The Aesthetics of Excess

The Aesthetics of Excess
Author(s): Maria Heim

Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion , Sep., 2003, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Sep.,
2003), pp. 531-554
Published by: Oxford University Press
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The Aesthetics of Excess
Maria Heim
This article explores South Asian Buddhist analyses of feelings and their
roles as intermediaries between the external world and moral choices and
motivations. Specifically, I consider emotions that, in their extremity, may
not at first appear to play a significant role in motivating moral action
and yet are evoked frequently in Buddhist narrative: fear, horror, grief,
and awe. I argue that the texts suggest a "moral naturalism" whereby the
external world is structured morally. Feelings of fear and horror, insofar
as they take their cues from such a moral structure, can provide trust-
worthy moral guides for those sensitive to them.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTENTION has long been recognized as

central component of Buddhist ethics. The Buddha's assertion that "it
intention [cetand] that I call karma" has led modern scholars to char
terize Buddhist ethics as "an ethic of intention" (Gombrich: 289).1 An ethi
of intention is meant to indicate that the moral value of an act (as det
mined by its karmic effect) rests on the intention or volition underly
it; moral acts are not simply external events but have an internal com
nent of choice and will. Less clear, however, is the question of what causes
or generates intentions and the moral significance of what lies behi
them. This is a long-standing problem in moral thinking in general t
may be put another way: If moral action depends on the intention or
to act morally, then how does one come to have the right sorts of int
tions? How does one become motivated to begin with?
Maria Heim is an assistant professor of religion at Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the panel "Ethics and Emotions in South A
Buddhism," at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, 24 March 2001, Chi
'Thevdcdya
kayena full quotation is: "Cetanaham
manasd" [Monks, it is intentionbhikkhave kammamn
that I call karma; vadami;
intending, cetayitva
one does kamma.m
karma with karoti
body, speech, and mind] (Hardy: 3: 415).
Journal of the American Academy of Religion September 2003, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 531-554
DOI: 10.1093/jaarel/lfg076
@ 2003 The American Academy of Religion

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532 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
Sanskrit and Pali Buddhist texts provide different sorts of answers to

this question, but in general they identify feeling and perception as gen-
erating intentions, a choice that makes the role of emotion in moral be-
havior immediately evident. Buddhist discussions of mental processes are
fascinated by causality and how mental states give rise to further mental
states. A quite standard listing of mental factors that generate intention is
given in the well-known Pali text The Questions ofKingMilinda (Milinda-
pafiho): The teacher NMgasena says that first there is contact between the
senses and the external world, which gives rise to feeling, which gives rise
to perception or awareness, which produces an intention, which gives rise
to initial thoughts and then sustained reflection.2 This is a sequence seen
elsewhere in Buddhist texts as well, and while there is some disagreement
among Buddhists about the exact mental factors (cetasikas) involved here,
they do agree that feeling and perception lead to intention and that vari-
ous processes of reflection follow.3
These mental factors do not have ready English equivalents, so some
additional explication of some of the key terms here is in order. The Pali
word for feeling (vedand) is broader than the English word emotion, in
that it includes physical sensations that originate from the body and from
forces outside one's control in the external world, such as feelings pro-
duced by the humors, by the changes of seasons, and by the maturing of
karma (Trenckner: 134-135). Vedanas are also mental in nature, corre-
sponding more closely with our word emotion.4 Varying lists of feelings
are given in Buddhist texts. Often there are simply three: pleasurable,
painful, and neutral (Hardy: 3: 400). However, feeling is described also as
fivefold: pleasure, pain, joy, grief, and equanimity (Warren and Kosambi:
390); and in other places the Buddha acknowledges multiple lists of feel-
ings: three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, or 108, enumerated according
to distinctions between religious feelings and worldly feelings and occur-
ring in the past, present, and future (Trenckner: 45-46; Trenckner and
Chalmers, vol. 1: 399). Another word sometimes related to emotion is
bhdva, but it too is broad, incorporating a variety of experiences and states.
Sometimes it can mean mental states or conditions, which might bear
some resemblance to the English word emotion.
2 He says: "Phasso pi tattha uppajjati, vedana pi tattha uppajjati, safifil pi tattha uppajjati, cetand
pi tattha uppajjati, vitakko pi tattha uppajjati, vicaro pi tattha uppajjati, sabbe pi phassapamukha
dhamma tattha uppajjantiti" (Trenckner: 60).
3 The Abhidhammatthasafigaha, for example, lists these mental factors thus: phasso, vedand, safafd,
cetand, ekaggatd (the unification of mind with its object), jivitindriya (vitalizes associated mental
states), and manasikara (attention) (Bodhi: 77-81 [11.2]).
4 The distinction between bodily (kayikd) and mental (cetasikd) feelings is made clear in a dis-
cussion in the Milindapafho, which argues that arhats may have bodily pains but are free of men-
tal feelings (Trenckner: 253).

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Heim: The Aesthetics of Excess 533
The meaning of cetand does not have a single English equi

ther, in that it incorporates various elements of intention, wi
and motivation. In the Pali material, the importance of cetan
rated in the Vinaya and elsewhere primarily in terms of moral cu
describing an ethic in which one is not held accountable for bl
actions done without intent. This interpretation of cetand emp
philosophical terms, intentionality, that is, the notion that m
bility from an act rests on whether or not one freely chose to en
This gives cetand a flavor of a rational and free choice.5 Elsew
ever, cetand is defined in terms of exertion (padhana), as a pur
or striving to do something, suggesting the English word mot
this context, cetand is described less in terms of making cogni
about what to do and more in terms of the mental effort in ca
an action. In other texts cetand has a quite affective quality, d
the pleasure associated with the decision and resolve to perfor
rious actions, in anticipation of, during, and even after performin
Returning to the analysis in the Milindapaiiho we see that th
motivation of action are conditioned in part by feeling, and th
ent moments of reflection occur-initial thoughts (vitakko) an
reflection (vicara). These two terms indicate the whole cognit
of thinking: applying one's thoughts to and then reflecting on
Thus, intention emerges not as a result of rational reflection b
sult of feeling and perception-our reactions and responses to
nal world. Feeling, not reason, generates the intentions on wh
significant actions rest, and cognitive activityfollows feeling and
This ordering suggests a quite striking departure from many west
cal systems, in that here, rationality and reflection, far from bei
of moral action and choice in motivations, follow along behin
are regarded as prior to motivation and are thus central to ana
moral activity comes about. Thus it would appear that feelin
distractions or impediments to forming intentions but, rather
sary and inevitable causal agents in making moral choices that
Richard Gombrich emphasizes this aspect of cetand, arguing that what is meant b
tance accorded to cetana is free will: "Karma is a doctrine of free will. Indeed, will i
the doctrine is that what counts is the intention, not the effect" (170).
6 For example, "Cetanati ca padhanavasena vuttarhi" (Mafigalatthadipani: 3).
7 The story of Mahapajapati Gotami, who gives a gift to the Buddha and is enjoine
cetands from this one act, is a good example. According to the commentaries she ha
tion directed toward the Buddha in three moments: before giving, while giving, and
given. In addition, the Buddha says that she should have three more cetands directed
before, during, and after, for a total of six cetands (Suttasatigahatthakathd: 18; see
1001). The three thought moments (cetands) of taking pleasure in giving a gift are a
at length in Mafigalatthadipani: 8.

