Final m1 Case Digest For Criminal Procedure
Final m1 Case Digest For Criminal Procedure
Final m1 Case Digest For Criminal Procedure
• ARREST Cases
FACTS: Luz M. Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor’s
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal,
allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral complaint of the police was received by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information was
filed with the MTC of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the
information on the ground that the crime had prescribed. She concluded that as the information
was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the alleged commission of the offense,
the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. The motion
was denied. On appeal, RTC sustained the denial. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure provisions, which covers violations of municipal or city ordinances. She then invokes
Act No. 3326, entitled “An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run”.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon filing the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent
judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase “such institution” and that the phrase “in all cases”
applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prescription period ceased to run when the case was filed on the
prosecutor’s office.
RULING: NO. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before
that. Section provides, “the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of
a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation.” Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation.
The Court concluded that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on
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July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of
the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a
judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing
of the information with MTC Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime
had already prescribed.
FACTS: Respondent Cawili borrowed various sums of money from the Petitioner. Respondent
Cawili together with his business associate Respondent Tongson jointly issued three checks in
payment of the loans to the Petitioner. However, the said checks were dishonored for insufficiency
of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made a formal demand to pay the amounts
to pay the amounts of the checks with the respondents. Petitioner filed a complaint against the
respondents for violation of BP 22 before the Quezon City Prosecutor. On the preliminary
investigation, only respondent Tongson filed a counter affidavit claiming that he was been unjustly
included on the case and averred that he was not Cawili business associate. Petitioner counter
the allegation and presented several documents showing that respondent Tongson were business
associate of respondent Cawili.
City prosecutor rendered a resolution found probable cause only against Cawili and dismisses
the charge against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even the case against
Cawili were filed in the proper court.
Chief State Prosecutor rendered a resolution directing the city prosecutor of Quezon city to
conduct a reinvestigation and refer the questioned signature to NBI. Respondent Tongson moved
for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.
Assistant City Prosecutor dismisses the complaint against respondent Tongson without referring
to the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and held that the case had already prescribe
pursuant to Act 3326.
Petitioner filed an appealed to the DOJ but was dismissed. Petitioner filed motion for
reconsideration and rendered a resolution in favor of him and declared that the offense had not
prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running
of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and directed the city prosecutor to file
three separate information against respondent Tongson. However, a resolution acting on the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Respondent Tongson ruled that the subject offense had already
prescribe and ordered the withdrawal of the three information.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on the Court of Appeal but was dismissed for failure to
attached a proper verification and certification for non-forum shopping. Petitioner moved for
motion for reconsideration and attached the said motion and still denied the motion
ISSUE: Whether or not the action against Cawili and Tongson had prescribed, per Act No. 3326
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RULING: The court grant the petition, reversed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, Annuled
the resolution of the DOJ and ordered to refile the information.
SC agreed that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year
or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years
from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof. Nevertheless, SC cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll
the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing rule at the time was
that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the
prescription of the offense is halted.
The court ruled that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses,
they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable
cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the
filing of the information against petitioner.
3. BRIONES, Danilo
FACTS: Slated for automatic review by the Court is this case wherein the respondent
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas ₱550,000 as
actual damages and ₱100,000 as moral and exemplary damages.
He was charged, together with three others, with the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide, for robbing Ms. Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of ₱200,000 in cash and jewelry
and on the occasion thereof, shot and killed her.
Among the four, only the respondent was tried, as one of them, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed
in a police encounter, while the other two, Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong"
remained at large.
Del Rosario was arrested in his residence by a certain SPO4 de Leon after the police raid and
encounter. This happened a day following the commission of the aforementioned Robbery with
Homicide. This arrest was assailed by accused del Rosario, for having been effected without a
warrant.
According to an eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo, he saw a parked
tricycle driven by the accused del Rosario. He alleged that the two men and a woman grappled
for a bag, and one of the men kicked the woman who fell to the ground. The other one who was
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armed gave chase to another man who tried to help the woman. Alonzo said that soon after, the
armed man returned and shot the woman on the head while she was still on the ground. The bag
taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside
received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the
sidecar.
The accused, Joselito del Rosario, alleged that indeed, the tricycle used in the crime was his. He
said he was hired for ₱120 by a certain "Boy" Santos, his co-accused. The original agreement
was for him to drive Santos to a cockpit. However, despite this prior agreement, Boy Santos
ordered him to proceed to the market place to pick up "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. The
two co-accused then boarded and alighted at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Streets. It
was there that Bisaya accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the
possession of her bag. Jun Marquez helped out. Accused del Rosario then tried to leave and seek
help but "Boy Santos", who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened
to shoot him. Meantime, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before
boarding the tricycle, "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head.
The accused made their getaway, and alighted at Dicarma. The three men warned del Rosario
not to inform the police about the incident, otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Because
of the threat, del Rosario did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle, nor to the barangay
captain and the police.
The trial court found accused del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced him to death. He
contends in this automatic review of the Court that the lower court erred in: (1) not considering
the presence of threat and irreversible force employed upon him by his co-accused; (2) not
considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy to commit the crime of Robbery
with Homicide; (3) not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and
(4) not considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule
113, of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
RULING:
(1) Yes, the accused was unlawfully arrested, because it was made in contravention to Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Particularly, it should be noted that the arrest was made a day
removed from the day of the commission of the crime. Moreover, SPO4 de Leon, the arresting
officer, had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused Del Rosario committed
the crime.
(2) Yes, Joselito del Rosario was wrongly accused of the crime. His claim for exemption from
criminal liability under para 5, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, wherein he acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force was sustained by the Court. He was also absolved by the Court
from any role of a conspiratorial nature.
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The decision of RTC Cabanatuan City was thus set aside and reversed, and the accused del
Rosario was acquitted of the crime charged.
4. CALDE, Ediser
Good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses in cases of malum prohibitum
offenses punishable by special law.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Wenceslao Jayson, a bouncer in a nightclub, shot and killed Nelson
Jordan. When he was arrested, a .38 caliber revolver, four live bullets, and one empty shell were
recovered from him. The firearm and ammunition were covered by a memorandum receipt and a
mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano of the Davao Metropolitan District Command,
authorizing appellant to carry the said firearm and twelve rounds of ammunition. He was charged
with illegal possession of a firearm. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty and sentenced him
to 20 years imprisonment, ruling that appellant acted in good faith, believing that the mission order
and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals increased
the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
RULING: The Court ruled that accused-appellant is liable for illegal possession of a firearm. The
Court of Appeals found that Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue the mission order in
question, as he was not any of the officers mentioned in the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of P.D. No. 1866. Additionally, accused-appellant was not qualified to have a mission order
because he was a mere reserve of the Citizens Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular monthly compensation. Good faith is not a valid
defense where the offense committed is malum prohibitum. The Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The Court held that accused-appellant is liable for illegal possession of a firearm because Major
Arquillano was not authorized to issue the mission order and accused-appellant was not qualified
to have a mission order. The Court also emphasized that good faith is not a valid defense in cases
where the offense committed is malum prohibitum. The Court further ruled that the provisions of
R.A. No. 8294, which provides for a lesser penalty for illegal possession of a firearm, cannot be
applied in this case.
