REPORT INTO AN INCIDENT

INVOLVING THE
‘FV DEARBHLA’
AT THE BLASKETS,
CO. KERRY
14th MAY 2020

REPORT NO. MCIB/301

(No.12 OF 2020)
The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) examines and investigates all types of marine
casualties to, or on board, Irish registered vessels worldwide and other vessels in Irish territorial
waters and inland waterways.

The MCIB objective in investigating a marine casualty is to determine its circumstances and its
causes with a view to making recommendations to the Minister of Transport - for the avoidance
of similar marine casualties in the future, thereby improving the safety of life at sea and inland
waterways.

The MCIB is a non-prosecutorial body. We do not enforce laws or carry out prosecutions. It is not
the purpose of an investigation carried out by the MCIB to apportion blame or fault.

The legislative framework for the operation of the MCIB, the reporting and investigating of
marine casualties and the powers of MCIB investigators is set out in the Merchant Shipping
(Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

In carrying out its functions the MCIB complies with the provisions of the International Maritime
Organisation’s Casualty Investigation Code and EU Directive 2009/18/EC governing the
investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector.
 Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
email: info@mcib.ie
www.mcib.ie

REPORT INTO AN INCIDENT

INVOLVING THE
‘FV DEARBHLA’
AT THE BLASKETS,
CO. KERRY
14th MAY 2020

The Marine Casualty Investigation

Board was established on the
25th March 2003 under the
Merchant Shipping (Investigation
of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

The copyright in the enclosed

report remains with the Marine
Casualty Investigation Board by
virtue of section 35(5) of the
Merchant Shipping (Investigation
of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000. No
person may produce, reproduce or
transmit in any form or by any
means this report or any part
thereof without the express REPORT NO. MCIB/301
permission of the Marine Casualty (No.12 OF 2020)
Investigation Board. This report
may be freely used for educational
purposes.
1
 Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CoP Code of Practice: Design, Construction, Equipment and Operation

of Small Fishing Vessels of less than 15 m Length overall (2014)
COG Course Over Ground
DOS Declaration of Survey
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
GT Gross Tonnage*Note 1
IMA Irish Maritime Administration
IRCG Irish Coast Guard
LOA Length Overall
MSO Marine Survey Office
SFLA Sea Fish Licensing Authority
S.I. Statutory Instrument
SOG Speed Over Ground
UTC Co-ordinated Universal Time
VHF Very High Frequency

Kilometres km
Kilowatts kW
Litres lts
Metres m
Nautical miles NM

Gross Tonnage is a nonlinear measure of a ship's overall internal volume. In the regulations which govern the
measurement of ships the ‘tonnage’ measurement is one of capacity, the unit of one ton being a capacity
measurement of 100 feet cubed (ft 3). Gross Tonnage should not be confused with measures of mass or
weight such as deadweight tonnage or displacement. Gross Tonnage is calculated based on ‘the moulded
volume of all enclosed spaces of the ship’ and is the total internal capacity of a ship measured from the top
of floors or ceiling to the tonnage deck including the fore and aft peak tanks above the floors. Gross
Tonnage is used to determine issues such as a ship's manning regulations, safety rules, registration fees and
port dues.

Gross tonnage is defined by the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969, adopted
by the International Maritime Organization in 1969, and came into force on 18 July 1982.

Report MCIB/301 published by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board.

Produced 23rd December 2020 and republished 18th November 2021 to correct an error at
Safety Recommendation 6.1. This marine casualty involved a fishing vessel of 15-24 metres in
length, therefore it comes under the remit of Directive 2009/18/EC. The Directive is
transposed by the European Communities (Merchant Shipping) (Investigation of Accidents)
Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 276/2011). Regulation 5 of S.I. 276 of 2011 adapts section 23 of the
Act. Accordingly, the reporting obligation for this type of incident is to report to the MCIB
(rather than the MSO), and the reference to Section 23 has been amended to reflect this.