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karma. Management of the will, then, would seem to require attentive-

ness to feelings on causal grounds, and the possibilities for performing
morally significant action will rest in part on mastery and control of those
feelings.
In the ensuing discussion in the Milindapafiho King Milinda asks the
monk Ndgasena if it is possible to point to the difference between these
various states or moments because it seems to be our experience that they
arise together (Trenckner: 63-64). That is, it seems that though we can
analyze them in their causal relations, we experience them all at once rather
than in a sequence of discrete events. NMgasena agrees and argues that it
is not possible to tell them apart, for it is like soup or a sauce in which
discrete things are mixed together. Our actual experience is that feeling,
intention, and thought consort together in something of a jumble. That
actual experience does not testify to the analysis of the causal sequence is
important and indicates a certain degree of psychological realism. The
difficulty of having direct access to how thoughts, judgments, feelings,
and intentions influence morally relevant action might find modern ex-
pression in psychoanalytic theory, which has forced our attention on the
difficulty of sorting out the emotions that lie just beneath the surface yet
motivate much of what we do. We often regard our motivations as based
in reason rather than emotion and have difficulty sorting out the various
elements of our moral motivations and decisions.
In another Buddhist analysis feeling's role as mediating between con-
tact with the world and meritorious action is specified in a different way.
In the Ariguttara Nikaya a discussion of various mental processes identi-
fies the source of vedana, the varieties of it, its result, its cessation, and
the steps leading to its cessation. The source of feelings is contact with the
world, and the result is meritorious or demeritorious action.8 Here feel-
ings are direct responses to input from the external world as well the in-
nermost springs of moral action.
Martha Nussbaum has invited us to see how emotions are important
in moral philosophy, arguing for a conception of emotions that does not
dismiss them simply as "blind surges of affect" (1990: 291). Like the Bud-
dhist analyses here, she see emotions as integral to moral decision mak-
ing and "part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning" (2001: 1). For
Nussbaum (2001: 135-136), emotions have an "intimate connection" with
motivation and are closely connected to action. She sees them as "judge-
ments of value" about the people and things in the world that provide
reliable guides to action because they are intimately acquainted with what
8 For example, "Phasso bhikkhave vedandnam nid~nasambhavo.... Yam kho bhikkhave vediyamrno
tajjam tajjam attabhivam abhinibbatteti pufifiabhdgiyam va apufifiabhdgiyamr va" (Hardy: 3: 412).

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matters most to us and how we fit into a world that influences us

we do not control. In her view emotions have some cognitive c
are empirical beliefs about what is important and valuable for
being (2001: 2-3).
As Nussbaum shows, many traditions in western philosoph
have tended to regard emotion with distrust and have generat
arguments against attaching moral value or significance to em
project is to argue that this distrust is misguided and that the
to emotions playing a role in the moral life can be met. As th
evidence here shows, these discourses share with Nussbaum a
what drive human motivation and decision making are affective r
This does not make morality problematic for Buddhists, how
emotions, as well shall see, can be reliable guides to what is im
human beings. They do so because they are most intimately
with a world that is itself structured in moral terms and that
responses to it in ways that are appropriate for making merit
ing demerit. How this might be so is the subject of this article
MORAL NATURALISM IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE
The view that the intention to perform a moral deed comes

ing and perception rather than from rational reflection h
implications in religious ethics. If moral choice and exertio
sult of our responses to the world in the immediate partic
context, rather than of the rational formulation of abstraction
approach to Buddhist moral reasoning may need to find n
entry. If moral response is prior to rational reflection, the
discursive styles of ethical analysis may have limitations on jus
they can explain of what prompts meritorious or demerito
Once again, Martha Nussbaum has paved the way for enr
philosophy's ability to grasp the nuances of context and p
As Nussbaum illustrates, abstract moral philosophy may n
equipped as literature to help us enrich our grasp of the partic
which human emotion intersects with moral interests. Turn
ture and narrative can help us to appreciate the complexity of
its impact on our decisions and motivations. In narrative, em
selves are engaged in a way that they are not in abstract and th
cussions of moral philosophy. The work of Charles Hallise
Hansen has taught us how to read Buddhist narrative in a w
beyond crude moral didacticism. Much as narratives can t
convey morals, and provide stimuli to moral reflection, t
deliver us to a world of thought and feeling more profound

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and thus prefigure a moral sensibility. In certain forms of Buddhist lit-

erature emotions are cultivated and crafted into experiences that make
meritorius action possible.
Although the various formal analyses of feeling and its relationships
to motivation and action suggest a causality that identifies feeling's po-
tential in moral processes, it is difficult to specify in any generic way the
exact nature of how feelings or emotions as a single class influence moral
action. Some emotions may have moral value while others do not, and
the precise type of moral value an emotion may have will differ from that
of other emotions. Neither Nussbaum nor the Buddhists treat emotions
in detail as a single phenomenon; rather, because emotions differ so much
from one another, they are perhaps best investigated on a case-by-case
basis. Literature is particularly effective at evoking each emotion's com-
plex particularity.
Equanimity (upekkha or majjhattabhdva) is often set forth as the ideal
Buddhist emotion and might appear to be a good candidate for having moral
value. It is the feeling of neutrality-neither pleasure nor pain, neither at-
traction to nor repulsion from the external world. As a feeling of even-
mindedness, balance, and impartiality it is sometimes conceived as the source
of many other Buddhist moral values and actions, described by Buddhaghosa
as present in every skillful state of mind (Aronson: 82). For Buddhaghosa,
the value of equanimity is skillful in part because it "hinders deficiency and
excess, and blocks partiality [ unadhikatdnivdranarasd pakkhapatupaccheda-
narasd]" (Warren and Kosumbi: 395). The importance attached here to bal-
ance from extremes would seem to suggest that the more passionate and
turbulent emotions have little role in the Buddhist view and are principally
to be quelled and calmed. It seems unlikely that we would find in Buddhist
moral thinking much room for strong and excessive emotion.
And yet some of the best known, often told, and widely circulated sto-
ries in the Buddhist world provoke not equanimity but excessive reactions
of fear, grief, horror, and astonishment. Much of the narrative literature
invites us to experience not only extreme emotions but also quite painful
ones. Because the Buddhist soteriological project is aimed at eliminating
sorrow and bringing about peace, it is intriguing that painful feelings are
so frequently invoked in Buddhist literature. Perhaps most challenging
to understand in terms of our question about the relationship of emo-
tions to ethics in a tradition that so prominently values equanimity is the
affective turbulence aroused by feelings of fear, anguish, grief, and hor-
ror. Why do Buddhist stories attempt to frighten and horrify us? Do such
experiences serve a moral or religious purpose?
We find a rich literature of anguish in the jdtaka and avadana litera-
ture and stories of self-sacrifice and extraordinary gifts, in which the Bod-