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5. CASIANO, Kim
FACTS: The prosecution presented, as its witnesses, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia
and Police Officer (PO) 3 Elmer Corbe. The appellant, Siochi, and Ruben Forteza took the witness
stand for the defense. The evidence for the prosecution established that on the evening of August
6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, composed of PO3 Corbe, PO3
Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis Padpad, PO3 Marcelo Alcancia, Jr., together with a female informant,
went to the parking area of McDonald's, West Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against
a certain alias "Nato."At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven
by Siochi. The informant approached the appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterward,
the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the latter
went out of the vehicle and ran away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad, and PO3 Alcancia chased the
appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab the appellant, causing the latter to fall to the ground. PO3
Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3
Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the appellant’s waist. The other members of the police arrested
Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi, and the seized items to the police
station for investigation.
The appellant, for his part, testified that at around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he called Siochi
on the phone, and informed him that the motorbike starter the latter needed was already available.
On the same day, Vanessa Paduada called the appellant and asked for directions to McDonald's,
West Avenue. At around 6:00 p.m., Siochi and Ruben arrived at the gate of Philam Homes on
board a space wagon. The appellant met them at the subdivision gate and showed the starter to
Siochi. Thereafter, Vanessa called on the appellant’s cellular phone. The appellant then boarded
the vehicle and told Siochi that he would just talk to a person at McDonalds. When the space
wagon arrived at McDonald's, the appellant alighted from the vehicle and proceeded towards the
restaurant’s entrance. Afterward, Vanessa called him from inside a parked car. The appellant
approached Vanessa who, for her part, alighted from the car. Vanessa told the appellant to get
inside the car’s rear. The appellant did as instructed; Vanessa went to the front passenger seat,
beside a male driver. Immediately after, the male driver alighted from the vehicle and entered the
car’s rear. The appellant got out of the car, but the male driver followed him and grabbed his hand.
The appellant resisted and wrestled with the driver along West Avenue. During this commotion,
the appellant heard gunfire; four (4) persons approached him and then tied his hands with a
masking tape. The police placed him on board a pick-up truck and then brought him to Bicutan.
In Bicutan, the police brought him to the interrogation room, where they punched him and placed
a plastic on his head.
In its joint decision dated April 22, 2004, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay a ₱500,000.00 fine.
RULING: Warrantless arrest invalid; seized. Items inadmissible Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
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That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and
cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge
that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in, or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity.
Furthermore, the appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not
be construed against him. Flight per seis not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including
fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, the appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de
Leon is susceptible to various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise
signify innocence. the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and
seizure. Corpus delicti not proved with moral. the Court has recognized that minor deviations from
the procedures under R.A. No. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also
declared that when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the
substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized
items that the prosecution presented in evidence.
6. DOTADO, MARAVILLA
FACTS: Petitioner Marlon Dominguez was charged with the violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The charge
pertained to the possession of 0.03 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) in a
transparent plastic sachet.
The prosecution alleged that on August 17, 2010, at around 2:00 AM, SPO1 Gerardo Parchaso
conducted monitoring under RA 9165 in Muntinlupa City. From a meter away, he saw Dominguez
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holding a small transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance suspected to
be shabu. SPO1 Parchaso seized the sachet, arrested Dominguez with the assistance of PO2
Salvador Genova and brought him to the police station. The seized item was marked, and an
inventory was conducted and then brought to the Philippine National Police - Southern District
crime laboratory, and it tested positive for shabu.
Dominguez denied the accusation. He claimed that at 11:00 PM on August 16, 2010, two men in
civilian clothes entered his house, arrested him and forcibly took him to a police station. The men
identified themselves as police officers, showed him a plastic sachet of white crystalline substance
and insisted that the same was recovered from him. Dominguez's wife testified that the officers
asked for P50,000, threatened detention and mentioned charging Dominguez under RA 9165.
The Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner Dominguez and affirmed by the Court of Appeals
concluding Dominguez was sought with a caught a sachet of shabu in plain view and in in
flagrante delicto.
RULING: No, the warrantless arrest is not valid. The court ruled that for an arrest in flagrante
delicto to be valid, two elements must occur a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime, and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is required.
The court found that the circumstances surrounding Dominguez's arrest did not meet these
elements. The arresting officer, SPO1 Parchaso, testimony that he saw Dominguez standing on
the street holding a small plastic sachet from a meter away distance, the court reasoned that even
with a perfect vision, the officer would not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy
the contents of the plastic sachet. Dominguez's acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic
sachet were deemed insufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause
for a warrantless arrest. The court referred this case to case of People v. Villareal stating that
merely holding something in one's hands cannot be considered a criminal act.
Therefore, the evidence seized during the warrantless search, including the sachet of shabu, was
deemed inadmissible in court. As a result, Dominguez was acquitted of the charges for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
6. DIQUIT, JANET
FACTS: Dominguez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. Upon
arraignment, Dominguez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
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Poblacion, Muntinlupa City. From a meter away, he saw a man wearing a red shirt and white
shorts, holding with his left hand a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu. This man was later identified as Dominguez. SPO1 Parchaso
grabbed the hands of Dominguez and seized therefrom one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing the substance suspected to be shabu. Consequently, SPO1 Parchaso and PO2
Genova decided to leave the scene, and brought Dominguez and the seized item to their office.
The marked seized item was brought to the PNP-SPD Crime Laboratory for examination and
yielded a positive result for shabu.
The RTC convicted Dominguez of the crime charged and held that the prosecution sufficiently
established all the elements for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The CA also held that there was no showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
item was compromised. It stated that the chain of custody can be easily established.
RULING: No, The Court acquits Dominguez for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court established the instant case reveals that there could have been no
lawful warrantless arrest made on Dominguez.
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In the case at hand, while it can be said that
the presence of the police officers was legitimate as they were patrolling the area and that
discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as to the third
requisite, it was clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is evidence of a crime, a contraband,
or otherwise subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1 Parchaso saw Dominguez, he only saw
that Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. To the Court's mind, a very small plastic
sachet is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such that it can be seized
without a warrant. The Court reiterates that it is committed to assist the government in its
campaign against illegal drugs; however, a conviction can only be obtained after the prosecution
discharges its constitutional burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, this Court
is duty-bound to uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.
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v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Warrantless arrests must comply with the parameters set forth in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and personal knowledge of the arresting officer is essential
in both instances. Additionally, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures,
without a lawful arrest, is deemed tainted and inadmissible.
FACTS: Leniza Reyes y Capistrano (Reyes), who filed a petition for review on certiorari against
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming her conviction for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The case originated from an Information filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) charging Reyes with illegal possession of 0.04 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The prosecution alleged that Reyes was apprehended by police officers
after they received information from two teenagers that a woman with long hair and a dragon
tattoo had just bought shabu. The police officers found a sachet of shabu in Reyes' possession,
which she allegedly voluntarily showed to them. Reyes denied the charges and claimed that she
was falsely arrested and extorted by the police officers. The RTC found Reyes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced her to imprisonment and a fine. The CA affirmed the conviction,
but corrected the quantity of shabu stated in the RTC's decision.
ISSUE: Whether Reyes' conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs should be upheld.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of Reyes, finding that no valid warrantless arrest took place as there was
no overt act indicating that she had just committed a crime. The Court also found that the
prosecution failed to establish the conditions for a lawful warrantless arrest and that the version
of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the drugs lacked credibility. Therefore, Reyes'
conviction was overturned.