2
 CONTENTS

PAGE

1. Summary 4

2. Factual Information 5

3. Narrative 9

4. Analysis 12

5. Conclusions 14

6. Safety Recommendations 15

7. Appendices 16

8. MSA 2000 Section 36 - Correspondence Received 36

3
SUMMARY

1. SUMMARY

1.1 At approximately 04:10 hours (hrs) on the morning of the 14th May 2020 whilst
on passage from Rossaveel, Co. Galway to Howth, Co. Dublin, the fishing vessel
(FV) ‘Dearbhla’ with five crew onboard, struck rocks at the north west peninsula
of the island of Inish na Bró in the Blaskets archipelago off the coast of Co. Kerry.

1.2 After the initial impact the vessel was able to manoeuvre to deeper water and
the crew investigated the extent of the damage. The crew were unharmed but
their investigations for damage found that there was heavy contact damage to
the vessel’s bows. They found no water ingress below the water line. The
emergency services were not informed of the grounding and the vessel continued
its voyage to Howth.

1.3 The vessel’s owner was informed of the incident at approximately 08:00 hrs that
day. The owner arranged for the vessel to proceed to Castletownbere for an
inspection of the damage and repairs. The inspection revealed that the vessel had
considerable contact damage to its stem at the waterline and was holed above
the waterline under the bows.

(see Appendix 7.1 - Photograph No.1 ‘FV Dearbhla’.

Photograph No.2 Bow damage above the waterline.)

4
 FACTUAL INFORMATION

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Vessel Details

Name: ‘FV Dearbhla’.

Official Number: 404155.

MMSI number: MMSI 250001269.

Type: Fishing vessel - trawler.

Port of Registry: Drogheda.

Port Letters/Number: DA55.

Overall Length: 23 metres (m).

Registered Length: 19.98 m.

Breadth: 7.14 m.

Moulded Depth: 3.65 m.

Engine make and model: Enerica Caterpillar 3508B.

Engine Power: 405 kilowatts (kW).

Date of entry into Service: 01-01-1992.

Date of Registration: 29-08-2014.

Gross tonnage: 150.

Builder: Ets PIRIOU Constructions Navales.

Builders Yard: Concarneau, France.

Keel Laid: 1st January 1992.

Fishing Vessel Safety Certificate: It was understood the vessels documents had
been removed for the owners safe keeping.

2.2 Vessel Extra Information

At the time of examination by the MCIB investigator the ‘FV Dearbhla’ was dry-
docked on a cradle on the repair yard slipway and bow damage was being assessed
by repair staff. There were no members of the vessel’s crew or owners’

5
FACTUAL INFORMATION Cont.

representatives onboard the vessel at the time of the MCIB examination on the
10th June 2020.

The MCIB learned that the ‘FV Dearbhla’ was subject to detention in accordance
with Section 459 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1984 effective from the 15th May
2020. The specific grounds for detention were ‘hull damage to bow and expired
certification’. The legislation allows the detention of the vessel until re-certified
by the Detaining Officer who will issue a Notice of Release if satisfied as to the
state of the vessel.

(see Appendix 7.2 - Notice of Detention.)

2.3 Crew Details

Relief Skipper – an experienced fisher and Skipper, Certificate of Competency

(CoC 285) Cert Type Fishing and Cert Class Deck, joined the fishing vessel in
Rossaveel to oversee the voyage to Howth only. At the time of the incident the
Skipper was the only qualified officer onboard the fishing vessel.

Crewmember ‘A’ – Watchkeeper. Crewmember ‘A’s name is entered in the crew

list page section of the vessels Official Logbook (for the 1st half of 2020) but does
not appear in the Official Logbook for 2019 (2nd half). Crewmember ‘A’ stated he
was onboard for the previous series of fishing trips which were “back to back” but
stated he was fully rested after the period alongside in Rossaveel. Crewmember
‘A’ did not have certified navigation skills.

Crewmember B – unknown experience.

Crewmember C – unknown experience.

Crewmember D – unknown experience.

