Article on Democracy by Janaki Srinivasan:

In several situations of collective existence, the idea of Democracy provides one basis for taking judgements
and therein, a democratic decision is one that takes into account and reflects the wishes of the people who
come under the purview of that decision. The advocates of democracy argue that a decision-making procedure
which reflects a commitment of taking into equal consideration the preferences of members of the concerned
group/s is a legitimate one. Democracy is, thus, both a method to arrive at collective decisions and a set of
values and behaviour with which people approach decision making.
What is the nature of a democratic decision? There has been much debate on this. As a conflict-resolution
model, democracy is often identified with majority rule and this raises the problem of oppression of minorities.
On the other hand, democracies are expected to arrive at a consensus. But in plural and complex societies that
are also unequal, consensus is difficult to achieve
THE CONCEPT
The concept of democracy is central to our contemporary political vocabularies, yet agreement on how to
conceptualise democracy is far from widespread. As Adam Przeworski has recently remarked: ‘Perusing
innumerable definitions, one discovers that democracy has become an altar on which everyone hangs his
or her favorite ex voto.'
At the heart of all democratic theories is the concept of popular power. According to Anthony Arblaster, it
refers to a situation where power and authority ultimately rest with the people. A democratic government is
contrasted with an authoritarian one where decisions are imposed on the people and exercised without their
consent. Democracy ensures the accountability of those holding power to the people who are the ultimate
source of that power. It is the consent of the people which makes government authority legitimate. The
question of consent immediately connects with that of participation.
In a direct democracy, there is a high degree of participation as citizens collectively decide, often through
mass meetings, on almost all major issues. In effect, people rule themselves. This form of democracy is
associated with the classical Athenian model.
In contrast, in an indirect or representative democracy, government functions through representatives who
are chosen through popular elections. These representatives provide a link between the governments and the
people and elections allow the people to control the action of the representatives and prevent abuse of power.
Liberal democracy is a representative form of government.
A minimal view of democracy: Advanced by Schumpeter, it goes as ‘a system in which rulers are selected
by competitive elections’, where such elections are held on a regular basis and under conditions of universal
suffrage. Przeworski has argued that there are good reasons to value democracy on a minimal understanding
of it pin pointing ‘that choosing rulers by election does not assure either rationality [of decision-making], or
representation [of the interests or will of the people], or equality [of citizens]’. He advances this argument on
two main grounds: first, ‘the mere possibility of being able to change governments can avoid violence’ and,
second, ‘being able to do it by voting has consequences of its own’. In other words, voting not only provides
a mechanism, like coin-tossing, that avoids violence but also provides current rulers and possible future rulers
with information concerning the political constitution of those subject to their rule, information which (given
their interest in re-election and election, respectively) is likely to inform the character of their rule.
This minimal view lays the foundation for a formal concept of democracy as: a mode of government in
which the members of the unit of rule are equal consociates and have collectively an effective capacity to
govern, either directly or via intermediaries, matters of common interest qua membership of this unit of rule.
This formal concept highlights two features which are typically taken to be basic to any substantive account
of democracy: the political equality of citizens and the idea of collective self-rule. In this way, Democracy
refers to a government based on political equality, i.e. consent is required of all the individuals who form part
of the political community. It is informed by the belief that all people are equally capable of, and have a stake
in making collective decisions that shape their lives. It is based on the idea of the equal moral worth of all
individuals and against the exclusion of anyone from the political process. Thus, it is against hierarchy or
inherited privileges and discrimination. A democratic society is also called an ‘open society’ where there is
space for all voices, however unpopular or conventional they may be, to be heard. This requires a range of
rights and political freedoms like freedom of expression, association and movement among others, which are
protected by the state. Thus, the practice of democracy is unthinkable without rights.
For democracy to be effective, those factors which discriminate against sections of people and hinder their
effective intervention in collective decision making need to be addressed. The presence of structures of power
that are sources of inequality in a society are an impediment to democracy. Equality, thus, is a condition of
democracy and democratic societies are expected to devise arrangements which further equality.
Thomas Christiano in his work on Democracy prescribes that he task of normative democratic theory
is not to settle questions of definition, but to determine which, if any, of the forms that democracy may
take are morally desirable, and when and how. To evaluate the arguments of democratic theorists, the need
is to decide on the merits of the different principles, and conceptions, of humanity and society from which
they proceed. We can evaluate democracy along at least two different dimensions:
i) Instrumentally, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision
making.
ii) Intrinsically, by reference to qualities that are inherent in the method-for example, whether there is
something inherently fair about making democratic decisions about matters on which people disagree.
INSTRUMENTALISM

1. Instrumental arguments in favour of democracy:

Two kinds of instrumental benefit are commonly attributed to democracy: relatively good laws, and policies
and improvements in the characters of the participants. John Stuart Mill argued that a democratic method of
making legislation is better than non-democratic methods in three ways: strategically, epistemically, and via
the improvement of the characters of democratic citizens.
-Strategically, democracy has an advantage, because it forces decision makers to take into account the
interests, rights, and opinions of most people in society. One forceful contemporary statement of this
instrumental argument is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues, for example, that 'no substantial famine has
ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press'.
The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press
have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.
-Epistemologically, democracy is thought to be the best decision-making method, on the grounds that it is
generally more reliable in helping participants to discover the right decisions. Democratic decision making
tends to be more informed than other forms about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms that are
necessary to advance those interests. Furthermore, the broad-based discussion that is typical of democracy
enhances the critical assessment of the different moral ideas that guide decision makers.
-Many have endorsed democracy on the basis of the proposition that democracy has beneficial effects on
character. Many have noted, with Mill and Rousseau, that democracy tends to make people stand up for
themselves more than do other forms of rule, because under democracy, collective decisions depend more
upon the will of the people than do those made under monarchy or aristocracy. In this way, the democratic
processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality, and morality of participants. Because these beneficial
effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favour of democracy and against other forms
of rule.