The Court held that for a valid warrantless arrest, there must be an overt act indicating that a
crime has just been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed. In this case, the
police officers relied solely on the information given by two teenagers, which was not sufficient to
establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest. There was no independent corroboration of the
information or any overt act observed by the police officers themselves. Therefore, the arrest of
Reyes was invalid.
Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the conditions for a lawful
warrantless arrest. The police officers did not have personal knowledge of the alleged crime, and
there was no urgency or necessity to justify a warrantless arrest. The mere receipt of information
from two teenagers was not enough to meet the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest.
Additionally, the Court found that the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the drugs
lacked credibility. The police officers claimed that Reyes voluntarily showed them the sachet of
shabu, but there were material inconsistencies in their testimonies regarding Reyes' state of
intoxication and her alleged consent to the search. These inconsistencies raised doubts about the
reliability and truthfulness of the police officers' version of events.
Moreover, the Court found that the police officers deviated from the prescribed chain of custody
rule under Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The police officers admitted that only the Barangay Captain was present during the
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marking and inventory of the seized items, and there was no showing that efforts were made to
secure the presence of other necessary personalities under the law. This deviation from the chain
of custody procedure rendered the seized shabu inadmissible as evidence against Reyes.
8. ESTAVILLO, Jerome
FACTS: On May 27, 2010, an Information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," the
accusatory portion of which reads:
On the 24th day of May 2010, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control, and custody
a total of one point ten (1.10) grams of dried Marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan
operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo)
was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private parts
at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony Velasquez (BB
Velasquez) then went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they later
identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of
a gate enclosing an empty lot.
BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification card, but instead, petitioner emptied
his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces
of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo and
BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as
well as the seized items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo (SPO3 Castillo). SPO3 Castillo then
inventoried, marked, and photographed the seized items, all in the presence of BB Bahoyo and
BB Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and a request for qualitative
examination of the seized two (2) pieces of rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing.
After examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that
petitioner was positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites,
both dangerous drugs.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the
facts. According to him, he was just urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay Bayan
operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, approached and asked him where he lived. Upon
responding that he lived in Kaong Street, BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez then frisked him, took
away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the barangay hall. He was
then detained for about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati and to another office
where a bald police officer questioned him. Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall
where they showed him two (2) sticks of marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him.
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The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and, accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum,
and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
RULING: No.In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.
The Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid warrantless arrest
was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private parts because if it
was indeed the case, then the proper charge should have been filed against him. However,
records are bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no prior arrest was
made on petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such process cannot be reversed. All
told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated marijuana is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2015 and the
Resolution dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio is ACQUITTED
of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause
his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason
Doctrine of Plain view states that evidence seized or found by chance or by accident are
admissible in the conduct of a lawful arrest. However, an unlawful arrest, renders the
subsequent evidence seized unlawful as well.
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FACTS: The petition assails CA decision in CA-GR No. 32516 dated Feb 18, 2011 and
Resolution dated July 8 2011. The facts uncovered by the RTC which ruled in favor of the
prosecution are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock
in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and
going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him
to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers
to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside
their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said
sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from
his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket
of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about
two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one
(1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after
the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that
upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which
turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the
charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003,
after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting
of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he
had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to
the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also
found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated.
Judgment wats hereby rendered, found accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1)
day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
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(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN
HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE
REASONABLE DOUBT
ISSUES: Was the search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for
violation of City Ordinance 98-012 unlawful? Was the arrest unlawful?
RULING: No, the first arrest was not unlawful as the accused was caught in flagrante delicto
when he was not wearing a helmet in violation of a City Ordinance. The second arrest was not,
however, unlawful, after the police officers discovered drugs while he was in custody.
The evidence seized was not in plain view.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest were inadmissible.
The petition was granted and the RTC decision reversed and the accused was thereby
ACQUITTED.
In a petition for certiorari, the petitioner must exhaust all available remedies and cannot bypass
the remedy of appeal.
FACTS: A petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines against Judge Basilio R.
Gabo of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and the respondents Wilson Cua Ting,
Edward Ngo Yao, Willy So Tan, and Carol Fernan Ortega. The petition seeks to set aside the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985.
The case stems from a fire that broke out on May 14, 2001, at the Sanyoware Plastic Products
Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware) in Bulacan. The fire destroyed Warehouse 2, which was
shared by Sanyoware and New Unitedware Marketing Corporation (Unitedware). The Philippine
3rd Regional Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) and the Inter Agency Anti-Arson
Task Force (IATF) conducted investigations, leading to the accusation of several individuals,
including the respondents, of destructive arson.
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RULING: The Supreme Court (SC) first addresses the procedural issue raised by the
respondents, that certiorari does not lie because the petitioner had an available remedy of appeal.
The SC agrees with the respondents, stating that certiorari is only allowed when there is no appeal
or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the petitioner
had the option to file an appeal but failed to do so, thus certiorari is not the proper remedy.
The SC explains that the remedy of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is available only
when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this
case, the petitioner had the option to file an appeal from the decision of the RTC, but failed to do
so. Therefore, certiorari is not the proper remedy.
The SC further explains that the remedy of appeal is an adequate remedy that allows the petitioner
to present its arguments and evidence before a higher court. The petitioner cannot simply bypass
the remedy of appeal and directly file a petition for certiorari. The SC emphasizes that the rules
of procedure must be followed and that parties must exhaust all available remedies before
resorting to extraordinary remedies like certiorari.
FACTS: On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera, together
with the other members of the Albay Provincial Police Office, proceeded to Ogayon's house in
Barangay Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003. The warrant
was for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the premises
of Ogayon's house. Barangay Tanod Jose Lagana (Tanod Lagana) and Kagawad Lauro
Tampocao assisted the police team in conducting the search.
On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed against Ogayon for the crimes allegedly
committed as follows:
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Honesto Ogayon the accused, with deliberate intent
to violate the law, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing 0.040 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), with
full knowledge that in his possession and control is a dangerous drug, to the damage and
prejudice of the public interest and welfare.
During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739 on January 21, 2004, and March
17, 2004, respectively, Ogayon denied both charges and pleaded "not guilty." The joint pre-trial
held on May 5, 2004 yielded only one factual admission on the identity of the accused. A joint trial
on the merits ensued.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Ligao City of Albay, Honesto Ogayon was convicted of violating
Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ogayon waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant
RULING:
1. The only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was his failure to
make a timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress the presentation
of the seized items as evidence. This failure alone, is not a sufficient indication that
Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly, and intelligently made a waiver.
2. Failure to attach to the records the depositions of the complainant and his
witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge's examination, though contrary to the Rules,
does not by itself nullify the warrant.
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which is infer that the
requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to
issue the search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform strictly to the
constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of
substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the requisite examination
of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court declares Search Warrant
No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.
The decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. and petitioner HONESTO
OGAYON is ACQUITTED of the criminal charges against him for violation of Republic Act No.
9165.
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FACTS: This case involves a search and seizure that occurred at Andy Quelnan's condominium
unit in Cityland Condominium, South Superhighway, Makati City. The police officers had a search
warrant, Search Warrant No. 96-585, which directed them to conduct an immediate search of the
premises and seize shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride). The warrant did not specifically
name Quelnan as the occupant of the unit but authorized the search and seizure of drugs and the
bringing of persons involved in accordance with the law.