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hisattva is depicted as giving up his own limbs, his loved one

his life for others. These stories are particularly poignant ex
a genre of tales that celebrate Gotama Buddha's former lives as a
tva, in which he cultivated the perfection of his character b
nary moral deeds. An important moral perfection is generosi
of the best known tales celebrate the renunciation and mag
great gifts. Perhaps the most famous story (besides that of G
dha's life) in many places in the Buddhist world is that of
santara, in which the Bodhisattva's crowning completion of h
of generosity required him to give away his beloved wife a
Other stories in both Sanskrit and Pali traditions describe th
"gifts of the body" (dehadana), such as when the Bodhisattv
named Sibi) gives away his eyes and when the Bodhisattva (in
ous birth as a hare) roasts his entire body to give as a gift of
these stories are riveting and dramatic in their praise of such gi
may also owe some of their widespread popularity to the fac
give voice to considerable moral ambivalence.
Narratives of the Bodhisattva's gifts provide good cases to
role of fear, anxiety, and awe in Buddhist literature for sev
The first is because the acts described attract these feeling
characters in the narratives themselves. Plucking out eyes an
off limbs as gifts are not morally unambiguous acts, even in tale
to celebrate and exalt the Bodhisattva's meritorious deeds. The observers
in the tales themselves react with fright and dismay. Second, the narra-
tives employ graphic description and horrified response to generate feel-
ings of horror and fear in the audience. In places the tales cue the audience
to react in certain ways. Finally, these stories have left an enduring legacy
on the tradition itself, inspiring lengthy discussions in other Buddhist texts
and commentaries about these acts. Thus both the narratives themselves
and the textual traditions reflecting on them furnish us with a significant
body of literary and commentarial reflection on the intersections of emo-
tion, ethics, and aesthetics.
The telling of the Vessantara story is a good example of a text instruct-
ing its readers on how to respond to its narrative.9 In the oldest Pali version
(see Cone and Gombrich) the events are immersed in pathos, culminat-
ing with the Bodhisattva giving away his two innocent children to be slaves
to a wicked brahmin. Who can forget the chilling refrain that occurs at
9 The story is known to most Buddhists in oral and visual form, in performances, recitations,
and Buddhist temple sculpture and paintings. In Sri Lanka recitations of the Vessantara story are
used ritually at Buddhist funerals during all-night mourning vigils (Cone and Gombrich: xlii). The
shared oral experience of the story, a quite different experience from reading it silently by oneself,
is likely to be relevant for conceiving of the text's emotional impact on the audience.

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the moment of Vessantara's exorbitant generosity when he offers up the

children? "Then there was a frightening thing, then there was something
to make your hair stand on end, for when he gave away the children, the
earth shook. Then there was a frightening thing, then there was something
to make your hair stand on end, when the prince, who brought prosper-
ity to the Sivi's kingdom, raising his folded hands, gave those luckless
children as a gift to the brahmin" (Cone and Gombrich: 59-60). Being
told of the appropriate circumstances to have one's hair stand on end is
not uncommon in Buddhist texts: "horripolation," like other emotional
reactions, can be enjoined. Here and elsewhere in the narrative, the text
gives direct cues-and permission-to its hearers to feel apprehension
and ambivalence about this extraordinary act.
The various literary devices employed in both Pali texts and the San-
skrit poetic language in the Garland of Birth Stories (Jdtakamdld) seem
crafted in such a way as to invite the audience to share in the anguish of
the characters in the stories. There is often a cast of characters who are
appalled by the bloodiness of the Bodhisattva's gifts of his own body. In
the tale of King Sibi, for example, we are told how the Bodhisattva's deci-
sion to give his eyes to a suppliant fills his ministers with misgivings; "dis-
tressed, agitated, and worried," they remonstrate with him to no avail
(Khoroche: 13). When he tears out his eyes, his subjects do not share in
his happiness of the gift; rather, "everywhere in the palace and royal capi-
tal, tears of grief sprinkled the ground" (Khoroche: 36). It takes some time
before the people's grief begins to abate.
In another story the Bodhisattva is once again a king and is asked by
some hungry ogres (raksasas) for food. He decides to give them what they
want, that is, "thick, solid lumps of flesh, dripping with blood," which he
procures by first letting them lap up his blood and then by slicing up his
own body (Khoroche: 51). His ministers, not surprisingly, are indignant
and alarmed and beseech him to reconsider. The ogres, for their part,
though at first impervious to his goodness, are radically transformed at
the offering of his flesh after consuming it, and they "thrill with intense
emotion," and their "hearts are melted with devotion" (Khoroche: 56).
They go on to become civilized and refrain from taking life.
While in many of these stories the ministers and subjects react in hor-
ror, in other stories the one to watch is Sakra, king of the gods, who expe-
riences a range of emotions, from astonishment and indignation to fear
and uneasiness, at the deeds of the Bodhisattva. As Reiko Ohnuma (116-
120) has suggested in her dissertation on dehadanas, Sakra often seems
to play the role of the curious and attentive reader: he asks the questions
about the moral ambiguities of these gifts that the reader may wonder
about, and he serves as a reliable, and often skeptical, witness. Sakra some-

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times devises tests to challenge the Bodhisattva's resolve out of