2.4 Marine Incident Information

Incident Type: This was a marine incident that resulted in damage to the hull of
the fishing vessel above and below the water line which may have resulted in
serious injury or death to the crew and the loss of the vessel.

2.4.1 Weather information from Met Éireann: Estimated weather and sea state
conditions for the coastal area between Loop Head and Slea Head between 18:00
hrs on 13th May 2020 to 05:00 hrs on 14th May 2020:

Weather: Dry throughout the period with variable cloud at first and clear skies at
the end of the period.

Air Temp: Air temperatures offshore remained at 9 or 10 degrees Celsius

throughout the period.

6
 Cont. FACTUAL INFORMATION

Wind: Moderate northerly breeze, Beaufort force 4, at first (mean wind speed
of 8 – 14 knots) with occasional gusts up to 20 knots. Winds gradually
decreasing during the evening of the 13th May and by 23:00 hrs were light and
remained light until 05:00 hrs on the 14th May, Beaufort force 2 or 3 (mean
winds speed 10 knots or less) from easterly or variable direction.

Visibility: Good, greater than 10 nautical miles (NM)

Sea State: Slight, mean significant wave height 1 m or less, mean wave period
~5 seconds. Wave direction northerly or north easterly.

Sea temp: 12 degrees Celsius (M3)

(see Appendix 7.3 - Fig.1. Sea Area 131800 to 140500 - Estimate of Weather
and Sea state.
Fig.2. Scale of Wave heights.
Fig.3. Scale of Beaufort wind force.)

2.4.2 Voyage Particulars: Note: All times are local time = UTC +1

The vessel departed the fishing port of Rossaveel at 18:00 hrs on the 13th May
2020 with the intention of passage to Howth. The Skipper had not made a
passage plan. The voyage to Howth would take approximately forty-two hours
(1 day 18 hours) at 8 knots with Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) for noon on
the 15th May.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No. 1, Rossaveel to Howth.)

The Skipper navigated the vessel out of Rossaveel Harbour and through Gregory
Sound off the Aran Islands and made course south for the Blasket Islands.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No.2, Rossaveel to Dingle Bay.)

At approximately 03:00 hrs the following morning, 14th May, the Skipper called
Crewmember ‘A’ to take over the navigation watch in the wheelhouse. The
Skipper instructed Crewmember ‘A’ to continue and proceed through Blaskets
Sound. The Skipper left the wheelhouse and proceeded to his bunk for rest. At
approximately 04:10 hrs the vessel grounded on rocks in approximate position
Latitude 52° 03.820’N Longitude 010° 36.296’W which is on the north west
peninsula of Inish na Bró island.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No.3, ‘FV Dearbhla’ Grounding – position.)

The crew were able to manoeuvre the vessel off the rocks and it continued its
passage to Howth. At approximately 08:00 hrs the vessel was directed by the
owner to re-route to Castletownbere for assessment and inspection of the
grounding damage to the vessels bow.

7
FACTUAL INFORMATION Cont.

Whilst alongside Castletownbere the vessel was boarded, inspected and detained
by a Surveyor of the MSO.

2.5 Emergency Response

The incident was not reported to the appropriate authorities and there was no
distress broadcast made. Accordingly, there was no emergency response to this
incident.

8
 NARRATIVE

3. NARRATIVE

3.1 The ‘FV Dearbhla’ departed Rossaveel, Co. Galway, at approximately 18:00 hrs
on the 13th May to make course for Howth, Co. Dublin. There were five crew
onboard including the Skipper. The Skipper joined the vessel for the voyage only
and was not the regular fishing Skipper. All other Crewmembers were permanent
crew. The Skipper navigated the vessel out of Rossaveel Harbour and made
passage through Gregory Sound in the Aran islands and then made course of 210
degrees (0) for the Blaskets, a distance of approximately 70 NM.