Upon arrival at the condominium, the police officers were accompanied by Security Officer
Celedonio Punsaran and proceeded to Unit 615. Quelnan, who was partially naked from the waist
up, opened the door. The search was conducted, and three plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substances, later confirmed to be shabu, were found on top of a table in the bedroom
. Other drug paraphernalia, such as an improvised burner, weighing scales, and empty sachets,
were also seized.
During the trial, the prosecution presented testimonies from the police officers involved in the
search, who positively identified Quelnan as the occupant of the unit at the time and testified that
he was caught in flagrante delicto with the drugs. The court found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible and established Quelnan's possession of the drugs based on his
control and dominion over them.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was properly enforced and whether the petitioner was validly
arrested without a warrant.
RULING: The court ruled that the search warrant was properly enforced and valid. The absence
of the petitioner's name in the search warrant did not invalidate it since the warrant was issued
for the search of specifically described premises and not for the search of a person. The court
also stated that the petitioner's arrest was valid because he was caught in flagrante delicto,
meaning he was apprehended while committing the offense, without the need for a warrant. The
court concluded that the petitioner's possession of the drugs was established and upheld his
conviction.
FACTS: The petitioners in this case were accused of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. They
were arrested after a search warrant was issued for their residence and the police found several
packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) inside. The petitioners filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that the search warrant was invalid
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
because it was based on a general allegation that the petitioners were engaged in illegal drug
activities.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the search warrant was invalid. The Court found that the
search warrant was based on a general allegation that the petitioners were engaged in illegal
drug activities, and this was not enough to support the issuance of a search warrant. The Court
explained that the search warrant should have been based on specific facts or circumstances that
would lead a reasonable person to believe that there was probable cause to believe that evidence
of a crime would be found in the place to be searched.
FACTS: Law enforcement agents applied for a search warrant and subsequently issued which
armed the law enforcement agents to search Dabon's residence for alleged violation of R.A No.
9165. On July 26, 2003, P/Insp Mallari and other CIDG team proceeded to an apartment unit
where the residence of Dabon is situated. Upon reaching the apartment, the CIDG operatives
requested Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, City Councilor Angalot, SK Chairman Angalot, media
representative Responte and DOJ Castro to witness the search.
The group entered the house, together with some of the witness they went to the second floor
where Dabon and his family resided. They found Dumaluan in the living room while Dabon was
inside one of the bedrooms. P/Insp. Mallari handed the copy of the search warrant to Dabon, the
CIDG operatives searched the kitchen where they found, in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad
Angalot, drug paraphernalia. The police officers then frisked Dumaluan and recovered from his
pocket, a coin purse, a lighter, a metal clip, three empty decks of suspected shabu, two pieces of
blade and crumpled tin foil. The police officers proceeded to search one of the bedrooms where
they found three plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. They also recovered the drug
paraphernalia.
On July 28, 2003, PNP Crime Laboratory received a letter signed by P/Insp. Mallari requesting
the conduct of chemical examination on the seized items. The letter and the seized items were
turned over to a Forensic Chemical Officer. The chemical examination and confirmatory test on
the seized items yielded positive results for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
For his defense, Dabon argued that he was surprised when he was awakened by alleged
members of the CIDG, who entered his room, pointing guns at him and telling them that they will
conduct a raid. Dabon and Dumaluan claimed that they were not allowed to witness the search
conducted by the CIDG. Instead, they were ordered to stay and sit in the living room while other
members of the household were locked inside the room of their house helper.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
RULING: No. It must be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in
implementing the same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper conduct of a search.
One of those parameters set by law is Section 8 of Rule 126, to wit: Section 8. Search of house,
room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
The law is mandatory to ensure the regularity in the execution of the search warrant. This
requirement is intended to guarantee that the implementing officers will not act arbitrarily which
may tantamount to desecration of the right enshrined in our Constitution. In this case, it is
undisputed that Dabon and his wife were actually present in their residence when the police
officers conducted the search in the bedroom where the drugs and drug paraphernalia were
found. It was also undisputed that, as the CA recognized, only Brgy. Kagawad Angalot was
present to witness the same. In this case the hierarchy among the witnesses as explicitly provided
under the law was not complied with. For one, the lawful occupants of the premises were not
absent when the police authorities implemented the search warrant. Even so, the two-witness
rule was not complied with as only one witness, Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, was present when the
search was conducted. In Bulauitan v. People, the court decided for the acquittal of the accused
because of failure to comply with the aforequoted rule, which rendered the evidence against him
inadmissible. Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search
warrant makes the search unreasonable.
While the courts is one with the government in its campaign against illegal drugs, courts cannot
disregard a constitutional right and run counter to what is explicitly prescribed by our Constitution
and to its purpose, is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political
power.
FACTS: Late in the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa
Ana, California, home of the petitioner with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a
coin shop. The police officers issued a warrant of arrest to the petitioner, however the petitioner
object the search, but on the basis of lawful arrest the officers conduct a search without search
warrant has been issued.
The officers search the entire house including the three bedrooms of the house, attic, garage and
small workshop. They were also instructed the wife of the petitioners to open the drawers and
physically move the contents side by side. The search took 45 minutes and the officers seized
numerous items including medals and primary coins. During the trial of the case the evidence
found during the search was presented against the petitioner and the court found him guilty for
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
the case of burglary. The petitioner contested that the search was unconstitutional. However, the
decision of the lower court was affirmed by the California Court of Appeals and California Supreme
Court, both of the court accepts the contention of the petitioner that his arrest was invalid due to
supporting affidavits was already lapse in the conclusory terms. However, the court held that the
officers conducting the search was in "good faith" and in the event that they have sufficient
information to constitute the probable cause for the arrest of the petitioners, the arrest becomes
lawful. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the search to the petitioner’s house was valid,
despite of the absence of search warrant, on the ground that it has been incident to a valid arrest.
ISSUE: Whether a warrantless search of the entire home is permissible, when the search is
incident to a lawful arrest that takes place in the home.
RULING: No, any search made to the arrestee’s home beyond the arrestee’s person and the area
within his immediate control is unreasonable, under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
The court states that when a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon in
possession or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove
the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution. However, in this case the
police officers routinely searching the entire home and even searched through all the desk
drawers or other closed or concealed areas in the house which the arrest occurs. In such
searches, this shall only made under the authority of a search warrant, where in this officer failed
to present during the arrest of the petitioner. The 'adherence to judicial processes' mandated by
the Fourth Amendment requires no less. The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified,
for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an
officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the
crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's
person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a search is
remote in time or place from the arrest. In the application of sound Fourth Amendment principles
to the facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here went far beyond the petitioner's
person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that
could have been used as evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the
absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search
was, therefore, 'unreasonable' under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the petitioner's
conviction cannot stand. Wherefore the decision made by the lower court on convicting the
petitioner was reversed by the higher court.
This is not to say that a search can be reasonable without regard to the probable cause to believe
that sizeable items are on the premises. But when there are exigent circumstances, and probable
cause, then the search may be made without a warrant, reasonably. An arrest itself may often
create an emergency situation making it impracticable to obtain a warrant before embarking on a
related search. Again, assuming that there is probable cause to search premises at the spot where
a suspect is arrested, it seems to me unreasonable to require the police to leave the scene in
order to obtain a search warrant when they are already legally there to make a valid arrest, and
when there must almost always be a strong possibility that confederates of the arrested man will
in the meanwhile remove the items for which the police have probable cause to search. This must
so often be the case that it seems to me as unreasonable to require a warrant for a search of the
premises as to require a warrant for search of the person and his very immediate surroundings.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
This case was the first in which the Supreme Court acknowledged an “automobile exception” to
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Under this exception, an officer only needs
probable cause to search a vehicle, rather than a search warrant.
