating implications for scientific
investigation. It questions the method of scientific investigation, and basically questions the
foundation of science as articulated above. Due to the problems associated with induction, the
question is this: Is there any better method that should be used for scientific investigation? It
seems to the researchers that inductive reasoning is the most appropriate method for scientific
investigation. This is basically as a result of the empirical nature of scientific investigation. It
is obvious that science, with the use of inductive reasoning, has recorded a lot of achievements
through its numerous discoveries as well as inventions, and has recorded a lot of progress
especially in the modern and contemporary periods. Such discoveries and inventions have, no
doubt, improved the condition and standard of life in the universe. Science has contributed
immensely and is still contributing towards the understanding of phenomena in the universe.
CONCLUSION
Scholarly attention has been given to David Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning and its
implications for scientific investigation. As it is obvious from the discourse, there are problems
associated with inductive reasoning. This study maintains that, despite such problems,
inductive reasoning seems to be the most adequate method for scientific research, given the
empirical nature of scientific research. With the use of inductive reasoning, science has
contributed immensely towards the improvement of human condition of existence in the
universe through its innumerable discoveries and inventions.
REFERENCES
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N. Zalta (ed.), URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr 2021/entries/logic-
inductive/
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philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford. edu / archives/win2022/entries/induction-problem/>.
Hume, D.(1888). A Treatise of human nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon
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Okasha, S. (2002). Philosophy of science: A very short introduction, New York: Oxford
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Logic. Ontario:Wadsworth
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Nigerian Journal of Arts and Humanities (NJAH), Volume 3 Number 3, 2023 (ISSN: 2814-3760, E-ISSN: 2955-0343)

Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Nigeria, Indexed in Google Scholar (Email:njahjournal@gmail.com)

DAVID HUME’S CRITIQUE OF INDUCTIVE REASONING: IMPLICATIONS FOR

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DAVID HUME’S CRITIQUE OF INDUCTIVE REASONING

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premises of an inductive inference do not guarantee the truth of the

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