the Bodhisattva is seeking to replace him as king of gods by p
such meritorious deeds (Khoroche: 42). But once he can be ass
the Bodhisattva has no designs on his own position, he acts as
of incredulous astonishment.
In addition to a divine witness, the stories often describe a natural
witness. It is customary for the earth to quake and the seas to boil at the
extraordinary deeds of the Bodhisattva. One of the most famous earth-
quakes known to Buddhist literature is the earthquake that occurred when
Vessantara gave away his children. In a Sanskrit telling this earthquake is
described as a reaction of giddy excitement: "The earth heaves her breasts,
the great mountains, as though shivering in ecstasy" (Khoroche: 71). The
shaking of the earth alerts Sakra and the other gods to what has happened
and fills them with wonder.
A much more terrifying seismic response to Vessantara's gift can be
found in some of the Pali accounts of this earthquake. We already have
seen in the narrative itself that "there was a frightening thing . .. some-
thing to make your hair stand on end, for when he gave away the chil-
dren, the earth shook," suggesting that we might be frightened not only
by the deed but by the earth's response. The frightening aspects of the
earthquake trouble King Milinda in the Milindapaiho, and he queries
NMgasena at length about it. In the Milindapahho's description of the
natural events after the gift, the earthquake is a scene of violent natural
calamity, eliciting not wonder but outright fear. The scene describes vio-
lent winds, tidal waves, contortions of the highest mountains, and many
creatures in grave danger:
The great winds raged below in a state of great strength and vigour be-
cause of the [king's] giving. And slowly, slowly, one by one, they blew up
in confusion, subsided, rose up and whirled about; leafless padapa [trees]
crashed down; thunder clouds, densely massed, raced across the sky; dust-
laden were the cruel winds, the sky obscured; the winds blew violently
and incessantly; a huge terrifying sound arose; because of those agitated
winds, slowly, slowly the water [began to] tremble; when the water was
trembling, fish and turtles were jostled about; waves formed in pair upon
pair; creatures living in the water were terrified; the waves of water rolled
on without a break between them, the roar of the waves went on, terrible
bubbles reared up, there were wreaths of foam, the great sea boiled up,
the water rushed to all points of the compass, crests of water flowed from
the mouth [of rivers] upstream and downstream; terrified were the asuras,
garulas, nagas, and yakkhas, and in their agitation thought: "what now,
how now, is the ocean turning upside-down?" and alarmed, they sought
a way of escape. While the sea was jostling and turgid, the great earth
quaked with its mountains and oceans. The rocky peak of a summit of

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Mount Sineru, twisting round was turned about; snakes, mongooses, cats,
jackals, swine, deer and birds were in consternation; the yakkhas of little
power cried out, the yakkhas of great power laughed---[ all while] the great
earth was quaking. (Horner 1969, vol. 1: 164-165)
This passage, worth quoting at length in Horner's vivid translation, poses

the question of why the earth responds so violently to what is regarded as
one of the most meritorious gifts ever. It is not surprising that Milinda
was perplexed by this gift and its reaction in the world. Why does the earth
react at all to moral events, and why does it respond so violently to this
one?
Given the considerable ambivalence of the act itself evinced in the Pali
accounts, could not the earth's reaction be a reflection of the general state
of mental upheaval this act generated? One possibility is to see natural
phenomena as metaphors and symbols of emotions. There is consider-
able precedent for the symbolic apprehension of nature in Indian aesthetic
theory that may furnish a useful comparative analogue here. Tamil cahkam
poetry indicates a close affinity between internal and external turbulence,
between physical and affective response. A. K. Ramanujan's (1967, 1974)
work on cahkam poetics demonstrates how every landscape is a mood and
how landscapes are formulized into a symbolic language depicting the
inner world of feeling. Tamil literary aesthetics employ natural landscapes
to chart emotional peaks and valleys. To employ Tamil poetic concep-
tions to this example, we might see here the exterior landscape matching
the interior landscape of the tumult and ambivalence of this act. It may
be that, like Tamil cahkam poetics, this scene of environmental destruc-
tion is a metaphor or symbol for internal states.
There is little in the Buddhist sources that would suggest that this
earthquake is a symbol, however. Indeed, the context of the discussion in
the Milindapahfho treats the quake in a very naturalist and literal sense.
Milinda is puzzled that this earthquake is not the result of one of the eight
"known" causes of quakes. Traditionally, there are eight causes of earth-
quakes, ranging from winds blowing, which disturb the earth because it
rests on water, to the activities of great beings or the Buddha.'o This par-
ticular earthquake was not caused by one of the eight causes; it was ex-
ceptional and happened only once (Trenckner: 115). It occurred because
the earth was so weighed down with Vessantara's virtues that it buckled
10 The eight causes are (1) great winds, (2) tremors caused by a holy person or god thinking of
the limited earth on limitless waters, (3) when a bodhisattva leaves heaven and enters a human womb
for his last birth, (4) when a bodhisattva is born from that womb, (5) when a bodhisattva becomes
a buddha, (6) when a buddha sets the wheel of dharma in motion, (7) when a buddha leaves aside
the body, and (8) when a buddha obtains final nirvana (Hare: 209-210; Trenckner: 113-115).

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under the pressure and trembled seven times (Trenckner: 116).

the storm clouds that occurred are not among the three cate
storm clouds found in the world (those holding rain, those f
ing cold weather, and those shedding rain). These clouds were
tional to known natural causes (Trenckner: 114).
This attempt to fit an extraordinary event into a known p
natural phenomena suggests that the earthquake was not unde
the Milindapaiiho as a symbolic event. A more likely interpret
see this scene and others like it as linked to a kind of "moral n
in the sense that the physical world is so ordered that it responds
acts. The earthquake is not a metaphor but, rather, demonstra
tual feature of the world and its connections to human moral deeds. The
world can actually buckle under the pressure of the Bodhisattva's merit.
Moral naturalism means that the external world is inscribed with a
moral order. This is expected in a world structured according to karma
because making merit is a natural process, in the sense that it bears fruit
independently of human or divine arrangements. Yet the Vessantara earth-
quake suggests an additional angle on moral naturalism that depicts a
physical world that is intimately connected and responsive to moral ac-
tion. In this account the world responds in a manner quite exceeding the
ordinary causal mechanisms of karma in which actions produce automatic
and proportionate effects. Here the natural phenomena react violently to
extraordinary goodness, almost in surprise and in quite exceptional cir-
cumstances. It is as though the earth is capable of experiencing and indi-
cating awe.
Moral naturalism has important implications for the role of feelings
in moral action. It is natural to care, to be alarmed at, and even to fear
extraordinary feats of the Bodhisattva, for the earth itself responds in this
way. Moreover, moral naturalism indicates that we are closely linked with
an external moral structure that is natural and prior to human arrange-
ments. Emotions are close and immediate empirical judgments about the
moral world and how we fit into it. This fact would suggest that vedand,
as our first contact with goodness or badness in the world, might in fact
be a trustworthy guide to moral action.
UNIVERSALITY AND OBJECTIVITY

IN THE EMOTIONAL LIFE
One difficulty in seeing feeling and emotion as key to mo

a prevailing sense that emotions are too subjective, transient
to ground morality. Much of western ethics is staunchly of this
ferring to leave moral action safely in the hands of reason,