FACTS: The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified in 1919, ushering the era of Prohibition, when
the sale and transportation of alcohol was illegal in the United States. In 1921, federal prohibition
agents stopped a car traveling between Grand Rapids and Detroit, Michigan. The agents
searched the car and found 68 bottles of liquor stashed inside the car seats. The officers arrested
George Carroll and John Kiro, the driver and passenger, for illegally transporting liquor in violation
of the National Prohibition Act. Before the trial, an attorney representing Carroll and Kiro motioned
to return all evidence seized form the car, arguing that it was removed illegally. The motion was
denied. Carroll and Kiro were convicted.
Arguments:
Counsel on behalf of Carroll and Kiro argued that federal agents violated the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches and seizures. Federal agents must
obtain an arrest warrant unless someone commits a misdemeanor in their presence. Witnessing
a crime is the only way that an officer can avoid getting an arrest warrant. That concept should
extend to search warrants. Officers should have to obtain a search warrant to inspect a vehicle,
unless they can use their senses like sight, sound and smell, to detect criminal activity.
Counsel on behalf of the State argued that the National Prohibition Act allowed the search
and seizure of evidence found in vehicles. Congress intentionally drew a line between searching
a house and vehicle in the legislation.
ISSUE: Can federal agents search an automobile without a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment?
RULING: YES. Federal agents may search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable
cause to believe they will uncover evidence of a crime.
Majority Opinion (Justices Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, Brandeis, Butler, Sanford)
Justice Taft delivered the 6/2 decision, upholding the search and seizure as constitutional. Justice
Taft wrote that Congress could create a distinction between cars and houses. For the Supreme
Court at the time, the distinction hinged on the function of a car. Vehicles can move, leaving
officers little time to obtain a search warrant.
Delivering the opinion for the majority, Justice Taft emphasized that the agents could not search
every vehicle traveling on public highways. The federal agents, he wrote, must have probable
cause to stop and search a vehicle for illegal contraband. In the case of Carroll and Kiro,
prohibition agents had reason to believe the men were involved in smuggling alcohol from
previous interactions. The agents had seen the men travel the same route to obtain alcohol in the
past and recognized their car. This gave them sufficient probable cause to search.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off in spite of warning
shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a
court order or search warrant.
Thus, petitioners filed for petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or
elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative,
to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the
protection of the people.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
FACTS: Appellant Susan Canton was charged before the Pasay City RTC with the violation of
Section 16 of Article III of RA No. 6425. February 12, 1998 at about 1:30 PM, Susan Canton was
at the NAIA. She was departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed the
metal booth a beeping sound emitted. It called the attention of Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT). She was the
frisker duty at that time, hence, she requested to frisked her. Upon frisking Susan, she felt
something bulging in her abdominal area when she inserted her hand under her skirt. She noticed
that there is a package contained and felt like rice granule. Also, when she frisked further, she felt
similar package in her genital area and thighs. Cabunoc asked to bring out the package but Susan
refused and said it is a money only.
SPO4 De Jos Reyes, supervisor on duty, upon the report of Cabunoc, he instructed to call the
Customs Examiner and bring her to a comfort room for thorough examination. The Examiner
discovered three individual packages wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape. One
found in the abdominal area, second, from in front of her genital area and the third, in her right
thigh. Upon laboratory examination of the packages, it yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu amounting NINE HUNDRED NINETY-EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT
HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS, a regulated drug.
The trial court rendered decision, Susan is guilty of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1
million. Susan filed for Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial. The motion was denied. The
specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and were therefore
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision hence
the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs,
as well as the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights?
Court does not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs,
as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights. The rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects, or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. However, there are recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence, which includes stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
In the case, the search was made pursuant to a routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, which states that every ticket issued to a
passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: Holder thereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search
for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not
be allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a part of the contract between the
passenger and the air carrier.
Wherefore, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case
No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation
of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000) and the costs is Affirmed. The appellant’s passport, plane tickets, and girdles are
ordered to be returned to her.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with robbery under the District of Columbia Code. At his trial in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, petitioner moved to suppress an
automobile registration card belonging to the robbery victim, which the Government sought to
introduce in evidence. Petitioner’s automobile had been seen leaving the site of robbery. The car
was traced and petitioner was arrested as he was entering near his home.
After a cursory search of the car, the arresting officer took petitioner to a police station. The police
decided to impound the car as evidence, and crane was called to tow it to the precinct. It reached
the precinct about an hour and a quarter after petitioner.
A regulation of the Metropolitan Police Department requires the officer who takes an impounded
vehicle in charge to search and thoroughly, to remove all valuables from it, and to attach the
vehicle a property tag listing certain information about the circumstances of the impounding.
Pursuant to this regulation, and without a warrant, the arresting officer proceeded to the lot to
which petitioner’s car had been towed, in order to search the vehicle, to place a property tag on
it, to roll it up the windows, to lock the doors. The officer entered on the driver’s side, searched
the car, and tied a property tag on steering wheel. Stepping out of the car, he rolled up an open
window on one of the back doors. Proceeding to the front door on the passenger side, the officer
opened the door in order to secure the window door. He then saw the registration card, which lay
face up on the metal stripping over which the door closes. The officer returned to the precinct,
brought petitioner to the car, and confronted petitioner with the registration card. Petitioner
disclaimed all knowledge of the card. The officer then seized the card and brought it into the
precinct. Returning to the car, he searched the trunk, rolled up the windows, and locked the doors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the officer discovered the registration card by means of an illegal search
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
RULING: No. The precise and detailed findings of the District Court, accepted by the Court of
Appeals, were to the effect that the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car,
but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances.
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim
on it, was plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced
in evidence.
For a valid “stop-and-frisk” the search and seizure must precede the arrest.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing
or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two
separate Information. According to the prosecution, the police officers received a report that the
accused was about to deliver drugs that night in Thunder Inn hotel. On the basis of such, a team
of operatives was formed. At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven
by the accused who alighted from such and was carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box. d SPO2
Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As
accused Binad Chua pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline
substance protruded from his right back pocket. Hence, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body
search which yielded 20 pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into
the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw a crystalline substance so he instantly confiscated the
items.
The accused Binad Sy Chua vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated that he
was arrested and brought to the police station after the police searched his car without his
consent. He was held inside a bathroom while the media was called. In the presence of reporters,
Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused was made to hold it while pictures were being taken.
He was convicted of Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of shabu. Hence
the appeal. Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the
police operatives was unlawful.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid stop-and-frisk.
Whether or not warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was unlawful.
RULING: No. There was no valid stop-and-frisk. For a valid "stop-and-frisk" the search and
seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Accordingly, before and during that
time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused-appellant had
just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Thus, a search and seizure
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in
the case at bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of accused-appellant. The accused
was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into his business
in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police
officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of the accused. Moreover, at
the time of his arrest, accused did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There
was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellant’s arrest.
Even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellant’s warrantless
arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk".
Moreover, on the issue whether or not warrantless arrest and search made by the
police operatives was unlawful. Yes, it is unlawful. A review of the evidence on the case at bar
the findings and conclusion of the trial court that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto. It
confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto)
and of a "stop-and-frisk." In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, in this instance, the law requires
that there first be arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the
area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any
money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime,
or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence. While "stop-and-frisk" is the same as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons."