3.2 At 02:45 hrs the vessel’s position was 52° 13.484’N, 01° 0 27.6199’W west of
Sybil Head and its Course Over the Ground (COG) was 2090 , Speed Over the
Ground (SOG) was 8.2 knots (kn).

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No.4 , AIS track to 02:45 hrs.)

The estimated position at 03:00 hrs was approximately northwest of Sybil Point
when the Skipper called Crewmember ‘A’ to take over the wheelhouse watch.
The Skipper gave Crewmember ‘A’ instructions to change course in order to
proceed through Blasket Sound. Weather was good with good visibility and
moderate swell. The Skipper retired to his bunk for rest before the course
change was made.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No.5, Blasket Islands.)

3.3 Shortly after taking over the watch Crewmember ‘A’ went down to the tea
station in the crew mess to make a cup of tea. Before leaving the wheelhouse,
Crewmember ‘A’ switched ‘OFF’ the ‘Watchkeeper Alarm’, a timer device
designed to give an audible sound in the wheelhouse every ten minutes. The
device’s function is to ensure the watchkeeper remains alert and in the
wheelhouse. The Watchkeeper Alarm panel is located on the main wheelhouse
console to the starboard side of the helm immediately in front of the
watchkeeper’s chair.

(see Appendix 7.1 - Photograph No. 3 , Watchkeeper Alarm Panel.)

The panel consists of four items:

• A keyed ‘system enable’ switch by which the device is switched ‘ON’ or ‘OFF”.
Unless the key is inserted into the switch mechanism the switch is locked in
position. The key is removable and may be taken away leaving the panel either
locked in the ‘ON’ (enabled) position or locked in the ‘OFF’ (disabled) position.
• A green ‘system enabled’ indicator light indicating whether the system is ‘ON’
and enabled or ‘OFF’ and disabled.

9
 NARRATIVE Cont.

• A large red press button which is the means by which the watchkeeper resets
the 10-minute timer cycle to ensure the audible alarm does not sound.
• Adjacent to the keyed switch is a twist switch that cancels the audible alarm
when the alarm has activated.

The device is, in essence, a timer working on a 10-minute cycle. When the alarm
panel is ‘ON’ and enabled, the watchkeeper, by pressing the red press button,
resets the timer to the beginning of the 10-minute cycle. If the watchkeeper
fails to press the red button after 10 minutes have elapsed, the audible alarm
sounds, first in the wheelhouse for the watchkeepers benefit and then, shortly
afterwards, and louder in the vessel’s accommodation to alert other members
of the crew.

Crewmember ‘A’ switched off the alarm so as not to awaken the crew if he was
delayed in making the tea.

After making the tea Crewmember ‘A’ returned to the wheelhouse and resumed
the watch. Crewmember ‘A’ stated that he forgot to switch the Watch Alarm
back ‘ON’ after he returned to the wheelhouse.

Shortly after he returned to the wheelhouse Crewmember ‘A’ fell asleep. There
was no other person on watch and the bridge watch system alarm was switched
off at this time. The vessels steering was on autopilot and its course and speed
over the ground remained unchanged. The watchkeeper had made no course
change to Blasket Sound.

3.4 At 03:40 hrs the vessel’s position was 52° 06.6149’N, 01° 0 34.008’W midway
between Great Blasket Island to the southeast and Inishtooskert immediately to
the north, the vessels COG 211.90, SOG 8.7 kn.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No.6, AIS track to 03:40 hrs.)

At 04:01 hrs the vessel’s position was 52° 03.9650’N, 010° 36.4710’W in
immediate proximity to Inish na Bró; the vessels COG was 209.80, SOG 8.7 kn
and unless the watchkeeper made a safe course change the vessel was standing
into danger of grounding on he island of Inish na Bró.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No.7, AIS track to 04:01 hrs.)

3.5 According to the vessels AIS track at 04:10:05 the vessel’s speed was 8.7 kn.
Sometime shortly after and according to the Skipper’s incident report the fishing
vessel grounded on rocks on the northwest peninsula of Inish Na Bró.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No.8, AIS track at 04:10 hrs.