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subject to the vicissitudes of emotion. However, the force of the objec-

tion is mitigated when a different sense of emotion emerges, one in which
emotion is not regarded as so unreliable and subjective. In fact, many
Buddhist texts support the opposite conclusion: feelings are to a large
degree predictable and natural, even universal in the sense that they are
widely available across space and time. Moreover, emotions and mental
states can be cultivated and trained in ways that can make them reliable
and useful as moral guides.
Buddhist texts often display a marked degree of confidence in predict-
ing the emotional responses that people will have to certain events. Any-
one familiar with Buddhist discourses that analyze mental processes will
recognize a feature they share with South Asian sdstric discourse more
generally, that is, a proclivity toward making lists that provide at once
definitive moral prescription as well as a sense of exhaustive and totaliz-
ing analysis. This capacity of the sdstra-style scholastic and technical lan-
guage of Buddhist texts to get at very internal, subjective states is taken
for granted in the tradition. To cite just one example, in a passage in the
Afiguttara Nikdya we are told that there are recluses and holy men who
possess certain undesirable qualities; gifts given to them are "not very fruit-
ful, nor very beneficial, nor very brilliant, nor very thrilling [ evam eva kho
bhikkhave a.tanigasamannagatesu samanabrahmanesu ddnarh dinnath na

mahapphalari hoti na mahanisarhsarh na mahajutikarh na mahavipphdram]"
(Hare: 162).11 The sense here is that we can name definitively certain mor-
ally relevant deeds that will be either thrilling or not; it is not only that the
texts can predict whether an act is fruitful but that they can predict and
instruct an affective response.
That emotions are predictable and prescribable is significant. Such
confidence in predicting emotions and reactions from a given act assumes
and promotes a naturalness and universality in emotional life. By stating
that a certain sort of gift is thrilling, the text presumes that any and all
rightly ordered persons will be stimulated from such a gift. Such discourses
do not seem to share the sense of many modern theorists that feelings and
aesthetic responses are private, subjective, or culturally circumscribed. The
modern trend toward assuming that emotion is a "sociocultural construct"
(Lutz; Lutz and Abu-Lughod: 7) is posited as a reaction to what has been
called an "ethnocentric" and "western" idea that emotions are natural and
universal (Lutz and Abu-Lughod: 25). In contrast, Buddhist authors were
1 The term for thrilling here is mahdvipphdram, from vipphurati, "to agitate, move, vibrate,
quiver." Buddhaghosa says that a thought that is vipphdra has the condition of trembling at first
arising, like a bird spreading its wings to fly into the air and like a bee diving into a lotus at first
scent of it (Warren and Kosambi: 115; see also Hare: 162n). As often seems to be the case with Bud-
dhist conceptions of emotions, there is a physical component here: one is moved.

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quite comfortable assuming that emotional and aesthetic exp

universal in the sense of being part of an objective and natu
Rasa theory in Indian aesthetics shares the same basic pr
of course, extending it to considerations of how literature can b
formulaically the experience of certain basic and shared hum
Rasa is less a feeling than a mood, savor, taste, or relish, an
not willy-nilly assume direct connections of Buddhist ideas
with Indian aesthetics. Nevertheless, there are features of rasa t
might be suggestive here for comparison. Some Sanskrit aes
tions identify eight relatively stable feelings or emotions (bhava
manipulated by poetic excellence or dramatic gesture can p
corresponding rasa in a sensitive connoisseur.12 The eight
assumed to be universally possible in human experience, are
grief, anger, exertion, terror, disgust, and wonder. These e
respond to eight moods or rasas, which are the "tastings" or
of the eight feelings: erotic, comic, compassionate, cruel, va
rible, abhorrent, and miraculous. These moods occur only un
rect conditions: literary and dramatic success must meet with t
of a rasika, someone with taste.
In the development of Indian aesthetic theory rasas came to b
as universal in the sense that any well-cultivated aesthete ca
them, and feelings can be crafted into experiences shared collect
tional experience can be reproduced by dramatic gestures a
to be savored publicly and in this way become "unyoked fro
tional authenticity of any particular person's feelings" (App
As Edwin Gerow, describing the theories of the medieval lite
Abhinavagupta, puts it, "The reality of emotional life not only
rated from the determinate contexts in which emotion is no
ized, but is, when thus perceived in se, the very same thin
pleasure" (221). This is a conception of a type of human ex
emotion that is not subjective and particular. The emotion is alr
understood as permanently impressed on a person's soul (thi
emotion is called stable or permanent, sthayi-bhava), and i
poetic skill to allow one to savor it (De: 53). Because all huma
emotional experiences, their capacity for appreciating rasa
because many people never learn to hear poetry, however, th
in practice, learn to savor the emotions (Gerow: 221). Aesth
ences of emotion are also generalized; the ability to experience l
12 Some list nine, including iOnta, peace or tranquility, but often it is left out b
lend itself to dramatic performance. There are other bhavas, but they are considered t
and transient to be able to relish them through poetic and dramatic skill (Ragh

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dramatic art is to "apprehend the universal" (Gerow: 221). Feelings and

aesthetic experiences are not regarded as subjective or relative, and in fact
they bring one out of one's own self and into a shared and universal space
-what Abhinavagupta calls "a consensus of minds" (Gerow: 221).
It is curious that experience of a generalized emotion invoked through
artifice should produce such pleasurable aesthetic experience. As Daniel
Ingalls explains, rasa is "not simply the apprehension of another person's
mental state. It is rather a supernormal relishing based on an involved
sympathy" (in Selby: 30). Here, apprehension of others' experience from
a distance, cultivated through artistic sensibility, is regarded as something
to be relished and enjoyed, even in the case of the more violent or nega-
tive bhdvas and rasas. Indeed, private experiences of the emotions of ter-
ror and disgust are not thought to be pleasing when they are particular to
oneself and privately one's own; yet the connoisseur seeks out fine poetry
and goes to dramatic performances to relish the terrible and abhorrent
"tastes" alongside the more pleasurable ones. Private emotion may be
painful, but public sharing of cultivated sympathy is a pleasure (De: 52).
Although the Sanskrit poetics traditions do not draw specific moral
implications from aesthetics, they do articulate how art can put us into
direct contact with what is most sublime and fulfilling in human expe-
rience. These observations about aesthetic experiences may be broad-
ened to a larger sphere of experiences when we consider Brahmanical
and Advaita Vedanta perspectives on emotions.'3 As Padmanabh Jaini dis-
cusses, bliss or ananda for Upanisadic thinkers is grounded in the self and
thus ultimately in Brahman. Experiences of happiness, and indeed any
other emotion or rasa, are experiences that transcend the subjective or
the particular: "All experiences are manifestations of the same 'savour'
(rasa) that constitutes the essence of the cosmic self' (Jaini: 5). If dnanda
is the true reality of the Self (atman), and the Self is identified with Brah-
man, the ultimate reality, then bliss is a sort of happiness continuum that
we are already in but simply need to wake up to. The particular experi-
ence is simply an instance of a cosmic experience that is already there, prior
to the individual partaking in it. Here we find a religious rather than lit-
erary postulate about emotion whereby it is pulled out of the private,
subjective sphere into a shared and generalized human space.
Although Buddhists are unlikely to share in many of these metaphysi-
cal assumptions, these comparative examples from other Indic traditions
13 Advaita Vedanta was, as Gerow puts it, "the backbone of the Kagmiri Saiva tradition" (see 225-
226), in which Abhinavagupta developed his thinking, and may provide some of the ontological
possibilities for the transcendent generalization of experiences that we see here attributed to the
Upanisads by Jaini.