2. Instrumental arguments against democracy:

Not all instrumental arguments favour democracy. Plato argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of
monarchy, aristocracy, and even oligarchy, on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise
that is necessary to properly governed societies. In a democracy, he argues, those who are expert at winning
elections and nothing else will eventually dominate democratic politics. Hence, the state will be guided by
very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal have used to help themselves into
office.
Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension
among subjects. From his perspective, individual citizens and even politicians are likely not to have a sense
of responsibility for the quality of legislation, because no individual makes a significant difference to the
outcomes of decision making. A sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes is seen to undermine the concern
of politicians for the common good, leading them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens. For
Hobbes, then, democracy has deleterious effects on subjects and politicians, and consequently on the quality
of the outcomes of collective decision making.
CONCEPTIONS OF INTRINSIC WORTH OF DEMOCRACY
 1. Deliberative democracy:

The idea behind deliberative democracy is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are
publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result
of free and reasoned debate among equals. Citizens justify laws and policies to each other on the basis of
mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely
engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and
equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions.
Reasonableness
The basis of public justification is reasonable consensus among citizens.The basic principle behind most
conceptions of deliberative democracy seems to be the principle of reasonableness, according to which
reasonable persons will only offer principles for the regulation of their society that other reasonable persons
can reasonably accept. The notion of the reasonable is meant to be fairly weak on this account. One can
reasonably reject a doctrine to the extent that it is incompatible with one's own doctrine, as long as one's own
doctrine does not require its imposition on others and it is a doctrine that has survived sustained critical
reflection. This is a principle of reciprocity, because one only offers principles that others, who restrain
themselves in the same way, can accept. Reasonable persons restrain themselves from proposing laws and
policies on the basis of controversial principles for the regulation of society. There are three key arguments
for this principle of reasonableness.
• Epistemological-There is no justification independent of what people, or at least reasonable people, believe.
Hence, if one cannot provide a justification for principles that others can accept given their reasonable beliefs,
then those principles are not justified for those persons.
• Moral-One fails to respect the reason of the other members of society if one imposes terms of association on
them that they cannot accept, given their reasonable views. This failure of respect for the reason of the other
members of society defeats the value of the principles that one is proposing for the society.
• Democratic-One does not genuinely treat others as equals if one insists on imposing principles on them that
they cannot reasonably accept, even if this imposition takes place against the background of egalitarian
decision-making processes.
But each of these three arguments can be questioned. Moreover, it is hard to see how this approach avoids the
need for a complete consensus, which is highly unlikely to occur in any diverse society.

2. Egalitarian conceptions of democracy:

An egalitarian conception of democracy emphasizes the intrinsic worth of democracy as a system that values
and promotes equality among individuals. The egalitarian conception of democracy realizes equality among
citizens in the context of irresolvable disagreement on basic matters of political value. The key normative
notion behind the egalitarian conception is the idea of public equality which holds that, despite the many
disagreements among persons about law and policy and their grounds, democracy is a way of publicly treating
each person as an equal. This perspective views democracy not just as a political mechanism for decision-
making but as a means to achieve social and political equality. The idea is that every citizen should have an
equal voice in shaping the direction of the society, regardless of factors such as wealth, social status, ethnicity,
or gender.
Egalitarian democracy seeks to achieve social justice by addressing and rectifying existing inequalities. This
may involve policies that aim to reduce economic disparities, eliminate discrimination, and promote the well-
being of all members of society. It recognizes the value of diversity and seeks to include perspectives from all
segments of society. This inclusivity not only enhances the quality of decision-making but also reflects the
principle that all individuals are of equal worth.
Against the background of these facts, each person has interests that stand out as especially important in a
pluralistic society. They have interests in correcting for the cognitive biases of others when it comes to the
creation or revision of common economic, legal, and political institutions. Each person has interests in living
in a world that makes some sense to them-a world that accords, within limits, to their sense of how that social
world ought to be structured. The basic facts described above and the principle of equality suggest that
each person ought to have an equal say in determining the common legal, economic, and political
institutions under which they live.
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY
As per David Held in his work 'DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: From the Modern State
to Cosmopolitan Governance':
Within the history of democratic theory lies a deeply rooted conflict about whether democracy should mean
some kind of popular power (a form of politics in which citizens are engaged in self government and self-
regulation) or an aid to decision-making (a means of conferring authority on those periodically voted into
office). This conflict has given rise to three basic variants or models of democracy. First, there is direct or
participatory democracy, a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly
involved. This was the ‘original’ type of democracy found in ancient Athens, among other places. Secondly,
there is liberal or representative democracy, a system of rule embracing elected ‘officers’ who undertake
to ‘represent’ the interests or views of citizens within delimited territories while upholding the ‘rule of law’.
Thirdly, there is a variant of democracy based on a one-party model. Until recently, the Soviet Union, East
European societies and many developing countries were committed to this conception.