Chart No.3, Vessel grounding position.)

10
 Cont. NARRATIVE

The Skipper was called immediately and the crew alerted. The Skipper
manoeuvred the fishing vessel away from the rocks and the crew investigated to
determine the damage to the vessel. There was no water ingress to the vessel
and no vibration felt from the propulsion system. The Skipper did not consider
the vessel to be in distress and the emergency services were not alerted at this
time. The vessel proceeded at reduced speed while a continuous assessment was
made by the Skipper on the extent of the damage and the crew watched for any
signs of water ingress.

3.6 At approximately 08:00 hrs the Skipper contacted the owner. The owner was
informed of the incident and given details of the damage to the vessel. The
vessel continued its voyage to Howth while the owner attempted to find a
shipyard able to carry out repairs. The owner stated that enquiries were
protracted before a yard in Berehaven was found to be available to take the
fishing vessel in at short notice.

The vessel was re-routed to Berehaven for inspection and damage assessment at
Bere Island Boatyard. The vessel arrived at the repair yard at approximately
09:00 hrs on the 15th May. The owner viewed the extent of the damage and
contacted the vessel’s insurance company at 10:00 hrs.

(see Appendix 7.5 - General Arrangement ‘FV Dearbhla’.)

Damage found to the bows and stem was extensive. The hull plating was
ruptured above the waterline and internal frames, beams, brackets and floors
in the forepeak tank were deformed and buckled. The deck in the forward store
was buckled. There was evidence of hard contact along the starboard chine and
on the leading edge of the bilge keel.

(see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 2, Bow Damage above the waterline.
Photograph No. 4, Stem Damage below the waterline.
Photograph No. 5, Starboard Chine damage.
Photograph No. 6, Starboard Bilge Keel damage.
Photograph No. 7, Forepeak Tank damage.)

The vessel was also inspected by a Surveyor of the MSO and detained on the
grounds of the damage to the bow and stem and expired certification.

11
 ANALYSIS

4. ANALYSIS

4.1 The ‘FV Dearbhla’ departed Rossaveel at approximately 18:00 hrs in the
afternoon of the 13th May for a voyage to Howth, Co. Dublin, with an ETA of
approximately forty-two hours’ later. The voyage was routed to pass through
Blasket Sound and pass several headlands which required navigational course
changes before the vessel would round Carnsore Point, enter the Irish Sea and
reach its destination in Howth.

(see Appendix 7.4 - Chart No. 1, Rossaveel to Howth.)

The vessel’s Skipper navigated out of Rossaveel Harbour and stayed on watch
until 03:00 hrs the following morning by which time he had been on watch for
approximately seven hours. Crewmember ‘A’, who relieved the Skipper in the
wheelhouse was familiar with the operation of the fishing vessel. He stated that
he was fully rested and prepared to take over watch duties. The Skipper
believed Crewmember ‘A’ was prepared to take over the watch duties and able
to take the vessel through Blasket Sound. There was no indication that the
Crewmember was tired and unable to take over the watch. The weather and
visibility was good.

4.2 The facility for making beverages and other light refreshments should be
available to watchkeepers at their place of duty. The facility for light
refreshments to the watchkeepers onboard ‘FV Dearbhla’ was located outside of
the wheelhouse, one deck down in the crew mess. This oversight enabled the
following sequence of procedural risks that arose when Crewmember ‘A’ took
over the watch at approximately 03.00 hrs:
• When he took over the watch Crewmember ‘A’ needed some refreshmentq and
left his place of duty in the wheelhouse to make tea. This action compromised
the vessel’s safety.
• Compounding this action and significantly increasing the risk level,
Crewmember ‘A’ switched ‘OFF” the Watch Alarm. The Watch Alarm was not
switched back ‘ON’ when he returned.
• Further increasing the risk level as the vessel was approaching the Blaskets,
Crewmember ‘A’ fell asleep on watch in the wheelhouse.