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may broaden our imagination about how emotions might b

be more stable, public, generalizable, and predictable than i
thought.'4 Buddhist texts prefer to conceive of aesthetic an
experience in naturalistic terms rather than in terms of transce
either way there is a sense of their existing in the world prior
particular experience. We have already seen how the world "
emotions whereby they can occur outside of human minds.
IS IT MORAL TO MAKE US QUAKE WITH FEAR

We have begun to see how emotions, even painful ones, m
to have the features of reliable guides: they are predictable a
able, they are natural and generalizable, and they take their
from empirical experience of a morally ordered physical w
impositions on us are critical for our well-being. It remain
however, how the painful emotions of fear and grief specific
ute to meritorious action.
A notable feature of the moral heroism of the Buddha or Bodhisattva
is that it is not usually depicted as something to be imitated. The tales of
the bodily gifts and the gift of wife and children do not enjoin their read-
ers to go and do likewise. The stories seek to inspire awe and admiration
rather than provide tangible exemplars for moral behavior. They do not
suggest that one imitate the Bodhisattva or the Tathagata but, rather, that
one note through awe and astonishment the chasm between one's own
capacity and the perfections of the great being.
A key issue in the narratives related so far regarding the Bodhisattva's
extraordinary deeds concerns not simply that such terrible events invoke
emotional experience but also that such events are morally ambiguous in
themselves; the texts lead us-through emotion-to a place of moral
bewilderment. Milinda gets at this in questioning NMgasena on the na-
ture of excess. Vessantara's gift is an atidana, an excessive gift (the prefix
ati- is itself significantly ambiguous in the Pali, in that it can mean either
excessive or just "great"-but here Milinda means excessive, when some-
thing is just too much). It is objectionable not only because it caused an-
guish to Vessantara's children and wife but also simply on the grounds of
being excessive, like excessive rains destroying crops, excessive weight
sinking a ship, and excessive passion leading to madness (Trenckner: 277).
Nagasena counters that excess is not in itself a vice; consider the excessive
hardness of the diamond, the excessive purity of the lotus that keeps it
14 Though, of course, Buddhists were practitioners of Sanskrit poetics.

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from being sullied by mud, and the exceeding brilliance of the sun that
dispels darkness. The Bodhisattva's excess makes him unrivaled, and he
becomes "praised, extolled, commended, magnified, and famous in the
ten thousand world-system" (Trenckner: 101). Hair-raising tales have the
feature of creating renown for the Buddha's deeds and teachings and make
themselves memorable for us to be able to discuss them in our own time
(suggesting the universality of emotions across space and time). As Nagasena
puts it: "Gradually and by successive tradition his renown has reached our
meeting here today so that, defaming and disparaging that gift, we ques-
tion whether it were well given or ill given" (Trenckner: 276; see Horner
1969, vol. 2: 97). Excess inscribes itself on human memory on the strength
of the feelings it can invoke and thus bridges time. The moral power of
fame is also in evidence here. Emotional impact is not conceived as fleet-
ing or transitory but, rather, endures a long time and thus stimulates
memory, ideas, and moral deliberation.
In addition to excess, the Tathagata also likes to inspire urgency. The
experience of samvega, translated variously as agitation, urgency, thrill,
fear, and anxiety, is often used in Pali sources to indicate fear that is ca-
pable of instigating a sense of moral and religious urgency. It is a feeling
that the Tathdgata delivering his teaching inspires among deities in the
heavens in exactly the same way that a lion's roar causes brutes of the for-
est to quake in fear (Morris, vol. 2: 33). The gods realize their imperma-
nence and vulnerability, which is a moment of fear and agitation. In a
jataka tale a king who notices his first gray hair, which beckons him to
retirement and renunciation, experiences samvega (Fausboll: 138). Some-
times great teachers deliberately generate samvega, urgency, in the negli-
gent, as when Maha Moggalldna performed a miracle by quaking the
heavens to cause wonder and amazement in the gods, making their hair
stand up on end (Trenckner and Chalmers, vol. 1: 254).
The use of samvega in these examples suggests that some fear is valu-
able, in that it can replace complacency with urgency. Samvega is like a goad
to beasts of burden, as when a steed sees the shadow of the goad stick and
feels agitation to wonder what work he must do for his master (Morris,
vol. 2: 114). In this extended analogy there are four types of horses: those
that merely glimpse the goad and feel urgency, those that need to be pricked
with it, those that need to be pierced through the skin, and those that must
be pierced to the very bone before they will feel samvega. Similarly, there
are different types of humans: those who need merely to hear of a person
in a certain town who has died to feel urgency about death, those who must
see the dead person, those who must have their own relative die, and those
who themselves must be stricken with a life-threatening illness before feel-
ing samvega (Morris, vol. 2: 114-115). Like animals, humans have varying

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degrees of sensitivity and will respond to different measure

before they are stirred to action.
Samvega is a tool for the Tathagata to stir up religious m
those mired in complacency and comfort.'5 Yet sometimes t
is downright harsh. Several intriguing discussions of fear a
cur in the Milindapahfho in reflections on the question of w
any of the Buddha's words, and by implication the Teaching, ca
be said to be harsh. In places the Tathdgata seems to provo
King Milinda questions NMgasena about how it is that the
represented as bringing only welfare and benefit to beings a
story of the Aggikkhandipama Sutta (Hardy: 4: 128-135; H
we learn that, at the end of the Tathdgata's sermon, hot blood g
the mouths of as many as sixty monks (Trenckner: 164-167
khandiipama Sutta, that is, the Simile of the Mass of Fire Disco
of the Buddha's fire-and-brimstone sermons. In the sutta t
queries his disciples on a number of points along the follow
Monks, what do you think would be better: that a strong man wit
ing hot iron spike, ablaze and fiery, should pry open one's m
thrust in a glowing hot iron ball, ablaze and fiery, so that it burn
burn the mouth, burn the tongue, burn the throat, burn the b
take along with it the intestines and the bowels and pass through
end ... or that one should enjoy alms which should be given o
teem (saddhddeyya)?
Surely, lord, it would be better to enjoy the alms which should
out of esteem. ... Unfortunate indeed would it be to have stron
thrust a glowing hot iron ball, ablaze and fiery into one's mout
4: 131-133)
But the Buddha disagrees: In fact, it is better in the case of a w

have a blazing metal ball thrust into his mouth than to receive
he would be accepting out of a misplaced faith or esteem in him
ing such gifts he assures his rebirth in hell, and no matter how
the glowing hot iron ball might be, it cannot even begin to
the fires of hell. Similarly, the Tathagata instructs that it is fa
wicked man to prefer blazing fires, the crushing of his bones d
marrow, and being stabbed by a sharpened sword than to e
brace of a tender maiden or to enjoy the flattery of the wealthy
at the end of the sermon, not only does hot blood issue from t
15 Accounts of the various hell realms in such texts as the Petavatthu (see Gehm
illustrations on temple walls throughout the Buddhist world, may have a similar a
accounts of hells in other religions, fear and horror have perhaps no equal as a dev
into religious activity.