1. The active citizen and republican government

Athenian democracy has long been taken as a fundamental source of inspiration for modern Western political
thought. The political ideals of Athens – equality among citizens, liberty, respect for the law and justice – have
been taken as integral to Western political thinking, and it is for this reason that Athens constitutes a useful
starting point. The Athenian city-state, ruled as it was by citizen-governors, did not differentiate between state
and society. In ancient Athens, citizens were at one and the same time subjects of political authority and the
creators of public rules and regulations. The people (demos) engaged in legislative and judicial functions and
thus, participating directly in the affairs of ‘the state’. Athenian democracy required a general commitment to
the principle of civic virtue: dedication to the republican city-state and the subordination of private life to
public affairs and the common good. ‘The public’ and ‘the private’ were intertwined. Citizens could properly
fulfil themselves and live honourably only in and through the polis. However, as citizens, among the excluded
were women and a substantial slave population. The Athenian city-state – eclipsed ultimately by the rise of
empires, stronger states and military regimes – shared features with republican Rome. Both were
predominantly face-to-face societies and oral cultures; both had elements of popular participation in
governmental affairs; and both had little, if any, centralized bureaucratic control. Furthermore, both sought to
foster a deep sense of public duty, a tradition of civic virtue or responsibility to ‘the republic’ – to the
distinctive matters of the public realm. And in both polities, the claims of the state were given a unique priority
over those of the individual citizen. But if Athens was a democratic republic, contemporary scholarship
generally affirms that Rome was, by comparison, an essentially oligarchical system. Classical republicanism
received its most robust restatement in the early Renaissance, especially in the city-states of Italy. The meaning
of the concept of ‘active citizenship in a republic’ became a leading concern. Political thinkers of this period
were critical of the Athenian formulation of this notion; shaped as their views were by Aristotle, one of the
leading critics of Greek democracy, and by the centuries-long impact of republican Rome, they recast the
republican tradition. While the concept of the polis remained central to the political theory of Italian cities,
most notably in Florence, it was no longer regarded as a means to self-fulfilment. Emphasis continued to be
placed on the importance of civic virtue but the latter was understood as highly fragile, subject particularly to
corruption if dependent solely upon the political involvement of any one major grouping: the people, the
aristocracy or the monarchy. A constitution which could reflect and balance the interests of all leading political
factions became an aspiration. Niccolò Machiavelli thus argued that all singular constitutional forms
(monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) were unstable, and only a governmental system combining
elements of each could promote the kind of political culture on which civic virtue depends. The best
example of such a government was, he proclaimed, Rome: Rome’s mixed government (with its system of
consuls, Senate and tribunes of the people) was directly linked to its sustained achievements. The core of the
Renaissance republican case was that the freedom of a political community rested upon its accountability to
no authority other than that of the community itself. Self-government is the basis of liberty, together with the
right of citizens to participate – within a constitutional framework which creates distinct roles for leading
social forces – in the government of their own common business. In Renaissance republicanism, as well as
in Greek democratic thought, a citizen was someone who participated in ‘giving judgement and holding
office’. Citizenship meant participation in public affairs. Although it would be misleading to suggest that the
rise of Christianity effectively banished secular considerations from the lives of rulers and ruled, it
unquestionably shifted the source of authority and wisdom from this-worldly to other-worldly representatives.
During the Middle Ages, the integration of Christian Europe from the Eastern Atlantic seaboard to the Balkans
came to depend above all on two theocratic authorities: the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman
Empire. There was no theoretical alternative to their account of the nature of power and rule. Not until the end
of the sixteenth century, when it became apparent that religion had become a highly divisive force and that
the powers of the state would have to be separated from the duty of rulers to uphold any particular faith, did
the nature and limits of political authority, law, rights and obedience become a preoccupation, from Italy to
England, of European political thought.

2. Liberal representative democracy

This preoccupation became the hallmark of modern liberal theory, which constantly sought to justify the
sovereign power of the state while at the same time justifying limits on that power. For the liberal democrats,
representative democracy constituted the key institutional innovation to overcome the problem of balancing
coercive power and liberty. The liberal concern with reason, lawful government and freedom of choice could
only be upheld properly by recognizing the political equality of all mature individuals. Thus, liberal democrats
argued, the democratic constitutional state, linked to other key institutional mechanisms, particularly the free
market, would resolve the problems of ensuring both liberty and authority. Two classic statements of the new
position can be found in the philosophy of James Madison and in the work of one of the key figures of
nineteenth-century English liberalism: Jeremy Bentham. In Madison’s account, ‘pure democracies’ (by
which he means societies ‘consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the
government in person’) have always been intolerant, unjust and unstable. By contrast, representative
government overcomes the excesses of ‘pure democracy’ because regular elections force a clarification of
public issues, and the elected few, able to withstand the political process, are likely to be competent and
capable of ‘discerning the true interest of their country’. The central concern of Madison’s argument is not the
rightful place of the active citizen in the life of the political community but, instead, the legitimate pursuit by
individuals of their interests, and government as a means for the enhancement of these interests. Madison's
position signals a clear shift from the classical ideals of civic virtue and the public realm to liberal
preoccupations. He conceived of the representative state as the chief mechanism to aggregate individuals’
interests and to protect their rights. In parallel with this view, Bentham held that representative democracy is
required to protect citizens from the despotic use of political power, whether it be by a monarch, the aristocracy
or other groups. The representative state thus becomes an umpire or referee while individuals pursue in civil
society, according to the rules of economic competition and free exchange, their own interests. The free vote
and the free market are both essential, for a key presupposition is that the collective good can be properly
realized in most domains of life only if individuals interact in competitive exchanges, pursuing their utility
with minimal state interference. However, alongside, there is a strong commitment to certain types of state
intervention: for instance, intervention to reshape social relations and institutions if, in the event of the failure
of laissez faire, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is not achieved – the only defensible criterion,
Bentham held, of the public good. From classical antiquity to the seventeenth century, democracy was
largely associated with the gathering of citizens in assemblies and public meeting places. By the early
nineteenth century, in contrast, it was beginning to be thought of as the right of citizens to participate
in the determination of the collective will through the medium of elected representatives. The theory of
representative democracy fundamentally shifted the terms of reference of democratic thought: the practical
limits that a sizeable citizenry imposes on democracy were practically eliminated. Representative democracy
could now be celebrated as both accountable and feasible government, potentially stable over great territories
and time spans. It could even be heralded, as James Mill put it, as ‘the grand discovery of modern times’ in
which ‘the solution of all difficulties, both speculative and practical, would be found’. Accordingly, the theory
and practice of popular government shook off its traditional association with small states and cities, opening
itself to become the legitimating creed of the emerging world of nation-states. But who exactly was to count
as a legitimate participant, or a ‘citizen’ or ‘individual’, and what his or her exact role was to be in this new
order, remained either unclear or unsettled. In this way, liberal democracy took on its distinctively
contemporary form: a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest participation of the majority of
citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions, that is, decisions affecting
the whole community. This cluster includes elected government; free and fair elections in which every
citizen’s vote has an equal weight; a suffrage which embraces all citizens irrespective of distinctions of race,
religion, class, sex and so on; freedom of conscience, information and expression on all public matters broadly
defined; the right of all adults to oppose their government and stand for office; and associational autonomy –
the right to form independent associations including social movements, interest groups and political parties.
The consolidation of representative democracy, thus understood, has been a twentieth-century phenomenon;
perhaps one should even say a late twentieth-century phenomenon. For it is only in the closing decades of this
century that democracy has been (relatively) securely established in the West and widely adopted in principle
as a suitable model of government beyond the West.