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable
to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives
on accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit
was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why
the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant
and searching his person. Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the
information given to them by their confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time
of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
The government’s drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not
undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The
constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do.
Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds,
otherwise the good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence.
The Supreme Court REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION (sentence of reclusion
perpetua and P1,000,000.00 fine) of Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59 against
Chua. ACCUSED Binad Sy Chua IS ACQUITTED.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
FACTS: On the said date, November 25, 2005, policemen received a text message from an
unknown informant saying that a certain individual, Marvin Buya, would transport marijuana.
Checkpoints were organized, and police officers identified the alleged perpetrators, Victor Cogaed
and Santiago Dayao, based on a statement given by a jeepney driver.
Cogaed and Dayao were carrying bags, and upon questioning by the police, they claimed not to
know the contents as they were supposedly transporting the bags for someone named Marvin,
despite no outwardly suspicious behavior, the police asked Cogaed to open his bag, revealing
bricks of what appeared to be marijuana.
Cogaed was arrested, and was checked at the police station confirming the presence of a
significant amount of marijuana in their bags.
ISSUE: Whether the conducted search and seizure by the police officers were deemed
reasonable and in compliance with the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
RULING: The evidence against accused, Victor Cogaed, should be excluded due to
unconstitutional nature of the search and seizure. Adjudication rules that the search hasn’t met
the standards of a search that qualifies within the context of Constitution’s definition. The court
holds that the "stop and frisk" conducted was not based on genuine reasons, as there were no
observable suspicious circumstances to warrant such action. Therefore, the court reverses the
decisions of the lower courts. Victor Cogaed acquitted, and released, citing the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained through an illegal search.
Warrantless search: Stop and Frisk: Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search,
the arresting officer should have personally observed two or more suspicious circumstances the
totality of which would then create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the
arresting officer to investigate further.
Two (2) of these exceptions to a search warrant—a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
and "stop and frisk"—are often confused with each other. Malacat v. Court of Appeals explained
that they "differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and
in their allowable scope.
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must
have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense. In both
cases, the lawful arrest generally precedes. or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search.
In direct contrast, stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime - they are necessary for
law enforcement, though never at the expense of violating a citizen's right to privacy.
For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal knowledge of facts,
which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act. There should be a
genuine reason, as determined by the police officer, to warrant a belief that the person searched
was carrying a weapon, mere suspicion is not enough.
FACTS: Petitioner Manibog was stopped and frisked without warrant and was found carrying a
pistol in violation of the gun ban. Petitioner assails the validity of the warrantless search.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search made on Manibog was valid under the “stop and frisk”
searches.
RULING: Yes. Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was
conducted on petitioner, the facts on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest. Rather, what transpired was a stop and frisk search. The tip on petitioner, coupled
with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his
waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban.
Evidence obtained through an illegal warrantless arrest and search, as well as confessions
obtained in violation of the accused's rights, are inadmissible in court.
FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari filed by Marvin Porteria y Manebali (Marvin) against the
People of the Philippines. The case revolves around Marvin's conviction for violating Section 2(2)
of Republic Act No. 6539, also known as the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972." The decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 26, finding Marvin guilty beyond reasonable
doubt was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Wilfredo Christian P. Mien (Christian) is the
registered owner of a blue Honda motorcycle. On December 10, 2010, Christian parked his
motorcycle in front of St. John Hospital in Naga City. When he finished his shift, he discovered
that his motorcycle was missing and reported it to the police. The following day, Christian and his
brother went to the police to report the incident again. On February 1, 2011, Marvin was arrested
in possession of photocopies of the registration documents of Christian's stolen motorcycle.
Marvin informed the police that the motorcycle was in the possession of a certain Felix Maratas
in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Christian's mother later spoke to Marvin, who allegedly confessed to
stealing the motorcycle and leaving it with someone named "Insan Joy" in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
The motorcycle was eventually recovered in Sta. Rosa, Laguna on March 11, 2011.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove
Marvin's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: The court ruled in favor of Marvin and acquitted him based on reasonable doubt. The
court found that the totality of the evidence did not corroborate Marvin's extrajudicial confession.
His conviction was based on tenuous grounds, including the illegal search that led to the discovery
of the gun, the violation of his right to counsel during his admission to the police officer, and the
lack of evidence to determine the voluntariness and veracity of his oral confession to Virgie.
Therefore, the court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court, and ordered the immediate release of Marvin unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause.
The court found that Marvin's arrest was invalid as there was no evidence of any overt act
committed by Marvin that would justify his arrest. The arresting officer also did not have personal
knowledge of any offense committed by Marvin. Therefore, the court ruled that Marvin's arrest
was invalid.
The court also found that the search conducted on Marvin's body and belongings was unjustified.
The search was not based on a valid warrant, and there was no lawful arrest prior to the search.
The court emphasized that the process cannot be reversed, and a search cannot be conducted
without a valid arrest. Therefore, the items seized during the search, including the documents
allegedly found in Marvin's bag, were deemed inadmissible as evidence.
The court further ruled that Marvin's alleged admissions of guilt were not sufficient to convict him
for carnapping. The court pointed out that Marvin's rights to remain silent and to counsel were
violated during his custodial investigation. The police officers did not inform Marvin of his rights or
give him the opportunity to obtain counsel. Therefore, any confession or admission obtained in
violation of these rights is inadmissible as evidence.
FACTS: Wilfredo Christian P. Mien (Christian) is the registered owner of a blue Honda Motorcycle,
2004 model, with Engine No. KPH125ME-8005271, Chassis No KPH 12-03X-00527, and plate
No. EL5401. Christian uses his Motorcycle on Dec. 10, 2010, at about 6 am when he went to work
at St. John Hospital in Panganiban Dr. Naga City. After finishing his shift, Christian discovered
that his motorcycle was no longer in its parking spot. Unable to find his motorcycle, Christian
went to the PNP Naga city Police precinct No. 2 to report that his motorcycle was stolen. The
following day Christian and his brother, Welfredo Angelus Mien, went to the PNP Provincial
Highway Patrol Group (HPG) 5- Camarines Sur to report the incident. He filed out and alarm
Sheet and a Complaint Sheet. Afterwards, Christian was asked to submit certain documents, such
as the original copies of the Official receipt (OR) of registration and the Certificate of Registration
(CR), the police blotter, the certificate of ownership, the relevant deed of sale, if any, and the
duplicate copy of the motorcycle’s key. Christian complied with the requirements of the PNP HPG.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
On Feb.1, 2011, the Police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur supposedly received a report that
there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist.
The Report eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin along the highway of Barangay San
Francisco. Ocampo, Camarines Sur for the illegal possession of firearms. He Was, thereafter,
subjected to a search of his body and the bag allegedly found in his possession. Inside the Bag,
the arresting officer found and assortments, including photocopies of the OR and CR of Christian’s
stolen motorcycle. At the Police Station, Marvin was asked re the documents discovered in his
bag. Marvin voluntarily, informing the police that the motorcycle was in the possession of a certain
Felix in Sta. Rosa Laguna.
On March 11, 2011 at around 3pm a check point was placed at the road of Barangay Kaingin Sta.
Rosa LagunaSPO3 Cariaso spotted a blue motorcycle approached the checkpoint. Seeing hat
the driver was not wearing helmet, the police flagged downthe motorcycle, who refused to stop.