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sixty fevered monks but sixty more give up their monastic vocation alto-
gether and return to lay life, saying, "What the Bhagavan teaches is hard,
what the Bhagavan teaches is very hard [Dukkaram Bhagavd sudukkararh
Bhagavd'ti]" (Hardy: 4: 135).
Ndgasena resolves (at least to Milinda's satisfaction) the issue of how it
is that the Tathdgata, who is said to bring only welfare to the world, is ap-
parently causing distress by this sermon. In fact, the Tathigata does not cause
distress to these monks; they bring it on themselves (Trenckner: 167). He
is no more to blame than a man shaking a mango tree, where the strong
fruits remain attached, but the rotten fruits fall. A curious analogy is offered:
Do we blame a man who offers the ambrosia of immortality just because
some who take it die from stomach problems encountered in ingesting it?
"Even so, sire, the Tathagata gave immortality, the gift of the Dharma, to
gods and humans in the ten thousand world-system; those beings who are
able awaken through the deathless Dharma; but those beings who are not
able are struck down and fall because of the deathless Dharma" (Trenckner:
167). The preservation and communication of the Dharma seem to require
that some be turned away from it, but they turn away from it as the result
of their own nature, not the Tathagata's teaching.
In another passage Milinda is concerned for a certain monk who is
stricken by fear and bad conscience when he is addressed by the Tathagata
as a "deluded man" (moghapurisa). Is the Tathdgata rightly using correct
speech when he says such harsh words (pharusd-vdca)? Yes, replies NMga-
sena, not unlike a physician who sometimes has to resort to harsh medi-
cines for the health of the patient, the Tathdgata uses harsh words to
"soften beings and make them pliable [satte sinehayati, muduke karoti]"
(Trenckner: 172). Harsh words can make one soft and tender, but they
do not-in themselves-cause fear and trembling. The text specifies that
the Tathagata's words may well be harsh, but they cause anguish to no
one (Trenckner: 172). This example provides one clue about what the
presence of harshness in a text or teaching is meant to do: to provoke not
anguish but, instead, softness or sensitivity in beings.
These aspirations of generating sensitivity stand in marked contrast
to some western conceptions of the role of fear in ethics and aesthetics.
Immanuel Kant thought that agitation and fear inspired by the sublime have
a place in the moral life. For Kant, contact with the sublime makes us aware
by contrast of our vulnerability. When we are confronted (through the might
of nature or the infinity of mathematics) with the sublime, the "absolutely
large," we fail to comprehend it through the imagination and become
aware of our smallness (Kant: 104). This leads, interestingly, to purpo-
siveness and a "respect for our own vocation," that is, our ability to en-
gage reason (Kant: 116). When we see violent thunderstorms, hurricanes,

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and volcanoes in all their destruction, we call these "sublime

raise the soul's fortitude above its middle range and allow u
in ourselves an ability to resist which is of a quite different kin
gives us the courage [to believe] that we could be a match
seeming omnipotence" (Kant: 120). Because our power of
infinity itself under it," we find "in our mind a superiority
itself in its immensity" (Kant: 120). Nature's ability to make
and vulnerable does not ultimately triumph because we have
reason's own infinity and supremacy, which calls forth moral a
even greatness (Kant: 121).
Although the Buddhist texts do not draw the same conc
vulnerability in the face of the sublime can lead to appreciation
ternal power of reason as moral capacity, they do share with
that vulnerability makes us reach out for something great.
dhists, though, fear and awe communicate when we are in t
of something of immediate importance in the world itself
Bodhisattva's extraordinary deeds leads to a sense of extremi
lights our own finitude and incapacity; however, in the Bud
it does not lead to reason but to dependency on and devoti
Paul Griffiths calls, the "maximal greatness" (58-60) of the
and apprehension of the sublime make us aware of our dep
things external to us, which is what it means to be sensitive
The theme of fear and terror often appears when one is
with someone who is highly advanced spiritually. When King M
approaches Venerable Nagasena, Milinda is described as "a f
by a snake... fearful, flurried, terrified, agitated (samviggo), hi
ing on end, perplexed and dismayed, his thoughts in turmoil
23). Ndgasena in contrast is "like a maned lion, fearless and f
horripilation, and trepidation" (Trenckner: 24). Milinda'
trepidation puts him on high alert, which is appropriate for
be influenced and convinced of the Dharma, while Nagasena,
is cool and calm. The Tathdgata and other great teachers, d
compassion and wisdom, should properly be feared and exal
who perceive how they stand apart.
Fear puts us on guard to our own and others' suffering
urgency as a response to threats and seeking to protect our
well-being. Horror and distress at the world may be most
Buddhist ethics in their ability to generate compassion.16
16 The objections to pity and compassion in Stoic and other western thought are
in Nussbaum 2001. Kant's view in "Doctrine of Virtue" is this: "Such benevolence
heartedness and should not occur at all among human beings" (34, in Nussbaum

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describes compassion (karunda) as that which "causes the trembling in the

hearts of good people in the presence of the distress of another [paraduk-
khe sati sadhfinam hadayakampanam karoti]" (Warren and Kosambi: 263).
Compassion is of course regarded as a supreme moral and religious achieve-
ment in Buddhism, exalted in the most positive terms. Yet compassion is
actually quite a painful upheaval because one feels, in a genuine way, the
distress of others. In compassion, one is sensitive to the way the world is
and how beings fit into it. Properly channeled, compassion can lead to
urgency in recognizing and mitigating suffering in the world.'7 Moreover,
many Buddhist meditative practices aim at controlling and directing com-
passion so that it is not applied subjectively, narrowly, or partially.'s
Finally, we might consider those who are impervious to the moral
ordering of the world and our complex emotional ties to it. In some of
the same literature as the stories of emotional excess we meet with a strong
disapproval of fools. Sakra himself is taken aback by what has got to be
one of the harshest indictments of fools ever registered. Upon an act of
extreme generosity by the Bodhisattva, Sakra presents him with a boon.
The Bodhisattva asks for the following wish:
"May I never have to hear, see or speak to a fool or endure the misery
and oppression of having to stay with one. This is the favor I beg of you."
"Surely someone in distress is especially deserving of a good man's
sympathy," said ?akra. "Now because it is the root of all evil, stupidity is
regarded as the worst affliction, and it is the fool who has a particular claim
on your sympathy. How is it that someone as compassionate as you does
not even want to set eyes on such a one?"
"Because there is no help for him.... Since not even the compas-
sionate have power to help a worthless fool, O best among the gods, I
have no wish even to set eyes on one." (Khoroche: 43-44)
What makes fools so objectionable in this tradition? To make sense of the