3. Marxism and one-party democracy

The struggle of liberalism against tyranny, and the struggle by liberal democrats for political equality,
represented a major step forward in the history of human emancipation, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
readily acknowledged. But for the Marxist tradition, the great universal ideals of ‘liberty, equality and justice’
cannot be realized simply by the ‘free’ struggle for votes in the political system together with the ‘free’ struggle
for profit in the market-place. According to the Marxist critique, the capitalist economy, by virtue of its internal
dynamics, inevitably produces systematic inequality and massive restrictions on real freedom. The formal
existence of certain liberties is of little value if they cannot be exercised in practice. Therefore, although each
step towards formal political equality is an advance, its liberating potential is severely curtailed by inequalities
of class. In class societies the state cannot become the vehicle for the pursuit of the common good or public
interest. Far from playing the role of emancipator, protective knight, umpire or judge in the face of disorder,
the agencies of the liberal representative state are enmeshed in the struggles of civil society. Marxists conceive
of the state as an extension of civil society, reinforcing the social order for the enhancement of particular
interests. Their argument is that political emancipation is only a step towards human emancipation; that is, the
complete democratization of both society and the state. In their view, liberal democratic society fails when
judged by its own promises. Among these promises are, first, political participation, or general involvement
mediated by representatives in decisions affecting the whole community; secondly, accountable government;
and thirdly, freedom to protest and reform. But ‘really existing liberal democracy’, as one Marxist recently
put it, ‘fails to deliver’ on any of these promises. For it is distinguished by the existence of a largely passive
citizenry; by the erosion and displacement of parliamentary institutions by unelected centres of power; and by
substantial structural constraints on state action and, in particular, on the possibility of the piecemeal reform
of capitalism. Marx himself envisaged the replacement of the liberal democratic state by a ‘commune
structure’: the smallest communities, which were to administer their own affairs, would elect delegates to
larger administrative units; these in turn would elect candidates to still larger areas of administration. This
arrangement is known as the ‘pyramid’ structure of ‘delegative democracy’: all delegates are revocable,
bound by the instructions of their constituency, and organized into a ‘pyramid’ of directly elected committees.
In the Marxist-Leninist account, the system of delegative democracy is to be complemented by a separate but
somewhat similar system at the level of the Communist Party. The transition to socialism and communism
necessitates the ‘professional’ leadership of a disciplined cadre of revolutionaries. Only such a leadership has
the capacity to organize the defence of the revolution against counter-revolutionary forces, to plan the
expansion of the forces of production, and to supervise the reconstruction of society. Since all fundamental
differences of interest are class interests, since the working class interest is the progressive interest in society,
a revolutionary party is essential. The party is the instrument which can create the framework for socialism
and communism. In practice, the party has to rule; and it was only in the ‘Gorbachev era’ in the Soviet Union
(from 1984 to August 1991) that a pyramid of councils, or ‘Soviets’, from the central authority to those at
local village and neighbourhood level, was given anything more than a symbolic or ritualistic role in the post
revolutionary period.
Indeed, Democracy is often called an ‘adjectival concept’ because of the endless number of ‘types’ or
‘models’ into which democracies are classified, for example; liberal, social, people’s, direct and indirect,
radical, associational, deliberative, strong and weak, procedural and substantive, pluralist and elitist … the list
goes on.
Concl- If a justifiable account of democracy is to be established, it is not enough to inquire into the proper
principles and procedures of democracy and of the liberal democratic state, important though this is. An
inquiry into the conditions of enactment of these principles and procedures is also necessary; that is, an inquiry
into the character and dynamics of different types of power and their impact on democratic arrangements.
Such an investigation must ask how and why one particular type of power – political power – crystallized and
became embedded in the state, and how and why democracy came to be associated with this site of power,
above all others. At issue is an attempt to understand the nature of the modern state, its reach over social and
economic affairs in a given territory, and the implications of this for the form and efficacy of democracy.
However, democracy has another side which also requires specification if its contemporary meaning is to be
grasped fully. The problems of democracy extend beyond state borders.
As per David Owen in his work on 'Dem'ocracy: Two Major Contemporary Models/regulative ideals
of Democracy+contestatory mechanisms that can play an important supplementary role with respect
to these models

1. The interest-aggregating model:

This first model begins with the intuitively simple and appealing thought that the basic substance of political
reflection and action is interests, where these interests are expressed by political actors as preferences. Given
this interest-oriented argument for democracy, Robert Dahl suggests the following five ideal standards as the
core normative commitments of democracy:
1) Effective participation
2) Equality in voting
3) Gaining enlightened understanding
4) Exercising final control over the agenda
5) Inclusion of adults.
Dahl’s response believes that, given the assumption that democracy is to be understood in terms of interests,
‘each is necessary if the members..are to be politically equal in determining the policies of the association’.
Dahl’s points that citizens must have an adequate and equal opportunity ‘for discovering and validating (within
the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the
citizen’s interests’, since otherwise some citizens may be disadvantaged relative to others in terms of being
able to accurately determine the choice which best expresses their fundamental interests with respect to a
given decision. Essentially the democratic idea expressed here involves two elements. First, that what count
as matters of collective interest (that is, matters on which political decisions may be appropriate) should be
determined by equal citizens as a collectivity within the constraints imposed by the conditions of democratic
rule. Second, that what is held to be in the collective interest (that is, what is the best course of action for the
polity to adopt) in relation to a given issue should be decided by equal citizens collectively in accordance with
the principles of democratic rule. That's why Dahl stresses the importance of both the collective ability of
citizens as political equals to set the agenda and to decide what to do. Any form of government that fails to
meet both of these conditions subjects citizens, in one way or another, to the rule of guardians.
In terms of this interest-aggregation model, it is clear that what we can and should expect is a commitment to
realizing as fully as practicable the five ideal standards which Dahl sketches and thus, most importantly, to
measures which seek to ensure our equal freedom to form and identify our own interests, our equal freedom
to express these interests at all stages of the democratic process from agenda-setting to final decision-making
and the equal weighting of our interests in determining our collective decision. Our democratic institutions
are to be evaluated in terms of their design and performance against their satisfaction of, and commitment to,
such measures.