The police officers chased the motorcycle using police car and finally caught up the driver.
RULING: The CA held that the circumstantial evidence replied upon by the trial court sufficiently
supported the conviction of Marvin. It painted an unbroken series of event, which resulted in the
recovery of the motorcycle in Sta. Rosa Laguna. Furthermore, the CA anchored its finding on the
facts that during the course of Marvin’s arrest for illegal possession of firearms, the police found
the registration documents of the stolen motorcycle in his possession. Marvin alleges that the trial
court and the CA should have not have considered the supposed discovery of the stolen
motorcycle’s OR and CR in his possession.
The court grants the petition. The circumstantial pieces of the evidence of the prosecution are not
sufficient. Wherefore premises considered the present petition is granted. The Decision affirmed
the judgement dated December 5, 2014 of the RTC of naga City Branch 26 are REVERSED AND
set SETASIDE Petitioner Marvin Porteria y Manebali is AQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
FACTS: Accused was chased and arrested by the police after he had fired a gun against them.
Recovered from him was a bag containing marijuana. Convicted of illegal possession of drugs,
he argues that the marijuana could not be used against him as it was not seized by virtue of plain
view doctrine, the same being contained inside a bag.
RULING: Yes. Under Section 13, Rule 126, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or for anything which may be used in evidence without a search warrant.
Here, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate
control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the the bag or dumped it to destroy the
evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its
discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced. The doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the prior justification
– whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
– and permits the warrantless seizure.
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police
officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come
across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of
the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
FACTS: At around seven (7) o'clock in the morning of September 10, 2015 in Purok 2, Barangay
San Juan, Gingoog City, Alfredo Salucana (Salucana) went to the Gingoog City Police Station to
report a mauling incident where Acosta purportedly hit him with a piece of wood. He also reported
that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana. Thereat, Salucana positively identified Acosta who
was then walking on the trail leading towards his house. The police officers then rushed towards
Acosta and arrested him before he entered his home. SPO4 Legaspi found thirteen (13) hills of
suspected marijuana plants planted beneath the "gabi" plants just outside Acosta's home, and
around a meter away from where he was arrested. They brought Acosta and the uprooted
marijuana plants to the police station for the marking and inventory of the seized items. the plants
tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. PCpI Esber then turned over the specimens to
the Evidence Custodian.
In defense, Acosta denied the charges against him and argued that the seized marijuana plants
are inadmissible in evidence as the "plain view" doctrine is not applicable. Furthermore, he also
said that there was a violation of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 since there was no proof of the
photography of the marking and inventory of the seized marijuana plants.
In a judgment dated February 7, 2017, the RTC found Acosta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine in the amount of ₱500,000.00. The RTC held that the identity, integrity, and
evidentiary value of the illegal marijuana plants were duly preserved as the chain of custody was
proved by the prosecution. The RTC found Acosta's defense of denial unavailing, as it cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution's witnesses.14Aggrieved, Acosta appealed15 to
the CA.
In a Decision16 dated February 22, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
ISSUE: Whether or not the plain view doctrine applicable to warrant the arrest of Acosta for
violation of Republic Act No. 9165?
RULING: The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.
In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.
In this case, it is clear from Salucana's testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even
prior to the mauling incident. It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police officers of the illegal
planting and cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the mauling incident. when the
police officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact that there could
possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument that the discovery of the plants
was inadvertent.
They proceeded to Acosta's abode, not only to arrest him for the mauling incident, but also to
verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana. All told, since the marijuana
plants seized from Acosta constitute inadmissible evidence in violation of Section 3 (2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the confiscated plants are the very
Corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Acosta's conviction to be improper and
therefore, acquits him
FACTS: Appellant was charged in three separate information with illegal sale of dangerous drugs
(0.08 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), maintenance of a drug den, and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs (0.04 gram of shabu). The RTC determined that all elements of
the illegal possession of dangerous drugs crime were established. The two small transparent
plastic sachets containing shabu were discovered on the table within his residence. Despite not
being in direct physical possession, constructive possession was established as the drugs were
found in a location under his dominion or control.
In its decision, the CA upheld the appellant's conviction, asserting that the drugs seized were
admissible due to a valid warrantless search under the "plain view doctrine." The CA also
endorsed the RTC's finding of maintaining a drug den, relying on SPO2 Navarro's observation
and the house's reputation. Although Valencia's statement was hearsay, the defense did not
object, leading the CA to give it weight in establishing appellant's house as a drug den. Regarding
the charge of illegal drug possession, the CA affirmed the RTC's determination that the appellant
had complete control and dominion over the drugs discovered in his residence.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
RULING: NO, for warrantless arrests conducted under Section 5(a), Rule 113, the presence of
two elements is required:
1. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
A lawful warrantless arrest, as stipulated by Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
necessitates that the arresting officer be propelled by probable cause, indicating a reasonable
suspicion grounded in circumstances strong enough to justify a cautious belief in the accused's
guilt. The concept of probable cause entails a level of certainty that the person apprehended was
engaged in the offense for which they are charged.
However, in the present case, the appellant was not engaged in any suspicious activity when
apprehended by SPO2 Navarro. Consequently, this arrest fails to meet the criteria for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) of Rule 113, as SPO2 Navarro lacked probable cause prior
to the arrest regarding the alleged crime of maintaining a drug den. The subsequent observation
of drug-related activities inside the appellant's house by SPO2 Navarro after the arrest cannot
retroactively establish probable cause for the initial apprehension.
Notably, Mallari had the potential to substantiate the overt act indicating drug use within the
appellant's residence prior to the arrest. Unfortunately, the prosecution did not present him as a
witness, preventing the determination of facts and circumstances essential to establishing
probable cause for appellant's arrest. The Court cannot engage in speculation regarding whether
Mallari genuinely possessed the probable cause necessary to justify SPO2 Navarro's warrantless
arrest of the appellant.
The questionable and invalid nature of the arrest renders the subsequent search in the appellant's
house equally invalid, invoking the exclusionary rule or the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous
tree. According to this doctrine, if the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it becomes inadmissible.
In simpler terms, evidence seized illegally is a direct result of the illegal act, while the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" is an indirect consequence of the same unlawful act. Even though the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" is at least one step removed from the initially illegally seized evidence, it remains
equally inadmissible. This rule is grounded in the principle that evidence unlawfully acquired by
the State should not serve as a basis for obtaining other evidence, as the tainted nature of the
originally obtained evidence extends to all subsequently acquired evidence.
In this instance, the appellant, constituting the primary source, underwent an illegal arrest lacking
probable cause. Consequently, all secondary or derivative evidence stemming from the
appellant's arrest is rendered inadmissible, encompassing items seized during the search
conducted inside his residence.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
FACTS: On or about January 15, 2008, Mario Veridiano y Sapi was charged with the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna for having in his
possession, control, and custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic containing 2.72
grams of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial
on the merits then ensued.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 am of January 15, 2008 a concerned citizen called a
certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a
certain “Baho” who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain
illegal drugs.
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to two police officers who were at the time both
on duty. The Chief of Police then instructed both of these police officers to set up a checkpoint at
Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano and chanced upon him at around
10 PM inside a passenger jeepney. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible
concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.
The police officers then and there recovered from Veridiano the sachet of dried marijuana leaves.
Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police
station.
The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal
possession of marijuana. Veridiano assailed the decision asserting that “he was illegally arrested.”