The facility for making hot beverages available in the wheelhouse of ‘FV
Dearbhla’ may have circumvented the series of events that led to the vessel
grounding on Inish Na Bró.

4.3 The Watch Alarm panel has a keyed ‘ON/OFF’ switch. The key is removable and
may be taken away leaving the panel either locked in the ‘ON’, (enabled)
position or locked in the ‘OFF’, (disabled) position (see paragraph 3.3). It would
have been good practice for a senior watchkeeper onboard the fishing

12
 Cont. ANALYSIS

vessel to switch ‘ON’ the Watch Alarm Panel switch, remove the key and keep
the key remote from the panel. By doing so the Watch Alarm system would be
locked in operation, always enabled and active during the voyage.

4.4 A voyage plan or passage plan had not been prepared and the times for course
changes were not fixed. The Skipper assumed the relieving watchkeeper,
Crewmember ‘A’, who was a regular Crewmember and considered competent by
the owner, was able to make course adjustments and changes. The Skipper
instructed Crewmember ‘A’ to make a transit through Blasket Sound. This would
require a course change shortly after Crewmember ’A’ took over the watch. The
passage through Blasket Sound was at night and involved a number of course
changes which required certain navigation skills of the watchkeeper in the
wheelhouse. Also, Crewmember ‘A’ was not qualified for navigational purposes
and whatever level of competence he had was unproven to the relief Skipper. It
would have been prudent for the Skipper to arrange the wheelhouse watch
system so that the vessel’s navigation through Blasket Sound and around the
various headlands and other navigational hazards along the coastal route was
given adequate oversight by a competent watchkeeper.

13
 CONCLUSIONS

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 By falling asleep whilst on watch in the wheelhouse the watchkeeper did not make
the necessary course alteration to keep the vessel in safe and navigable waters.
The vessel grounded on rocks.

5.2 The incident may have been averted if the required course change to navigate
Blasket Sound safely was better supervised.

5.3 The incident may have been averted if there were adequate facilities in the
wheelhouse to make beverages and therefore allow watchkeepers to take light
refreshments.

5.4 The incident may have been averted if the Watchkeeper Alarm panel keyed switch
facility had been used as intended by its designer.

5.5 No evidence was provided demonstrating that the crew had received adequate
training to reduce the risks of endangering the health and safety of the crew or
preventing accidents.

14
 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The Minister for Transport should remind owners and operators of fishing vessels of
the following requirements:
• for crew to receive training as required under S.I. No.640 of 2007, Merchant
Shipping (Safety of Fishing Vessels) (15 – 24 metres) Regulations 2007 as per
below:
‘102. (1) Owners shall ensure that their vessels are operated without
endangering the safety and health of the crew.
(2) The crew shall be given training and instructions on health and safety
matters on board fishing vessels, and, in particular on accident prevention.’
• Under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000, Part
3 - Reporting of Marine Casualties as per below:
‘23.—(1) An owner, charterer, master, skipper, person in charge, ship's agent,
ship's manager or ship's husband of a ship involved in a casualty or incident
shall, by using the quickest feasible means, notify the Board of the casualty or
incident immediately he or she is aware that the casualty or incident has
occurred or commenced, or as soon as practicable thereafter.’

6.2 The Minister for Transport should issue a Marine Notice:

• To remind vessel owners and operators to ensure all navigation is planned in
adequate detail and that passage plans, with contingency plans where
appropriate, are compiled and made known to the crew.
• To require fishing vessel owners and operators develop contingency plans and
procedures for a grounding event or collision incident.

15
 APPENDICES

7. APPENDICES
PAGE

7.1 Photographs 17

7.2 Notice of Detention 23

7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report 24

7.4 Charts 27

7.5 General Arrangement 35

16
 APPENDIX 7.1

Appendix 7.1 Photographs

Photograph No. 1 - ‘FV Dearbhla’.

17
 APPENDIX 7.1 Cont.

Appendix 7.1 Photographs

Photograph No.2 - Bow damage above the waterline.