2. The deliberative model

Whereas the first model takes interests as the basic currency of politics, the second model takes public reasons
as occupying this position. The deliberative argument for democracy, thus, emerges from a claim about the
political equality of citizens as grounded on their equal moral status as autonomous individuals capable of
giving and exchanging reasons – and, hence, on what Rainer Forst has called their basic moral right of
justification, that is, the basic right to have exercises of collective power over their free activity as citizens
justified by reasons that are acceptable to them as citizen.
On Joshua Cohen’s account, the ideal standards can be given by presenting ‘an idealized procedure of
political deliberation, constructed to capture the notions of free, equal and reason that figure in the deliberative
ideal’. The ideal procedure is as follows:
1) All citizens acknowledge the freedom of each citizen to participate.
2) Citizens are formally equal in that each has the same rights to propose issues and solutions, to offer reasons
for or against proposals, and to have an equal voice in deciding the outcome.
3) Citizens are substantively equal in that each has an equal opportunity to exercise their rights of participation.
4) Citizens are reasonable ‘in that they aim to defend and criticize institutions and programs in terms of
considerations that others, as free and equal, have reason to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and
on the assumption that those others are themselves concerned to provide suitable justifications’.
The standards invoked by this idealised procedure are interestingly analogous to those proposed by Dahl in
that this procedure ensures the opportunity for effective participation, equality of voting, gaining enlightened
understanding, exercising final control over the agenda and inclusion of adults. In addition, this model also
invokes the standard of reasonableness, namely, that citizens acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism
and seek to offer reasons that other reasonable citizens could not reasonably reject. In this respect, the
deliberative model is more demanding than the interest-aggregation model since it requires that citizens
exercise a form of democratic self-restraint, namely that they reflect as citizens and not in terms of their private
interests.
In this way, the deliberative model involves a commitment to realising as fully as practicable a framework of
social and institutional arrangements that ‘facilitate free reasoning among equal citizens while ensuring that
citizens are treated as free and equal in that discussion; and tie the authorization to exercise public power –
and the exercise itself – to such public reasoning’. It is against such criteria that our democratic polity is to be
judged.
David Miller has argued that the interest-aggregation model is exposed to social choice dilemmas in part
because it posits choosing a decision rule independently of consideration of the content of the citizens views,
whereas because the deliberative model sees the content of citizens’ judgements concerning the collective
interest as emerging in the course of reasonable deliberation, making it less vulnerable to problems.