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano. The Court of Appeals
contends that Veridiano was caught “in flagrante delicto.”
Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Hence, Veridiano filed for
a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petition was granted.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest
2. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search against the petitioner
RULING:
1. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest was unlawful. Under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court,
for a warrantless arrest of an in flagrante delicto to be effected, two elements must concur: 1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and 2) such overt act is done in the
presence of or within the view of the arresting officer.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest. He was not
committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any
unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information
alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be
arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be
committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
2. The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop
and frisk" searches.
A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua as "the act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Thus, the
allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons."
Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While
probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a
suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their
experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot.
Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would
give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession.
Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to
show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer
anything suspicious.
As a result, the Supreme Court ordered the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside. Subsequently, petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi was acquitted
and was ordered his immediate release from confinement unless he is being held for some other
lawful cause.
FACTS: The case is about the charges filed against Petitioners Vaporoso and Tulilik who have
allegedly committed the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The case started when
Police Officer Alexander Torculas was patrolling along National Highway, Brgy Salvacion, Panabo
City on 25 August 2013 when he noticed two (2) men aboard a motorcycle with the rider holding
a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked nearby. When PO2 Torculas
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
called out to the petitioners, the latter immediately sped away. At this point, one Narcisa Dombase,
who owned the vehicle parked nearby, approached PO2 Torculas and reported that the
petitioners broke her car window and took her personal belongings. This prompted PO2 Torculas
to chase the petitioners to a dark, secluded area in Brgy Bangoy. PO2 Torculas then requested
for back up police officers and intel operatives and they conducted a stakeout. The following day,
26 August 2013, the PO2 Torculas and a fellow police officer saw the petitioners coming out of
the secluded area. They approached the latter, but the petitioners attempted to escape. PO2
Torculas and his team successfully arrested the petitioners who w and recovered Dombase’s bag
and belongings. The police officers conducted an initial body search on the petitioners then
brought them to Panabo Police Station. At the station, the police did another thorough search on
petitioners which yielded five (5) plastic sachets containing crystalline substance from Vaporoso
and four (4) sachets of similar content from the possession of Tulilik. The items seized were
examined and tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.
The Regional Trial Court found the petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and sentenced the petitioners of indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 14 years minimum to seventeen (17) years maximum and to pay the penalty of
Php300,000.00 each. The petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling that the body search conducted on petitioners at the police station was a valid search
incidental to a lawful arrest. Petitioners sought reconsideration but was denied at this point.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on the petitioners at the Panabo Police Sation
where the dangerous drugs were seized is valid.
HELD: No. The search conducted on the petitioners at the Panabo Police Station where the
dangerous drugs were allegedly recovered from, is not valid.
Section 13 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that ”a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.”
The reason for allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his
immediate control” refers to the area from within which the arrested might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. Case law requires a strict application of this rule. That is, “to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at
the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to “dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.” Such warrantless search clearly cannot be made
in a place other than the place of arrest.
The first search made on petitioners which yielded only personal belongings of the petitioners is
considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done immediately during their arrest
and at the place of apprehension. However, on the second arrest which yielded the illegal drugs
after a considerable amount of time had already passed from the time of the arrest to the time of
the second search and the fact that the second search was done at a different venue—the police
station, instead of the place of actual arrest.
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Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also states that in
warrantless arrests, “it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed it.” The provision emphasized that it is essential that the element of personal
knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified
and as a result, the items yielded from the search will be rendered inadmissible based on the
exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. The time element, “element of Immediacy”, acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts within a very limited time
frame and prevents the contamination of the evidence.
In this case, the first search upon arrest and conducted at the place of arrest is valid. However,
the second search conducted in Panabo Police Station wherein substantial amount of time had
elapsed prior to its conduct and the place it was conducted is not the place of arrest is not valid.
Consequently, the seized illegal drugs in the second arrest constitutes inadmissible evidence.
Given also that the recovered illegal drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
petitioners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated.
Therefore, the Court granted the petition, and the Decision and Resolutions were reversed and
set aside. Vaporoso and Tulilik were acquitted of the crime charged and was immediately
released.
FACTS: On May 5, 2009, a Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint. SCAA Buco, a member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside.
He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal
firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals. He checked all the baggage and personal
effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag caught his attention. He lifted the bag
and found it too heavy for its small size. He then looked at the male passengers and noticed that
a man in a white shirt (identified as the petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the
direction of the bag.
SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that the
petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back.
SCAA Buco then requested the petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged
and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial
number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade;
and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked the petitioner to produce proof of his
authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, the petitioner was immediately
arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.
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After probable cause was found, the petitioner was charged with illegal possession of high-
powered firearms, ammunition, and explosives under PD 1866.
RTC and CA convicted the petitioner with the said charges against him.
Hence, this petition. The petitioner argued that the seized items were inadmissible on the ground
that the search conducted by the Task Force was illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the item seized was inadmissible as a product of an illegal conduct of
search?
RULING: The search was not illegal making the seized item admissible. The Court says that
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari. Thus, it is not duty-bound to weigh and sift through the evidence presented during
the trial. Further, factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, are accorded great respect for
finality.
The petition of the accused on the prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately
stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, the State can intrude into a person's expectation
of privacy, in instances which society regards as reasonable. Example of this searches are what
has been applied among various jurisprudence:
People v. Johnson- the Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the search
and seizure clause.
Dela Cruz v. People-the Court described seaport searches as reasonable searches on the ground
that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy.
In view of the application of the jurisprudence, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao
at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Davao Metro Shuttle, where the
petitioner rides, is a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy.
FACTS: On appeal is the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 affirming the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Joint Decision dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase
of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team. The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his physical description.
On May 20, 2003, appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis
bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. When appellant
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with
earlier. The team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying
shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his
pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165,
for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing
dangerous drugs.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. At the trial, appellant
denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother. He maintained that
the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the
circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the
tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his
clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation.
The RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug
because of the team’s failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental
brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent
warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it
was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
ISSUES:
1. WON the arrest is valid?
2. WON the warrantless search and seizure of the sachet of shabu is valid?
RULING:
(1) Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed
below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of
shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. We must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest.
(2) No. As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions, namely:
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office
received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not
only the appellant’s physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that
appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there
the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated
item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution,
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to
question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the
case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
FACTS: Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
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Hon. Judge Josephine M. Advento
On June 15 2004, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram
knowing the same to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
According to the prosecution, a Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for
allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the incident in the
police blotter, the police officers, together with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva and
informed him of the Complaint lodged against him. They invited him to the police station where
he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered
from the left pocket of his pants.
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when the police
officers invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been identified as
responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at the police station.
On April 6, 2009, RTC Branch 127 of Caloocan city convicted the petitioners of the offense. The
CA later reviewed the case on May 4, 2011 and has confirmed the ruling of the lower court.
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated 18 October 2011. Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview
of valid warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence,
to "invite" him to the precinct without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is,
consequently, inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether the court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Sec 11 of RA 9165
despite the illegality of the arrest?
RULING: None of the circumstances that transpired would make the warrantless arrest lawful.
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have
established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant.
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. There could not have been a seizure
in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left pocket of the accused-
appellant's pants.
Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
In this case, the petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket. The
evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant. Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of the
accused appellant cannot be sustained. Therefore, the petitioner is acquitted.
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