Bodhisattva's incapacity with regard to helping fools-a startling limita-
17 Compassion is a positive response to horror at the world and one that engages our involve-
ment. Other uses of our horror at the world, such as disgust at the body and its decay, are deployed
to provoke a turning away from the world in renunciation and often have important implications
for gender analysis in South Asian texts (see Wilson). Some kinds of horror might be more useful
for soteriological purposes but would not seem to have any moral component because they turn
us away from engagement in the world. In fact, Nussbaum (2001: 220-221) argues that disgust is
not helpful in moral processes.
18s As Nussbaum (2001: 360) indicates, one of the chief Stoic objections to compassion as a ground-
ing of moral action is that it is unlikely to be evenly and fairly distributed. Buddhist meditative
techniques of applying compassion in which one gradually enlarges one's spheres of concern to
expand compassion beyond one's partial and narrow circle (Warren and Kosambi: xi.9-13), and
the meditations in which one comes to regard all beings as one's mother (Warren and Kosambi:
ix.36), may deflate these objections.

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tion on his own boundless compassion-we need to see fools as

merely stupid in a childlike or untutored way. Fools (bala) a
according to one Pali etymology as "those who live (balanti) w
bent or inclined (a-nanti)" (balanti ananti ti bala) (Smith: 12
gests that part of the trouble with fools is that they are not ben
able, or soft and thus cannot be helped. This implies a lack o
sensitivity, not just cognitive error.
As we have seen, great moral actions celebrated in literatu
late human feelings; it is deemed natural that both the physic
the realm of human emotion respond to moral greatness. In t
sigence fools are a clear affront to this naturalism. Nussbaum
of the emotions with providing intelligent appraisals of our "fit
world is suggestive here in making sense of the Bodhisattva's
with fools. In Nussbaum's view, although emotions are somet
of trying "to make the world fit our mental attitude," inste
site is the case: "Emotions do attempt to fit the world-both
the events that really do take place, and to get an appropriate vi
matters or has value" (2001: 48). Fools remain impervious to
external stimuli coming in from outside, making them rigid
ily helped.
CONCLUSIONS
Buddhist texts are not merely descriptive accounts of th

our place in it; as this article has attempted to demonstrat
seek to have an enduring effect on their audiences. Didacti
vey a confident assessment of how mental processes cond
well-specified emotions and feelings and how these in tur
related to meritorious action: emotions are universal, pre
prescribable. Yet it is in narrative, through literary effect,
tions themselves are engaged. When the texts cause us to fe
they insert us into the world outside of ourselves and may evo
glimmerings of a moral consciousness. The moral consciou
dered-in those attuned to the external world prodding th
tive to a moral ordering of the world and its various cues
relevant for our well-being.
Emotions of fear and horror direct us to sense our own
in the world as a way to generate urgency and admiration o
ism. The morality of emotional excess is not the ethics of
bodhisattva, however, or for those further advanced on t
santara is held in awe for the fact that he did a thing most dif
in that "though he was in great distress and terror as the

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being led away and had gone out of sight, his heart did not split into a
hundred or a thousand pieces" (Trenckner: 275; see Horner 1969, vol. 2:
97). The imperturbable and balanced nature of great beings stands in
marked contrast to the fear and trembling invoked in those who stand in
awe of them (and is in part the reason for standing in awe of them). Un-
like the Bodhisattva, whose mastery of himself has put him beyond many
of the depredations entailed in being subject to worldly events, we are
intimately connected to the empirical world and its impositions on us.
Feelings and perceptions are our most immediate connections to that
world. They respond to it and take their cues from it in ways that pro-
duce religious and moral urgency, tenderness, and compassion.
At least since Clifford Geertz defined so clearly the subject matter for
religious studies as dealing in part with "powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations" (90), our field has identified questions
of religious feeling and motivation as a critical area for investigation. The
subfield of religious ethics is slowly catching up. As all of the articles in
this discussion attempt to demonstrate, the study of Buddhist ethics holds
out considerable potential for genuine advances in the exploration of
moods and motivations as they impact moral as well as religious lives.
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Appadurai, Arjun "Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion

1990 India." In Language and the Politics ofEmotion, 92
Ed. by Catherine A. Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod. C
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aronson, Harvey Love and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism

1980 Motilal Banarsidass.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. A Comprehensive Manual ofAbhidhamma: The Abh

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The Aesthetics of Excess

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The Aesthetics of Excess

Author(s): Maria Heim

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1466492

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTENTION has long been recognized as

Maria Heim is an assistant professor of religion at Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002.

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Sanskrit and Pali Buddhist texts provide different sorts of answers to

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The meaning of cetand does not have a single English equi

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karma. Management of the will, then, would seem to require attentive-

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matters most to us and how we fit into a world that influences us

MORAL NATURALISM IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE

The view that the intention to perform a moral deed comes

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and thus prefigure a moral sensibility. In certain forms of Buddhist lit-

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hisattva is depicted as giving up his own limbs, his loved one

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the moment of Vessantara's exorbitant generosity when he offers up the

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times devises tests to challenge the Bodhisattva's resolve out of

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This passage, worth quoting at length in Horner's vivid translation, poses

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under the pressure and trembled seven times (Trenckner: 116).

UNIVERSALITY AND OBJECTIVITY

One difficulty in seeing feeling and emotion as key to mo

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subject to the vicissitudes of emotion. However, the force of the objec-

bhikkhave a.tanigasamannagatesu samanabrahmanesu ddnarh dinnath na

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quite comfortable assuming that emotional and aesthetic exp

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dramatic art is to "apprehend the universal" (Gerow: 221). Feelings and

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may broaden our imagination about how emotions might b

IS IT MORAL TO MAKE US QUAKE WITH FEAR

14 Though, of course, Buddhists were practitioners of Sanskrit poetics.

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degrees of sensitivity and will respond to different measure

But the Buddha disagrees: In fact, it is better in the case of a w

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and volcanoes in all their destruction, we call these "sublime

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describes compassion (karunda) as that which "causes the trembling in the

What makes fools so objectionable in this tradition? To make sense of the

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tion on his own boundless compassion-we need to see fools as

Buddhist texts are not merely descriptive accounts of th

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Appadurai, Arjun "Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion

Aronson, Harvey Love and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism

Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. A Comprehensive Manual ofAbhidhamma: The Abh

Cone, Margaret, and The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara. Oxfor

De, S. K. Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic. Berkeley: Uni-