3. Contestatory democracy

Given the above account of the two models of democracy, there might still be the potential problem posed by
the tyranny of the majority. While both models provide effective arguments for liberal freedoms such as
freedom of speech and freedom of association as intrinsic to democratic rule, it remains plausible that, under
non-ideal conditions, the interests or reasons expressed by minority groups may be ignored or, at least, not
granted equal status within the decision-making process. In the practical context of democratic rule by way of
representative government, addressing this problem ‘would require not just that the majority are heard in
determining what common, perceived interests ought to be pursued by government, but also that the relevant
minorities get a hearing. So the question is whether there is any way of subjecting government to a mode
of distributive or minority control in order to balance the electorally established mode of collective or
majority control. Pettit’s suggestion is to introduce contestatory mechanisms: mechanisms through which a
minority group who hold that the decision reached has not adequately acknowledged their political voice can
contest the decision through ‘a procedure that would enable people, not to veto public decisions on the basis
of their avowable, perceived interests, but to call them into question on such a basis and trigger a review; in
particular, to trigger a review in a forum that they and others can all endorse as an impartial court of appeal’.
This supplement to both the major models is important not least because it contributes to maintaining an
effective sense of political belonging among minority groups.
Consequently, under non-ideal conditions, a concern with promoting democratic stability in the sense of a
strong identification of citizens with their democratic institutions entails that we have good reasons to adopt a
contestatory supplement to our basic democratic fora and that this is the case whether our democratic
understanding is primarily informed by either of the two main models considered.
DIRECT PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
The most celebrated form of direct participatory democracy was the one practised in the Athenian city-state
of ancient Greece during the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. Athenians prided themselves on the ‘happy versatility’
of citizens and their ability to perform all tasks of governance, i.e. in enacting, implementing and adjudicating
of laws. All major decisions were made by the assembly to which all citizens belonged. Offi ces were fi lled
by either election or draw of lots and no officer was to enjoy perpetual tenure. The idea was to ensure that at
least the short-term offices went to as many people as possible. This remarkable model ensured a high level
of political accountability and political activity of the citizen. Participation in the collective affairs of the
community was considered important for the rational self-development of the citizens; it was the highest form
of good life that they could hope to achieve, fulfill themselves, and live honourably.
Republican Rome shared some features of Athenian democracy, namely, the notion of popular participation
in civic life, a strong sense of duty to the community, the idea of public good and civic virtue as being of
higher value than private individual interests. This is also called civic republicanism.
Rousseau, an early critic of liberal democracy, was heavily inspired by this model. Writing in the 18th
century, Rousseau was critical of electoral democracy and representative mechanisms which were emerging
in various European states. For Rousseau, democracy was the way by which citizens could achieve freedom.
By freedom he did not mean the absence of constraints on the individual’s pursuit of self-interest. Instead, he
articulated a positive notion of freedom. Individuals are free only when they participate directly, actively and
continuously in shaping the life of the community, especially in the making of laws. For him, law-making was
an exercise of sovereignty—which cannot be transferred or represented by anyone else—and an expression of
the will of the people and thus, his idea of General Will: When people set aside their selfi sh interests and
deliberate on the collective common good of the community. Freedom lies in obedience to the general will;
by doing so they are obeying their own true nature. Rousseau goes to the extent of saying that people can be
‘forced to be free’, i.e. obey the general will.
Such conceptions of participatory self-governance, active citizenship and community life have been an
attractive one for all those critical of liberal democracy. However, the very conditions in which this model
has been practised provides a note of caution. The successful operation of the Athenian democracy depended
on a system of exclusivity and inequality. Only citizens were worthy of the good life and a majority of the
population—women, slaves and resident aliens—were kept out of citizenship. Indeed, it was on the basis of
their labour and economic activities that the free adult male could be freed for citizenship. Aristotle, even as
he was critical of democracy, justified this denial of political equality to women and slaves both on the grounds
of necessity and the latter’s natural inferiority. Rousseau, too, explicitly kept out women from political
participation arguing that women were primarily meant to perform sexual and domestic roles and their public
presence would be a distraction. Rousseau did, however, consider a certain measure of economic equality
essential for the exercise of citizenship. For any renewal of strong and active participation a society has to
work out a balance between the satisfaction of material needs and political participation in a framework which
treats all adults equally. A further point of debate is whether present societies can work with a single notion
of common good which can be oppressive not just to individual freedom, as liberals fear, but also to the diverse
groups and cultures which comprise most societies. In other words, a participatory system is seen to put
pressure on attaining homogeneity.Therein, Rousseau’s theory has totalitarian implications.
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
i) Protective Democracy: For early liberals, democracy was meant to be protective, in the sense that it was
meant to protect the rights of citizens and safeguard them from the tyranny of state power. According to liberal
notion, all individuals are free and autonomous, masters of themselves, and makers of their own destiny. They
are primarily rational and self interested beings, intent on pursuing their desires and goals. According to liberal
thinkers like Hobbes and Locke, individuals do not derive their identity from the community and are not
bound to it by any sense of duty, nor do they see themselves as part of a hierarchical system or a divine plan.
Thus, liberalism’s lasting contribution to political thought is a radical notion of equality among human beings.
This view on human nature meant a re-conceptualization of the role and purpose of government. The role of
the government is to create and maintain a system of individual rights, and undertake activities to that end.
The coercive power of the state is required to ensure that individuals in their interaction with each other in a
civil society do not encroach on each other’s rights. Governments were not meant to arrive at or promote a
common good, since individuals do not share a substantive notion of good life. The state is a neutral arbiter;
it is not supposed to interfere in the functioning of civil society. At the same time, liberals share a deep fear
that governments will abuse this power and encroach on these rights. In other words, there is need for a strong
but limited government. Moreover, among free and equal individuals any institution of authority over them
requires their consent, otherwise it will be illegitimate. Thus, there is need for a mechanism through which
people can consent to a government and retain control over it to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted
to it and restrain it from exceeding its limits. This is where liberals turn to democracy as a solution.
Liberals advocate a representative democracy. The task of governance requires expertise, but those in power
must be made accountable. Political participation is not considered a good in itself, like in Athenian
democracy, but a means to control the government and ensure the protection of individual liberties. Political
decisions can be made only by these representatives, because only they enjoy the consent of the people. This
ultimate authority of the people is affirmed, and people can keep a check on the representatives through
periodic elections.
Even though the model of representative democracy was based on the principle of equality, in early liberal
democracies, franchise or political equality was in effect restricted to a few. They were more in the nature of
oligarchies. Early liberals were as fearful of the ‘tyranny of the masses’ as they were of the tyranny of state
power. Locke, James Mill, Madison and Montesquieu were all opposed to universal franchise. For example,
John Locke, who was the first to articulate the key ideas of liberal democracy, restricted franchise to property
owners, defended property as a ‘natural’ right as well as the unequal distribution of property. Even John Stuart
Mill, who supported universal adult franchise and was among the first to support enfranchisement of women,
sought to restrict the right to vote to those with basic educational qualifications and desired provisions for
giving extra votes to educated and better qualified individuals. It was feared that if vested with political
freedoms, the majority would not use their right to vote responsibly but would overturn the distribution of
(unequal) property in society.
It was in the aftermath of the French and the American Revolutions that popular democratic struggles
emerged. The 19th and 20th centuries were marked by increasing and often violent struggles by the working
class, African Americans, and women, demanding the extension of suffrage on the basis of the very ideas of
individualism that had been invoked by the propertied male to win freedom from aristocracies and monarchies.
The implicit radical potential of the notion of individualism, rights and equality was realized by these
struggles. It is only with this acceptance of universal adult franchise that liberal democracy acquired its current
form.
ii) John Stuart Mill and Developmental Democracy: Predominantly, liberal democracy is concerned with the
protection of individual rights and prevention of abuse of power. Participation in this context is of value
because it allows the individual to put forward his/her interests and keep a check on the activities of those in
positions of power. It is of no intrinsic value in terms of the self-development of the individual. James Mill
controversially claimed that since individuals find political activity a distraction from the pursuit of self-
interest, franchise need not be extended to those whose interests are subsumed under those of others.
The views of John Stuart Mill, known as the best advocate of liberal representative democracy, present a
contrast to this. For Mill, a representative system must create maximum space for people to take part in the