18
 Cont. APPENDIX 7.1

Appendix 7.1 Photographs

Photograph No. 3 - Watchkeeper Alarm Panel.

19
 APPENDIX 7.1 Cont.

Appendix 7.1 Photographs

Photograph No.4 - Stem damage below the waterline.

20
 Cont. APPENDIX 7.1

Appendix 7.1 Photographs

Photograph No. 5 - Starboard Chine damage below the waterline.

Photograph No.6 - Bilge Keel damage below the waterline.

21
 APPENDIX 7.1 Cont.

Appendix 7.1 Photographs

Photograph No. 7 - Forepeak Tank damage.

22
 APPENDIX 7.2

Appendix 7.2 Notice of Detention

Notice of Detention

23
 APPENDIX 7.3

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report

Fig.1. Sea Area Weather 131800 to 140500 May off the Blaskets.

24
 Cont. APPENDIX 7.3

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report

Fig.2. Scale of Wave Heights and Sea States.

25
 APPENDIX 7.3 Cont.

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report

Fig.3 - Beaufort Scale of Wind.

26
 APPENDIX 7.4

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 1. Rossaveel to Howth.

27
 APPENDIX 7.4 Cont.

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 2. Rossaveel to Dingle Bay.

28
 Cont. APPENDIX 7.4

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 3. ‘FV Dearbhla’ Grounding Position.

29
 APPENDIX 7.4 Cont.

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 4. ‘FV Dearbhla’ AIS track to 02:45 hrs.

30
 Cont. APPENDIX 7.4

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 5. Blasket Islands.

31
 APPENDIX 7.4 Cont.

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 6. ‘FV Dearbhla’ AIS track to 03:40 hrs.

32
 Cont. APPENDIX 7.4

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 7. ‘FV Dearbhla’ AIS track to 04:01 hrs.

33
 APPENDIX 7.4 Cont.

Appendix 7.4 Charts

Chart No. 8. ‘FV Dearbhla’ AIS track to 04:10 hrs.

34
 APPENDIX 7.5

Appendix 7.5 General Arrangement

General Arrangement – ‘FV Dearbhla’

35
 MSA 2000 SECTION 36

SECTION 36 PROCESS

Section 36 of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000

It is a requirement under Section 36 that:

(1) Before publishing a report, the Board shall send a draft of the report or sections of
the draft report to any person who, in its opinion, is likely to be adversely affected
by the publishing of the report or sections or, if that person be deceased, then such
person as appears to the Board best to represent that person’s interest.

(2) A person to whom the Board sends a draft in accordance with subsection (1) may,
within a period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the draft is sent to the
person, or such further period not exceeding 28 days, as the Board in its absolute
discretion thinks fit, submit to the Board in writing his or her observations on the
draft.

(3) A person to whom a draft has been sent in accordance with subsection (1) may apply
to the Board for an extension, in accordance with subsection (2), of the period in
which to submit his or her observations on the draft.

(4) Observations submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2) shall be
included in an appendix to the published report, unless the person submitting the
observations requests in writing that the observations be not published.

(5) Where observations are submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2),
the Board may, at its discretion -

(a) alter the draft before publication or decide not to do so, or

(b) include in the published report such comments on the observations as it thinks
fit.’

The Board reviews and considers all observations received whether published or not
published in the final report. When the Board considers an observation requires
amendments to the report that is stated beside the relevant observation. When the Board
is satisfied that the report has adequately addressed the issue in the observation, then
the observation is ‘Noted’ without comment or amendment. The Board may make further
amendments or observations in light of the responses under Section 36. ‘Noted’ does not
mean that the Board either agrees or disagrees with the observation.

Response(s) received following circulation of the draft report are included in the
following section.

36
 CORRESPONDENCE

8. SECTION 36 - CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

No correspondence was received on the draft of this report.

37
 NOTES

38
NOTES

39
 NOTES

40
 Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
email: info@mcib.ie
www.mcib.ie