functioning of the government and not restrict their involvement by merely allowing them to vote. He
considered participation important because it develops the confidence of the people in their ability to govern
themselves. Mill, thus, understood democracy as a system which allows for the development of an individual’s
personality. It develops the intellectual talents of people and is the best condition for liberty to flourish.
Participation makes informed and intelligent debate possible. It is through debate and discussion, where there
is space for rational persuasion of each other, that the best argument emerges and this helps in solving the
problems affecting the whole community, for instance, Parliament as a debate and discussion forum. Mill
considers a measure of socio-economic equality as necessary for democracy and liberty to be actualized.
Despite his insistence on the value of participation, he was sceptical of the capability of every citizen to govern
and considered governance a task requiring expertise. He sought to balance this by recommending maximum
participation at the local level so that people get educated in the task of governance.
iii) Policy Making and the Pluralist View: The pluralist view, associated with the work of Robert Dahl, is a
specifically American understanding of political processes, but still has relevance for understanding liberal
democratic practice in general. Power, according to Dahl, is the capacity to influence...the process and
outcome of decision-making. People form groups and associations based on their specific interests; so in any
society there will be a wide variety of interest groups which serve as the mechanisms that people adopt in
order to advance their interest, promote their causes and achieve preferred policy outcomes. The policy making
arena is like the market, where different groups pursue their interests and the outcomes are not pre-determined,
but a balance is achieved out of conflicts; through a sort of an ‘invisible hand’ mechanism. Unlike elitist and
Marxist views, pluralists understand power as not concentrated in a particular class, but as spread throughout
society.
Democracy here is identified with certain institutional mechanisms and procedures, representative institutions,
accountability of executive to elected assemblies, basic liberties for all including the freedom of expression
and organization and an independent judiciary. As long as these procedures are followed, a system can be
referred to as being democratic. This is also called procedural democracy as distinguished from a
substantive democracy. The latter is concerned with the attainment of certain ends, like equality or justice.
The chief merit of the pluralist analysis is that all modern democracies do have a plurality of forces struggling
and competing for their interests. However, procedural democracy is compatible with the results which are
always skewed in favour of particular interests and groups. Social and economic inequalities reduce the
opportunity of disadvantaged groups to influence policy outcomes. In his later writing, Dahl does
acknowledge the fact that inequalities can be debilitating and consistently leave certain groups out of the
political process, despite the formal freedoms of a democracy, in which every citizen has the right to
participate in the decision-making process. Thus, there are structural and ideological constraints which
prevent democracies from operating as an open, equal marketplace of competing interests. In this process, the
existence of democratic procedures and its openness to conflicting views, interests and methods of influence
is valuable for a democracy, but the outcomes are liable to be undemocratic. Thus, in the liberal view, the
aim of democracy is to aggregate individual choices and preferences in the best possible way. This
aggregation of choices could be restricted to the choice of government or should constitute a mechanism of
policy making. In the first view, the role of democracy is to basically provide a defence against arbitrary and
unaccountable government through elections and constitutional government. In the second view, democracy
has a more direct link with choosing and influencing the activities of the government. This is usually done
through a wide range of interest groups, political parties and pressure groups.
Today, liberal democracy is both at a moment of triumph and crisis. On the one hand, the collapse of the
communist bloc, introduction of liberal democratic institutions in the former communist countries as well as
the military intervention of the USA in West Asia to introduce democratic regimes signal its near universal
acceptance as the only practical model of democracy. Indeed, the key ideas and institutions of liberal
democracy like representative governments, rule of law, individual rights, electoral competition and multi-
party system have become central to any conception of democracy. Francis Fukuyama in his ‘end of history’
thesis argues that there is no credible alternative to liberal democracy. On the other hand, liberal democracy
continues to be subjected to a scathing critique by socialists, feminists, multiculturalists and deliberative
democrats for not being democratic enough and these critiques have sharpened in the context of globalization.
They observe how the form of liberal democracy currently advocated is minimalist or what Benjamin Barber
calls a ‘weak democracy’ emphasizing elections and a choice of political parties.
OBJECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY:
Everybody’s for democracy in principle. It’s only in practice that the thing gives rise to stiff objections. —
Noam Chomsky
Critics of democracy can be classified into two groups—those who are dissatisfied with a particular kind of
democratic practice and seek to deepen it and those who are critical of the democratic principle as such.
-A key objection to democracy is that it produces incompetent and inefficient governments. In his critique of
Athenian democracy, Plato argues that governance is a matter of skill and expertise and therefore should be
left to experts. Human beings are by nature fundamentally unequal. However, democracy presumes that every-
one can handle complex matters of governance and is, therefore, based on a false understanding of human
nature. Thereby, it substitutes ignorance and incompetence for excellence and expertise. Because it allows
non experts to rule, democracy is an irrational form of government. He recommended a strict division of tasks
depending on one’s ability. Matters of the state would thereby be left to a particular class of people who by
nature and training were most fit to rule—whom he called ‘philosopher-kings’. To rule meant ensuring that
everybody else performed tasks they were most fit for.
-A deep fear and distrust of the ‘masses’ runs through the history of democracy. Aristotle in his classification
of governments placed democracy as an ‘impure’ system where the multitude rule in their own interest.
-Early liberals were sceptical of mass suffrage and considered political equality a threat to liberty.
Constitutionalism and an elaborate system of checks and balances were devised to prevent
majoritarianism.Writing in the 19th century in the context of the emerging democratic society in Europe and
America, Tocqueville coined the phrase ‘tyranny of the majority’ to describe the threat that democracy posed
to minorities and individual liberty. He particularly feared its cultural repercussions. Since the cultural
standards of the majority are dominant, general morals, manners and creativity are debased in a democracy.
-Even J. S. Mill for all his defence of democracy and political participation considered majoritarianism and
mediocre government as the biggest weaknesses of democracy. Not only does majoritarianism exclude
minority voices but it lowers the standards of the government. Subsequently, people with a lower level of
intelligence perform the most important task of legislation and administration.
Mill suggested a number of institutional mechanisms to counter these ills. Through proportional
representation, minorities can obtain a place in the legislative assembly and, through plural voting, educated
and intellectually superior individuals can have more say in the choice of representatives. He also
recommended a separation of the tasks of government, wherein the all-important task of law formulation
would be done by an expert constitutional committee, and the administrative tasks were to be carried out by a
skilled bureaucracy. The task of the representative assembly was to debate and deliberate on the legislation
and to monitor the functioning of the government. Mill’s philosophy, thus, combines a value for participation
and equality (which is unique among liberal thinkers) with elitism, where governance is seen as the task of
the educated and the experts.
While Plato and Mill draw attention to the dangers of majority rule, elite theorists consider a functioning
democracy impossible because of the inevitability of concentration of power. The Etist theory is attributed to
a specific critique developed by Pareto, Mosca, Mills and Michels about the inevitability of elite rule.
Classical elite theorists like Pareto and Mosca say that political power in every society has always been in
the hands of a minority, the elite, which has ruled over the majority in its own interest. These elite manage to
dominate because they possess exceptional skills, especially the psychological attributes and political skills of
manipulation, and coercion. C. Wright Mills’ study of the American political system refers to a ‘power elite’
which dominated executive power and members of this class were closely knit, sharing the same background
and common values. In his study of socialist parties, Michels noted how despite socialist principles, the actual
working of the decision-making process tended to concentrate power in the leadership due to bureaucratization
and centralization. Not only did the leaders not consult the working-class members, the decisions taken were
often contrary to their interests. This led Michels to postulate an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which applied to all
organizations resulting in undemocratic outcomes.
The merit of these critiques lies insofar as they expose the myths of democratic practice by exposing
who actually wields power. But in considering this concentration of power as inevitable, these critiques
affirm a belief in the natural inequality among human beings, and are pessimistic in nature. In this view, the
value of democracy, given the inevitability of elite rule, is that it allows people to choose among the elites.
Joseph Schumpeter in his influential work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy puts up a model of
competitive elitism as the most workable one in modern industrial societies. He has a low opinion of the ability
of people to develop an informed opinion on key issues and opines that it is better to let experts rule. Passive
citizenship is good for governance. The only role that people have is in the selection of the government among
rival competing political elites through voting. Democracy, thus, performs the crucial function of legitimating
a government. The unanswered question is one of how people who are incapable of reflecting on key issues
can make an informed choice among political groups.
PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY

1. Socialist/Marxist View:

Socialists share the elitist view that even in a democracy, political power is used to protect and advance the
interests of a minority. While elitists attribute psychological, social and economic attributes to the elite which
allow them to dominate; for socialists, the power of the minority derives from their economic class position,
that is, their control over the means of production. The inequality then is not ‘natural’ but a product of
specific social and economic arrangements. All strands of socialism draw attention to the incompatibility
between democracy that is based on political equality, and capitalism which is based on the right to private
property and market economy. Thus, the existence of private property and the unequal distribution of wealth
is the source of socio-economic inequality in society and this prevents most people from effectively exercising
their political freedoms. In a market economy most people neither have the time nor the resources for more
political involvement.
Marxists challenge the liberal conception of the state as a neutral body. There are two strands of thinking
about political power in the writings of Marx and Engels. In the first instance, the state and its agencies are
the instruments of dominant class interest. As Marx declared in The Communist Manifesto (1848), ‘the
executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’.
In the second instance, Marx and Engels talk about the ‘relative autonomy of the state’ from the dominant
class. For Marxists, the vote cannot be used to transform the system, because any welfare policies will be
corrective at best and will not address the structural reasons of inequality.
Marxists acknowledge the emancipatory potential of liberalism because it rejects hierarchy and affirms the
equal moral worth of all individuals. However, the liberal distinction between the state and the civil society,
or the public and the private marks the economy out as the private realm of freedom and therefore, out of the
purview of political decision making. The socio-economic divisions generated in civil society render the
political equality guaranteed by the state ineffective. A democracy which does not tackle the inequities of
class power is inadequate at best and a sham at worst. As against the fear of people like Tocqueville that
democracy can lead to the tyranny of the masses, Marxists fear that it will not. The ideological and cultural
hegemony of bourgeois values secure the consent of the working classes. Liberal democracy and its
institutions thus provide an ideological facade of equality and thereby act as a legitimizing shell for
capitalism. While democracy provides the ‘road to socialism’ it is incompatible with capitalism.
Marxists and socialists are further critical of the nature of individualistic rights which are the corner stone of
liberal democracy. Marx terms these the rights of the egoistic man, separated from his community. The
socialist aim is a situation where the free development of each is compatible with the free development of all.
Thus, they endorse a more participatory democracy where democracy extends to the management of all
collective affairs, including the workplace.
Marxists have usually ignored the concentration of power in the party and the state. The experience of one-
party communist states, the distortions of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the fall of USSR have
led to a reappraisal of democracy within Marxist thought. The debate had usually been structured as
prioritizing between political freedom and economic freedom. Contemporary thinkers on the left, on the other
hand, affirm that socialism and the attainment of economic equality do not necessitate giving up the gains of
liberal democracy, and particularly those of individual rights. What is needed is a deepening of democracy
which can both tackle inequalities and allow more participation.

2. Feminist View:

Feminists have further critiqued the liberal distinction between the public and the private. They characterize
relations between men and women as one of unequal power relations wherein there is indivision of Labour
and the tasks done by women are devalued and not considered productive enough to constitute paid labour.
Thus, the domestic arena is a site of unequal power structures and is, therefore, an arena of democratization.
In liberal theory, the family is part of the private sphere and hence kept out of politics and therefore, out of
democratization. This is one dimension of the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’. The other dimension
is that this gendered division of labour and power in the private sphere is linked to the unequal
distribution of political status and power in the public sphere.
Most political thinkers explicitly excluded women from the category of citizenship on the grounds of their
natural inferiority and incapability. Feminists are of the view that the measures to ensure substantive equality
for women have to be of a distinctive kind; they have to incorporate a notion of difference. Understanding
differences between men and women solely as a disadvantage is to adhere to a male norm. For example,
politics has always been construed as a male domain and women politicians have to prove they are ‘tough’
and ‘strong’ according to this standard. Understanding differences as disadvantages has meant that democratic
theory has been insensitive to the realities of women’s lives. Using a particular norm as the standard and
imposing it on others is an act of discrimination. This disadvantages women as a group. Thus, feminists
contend that there is a gender bias in the democratic theory itself. In order to ensure substantive equality,
democracy has to think in terms of recognizing and accommodating differences.
Like the deliberative democrats, feminists have also been critical of liberal democracies for taking people’s
preferences as given and for the restrictive view it has of participation. If interests and preferences are taken
as given, then democratic decision making will simply reproduce the status quo. Unequal power structures
sustain themselves through ideologies and socialization. Thus, for women, the process of democracy is also a
process of empowerment, where they become aware of exploitation, gain confidence, and seek to transform
their conditions.This, however, calls for a more active and participatory democratic practice.

3. Deliberative View:

Deliberative democrats like David Miller, J. Drysek and Joshua Cohen, among others believe that people’s
preferences are formed during the political process and not prior to it. Democracy, then, is a process of arriving
at an agreed upon judgement or a consensus. Such an agreement is an outcome of deliberation, i.e. a process
where people try to persuade each other through the give-and-take of rational arguments. Deliberation, thus,
reinvents a participatory model of democracy and the key idea is that of a dialogue. Through open
participation and unlimited discourse, a better argument emerges. But this needs what Habermas calls ‘an
ideal speech situation’, i.e. a situation where free and equal participants are able to communicate with each
other without discrepancies of power and constraints of particular circumstances. There is an inherent danger
of preferring certain dominant forms of communication and knowledge as more authoritative. Moreover,
deliberative democrats hope for a consensus which is difficult, if not impossible to achieve in diverse and
complex societies.
THE SCOPE OF DEMOCRACY/CONCLUSIONS:
Democracy is of relevance to all spheres of human collective life, be it the family, association, workplace,
community or the nation. Within the framework of the nation-state, the agenda of deepening democracy
involves enhancing participation and the devolution of power to regional and local, nation-state and global
levels. David Held suggests a cosmopolitan model of democracy as a way to respond to these changes and
democratize the global system, tracking the levels of governance to which we, as peoples, are subject. It
envisages setting up political, legal, administrative and regulatory institutions at global and regional levels,
which would help create methods to ensure transparency and accountability in international government and
non-government institutions; secure world-wide consultation and referenda on certain issues; and enforce
peace and human rights within nation-states. This model of democracy is not meant to be an alternative to the
nation-state but a system that complements democracy at the national and local levels. This raises a plethora
of theoretical and practical issues for democracy but the challenges posed by these difficulties need to be met
if we are to maintain our practical identities as democratic citizens.